Procedural Due Process (Lacking Rivera, Bautista, Gov. of Us and Gov. of Hongkong)

7/27/2019 Procedural Due Process (Lacking Rivera, Bautista, Gov. of Us and Gov. of Hongkong)

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BANCO ESPANOL FILIPINO VS. PALANCA

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real propertyin Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there

he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor

then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was

necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send

copy of the summons to the defendants last known address, which is in Amoy, China.

It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after

publication in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by

default was rendered. The decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by

public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this

sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of

this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the

original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of

default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The

basis of this application was that the order of default and the judgment rendered

thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant

or over the subject of the action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over thedefendant and the subject matter of the action

Whether or not due process of law was observed

RULING:

On Jurisdiction

The word jurisdiction is used in several different, though related, senses since it may

have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action

or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over

the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.

The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its


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powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the

actions which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.

How Jurisdiction is Acquired

Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court

and his submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal

process exerted over the person.

Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either

from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual

custody of the law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein,

under special provisions of law, the power of the court over the property is recognized

and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times within the

potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An

illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment

proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some

subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An

illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the

proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land.

Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the

instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the

property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world.

In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a

proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly

speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The

expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow application, used only with reference to

certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property alone is treated as

responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The

action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the

former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to

subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. Allproceedings having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of

the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a

general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive

only between the parties.

xxx


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It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is

made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as

such. This, however, does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to

appear the action is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference

to the principles governing actions in rem.

On Due Process

xxx As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty that

the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present,

namely; (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and

determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the

person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3)

the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be

rendered upon lawful hearing.

Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be

heard, we observe that in a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the

nonresident owner, prescribing the time within which appearance must be made, is

everywhere recognized as essential. To answer this necessity the statutes generally

provide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, for the mailing of notice to the

defendant, if his residence is known. Though commonly called constructive, or

substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely a means provided by law

whereby the owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of judicial

proceedings and that it is incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to

protect it.

It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute

assurance that the absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical

containing the publication may never in fact come to his hands, and the chances that

he should discover the notice may often be very slight. Even where notice is sent by

mail the probability of his receiving it, though much increased, is dependent upon the

correctness of the address to which it is forwarded as well as upon the regularity andsecurity of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of our law

relative to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice

unconditionally and in every event, but only in the case where the defendant's

residence is known. In the light of all these facts, it is evident that actual notice to the

defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be considered absolutely

necessary.


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The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of

notification which may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always

assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be

safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedingshave been instituted for its condemnation and sale.

Did the failure of the clerk to send notice to defendants last known address constitute

denial of due process?

The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of

the clerk to mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an

irregularity, as amounts to a denial of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that

irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the judgment in this case. Notice was given by

publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of notice which the law

unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that was absolutely necessary to

sustain the proceedings.

It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a

difference whether it be viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a question

involving due process of law. In the matter of jurisdiction there can be no distinction

between the much and the little. The court either has jurisdiction or it has not; and if

the requirement as to the mailing of notice should be considered as a step antecedent

to the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no escape from the conclusion that the

failure to take that step was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the application of

the idea of due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so

rigorous. The jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter

requires is an opportunity for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly

made in the newspaper, it would seem highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail

the notice was fatal. We think that in applying the requirement of due process of law, it

is permissible to reflect upon the purposes of the provision which is supposed to have

been violated and the principle underlying the exercise of judicial power in these

proceedings. Judge in the light of these conceptions, we think that the provision of Actof Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of his property without due

process of law has not been infringe


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MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:

1. On June 8, 1984, IMELDA MARCOS and JOSE DANS, as Chairman

and Vice Chairman of the Light Railway Transit Authority (LRTA) enteredinto a Lease Contract with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation(PGHFI) involving an LRTA property in Pasay City for P102,760.00 per monthfor 25 years;

2. On June 27,1984, the PGHFI subleased the said property forP734,000.00 per month to the Transnational Construction Corporationrepresented by one Ignacio Jumenez;

3. After petitioners husband was deposed as President of thePhilippines, she and Dans were charged of alleged violation of Section 3 [g]of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Actbefore the Sandiganbayan;

4. After trial , the First Division of the Sandiganbayan failed to complywith the legal requirement that all the 3 justices must be unanimous in itsDecision because Justice Garchitorena and Justice Jose Balajadia voted forthe conviction of both accused while Justice Narciso Atienza voted to acquitthem;

5. Thereafter, Justice Garchitorena as Presiding Justice issued

Administrative Order No. 288-93 constituting a Special Division of five anddesignating Justices Augusto Amores and Cipriano del Rosario;

6. On September 21, 1993, Justice Amores wrote Justice Garchitorenathat he be given 15 days his Manifestation. On the same date, however,Justice Garchitorena dissolved the division of 5 allegedly because he andJustice Balajadia had agreed to the opinion of Justice del Rosario;

7. On September 24, 1993, a Decision was rendered convictingthe petitioner and Dans of violation of Sec. 3 [g] of RA 3019;

8. On June 29, 1998, the Third Division of the Supreme Court by a voteof 3-2 affirmed the conviction of the petitioner but acquitted DANS;

9. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and at the sametime prayed that her Motion be heard by the Supreme Court en banc claimingthat her right to due process of law, both substantive and procedural, wasviolated:


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a. as a result of the fact that she was convicted as a result of thealleged disparity of the rentals agreed upon with PGHFI and the subsequentsub-lease contract between PGHFI and Transnational ConstructionCorporation; and

b. the First Division convicted her after Justice Garchitorena dissolvedthe Special Division of 5 after a lunch in a Quezon City restaurant where theyagreed to convict her in one case and acquit her in her other cases. The saidmeeting was attended by another justice who is not a member of the FirstDivision or the Special Division in violation of the Rules of the Sandiganbayanwhich requires that sessions of the court shall be done only in its principaloffice in Manila and that only justices belonging to the division should jointhe deliberations.

Held:

The petitioner is hereby acquitted.

