Procedural Due Process Case Digests

7/30/2019 Procedural Due Process Case Digests

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Page 1 of6 (PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CASE DIGESTS)

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CASE DIGESTSBanco Espaol Filipino v. PalancaG.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918

JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation mayresult either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actualcustody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under specialprovisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective.

The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the ideathat while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantiallysuch.

DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of itsowner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected withknowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to

El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810 withoutreturning again to thePhilippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is anon-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy ofthe summons to the defendants last known address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerkcomplied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the causeproceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale bypublic auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by thecourt. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, asadministrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside theorder of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis ofthis application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court hadnever acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matterof the action

Whether or not due process of law was observedRULING:

On Jurisdiction

The word jurisdiction is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to theauthority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it mayrefer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.

The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in general and thusfixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.

How Jurisdiction is Acquired

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his submission to its

authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the person.

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the propertyunder legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the institution oflegal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognizedand made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, maynever be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found inattachment proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage ofits progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdictionover the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land.


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Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some personclaiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of thepetitioner against all the world.

In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, bywhich is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature andis substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference tocertain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or

obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in thecircumstance that in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is tosubject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their soleobject the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or otherform of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusiveonly between the parties.xxx

It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears, the actionbecomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not affect the proposition thatwhere the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with referenceto the principles governing actions in rem.

On Due Process

xxx As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that the requirement of dueprocess is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothedwith judicialpower to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over theperson of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must begiven an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.

Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we observe that inaforeclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing the time within whichappearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as essential. To answer this necessity the statutes generallyprovide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence isknown. Though commonly called constructive, or substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely ameans provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of judicialproceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect it.

It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the absent ownershall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication may never in fact come to his hands,

and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be very slight. Even where notice is sent by mail theprobability of his receiving it, though much increased, is dependent upon the correctness of the address to which itis forwarded as well as upon the regularity and security of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that theprovision of our law relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of noticeunconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is known. In the light ofall these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to beconsidered absolutely necessary.

The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which may fall short ofactual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or byagent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings havebeen instituted for its condemnation and sale.

Did the failure of the clerk to send notice to defendants last known address constitute denial of due process?

The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to mail the notice,

if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due process of law; andhence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given bypublication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in ouropinion is all that was absolutely necessary to sustain the proceedings.

It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference whether it be viewed as aquestion involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due process of law. In the matter of jurisdiction there canbe no distinction between the much and the little. The court either has jurisdiction or it has not; and if therequirement as to the mailing of notice should be considered as a step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction,there could be no escape from the conclusion that the failure to take that step was fatal to the validity of the

judgment. In the application of the idea of due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so


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rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is an opportunityfor the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it would seem highlyunreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in applying the requirement of dueprocess of law, it is permissible to reflect upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have beenviolated and the principle underlying the exercise of judicial power in these proceedings. Judge in the light of theseconceptions, we think that the provision of Act of Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of hisproperty without due process of law has not been infringed.

Judicial Due Process Requisites

Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt. His debt amountedto P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make hispayments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracios property. Engracio however left for China andhe never returned til he died. Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent tosue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court further orderdd the clerk of court to furnishEngracio a copy and that itd be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to executeEngracios property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition forthe annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio never received thesummons.ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process had been met. Therequisites are;

1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the matterbefore it.

2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of theproceedings.

3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.

In Banco Espanol Filipino vs. Palanca which is a case of foreclosure, some notification of the proceedings to thenon-resident owner is essential which must prescribe the time within which appearance must be made. Thisnecessitates a publication or a personal notice thru mail if the residence of the non-resident is known. Thisis constructive service or notice which is a means provided by law whereby the owner may be admonished that hisproperty is the subject of judicial proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit toprotect it. Since property is assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by an agent, he may besafely held to be affected with knowledge that a proceeding has been instituted against his property. So that whenthe effectiveness of the means of notification falls short, presumption of possession takes place and the owner alsohas the duty to inspect the status of his property.

Ang Tibay v. CIRDue Process Admin Bodies CIRTeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to allegedshortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that Toribiosact is not valid as it is not within the CBA. That there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and National WorkersBrotherhood. That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new trial asthey were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before as they wereinaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the CIR.ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law.HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all administrative bodiescannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. They are;(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own caseand submit evidence in support thereof.(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending toestablish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity whichcannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothingto support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be

substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonablemind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the recordand disclosed to the parties affected.(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independentconsideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arrivingat a decision.


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(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a mannerthat the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that thesupposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematicallydischarge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner withthe records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. That National Worker'sBrotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged

by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for newtrial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion.

Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whosefunctions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more anadministrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a merereceptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its

jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of theCIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises

judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but itsfunctions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider,investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affectingemployers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations

between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.

As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowlyconstrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard totechnicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mindin such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does notmean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essentialrequirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primaryrights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof;(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;(3) The decision must have something to support itself;(4) The evidence must be substantial;

(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record anddisclosed to the parties affected;(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts ofthe controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties tothe proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected bythe result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire recordof this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as maybe relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered.Facts: Ang Tibay was a manufacturer of rubber slippers.

There was a shortage of leather soles, and it was necessary to temporarily lay off members of the National LaborUnion.

According to the Union however, this was merely a scheme to systematically terminate the employees from work,and that the shortage of soles is unsupported. It claims that Ang Tibay is guilty of ULP because the owner,Teodoro, is discriminating against theNational Labor Union, and unjustly favoring the National WorkersBrotherhood, which was allegedly sympathetic to the employer.

