OF AMERICAUNITED STATES

(iongressional RecordPROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 9 I 5t

CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

VOLUME lIS-PART 18

AUGUST 13, 1969. TO SEPTEMBER 10. 1969

(PAGES 23659 TO 25124)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON. 1969

SepteJnber 10, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 25057

For example, we know that the twocarrier task forces "on station" in theMediterranean are capable of providinga maximum of 150 offensive sorties perday. But what is the military significanceof this number of sorties? Since we areflying almost 1,000 offensive sorties perday in Vietnam, it Is clear that 150 sortieswould only be of marginal value in aconflict of similar size in the Mediter­ranean. Given this fact, it is importantto determine whether the Navy's policyof continually maintaining a certainnumber of carriers on station Is worththe costs.

The reliance upon carrier rather thanland-based airpower Is made even morequestionable by the high degree of vul­nerability of the carrier in light of mod­ern weaponry. Carriers are vulnerable toattacks by submarines, aircraft, ship-to­ship and air-to-ship missiles.

Submarines pose a particularly omi­nous threat to carriers. Because of thevery rudimentary nature of antisubma­rine warfare, there is very little a carriercan do to defend itself adequately fromsubmarine attacks. The Navy has ac­knowledged in congressional testimonythat one of the primary missions of thelarge Soviet submarine fleet is anticar­riel' warfare.

Rapid technological innovations inmissile development have made the car­rier unusable in all but the most lim­ited conflicts. The lethal nature of eventhe older missiles, such as the SovietSTYX, was recently demonstrated whenan Egyptian PT boast sunk an Israelidestroyer with a single STYX. Both theSoviet and the American arsenals con­tain far more advanced antiship missiles,with greater range and higher speed.

Once again, the basic material is classi­fied, and probably wisely so; but it isfair to say that modern missilery raisesprofound doubts concerning the vulner­ability of the modern attack carrier.

Unique to the Soviet inventory. ac­cording to the Chief of Naval Operations,is the guided cruise missile. The Navyestimates that 16 percent of the Sovietfleet carry 400 nautical mile cruise mis­siles designed primarily for use againstland or sea targets.

In his testimony before the SenateArmed Forces Committee, Secretary ofthe Navy John H. Chaffee spoke of "thewide scope and gravity" of the missilethreat to our surface fleet:

In an effort to counter the surface forces,the Soviet Union Is developing the capabil­ities of the terminal-homing cruise mis­sHe which may be launclllld from aircraft,surface units, surfaced SUbmarines, or landsites, at short or long ranges ... our capa­bility to defend against a cruise missile at­tack continues to concern us, but we aremoving forward with programs directed to­ward significant long-term improvements.

I would like to ask that special empha­sis be placed upon the Secretary's ownadmission in this field when we hear thearguments, as I am sure we will. that thecarrier is invulnerable.

It is not that the carrier is completelydefenseless against these threats. Rather,the ever-present fear of enemy attackcauses the carrier task force to concen­trate its resources on defense. therebysubstantially reducing its offensive capa-

bility. This idea was best expressed in a1966 dissertation on attack carriers byDesmond Wilson, now at the Center forNaval Analysis. In Dr. Wilson's words:

Most of the carriers' usefulness whenfunctioning in support of a land campaignduring a limited war appears to be significantonly under conditions of little or no sub­marine opposition. It Is a matter of somedoubt that the carrier force could continueproviding combat sorties in support of aland campaign If the task force commanderhad to worry about air or submarine attacks.

As Wilson observed, effectiveness ofthe carrier task forces in limited war isclosely related to the problem of vulner­ability, which, in turn, is conditioned bythe rules or limits by which the war willbe fought. Threats of escalation, such asthe introduction of submarines or air­craft, can diminish carrier effectiveness:By forcing carriers to stay far at sea,thus diminishing the fuel available to theaircraft for combat purposes, and, by re­quiring continual movement of the car­riers from area to area, thereby prevent­ing it from staying in one locale to pro­vide continual air support.

Mr. President, I understand the timehas now come to recess for the funeralservices. I ask unanimous consent that Ibe permitted to resume my speech at thecommencement of the session this after­noon.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, re­serving the right to object-and I shallnot object-I wonder if the Senatorwould ask that the Senator from Missis­sippi have unanimous consent to followhim for 20 minutes.

Mr. MONDALE. We had left that onan informal basis. I propose to do so. Iwanted to see what would happen withthe colloquy, but I propose to do so atthe appropriate time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, the Senator from Minnesotawill resume the floor at the conclusion ofthe recess.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi­dent, there will be a recess at 11: 45 a.m.,at which time Senators will assemble togo to the rotunda, to be present when thebody of the late and beloved minorityleader, Everett McKinley Dirksen, willbe removed. Senators who wish to at­tend the church services at 1 o'clock willassemble on the Senate steps at 12:15.

I shall now put in a quorum call, withthe expectation of ca.lling off the quorumcall at 11: 45, at which time the Senatewill recess.

Mr. President, I suggest the absenceof a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerkwill call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk pro­ceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, Iask unanimous consent that the orderfor the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

RECESSMr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask

unanimous consent that the Senate standin recess subject to the call of the Chair.For the information of the Senate, we

will very likely be back in session some­where between 2 and 2: 15 this afternoon.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is thereobjection? The Chair hears none, and itis so ordered.

Thereupon (at 11 o'clock and 52 min­utes a.m.) the Senate took a recess sub­ject to the call of the Chair.

The Senate reassembled at 2 o'clockand 13 minutes p.m., when called toorder by the Presiding Officer (Mr.GRAVEL in the chair).

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi­dent, I ask unanimous consent that therebe a brief quorum call without interfer­ing with the rights of the able Senatorfrom Minnesota (Mr. MONDALE) underthe order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

The clerk will call the roll.The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I ask

unanimous consent that the order forthe quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSEA message from the House of Repre­

sentatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of itsreading clerks, announced that theHouse had passed the following bill andjoint resolution, in which it requestedthe concurrence of the Senate:

H.R. 471. An act to amend section 4 ofthe act of May 31, 1933 (48 stat. 108); and

H.J. Res. 247. A joint resolution relatingto the administration or the national parksystem.

HOUSE BILL AND JOINTRESOLUTION REFERRED

The following bill and joint resolutionwere each read twice by their titles andreferred to the Committee on Interiorand Insular Affairs:

H.R. 471. An act to amend section 4 of theact of May 31,1933 (48 Stat. 108); and

H.J. Res. 247. A joint resolution relating tothe administration of the national park sys­tem.

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA­TIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT,RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT,AND FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OFMISSll,E TEST FACll,ITIES ATKWAJALEIN MISSll,E RANGE,AND RESERVE COMPONENTSTRENGTHThe Senate resumed the consideration

of the bill (S. 2546) to authorize appro­priations during the fiscal year 1970 forprocurement of aircraft. missiles, navalvessels, and tracked combat vehicles, andto authorize the construction of test fa­cilities at Kwajalein Missile Range, andto prescribe the authorized personnelstrength of the Selected Reserve of eachReserve component of the Armed Forces,and for other purposes.

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President.will the Senator from Minnesota yieldto me v:ithout losing his right to thefloor?

Mr. MONDALE. I am pleased to yieldto the distinguished Senator from Ohio.

25058

•

CONGRESSIONAL RECORDL:.. SENATE September 10, 1969

Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, Istrongly support the pending amendmentoffered· by· the distinguished Senatorsfrom New Jersey and Minnesota. I favorthat we do withhold the expenditure ofthe $377 million authorized in the mili­tary authorization bill for a proposedadditional nuclear aircraft carrier untilthe Congress has completed a compre­hensive studY and investigation of theneed for building an additional attackcarrier.

In my opinion, Mr. President, this pro­posed huge carrier is just as obsolete nowand will be more obsolete in future yearsas much as was the ba.ttleship some timeback. But, of course, the big brass in theNavy did not appreciate that and did notbelieve it. They were proved wrong.

Over the years, it has become clearthat our military and naval leaders areamong the last to accept changes in thenature of warfare in this space age ofchange and challenge. For example, wecontinued to add battleships to the fleetlong after it was obvious to all intelligentpersons in the United States that theywere ineffective and uneconomica~in theage of the nuclear submarine. The factis that the aircraft carrier is no longerpart of our strategic nuclear forces. OurICBM's, Polaris and Poseidon sub­marines, and land-based SAC bombersform our real deterrent force.

The best defense of the United Statesat this time is the power of our Polarissubmarines capable of roaming beneaththe surface of the seven seas for as longas 300 days and nights, capable of firingnuclear warheads and striking targets inan enemy country at a distance of 2,875miles.

The primary mission of aircraft car­riers today is to provide tactical airpower. We now have 15 attack carriers.each requiring a task force of escort andsupply ships. It is estimated that onenuclear carrier task force, consisting ofa carrier and four destroyers. costs tax­payers more than $1.4 billion. Also, as thedistinguished junior Senator from Min­nesota (Mr. MONDALE) , who has made ex­tensive research and devoted a great dealof time to the subject, has pointed out,to keep one such task force on station innormal times involves maintaining twocomplete task forces in reserve. There­fore. the real cost of placing one carriertask force on station is approximatelY$4.2 billion. This is luxury that oureconomy and taxpayers can no longerafford. It would be an unjustified extrav­agance.

Neither the Soviet Union nol' Commu­nist China is building a single attack air­craft carrier. There are no indicationsthat either plan to do so. It is a fact thatthe Soviet Union is rapidly building UPits naval strength, but it is doing so inkeeping with the realities of the nuclearage. The main emphasis is placed on nu­clear submarines and other smaller moremaneuverablevessels by the astute lead­ers of the Soviet Union. Great Britainand· France are,the only other nationswith attack ca.rriers in their fleets. TheBritish have announced their· decision tophase out their carriers.

At a time when lheUriitect.States

maintains approximately 138 squadronsof tactical fighters and bombers on landbases at home and abroad, it is uncon­scionable and wasteful to maintain atthe same time 15 aircraft carrier taskforces. An average airbase in the Pacificarea costs $53 million. It accomplishesthe same purpose as a carrier task forcecosting $4.2 billion. Furthermore, withmodem midair refueling techniques, ourtactical air power can be operational ina very short period of time regardless ofwhere it may be needed.

The large, modern carriers are effec­tive only in very limited conflicts andsituations. They are extremely vulner­able to destruction by submarines, air­craft, ship-to-ship missiles and air­launched missiles. Almost one-half ofthe cost of a carrier task force is fordefensive purposes.

It is high time that our admirals rec­ognize and accept the realities of presentand future defense needs. They seem toignore the availability and the compara­ble effectiveness of land-based aircraft.Not only is there no need whatever foradditional carriers, but there is no reasonwhy the Navy cannot reduce the presentnumber of the fleet.

Mr. President, the $377.1 million re­quested for the proposed CVAN-69 nu­clear aircraft carrier is merely the down­payment for what will eventually be anexpenditure of $4.2 billion of taxpayers'money. I am hopeful that the Senate willagree to the pending amendment, au­thored by the Senator from Minnesota,who just yielded to me, to prevent thatexpenditure until the Congress has hadthe opportunity to complete its study andinvestigation of past and projected costsand the effectiveness of attack aircraftcarriers and their task forces.

Mr. MONDALE. I thank the Senatorfrom Ohio for his excellent statementand, if I may say so, for his leadership,much earlier. in this field. He was one ofthe first in the Senate, some time back,to raise the question whether, in thelight of modem realities, it was wise tocontinue at our present attack aircraftcarrier levels 'or whether that policyshould be reviewed.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, will theSenator yield?

Mr. MONDALE. I will be glad to yieldin a little while.

The Senator from Ohio underscoresthe importance of having sYstems thatare modern and relevant, not to WorldWar II or to World War I, but, tragically,to the next war which we 'will have tofight if it is necessary to do so,

Referring to what one military his­torian said. military history is stUddedwith institutions which have managed tododge the challenge of the obvious; andone of the reasons why they have beenable to do so in this country is that wein Congress have not done our job aswell as we should. The job Congress is re­quired to do under the Constitution isto raise and maintain. the Army and theNavy. It is our responsibility under theConstitution. I am hopeful that in thisamendment, and in other ways, we canbegin to assert our traditional, and al­most sacred, responsibility in this field.

I thank the Senator from Ohio for hiS

contribution, not· only today but in thepast.

I now yield to the Senator from Alaska.Mr. STEVENS. In my study of this

problem. it is my understanding that thecarrier to be authorized by the bill beforeus, which the Senator's amendment seeksto delete, will be capable of handling theF-14. but that the Essex-type carrier­which this newly authorized carrier willreplace-not only v.ill not handle theF-14, but also not serve the F-4, or theRA-5C, the A-6, or the F-14. There arefour of the carrier-based planes thatcannot be landed upon this obsolete typeof aircraft carrier. It was valid in WorldWar II but is no longer capable of dealingwith these new aircraft.

If the Senator's amendment isadopted. what are we going to do withthe F-14?

Mr. MONDALE. I thank the Senatorfrom Alaska for his question. The truthof it is that at least 10. and possibly 13,of the 15 carriers can handle the cur­rent aircraft which the Navy has, andcould handle the F-14 when completed,if it is authorized.

If the Senator would review the re­marks by the Chief of Naval Operationsin which he recounted to us the warsand near wars in which we have beeninvolved since 1946, he would find thatat least half of those wars were against"major" powers like Zanzibar.

It seems to me when we look at thequestion of the carrier force, we mustlook at it not only in terms of numbersbut of the mix. To send a $1.8 billion nu­clear-powered force to show our flag offHaiti, for example, seems to me thegreatest waste of money. So we mightwisely ask what kind of attack forcewe need.

What we are asking is not to strikethe authorization for the carrier, butto ask. what kind of carrier force levelwe need, what kinds we need, and whatthe purpose will be.

The same questions we are asking to­day are the questions that were asked inthe executive branch and in the NationalSecurity Council. That is all we are do­ing. We are not asking to pass on themerits. We are asking questions whichshould have been asked a long time agoas to where we can save money and a voidwaste where it exists. That is the salepurpose of the amendment.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, will theSenator yield further?

Mr. MONDALE. I am glad to yield,Mr. STEVENS. I did review a state­

ment made by Admiral Moorer, Chief ofNaval Operations, the one which wasmade to the Veterans of Foreign Warslast month. He pointed out that the So­viet Union had quadrupled its merchantmarine tonnage since 1950, and, evenfurther, in the warship area, that 60 j:er­cent of the warships on which we busedour advance strategy had passed the20-year mark, whereas, of the SovietUnion's 1,000 or more navy or surfaceships that they relied on, less than one­fourth had passed the 20-year mark.

My question to the Senator from Min­nesota is that it was my understandingthat this matter had been studied-it wasstUdied in 1968, before I got here, and it

September 10, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 25059

\vas studied particularly by SecretaryMcNamara'who requested this buildingprogram~are we annua.lly to get to thepoint where we ask for a delay? Havmg'had areview by the executive branch andby the Congress, are we n'ow to come' upthe next year and say, "Let us delay itfor a year so we can study it again ?'iWhat new matters have entered into thematter which the executive branch andthe Congress studied that require the re­view that he suggests at this time?

Mr. MONDALE. I am glad the Senator'has raised the question for, asa matterof fact, after writing the Navy Depart­ment, there came a letter which says itis studying the issue of national securityand is making a sweeping revIew of thetraditional "arms,of the Navy and theNavy aircraft carrier and Navy aircraftcarrier levels.

But even the Navy and the Departmentof Defense havesaid in writing that thismatter should be, and it is being, studied.As a matter of fact, I know that it is;and it may be that as we meet here today.these recommendations are' befrig sUb-:­mitted to the National Security Council.

Furthermore, I am glad that the Sena'"tor from Alaska brought up the formerSecretary of Defense. because "in 1964he testified' that he wanted a reducedlevel of aircraft· carriers for the early1970's. So the recommendation of thepast Secretary of Defense, as well as therecommendatJonswhich are classified bythe present systems analysis group thisyear, have called for reductions in theaircraft carrier level, and there has beena good deal of speculation. albeit notconfirmed, that this administration isplanning to cut two or three aircraftcarriers from Its force.

80 there is plenty of inside,official con­sideration being given to that, and itwould seem very strange that in themidst of all this, the one agency thatthe Constitution charges with establlsh­lng and maintaining the Army and Navywould sit back and simply continue toappropriate billions of dollars for a sys­tem that is under stUdy. I think we canafford to take a few months and makecertain we are acting wisely.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, will theSenator yield for one last question?

Mr. MONDALE. I yield.Mr. STEVENS; My last question is

this: In my study. I have found that wehave already obligated, in 1968 and 1969,after the time that the previous reviewtook place, some $132.9 .mUlion·for thiscarrier. I am informed that if a disrup­tion of. the production schedule comesabout by virtue of this amendment, itwill probably cost us in the neighbor;'hood of $100 million to delay thiscarrier.

If that is correct, the total cost of thesenator's amendment would be approxi­mately $232 million, as opposed to thetotal cost of a catTier under the pro­gram that was previously authorized,with the idea that the newcarrler andthe F~14 would come on the line at thesame time. '. .

Is tills really wise USe of our ,Treasury,the taxpayers' money. if we make a'de~

cision in COngress to go ahead With th~construction of a new carrier, and'spend'

the money,. order. the vessel, and then, ayear later, come along with an amend­ment to delete this new carrier?

,.1 understand we have an amendmentpending to dele~ the F':"14 also. But howcan the Senator Justify the spending of$132 million; if my information is cor­rect, that' has already gone by the board,and. the $100 million additional that willbe brought about by the disruption ofthe production schedule? In view of thetbtalcost of the carrier itself, why notgo ahead with the carrier?

Mr. MONDALE. In the revised amend­ment .whlch I called up Yesterday, andwilleh is the pending business, we madeone alteration to correct a technicalerror in the original amendment, to makeIt clear that' this amendment appliesonly to moneys authorized to be appro­priated under this act, not the earlier$130 million to which the Senator's argu­ment makes reference.

Based on the earUer amendment, theSenator is correct; based on the amend­ment as reVised, it is no longer relevant.

Of course; the big issue to'<fay Is notwhether a few million dollars will be lost,as we determine whether we are pursu­ing the Wisest course and the wisest forcelevels. I regret any losses; but what weare talking about here is anuclear attackcarrier which, with its nuclear escortsand wingS, will cost at least $1.8 billion,and could.well be $2 bilUon, and a policywhich involves 40 percent of the budgetof the Navy. Certainly, a few days spentwisely determining these matters couldsave billions of dollars. If I may say so,it is a standard tactic of the DefenseDepartment to buy long lead items, andthen come in and say:

It Is too, late to decide the polley mattersunderlying this system, because we have al­ready spent a few million dollars; let's notget Into It,

Mr. STEVENS. But as I understandthe justification of this program, this isjust replacing an existing carrier; It willnot add to the carrierfieet.

Mr. MONDALK The present policy ofthe Navy, as I understand it, is to retireone of the old World War II type car­riers for everyone of these massive newnuclear carriers. But that is not holdingto the same military capacity; it is dou­bling it, because one of these old WorldWar. II type carriers had, at best, halfthe capacity of the new nuclear attackcarriers. We are not pursuing a neutral,hold-the-line polley. Our present polleyis to commit an ever-increasing share ofthe Navy's contribution to this Nation'sdefense on ar:. ever-growing fleet of air­craft carriers.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will theSenator yield for a question?

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I yieldfor one question; then I wish t-o returnto my speech.

Mr. MURPHY. Does the Senator un­derstand they are going to retire onecarrier as they build one new carrier?

Mr. MONDALE. That is my under­standing., Mr. MURPHY. Then the Senator's im-.plication is that they will have increased,actually, the carrier force?

Mr, ; MONDALE. No, my Implica­tion-'--,

Mr. MURPHY. My understanding isthat there are several carriers presentlybeing used that are so old they shouldhave been retired some time ago. As amatter of fact; last Saturday morning Isaw two carriers in Long Beach, Calif.,that are to be retired; and it is my un­derstanding that the nuclear carrier, bythe time it is constructed, fitted, andfurnished, will just barely, if actually,maintain the present strength. That wasthe purpose of my question.

I thank my distingUished colleague.Several Senators addressed the Chair.Mr. lVIONDALE. Mr. President, I should

like to respond to the question of theSenator from California, and I am will­ing to respond to one or two more ques­tions, but I am only half-waY throughmy speech, and would like to completeit, if I may.

In my later remarks, I intend to getinto this matter. I asked the Navy if therewere some shorthand way that one couldrefer to the capacity of these aircraftcarriers, and it turns out that they havedeveloped what they call an A-4 equiva­lent, which measures roughly the ca­pacity of each of these carriers.

They rate the old Hancock class car­rier, which is one of those scheduled forreplacement by the new nuclear carrier,at 83, and the Nimitz-class nuclear car­riers, willch are at issue here, at 152­not quite two to one in terms of capacity,but nearly so.

I am happy now to yield first to theSenator from Virginia, and then to theSenator from Mississippi.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President,I mention this point just for purposes ofclarification.

In the Senator's colloquy with theSenator from Alaska. he very accuratelybrought out that in 1964, Secretary of De­fense McNamara recommended a reduc­tion In the number of carriers.

Mr. MONDALE. That is correct.Mr. BYRD of Virginia. But I think,

so that the record may be complete andaccurate, it should show that subequentto that. in 1968, I believe it was, or 1967,Secretary McNamara strongly recom­mended the building of three new nuclearcarriers.

Mr. MONDALE. Yes; and the twostatements may be consistent.

In other :words, while I do not have histestimony before me, he may have con­templated that each of the new nuclearattack carriers, which are being· built inthe State of the Senator from Virginia,may in fact replace not one but two ofthe older carriers, so that, while we areattaining the new'nuclear attack carriersthe total carrier attack force level, interms of numbers of carriers, would bereduced.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. The Senatoris correct. I interrupted him at this pointonly so that the record could show thatthe Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara,recommended that the carrier now underdiscussion be built. .

Mr. MONDALE. The Senator is correct.Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the

Senator yield to me briefly?, 'Mr~ MONDALE. I ~'ield to the senator

from Mississippi.Mr. STENNIS.. I.· understand that the

25060 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 10, 1969Senat{)r has not finished his speech, andI certainly do not wish to detain him onthat. As the Senator knows, I have inmind asking for about 20 m1nutes, atleast, when he has finished; but I want torespond, if I may. quite briefly about thiscarrier-force level, and simply say this:that of the 16 carriers in operation now,nwnber 16 is extra because of the war;and it is to come out, as the Senatorknows, as soon as possible, and not countas the carrier reduction that this willcover.