1. The great disparity between the rental price of the lease agreement signedby the petitioner (P102,760.00 per month) and the sub-lease rental(P734,000.00 per month) does not necessarily render the monthly rate ofP102,760.00 manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government inthe absence of any evidence using rentals of adjacent properties showingthat the rentals in the property subject of the lease agreement is indeedvery low. NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER WAS PRESENTED BY THEPROSECUTION REGARDING THE RENTAL RATE OF ADJACENT PROPERTIES..

As such, the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of thepetitioner reasonable doubt.

2. The court notes likewise the bias and prejudice of Presiding JusticeGarchitorena against the petitioner as shown by his leading, misleading andbaseless hypothetical questions of said justice to RAMON F. CUERVO, witnessfor the petitioner. Said justice asked 179 questions to the witness as againstthe prosecutor who cross-examined the witness which was 73. Said numberof questions could no longer be described as clarificatory questions.

Another ground therefore for the acquittal of the petitioner is that she wasdenied IMPARTIAL TRIAL before the Sandiganbayan. This is one reason why

the case could no longer be remanded to the Sandiganbayan especially sothat the other Sandiganbayan Justices in the Special Division of 5 haveretired. There is therefore no compelling reason why the case should still beremanded to the lower court when all the evidence are already with theSupreme Court.


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People v. Medenilla [GR 131638-39, 26 March 2001]First Division, Kapunan (J) : 4 concur

Facts:

On 16 April 1996, Loreto Medenilla y Doria was caught for illegal possession andunlawfully selling 5.08g of shabu (Criminal Case 3618-D), was in unlawful possession of4 transparent plastic bags of shabu weighing 200.45g (Criminal Case 3619-D) inMandaluyong City. Versions of facts leading to the arrest are conflicting; theprosecution alleging buy-bust operations, while defense claim illegal arrest, search andseizure. Arraigned on 25 June 1996, Medenilla pleaded not guilty. The judge therein, forthe purpose of clarification, propounded a question upon a witness during the trial. On26 November 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig (Branch 262) found Medenilla, inCriminal Cases 3618-D and 3619-D, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating

Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).

Issue: Whether judges are allowed to asked clarificatory questions.

Held:

A single noted instance of questioning cannot justify a claim that the trial judge wasbiased. The Court have exhaustively examined the transcript of stenographic notes and

determined that the trial judge was more than equitable in presiding over the hearingsof this case. Moreover, a judge is not prohibited from propounding clarificatory

questions on a witness if the purpose of which is to arrive at a proper and justdetermination of the case. The trial judge must be accorded a reasonable leeway inputting such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts to makethe record speak the truth. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questionshe propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of oneparty.


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CRUZ and PAITIM vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION[G.R. No. 144464, November 22, 2001]

KAPUNAN, J:

FACTS:

On September 9, 1994 it was discovered by the Civil Service Commission that Paitim,Municipal Treasurer of Bulacan took the non-professional examination for Cruz after thelatter had previously failed in the said examination three times. The CSC found after afact finding investigation that a prima facie case exists against you for DISHONESTY,GRAVE MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THESERVICE. The petitioners filed their Answer to the charge entering a general denial ofthe material averments of the "Formal Charge." They also declared that they wereelecting a formal investigation on the matter. The petitioners subsequently filed aMotion to Dismiss averring that if the investigation will continue, they will be deprivedof their right to due process because the Civil Service Commission was the complainant,the Prosecutor and the Judge, all at the same time. On November 16, 1995, Dulce J.Cochon issued an "Investigation Report and Recommendation" finding the Petitionersguilty of "Dishonesty" and ordering their dismissal from the government service.Petitioners maintain that the CSC did not have original jurisdiction to hear and decidethe administrative case. Allegedly, in accordance with Section 47(1), Chapter 7, Subtitle

A, Title 1, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC is vested with appellatejurisdiction only in all administrative cases where the penalty imposed is removal or

dismissal from the office and where the complaint was filed by a private citizen againstthe government employee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners right to due process was violated when the CSC acted asinvestigator, complainant, prosecutor and jugde all at the same time.

HELD:

NO. The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it could

not be an impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision was based onsubstantial findings. Factual findings of administrative bodies, being considered expertsin their field, are


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David vs. Aquilizan, 96 Scra 707

FACTS:

David has a large parcel of land in Polomolok, Cotabato. He let Felomeno Jugar and

Ricardo Jugar tend and caretake separate portions of his land in 1971. The land isestimated to be yielding 60-70 cavans of corn cobs an dthe share agreed upon is 50-50.In 1973, David withdrew the land from the brothers and has not allowed them to goback there. The brothers prayed for reinstatement but David refused to do so. Daviddenied that the brothers were his tenants. He said that Ricardo was his tractor driverbefore but he resigned to take care of his dad and to work for DOLE. Fewlomeno on theother hand surrendered the portion of the land he was tending to continue his faithhealing. J Aquilizan handled the case filed by the brothers against David and after threemonths he rendered a decision in favor of the brothers without any hearing. Davidaverred he was denied due process. J Aquilizan admitted that there was indeed nohearing conducted but he said the decision has already become final and executory asthe period for appeal has already lapsed.

ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to an appeal.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of David. A decision rendered without a hearing is null andvoid and may be attacked directly or collaterally. The decision is null and void for wantof due process. And it has been held that a final and executory judgment may be setaside with a view to the renewal of the litigation when the judgment is void for lack ofdue process of law. In legal contemplation, it is as if no judgment has been rendered atall.


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ANIAG VS. COMELEC[237 SCRA 194; G.R. NO. 104961; 7 OCT 1994]

Facts:

In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issuedResolution No. 2323, Gun Ban, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing,carrying and transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security personnel orbodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations,and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period.COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification ofcandidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizingspecial strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the Gun Ban, Mr.Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote petitioner forthe return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Petitionerthen instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioners house andreturn them to Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by Arellanoapproached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms. Arellanowas apprehended and detained. He then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioneralso explained that Arellano was only complying with the firearms ban, and that he wasnot a security officer or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of theOmnibus Election Code, and for petitioner to show cause why he should not bedisqualified from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions theconstitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that gunrunning, using ortransporting firearms or similar weapons and other acts mentioned in the resolution

are not within the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according topetitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on the disqualification ofpetitioner from running in the elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for aseat in Congress in the elections.