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent Court ofIndustrial Relations and to the motion for new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.

Issue: Whether or not special courts like Court of Industrial Relations should observe due process.

Held: Yes. The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and


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Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,without regard to technicalities or legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just andequitable.

There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of theserights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own caseand submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and toadduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence

presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessitywhich cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. Not only must therebesome evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must berendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the partiesaffected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independentconsideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arrivingat a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such amanner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisionsrendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

In Ang Tibay vs. CIR, the Court laid down cardinal requirements in administrative proceedings which essentiallyexercise a judicial or quasi-judicial function. These are:

1. the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit evidence in supportthereof

2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented3. The decision must have something to support itself4. The evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence means such a reasonable evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion5. The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearting or at least contained in the record

and disclosed to the parties affected6. The tribunal or body of any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and

facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate7. The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the

parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved and the reason for the decision rendered.

Central Bank v. CASee under political law review case digests

Zambales Chromite v. CA

Due Process

Administrative Due ProcessZCM filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines Gozon to have them be declared the rightful and priorlocators and possessors of 69 mining claims in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. They are asserting their claim against thegroup of Martinez and Pabiloa. Gozon decided in favor of Martinez et al. ZCM appealed the case before theSecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. During pendency, Gozon was assigned as the Sec of Agri. AndNatural Resources. He did not inhibit himself from deciding on the appeal but he instead affirmed his earlierdecision when he was still the director of mines. ZCM then appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI affirmedthe decision of Gozon. It held that the disqualification of a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule137, Rules of Court) does not apply to administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the Mining Law,disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal from a case which he haddecided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground for disqualification; that the ZCM did not seasonablyseek to disqualify Gozon from deciding their appeal, and that there was no evidence that Gozon acted arbitrarilyand with bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to ZCM. ZCM appealed the case to the CA. The CA reversed Gozonsfinding and declared that ZCM had the rights earlier attributed to Martinez et al by Gozon. Martinez et al appealedaverring that the factual basis found by Gozon as Director of Mines be given due weight. The CA reconsidered afterrealizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision and the CA remanded the case to the Minister of Natural

Resources. Now both parties appealed urging their own contentions; ZCM wants the CAs earlier decision to bereaffirmed while Martinez et al demanded that Gozons finding be reinstated. The CA denied both petition.ISSUE: Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing due process.HELD: The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery of justice. Gozon had acted with grave abuseof discretion. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, thereviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could beno different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be abiased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken inhis first view of the case. The SC affirmed the 2 nd decision of the CA.FACTS:


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Zambales Chromite Mining Corp., Inc. (ZCM, Inc.) sought to be declared the rightful and prior locators andpossessors of 69 mining claims in Zambales. ZCM filed their claims with then Director of Mines Benjamin Gozon.ZCM, Inc., were asserting their claim against the mining claims of Martinez and Pabilona. Director Gozon decided infavor of Martinez and Pabilona and dismissed the claims of ZCM, Inc., ruling that ZCM, Inc. did not discover anymineral nor located any mining claims in accordance with law. ZCM appealed the decision before the Secretary ofEnvironment and Natural Resources. During the pendency of the appeal, Director gozon was appointed Secretary ofEnvironment and Natural Resources. Gozon in his capacity as Secretary affirmed his decision as Director of Minesand dismissed the appeal of ZCM, Inc.

ZCM then appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI affirmed the decision of Gozon.

RULING OF CFI:The disqualification of a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not applyto administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture andNatural Resources from deciding an appeal from a case which he had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadezais not a ground for disqualification. ZCM appealed the case to the CA.

RULING OF CA:CA after realizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision remanded the case to the Minister of NaturalResources.

ISSUE/S:Whether or not Gozon can review and validly affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing due process?

HELD:Secretary Gozon cannot review his decision as Director of Mines. A Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resourcesreviewing his own decision as Director of Mines is a mockery of administrative justice.

RATIO:In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce the

reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could beno different viewor there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be abiased view; inevitably, it would be the same viewsince being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken inhis first view of the case.

Anzaldo v. ClaireDue Process Administrative Due ProcessDr Anzaldo , 55, had been working in the National Institute of Science and Technology for 28 years. She washolding the position Scientist Research Associate IV when she was appointed as Science Research Supervisor II.

Her appointment was approved by the CSC in 1978. The position was previously held by Dr Kintanar whorecommended Dr Venzon to his position. Dr Venzon contested the position. Dr Afable, the one who appointedAnzaldo, averred that Anzaldos appointment was approved by the NIST evaluation Committee which gave 88points to Anzalado and 66 points to Venzon. The issue was elevated to the Office of the president by Venzon. Clavewas then the Presidential Executive Assistant. Pursuant to PD 807 or the Civil Service Decree, Clave referred theissue to the CSC. Clave was also holding the chairmanship of the CSC. Clave issued Res 1178 appointing Venzon tothe contested position. After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution, or on January 5,1980, Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines. Since Clave was holding the office of PEAhe just affirmed his decision as the CSC chairman.ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in the case at bar.HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA Clave said in his decision that he was inclined to concur in therecommendation of the Civil Service Commission, what he meant was that he was concurring with ChairmanClaves recommendation: he was concurring with himself. It is evident that Anzaldo was denied due process of lawwhen Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of (himself) Chairman Clave of theCivil Service Commission. Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Anzaldo that PEA Claveshould decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the CSC, as to who between Anzaldo and Venzon

should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines.

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Procedural Due Process Case Digests