The Navy has the very deflnite posi­tion that they will take out of operationcarrier No. 15. I will call it.

I have conferred with Admiral Moorer,who is, I think, one of the ablest andfrankest men in the military. I am onewho will not disbelieve what militarymen tell me and not believe it just be­cause they wear uniforms. They are intrustworthy positions. Until I know to thecontrary, I would trust them on thesedirect, major questions.

Who knows what our conditions will bewhen the carrier provided for in thepending bill is completed? If anyoneknows that, then he can give an accurateestimate about what we will do about thecan1ers and how many we will take out.

I have pressed for an answer on this.It is going to be reviewed and ought to bereviewed by the President, the Secretaryof Defense, the Chief of Naval Opera­tions, and everyone else. including Con­gress, in a position of responsibility as tohow many will continue to be operated.

I think there is a very fine chance thatby the time this carrier is completed, anadditional one, carrier No. 14, will comeout of the fleet. I hope so. I hope thateven more of them will come out of thefleet. However, I think there is a highprobability, with the added capacity thatthe Senator has already mentioned, thatit will be entirely possible to take an ad­ditional carrier out of the fleet.

I do not think we can argue with anysuccess at all now as to definitely howmany carriers we will need in 1972 or1973.

As we remember, we built airbases inFrance. We helped to proviC'.e hundredsof millions of dollars to build and con­struct those airbases. Now, we cannotuse those bases or even fly across Francewithout a day-to-day permit, as I under­stand it. That is the kind of world inwhich we are living.

I had the expe11ence of being inFrench Morocco. We were there lookingvery closely at the bases. A bystandertold me, "You will never use these basesfor more than a short time."

I said, "Why?"He said, "French Morocco will get its

independence and run you out of here."That is exactly what happened 2¥2

years later. That is the kind of world inwhich we live.

r think the senator from Minnesotahas a very fine statement here. However,the matter concerning the number weneed rests with the gods.

r thank the Senator for yielding.Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I thank

the Senator from Mississippi. I was quiteencouraged by the statement he madethe other day in which he expressed thehope, and repeated it this afternoon, that

when the next nuclear carrier is com­pleted, we might displace not only onebut, he hoped, more than one. I was en­couraged by that statement because Ithink that may well be one of the possibleresults of this amendment.

One of the problems I have had inseeking to deal responsibly with theamendment is the remarkable degree ofdifi'erence that exists between the Navyand the Air Force when each one of themdescribes the effectiveness of its own tac­tical airpower and its own bases andequipment.

The Senator from Mississippi quitecorrectly states that he does not dis­believe a person because he is in theNavy or wears a unifolTil I agree withthat statement. However,'fn this case wehave a letter which I had printed in theRECORD earlier today in Which the AirForce said in response to a question fromthe Senator from Oregon (Mr. HATFIELD)that we have enough land bases in allof Europe and Southeast Asia to meetall of the tactical air needs of any con­tingency which the Joint Chiefs haveconsidered.

We are all aware that one of the chiefuses of the aircraft in Vietnam has beenthe bombing of North Vietnam whichwe have since stopped.

Certainly the fact that aircraft wereonce used for functions which are nolonger required ought to be some justifi­cation for lowering the task force levelin that area.

The fact is. the National SecurityCouncil of the Defense Department rightnow, as the Senator from Mississippiknows, is undertaking, and may havecompleted, a sweeping review of the gen­eral purpose of the force level.

I am not content-and I am sure theSenator from Mississippi would agreewith me-to let the matter of the de­fense spending level of this country orthe wisdom of every expenditure rest inthe exclusive domain of the executivebranch. I have been around long enoughto believe that it would be an unwisepolicy.

Mr. STENNIS. I will develop my ideaand my argument about the level of thecarriers on my own time. However, I dowant to point out that I have never beenand never will be a party to the argu­ment between the Air Force and theNaval air arm as to how much the otherone needs. I will never be a party to that.I have never had any patience with it.I do not now.

We need both of them in a supple­mental way. And we need them verybadly.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I askunanimous consent that, at the conclu­sion of my remarks, the Senator fromMississippi (Mr. STENNIS) be recognizedfor 20 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, willthe Senator yield?

Mr. MONDALE. I yield.Mr. SYMINGTON. It was not possible

for me to be present at the beginning ofthe address being made by the distin­guished Senator from Minnesota.

I was back in my State last night andpart of this morning and was impressed

by the fact a great many of the pro­grams considered essential in our cities,our suburbs, and the rural districts ofour country are drying up because of lackof funds.

It has been my lot to be associated atleast indirectly with the defenses of theUnited States for some 50 years, anddirectly in this town for over a quarterof a century.

I have watched weapons systems comeand go. The RECORD will show that as aSenator Sot no time have I criticized theuse, development, or number of aircraftcarriers. But I have seen the death ofthe battleship. That all started when thePrince of Wales and the Repulse weresunk by some old Japanese planes off thecoast of Malaysia; and continued whenthe Bismarck, after sinking the greatestbattleship ever built, up to that time,was destroyed by a few old Fairey planesoff an old British carrier, the Wasp.

It happer.ed I was flying militarilyfrom England to Portugal at that time­the spring of 1941-and ran into thatparticular fight, which thereupon alsoended the concept of the large battlecruiser.

There was a time when many of uswere convinced that the new strategicbomber, the B-70, was needed for thesecurity of the United States. It is a mat­ter of record that the B-70 was volun­tarily abandoned by the Air Force, whenthe latter changed from the B-70 to theRS-70. At that time I left the boat, pri­marily because of the great developmentof ground-to-air missiles by the possibleenemy.

For years efforts have been made toascertain the true cost of a carrier taskforce; and also it is true now that we havethis tremendous development in missiles,a development which is increasing inmomentum rather than decreasing; itis vital that this system be examined.

Now the Senator says in his talk thatthe mission of the carrier, because of thedevelopment of these missiles in effecthas been changed from a strategic mis­sion to a tactical mission. That is worthyof most serious consideration.

For the first time since World War IIwe are really discussing, in detail, aweapons system that never before wasdiscussed in detail. I am not saying thatwe should adopt or reject this amend­ment, but I am saying that it is not onlythe right, it is also the duty of the Senateto consider this system as it considers allother weapons systems and problems ofdefense procurement that come beforethe Senate. There should be nothing in­violate, nothing sacred, about anyweapons system; because, in the end itis the taxpayer of the United States ~hois going to pay for it.

I respectfully commend the distin­guished Senator from Minnesota and thedistinguished Senator from New Jerseyfor bringing this matter up in such detailbefore the Senate.

There have been sharp and basic de­velopments in warfare in recent years,and without question the greatest de­velopment has been in the missile field.Missiles are air to sea, sea to sea, andground to sea, just as they are ground

September 10, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 25061to air and sea to air, and ground togr01U1d.

The Mediterranean situation is one ofparticular interest to me. because myForeign Relations Subcommittee has todo with that part of the world. A greatmany people have expressed new interestin. and concern about, the future ofnaval warfare because of the recent de­velopment of the Styx missile by theSoviet Union and the catastrophic resultwhen it was used in an attack by theUnited Arab·· Republic· in the Mediter­ranean.

I did not intend to make extended re­marks on this subject, and look for­ward to listening to the able Senatorfrom Minnesota. I do know, as doeseveryone in this Chamber, that thiscountry must stay strong if iUs to stayfree. But it is our duty-an(\' 1 believethe Senator from Minnesota is quite ac­curate when he· says it is our duty-todiscuss all weapons systems in detail. Atother times I have opposed valious sys­tems in the other two branches of theservices. but to the best of my knowledge,this is the first time I have ever givenconsideration to reducing a Navy sys­tem. Now we should examine in detailwhether or not the addition of aircraftcarriers is the right type and charac­ter of action in this missile age.

Somehow, in some way. we must cutthe increasingly high cost of defense.If we do not, we will destroy the valueof the dollar, and all that connotes alsofrom the standpoint of the real futuresecurity of the United States.

It would be unfortunate if this discus­sion deteriorated at any time into a dis­agreement between one service andanother-specifically, between the AirForce and the Navy. I would hope thatdoes not develop. The Air Force mayhave too many bases abroad. So may theNavy, in this nuclear space missile, havetoo many bases in the form of carriers.Many bases were created and supportedwhen the strategic bomber, Navy andAir Force, was dominant as the strong­est strategic defense weapon· of theUnited States. That is no longer thecase. The Polaris is the greatest stra­tegic weapon today.

All of us should worry about the factthat the strength of the Soviet Unionin submarines is far greater than any­thing the Kaiser or Hitler ever had orthe United States has today. We stickwith the carriers while they now build anattack submarine force which is hun­dreds larger than ours. As they looktoward modernity in weapons, however,they have not yet laid down a singlecarrier.

In any case the point I w~t to makeis that it does not make anY differencewhether the tactical airpower of the AirForce is more important or more valu­able 0tmore desirable than the tacticalairpower of the Navy, or whether thetactical ail'POwer of the Navy is moredesirable or more important than thetactical aiI"power of the Air Force. Whatis important is what is necessary for thesecurity of the country. I would hope thatmany of these. bases in these farawaylands, created to handle a type and char­acter of warfare which will never occur

again, are dismantled, so they will nolonger be an additional burden on theAmerican taxpayer.

I would hope we would look at all thisnot as rivalry between the services,rather as a possible way, manner methodby which we can reduce the costs of De­fense.

Mr. MONDALE. I thank the distin­guished Senator from Missouri. I shallrespond shortly but I had promised thatI would yield to the Senator from NewJersey. I now yield to the Senator fromNew Jersey.

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I thank thedistinguished Senator.l have not pre­viously joined in the discussion. I wishto say first how much I value this collab­oration. It has been not only a satisfac­tion but also a very great pleasure to thispoint. My association with the Senatorfrom Minnesota has increased my highregard for his ability. My participation inthe discussions on these several amend­ments has also increased my regard forthe Senator from Mississippi and thesplendid way in which he has accom­modated himself to what has been inmany ways a very trying experience.

After working for months on this leg­islation in his committee he has had todeal with what I know has been a verytrying series of amendments. To someonewho has been over this ground manytimes 9Jready, perhaps it seems an un­necessary expenditure of time and en­ergy on his part. However, for the goodspirit he has shown in pelmitting us tocontinue what we think is our duty to­day I am most grateful. That was thereason I asked to be recognized.

I want the Senator from Missouri torecognize what we are attempting to doin this amendment, as in other amend­ments which have been and which willbe offered to the bill. It is very helpfuland encouraging that he has so fullyaccepted and so well stated what wethink is the primary issue here: ShallCongress remain in control and, as someof us think, regain control of the basicdecisions affecting national policy in thefield of weaponry and large strategicmatters?

It is our conviction, and my own verydefinitely, that we have not done ourshare of this in the past, we have notbeen organized to do it, and we have notregarded it as a function which we oughtto perform. I can see no argumentagainst our asking the Congress to dothat job now.

I think that the matter of the canierand several of these other strategic weap­ons systems are appropriate vehicles bywhich we can ask Congress to bring it­self to this task. That is the purpose. Weare not for or against this earlier, quacarrier, nor do we have any firm view asto the number of carriers, if any carriersthere are to be in the armed services ofthe United states now and for the next30 years. We do think Congress shouldtake this opportunity to study that ques­tion, and that is the purport and purposeof our amendment.

I am grateful that someone so experi­enced in the operations of high policy inthe defense of the United States shouldapprove our effort and think it good.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. Preiident, I amglad to yield to the Senator from Cali­fornia.

Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senatorfor yielding. My purpose in rising is toaddress a question to the Senator fromMissouri.

I wish to say first that the views ofthe senior Senator from Missouli carryextraordinary weight with me on militarymatters because of his utterly uniquebackground in this field, and because ofhis careful attention to the broadeststrategic implications of these mattersand the narrowest details in relation totactics, costs, and so forth. His speechthe other day on the C-5A had more todo with my opposing that amendmentthan any other single factor.

Having said that, I would like to askthe Senator if the remote presence con­cept has any relevance to the carriers?Does the existence of a substantial num­ber of carriers specifically relate to thisamendment? Is there any reason to be­lieve that by supporting the carrier pres­ently under consideration we might havea greater opportunity to cut back ontroops stationed abroad?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I sayto my able and distinguished friend, theSenator from California, that I deeplyappreciate his kind but undeserved re­marks.

His question gets into tactics.The Mediterranean Sea today is a nar­

row lake from the standpoint of mOdelTIweaponry; in fact, for a time, after theEgyptians sank the Israel destroyerElath, it was believed the missiles musthave come from the land. The fact therewas disagreement as to whether it camefrom sea or from the land is in itself in­teresting from the standpoint of thequestion posed by the able Senator fromCalifornia. Some parts of the Mediter­ranean are but 7Y2 miles wide; thereforeof course ships could be attacked fromthe land by missiles as well as fromthe sea and from the air.

We know how dangerous the Sam mis­siles were to our planes in the Vietnamtheater. For example, unless by mistake,no B-52 ever went over North Vietnam.But that Sam-2 missile is obsolescentcompared with modem air-to-groundmissiles developed by the Soviet Unionand passed out to their friends and allies.

A ground-to-air missile works againstgravity but an air-to-air or air-to-groundmissile has gravity working in its favor.

Today both the United States and theSoviet Union have underway missiles farmore sophisticated than those SovietStyx missiles which sank the Elath.

In reviewing the speech of the dis­tinguished Senator from Minnesota (Mr.MONDALE) , I noticed the large proportionof our carrier task fleets that he saysare assigned to the Mediterranean. Atone time I worked for the late, greatSecretary of Defense James Forrestal. He"felt that the first person responsible forputting one enemy of the United Statesin the Mediterranean could be respOn­sible for the first nail placed in the coffinof our security. Today the forces of possi­ble enemies are spread all over the Medi­terranean.

It is interesting to notice just how few

250(}2 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -,-;SENATE September 10, 1969

Mediterranean· ports are now availableto OUr fleet.

Perhaps the most dramatic develop­ment in the Mediterranean in recentmonths and years has been the growthof the Soviet fleet in that sea.

But even as of today they have notbuilt a single carrier. They have a heli­copter pad called the Moskua, but that isnot a carrier. They also have a lot ofsubmarines and cruisers and destroy­ers. If it is true, as the talk of the Senatorfrom Minnesota brings out, that count­ing the backup, the money we have in­vested in the Mediterranean in carriersruns into many billions of dollars, asthe development of the art of missilerycontinues, that would appear of thegreatest importance in this discussion.

Is by chance this inland sea a trapto old concepts of weaponry in this mis­sile age? If it is, should we not changeour concept; or should we continue tohandle it today as we did 25 years ago?

All countries that once built carriershave now discontinued building them,except the United States; and the coun­try rising in naval power, all over theworld-the Soviet Union-has never yetlaid down a single carrier.

These are problems the Senator fromMinnesota is bringing out on the fioorof the Senate. The theory of "remotepresence" is certainly designed to elimi­nate some Army and Air Force bases;and I would say to my good friend fromCalifornia that this theory should alsoeliminate some Navy bases as exempli­fied by carriers.

Mr. MONDALE. I thank the Senatorfrom Missouri for his most usefUl andgifted discussion of this issue. I share theadmiration of the Senator from Cali­fornia for the Senator from Missouri forhis lifetime of interest in this subject, theunique experience which he brings tobear, and his devotion to his country andits best interests.

Would the Senator from Missouri saythat while much of it is classified, it isfair to say that the Soviets have beenmaking an intensive effort to develop thelatest, most accurate, speediest, and mostpowerful missilery? Would there be anydoubt about that?

Mr. SYMINGTON. The proponents ofthe ABM system made this perhaps theirchief argument in justification of thatsystem. To the best of my knowledge, noone has questioned the fact that theSoviet Union was racing ahead in themissile field and attempting to equal, ifnot exceed, the position of the UnitedStates in that field.

Mr. MONDALE. Is it not correct thata good many of the currently deployedSoviet cruisers, destroyers, submarines,and airplanes have on them cruiser mis­siles of this kind?

Mr. SYMINGTON. That is my under­standing. The missiles which sank theElath are now considered to have comefrom what was little more than a largemotorboat. The sharpness of that attack,and its decisiveness, amazed variousnaval people with whom I talked. Thelaunching ship was very small, and themissiles were made by the Soviet Union,and were effective.

Mr. MONDALE. As the Senator fromMissouri has already said, the Styx mis­sile is an old generation and certainly 15not in the front ranks of the currentstate of the art as developed by the So­viet Union; 15 that not correct?

Mr. SYMINGTON. I would answer mygood friend that it probably does not goas far back as Bam, the Redstone, or theThor, but it is a long, long way fromwhat we are confident the Soviet Unionhas today; and what are our own plansand programs in this particular field.

Mr. MONDALE. As the senator knows,the amendment-and we have to keeprepeating this because .it is being char­acterized In a very different way-is avery modest amendment. It would askonly that Congress ask the General Ac­counting Office to review the facts, thecost evaluation, and all the accountingdata, and to pass this information onto Congress so that we can make somejudgments as to the proper force level,the best use of our total defense budget,and the need at this time for a new nu­clear attack carrier. That is all theamendment would do. As I understandthe comments of the Senator fromMissouri, this kind of study is not onlyvaluable but long overdue.

I should like to make one final com­ment and then I should like to return tomy speech.

The President made a statement aboutthe spending level of the economy andasked some grave questions about thefuture value of the American dollar. Weall agree that if we want to demoralizethis country, erode the value of the dol­lar, and destroy the savings and pen­sions of millions and millions of Amer­icans, all we have to do is continue tospend billions of dollars without firstasking "whY" or setting forth any pri­orities. Thus, as we look at the Nation'sbUdget, every bit of it has to be analyzed,including the budget of the Departmentof Defense.

The other day, the President calledcertain people "unilateral disarmers."I think he might have had me in mind.I checked to see how much I had votedfor in defense spending since I came tothe Senate. I am a junior Member ofthis body and have been here for 5 years;that is two and one-half Congresses. Ifind that I voted for $289 billion worthof defense spending. That is directspending-$289 billion-,-think of it. Doesthat make one a unilateral disarmer. inthe judgment of the Senator from Mis­souri?

Mr. SYMINGTON. Well, it is tiresometo have people put in the broad cate­gories of hawks or doves just becausethey try to discriminate between all theweapons systems advanced instead ofendorsing all said systems.

The two men who introduced theABM amendment, one, the senior Sen­ator from KentUcky (Mr. COOPER), en­listed in the U.S. Army as a private inthe Second World War and came out anofficer. The other sponsor, the seniorSenator from Michigan, received·. hisPurple Heart on Utah Beach on D-day.

One of tM two Senators I 'joined insigning the ABM minority report of theArmed Services· Committee was a deco-

rated combat inia.ntryman on the Anziobeachhead when he was over 50, theother, who left his right arm 10 Italyfighting 'for his country, received thefinest citation I ever read,and the Dis;.tinguished Service Cross. Based on thecitation, and what Gen. Mark Clark saidabout him to the Armed Services Com­mittee, I still do not understand why hedid not receive the Medal of Honor.

So talk of pacifism and unilateraldisarmament on the part of certainMembers gets a little tiresome.

I have been here longer than my ableand respected colleague from Minnesota.,and found out recently that I haveworked for and voted for $953 billion forthe security of the United States sincecoming into the Government. Thatmeans that by the end of this year thefigure will be over $1 trillion. But justbecause one asks, not that a system bestopped, only deferred for additional de­velopment, he is labeled in some quar­ters as being antimilitary. What afarce.

I have great respect for the ultimatewisdom of the people of this country.who are wa.tching the continuation ofthis· sad and tragic venture in Vietnam;and because I have that respect, I believenone of us has cause for apprehensionabout such attacks.

It is both patriotic and constructive forthe senator· from Minnesota and theSenator from New Jersey to bring thismatter up for discussion. We have aright, as representatives of the people­all the P€1>ple, no particular clique orcaste-to ask: What is true security? Isit more important for' our citizens torespect the wisdom of the leadership ofthe country In the expenditure of theirmoney than to have a particular weaponssystem? Which is the more important? Itwould appear just as important to thesecUlity of' the United states for us tohave a sound economy ·as to have a par­ticular weapons system.

Should we continue to pile armamentonto armament as against continuing tomake every effort to work for a just andhonorable peace. '

These are but a few of the questionsbeing raised back home with respect toweaponry, on this carrier system as theyhave been raised on other systems. It isall constructive and I believe what thepeople expect of their representatives.

,Mr. MONDALE. I thank the Senatorfrom Missouri for his most encouragingremarks and his keen interest in thisissue.

James Field, a naval historian, notedthat a carrier task force, in fear of enemyattacks, cannot successfUlly participatein a campaign of interdiction. He wrotethat in· Korea, for example, "Logisticconsiderations arid the dangers of airand submarine attack made it undesira­ble for carriers to operate for more than2 days in the same location."

Perhaps the most crucial limitation onthe carrier's ,effectiveness is that thethreat of attack diverts potentially of­fensive carrier sorties to defense of thetask force. Thus, during World War II'and the Korean war, 23 percent of thetotal combat sorties flO1vn from carrierswere defensive. This contrasts with 2.7

September 10, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL .. RECORD- S,ENATt: 25063

percent flown by planes from land basesduring the Korean war.

Fears and uncertainties concerning anenemy's anticarrier warfare. potentialalso affects the rapid responsiveness ofthe attack carrier, which is its strongestattribute. Wilson noted that uncertain­ties as to weapons, belligerents, and thelimits of the war did in fact impede car­rier deployment early in the Korean con­flict. Future limited wars will also besurrounded by "uncertainties as to whowill fight and with what weapons."

Because of the tremendous investmentin a carrier and its task force and be­cause of the recognition of the vulner­ability of the carrier under certain con­ditions, the Navy is naturally hesitant tocommit the carrier to a conflict or po­tential conflict. Once committed, theever-present fear of enemy attack mayprevent the carrier from serving as aneffective sea base for tactical airstrikes.

It should be emphasized that thethreats which have limited a carrier'sresponsiveness and effectiveness in pastwars are far more dangerous today. Andsince naval doctrine, as Wilson pointsout, "as yet says nothing about treatingthe attack carrier as expendable in alimited war," there is every indicationthat the carrier will be even less effectivein future conflicts with' a sophisticatedenemy.