Issue:

Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to returnthe firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant lesssearch of his car

Held:

A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriateauthority. However, a warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as longas the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and theinspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, theguns were not tucked in Arellanos waist nor placed within his reach, as they were


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neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given thesecircumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the car lawfully as well asthe package without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent any justifyingcircumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, thesearch could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from the

warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It was alsoshown in the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of settingup the checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP withviolation of the Omnibus Election Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutorthat he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation. Such constituted a violationof his right to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fullygiven the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not informed thathe was himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted bythe PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot be used asevidence in any proceeding against the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 isunconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.


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EASTERN BROADCASTING VS. DANS

Facts:

A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was summarily closed on

grounds of national security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite people tosedition. Petitioner, DYRE contends that they were denied due process. There was nohearing to establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of theradio station violates freedom of expression. Before the court could even promulgate adecision upon the Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed amotion to withdraw the petition. The rights of the station were sold to a new owner,Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Despite the casebecoming moot and academic, (because there are no longerinterested parties, thus thedismissal of the case) the Supreme Court still finds that there is need to pass a

RESOLUTION for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals inmatters as this case.

Issue:

Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE.Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of FreedomofExpression.

Held:

The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void. Theabsence of a hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary requirements inadministrative proceedings are laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of IndustrialRelation (69 Phil.635).

The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed before any broadcast station may be closed.The

Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the following requirements:(1) The right to hearing, includes the right to present ones case and submit evidencepresented.(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented

(3) The decision must have something to support itself.(4) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to supportconclusion)(5) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing(6) The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of law and factsand not simply accept subordinates views


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(7) Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know thevarious issued involved and reasons for decisions rendered.

The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of DueProcess, it gives an unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in

order that deprivation of life,liberty and property is valid.The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right offreedom of speech and expression. The court stresses that all forms of media, whetherprint or broadcast are entitled to this constitutional right. Although the government stillhas the right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violentlyoverthrow it. The test for the limitation of freedom of expression is the clear andpresent danger rule. If in the circumstances that the media is used in such nature as tocreate this danger that will bring in such evils, then the law has the right to prevent it.However, Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or signal a startof widespread uprising. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to thevitality of a representative democracy. The people continues to have the right to beinformed on public affairs and broadcast media continues to have the pervasiveinfluence to the people being the most accessible form of media. Therefore, broadcaststations deserve the the special protection given to all forms of media by the dueprocess and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.


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MARIVELES SHIPYARD VS. CA

Facts:

Sometime on October 1993, Mariveles Shipyard Corporation engaged the services ofLongest Force Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. to render security services at itspremises. Pursuant to their agreement, Longest Force deployed its security guards, theprivate respondents herein, at the petitioners shipyard in Mariveles, Bataan.

According to petitioner, it religiously complied with the terms of the security contractwith Longest Force, promptly paying its bills and the contract rates of the latter.However, it found the services being rendered by the assigned guards unsatisfactoryand inadequate, causing it to terminate its contract with Longest Force on April 1995.Longest Force, in turn, terminated the employment of the security guards it had

deployed at petitioners shipyard.

On September 1996, private respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal,underpayment of wages pursuant to the PNPSOSIA-PADPAO rates, non-payment ofovertime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay, 13thmonth pay and attorneys fees, against both Longest Force and petitioner, before theLabor Arbiter. The case sought the guards reinstatement with full back wages andwithout loss of seniority rights.

Longest Force admitted that it employed private respondents and assigned them as

security guards at the premises of petitioner rendering a 12 hours duty per shift for thesaid period. It likewise admitted its liability as to the non-payment of the alleged wagedifferential in the total amount of P2,618,025 but passed on the liability to petitioner

The petitioner denied any liability on account of the alleged illegal dismissal, stressingthat no employer-employee relationship existed between it and the security guards. Itfurther pointed out that it would be the height of injustice to make it liable again formonetary claims which it had already paid. Anent the cross-claim filed by Longest Forceagainst it, petitioner prayed that it be dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner averred thatLongest Force had benefited from the contract; it was now estopped from questioningsaid agreement on the ground that it had made a bad deal.

The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment that Longest Force and Mariveles Shipping bejointly and severally liable to pay the money claims of the complainants. Petitionerappealed the foregoing to the NLRC. The labor tribunal, affirmed the decision of theLabor Arbiter. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the NLRC.The petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari assailing the NLRC judgment


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for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion with the Court of Appeals. TheCourt of Appeals denied due course to the petition and dismissed it outright.

Issue:

WON Longest Force should be held solely and ultimately liable.

Held:

Petitioners liability is joint and several with that of Longest Force, pursuant to Articles106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code which provide as follows:

ART. 106. CONTRACTOR OR SUBCONTRACTOR.Whenever an employer enters into acontract with another person for the performance of the formers work, the employeesof the contractor and of the latters subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance

with the provisions of this Code.

In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of hisemployees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severallyliable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the workperformed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable toemployees directly employed by him.

ART. 107. INDIRECT EMPLOYER.The provisions of the immediately preceding Articleshall likewise apply to any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not

being an employer, contracts with an independent contractor for the performance ofany work, task, job or project.

ART. 109. SOLIDARY LIABILITY . The provisions of existing laws to the contrarynotwithstanding, every employer or indirect employer shall be held responsible with hiscontractor or subcontractor for any violation of any provision of this Code. For purposesof determining the extent of their civil liability under this Chapter, they shall beconsidered as direct employers.

In this case, when petitioner contracted for security services with Longest Force as thesecurity agency that hired private respondents to work as guards for the shipyard

corporation, petitioner became an indirect employer of private respondents pursuant toArticle 107 abovecited. Following Article 106, when the agency as contractor failed topay the guards, the corporation as principal becomes jointly and severally liable for theguards wages. This is mandated by the Labor Code to ensure compliance with itsprovisions, including payment of statutory minimum wage.