The Navy, however, refuses to fullyrecognize the vulnerability of carriers.Its grandiose planning for the use ofcarriers illustrates this fact.

Mr. President, at this point I wish tocomment upon the agreements by whichthe Navy has attempted to demonstratethe invulnerability of the aircraft car­rier. I will quote from a speech of theChief of Naval Operations,' AdmiralMoorer, who said at a recent Veterans ofForeign Wars convention:

In some 50 wars or near wars since 1946,we have not lost a carrier or had' one dam­aged owing to hostile action.

That is what he told the VFW inorder to satisfy them that the attackcarrier was no longer vulnerable.

I wrote the Chief of Naval Operationsand asked,. "WoUld you please provideme with a llst of those wars or near warsthat you based your invulnerability ar­gument upon?"

After some 10 days, I received a docu­ment which, surprisingly,. was classified.In it, he recounted not 50, but 48 warsor near wars in which the aircraft car­rier had actually been involved oralerted.

In four of those wars or"near wars,the aircraft carrier was not even there;it had just been alerted. We checked thenames of the various wars or near wars,and asked the admiral to declassifythem, so that the Senate could know theexperiences, areas, and events in whichthe carrier has been involved during thepast 23 years. Such a list would probablybe the best indication of when, underwhat circumstances, and in what kind ofchallenges the naval attack carder wasused.

We received a partially declassifiedlist. To be charitable to the Navy, I wouldsay the most embarrassing incidents re­main classified. But it is fair to say that

at least half of these alleged wars ornear wars were wars in which the carrierwas only remotely involved, and againstalleged enemies which had no capacity

.at all to inflict any kind of damage uponthe attack carrier, even if they wantedto; and in most cases there is no evidencethat they did.

I do not think that it says much aboutthe invulnerability of the carrier inthose incidents where the carrier wasnot involved, to say it was not sunk; orto say, when in about half the instancesthat he has listed in this message theenemy had no capacity tC' respond at all,or showed no intention of responding,that somehow the carrier survived andtherefore is invulnerable.

The issue on vulnerability is an obvi­mis one: Do modern missilery, aircraft,submarines, and other kinds of tech­nology and weapons raise doubts as tothe survivability of the attack carrierunder certain instances and in certainkinds of wars? That is the issue, and Ideeply regret that the Chief of NavalOperations would base his case for theinvulnerability of the carrier by refer­ring to a list of minor events and foreignriots in which no carrier was sunk ordamaged.

I ask :manimous consent that the de­classified version of the list of instancesto which the admiral made reference beprinted in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the list wasordered to be printed in the RECORD, asfollows:SUMMARY OF WARS, NEAR WARS SINCE 1946

(The follOWing list represents only major/minor conflicts or crises where U.S. Navalunits were Involved as prime factors, alertedor redeployed.)

Turkey (4/46): USSR-Iran host1lltles andUSSR-Turkey diplomatic tensions; Navalunit deployed as affirmation of U.S. inten­tions to shore up Turks against ~Jvlet Im­perialism.

Trieste (7/46) : Trieste ownership dispute;U.S. and British Naval units dispatched toscene with open warfare Imminent. Com­menced Adriatic Patrol which lasted untilTrieste Issue resolved In 1954.

Greece (9/46) : Political crisis. Naval Unitsvisit requested by U.S. Ambassador,

Indochina War (11/46-7/54): Naval unitsemplo~'ed In evacuation, assistance, alertstatus.

Israel (6/48-4/49): Naval units assignedUN mediator for the Palestine Truce. Evacu­ated UN team eventually In July.

. Qreek Clvll War (46--49): Presence andalert.

Korea (50-53) : Combat operations,Tachens Crisis (7/54-2/55): Evacuation of

clvlllans/mllltary personnel; alert and opera­tions.

Vietnam Guerrilla War (9/55-Present):Presence, assistance, combat operations.

Red Sea (2/56): Naval unit patrols estab-lished In view of developing Suez Crisis.

Jordan Tension (5/56) : Provided presence.Pre-Suez Tension (7/56): Alert.Suez War (10-11/56): Alert, evacuation,

prOVided presence.Jordan Crisis (4/57): External conspiracy

charged With intent to subyert Jordan. Nayalunits dispatched.

Klnmen Island (7/57): Communist shell­ing, Nm'al units dispatched to defend Taiwan.

Haiti Disorders (6/57): Alert, surface pa­trols.

Syria Crisis (8-12/57): Alert, provided pres­ence.

Leba.non Clvll War (5/58) : Support opera-tions. .

Jordan/Iraq Unrest (8-12/58): Alert, sUr­veillance, surface patrol.

Cuba Civil War (12/56-12/58) : Alert, evac­uation, provided presence.

Quemoy-Matsu Crisis (9-10/68): Evacua­tion, combat operations.

Panama Invasion (4/59): PrOVided pres­ence.

Berlin Crisis (5-9/59) : Alert, provided pres­ence.

Nationalist China-Communist China Crisis(7/59): Provided presence.

Panama Demonstratio1lll (8 & 11/59) : Alert.Laos Clv11 War (12/60-5/61): Alert, pro­

vided, presence.Congo CiVil War (7/60-8/63): Alert, evac­

uation.Caribbean Tension (4-12/60): Alert. all'

and surface patrols.Guatemala-Nicaragua (11/60): Alert, all'

and surface patrols.Bay of PIgs Crisis (5/61) : Alert.Zanzibar Riots (6/61): Alert.Berlin Crisis (9/61-5/62): Alert, provided

presence.Dominican RepUblic (11-12/61): Alert, all'

and surface patrols.Guantanamo Tension (1 and 7/62): Alert,

prOVided presence.Guatemala (3/62): Alert, provided pres­

ence.Thailand (6/26) : Alert, provided presence.Quemoy-Matsu Crisis (6-62): PrOVided

presence.Cuban Missile Crisis (10-11/62) : Provided

presence and intervention.Yemen Revolts (2--4/63): Alert, provided

presence, surface patrols.Laos Tension (4/63): Alert, provided

presence.Jordan Crisis (4/63) : Alert, provided pres­

ence. surface patrols.Caribbean Tensions (1963): Alert, all' and

surface patrols.VIetnam Civil Disorders (8-9 and 10/63) :

Alert, air and surface patrols.Dominican RepUblic (9/63): Alert.South Vietnam Crisis (11/63): FollOWing

death of President Diem. Provided presence.Indonesia-Malaysia (12/63): Alert. pro­

vided presence.Panama (1--4/64) : Alert, provided presence

and pvacuatlon.Guantanamo Tensions (4--7/64): Provided

presence, surface patrols.Panama (5/64) : Provided presence.Dominican Republic (6 and 7/64): All' and

surface patrols.Tonkin Gulf (8/64) : Combat operations.Dominican Rep\lbllc (4/65): Intervention

and combat operations.Arab-Israeli War (6/67): Alert, provided

presence, covered e"acuatlon of U.S. citizens.Pueblo Capture (1-4/68): Redeployment

of forces; maintained presence in area to takeactions as directed.

EC-121 Loss (4/69): Redeployed forces;maintained presence to take actions as di­rected.

Mr. MONDALE. The Navy, however,refuses to fully recognize the vulner­ability of the carrier.

The Navy justification for 15 carriersis based on the theory that the carrierfleet must be adequate to fight, simul­taneously, two and one-half wars-that

'is, a major conventional war upon boththe Atlantic and the Paciflc, plus abrush-fire war' somewhere else.

The Navy assumes that the carrierwill be a vital participant in the fullrange of conventional conflicts-the rela­tively minor. Dominican Republic type,the mild-range Vietnam type, and thefull-scale conventional war-whateverthat would be in this nuclear era..By allocating' to Itself such a major rolein stich a range'Of posSible conflicts, the

25064 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 10" 1969

FULURE OF NAVY TO RECOGNIZE COMPLEMEN·TARY ROLE

All of these arguments are not in­tended to prove that there is no need forattack carriers. Indeed, carriers can serveas a complement to land-based air pow­er-but primarily in limited conflictswhere land bases are not immediatelyavailable.

Despite the Navy's recognition thatcarriers should be complementary toland-based airpower,. it has been un­willing to accept the fact that the needfor carriers is reduced where there isample land-based air capability.

Carriers, for example, were useful inthe beginning of the Vietnam conflictwhen land bases were still limited. Buta serious question can be raised whetherthe Navy's continuing level of involve­ment in the Vietnam conflict--once suf­ficient land bases were constructedthere-reflects as much the need to givethe Navy a "piece of the action" as areasoned military judgment.

Mr. President, I point out here thatthe decision to stop bombing in Vietnam.with which I healtily agree, has certainlyreduced the need for attack air carrierforce levels. One would like to see whatresponse the Navy makes to that changeof circumstances.

The designation of six carrier taskforces ~ the Atlantic and nine to thePaciftc also attests to the Navy's un­willingness to recognize the complemen­tary nature of carrier-based airpower.Commenting on the Mediterranean taskforces, Desmond Wilson wrote:

With the SUbsequent development of land·based air covering NATO's southern fiank,and with the later introduction into the re­glon and coverage of the region by sea Rndland-based missile systems, the Sixth Fleetmay have become increasingly redundant. Italmost certainly became Increasingly vulner­able with the marked growth of the Sovietnuclear capability, along with submarine,aviation, and mlsslle dellvery systems.

But even this type of fleet deploymentcan be carried out with less than 15 car­riers. The Navy claims that 15 carriertask forces are required to keep five con·tinually on station-two in the Mediter­ranean and three in the Western Pacific.While the Navy points out that the rateof "on station" deployment has actuallybeen higher in the past, they continue toinsist that three task forces are neededto maintain one "on station" throughoutthe year. This method of deployment isexplained as arising from the need torest the crew, make necessary repairs,and take care of other logistical prob·lems.

The Navy does concede that, but forthe need to relieve the crew, a carriertask force could remain on station fora longer period of time. However, theyhave never satisfactorily explained whythe relief of the crew should force thecarrier to be withdrawn from forwarddeployment.

The Navy itself has successfully dealtwith this problem in the operation ofPolaris submarines by using what iscalled a "blue and gold" crew concept--

overly oriented toward defense against without them, or else the Soviet's sur­low level threats. face fleet is not a significant naval

threat.FAILt7RE OF OTHER NATIONS TO BUILD CARRIERS

It may well be that all of these con­siderations explain the reluctance of theSoviet Union-and almost every othernation-to rely on attack carriers. Infact, the United States is the only majormilitary power with an attack carrierin its fleet. Neither the Soviet Union norChina has built a single attack carrier,~nd neither plans to do so. England is inthe process of phasing out its attackcarriers, and France is the only othel'country with such a carrier.

According to a 1969 report by the Sea­power Subcommittee of the House Com­mittee on Armed Services, the SovietUnion in recent years has built over 500surface ships in 20 classes. The reportstates:

The Soviet Union is developing a massivewell-balanced program in virtually all phasesof seapower.

The U.S. Navy not onlY agrees withthis assessment, it constantly stresses thegrowing menace of the Soviet's surfacefleet. Only the absence of attack carriersprevents the Soviet fleet from surpassingours, according to the Navy. The Chiefof Naval Operations recently stated thatthese carriers "are the key to our pres­ent superiority," and that "with too few,or none" in the U.S. fleet, "the Sovietswould probably be the leading navalpower,"

Even assuming that carriers are thekey to our naval superiority, it is ob­vious that we do not need as many as15 carriers to maintain tWs superiority.

But if the carrier is really such a vitalsWp, then why have the Soviets failedto build a single attack carrier? Why dothey have no plans to do so? Since theyare currently in the midst of a massiveshipbuilding program and since they ob­viously have the technological capabilityto build carriers, their decision to rely onother surface sWpscannot be due to lim­ited resources. The U.S. Chief of NavalOperations offered the following expla­nation for the Soviet failure to build at­tack carriers:

Geography. more than any other reasonhas kept the SOViets out of the aircraft CIU'­riel' business. The routes of egress from SO­viet .naval bases to the open oceans are, byway of choke pOints, controlled by otherpowers. For an aircraft carrier such a situa­tion could spell disaster In a shooting war.If the SoViets were to gain control of thepoints, however, the situation might change.

But this constriction of egress fromSoviet naval bases to the open seas hasnot deterred the Soviets from building alarge number of almost every other typeof surface warship. If the Soviets canmove their carriers and destroyersthrough those choke points, then whywould a carrier pose a different prob­lem? It would seem that Soviet navalplanners have decided that attack car­riers simply are not worth their enormouscost.

Regardless of the reasons for the So­viet decision not to build carriers, ourNavy cannot have it both ways. Eithercarriers are not that vital to a surfacefleet and the Soviet Navy is a threat

Navy refuses to acknowledge that eventshave changed the proper role of the car­rier since 1945 by limiting the scenariosin which carriers can be effective.

When engaged in a major conventionalwar with a sophisticated enemy, thecarrier task force will be exposed to acomplete range of anticarrier weapons.While the Soviet Union represents thegreatest military threat to the carrier,other countries possess various weaponsdesigned for anticarrier warfare.

For example, Desmond Wilson pointsout that Cuba, China, Indonesia, andEgypt, in addition to the Warsaw Pactstates, are knO'l\n to have large numbersof Soviet-built 1L--28 Beagles-bomberswhich are capable of striking carrier taskforces with a 4,400-pound bomb loadat a combat radius of about 800 nauticalmiles. Moreover, the Soviet Union hasdistributed at least some of their 1,500to 2,000 TU-16 Badgers, a bomber ca­pable of being used against surface ves­sels. The Badger, known to have beensupplied to China and Indonesia, cancarry two air-to-surface missiles or a7,OOO-pound load to a radius in excessof 1,500 nautical miles. Large numbersof Mig-21's have been made availableto Communist satellites and some neu­tral states. Furthermore, the styx mis­sile and other antiship missiles are alsoin the arsenal of many of the Sovietallies.

In addition to high performance air­craft and missiles, the Soviet Union hasdistributed a number of its Whiskeyclass long-range conventional subma­rines to several satellite and neutralnations.

There are, therefore, relatively fewscenarios in which you can imagine acarrier free from threats of enemy actionand thus able to function effectively inan offensive tactical capacity. This isnot to say that the carrier has no role ina conflict where the enemy has someanticarrier capability. But as the ca­pability increases, so does the threat, andcarriers simply do not operate effectivelyin such an environment.

The Navy is quick to remind us thatland bases for tactical aircraft are alsovulnerable to enemy attack. This is, ofcourse, true. Land bases are subject toattack by aircraft and missiles; in addi­tion, they are uniquely subject to groundattack and artillery, particularly in aguerrilla war as in Vietnam.

But in examining the relative vulner­ability of land and sea-based tacticalairpower, we must look at their relativeeffectiveness. The historical recordstrongly suggests that land bases are lessinhibited than carriers by the threat ofattack and that they are capable ofdelivering more offensive sorties.

The threat of enemy attack also makesthe carrier less desirable from a cost pointof view. It has been estimated that atleast one-half of the cost of a carrier taskforce is allocated for carrier defense.This high allocation of resources to de­fense sharply raises the cost of eachcarrier-based offensive sortie. In returnfor this large investment in carrier de­fense, we have carrier task forces which,in all probability, would be of little valueagainst high level threats-and are

September 10, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 25065

Total A-4 equlvalents 108

Total A-4 equivalents____________ 83

Total A-4 equivalents 132

Total A-4 equivalents 152

(NoTE.-The types of aircraft which can beoperated by a carrier depend primarily uponthe flight deck and its installations such asthe catapults. arresting gear and elevators.Ship-installed support facUlties also Ilmltaircraft types which can be operated. Thenumber of aircraft whlch can be carried de­pends upon deck area and the mix of types.Some types of aircraft are conside.·abl)' largerthan others, and a smaller total of generallylarger aircraft can be physically accommo­dated. The smallest tacticai aircraft in theU.S. Navy's carrier inventory is the A-4 S1Jk­hawk. Therefore, for· standardization pur­poses, the Navy expresses carrier aircraftcapacity in tenus of A-4 equivaients.

Mr. MONDALE. This increased capa­bility of the carrier fieet means that to- .day's 15 attack carriers can deliver moretactical air support than the 15 carrierswhich comprised the fleet in the mid­1950's. That is why Secretary McNamararelied on the increased capability of thenewer carriers as a justification for re­ducing the size of the carrier fleet. Unlessit is assumed that the need for tacticalairpower has substantially increased inthe past 15 years, a decision to defer thebuilding of an additional nuclear carrierwiII not endanger national security.

Nor does a decision to postpone this

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carrier mean that we will be stuck withan obsolete attack carrier fleet. I re­

2 ferred to this argument several times2 today. Excluding the oldest four carriers,1 the attack carrier force consists of one

nuclear carrier, the Enterprise; eightForrestal carriers, and three Midways; in1972, the second nuclear carrier, CVAN­68, will join the fleet. At least 12 of these13 carriers are suited for handling allmodem aircraft with safety and em­ciency.

I emphasize that because the ArmedSerVices Committee repOrt cites as oneof its main reasons the fact that manyof the new aircraft cannot be accommo­dated on these carriers.

The truth is that 12, or perhaps 13, ofthese carriers can handle everything weare making and plan to make. In addi­tion, the three Midways are the onlycarriers in this group over 13 years old,and two of these carriers have recentlybeen modernized.

This means that we will have 13 attackcarriers which are not obsolete by theNavy's standards, at least through 1976,and probably longer in light of the mod­ernization of the Midways. Even if wedecide not to authorize funds for CVAN­69, the attack carrier force level w1Il re­main at 13 fUlly effective ships-by theNavy's definition-for some time.

But why are the World War II attackcarriers called obsolete?

Secretary McNamara testified beforeCongress in 1964 that the chronologicalage of a particular ship was not impor­tant in determining fleet obsolescence.Rather, the key question was whether aship "is able to perform its mission in theface of the expected threat."

Mr. President, I ask the Senate to lookat the list of occasions on which the car­rier has been used as set forth by AdmiralMoorer, and I ask how many of theseminor events are events in which, if acarrier has to be used at all, one of theoldtr carriers would not be adequate andhow many events as listed by the admiralrequire the latest, largest. and most ad­vanced carriers?

The Armed Services Committee, aswelI as the Navy, maintains that theseolder carriers are "simply inadequate toserve efficiently and safely the newestaircraft now eperating in the fleet."However, these carriers can certainlyhandle other jet aircraft-such asF-8's-with safety and efficiency. Andsince the usefulness of attack carriers islimited to conflicts where there are low­level threats, there is no reason whythese older carriers cannot continue toprovide tactical air support-that is ifthe Navy insists that it needs a minimUmof 15 attack carriers.

It should be pointed out that thENavy's carrier fieet is not limited to at­tack carriers. There are. in addition, sixsmaller carriers, used primarily for anti­submarine warfare. These carriers arecapable of handling several types of tac­tical jet fighters, and one of them isbeing currently used in Vietnam in an"attack" capacity. Surely such carrierscould be used to supplement the existingattack fleet in many cases where limitedtactical air power is called for. It be-

111

Nimitz class (the air wing listed below isplanned for the Nimitz in fiscal year1973) :

~ghter squadrons (F-14) _Light attack squadrons (A-7) _Attack squadron (A-6) _Tanker squadron (ICA-6) _Electronics warfare squadron (EA-6)_Airborne early warning squadron(E-2) _

Reconnaissance squadron (RA-5C) _Rescue squadron detachment (UH-2)_

Midway class:Fighter squadrons (F-8) (F-4's as-

signed when avallable) _Light attack squadrons (A-7) _Attack squadron (A-6) _Electronics warfare/tanker squadron(EICA-3) _

Airborne, early warning squadron(E-2) _

Reconnaissance squadron (RF-8G) _Rescue squadron detachment (UH-2)_

Hancock class:Fighter squadrons (F-8) _Light attack squadrons (A-4) _Electronics warfare/tanker squadron(E1CA-3) _

Airborne early warning squadron de-tachment (E-1B) _

Reconnaissance squadron detachment(RF-8G) _

Rescue squadron detachment (UH-2)_

Nominal air wing complementsEnterprise/Kitty Hawk/Forrestal ciasses:

Fighter squadrons (F-4) _Light attack squadrons (A-7) _Attack squadron (A-6) _Eiectronics warfare/tanker squadron(E~-3) _

Airborne early warning squadron(E-2) _

Reconnaissance squadron (RA-5C) _Rescue squadron detachment (UH-2)_

the submarine stays on active duty andthe crew is simply rotated. By thismethod, a polaris submarine is able tostay on active duty for a significantlylonger time than the carrier. And yet,the Navy has failed to adapt this methodor a similar one to the attack carrier.Such a procedure would make it possibleto deploy five task forces on station witha reduced carrier fieet.

MORE EFFICIENT USE OF PRESENT FLEET

Those who favor the authorization forthe new carrier in the pending bill arguethat the carrier is ne.eded, even if thecarrier force size is reduced. In a recentnews conference, Secretary Laird stated:

Whether we have a 12- or 15-carrier forcedoes not affect 4lW request for CVAN-69.

The assumptions underlying this argu­ment are that the older attack carriersare no longer usable; that they, there­fore, must be replaced with modern nu­clear carriers; and that a congressionaldecision to defer the building of CVAN-69wil1 insure that there is a substantialpercentage of obsolete attack carriers inthe 1970's; and that such a decision wiIIweaken the capacity of our attack carrierfleet, thereby weakening our overal1 de­fense posture.

This argument does not square withthe facts. To begin with, the attack car­riers which have joined the fleet sLIcethe mid-1950's are almost double the sizeof the olde: carriers, are equipped withthe most modern aircraft, and, there­fore, have far greater capability for tac­tical air than the oldest carriers whichthey replace. The Navy has stated thatthe nuclear carrier air wing is tactical1ymore than twice as effective as that ofthe World War II carriers.

But since the Navy has fol1owed a one­for-one replacement policy in the past,the actual capacity of the carrier fleet interms of providing tactical air pOwer isfar greater than the 15 carrier force levelwould imply. The Navy's carrier replace­ment pOlicy would, therefore, more ac­curately be described as a two-for-onepolicy-an escalation, in fact, of the car­rier force level. Even if the Navy cansupport a case for repl!l.cing the oldercarriers with nuclear carriers, there isno reason why at least two of the oldercarriers could not be replaced as eachnew carrier joins the fleet.

We tried for some time. as I indicatedearlier, to determine whether the Navyhad a shorthand way of indicating therelative effectiveness and capacity of thevarious carriers.

I am pleased to find that they haveworked it out in terms of what they calIthe A-4 equivalent, which indicates thenumber and the amount and the type ofaircraft that operate on each carrier.

As I said earlier, the older Hancockclass has an equivalent of 83. The Nimitzclass has an A-4 equivalent of 152.

I ask unanimous consent to haveprinted at this point in the RECORD atabulation setting forth that informa­tion.

There being no obj ection, the tabula­tion was ordered to be printed in theRECORD, as fol1ows:

CXV--1579-Part 18

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25066 ·CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Septem,ber 10, 1969

comes all the more difficult, therefore,to justify the beginning of a brandnewattack carrier in light of the overwhelm­ing cost of a fieet which actually num­bers not 15 but 2l.

The Navy claims that a "modernforce" of 15 attack carriers, in whicheach ship is retired after 30 years ofservice, requires a construction programincluding a new carrier every other year.But there are several alternatives formaintaining or increasing the nwnber ofcarriers capable of providing tactical airsupport, without resorting to such acostly construction program. Given themore limited role of carriers called for bymodern military realities, the require­ment for a fleet composed entirely ofhuge attack carriers, all capable of han­dling the most modern aircraft, is at bestquestionable.

It is likely that the Navy will not ac­cept a more limited carrier role. TheNavy insists that the attack carrier canmeet any conventional war contingency,claiming the carrier to be no more vul­nerable today than it was in World WarII. Such a position ignores a warningmade some years ago by the great navalhistorian, Alfred Mahan:

He (the strategist) will observe also thatchanges of tactics have not only taken placeafter changes in weapons, which necesrerilyis the case, but that the interval betweensuch changes has been unduly long. Thisdoubtless arises from the fact that an Im­provement of weapons is due to the energyof one or two men, While changes In tacticshave to overcome the inertia of a conservativeclass; but It Is a great evil. It can be remediedonly by a candid recognition of each change;by careful study of the powers and limita­tions of the new ship or weapon, and by aconsequent adaptation of the method of us­Ing it to the qualities It possesses, which willconstitute its tactics. History shows that It isvain to hope that military men generally willbe at pains to do this, but that the ones Whodo will go into battle with a great ad­vantage-a lesson In Itself of no mean value.

FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS

There is another basic motivation forour amendment, other than the call foran evaluation of the proper carrier forcelevel. For, in addition to these problemsof efficiency and effectiveness, the use ofthe aircraft carrier has serious foreignpolicy implications. For example, it is offi­cial naval doctrine that one of the mainadvantages of carrier airpower is thatit can be employed unilaterally, withoutinvolving third parties and without rely­ing upon treaties, agreements, or over­fiight rights.

One such instance is the use of thecarrier task force to show the flag orto establish our military presence in anunstable region. There may have beentimes in the past when a show of forcehas lent stability or discouraged hostili­ties. On the other hand, there is reasonto believe that the ready availability ofAmerican power has, at times, generatedunilateral action where such interventionhas actually been harmful to our imageand our interests.

The Senate has an obligation to de­bate whether it is in our national inter­est to maintain 15 carrier task forces"posed for unilateral action." In fulfill­ing this obligation, we need to know thesituations in which carriers have been

used in this "show of force" role and thereasons for such a use of the carrier.Even if it is determined that this is alegitimate use of naval power, the ques­tion arises whether attack carriers areessential in performing this mission­would smaller carriers or other warshipshave the same effect?

The Navy also contends that a carriercan always be counted upon for tacticalair support in a limited ~ngagement

where land bases may not be availablebecause of political constraints. To besure, there may be times, as in the earlydays of the Korean war, when land basesare actually held by enemy forces, andcarrier-based air support may be a val­uable temporary complement to nearlyall land bases.

But how much of our overall defensecapability should be devoted to that un­likely possibility where we might becalled upon to defend a nation and, at thesame time, be denied the use of its basesfor tactical support? And, if the com­mitment arises out of a multinationtreaty, such as SEATO, should there notbe land bases available to us in at leastsome of those nations in the treaty or­ganization? If we need carrier-based air­power to allow us to meet foreign com­mitments in areas where the UnitedStates is denied the use of land bases,it may well be that there is somethingamiss about the nature of these com­mitments.

In recent congressional testimony, theChief of Naval Operations stated:

The carrier will be necessary in the futureif the U.S. Is to have the fleXibility and theselectivity of operations In areas Withoutfirst haVing to make some political arrange­ment to do so. (Emphasis added.)

In light of such testimony, it is im­portant for Congress to be involved indetermining those situations in whichthe United states should be prepared tointervene in conflicts unilaterally and"without first having to make some po­litical arrangements to do so "

A congressional inquiry into the for­eign policy implications in the use ofcarriers is necessary to assure that for­eign policy determines the need for mili­tary expenditures-rather than theother way around.

CONCLUSION

Because of these foreign policy im­plications and, more important, becauseof the overwhelming evidence that thecarrier is an extravagant and often un­necessary means of providing tactical airsupport, the request for an additionalcarrier raises fundamental questionswhich must be answered.

Throughout this statement, certaincontentions have been made about therole of the attack carrier, the manner inwhich it is deployed, and the proper sizeof the carrier fleet. It should be em­phasized, however, that the burden forjustifying the carrier in this bill-as wellas other carriers-is and should be onthe Navy. And while there may be strongdisagreement with some of the pointsraised herein, there should be little doubtthat the NavY has simply failed to meetits obligatton in this matter. The onepoint the Na\'Y has made in responJ3e to

the question of whether we need 15 car­riers is that the matter is under study.

The Navy has responded to questioningof the carrier force level with vague andgeneral assertions that at least 15 at­tack carriers are needed to meet the vari­ous contingencies which might arise infulfilling U.S. commitments and in pro­tecting national security. There has beenlittle or no explanation as to why chang­ing missions and contingencies have notaltered the carrier force level.

Again I bring up the fact that none ofour carriers in Vietnam was used pri­marily in the bombing of North Vietnam.I am glad we stopped bombing there. Isthis not, then, a proper time to considerwhether we could reduce some of theattack carrier force levels, now that thatmission is no ·longer necessary?

In response to doubts about the effi­cacy of sea-based air power, the Navypoints out that since the seas coverthree-fourths of the earth's surface, thecalTier can be used in many more placesthan land bases. The military historianwill recognize the disturbing similaritybetween this argument and that ad­vanced in 1922 by a major in the Cavalrywho, observing the absence of roads onmuch of the earth's surface, wrote:

To base our transportation needs solelyupon conditions existent in the compara­tively tiny portion of the earth's surfacecontaining roads . . . is putting too manyeggs In the same basket.

As we have seen, there are substantialdoubts within thf' Defense Departmentas to whether a fltet of 15 attack carrierscan be justified. Indeed, the Defense De­partment's official response to a congres­sional inquiry about the need for thismany carriers is that the entire matteris under study. We know that classifiedrecommendations from the SystemsAnalysis Office have recommended thesame thing. It has made observationsabout the relative costs of sea-based airthat should be the subject of andshould be available for the Senate's con­sideration, but because of classificationby the Defense Department, it cannot beproduced here. Until this study is com­pleted, Congress is asked to continuespending for carriers as if the need fora fleet of 15 was clear.

In effect, the Defense Departmentwould have us reverse the nonnal au­thorization process. Instead of seekingfunds for items wl:::ch have already beenjustified, we are being asked to providefunds in expectation of a rationale. Weare not following a policy of one for one.Our policy is not neutral, even with re­spect to force levels, because each newnuclear task force attack carrier isnearly twice as effective as the one it isreplacing.

It would be fiscally irresponsible forCongress to act in this manner. At a timewhen the American people are bearingan overwhelming tax burden. at a timewhen the President is calling for a 75­percent cutback in Federal construction,and when inflation is demanding econ­omies in every area of Governmentspending, we must demand adequatejustification for all programs.

That is why we have introduced ouramendment. The amendment in no way

Septernber 10, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 25067questions the integrity of military lead­ers or of the civilian officials at the De­fense Department. If anything. theamendment is a bipartisan rtcognition ofthe fact that those of us in Congress havefailed to ask the hard questions con­cerning military spending that we haveasked in the domestic area. Our past his­tory of blanket acceptance of the mili­tary budget not only is in sharp contrastto our close scrutiny of proposed domes­tic programs; it also amounts to an ab­dication of our responsibility under theConstitution "to provide for the com­mon defense," "to raise and supportarmies," and "to provide and maintaina navy."

The acquiescence in military mattersis particularly true of that part of themilitary budget involving the generalpurpose forces--as opposed to strategicnuclear forces. These forces. which in­clude everything from carriers to man­power, make up 60 percent of the peace­time defense budget. And yet. their un­derlying assumptions and objectives areseldom discussed by Congress and thepublic.

In calling for congressional vigilanceover military spending. I am acutelyaware of the high priority of nationaldefense. In my earlier colloquy withthe Senator from Missouri, I pointed outthat in the 5 years I have been in theSenate. I have voted for $289 billion indefense spending. But approval of ques­tionable items in the defense budget doesnot serve the cause of national defense.It has been observed that national secu­rity can best be maintained if we are"efficient in the forces we buy"-anytime forces cost more than is necessaryto do a job, our inefficiency may requireus to give up other policy commitments.

There is another reason why it is im­perative to take a close look at militaryexpenditures. Because of the pressingnature of our other national priorities,any form of unnecessary and unjustifiedFederal spending must detract from ourcommitments to our children, ow' cities.our towns, our farms, and our naturalenvironment.

Budget Director Charles Schuitze ob­served:

The benefits and coots of proposed mll!­tary programs cannot be viewed in Isolation.They must be related to and measuredagainst those other national priorIties which,In the context of limited resources, theiradoption must necessarUy sacrifice.

The time when we could afford theluxury of such "eternal v~rities" as afieet of 15 carriers has long since passed.I am very much afraid that unless wetake a close look at this carrier program,our children will observe in the futurethat our blind adherence to 15 attackcarriers was every bit as absurd andwastefui as the fallure to recognize thedemise of the battleship and the obsoles­cense of the horse cavalry.

Mr. PROXMffiE. Mr. President, willthe Senator yield?

Mr. MONDALE. I yield.Mr. PROXMffiE. Mr. President, I

commend the distinguished Senator fromMinnesota on a remarkable speech. It isremarkable because there is no questionthat this enormous amount of spending

does require a challenge. We have nothad this kind of documented and thor­ough challenge in the years I have beenin the Senate. There have been timeswhen we objected to aircraft carriers inthe past. but it was suggested that therehad been a comprehensive stUdy of thekind that this speech represents.

As I understand what the Senator said.as long ago as 1965, the Secretary of De­fense, in his posture statement, calledfor some reduction in attack carriers bythe early 1970's.

Mr. MONDALE. The Senator is cor­rect. The former Secretary of Defensecited a number of reasons in support ofa reduced role for one attack carrier. Hecited the effective end of the carrier'srole in strategic retaliation, given ourland and submarine-based missiles.

He referred to a numbcr of develop­ments in modern carriers, modern air­craft, and modern refueling techniques.These developments give our existingcarriers a far greater capability. Theyalso give our existing land bases a fargreater range and effectiveness. For ex­ample, in the last few years the reachof land-based air has increased fromtwo to two and a half times and withrefueling techniques it is even more thanthat.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous con­sent to have printed in the RECORD ex­cerpts from the posture statement of thethen Secretary of Defense, Robert Mc­Namara.

There being no objection, the excerptwas ordered to be printed in the RECORD,as follows:

EXCERPT FROM STATEMENT BY SECRETARYMcNAMARA

By the early 1970's we plan to make somereduction In the number of atreck carriers.Therefore, in the fiscal years 1965-69 programthe new investment In aircraft and ships Islimited to that which would be required bya somewhat smaUer eVA force.

This jUdgment Is supported by four majorconsiderations:

(1) The Forrestal class carriers are muchmore effective than the Essex class they arereplacing. A Forrestal class costs betweenone-third to one-half again as much as anEssex, but this differential does seem justi­fied. For example, the area available for spot­ting aircraft Is about 50 percent greater;overhead clearances in the llangar Lays aTeabout 40 percent greater, permitting largeraircraft to be stowed; aviation fuel and ord­nance storage spaces are greater, allowinglonger periods of sustained combat; and soforth.

(2) The capabilltles of carrier-based alr­craft are improving steadily. In the attackaircraft field, we are replacing the early A-4'swith the A-4E's, and an entirely new alI­wea ther, large payload aircraft, the A-5, Isbeing Introduced. In the ft.ghter fi"ld, weare replacing the F-8 low supersonic, fqlr­weather day fighter armed with SideWinder "mlssUes, with the supersonic aU-weather F-4.armed with Sparrow air-to-air missiles. Fur­ther gains In combat capab1l1ty wl1l be real­Ized when still more effective aircraft, suchas the new VAL (which I wlll discuss pres­ently) , and the F-Ill (TFX) , become avail­able later In the planning period.

(3) By fiscal year 1966, when we wl1l havea large number of strategic missiles In place.the CVA forces will be relieved of their stra­tegiC alert retaliatory mission, thus releasingadditional capab1l1ties for the carriers' IIm­ltedwar mlslson. assignment of carriers to

strategic missions restricts their fiexlb1l1tyIn terms of areas In which they can operateand the kinds of operations they can conduct.If pilots and aircraft must be held on nuclearalert, limited war capabilities are reduced.

(4) The Increasing range of land-basedtactical aircraft has reduced our requirementfor forward based alrpower. The F-4's withInfilght refueling, can be fiown to Europe andthe West Pacific. The TFX will be able todeploy to Europe without any infilght re­fueling.

Although a precise analysis of the optimumnumber of carriers Is diffiCUlt to make, itseems clear on the basis of these factors thatsome reduction In the number of attackcarriers will be possible by the end of thisdecade.

We have deleted from the shlpbuUdlngprogram the preViously planned fiscal year1965 carrier but have tentatively programedanother new carrier In a later year.

Mr. PROXMIRE. The Senator fromMinnesota also points out that the no­tion that we should have 15 attack car­riers goes back to a time when we facedJapan in the Pacific.

Mr. MONDALE. It actuallY goes backfurther.

Mr. PROXMIRE. To 1921.Mr. MONDALE. Dr. Wilson wrote a

thesis on the attack carrier and he triedunsuccessfully to determine what poli­cies and decisions justified what he calledthe "eternal verities" of a fieet of 15battleships, followed after World WarII by 15 attack carriers. The only thinghe could find was the agreement in 1921,the Washington Naval DisarmamentTreaty, that we should have 15 ships. TheNavy came back and said we said theyhad not had 15 ships.

We called an expert on the matter andwe have had printed in the RECORD to­day a table. As a matter of fact the num­ber of carriers we have had every yearsince 1946 has been 15.

Mr. PROXMIRE. This research hasnot been done publicly before. It has notbeen pUblicly disclosed. I think it is verysignificant.

In World War II we were facing Japan,which was a great sea power in the Pa­cific where positions were so farfiung.Japan had its own attack carrier fieetand a great air force. A large number ofattack carriers was then logical and nec­essary. Now. Japan has disarmed.

What kind of navy does China have?Roughly how big is China's navy?

Mr. MONDALE. It is insignificant, Iam sure.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I am talking aboutin comparison with the navy we facedin Japan.

Mr. MONDALE. I wouid not thinkthere is any comparison. I am not anexpert.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will theSenator J'ield to me briefly?

Mr. MONDALE. I yield.Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President. I do not

wish to intrude on the time of anyone.but as a matter of taking inventory ofow' time, I wish to make an obsen-aEon.We are not going to be in session tomor­row. The Senator from Minnesota willremember that I suggested he obtainthe fioor first today, and I objected toanyone else obtaining the fioor until hearrived this morning.

Howe\'er, in fair play. several other

25068•CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE September 10, 1969

Senators wish to speak. The Senatorfrom Washington has been waiting. TheSenator from Virginia has been waitingall day. I think the chairman of the com­mittee should say at least a few wordswithout attempting to cut off anyoneelse. In that sense of recognition, if theSenator could conclude shortly, I wouldtake just a few minutes. The Senatorfrom New York has a speech he feelscompelled to make this afternoon.

Mr. MONDALE. I thank the Senator.The Senator has been very kind to me.We had the recess for the funeral. Ihave yielded a good deal, and thus it hastaken me nearly 5 hours.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator does nothave to yield indefinitelY. I do not wantto make a point of order, but the Sena­tor cannot yield to anyone to make aspeech.

Mr. MONDALE. I shall yield the floorin just a moment. I thank the Senator.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senatorfrom Minnesota.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, willthe Senator yield?

Mr. MONDALE. I yield.Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I

fully support the position of the able anddistinguished chairman of the Commit­tee on Armed Services. This matter isone Which should be discussed exten­sively.

I hope we do not have the vote on Mon­day; and before we vote, I hope we candevelop the issue thoroughly.

I have listened with a great deal ofinterest this afternoon to the Senatorfrom Minnesota.

It was necessary for me to be in myState part of yesterday. I hope not tomiss the vote on this issue. Let us con­tinue until all the facts are on the table.

Mr. MONDALE. I thank the Senator.Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I shall

continue briefiy. I appreciate the need forothers who want to speak and speak soon.

I am delighted that the Senator in hispresentation stressed at the outset thathe is not making a proposal that weeliminate all of our carriers. He is sayingwe should consider whether we need 13or 14.

On the 14, this is the issue that shouldbe debated again and again, I am sure,in the course of debate, as in the courseof the so-called briefings-the brain­washing to which we have been subjectedby those who oppose the amendment­that we cannot eliminate all the carriers,because if we do, we will be defenseless.No one is suggesting that. The Senatorfrom Minnesota would provide merelyfor a study as to whether it is neces­sary to spend this additional money forthis additional carrier.

Mr. MONDALE. The Senator could alsoobserve that this is not a bizarre request.In fact, as we gather here this moment,we know that the Defense Departmentand the National Security Council haverequested and may have already receiveda study on the very issue we are talkingabout today. It is obvious that this is acase where the legislative and executivebranches can work together with mutualstudies and come up with a rationaldecision that can bring ab:mt the most ef­fective and sensible defense and would

generate the kind of public confidencewhich that would bring about.

Mr. PROXMIRE. I was present at thejoint economic hearing when formerDIrector of the Budget Schultze testified.In my view, he is the most able manwho ever served in the Budget Bureau.He of course was responsible for expendi­tures covering a vast area, Including mili­tary expenditures, for a number of years.This kind of question is rarely asked.Either the Senator from Missouri (Mr.SYMINGTON) or Representative MOORHEADasked Mr. Schultze if he could design8.tethe area of military spending which, inhis view, should have the lowest prioritywhere we could justify most clearly a re­duction. Without any equivocation orqualification at all. Budget DirectorSchultze said, "Yes, a 15th aircraft car­rier." In his view, it was the hardest tojustify of all that was in the $80 billionbudget.

I am very happy that the distinguishedSenator from Minnesota brought thatout, because I think it is the kind of thingthat should make us stop, look, and listen.

May I also commend the Senator fromMinnesota on his stress on the revolu­tion we have had in military weapOnry.It is a revolution. Some people say wehave had a revolution almost every 5years. There has been a dramatic change.Yet we go on and on on the basis of aset justification that we had 20 years agoand we must have exactly the same now.We make the same kind of argument thatwe have to have the same fleet we had inthe past. I would also like finally to com­mend the distinguished Senator fromMissouri on what I think is a most im­pressive analysis of the cost of maintain­ing a canier fleet. He points out, first,not only that we have the ships, but theplanes, and the escort carriers and an­other fleet behind it, and a third fleet.So, we end up with something that wewere told. in World War II cost $83 mil­lion, was $171 million at the time of theKorean war, and is now $510 million to$700 million for this one-

Mr. MONDALE. It might be $700 mil­lion, but somewhere between $510 mil­lion and $700 million.

Mr. PROXMIRE. It could be. i haveheard the figure in committee unchal­lenged, as given by the Senator fromMissouri, of $1.8 billion for the wholefieet.

Mr. MONDALE. The Navy says it willcost $1.8 billion for an attack carrier, thewing, the destroyers, and the escorts. Ofcourse, that has to be times three.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Yes, times three.Then we get $5.4 billion to maintain acarrier fieet with replacements. The 15carriers, that is right. This refers to 40percent of the entire operating budget ofthe U.S. Navy. This cost is so astronomi­cal, I suppose the only way we can ap­preciate it is in proportion to otherspending. That $l'.4 billion is 15 times asmuch as we spend on low- and middle­income housing for the entire country. Itis more than tWice as much as is spenton Federal aid to elementary and sec­ondary education in the entire Nation. Sothat I think to put this in perspectiveand to challenge it is not to say that wetear down the military force or weaken

it or enfeeble it, but as the Senator saysso well, it will save money to be usedmore wisely in our defense, or in someother areas which are so essential.

Mr. MONDALE. I thank the Senator.I want to yield, because the Senatorfrom Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) has beenvery kind to let me complete mymessage.

I would siIIUJly say this iri closing, thatthe one set of nuclear carriers, destroy­ers, and so forth, to keep one wing onstation, would cost nearly $1 billion morethlln the President's widely heralded newwelfare program which is supposed tobring sustenance, health, and the goodlife to 22 million Americans.

One other point in closing, and thatis that Systems Analysis has completedthis year in July a study of cost effective­ness, a cost comparison between the samewing of aircraft, one on sea and one onland. It is classified. I cannot give thefil?'Ures. But the cost comparison showsastonishing savings that can be madethrough land-based aircraft.

I want to thank the Senator from Mis­sissippi for his impressive patience heretoday. I regret it has taken so long, butI have yielded to so many Senators bothpro and con that it has taken this muchtime.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the at­tack carrier is the backbone of the sur­face Navy of the United States. The car­rier force is the primary naval strengthwhich assures us freedom of the seas inthe face of a growing Russian maritimecapability. And freedom of the seas isabsolutely essential to the security ofthese United States. The Soviet Union,which is situated on the large land massof Europe and Asia, has access to most ofthe world's raw materials over land linesof communication. On the other hand,the United States must use the sea lanesto provide critical raw materials notavailable in this hemisphere, as well asthe tremendous amounts of fuel that areneeded to operate an industrial machinein peace or a war machine during hos­tilities. Our reliance on the high seas forthe movement of the bulk of our over­seas cargo is a simple matter of geog­raphy: We are essentially an island andthis is not a transient condition but apermanent, unchanging physical fact.