The security agency is held liable by virtue of its status as direct employer, while thecorporation is deemed the indirect employer of the guards for the purpose of paying


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their wages in the event of failure of the agency to pay them. This statutory schemegives the workers the ample protection consonant with labor and social justiceprovisions of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner cannot evade its liability by claiming thatit had religiously paid the compensation of guards as stipulated under the contract withthe security agency. Labor standards are enacted by the legislature to alleviate the

plight of workers whose wages barely meet the spiraling costs of their basic needs.Labor laws are considered written in every contract. Stipulations in violation thereof areconsidered null. Similarly, legislated wage increases are deemed amendments to thecontract. Thus, employers cannot hide behind their contracts in order to evade their (ortheir contractors or subcontractors) liability for noncompliance with the statutoryminimum wage.However, the court emphasizes that the solidary liability of petitioner with that ofLongest Force does not preclude the application of the Civil Code provision on the rightof reimbursement from his co-debtor by the one who paid. As held in Del Rosario &Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC , the joint and several liability imposed onpetitioner is without prejudice to a claim for reimbursement by petitioner against thesecurity agency for such amounts as petitioner may have to pay to complainants, theprivate respondents herein. The security agency may not seek exculpation by claimingthat the principals payments to it were inadequate for the guards lawful compensation.

As an employer, the security agency is charged with knowledge of labor laws; and theadequacy of the compensation that it demands for contractual services is its principalconcern and not any others.


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Suntay v. People [GR L-9430, 29 June 1957]

Facts:

On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a

verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of QuezonCity, alleging that on or about 21 June 21954, the accused took Alicia Nubla from St.Paul's College in Quezon City with lewd design and took her to somewhere near theUniversity of the Philippines (UP) compound in Diliman and was then able to havecarnal knowledge of her. On 15 December 1954, after an investigation, an AssistantCity Attorney recommended to the City Attorney of Quezon City that the complaint bedismissed for lack of merit. On 23 December 1954 attorney for the complainantaddressed a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City wherein he took exception to therecommendation of the Assistant City Attorney referred to and urged that a complaintfor seduction be filed against Suntay. On 10 January 1955, Suntay applied for and wasgranted a passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs (5981 [A39184]). On 20January 1955, Suntay left the Philippines for San Francisco, California, where he is atpresent enrolled in school. On 31 January 1955, Alicia Nubla subscribed and swore to acomplaint charging Suntay with seduction which was filed, in the Court of First Instance(CFI) Quezon City, after preliminary investigation had been conducted (Criminal case Q-1596). On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court toissue an order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularlythe National Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for thepurpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealtwith in accordance with law." On 10 February 1955 the Court granted the motion. On 7March 1955 the Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing him

to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to Suntayand to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges againsthim. However, this order was not implemented or carried out in view of thecommencement of this proceedings in order that the issues raised may be judiciallyresolved. On 5 July 1955, Suntays counsel wrote to the Secretary requesting that theaction taken by him be reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a motion prayingthat the Court reconsider its order of 10 February 1955. On 7 July 1955, the Secretarydenied counsel's request and on 15 July 1955 the Court denied the motion forreconsideration. Suntay filed the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Issue:

Whether Suntay should be accorded notice and hearing before his passport may becancelled.

Held:


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Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion isexercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of aserious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing may be dispensed with bysuch officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearingdoes not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of

the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious because of theabsence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with thedue process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunctionissued ex parte would be violative of the said clause. Hearing would have been properand necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were notclear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal charge in ourcourts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign

Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion (Section 25, EO 1, S. 1946, 42 OG 1400) torevoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically orcapriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Suntays suddenly leav ing thecountry in such convenient time, can reasonably be interpreted to mean as a deliberateattempt on his part to flee from justice,and, therefore, he cannot now be heard tocomplain if the strong arm of the law should join together to bring him back to justice.


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CO VS. BARBERS

Petitioner Governor Josie Castillo-Co of Quirino, through this special civil action forcertiorariand prohibition, with prayer for temporary restraining order/writ of preliminaryinjunction, seeks to nullify the Order of the Deputy Ombudsman directing her

preventive suspension.

On 27 June 1997, Quirino Congressman Junie Cua filed a complaint before the Office ofthe Ombudsman against Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Virgilio Ringor.Congressman Cua alleged that in the course of its investigation in aid of legislation, theHouse of Representative Committee on Good Government chaired by him uncoveredirregularities in the purchase of heavy equipment by the Governor and the ProvincialEngineer. Congressman Cua charged that the equipment purchased was"reconditioned" instead of "brand new" as required by resolutions of the province'sSanggunian authorizing such purchase. Other irregularities claimed to have beencommitted included overpricing, lack of public bidding, lack of inspection, advancepayment prior to delivery in violation of Section 338 of the Local Government Code, andan attempt to cover up such irregularities. Congressman Cua thus accused GovernorCastillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Ringor of violating Sections 3(e) and 3(g) of the

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,1as amended, and Articles 213 2and 2173of theRevised Penal Code.

In an Order4dated 4 July 1997, that is, a week after the complaint was filed, GovernorCastillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Ringor were placed under preventive suspension fora period of six (6) months. Said order was signed by Emilio A. Gonzales, III, Director,and approved by Jesus Guerrero, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.

Governor Castillo-Co and Provincial Engineer Ringor thereafter filed separate motionsfor reconsideration. Both motions were denied in a "Joint Order"5dated 1 August 1997signed by Director Gonzales and approved by Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero.

On 12 August 1997, Governor Castillo-Co filed the present petition. Petitioner imputesgrave abuse of discretion upon the Deputy Ombudsman for issuing the order ofpreventive suspension against her. As may be deduced from the petition, the groundsinvoked in support thereof are:

(1) The Deputy Ombudsman is not authorized to sign the order ofpreventive suspension.