To maintain our capability to preservethe freedom of the seas for the pursuitof our own national interest under thethreat of a growing Russian Navy, wemust have a strong modern Navy. Thiscan only be achieved through the con­tinuing input of new and modern ships.Let me just make this point, Mr. Presi­dent-we are not building a new fleet; weare trying to maintain a viable force byreplacing aging ships which can nolonger perform their mission in the faceof the rapidly increasing strength of thethreat that they face. The attack ear­lier is the basic building block of ourNavy's strength. It seems to me thatdelaying the acquisition of this carrier,while costs continue to rise, and fundsare spent on obsolete equipment, con­stitutes false economy.

As a maritime power with our verysurvival as a first-class Nation dependingon freedom of the seas, it is a matter of

September 10, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 25069

great concenl to me, Mr. President, thatour capability of insuring the uninter­rupted use of the sealanes of communi­cation is being actively threatened. I wasimpressed by some rather startling .sta­tistics which were cited by AdmiralMoorer, the Chief of Naval Operations,in an address last month to the Veteransof Foreign Wars. He pointed out that theSoviet Union has more than quadrupledits merchant ship tonnage since 1950.On the other hand, today the UnitedStates has less than a third of the mer­chant shipping which we operated in1950.

Admiral Moorer pointed out that thesame trend prevails in combatant ships.Mere numbers tell only part of the storythough: Nearly 60 percent of our war­ships upon which our forward defensestrategy depends, are 20 years old ormore, while in the Soviet Navy, of the1,000 or more surface combatants andsubmarines currently in the Soviet Fleet,less than one-fourth of 1 percent arepast the 20-year mark.

In the face of this dramatic increase innaval capability by the Soviet Union, Iconsider it the height of imprudence forus to allow our own fleet to rust awayinto obsolescence while we drag our feetand fail to provide the replacement shipsthat will keep our Navy a viable force.

On the subject of modernization, Mr.President, I think it is important for Sen­ators to recognize that the need for thecarrier which is funded in this bill doesnot depend for its validity on a carrierforce level of 15 or 16 carriers. When thisship goes into the fleet in 1974 it will re­place a carrier which at that time will be30 years old-it replaces an Essex-typecarrier of World War n vintage which isnot capable of handling such modern air­craft as the F-4, the RA-5C, the A-6, orthe F-14. Thus, Mr. President, the Essexclass carrier today is restricted to secondclass fighters and by 1974, when it is re­placed, it will be operating what is, in ef­fect, third-rate planes. I think it is clear,Mr. President, that we are approachingthe time when the Essex class air wingcannot survive in the threat environmentestablished by the newest Soviet tacticalaircraft. Certainly we will reach thatpoint before CVAN-69 can be completed,even if it is started this year. I for oneam not willing to say to our pilots andcrewmen, "Do the best you can withthese inferior weapons. They are all yourcountry can afIord." I can see no validreason for delaying the funding of thiscarrier any further while we restudythe requirement. The requirement hasbeen validated by carefUl study andanalysis in the Navy, the Department ofDefense, and the Congress when we stud­ied this three-ship bUilding program in1968. The sea lanes are too vital to usas a maritime power to risk their loss. Weneed this carrier and we need to start itthis year.

The reasons for this action are asfollows:

First. For all levels of military actionother than all-out nuclear war-from ashow of force to general war-the attackcarrier is the primary striking force ofour Navy. It provides the ofIensive powernecessary to assure free use of the seasand the air over the seas in support ofour national objectives.

Second. Despite the tremendous tech­nological progress that has been made intransportation and weapons systems inthis century, free use of the seas-whichcover three-fourths of the earth's sur­face-continues to be essential to thesecurity of the United States, whetherwe are forced to fight to defend ourselvesor to help defend our allies.

Third. Today our overseas allies de­pend upon our support, which must comeby sea. There is no valid plan for over­seas military operations of the Anny, AirForce, or amphibious forces with em­barked marines that does not depend onour free use of the seas. For example, 98percent of all of the supplies which havegone to Vietnam have been carried byships.

Fourth. Our present national strategyrelies heavily upon military forces de­ployed overseas-forces capable of re­sponding to a spectrum of contingenciesin overseas areas of primary national in­terest. These forward deployed forces,which must be supplied by sea, providethis country with flexible and rapid re­sponse to whatever pressures our poten­tial enemies may apply.

Fifth. A change in national strategyresulting in the withdrawal of our de­ployed military forces, would increase therequirement to maintain a strong mari­time posture. The capability of theUnited States to fight for an extendedperiod in defense of its territory andareas of interest is dependent on ourability to maintain the flow of materialsand oil over the seas. The sheer bulk ofthe daily use of oil for military and in­dustrial needs precludes stockpilingquantities for more than short-termneeds.

Sixth. An efIective tactical air capa­bility is essential to sustain ow' generalpurpose and logistic support forcesagainst a determined enemy usingmodern weapons. Sea-based and land­based tactical aircraft are required toprovide support for our forces in theareas of the world where we must beprepared to flght.

Seventh. Land-based tactical aircraftcan be employed when their land baseshave been adequately prepared, pro­visioned and defended, and when theyare located within range of the area ofconflict.

Eighth. sea-based tactical aircraft arerequired when land bases are not avail­able or do not have the capacity to meetthe required tactical aircraft needs. Theattack carriers can quicklY concentratethis sea-based tactical air power.

There are those that say that carriersare provocative; that they tend to in­volve the United States in the afIairs ofother nations and commit us to wars wedo not want to fight. To this I can only'say that of all our major instruments ofnational power, the carrier is the leastprovocative. U.S. bases on foreign soilinvariably involve political and militarycommitments in exchange for baserights. The bases themselves, as centersof U.S. power and influence, invite at­tack from dissident elements in the hostcountry, involving us in unwanted con­frontations, committing us to measuresnot in consonance with our overall na­tional policy. Sovereignty questions as­sociated with our overseas bases have

caused problems between our Govern­ment and host nations and have been amajor source of the Yankee-go-homesentiment. Attack carriers, on the otherhand, are mobile air bases which can beretained in home waters and deployedor withdrawn to meet changing interna­tional situations without altering ourinternational commitments. Carriers canremain in home waters and then deployto an overseas trouble spot. When de­ployed, the carrier can remain in thewings, out of sight, so as not to upset adelicate situation but still be availableto unleash its power at a moment's noticeor should the situation dictate, the de­ployed carrier can appear on the sceneand by its very presence provide a sta­bilizing influence by serving as tangibleevidence of U.S. interests.

A final word, Mr. President, about theeffect that delay in funding this carrierthis year would have. I am sure the Sen­ators are aware that we have alreadyobligated in 1968 and 1969 funds, some$132.9 million, and that a large portionof this has either been spent or wouldbe lost in termination charges if thecontract for long leadtime nuclear pro­pulsion components were terminated. Inaddition, the Navy estimates that thedisruptions in the production plan mightwell add an additional $100 million tothe projected total cost of this carriershould we make the delayed decisionnext year to fund the carrier with fiscalyear 1971 funds. Mr. President, I amproud of the efIorts of the Senate thisyear to reduce the spending level of ournational defense. I know that this hasbeen a sincere efIort, a dedicated effort,but we must all recognize that the threatwe are facing is not diminishing and if

. we reduce the level of our spending to op­pose that threat, then we must get morefor our money. We must spend our avail­able defense funds more wisely. In myjUdgment, Mr. President, it is not wiseto waste funds on indecision. It is notwise to delay the introduction of need­ed capability into our fleet needlessly,and that, in my judgment, is what thisamendment would do: First, inject need­less delay, and second, substantially in­crease the cost in the weapon systemwhich I am convinced is urgently re­quired to maintain modem naval forcesthat are vital to our national interests.I hope that the amendment will not beadopted.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Underthe previous order, the Senator fromMississippi (Mr. STENNIS) is recognizedfor 20 minutes.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I shallnot undertake today, particularly at thistime, to outline all of the real, basic rea­sons for inclusion in the bill of the car­rier. I shall do so in the course of futuredebate. But many other Senators are pre­pared to speak on the subject. As chair­man of the committee, I wish briefly tosum up what I think are the real issuesand the real decision to be made.

In the first place, there is no law thatsets 15 or any other number as the levelof the carrier force. They are not au­thorized in that way. The President canorder them cut in half tonight. He wouldnot be violating any law if he did so.This matter is passed on every time a

25070 c;ONGRESSIONAl RECORD-SENATE Septembe~' 10, 1969

bill on the subject comes before theSenate, or on an appropriation bill. TheAppropriations Committee could recom­mend cutting down on the number ofcarriers by cutting down on the money.That would be the issue. So there is nosingle, fixed law about it.

This afternoon, I have already ex­plained that this is purely a replacement.We have four types of planes, four of themajor ones of aL the planes that fly fromcarriers, that cannot even use the oldcarriers. In the course of time, somethingmust be done about them. The only thingto do, anyway, is to have the modernweapons and phase out the older ones asfast as can be done with prudence. Howmuch is taken out because of this onegoing in will be determined by condi­tions that exist in 1974.

That will be a judgment matter for thePresident of the United States, the Sec­retary of Defense, and the Congress.

We start with the fact here that 3years ago Mr. McNamara-he has beenquoted on both sides of this matter, buthe is a very knowledgeable man-decidedthat this country should have threemodern Nimitz-class carriers. The planwas to get them over a period of 6 years,one every 2 years. We have alreadyslipped on that 1 year in time; $140 mil­lion, in round numbers, has already beenappropriated for the carrier we are talk­ing about, and a great deal of that hasbeen spent under authorizations of theCongress. Virtually all of it has beenauthorized under the authority of theCongress. Now this is for the final pay­ment on it.

But someone comes along and says,"Wait. We ought to have the GeneralAccounting Office look into this. Weought to cut back and overrule thesepeople until we can get certain informa­tion from them."

I understand an amendment has beenoffered to change the provision from theGeneral Accounting Office to the Con­gress, but, anyway, that is the motiva­tion, or part of it, involved in theamendment.

There are no overruns involved, be­cause there has not been time for over­runs with respect to this particular car­rier. However, I have the figures for theoverruns for the last two we built of thiskind. One had an authorized total costof $280 million, with an actual cost of$298 million. The second one had anauthorized cost of $293 million. Theactual cost was $247 million, so that costwas almost $50 million less than theestimate.

So we are talking here in a category ofsomething that is fairly definite and:fixed. The matter has already beenstarted. The money has been spent. Theonly issue here, after all, is the moderni­zation of weapons.

There is another item that has beenspoken against already, the A-14, whichis to be an ultramodern Navy plane totake the place of the one that did notpan out, the Navy version of the TFX.Those two go together to show the needfor modernization. We must be up frontwith the best weapons that science andmoney can afford.

In my humble opinion, Mr. President,this carrier fteet is the best possible in­vestment we could make, warld condi-

tlons being what they are and our leader­ship being what it is. There has been talkabout Soviet Russia having no carriers.Of course Soviet Russia does not havecarriers as compared with us. She doesnot have any commitments, either, in thePacific to protect Japan. She does nothave any commitments to protect thePhilippines or the Stat~ of Hawaii inthe middle of the Pacific Ocean. She doesnot have any commitments with refer­ence to Formosa. She has no commit­ments with respect to protecting Koreaover all those water miles, even if shehas commitments with respect to NorthKbrea. It is a land-based nation, livingoff the land, where the life of the peopleis, and the country has few commit­ments.

This carrier force, after all, which isable to exert a deterrence, and which hasa stabilizing inftuence, has been the sin­gle most powerful inftuence in world af­fairs since World War II.

I have a list of the incidents whichhave happened when our carrier forcewas directly involved. In the Korean war,10 carriers engaged in combat operationsduring the period of that unfortunateconfiict. We remember that our air baseswere knocked out earlier. If it had notbeen for our carrier fieet, where wouldwe have been or where would the UnitedNations Forces have been?

I will skip down the list to the KinmenIsland, 1957, Communist shelling, inwhich the naval units were dispatchedto defend Taiwan. Four carriers were onthe scene. Taiwan was once the symbolof our efforts to protect those parts ofAsia from encroachment.

The Lebanon civil war in 1958. Threecarriers provided air cover for the Ma­rine landing.

Does anyone belittle the Mediterran­ean Sea? When the conftict came, whatwas it there that did the work and car­ried the protection?

Quemoy and Matsu crisis in 1958;Many Of us remember that. Three car­riers were sent to cover evacuation andtwo additional carriers alerted.

The Cuban civil war in 1956 and 1958.One carrier was on the scene to coverevacuation and provide a presence.

The Quemoy and Matsupresence againin 1962.

The Cuban missile crisis in Octoberand November 1962. Naval forces pro­vided protection and intervention. Eightcaniers were on the scene.

The Arab-Israel war, June 1967. Twocarriers were on the scene to coverevacuation.

We saw the headlines in the morningnewspapers. Shooting is going on overthere now.

In my humble opinion, if it were notfor the American fteet in the Mediter­ranean area-and I am not trying tostir up anything-within 6 months' timeGreece and Turkey could be invaded andmore serious troubles and clashes could,and probably in time would, occur in theNear East.

Those are the practicalities. We aretalking about hardware. We are talkingabout modernization. We are talkingabout some of the most effective andsome of the most immediately availableweapons we could possibly use.

n is all right to challenge this matter.

Debate is always wholesome. But no oneneed think this subject has been a quietsubject all these years. This matter hasbeen heard in the Appropriations Com­mittee year after year after year, andwe on the Appropriatiolli" Committee areall familiar with the confiict of interestbetween the Air Force and the Navy. Ispeak with proper respect for bothbranches, but I do not have any patiencewith their eternal argument about whichis the best and which is the worst, whichis the most effective and which is theleast effective. It is just "trade talk,"mostly, and very few members of the Ap­propriations Committee who have fol­lowed the matter all the way throughhave any doubt about the need for thisweapon to be there at the right time atthe right place.

I will help take the lead in reducingthe amount of the cost of the operationsof the Navy as to carriers or anythingelse. I will help anyone who goes at it inthe right way. But I will not come inhere and attack from the side or fromthe rear in any way on the foremost andthe keenest possible naval weapon wecould have, except for our modern sub­marines, which serve in another field.

Let us get down to someone who knowssomething about the subject, anotherman who wears his uniform. I will takehis word anywhere. any time, any place,in a statement for himself or againsthimself.

That is Admiral Rickover. I wrote Ad­miral Rickover a letter; I did not callhim up and ask him what he thought,what he would say, or anything else. Ijust wrote him a letter and told him Iwanted to know what he tho"Jght aboutcarriers. I knew one thing: He would putsubmarines first, which he did. He knowsthe subject, and he knows why, and wecan thank God there has been a Rick­over, and that Congress would not letthem put him out of the Navy 10 yearsago. We can be thankful for that.

But that very :fine man and very gra­cious officer said:

There are, however, some Important Navymissions, which cannot, In any known prac­tical way, be carried out by submarines.

Then, after he complimented the sub­marines, he said:

One of these Is the provision of sea-basedtactical air power to protect our sea lanesand our air lanes over the seas, as well as tosupport amphibious operations and overseasmilitary land operations beyon" the range ofthe land-based tactical air power availableto us.

Then he goes on, and I shall read morefrom this letter, but briefiy now I shallread, as he gives them, the reasons for hisconclusions about this Nimitz-class car­rier and the need for it.

He said:Three-fourths of the earth's surface Is cov­

ered by water; 95 percent of the world's pop­ulation live within range of carrier aircraft.

The United States Is essentlally an Islandbetween two oceans-an Island dependent onfree use of the seas for transport of materialand fuels necessary for our survival-

I mentioned our commitments a whileago. He continues:

No valid plan exists for overseas militaryoperations by the Army-

This is Rickover speaking-

September 10, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 25071by the Air force, Dr by amphibious forces,which does not depend on our abiUty toguarantee free use of the seas. Virtually allsupplies to Vietnam, for example, have beencarried by ships.

That will be true a long, long time, inspite of the C-5A's, to Vietnam or someother Vietnam. A lot of it will have to goby ship, the followup part particularly.He continued:

Without a modern attack carrier force, theUnited States is not assured free use of theseas In those areas of the world that are im­portant to us. It is simply not practicable toestablish enough land air bases adequatelyprepared, provisioned, defended, and withinrange of potential areas of conflict.

This is still Rickover speaking:Seven of the sixteen carriers currently op­

erating in the attack carrier role werelaunched during or shortly after World WarII. Five of these cannot operate several of themodern aircraft types now in the fleet. Theywill not be able to operate air wings whichcan survive against Soviet weapons tech­nology of the 1970's.

That is the admiral still speaking, Mr.President.

Each Nimitz-class carrier-

And that is what we are arguingabout--will carry 50 percent more aircraft ammuni­tion and twice as much aircraft fuel as thelatest conventional powered attack carrier.

This, combined with the unllmited highspeed endurance provided by nuclear powerwill greatly increase their capability for sus­tained combat operations.

• • • * •The Nimitz-class will be the best protected

and least vulnerable carriers ever des1gned-

That is the Nimitz class, which is whatis in this bill-The added protection is provided by extensiveuse of armor against bombs and guided mis­siles, as well as by improVed anti-torpedohull demgn. The unlimited endurance at highspeed and freedom from the need to slowdown to refuel PrQvided by nuclear propul­sion further reduces the carriers' vulnera­bllity.

Our friends here say all the carriersare vulnerable. Is there any weapon thatis not vulnerable? Is there any invulner­able weapon? Not even the igloo in thefrozen north can be made invulnerable.Certainly those of us down home in thepath of that hurricane know that mandevises or plans, but a superior poweracts. And a superior power decides in themilitary. Nothing is invulnerable. But hesays they are the best protected and leastvulnerable of all carriers ever designed.

The second ship of this ClaSs, the CVAN-

That is the one in the bill-is scheduled for dellvery in 1974.

And he says what it will replace. That,of course, was already known. He con­tinued:

Were the Navy required to operate asmaller carrier force, the improved capabili­ties of the Nimitz class would become evenmore important.

I hope we do operate a smaller num­ber of carriers, and I believe we will. Thebest way to get the number reduced is tohave this modern type, with its addi­tional capabilities. He continued:

The 3 Nimitz-class attack carriers are might have anywhere with their groundthe only ones authorized or planned from bases.FY 1964 through 1972, a period of 9 years; Fine as they are, our land bases over­this will average out to but one new attack seas have shrunk from 105 to 35 in thecarrier every 3 years. last 10 years, in round numbers. I re-

He says further: member being in France, as I have statedIf we do not continuously modernize our before so many times, where so many of

attack carrier force, its ability to protect our air bases were dedicated-I knowour naval and overseas mllitary forces and of nearly a billion dollars that we spentthe logistic lifeline for our military and in- there on those bases-and now we can­dustrial needs against the increasing capa- not even land there without a permit. Webllities of potential enemies will be degraded. cannot even fly over the airspace above

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the France, the heart of Europe, without get-Senator yield at that point? ting a permit. Of course, this is a diplo-

Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator matic thing, but you have to fly. Thirtyfrom Rhode Island. days in advance, you have to get that.

Mr. PASTORE. Speaking on this It shows that we are skating on thequestion of modernization and improve- thinnest possible ice and are talkingment, I think the one thing that we have about an imaginary thing when we talkto bear in mind is that we cannot rest about having airbases wherever we mighton the accomplishments of the past to need them.guarantee the security of the future. I yield the floor.

Take the Enterprise. The Enterprise Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, inwas the first nuclear propelled aircraft an effort to clear up what I think was acarrier. The Enterprise has eight reac- misunderstanding this morning, beforetors, and its maneuverability, was proved today's debate ends on this issue, I shouldin the Mediterranean and in the Cuban like to clarify remarks made this morn­crises. It has been further proved in ing by the Senator from Maryland con­Vietnam. cerning Mr. George Wilson's article pub-

But now, the Nimitz, instead of the lished in the Washington Post entitledeight reactors, will have two reactors. "Air Force May Spur Navy Carrier De­Mind you what improvement has been bate." The article was printed in themade in such a short time~ The Nimitz RECORD as evidence of Air Force efforts towill hit the water, I understand, in 1971. discredit the capability of the naval air

Mr. STENNIS. The first one, that is force.right. Part of the information was taken

Mr. PASTORE. Those two reactors from a letter from the Air Force to ahave the same power of the eight reactors U.S. Senator in response to these threein the Enterprise. And do you know what questions:those two reactors are the equivalent of, (1) What is the number of overseas-airin power? They tell me the power of bases that the Air Force has relinquishedthose two reactors is equivalent to that since the Korean war? Why were these basesof the line of oil freight cars stretching given up? And has the release of these basesa distance of 500 miles. That is the power, jeopardized the USAF tactical air capabll1ty?and that shows the progress that we I stress and underline the words "thehave made. If we stop at this point, what U.S. Air Force tactical air capability." Itwe are going to do is rely on the past to does not say anything about the level ofprotect us in the future. That is the mis- the Naval Air Force tactical capability.take of stopping now. The other questions were:

Furthermore, we have already in- (2) What is meant by the "KIT" methOdvested, in this new aircraft carrier, al- of quick construction of land bases as brieflymost $130 million, that will go right described in the August 25 edition of thedown the drain. The question here is, Washington Post?How far can we go in flirting with dis- (3) What is the capablllty of the Airaster when it comes to the security of Force's new air superiority fighter, the F-15?this country? The Air Force capability refers only to

I thank the Senator. Air Force tactical capability. In fact, theMr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator words "Navy carrier" are not even con­

from Rhode Island very much for his tained in the letter. Consequently, tosplendid contribution. No one is more quote from the letter and then refer toknowledgeable as a legislator-I make no it as an "Air Force paper likely to haveexceptions-in this field and related short- and long-range impact on the de­fields than is the Senator from Rhode bate on the American Military Estab­Island, who has contributed so very lishment" is an incredible exaggeration.much indeed as chairman, for a while, More specifically, I feel that in hisand then as a member of our Joint Atom- statement made his morning. the dis­ic Energy Committee. tinguished Senator from Maryland clear-

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 20 ly implied that the Air Force ,,'asminutes of the Senator from Mississippi attempting to discredit and replace thehave expired. • Air Force carrier. Such implication is

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask for erroneous.1 additional minute. We are not WIder Air power, land-based and sea-based,controlled time, but I shall take 1 ad- each has its separate and distinct role toditional minute. play.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- The Air Force clearly recognizes theator from Mississippi is recognized for 1 c::>mplementary nature of the mission inadditional minute. support of the aircraft canier and the

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the ar- mission of the U.S. Tactical Air Force.gument made by the Air Force-I have I have some confidential informationheard it over and over-is that they are with me which, if I eliminate enclosureable to take care of all situations that we No. I, is no longer classified. Enclosure

25072 •CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 10, 1969

SEPTEMBER 2, 1969.

0- 3, 000- 5, 000- 8, 0003, 000 5, 000 8,000 or over

No. 1 has to do with major base dis­elosures, going into it item by item.

I ask unanimous consent to haveprinted at this point in the RECORD theletter addressed, "Dear senator HAT­FIELD," from the Air Force.

There being no objection, the letter wasordered to be printed in the RECORD, asfollows:

JOHN R. MURPHY,Major General, U.S. Air Force, Director,

Legislative Liaison.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, Iwill eliminate enclosure NO.1 which willdowngrade the classification from con­fidential to normal. I then ask unani­mous consent that attachment No.2 andattachment No.3 be printed at this pointin the RECORD.

There being no objection, the materialwas ordered to be printed in the RECORD,as follows:

TOTAL NUMBER OF AIRFIELDS BY COUNTRY AND BYLENGTH RUNWAY (FEET)

206

111133

149

231

All air·fields

11338

2098

143

Number of activenational airfields

11oo2o4

28 235

10 154 680

LongerActive thanUSAF 8,000 feet

o

oo41oo

Inacti­vated

SUMMARY

Number of majorhases I

Country

PacifiC:Bonin Is_____ 1 0 0 1Japan__ 9 4 14 59Korea_______ 1 2 6 22Others.______ 0 18 132 476

---'---------Subtotal. __ 11 24 152 558

Others:Canada __Miscellan-

eous ~

Europe:France__ 22 0 17 81Germany_____ 11 8 34 119Italy________ 3 1 21 43Netherlands__ 0 1 12 16Spain.______ 0 2 17 30United

Kingdom___ 14 9 34 171OtherL___ __ 0 0 73 216

----------Subtotal. __==,;50~=o=:2;,1==~20;;8==~68;,6

Mediterranean:Greece _Libya _Morocco __ .• _Saudi Arabia••Turkey _Others. _

-----------Subtotal. __

0- 3, 000- 5, 000- 8, 0003, 000 5, 000 8,000 or over

Subtotal ==~==~12~=,,;;;,18:;2==~91~5

. TotaL_____ 67 61 685 2,3911

TOTAL NUMBER OF AIRFIELDS BY COUNTRY AND BYLENGTH RUNWAY (FEET}-Continued

I Bases in U.S.-owned territory excluded.

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, Idid not mention the "KIT" constructionmatter that the Washington Postbrought up. The Air Force does not

Turkey • .______________ 4 9 20

~~~~sia~~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ~ -- -- ---jTaiwan .__ I 2 3 10Union South Africa________ 1 7 23 8United Kingdom__________ 4 41 88 33UpperVolla .____ 1 1Uruguay .____ 2 4 2 .. __Venezuela_______________________ 4 7 5Soulh Vietnam.__________ 7 22 6 8

~[~~~1~~_~~~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ~ ::::::::Western Samoa___________________ 1 3 . _Yemen .___________ 1 1 2Yugoslavia.______________ 2 7 7 15ZanzibaL • .. __ __ 1 _Lebanon • • •• __• .,. • • 3

~:~~~:rf~t;::::::~::::::::::::::::::::::::::: !Netherlands Antilles • _. • _. _ 2French Somaliland • .. _ 1SI. Helena . __ 1Sierra Leone . __ 1American Samoa_.... _. . __ ' • 1Trinidad ._ ••. " __ _ 1Uganda .. • ._ ___ 2Rwanda •• 1 1SI. Pierre .... ..._ 1 1Port Timor.. ._______________ 1 __ ._____ 1Surinam • _. __ • . .__ 1Qatar. .. . _. ._ __ ________ __ ____ __ ___ 1Cape Verde . . . 1Andaman Island. . . . 1Barbados~ • __ ___ __ __ ____ __ __ __ ______ _ 1Bermuda • • _ 1Burundi • . • . 1Cambodia__.. • _ 2Nawpo Shoto Island__ • ._ __ 1Faeroe Islands___________________ 1 _French Guiana. .______ _ 1liberiL_________________________ 1 __ ._____ 1Mascarene Islands________________ 1 2New Caledonia ._____ 1 ..__ 1

TotaL____________ 128 541 1,036 685

I 31 _

2 18 8

10 31 21 ....1 81 ._._5 11 _. __ • _2 36 293 14 21 • _

2 412 651 173 11 111 I1 II .1 71 • _

2 112 11 2

27 341 12 _. _

16 71 _

2 136 383 68 131 5

16 211 1

13 141 2.( --------3 25 66 _1 _2 _4 22 32 _

4 21 2 ._.

1 _

7 37 _1 _

33 78 33 122 _

8 15 19 111 • _2 18 _1 __

10 22 11 13 101 . _6 69 82 22 33 81 ...1 I1 13 33 13 23 13 _

2 11 _

3 24 12 11 21 29 173 82 _1 ..5 _

47 62 9

10 63 _. •1 24 9

TOTAL NUM-BER OF AIRFIELDS BY COUNTRY AND BYLENGTH RUNWAY (FEET)-Continued

0- 3.000- 5.000- 8, 0003, 000 " 000 ~, 000 or over

!~~;:[[~~::[[:::::::[~:.j:Denmark .__ 3 .(Dodecanese .__________ _ .(Dominican Republic .__ 1E~ter_'_'" __ . __ • • _.. _Ecuador .. • • _

fr&J~~({_~ ~:::: ::::::::::::::::::: l~i ~:rv~~~~::: ::::::::::::::::::: ~_~l~I~~~a~ ~::::::::::::::::::::::: -----.2'

~~F~~;i j~~i~;~~:::::::::::::: ~:. ~~.Gambia.. .. _Gabon Republic ._____________ 2

I~;~~:~::::::~:~:~~:~:':::::::i:FederalRepublicofGermany 35 23

South Korea .. 5 6Laos . __ •• .__ 1 5Line Island Group •• .---------

tr~r~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::Ma agasy Republic.. 7Madiera . •• _

~~~~h~iC-:-.·------·-.-.------ 2

~~t;~j!!!!~::••::::;~~:~::;.

t~J;]I;;);;·;;::::I::jNew Zealand.____________ 2 28Muscat-Oman_ __ _ 1Paraguay ._ 3 3

~~~nix __~~::::::: :::::::_ .. ~ ~.Philippines .__ 10West Pakistan_. .. ._____ 1Panama .. 1 2Puerto Rico______________________ 4

~~~uJ~:iiea:::::::::::::::::::::: ~_Panama Canal Zone •• .. _Ric Muni. __ .. . . • __Ryukyu Islands ._____________ 1MaIL______ 2N. Rhodesia . __ .________ 1S. Rhodesia .... __ 1Solomon . 2Sardinia_. ... .. ._ .. _•. __Sarawak. __ .. __ 3Sicily .. _ 1Society__ . __ • _.__________________ 1SenegaL .. .. 1SomalI. ... .. _Singapore____ ____ 1Spain ___ __ ____ __ ____ __ ___ __ _____ 4Saudi Arabia . . . •Sp. Sahara . ._. __Sao Tome_ . __ .. ._. _Sudan .. • __ •Sweden__________________ 2 4Syria . __ .. _Switzerland • 5 5Tanganyika __ • __ __ __ _______ __ 1Trucial Oman . .Thailand. __ ___ 7

I 14 5

12 158 4

31 1154 146 13 31 2I 11 94 31 _1 __

1 22 _. ._5 27 31 ...2 __ ._. _

37 73 _.... _2 _1 23 13 15 1

16 21 11 _

3 1101 28

9 33 1

Aden_. •___ __ __ ____ __ _ IAfghanistan ' ______ _ 2Algeria . . __ . _. _.. __ . _ 1Angola_._ .. __ ___ ___ 6Argentina________________ 4 11Australia_ __ __ __ __ __ _ 11Austria .______ I 4Antarctica _Azores ._Bahrein • __ •. _Belgium_. _. 4Bahamas __ . ... . . 1Br. Guiana ...... • _Bornholm • .. __ ...... •Balearic • .. __ • ' _.Bechuanaland. ._. ._ 1Bolivia__________________ 1 9Burma. .. __ 6British Honduras.________ 1 _N. Borneo ._.... IBrazil. .__ __ _ 23West Berlin__ • . . _Brunei. • • . _. _Canary . __ . ... _Central African Republic .. __ ._. _Ceylon • • __ _ IChad _. _. _._ ..... • _Chile____________________ 1 9Cocos Island • _Caroline • _Cameroon ._ •••••• _Canada_____ 24 82Columbia . _ 2Congo, Republic 01.. . _

Hon. MARK HATFIELD,U.S. Sena.te.

DEAR SENATOR HATFIELD: A few da.ys ago,Mr. Michaelson of your Stall' asked the AirForce to provide you with information re­garding air bases overseas, quick construc­tion of bases and the performance capabl11tyof the F-15. More specifically, I understandyour questions were:

1. What is the number of overseas airbases the Air Force has rellnquished sincethe Korean War; why were these bases givenup; and has the loss of these bases Jeopard­ized the USAF tactical air capab1llty?

2. Wha.t is meant by the "Kit" method ofqUick construction of land bases as brlefiydescribed In the August 25 edition of theWashington Post?

3. What is the capab1llty of the Air Force'snew air superiority fighter, the F-15?

Although an attempt was made to keep theanswers to these questions unclassified, tobe completely responsive, an additional clas­sified answer was required for the F-15 be­cause some of the performance parametersof the aircraft are classified and simllarly, aportion of the information relating to baseclosures Is classified.

If we can be of any further assistance,please call.

Sincerely,

September 10, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 25073know what the Post is talking about. I amnot surprised. That is customary.

I should like to comment on the mat­ter because the distinguished Senatorfrom Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) waspresent earlier and called for overseasbase reduction.

I would point out that since the Ko­rean war, we have inactivated 67 over­seas bases, and there remain 61 activeoverseas Air Force bases. There are 685overseas national air fields, with longerthan 8,000-foot runways. There are 2,­390 airfields in all.

Mr. President, I will eliminate any ref­erence to the F-15 question, because thatremains, as it should remain from thenature of the information, a highly clas­sified one. However, I did want to getthis matter disposed of today, because Ifelt distinctly that it was an effort togenerate a feud between the Air Forceand the Navy. And I have sat throughtoo many hearings to think for one mo­ment that the Navy is out to get the AirForce, or that the Air Force is out toget the Navy. They work in a comple­mentary way. There are differences, ofcourse; there always will be argumentabout weapons.

I did not want the debate to proceedfurther with Senators thinking that theNavy was out to get the Air Force, orthat the Air Force was out to get theNavy. Such is not the case.

There is a distinct difference in thebasic need for sea-air power as broughtout very distinctly by the chairman ofthe committee.

When I note that the basic require­ment of sea-air power is to provide airsuperiority for the fleet and for the con­veyance of merchandise and troops andheavy cargo overseas, their distinct usefor tactical operation is largely for at­tacking tactical targets that we cannotattack from land because of the longdistance involved.

I cite the part played by the Navy inbasing the carriers in the Tonkin Gulfand eliminating the need for the U.S.tactical aircraft to make long missionswhich require refueling.

Mr. President, I appreciate the oppor­tUnity to clear up this matter.

Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, I wouldlike to commend the proponents ofamendment No. 136 for drasticallychanging their original proposal. Thedistinguished Senator from Minnesotaand the distinguished Senator fromNew Jersey have demonstrated wisdomand foresight by rewriting their amend-ment. '.

As originally proposed, Mr. President,there were two items out of 14 that theComptroller General could properlyperform.

The amendment as rewritten nowseeks to have the Comptroller Generalinvestigate and report on only those twoof the original 14 tasks.

The amendment as originally pre­pared, after striking $377 million fromthe bill, sought to impose the Comptrol­ler General as a new form of con­gressional systems analysts reminiscentof that office that has caused such fear­ful headaches during the McNamararegime.

CXV--158o-Part 18

I am particularly delighted that theoriginal amendment has been withdrawnbecause the Congress never intendedthat the General Accounting Officeshould second guess the Joint Chiefs ofStaff. This is what that amendmentsought to accomplish.

The rewriting of amendment No. 136also demonstrates that the debate on theC-5A aircraft has provided a warningsignal that the meat-ax approach is anexercise in futility.

Mr. President, I would like also tosay that I am pleased that the distin­guished Senator from Minnesota hasnow returned to his earlier thinkingabout the proper functions of the Comp­troller General and the General Ac­counting Office.

During hearings on Economic Oppor­tunity Amendments of 1969 in May ofthis year before the Subcommittee onEmployment, Manpower, and' Poverty,Senator MONDALE addressed the Honor­able Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller Gen­eral of the United States as follows, frompage 367 of the printed hearings:

I don't wish to be unduly critical. I thinktt.at it was the Congress that insinuatedthe General Accounting OlIice in this wholearena. But I have grave doubts that this isthe role that tt,e General Accounting OlIiceshould perform because these are politicaljudgments. These are judgments in additionthat reqUire the sophistication of profes­sIonals in education, in health, in legal serv­ices, that involve a lifetime of the mostrigorous sophisticated academic and prac­tical background coupled with experience.

I agree wholeheartedly with the dis­tinguished Senator from Minnesota.

Thank you, Mr. President. During thedebate I will further comment on thesubject of this amendment.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENTMr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the

pending matter is the amendment of theSenator from Minnesota and the Senatorfrom New Jersey, and I ask unanimousconsent that when the Senate conveneson Friday the time on the amendment becontrolled, commencing at 10:30 a.m. Iunderstand that an order already hasbeen entered that the Senate convene at10 a.m. on Friday.

I also ask unanimous consent that theSenator from New Jersey (Mr. CASE) berecognized first to speak on the amend­ment; that the time, beginning at 10:30,be controlled by and be equally diVidedbetween the proponents of the amend­ment and the Senator acting as fioormanager of the bill on behalf of the com­mittee; and that we vote at 3 p.m., notbefore, on Friday.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.CRANSTON in the chair). Without objec­tion, it is so ordered.

The unanimous consent agreement,subsequently reduced to writing, is asfollows:

Ordered, That effective at 10:30 o'clocka.m., Friday, september 12, 1969, further de­bate on pending amendment No. 146, offeredby the Senator from Minnesota (fo.Ir. MON­DALE), to S. 2546, the military procurementproponents (Mr. MONDALE) and the oppon­authorization bUl, be 11rn1ted to 4~~ hoursto be equally divided and controlled by theentB (Mr. STENNIS), and that the Senate

proceed to vote on said amendment No. 146at 3 o'clock pm. on that day.

Ordered further, That at 10:30 o'clock am.,Friday next, the Senator from New Jersey(Mr. CASE) be recognized by the Chair.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I speakin opposition to the pending amendmentwhich would strike from the fiscal year1970 Department of Defense authoriza­tion bill the funds necessary to build ourthird nuclear-powered attack aircraftcarrier, CVAN-69.

My opposition to this amendment de­rives from three main considerations:

First, there are only two practical waysto project modern tactical airPower in­to those parts of the world where we havevital interests-tactical aircraft flyingfrom Air Force land airbases and tacticalaircraft flying from the Navy's attackcarriers. The United States could notbuild the number of land airbases aroundthe world that would be required to meetall of our tactical air requirements. Infact, we are experiencing continuous ero­sion in the number of overseas basesavailable to us. For example, at the endof the Korean war we had 551 overseasbases. Today we have less than 173. Op­erational U.S. Air Force overseas baseshave declined in number from 105 in1957 to 35.

The difficulties involved in keepingforeign bases are becoming increasinglyevident as the United States tries to ne­gotiate or renegotiate foreign base agree­ments. Also, land bases on foreign soilare vulnerable to political action. Re­gardless of treaties or agreements, a na­tion can unilaterally cancel a treaty andour bases in that nation are no longeravailable. This happened to us, for ex­ample, in Morocco and France. Further­more, the use of land bases can be tem­porarily denied to us for political rea­sons-and without warning.

Naval attack carriers, by contrast, aremobile airbases which can be kept inhome waters or deployed to meet con­tingencies, without political involvement.Operating from international waters, thecarriers are normally unencumbered byoverflight clearances and base restric­tions so frequently encountered by land­based air.

Second, if any reduction in our car­rier force level is decided upon in the nextseveral years, I beli~ve it should be madeby retiring our World War II carriers,not by canceling or delaying the con·struction of our new nuclear-poweredattack carriers.

The Navy has built nine modern at­tack carriers since 1952, including thenuclear-pOwered Enterprise. The re­maining six attack carriers operating to­day were launched during or shortlyafter World War II; four of these areof the Essex class.

It is not practical to further modern­ize the Essex-class attack carriers. Theycannot operationally support several ofthe new aircraft: F-4 Phantom II, RA­5C Vigilante, A-6 Intruder, E-2 Hawkeye,F-14. The problem is that aircraft sizeand speed have become too much for thesmaller size decks of the World War IIcarriers.

There are three carriers in the Mid­way class which were laid down at thepeak of World War II. These shiDS are

25074 • CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Septe'mber 10, 1969

larger than the Essex class, but muchsmaller than the Forrestal, Enterprise,and Nimitz classes. The Department ofDefense had planned to modernize allthree of these carriers over the next sev­eral years. However, the modernizationof the Midway which is nearing comple­tion has turned out to be so expensivethat plans to modernize her sister ships,the Franklin D. Roosevelt and Coral Sea,have been abandoned.

The Nimitz-class carriers incorporatethe most modern technological advancesincluding nuclear propulsion and thecapability to handle and support thenewest tactical aircraft. In designing theCVAN-69 the Navy has drawn on manylessons learned in carrier operations inthe Vietnam war, particularly in theareas of command and control, intelli­gence processing, ordnance handling,firefighting, and damage control.

Also, since the nuclear carrier does nothave to carry propulsion fuel oil, it cancarry much larger amounts of aircraftfuel and other combat consumableswhich greatly increases its combat ca­pability. The nuclear cores being built atthe present time for the Nimitz and theCVAN-69 will fuel the ships for at least13 years of normal operations.

If it proves necessary for us to operatea smaller carrier force in the future, itwill become even more important thateach ship in the operating forces be asup to date and capable as possible. Inthis regard, it should be noted that pro­ceeding with the CVAN-69 will not in­crease the number of carriers in theNavy's active inventory. When this car­rier joins the fleet in 1974 it will replacethe Bon Homme Richard-which willthen be 30 years old-a veteran of WorldWar II, Korea, and Vietnam.

Third, this ship-CVAN-69-has beenin the 5-year defense plan for 4 years.Each year the need for the ship has beenthoroughly reviewed and reconfirmed bythe Department of Defense and Con­gress.

Congress has already appropriated atotal of $132.9 million for this ship overa 2-year period. The propulsion machin­ery for the CVAN-69 is well along infabrication. The procurement of the re­maining components and the ship con­struction are carefully sequenced withthe Nimitz for maximum economy-thiseconomy can be achieved only if thefunds required for this ship are retainedin the fiscal year 1970 budget.

To delay this ship now by furtherstudy-as would be done if the proposedamendment were adopted-would wastetens of millions of dollars due to the dis­ruption and inefficiency that would beforced into the ship construction by theholdup.

Mr. President, I cannot see that itmakes any sense to delay or otherwiseinterfere with the construction of thisNimitz-class carrier. I shall vote againstthe proposed amendment.

Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President,I wish to commend the distinguishedSenator from Washington for his veryexcellent presentation as to the reasonsthe pending amendment should bedefeated.

Mr. President, I support the author­ization of $377 million for the CVAN-69

nuclear aircraft carrier. It is a vitallyimportant part of the military procure­ment program and will provide anequally important element of our sea­power. Our Nation must remain mili­tarily strong if it is to remain free.

The aircraft carrier is the primarystriking force of our Navy. Our aircraftcarriers must be modern if our Navy isto be modern.

The carrier proposed for fiscal year1970 originally was scheduled to befunded in fiscal year 1969. Congress al­ready has appropriated nearly $133 mil­lion for this carrier, making a total costof $510 million.

The cost of a modern, nuclear aircraftcarrier is great. But the stakes involvedin control of the seas are even greater.

The distinguished senior Senator fromVermont (Mr. AIKEN) recently usedthese words in discussing nuclear sub­marines:

Whoever controls the seas Will control theoverriding question of peace or war.

Because of sea power, I strongly urgeauthorization of the new nuclear car­rier, which will be our third such ship.

I speak as one who does not believein blank checks for Pentagon projects: Ialready have voted for a reduction of $2billion in the current military procure­ment authorization.

Mr. President, it is important to putin perspective the money involved in thetotal procurement program. The budgetsubmitted by the administration of Pres­ident Johnson in January called for a $23billion outlay for military hardware, re­search, and development. When Presi­dent Nixon came into office, this was re­viewed and the Nixon administrationbrought in a bUdget of $22 billion.

The Armed Services Committee, underthe leadership of the distinguished Sen­ator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS),went very carefUlly into the military pro­curement program, and the committeerecommends to the Senate that $2 bil­lion be taken out of the request fromthe administration, leaving a militaryprocurement authorization bill of $20billion. ThUS, the committee favors areduction, and the Senator from Virginiafavors a reduction. We favor cutting thefat out of the military budget, but we donot favor cutting out the muscle.

The carrier now being considered isthe second in the Nimitz class. The nameship of the class, the Nimitz, now is un­der construction. The Nimitiz will beour second nuclear-powered carrier-theEnterprise, of course, already is in ac­tion-and the ship requested in the cur­rent authorization will be Navy's third.

This program is essential if we are tomaintain mobile bases for our tacticalaircraft.

Tactical aircraft are vital to the de­fense of our national interests. Tacticalaircraft, like any other, need a place toland and a place from which to take off.Since 1954, the United States has losttwo-thirds of its overseas bases, andthere is nothing in the world politicalscene that indicates a future reversalof this trend.

The aircraft carrier, therefore, is theonly assured overseas "base" for tacticalaircraft that can be bought today. Thecarrier does not come cheap, but the cost

Is not prohibitive, considering the stakesthat are involved.

It has been proposed that a review bemade of the role of carriers in contin­gencies, the vulnerability of carriers, thepolicy of replacing carriers on a one-for­one basis and the foreign policy implica­tions of the carrier force.

This kind of review is being carried oncontinually. I believe that the wholespectrum of American foreign policy andmilitary posture should be under con­tinuous review by the Congress and theadministration.

However, even though such .a reviewis carried out, it would not el1mmate theneed for this carrier.