(2) The issuance of such order was hasty and selective, and deprivedpetitioner of due process, and(3) The conditions required to sustain petitioner's preventive suspensionhave not been met and that, at any rate, the duration thereof isexcessive.


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In a Resolution dated 26 August 1997, 6 this Court resolved, among others, to grantpetitioner's prayers for a temporary restraining order.

The petition has no merit.

I

Petitioner claims that under Republic Act No. 7975, 7 only the Ombudsman has theauthority to sign the order placing officials with a 27 salary grade or above, likepetitioner-governor, under preventive suspension. 8In this case, the suspension orderwas neither signed nor approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto. Rather, said orderwas signed by Director Emilio Gonzales III and approved by Deputy Ombudsman forLuzon Jesus Guerrero.

There is nothing in RA 7975, however, that would remotely suggest that only theOmbudsman, and not his Deputy, may sign an order preventively suspending officialsoccupying positions classified as grade 27 or above.

On the other hand, Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 9provides:Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension.The Ombudsman or his Deputymay preventively suspend any officer or employee under hisauthority pending an investigation, if in his judgment, theevidence of guilt is strong. and (a) the charge against suchofficer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grossmisconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty; or (b) thecharge would warrant removal from the service; or (c) therespondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed

against him.The preventive suspension shall continue until the case isterminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more thansix months, without pay, except when the delay in thedisposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due tothe fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which casethe period of such delay shall not be counted in computing theperiod of suspension herein provided. (Emphasis supplied).

Similarly, Section 9, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of Ombudsman 10provides:

Sec. 9. Preventive suspension. Pending investigation, the respondent

may be preventively suspended without pay for a period of not more thansix (6) months, if, in the judgment of the Ombudsman or his properdeputy, the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against suchofficer or employees involves dishonestly, oppression or gross misconduct,or neglect in the performance of duty, (b) the charge would warrantremoval from the service, or (c) the respondent's continued stay in officemay prejudice the case filed against him.


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If the administrative investigation is not terminated within the period therespondent is suspended, the respondent shall be automatically reinstatedunless the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault,negligence or any cause attributable to the respondent, in which case theperiod of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of

suspension. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under these provisions, there cannot be any doubt that the Ombudsman or hisDeputy may preventively suspend an officer or employee, where appropriate, asindicated by the word "or" between the "Ombudsman" and "his Deputy." The word "or"is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from eachof the other things enumerated.11The law does not require that only the Ombudsmanhimself may sign the order suspension.

II

Petitioner next questions the manner by which the suspension order was issued. Sheclaims that she was denied due process because she was not afforded the opportunityto controvert the evidence against her before the order of preventive suspension wasissued. 12A preventive suspension, however, can be decreed on an officialunder investigation after charges are brought and even before the chargesare heard under investigation after charges are brought and even before thecharges are heard since the same is not in the nature of a penalty, 13 butmerely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.Thus, in Lastimosavs. Vasquez,14we quoted with favor our pronouncement in Nera vs. Garcia:15

In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to theadministrative complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was not a punishment orpenalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventivemeasure. Suspension as a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If aftersuch investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is foundguilty of facts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is thepenalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officerpending his investigation and before the charges against him are heard andbe given an opportunity to prove his innocence.

The fact that the said order was issued seven days after the complaint was filed did not

constitute grave abuse of discretion. The immediate issuance of such order is requiredin order to prevent the subject of the suspension from committing further irregularities.Such prompt action, moreover, is in consonance with Section 15 of RA 6770 whichexhorts the Ombudsman to:

. . . give priority to complaints filed against high ranking governmentofficials and/or those occupying supervisory positions, complaints


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involving grave offenses as well as complaints involving large sums ofmoney and/or properties.

We do not give much credence to petitioner's suggestions of a malicious conspiracybetween the Deputy Ombudsman Guerrero and Congressman Cua, reputedlypetitioner's political adversary, to harass her. The Deputy Ombudsman and the

Congressman, being public officials, enjoy the presumption of regularity of performanceof dutes. Such presumption can be overcome only by strong and convincing evidence.16No such evidence exists in this case.

III

Contrary to petitioner's contention, the conditions required to sustain her preventivesuspension have been met in this case. These conditions are:

(1) That the evidence of guilt is strong; and(2) That any of the following circumstances are present:

(a) the charge against such officer or employeeinvolves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconductor neglect in the performance of duty;(b) the charges would warrant removal from theservice; or(c) the respondent's continued stay in office mayprejudice the case filed against him. 17

The first requisite rests upon the determination of the disciplining authority, the Officeof the Ombudsman in this case:

As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, however, whether the evidence of guilt is strong is leftto the determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence beforehim. A preliminary hearing as in bail petitions in cases involving capital offenses is notrequired. In rejecting a similar argument as that made argument as that made bypetitioner in this case, this Court said in that case.

The import of the Neradecision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretionto decide when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 ofR.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such determination of guilt to the "Judgment" of theOmbudsman on the basis of the administrative complaint . . . 18

We find no reason to disturb such determination in this case.

Allthe circumstances enumerated in the second requisite are likewise present

Petitioner is charged with, among others, fraud against the public treasury andmalversation, offenses indubitably involving dishonesty and grave misconduct. These


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charges, if proven true, also constitute grounds for her removal upon order of theproper court. Section 60(c) of the Local Government Code states.

Sec. 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. An elective official ma bedisciplined suspended or removed from office on any of the followinggrounds:

xxx xxx xxx,c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or anoffense punishable by at leastprision mayor.. . . (Emphasis supplied).

Petitioner's high position likewise gives her access to public records and the cloud toinfluence possible witness. Her continued stay in office may thus prejudice theprosecution of the case filed against her. It is immaterial that, as petitioner contends,no evidence has been adduced to prove that petitioner may influence possiblewitnesses or may tamper with the public records. It is sufficient that there exists such apossibility.