For one thing, no review of the inter­national situation and our military pos­ture can result in an accurate predictionas to When, or where, or under whatconditions wars may be fought in theyears to come. The only way to insurethat a war will be fought in a particularplace is to start it yourself, and that isnot the policy of the United States.

On the contrary, our policy is to deterwar-either limited or general-to thevery best of our ability.

I do not favor extension of U.S. mili­tary commitments overseas. As a mat­ter of fact, I feel that this country al­ready is overextended in its commit­ments.

But this does not mean that the UnitedStates can stage an instant withdrawalfrom the world at large, nor does it meanthat we can let our guard down.

I do not favor a "world policeman"role for this country.

I have felt from the beginning thatthe involvement of the United States ina ground war in Southeast Asia was agrave error of jUdgment. But in this un­certain and imperfect world, I want ourNation to remain militarily strong.

There is a critical difference betweendeclining to police the world because wedo not choose to do so, and decliningbecause we are unable to do so.

Choosing not to do so is an act of judg­ment, which implies the existence of anAmerican deterrent that discourages ad­venturism on the part of potentialenemies.

Being unable to do so implies a postureof impotence that can only encourageaggressors.

We must be in a position of choice, nota position of impotence.

We cannot escape our position of re­sponsibility In this imperfect world. I donot favor a policy of intervention-cer­tainIy not a policy of unilateral interven­tion-but I believe in looking at the,vorId as it is, not as we might wish itto be.

In the world as it is, the aircraft car­rier is an important instrument of na­tional policy.

Before the Senate now is an amend­ment proposed by the Senators fromMinnesota and New Jersey which wouldeliminate the nuclear-powered aircraftcarrier from this year's military procure­ment authorization.

I do not believe that the course rec­ommended in this amendment is eitherwise or safe.

The sponsors of the amendment main­tain that the status and mission of our

September 10, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 25075carrier force should be reviewed. I do notdisagree.

As a matter of fact, all weapons sys­tems should be under continuous review.The Navy, the Defense Department, thePresident, and the Congress have the ob­ligation to see that our defense dollarsare wisely spent.

But this should be a continuing proc­ess. Such questions as the mission ofcarriers, their overall effectiveness, theirrelative vulnerability, and the compara­tive effectiveness of alternate weaponssystems should be reviewed regularly.

However, this is being done. The De­fense Department constantly weighs theeffectiveness of weapons systems againsttheir cost.

So far, experience has taught us thatthe aircraft carrier is a valuable and ver­satile member of our weapons family, andthat nuclear power has great advantagesover conventional power. That is why theDepartment of Defense now supports thisthird nuclear aircraft carrier.

Mr. President, at this point, I mightmention that the Senator from Minne­sota (Mr. MONDALE), in making his pres­entation today, pointed out that thethen Secretary of Defense, Robert S.McNamara, recommended in 1964 thatthe number of aircraft carriers be re­duced. That is an accurate statement bythe Senator from Minnesota.

What I think should be emphasized isthat while he recommended that thenumber of carriers be reduced, he equallystrongly recommended that three newnuclear carriers be built, because he rec­ognized, as I think most officials in theDepartment of Defense recognize, thatif we are going to have a Navy, we hadbetter have a modern Navy.

In addition to Defense DepartmentstUdies, there is the annual review ofmilitary spending proposals by the au­thorizing and appropriating Committeesof Congress, and debates like the onesthat have occurred on the floors of theHouse and the Senate .over the past6 to 9 weeks.

If it is true that weapons systems oncewere automatically approved by the serv­ices, the Secretary of Defense and theCongress, that certainly is not the casetoday. I should say at this point that Iheartily approve of the close scrutinynow being given military appropriations.

I think it is well that the Senator fromMinnesota presented this amendment. Ithink it is well that the Senator fromWisconsin presented the valious amend­ments he has presented. I think it is wellthat the Senate and the Congress debatefully matters of military il,ppropriations,because we should want to give the tax­payers a dollar's worth for every dollarof their funds that is spent; and that canonly be done if there is a careful reviewon the part of the Congress. I approveof this debate. But, while I approve ofthis debate as a symbol of alertness topossible waste in the military, I cannotapprove of the amendment proposed bymy distinguished colleagues from Min­nesota and New Jersey.

One of the announced aims of thepending amendment is economy. Buteven as an economy move, the amend­ment makes no sense.

The fact is that $133 million alreadYhas been spent for a second Nimitz car­rier. If the carrier is eliminated fromthe bUdget, this money will be down thedrain.

If the construction of this carrier isdelayed, of course, the cost will go up.

Of course, it might make sense to sacri­fice $133 million if there were real reasonto believe that the new carrier will not beneeded. But this is not the case.

I believe the role of aircraft carriersand the need for this particular. nuclearcarrier have been sufficiently studied andis sufficiently established.

However, if the Senate should decidethat additional stUdy is required, with­out delaying the second Nimitz carrier,I would have no serious objection. I donot believe the study would be harmful.There may be some value in a review ofthe need for 15 carriers.

Let us indulge in fantasy for a moment.Let us suppose that the proposed stUdy iscarried out and the verdict is that theUnited States will need only three air­craft carriers in the 1970's and beyond.Personally, I would call into question thejudgment of anyone who would come tosuch a conclusion, but for the sake ofargument, let us assume for a momentthat this unbelievable conclusion isreached and accepted.

How would we go about reducing ourfuture force to three carriers? By keep­ing the newest, of course, and retiring theolder ones.

But It is axiomatic that the smalleryour force, the more important its qual­ity. Surely we do not have to proveagain, having finally hammered It homeeven to Mr. McNamara, that nuclear air­craft carriers are the carriers of thefuture.

The United States now has only one ac­tive nuclear-powered carrier, the Enter­prise. A second, the Nimitz, is under con­struction. That is all we have.

So if this Nation were to have onlythree modern carriers, carriers with nu­clear power-why, even then, the shippropOsed in this bill would demand im­mediate authorization.

Proponents of the amendment now be­fore us maintain that land-based tacticalaircraft can do the job of carrier-basedaircraft more cheaply and efficiently.

But tactical aircraft based on landcannot substitute for carrier-basedforces. As a matter of fact, during WorldWar II and in the Korean war aircraftbased on carriers often were essential toprovide air superioity in areas. where weseized bases that later became airfieldsfor land-based tactical planes.

I may point out that during theLebanon crisis. a base was available inTurkey, but the use of this base wasdenied us because Greece, a NATO ally,refused to allow overflights. Our carrierfleet provided air cover for the Marinelanding after the order was issued.

The carrier force which we have todayis rapidly aging. Of our 15 attack car­riers, seven were built during World WarIT or shortly thereafter.

I have a list of all of those. Three ofthem were built 25 years ago. When theseare replaced under the program whichhas been worked out, some of them will

be 33 years old before they are takenout of service. I submit that thoseno longer can be called modenl aircraftcarriers.

Three of these ships, the Essexclass, are unable to operate some ofthe Navy's newest aircraft, including theF-4 Phantom II, A-6 IntrUder, and theRA-5C Vigilante. The safety record ofthese old carriers is unsatisfactory; thelanding accident rate aboard these shipsis about twice that of their more modernsisters.

It is possible that a review of ourforeign policy and overseas commitmentsmay conclude that fewer than 15 attackcarriers will be needed in the !teet in thefuture.

I do not argue as to whether we shouldhave 15 carriers. I do reason we musthave some modern, nuclear-poweredcarriers, and to date, we have only one.

Another is being built and should bein service in 1971, and a third one isthe one which is being considered today.

It has seemed to me somewhat sadthat the memory of that fine sailor, for­mer President Kennedy, should be hon­ored with an aircraft carrier poweredwith an outdated propulsion system.

The decision to build the Kennedywith oil-fired engines was an error ofjudgmen1r-nearly all military authori­ties agree on this poin1r-and it is anerror that should not be repeated. It wasan error, I might say, not on the part ofthe professional military leaders, butrather on the part of Secretary of De­fense McNamara.

Sooner or later, this new nuclear air­craft carrier proposed in the bill now be­fore the Senate must be built. Delay inproviding the necessary funds will onlyincrease the cost and lessen our security.

We have only one nuclear carrier to­day-the Enterprise. The Nimitz nearscompletion, and a second Nimitz is thecarrier to which the current authoriza­tion would apply. Thus, even with thecurrently sought authorization, we willhave only three modem nuclear-poweredaircraft carriers.

Unless we want to get out of the sea­power business entirely, the very leastwe can do is have three nuclear-poweredmodern aircraft carriers.

In analyzing and studying the excel­lent speech made this morning by theSenator from Minnesota-excellent fromhis point of view; I heard most of it; Iread it twice--what impressed me aboutthat speech was that his main argumentis built along the line that we should nothave 15 attack carriers.

That is not the point at all, as I see it,Mr. President. The point is, shall we havea modern Navy? It is not a question ofhow many carriers we should have. Thatis not the question at issue today. Thequestion at issue today is that we haveone modern nuclear-powered carriernow, we have a second one being bUilt,and the question is, Shall a tll1rd modernnuclear-powered carrier be built?

That is the issue. It is not the issuewhether we should have 15 carriers or 12carriers or 10 carriers, or whatever. Thisyear, shall we have a modem fleet? Shallwe have at least some modem carriers?

I submit that these fossil fuel caniers

25076 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 10, 1969

cannot be considered to be modern car­riers. The only modem carriers are thosewhich are nuclear powered.

Mr. President, I wish to say again thatI believe very strongly that Congress hasan obligation to cut the fat out of anymilitary budget submitted to Congress.I have voted for very considerable cutsin bUdgets submitted by President John­son, and I have voted for cuts in thecurrent budget which has been sub­mitted by President Nixon. I believe incutting out the fat.

But, Mr. President, we must not cutthe muscle. We must not cut the muscle,and I say that if you cut out, eliminate.scuttle the nuclear-powered aircraft car­rier, we are cutting the muscle of theU.S. Navy.

Mr. President. I was tremendously in­terested in one aspect-I was interestedin many aspects of it, but particularly inone aspect--of the address of the distin­guished Senator from Minnesota, inwhich he said-and I read from page 4of his manuscript-speaking of hisamendment:

This is not an "anti-carrier" amendment,as Navy spokesmen would have us believe.Our amendment in no way suggests that theattack carrier is obsolete or has no viablerole in the U.S. Navy.

Mr. President, that is a very signifi­cant statement, I believe. And I mightsay that the able Senator from Minne­sota repeated several times in his com­ments today that he felt that the Navyhas an important role to play.

If that is the case-and I think it is­then I say we must have a modern Navy.There are Senators-and many of themhave told me so-who do not believe thatwe should have aircraft carriers. Theysay there is no need for aircraft carriers,they are obsolete, and we ought to doaway with them.

I say that Senators who feel that waycertainly should vote for the Mondale­Case amendment. It is the only logicalvote for them to cast. But I point out,Mr. President, that Senator MONDALE andSenator CASE do not believe that theNavy is obsolete, and I have just quoteda passage from the speech of the Senatorfrom Minnesota to justify that assertion.They do not believe that the Navy isobsolete and should be done away with.What they do want to do is eliminatefrom the present authorization bill thefunds to construct a third nuclear­powered aircraft carrier.

I can see the point of some Senatorswho say we should not have aircraftcarriers. I do not agree with their view,but at least they have something thatthey can stand on. They just do not be­lieve in aircraft carriers serving a usefulpurpose. If they believe that, they oughtto vote for the amendment. But I amconvinced that the large majority ofSenators do not feel that way. MostSenators feel we must have aircraft car­riers.

I submit that if we feel we must haveaircraft carriers, then it is only logicalthat \ve have modem, nuclear-poweredones, and not be forced to utilize carrierswhich are reaching a high age, andwhich, as a consequence, are and will

continue to be much more costly to oper­ate.

Mr. President, I think it would be un­wise if the Senate were to adopt theamendment of the distinguished Sena­tor from Minnesota and the distinguishedSenator from New Jersey. I say again, itis not a question-and the amendmentis built on this premise-<lf how manycarriers the Navy ought to have. I do notargue whether the Navy should have 15carriers, 10 carriers, seven carriers, orwhatever it should have; but if you con­cede that the Navy should have carriers,if you concede that we must have car­riers if we are to maintain a modernnavy, then I SUbmit, Mr. President, thatthe least number of modern nuclear­powered carriers we can or should haveis three.

We have to date one, the Enterprise.We have the Nimitz. which will be in usein 1971, and the funds for the third nu­clear-powered carrier are included inthis bill, which the Senate has beendebating for the past 8 or 9 weeks.

So, Mr. President, I support the au­thorization of this third nuclear-poweredattack aircraft carrier, and I oppose theamendment offered by the Senator fromMinnesota and the Senator from NewJersey.

Mr. President, in connection with myremarks about the value of aircraft car­riers, I ask unanimous consent that astudy of the use of carriers, entitled"Carrier Employment Since 1950," byAdm. David L. McDonald, former Chiefof Naval Operations, be printed at thispoint in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the studywas ordered to be printed in the RECORD,as follows:

CARRIER EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1950(By Adm. David L. McDonald, U.S. Navy,

president, U.S. Naval Institute)At this time of international tensions that

require large national investments for de­fense, at this time when technology makespossible a wide selection of complex, costlyweapons, it is well, perhaps, to back off andlook at the practical results recentlyachieved by any given major weapon underconsideration. If it is true that the proof ofthe pUdding is in the eating, then it is truethat the proof of a weapon is In its employ­ment. Let us examine, then, the employmentin recent years of one of the Navy's majorweapons-the aircraft carrier.

The imd of World War II found the Navywith an inventory of 24 Essex-class attackcarriers commissioned or bulldlng, eightlight carriers, 74 escort carriers, and threeobsolete prewar carriers. Of the III carriersof ali types used In the War, 11 were lost incombat, none of which were Essex-class. Ifthe performance of carriers in World War IIcan be summarized in one sentence, it isthis~rrlerstrike forces, Japanese as well asAmerican, always defeated land-based airforces. The issue was in doubt only whenthey were carriers on both sides of the battle.

At the outbreak of the Korean War in thesummer of 1950, the Navy had seven attackcarriers, four light carriers and four escortcarriers In commission. Three of the attackcarriers were of the 45,OOO-ton Midway­class-the Midway, Franklin D. Roosevelt,and Coral Sea, CVBs 41--43, respective1y­Which had joined the Fleet between 1945 and1947. The bulk of the force was In theAtlantc or Mediterranean; the Pacific FleetIncluded only three attack carriers and two

escort carriers. The one Pacific Fleet attackcarrier west of Pearl Harbor, USS Valley Forge(CV--45), was In the South China sea on 26June; on the 27th she was ordered to Koreanwaters. En route, she was diverted to makea show of force In the Taiwan Straits becauseof possible Chinese Communist invasionpreparations. Operating in the Yellow Sea afew days later, she launched the first carrierstrikes of the War on 3 and 4 July againstPyongyang, capital of North Korea and focalpoint of its western railroads. The ValleyForge was then ordered south to stand byto counter possibleh05t1l1ties in the TaiwanStraits. Back in the Sea of Japan on 18 July,she supported the lancUngs at Pohang. Re­maining In the area for several days, sheoperated to the south and west of the penin­sula with offensive missions against enemytroops and .supply lines in support of theholding actions of Americans and SouthKorean ground forces.

The Valley Forge remained the only en­gaged carrier until the beginning of Augustwhen another Pacific Fleet attack carrierarrived. The build-up continued with twoescort carriers whose ASW aircraft had beenreplaced by Marine squadrons and by thethird Pacific Fleet attack carrier-the USSPhilippine Sea (CV-47)-which arrived inmid-September. The first Atlantic Fleet at­tack carrier-the USB Leyte (CV-32) arrivedin early October. At this point, four of theseven attack carriers in operation at the be­ginning of the War were committed toKorean operations; the fifth and sixth werein the Mediterranean, and the seventh wasoperating in the Caribbean.

In the meantime, reinforcements were ar­riving from the United States, and an am­phibious force was organized to land atInchon. behind the front and halfway up thewest coast. After delivering a capacity load ofammuntlon, 145 F-51s for the U.S. Air Force,and a number of radar vans, jeeps, and othermaterial, from Alameda, California, to Yok()­suka, Japan, the USS Boxer (CV-21) returnedto Alameda for reloading and rejoined theforces in the Western Pacific Just in time toparticipate in the landing. Under cover ofnaval gunfire and sea-based aircraft fromthree attack carriers and two escort carriers,the landing force went ashore at Inchon on15 September and pressed Inland towardSeoul.

The fighting during this period, rangingas it did from the retreat to Pusan to theInchon invasion, comprehended a number ofinteresting characteristics. The final NorthKorean drive to the Pusan perimeter resultedIn the withdrawal of all Air Force fighterbombers to Japanese bases, and this reducedthe payloads and loiter time available forclose support. Carrier-based alrcraft there­after provided a. SUbstantial advantage Insortie rates, weapons, and time on station,but it proved difficult to exploit this. Evenrelatively modest numbers of aircraft tendedto saturate the existing air control system(al though targets were not lacking). Actionreports of the pertod contain frequent com­plaints of the inabll1ty of the control systemto absorb profitably naval close supportmissions.

Following the Inchon landings our forcesmoved rapidly toward the Yalu River. Victoryappeared imminent, so the Boxer was per­mitted to return to the United States forher delayed overhaul. The Valley Forge wasalso ordered home on 21 November.

CWnese Communist forces from Manchu­ria attacked en masse on 26 November. Inaddition to throwing back the Eighth ArmyIn the west, they succeeded in cutting offthe Tenth Corps near the Chosin Reservoir.At this point, with land-based tractlcal airbeing pushed off advanced bases, the situa­tion was critical; with only the Leyte andthe Philippine Sea on the line, reinforce­ment was urgently required. The USS Prince-

September 10, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 25077ton (CV-37), freshly out of mothballs andalready on the way, arrived on 2 December.A fourth attack carrier haVing just arrivedin San Diego on 1 December. embarked theBoxer Air Group and returned to action on22 December in time to cover the last daysof the evacuation, Marine Corps squadronsashore, now without airfields. were used tofill empty deck spaces on three carriers off­shore (two escort carriers and one light car­rier) and continued their support missions.For 16 successive days, the surrounded TenthCorps received on the order of 220 close sup­port sorties a day with a record peak of 315on one day at the height of the breakout.Each carrier-based sortie remained on sta­tion from one to 1.5 hours and made betweenfive and nine attack passes. Over three-quar­ters of these sorties were provided by car­riers, and it Is unllkely that the Tenth Corpswould have broken out to the coast withoutthem. As a result of the severe losses in­filcted on the Chinese by the Tenth Corpsand tactical air, the SUbsequent evacuationof over 100,000 troops and their full equip­ment was accomplished With negligible loss.

Carrier operations in the remaining yearsof the Korean War emphasized sustained in­terdiction of the logistic net In the easternhalf of Korea. When the Chinese undertookoffensive ground action there were diversionsto close air support and to airfield neutrall­zatlon during the periodic Chinese efforts toregain air superiority. The fact that the frontline was perpendicular to the coast line gavecarrier aircraft shorter radU and thereforehigher payloads and sortie rates for manyInterdiction and airfield targets. Throughout1952 and 1953, about half of the Pacific Fleetcarriers were maintained In Korean waters.

Of the 11 attack carriers which ultimatelysaw action In Korea, only four were In activestatus at the start of the War. The carrierforce level rose during the three years ofwar from seven at the beginning to 18 at theend by reactivating ships from the ReserveFleet Inventory which had been created 1I8

a result of World War II.The Korean Armistice went Into effect In

July 1953. Soon thereafter, the Communisteffort was stepped up in Southeast Asia. Inresponse, the Navy shifted the bulk of ItsWestern Pacific carrier forces to the south.During the desperate battle of Dien BienPhu in May 1954, two attack carriers werestanding by to intervene on behalf of theentrapped French and Vietnamese forces hada decision been made to do so.

The next major employment of attack car­riers occurred In 1955, north of the TaiwanStraits. The Chinese Communists assaultedand seized one of the Tachen Islands. Of thenine attack carriers In the PacUic Fleet, fivewere quickly assembled off the Tachens tocover another amphibious evacuation. Thecommitment of this major naval force un­mistakably indicated U.S. willlngness to in­tervene, and the 1,800 sorties fiown in a weekalso clearly demonstrated. a capablllty toIntervene effectively Without recourse to nu­clear weapons. The over-all.posture of thecarrier force at this time was as follows:In commisslon 16Overseas 7

Coastal waters_________________________ 7Overhaul 2

Active Intervention In the Taiwan area wasagain necessary In 1958. The Incident also in­volved coastal islands and was accompaniedby renewed activity in the Straits, a build-upof forces on the Chinese mainland, and re­peated announcements that Formosa wouldbe "liberated." The timing may have beenInfluenced by the simultaneous involvementof U.S. naval forces In the Lebanon crisis Inthe Mediterranean. If this was an attempt bythe Communists to catch U.S. naval forcesolf guard, it failed. In fact, an immediatemove was made to improve the readinessposture In the Western Pacific by sa1l1ng theUSS Lexington (CVA-16) (When, in October

1952, OVs and CVBs were officially desig­nated as CVs, they became in name whatthey had been In fact--attack aircraft car­riers) from san Diego on 17 July for thatpurpose.

On 15 JUly with the situation In Lebanonrapidly approaching the crisis state, Presi­dent Dwight D. Eisenhower responded affirm­atively to President Camllle Chamoun's ap­peal for intervention. At this time we hadtwo attack carriers deployed in the Mediter­ranean out of a total of six in the AtlanticFleet. Twelve hours after the President's or­der was issued, these two carriers supportedU.S. Marine corps landings to seize the Beirutairport. U.S. Army troops were air-lifted intothe Marine-held airport four days later, on19 July. Clearances on over-flights and land­ing rights were required by several European,African, and Middle Eastern nations. Sincethese did not affect carrier operations, theNavy retained air support responsibility until5 September.

Turning back to the Pacific, the Commu­nists began shelllng the islands of Quemoyand Matsu, off the Chinese mainland, on 23August 1958, thus preventing the logisticsupport of Nationalist garrisons there. Whenthe Seventh Fleet Intervened, all the Ingre­dients of all-out war were present.

The pattern of Fleet operations that de­veloped concentrated the attack carrier taskgroups on an arc around Formosa With theiractivity designed to make the enemy fullyaware of both their presence and theirstrength. Carrier aircraft covered surfaceunits escorting Chinese Natlonallst logisticforces in international waters en route toand from the island groups under fire. U.S.support helped to keep the islands fromfalling to the Communists.

On the day the shelllng of Quemoy andMatsu began, we had 15 attack carriers onactive duty and they were located as follows:

Eastern Mediterranean (Lebanon area) _ '2Eastern Atlantic_______________________ 1East coast_____________________________ 22Overhaul east coast___________________ 1

Total___________________________ 6

Western Pacific (Quemoy-Matsu) 3En route western Pacific_______________ 2\Vest coast____________________________ 24

Total___________________________ 9

'One CVA sailed five days later for WestPacvia Suez, as her rellef arrived In the Medi­terranean.

• One CVA on each coast was conductingrefresher training subsequent to major over­haul.

The situation again stabilized and the Im­mediate threat of an over-water invasionsubsided. Communist forces kept the issueallve, however. Unable to achieve control ofFormosa Strait and the coastal water of theEast China Sea, they turned with renewedeffort to expand southward on the mainland.Without challenging the naval forces present,they waged war In Vietnam, In Laos, and onthe borders of India. None of the countriesin Southeast Asia escaped their persistentaggresslveness.

During this general period. the carrie!'forces had been undergoing a gradual changein character and capabilities. Four Forrestal­class attack carriers-the Forrestal, Sara­toga, Ranger, and Independence, CVAs 59--62,respectively-joined the Fleet between Octo­ber 1955 and January 1959. Two ImprovedForrestal-class carriers-the Kitty Hau'kand the Constellation, CVAs 63 and 64 werecommissioned in 1961, as was the nuclear­powered USS Enterprise (CVAN-651. Inresponse to announced national polley, theemphasis on nuclear delivery capab111tiesgrew steadily. Aircraft primarily designed fornuclear strikes, such as the A-3, were in­troduced In quantity. Efforts were made to

develop Improved weapons llke Bullpupdespite increasing pressure to economize onconventional capabilities.

In 1960, a major short-term build-up ofU.S. retaliatory capability was undertakenin response to Soviet pressure on Berlin.Among other emergency measures taken wasa major Increase In the degree to which thecarrier force was committed to a nuclearretaliatory role. Most noticeable was thedeployment of an additional carrier to theMediterranean bringing the total there tothree. This carrier and one of the threecarriers in the Far East were loaded with airwings which consisted almost entirely of at­tack aircraft. This emergency posture wasmaintained from mid-1960 to mid-1961, andprovided for overseas deployment of six ofthe 15 available carriers during most of theperiod. The protracted commitment placeda severe strain on Fleet resources.

During the spring of 1961, carriers wereinvolved In readiness operations in the Carib­bean and Western Atlantic, which did notreceiver pUblic notice. This is an illustra­tion of the discreet manner In which air­craft carriers can be employed.

A more recent crisis in which carriers par­ticipated involved Cuba. In October 1962,the late President John F. Kennedy de­manded the removal of Soviet missiles clan­destinely Introduced Into the island andtook firm measures to back up his demand.The USS Enterprise (CVAN-65) and the USSIndependence (CVA-62) played major rolesin the Quarantine action and they, alongwith the Lexington, would have stlpportedthe landings in Cuba had the President madea decision to invade. The adaptability andfiexiblllty of the sea-air team was demon­strated by reassigning the Lexington, ondUty as the Naval Air Training carrier, tem­porarily to attack carrier duty with an AirWing embarked from a carrier In overhaUl.During the Quarantine, the Enterprise andthe Independence were at sea for 49 and 41consecutive days respectively without reUefor in-port replenishment, and their air wingsaveraged 120 filghts per day. Because of thepossibility of Soviet moves elsewhere. for ex­ample against Turkey, the two attack car­riers in the Mediterranean were maintainedon station. Similar contingencies In the Pa­cific motivated the movement of a carrier tothe Hawaiian area to reduce the time re­quired to reinforce the three carriers alreadyin the Western Pacific. The resulting postureIs summarized below:Active carriers 16Committed to Cuban operatlon_________ 3Deployed overseas 6Coastal waters and overhaul.___________ 7

There were other crises and Incidents Inwhich attack carriers played Important roles.

For almost three years following the 1948break between Moscow and Belgrade therewas a steady military bUlld up In the EastEuropean Satellltes. This was coupled Witheconomic, ideological, and implied militarypressure. In the politically critical spring of1951, the United States suddenly doubled ItsMediterranean Fleet by having the forcesscheduled to relieve arrive about six weeksahead of time and by retaining the forcesdue to be relieVed for several weeks beyondtheir normal tour. In November, the UnitedStates formally committed Itself to providemilitary assistance to Yugoslavia. A monthlater, a cruise by Marshal Tlto in the USSCoral Sea (CVA-43) further underscored thiscommitment and advertised the immediateavallablllty of U.S. mllltary power in theMediterranean even thought we were at thesame time fighting a war In Korea.

During the Suez crisis In late OCtober 1956,the USS Frankltn D. Roosevelt (CVA-42) CQV­vered the evacuation by. ship of 1,700 U.S.citizens from Israel and Egypt. Both Medi­terranean carriers were kept at a high degreeof readiness during this crisis.

Inventory includes those CVAs capable ofoperating all models of CVA aircraft existingIn significant numbers in the aircraft inven­tory. VVhere force level exceeds inventory,In the table above, obsolete carriers withsecond Une aircraft were included.

It is instructive to review the actual waysIn which carriers have been used since 1950with a view to comparing doctrine With prac­tice. Since the demise of the Japanese Fleetand the appearance of nuclear weapons, car­rier force doctrine (In common with manyother force doctrines) had emphasized nu­clear deterrence, with reduced emphasis onsupporting amphibious operations, control ofthe sea, and showing the flag. All of thesemissions have continued to engage the Fleet,however. It Is striking that amphibiousevacuation has been encountered about asoften and as importantly as amphibioushb~l\ult. Perhaps It is natural that this rolehas been commonly overlooked. Few plannersplan on. (H~a3~er, and the recurrent occur­rence of military and political reverses hasbeen submerged by the generally successfulresults of the series of confrontations duringthe past decade.

The classic World War II role of the car­rier-the gaining and exploiting of air su­periority in a local area until forward land­based air could assume the function-hasnot been exercised In the recent past prl-

•In April 1957, Sixth Fleet units, includingthe USS Forrestal (CVA-59), were in theEastern Mediterranean to support PresidentEisenhower's warning against a threa.tenedtake-over of the government of Jordan bythe Communists. This show of force wasmaintained for a week to emphasize U.S. de­termination that Jordan should remain in­dependent.

In .the summer of 1960, the usa Wasp(CV~18) arrived off the Congo to help in themass evacuation of Americans should thatbecome necessary. She also delivered aviationgasoline to support the UnIted Nation's air­lift of Congo forces.

In November 1961, at the request of Guate­mala and Nicaragua, President Kennedy or­dered a naval patrol of Central Americanwaters to intercept and prevent any Commu-'nlst-led invasion of those two countries fromthe.sea. The USS Shangri-La (CVA-3B) im­mediately Initiated the patrol.

Pacific Fleet carriers covered the deploy­ment of the Marines in Thalland In May 1962.This action, In response to the violation ofthe cease-fire In Laos, followed by majorPathet Lao successes, was designed to give aclear Indication of U.S. intentions to defendThailand, to place a precautionary impact onthe situation In Laos, and to maintain posi­tions for qUick reaction In the event of adecision call1ng for further aetlon.

A table of crises showing carrier forcelevels and Inventory is given below:

CRISES INVOlV ING CARRIERS

June 1950 . • _ Korea (start) __March-December 1951. _ Yugoslavia _July 1953.. Korea (end)..February 1955. Tachen

evacuation.October 1956__ .. Suez. _April-May 1957...... Jordan.. _July-August 1958_ .. __.. lebanon __..._August-December 1958__ Quemoy·

Matsu.July 1960.. .. Congo.. __September 1960 •__ Berlin. • __November 1960 .. _ Guatemala

and Nica·ragua.

February-April 1961. Laos.. _June 1961... Dominican

Republic.May 1962 Thailand...._October-December 1962. Cuba _Present strength.. .. ..

ForceCVA CVA

level inventory

September 10, 1969overflight clearances, sometimes a time-con­suming requirement.

The aircraft carrier is sovereign U.S. terri­tory. The carriers have proven themselves tobe initially self-sustaining and readily re­plenishable at sea during ail of the crises inwhich they have played a role. In these crisesthey have not had to depend on preposi­tioned base facilities, supplies, etc., sinceoverseas replenishment has been made at seafrom an underway replenishment group.Carrier's launch and recovery areas haveproven as extensive as international waters;for example, a show of force over the Tai­wan Straits and a few days later a strikefrom the Yellow Sea against Pyongyang.Tactically, carriers have been able, as in theTachens evacuation and the Quemoy-Matsucrises, to concentrate as a single force toobtain desirable odds.

The records show that attack carrier forcelevels rose from a low of seven at the begin­ning of Korea to 18 at the end by recommis­sioning from the inventory created by WorldWar II; force-levels subsequently ranged from19 in 1956, to 14 in 1960, to 15 at the presenttime. The average number of active carriershas been slightly more than 15.

Secondly, in the Far East, a maximum de­ployment of five carriers has been recurrent;in the Mediterranean, three have been usedwith additional carriers pushed forward inthe Eastern Atlantic; and in the Caribbean,three have been called out.

This history, covering a decade and a half,suggests the following conclusions about at­tack carriers:

They have typically been on the scenewhen needed.

They have been directly involved in themajority of post-World Wa.r II crises.

They have been ideally suited for the pro­jection overseas of U.S. military power eitherdiscreetly or ostentatiously.

They have been adaptable to a wide rangeof missions.

Carriers have always been used advantage­ously by the United States; it is diffiCUlt forme to conceive of accomplishing the sameresults with fewer.

SUMMARY 01' USES OF eVA's SINCE 1950­CRISIS AND MISSION

Inchon: Provided air cover for amphibiouslandings.

Inchon, Lebanon, Thailand: Provided aircover for deployment of land-based air andtroopS-in Lebanon from time of landing oftroops until relieved of air support responsi­bility six weeks later.

Korea: Provided close air support forground forces.

Yugoslavia, Tachens, Jordan, Lebanon,Congo, Quemoy-Matsu, Dominican Republic:Provided U.S. military presence.

Cuba, Guatemala, and Nicaragua: Preparedto conduct blockade, search, and attack.

Hungnam, Tachens: Provided air cover foramphibious evacuation.

Korea: Interdicted logistic net and neu­tralized airfields.

Berlin: Contributed to nuclear strategicdeterrent.

Suez, Cuba: Provided air cover for evacua­tion of U.S. civilians In crisis area.

Korea: Transported Army and Air Forceequipment InclUding planes, jeeps, vans, am­munition, etc.

Congo: Transported gasoline to U.N. forces.

Mr. SPONG. Mr. President, today webegin the debate on the amendment todefer the construction of a second at­tack carrier already funded in part; andonce again, as is so well pointed out inan editorial published in the Virginian­Pilot of September 8, 1969, the effective­ness of the attack carrier is being chal­lenged.

I ask unanimous consent that the edi­torial be printed in the RECORD.

marily because such a challenge was declinedby the opponents. However, the potentialvulnerability of airlifted forces which wasInferentially demonstrated in the 1961Laotian crisis implies that the air superioritymission Of the carrier may recur with in­creasing Importance. A new but related rolehas emerged since 1950 which provides coverfor the arrival of airlifted troops and deploy­ing land-based aircraft. In Lebanon, thismission was only an extension of the basicpurpose of amphibious operations. But inthe 1961 Laotian crisis, the potentiallychaotic ground situation at the terminal air­fields made troop commanders conscious ofthe Importance of having close air supportavailable immediately upon landing. Simi­larly. the proximity of the airlift route toChinese airfields Indicated the desirabilityof carrier-based fighter escort.

A final characteristic of the past decadeand a half can also be noted. This was thetendency of crises to occur In the TaiwanStraits coincidentally with the commitmentof U.S. forces elsewhere. This happened sev­eral times during the Korean War, perhapsfor diversionary purposes, and the Quemoy­Matsu crisis appears to have been a test ofU.S. ability to respond while major forceswere committed In the Middle East.

It is Interesting to note that although thecarrier force Is relatively slow moving In com­parison with modern aircraft, carriers havebeen on tl1e scene early in the development ofmost major crises. This appears to result fromone of the salient characteristics of the force.Although It moves in an assault configura­tion, essentially ready for maximum effort airoperations, it can be moved as ostentatiouslyor as discreetly as desired. One thing In com­mon about most of these crises is the mannerin which carrier forces have been moved to­ward the trouble spots. Is they were InLebanon, Quemoy-Matsu, and Cuba, on themost tenuous strategic warning and prior tonational political decisions. They have alsomoved in the face of SUbstantial enemythreats as was the case both In Korea andduring the Taiwan crises.

Looking back over the last 15 years, whathave the attack carriers' missions been andwhat have their particularly useful character­Istics been? The missions can be summarizedas follows:

Provide air cover for amphibious landings,as In Inchon, Lebanon, and potentially inCuba.

Provide close air support for wound forcesas In Korea.

Provide U.S. m1l1tary presence, as duringthe Dominican Republic crisis, the Tachensevacuation, the Quemoy-Matsu and Lebanoncrises.

Provide air cover and ground support foramphibious evacuations as at Hungnam.

Provide air cover for deployment of troopsand land-based air as in Korea, Lebanon, and,more recently, Thailand.

Prepare to conduct blockade, search andattack, as was done off Cuba, Guatemala,and Nicaragua.

Contribute to the alert strategic forces forgeneral war.

The particularly useful characteristics ofattack carriers have been that they move Inan assault configuration prepared, as theywere In the Inchon and Lebanon landings,the Tachens and Hungnam evacuations, andthe Quemoy-Matsu crisis, to take control ofthe air against air opposition. As pointed outpreviously, they move easily to trouble spotson the basis of even tenuous strategic warn­Ings.Lebanon, Quemoy-Matsu, Cuba, andthe Dominican Republic are examples. Toplevel decisions to move naval forces prior tocommitment have not been required becausethey were operating In international waters.Because they operate In international waters,permission from a foreign country has neverbeen necessary to proceed to the scene of acrisis, whereas U.S. land-based planes enroute to Lebanon and the Congo required

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Septem,ber 10, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 25079There being no objection, the editorial

was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,as follows:NAVY CHALLENGED AGAIN: THE CASE FOR THE

CARRIER

The Navy has had, heaven knows, experI­ence enough at defending the aircraft car­rier-In concept, propulsion, numbers. Itscurrent campaign against the Mondale-Caseamendment in the Senate to cut the pro­jected third nuclear-powered carrier fromthe 1970 military authorization bill Is areminder that one decade ago senator Wil­liam Proxmire was arguing against the con­struction of a second nuclear carrier on thegrounds that the first, which was a year fromlaunching, would be obsolete In this "age ofIntercontinental and intermediate-range bal­listic missiles."

In those days the Navy was insisting thatthe big attack carrier had a nuclear-deterrentrole, just like the Polaris-missile submarinesand the land-based ICBM. "In a nuclear war,"Admiral George Anderson said when Chiefof Naval Operations In the Kennedy years,"any carrier that could launch Its air groupequipped with nuclear weapons would haveperformed Its mission. Even If ten of ourfifteen carriers were caught before they couldlaunch, planes from the five other attack car­riers could destroy any country in the world."

That argument soon was shifted; the Navybegan to Justify the attack carrier for Itsguarantee to the Nation of "strategic airmObility" in distant corners of the world.ShOUld United States air bases abroad be­come untenable-as surely they would Inmany circumstances-the carrier's useful­ness as a moblle airfield would become highlyimportant. And even If land bases remainedintact and avallable, carrier readiness andspeed would be advantageous. "The best ex­ample of comparative reaction time betweencarrier-based and other air power was theLebanon crisis," said Vice Admiral P. D.Stroop, then Chief of the Bureau of Weap­ons, In 1963. "Strike aircraft from the SixthFleet were flying 120 sorties a day on the firstday-wlt.hln twelve hours of President Cham­oun's request for ald--coverIng the landingof 5,500 Marines. The carrier planes con­tinued tWs sortie rate for three weeks untilthe first land-based alrcraft--a TAC strikegroup fiown In to the big NATO jet base atAnda, Turkey-were avallable for sustainedoperations."

The Lebanese affair of 1958 remains an ar­gument for the aircraft carrier. It also Is anantl-carrler argument. For U.S. people havebecome progressively skeptical, largely ln re­action to the Vietnam War stalemate, of theGovernment's Involving Itself In the far­place flareups that from time to time becomeInevitable. There Is opinion that the carrierfleet tempts Washington In!:<> sticking Itsnose where It should not--Into continuingIts dubious role of world policeman.

Yet theIe Is an overwhelming case for apowerfUl carrier force. Control of the seas Isvital to the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza­tion and to the system of Western alliancesupon which the security of the United Stateshas been built. So the Soviet Union's currentdrive for maritime dominance threatens tobecome the most Important development ofthis half of the Twentieth Century. Theprincipal Western check on that drive Is thecarrier and her family of escorts and aux­llIaries-Is, In brief, the U.S. sUrface fleet. ItIs Indispensable to the Free World.

AUTHORIZATION FOR THE TRANS­ACTION OF ROUTINE MORNINGBUSINESS ON FRIDAYMr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Presi­

dent, I ask unanimous consent that whenthe Senate convenes on FIiday morning

at 10 o'clock, there be a period for thetransaction of routine morning businessnot to extend beyond 10:30 o'clock.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

ORDER FOR UNFINISHED BUSINESSTO BE LAID BEFORE SENATE ONFRIDAY

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. Pres­ident, I ask unanimous consent that thepending business be laid before the Sen­ate as the unfinished business at theconclusion of the transaction of routinemorning business on FIiday morning,but not later than 10 :30 o'clock.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.President, I suggest the absence of aquorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerkwill caIl the roll. .

The assistant legislative clerk pro­ceeded to caIl the roll.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I askunanimous consent that the order forthe quorum will be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoutobjection, it is so ordered.

ADJOURNMENT UNTIL FRIDAY, SEP­TEMBER 12, 1969, AT 10 A.M.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, ifthere be no further business to come be­fore the Senate, I move, in accordancewith the order of September 9, 1969, thatthe Senate stand in adjournment until10 o'clock FIiday morning.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 5o'clock and 50 minutes p.m.) the Senateadjourned until Friday, September 12,1969, at 10 o'clock a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by theSenate September 10,1969:

DIPLOMATIC AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Joseph S. Farland, of the District of Co­lumbia, to be Ambassador Extraordinary andPlenipotentiary of the United States ofamerica to Pakistan.

NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE ARTS

Nancy Hanks, of New York, to be Chairmanof the National Council on the Arts for aterm of 4 years, vice Roger L. Stevens, termexpired.

U.S. ATTORNEY

Edward R. Neaher, of New York, to be U.S.attorney for the eastern district of New York,for the term of 4 years, vice Joseph P. Hoey,resigned.

U.S. MARSHAL

Gaylord L. Campbell, of California, to beU.S. marshal for the central district of Cali­fornia for the term of 4 years, vIce George E.O'Brien, retired.

Arthur F. Van Court, of California, to beU.S. marshal for the eastern district of Cali­fornia for the term of 4 years, vice John C.Begovlch.

Anthony T. Greskl. of New Jersey, to beU.S. marshal for the district of New Jerseyfor the term of 4 years, vice Leo A. Mault.

IN THE ARMY

I nominate the following-named officer un­der the provisions of title 10, United StatesCode, section 3066, to be assigned to a. posl-

tion of Importance and responsiblllty desig­nated by the President under subsection (a)of section 3066, In grade as follows:

To be lieutenant generalMaj. Gen. George Gray O'Connor, 021088,

U.S. Army.The follOWing-named officers for temporary

appointment In the Army of the United Statesto the grade Indicated under the provisionsof title 10, United States Code, sections 3442and 3447:

To be major generalBrig. Gen. Robert Clinton Taber, 245-60­

5462, Army of the United States (colonel,U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. Charles Carmln Noble, 081-32­6780, Army of the United States (colonel,U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. James Francis H01l1ngsworth,454-24-0234, Army of the United States(colonel, U.S. Army) .

Brig. Gen. BurnSide Elijah Huffman, Jr.,257-07-8732, Army of the United States(colonel. U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. Warren Kennedy Bennett, 493­14-3594, Army of the United States (colonel,U.S.Army).

Brig. Gen. John Reiley Guthrie, 125-07­6675, Army of the United States (colonel,U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. Edwin I. Donley, 104-14-7055,Army of the United States (colonel, U.S.Army).

Brig. Gen. Thomas Matthew Rienzi, 577­52-4237, Army of the United States (colonel,U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. Felix John Gerace, 213-38-3649.Army of the United States (colonel, U.S.Army).

Brig. Gen. Thomas Harwell Barfield. 420­52-5599, Army of the United States (colonel,U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. Edward Michael Flanagan, Jr.,224-52-3184, Army of the United States(colO!11el, U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. Bernard William Rogers, 514­40-3091, Army of the United States (colonel,U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. Allen Mitchell Burdett, Jr., 245­60-8662, Army of the United States (colonel,U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. John Albert Broadus Dillard,Jr., 289-09-7456, Army of the United States(colonel, U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. Richard Logan Irby, 225-16-2940,Army of the United States (colonel, U.S.Army).

Brig. Gen. Richard McGowan Lee, 519-44­6126, Army of the United States (colonel,U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. John Daniel McLaughlin, 551­18-9718. Army of the United States (colonel,U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. George Mayo, Jr., 224-52-3170,Army of the United States (colonel, U.S.Army).

Brig. Gen. Albert Hamman SInith, Jr., 214­.10-0349. Army of the United States (colonel,United States Army) .

Brig. Gen. John Stephan Lekson, 283-01­0052, Army of the United States (colonel,U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. Franklin Milton Davis. Jr.. 006­10-7683, Army of the United States (colonel,U.S. Army).

Brigadier General Leo Edward Benade. 326­05-4359, Army of the United States (colonel,U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. Theodore Antonelli. 045-12-3195.Army of the United States (colonel, U.S.Army).

Brig. Gen. William Bennison Fulton, 567­05-6670. Army of the United States (colonel,U.S. Army).

Brig. Gen. James George Kalergls, 029-10­0210, Army of the United States (colonel.U.S. Army).B~. Gen. Erwin Montgomery Graham,