Finally, the duration of petitioner's suspension is not excessive. Petitioner's suspensionfor six (6) months is within the limits prescribed by Section 24 of R.A. 6770. The lengthof the period of suspension within such limits, like the evaluation of the strength of theevidence, lies in the discretion of the Ombudsman.

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining orderissued by this Court per its Resolution dated 26 August 1997 is hereby LIFTED withimmediate effect.

SO ORDERED.


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SANTIAGO VS VASQUEZ

Facts:

An information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of the

Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued with bail for releasefixed at Php.15,000 so she filed a motion for acceptance of cash bail bond. On the sameday the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the petitioner to post cash bondwhich the later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000. Her arraignment was set, butpetitioner asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowedprovisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred it. TheSandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner, by reason of theannouncement she made that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship aHarvard. In the instant motion she submitted before the S.C. she argues that her rightto travel is impaired.

Issue:

Whether or Not the petitioners right to travel is impaired.

Held:

The petitioner does not deny and as a matter of fact even made a public statement,that she he every intension of leaving the country to pursue higher studies abroad. Thecourt upholds the course of action of the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of suchfact of petitioners pal to go abroad and in thereafter issuing a sua sponte the hold

departure order is but an exercise of respondent courts inherent power to preserve andto maintain effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

Also, the petitioner assumed obligations, when she posted bail bond. She holds herselfamenable at all times to the orders and process of eth court. She may legally beprohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. (Manotoc v. C.A.)


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MEJIA VS. PAMARAN

Facts:

6 ejectment cases were filed separately in the City Court of Manila by Eusebio Lu

against Feliciano F. Endangan, Josefina Meimban, Teodorico Bontia, Rolando Antillon,Jose Mabalot and Vicente Villamor. All cases were decided by the City Court of Manilaagainst Endangan, et. al., all of whom appealed in due time to the Court of FirstInstance (CFI) of Manila, where the cases were raffled to Branch XXVI, presided overby the Honorable Jose P. Alejandro (Civil Case 122794 to 122799). On 12 August 1979,Endangan, Bontia, Antillon, Mabalot, and Villamor entered into a compromiseagreement with Lu whereby the Endangan, et. al. individually received from Lu the sumof P5,000 in consideration of which Endangan, et. al. agreed to vacate the premises inquestion and remove their houses therefrom within 60 days from the date of theexecution of the agreement, failing which the appellee shall have the authority todemolish Endangan, et. al.'s houses with costs thereof chargeable against them. Thecompromise agreement was submitted to the court. Josefina Meimban did not join herco-defendants in entering into the compromise agreement. Up to that stage of thecases, the counsel of record of the defendants was Atty. S. G. Doron. On 22 August1979, Atty. Modesto R. Espano of the Citizens Legal Assistant Office (CLAO), wrote Atty.Doron to inform him that Mrs. Meimban has sought the assistance of the CLAOregarding her case, and asked that the records of the case be sent to him. As aconsequence, Atty. Doron filed on 30 August 1979 his motion to withdraw appearanceas counsel for Meimban in Civil Case 122795. While Endangan, Bontia, Antillon, Mabalotand Villamor, have decided to settle with Lu through compromise agreement that theysigned, Meimban resolved to prosecute her appeal in her own case, Civil Case 122795.

When Meimban followed up her case in Branch XXVI of the CFI of Manila and hadoccasion to talk to Danilo Buenaventura of that Branch who told her that her case wasalready submitted for decision. She sought assistance from the CLAO where she wasinstructed by Atty. Espano to find out the real status of the case. She returned to thecourt sometime in July 1979 and that was when she first came to know Atty. AuroraMejia who told her that the case has not yet been decided because there was still oneparty who has not signed the compromise agreement prepared by Atty. Doron. Atty.Mejia also remarked that she was surprised why rich people were helping in that case,like a certain Atty. Lu, a brother of Eusebio Lu, who has been approaching the presiding

judge; and then told her she would help them provided they give P1,000 each for a giftto the Judge, to which she replied she would broach the matter to her companions.

From the court, she went to Atty. Modesto Espano and told the lawyer the case was notyet submitted. Atty. Espano instructed her to get her papers from Atty. Doron, whichshe did. Thereafter, she told Pilar Bautista, daughter of Jose Mabalot, and Gloria

Antonio, daughter of Vicente Villamor, about the help offered by Atty. Mejia. The twosaid they would think it over as they had already signed something. When she went tothe court to deposit her rentals Atty. Mejia asked her if her companions were agreeableto the suggestion and she replied she had already told them and that they would


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consider the matter. On 20 November 1979, Sylvia Dizon y Resurreccion who loanedMeimban P500 accompanied the latter to the court. She was seated at the corridor nearthe door of Atty. Mejia's office which was partially open, and she saw Meimban handedan envelope to Atty. Mejia who put it inside her desk drawer. On 7 December 1979, thedate set for the hearing of the motion to withdraw the compromise and to file

memoranda filed by Pilar Bautista and Gloria Antonio in behalf of their fathers, Atty.Mejia approached Meimban and said no oppositor might arrive, and asked her ifBautista had brought 1/2 of the P1,000.00. Bautista placed P600 in an envelope and thetwo of them, Bautista and Meimban, went to Atty. Mejia's office. Bautista handed theenvelope containing the money to Atty. Mejia who received it. On 3 September 1980,

Atty. Mejia attempted to bribe the Tanodbayan Investigator (Christina Corall-Paterno),through intricate gold chain with a pendant hearing an inscription of letter "C," (whichthe investigator returned through an employee, Dante Ramos). Corall-Paternoinvestigated the complaints of Josefina Meimban and Pilar Bautista against Atty. AuroraMejia y Rodriguez for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On 23 April1981, the Sandiganbayan, in Criminal Case 1988, found Aurora Mejia y Rodriguez guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b), Section 3 of RA 3019 andsentenced her to an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from 4 years and 1 day asminimum to 7 years as maximum, to suffer perpetual disqualification from public officeand to indemnify the victim Josefina Meimban the sum of P1,000.00 representing themoney given to her. The Sandiganbayan also found Mejia, in Criminal Case 1989, guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b), Section 3 of RA 3019 andlikewise sentenced her to an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from 4 years and 1day as minimum to 7 years as maximum, to suffer perpetual disqualification from publicoffice and to indemnify the victim Pilar Bautista the amount of P500 representing themoney given to her. Mejia was also ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings. Mejia

filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether Presidential Decree is an ex-post facto law.

Held:

The contention that Presidential Decree 1606 is contrary to the ex post facto provisionof the Constitution is similarly premised on the allegation that "petitioner's right ofappeal is being diluted or eroded efficacy wise." Mejia alleged that the procedure

provided for by the Sandiganbayan are ex post facto and hence all proceedings takenagainst her are void ab initio being in violation of the Constitution. It is further arguedthat only one stage of appeal is available to Mejia under PD 1606 which effectivelydeprives her of the intermediate recourse to the Court of Appeals and that in saidappeal to the Supreme Court only issues of law may be raised and worse still the appealhas become a matter of discretion rather than a matter of right. A more searchingscrutiny of its rationale would demonstrate the lack of persuasiveness of such an


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argument. The Kay Villegas Kami decision, promulgated in 1970, supplies the mostrecent and binding pronouncement on the matter. To quote from the ponencia ofJustice Makasiar: "An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act donebefore the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes suchan act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; (3)

changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to thecrime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes convictionupon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission ofthe offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposespenalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful, and (6)deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has becomeentitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation ofamnesty." Even the most careful scrutiny of the said definition fails to sustain Mejia'sclaim. The "lawful protection" to which an accused "has become entitled" is qualified,not given a broad scope. It hardly can be argued that the mode of procedure providedfor in the statutory right to appeal is therein embraced.


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ANG TIBAY VS CIR

Facts:

Toribio Teodoro, the manager and proprietor of Ang Tibay, laid off 89 laborers, who

were members of the National Labor Union (NLU), due to alleged shortages of leathermaterials. The National Labor Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against

Ang Tibay, alleging therein, among others, that Toribio dominates the National WorkersBrotherhood (NWB) of Ang Tibay, another union in the company, and that Toribiodiscriminated against the NLU and unjustly favoring the NWB, which he allegedlydominated. The Court of Industrial Relations ruled in favor of NLU, due to the failure of

Ang Tibay to present records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of nativedealers in leather and thus to disprove NLUs allegation that the lack of leathermaterials as a scheme to discharge NLU members. The Supreme Court, however,reversed the decision, finding no substantial evidence that the 89 workers weredismissed due to their union affiliation or activities. Thus, the Solicitor General, in behalfof the Court of Industrial Relations filed a motion for reconsideration, while the NLUfiled a motion for new trial, praying that the case be remanded to the Court ofIndustrial Relations.

Issue:

Whether the CIRs freedom from the rigidity of procedural requirements prescribespecial requirements of due process in administrative cases.

Held:

The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) is not narrowly constrained by technical rules ofprocedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantialmerits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not bebound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manneras it may deem just and equitable." The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to befree from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in

justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental andessential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrativecharacter. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even inproceedings of this character, to wit:

a. Right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected topresent his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. The liberty and propertyof the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented, after the party is given anopportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rightswhich he asserts. The right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the


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part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the personor persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice orconsideration.c. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it doesimply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to

support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a placewhen directly attached. This principle emanates from the more fundamental principlethat the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimitedpower anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.d. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but theevidence must be "substantial." Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. Itmeans such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate tosupport a conclusion." The statute provides that 'the rules of evidence prevailing incourts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this andsimilar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rulesso that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicialproceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of adesirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orderswithout a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroboratedhearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.e. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at leastcontained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining theadministrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter beprotected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not,however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for thatpurpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself

of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointedfor the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but theirreport and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, CA103.) The CIR may refer anyindustrial or agricultural dispute of any matter under its consideration or advisement toa local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or any public official inany part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and maydelegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the CIR maydeem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself ofany of its powers (Section 10)f. The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independentconsideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views

of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such thatit is literally impossible for the titular heads of the CIR personally to decide allcontroversies coming before them. There is no statutory authority to authorizeexaminers or other subordinates to render final decision, with right to appeal to boardor commission, to solve the difficulty.g. The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a mannerthat the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the


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reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable fromthe authority conferred upon it.


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SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. LANTION

Facts:

On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree

1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have CommittedCrimes in a Foreign Country". On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice FranklinM. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed inManila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of thePhilippines and the Government of the United States of America. "The Senate, by wayof Resolution 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It alsoexpressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying anextradition requestupon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested stateresident in the Requesting State). On 18 June 1999, the Department of Justice receivedfrom the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale 0522 containing a requestfor the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbalewere the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court,Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition.Jimenez was charged in the United States for violation of (a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy tocommit offense or to defraud the United States, 2 counts), (b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt toevade or defeat tax, 4 counts), (c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2counts), (d) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries, 6 counts), and (E) 2 USC 441f(Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts). On the same day, the Secretaryissued Department Order 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to takecharge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition

documents, Jimenez (on 1 July 1999) requested copies of the official extradition requestfrom the US Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith,and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall havereceived copies of the requested papers. The Secretary denied the request. On 6

August 1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition against the Secretaryof Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau ofInvestigation, for mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez theextradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity tocomment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the requestimpartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretarys letterdated 13 July 1999); and prohibition (to restrain the Justice Secretary from considering

the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin theSecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any actdirected to the extradition of Jimenez to the United States), with an application for theissuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. The trialcourt ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before theSupreme Court. On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the


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Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered the Justice Secretary to furnishJimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him areasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. On 3February 2000, the Secretary timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether Jimenez had the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of anextradition process.

Held:

Presidential Decree (PD) 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty providesthe time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition aswell as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in theextradition court (Section 6). It is of judicial notice that the summons includes thepetition for extradition which will be answered by the extraditee. There is noprovision inthe Treaty and in PD 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand from theJustice Secretary copies of the extradition request from the US government and itssupporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still undergoingevaluation. The DFA and the DOJ, as well as the US government, maintained that theTreaty and PD 1069 do not grant the extraditee a right to notice and hearing during theevaluation stage of an extradition process. It is neither an international practice toafford a potential extraditee with a copy of the extradition papers during the evaluationstage of the extradition process. Jimenez is, thus, bereft of the right to notice andhearing during the extradition process evaluation stage. Further, as an extradition

proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extraditionproceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in thelatter do not necessarily apply to the former. The procedural due process required by agiven set of circumstances "must begin with a determination of the precise nature ofthe government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affectedby governmental action." The concept of due process is flexible for "not all situationscalling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure." Thus, thetemporary hold on Jimenez's privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on hisright to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should hedecide to resist the request for his extradition to the US. There is no denial of dueprocess as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.


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GUZMAN VS NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

FACTS:

Petitioners who are students of the National University were barred from enrolment.The school claims that their scholastic standing is poor and that they have beeninvolved in activities that have disrupted classes and had conducted mass actionswithout the required permits.

HELD:

a. It is apparent that despite the accusations of alleged violations hurled by the schoolagainst the petitioners, the fact is that it had never conducted proceedings of any sortto determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated inactivities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school

authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein.

Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite any duly published rule of theirs bywhich students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing.

b. Under the Education Act of 1982, students have the right to freely choose theirfield of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up tograduation, EXCEPT in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinaryregulations.

The petitioner were denied of this right, and were being disciplined without dueprocess, in violation of the admonition in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schoolsthat no penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in ***(the) Manuel and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and onlyafter due investigation shall have been conducted. It has already been held inBerina vs. Philippine Maritime Institute, 117 SCRA 581, that it is illegal of a school toimpose sanctions on students without conducting due investigation.

c. Of course, all schools have the power to adopt and enforce its rules. In fact themaintenance of good school discipline is a duty specifically enjoined on every privateschool. The Manual of Regulations for Private Schools provides that:

* * The school rules governing discipline and the corresponding sanctions thereformust be clearly specified and defined in writing and made known to the students and/ortheir parents or guardians. Schools shall have the authority and prerogative topromulgate such rules and regulations as they may deem necessary from time to timeeffective as of the date of their promulgation unless otherwise specified.


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d. The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural dueprocess. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students:

a. need not entail proceedings and hearing similar to those prescribed for actions andproceedings in court of justice;

b. the proceedings may be summary;

c. cross-examination is not an essential part thereof.

But the S.C. said that the following minimum standards must be met to satisfy thedemands of procedural due process:

1. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusationagainst them;

2. they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with theassistance of counsel;

3. they shall be informed of the evidence against them;

4. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;

5. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official

designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.


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GONZALES VS. NLRC

FACTS- Lorlene Gonzales was a Grade 6 teacher in Ateneo de Davao University from 1974 to1993, when she was terminated. In 1991, the Grade School Headmaster sent her a

letter informing her of 2 complaints from parents of her students for alleged use ofcorporal punishment. She demanded to know who the parents were because Ateneowouldnt tell her. When she found out that Ateneo was soliciting complaints fromparents of her students, she demanded an investigation.- Ateneo sent her a notice of investigation, schedule, Committee composition, affidavitsof the parents, and the rules of procedure. She refused to take part in the investigationunless the rules of procedure were revised. The committee, under advise of counsel,did not revise the rules, since it had been used for a different teacher in the past. Theinvestigation went on, without her participation. In 1993, she was asked to tender herresignation, otherwise she would be considered resigned.- Lorlene filed for illegal dismissal with the LA. The LA found that she was indeedillegally dismissed because although she was afforded due process, Ateneo failed toestablish substantial evidence as to Lorlenes guilt. It was established that she is a verygood teacher, equipped with the appropriate educational qualifications, trainings,seminars and work experiences. Such fact was affirmed by her present and formerstudents, their parents, colleagues and the former headmaster of the grade school. As amatter of fact, 6 out of the nine 9 students and their parents/guardians retracted andwithdrew their statements.- NLRC reversed LAs decision, sayingthe dismissal was valid and legal.

ISSUE

WON dismissal was valid and legal

HELD

NO- In view of the foregoing, the conclusion of the NLRC is unwarranted.No due processThe committee refused to revise the rules of procedure. As a result,Lorlene wasnt afforded a chance defend herself and to examine / cross-examine theaccusers.Failure to prove by substantial evidenceThe evidence of Ateneo didnt measure up to

the standard laid down in Ang Tibay v CIR: "substantial evidence is more than merescintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept asadequate to support a conclusion."

Lorlenes evidence She was able to prove that shes a competent and dedicatedteacher of Ateneo for 17 years.- Employment is not merely a contractual relationship; it has assumed the nature ofproperty right. It may spell the difference whether or not a family will have food on


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their table, roof over their heads and education for their children. It is for this reasonthat the State has taken up measures to protect employees from unjustified dismissals.It is also because of this that the right to security of tenure is not only a statutory rightbut, more so, a constitutional right.


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ATENEO VS. CAPULONG

Facts:

Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious

physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis.Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renalfailure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the sameoccasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a reportwithin 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said noticealso required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four(24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the writtennotice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventivesuspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, afterreceiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, founda prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law SchoolCatalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file theirwritten answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board tohear the charges against respondent students. The Board found respondent studentsguilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline whichprohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimityamong the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left theimposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernasimposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filedwith RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was

also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the respondents. A day after theexpiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Boardto investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza.This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creationof the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack ofdue process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered.

Issue:

Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.

Held:

There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean ofthe Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit theirwritten statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent studentsrequested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of theaccusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin


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elements of notice and hearing.

Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instantpetition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsiderationfirst before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is

accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies iswhen the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether ornot respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to theirdismissal from Petitioner University.

Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions inacademic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusationagainst them;(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with theassistance of counsel, if desired:(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or officialdesignated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

Documents

Procedural Due Process (Lacking Rivera, Bautista, Gov. of Us and Gov. of Hongkong)