Problems and Solutions In Future Coalition Operations Pub315

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PROBL EMS AND SOL UTI ONS

I N FUTURE COAL I TI ON OPERATI ONS

Edit ed by

Th omas J . Mar shal l

w i t h

Phi l l i p Kaiser

and

J on K essmei er

December 1997



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The views expressed in t his report are those of the authors and donot necessarily reflect the official policy or posit ion of the Depart ment ofthe Army, the Department of Defense, or t he U.S. Government . This

report is cleared for public release; dist r ibution is unl imi ted.

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should beforwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Inst i tute, U.S. Army WarCollege, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of thi s reportmay be obtained from the Publi cations and Product ion Office by call ing

commercial (717) 245-4133, DSN 242-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or viathe Internet at rummelr@carl isle-emh2.army.mi l

*****

Selected 1993 and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)monographs are avail able on t he Strategic Studies Insti tut e Homepagefor electronic disseminat ion. SSI 's Homepage address is: ht tp://carl isle-

www.army.mil/usassi/

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors wish to thank General William Crouch,former Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, andLieutenant General Robert E. Gray, former DeputyCommander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, without whosevision and support this book would not have been possible.Addit ionally, Colonel John Dr inkwater , Mr . Paul Quintal,and Ms. Rachel Mokelke, each from Headquarters, U.S.Army, Europe and Sevent h Ar my, provided the energy and

talent to skillfully guide the study from conception tocomplet ion. The authors would also l ike to thank thenumerous experts and practitioners who generouslycontributed their time and insights to this study, inparticular, Robert Kaplan, St. Thomas Aquinas College;Er ic Newsom, U.S. Department of State; Jaromir Novotny,Mini st ry of Defense of t he Czech Republ ic; Colonel GeneralLeontiy Shevtsov, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers

Europe; and Lieutenant General (Ret.) Bernard Trainor,Harvard University. Finally, the insights and tirelessefforts of John McDonald, Assistant Vice President andDivision Manager with Science Applications InternationalCorporation, were invaluable for synthesizing the disparateexperiences and viewpoints of study members into usefulact ions to improve future coali t ion operations.

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FOREWORD

Each year, the Uni ted States Army, Europe (USAREUR)undertakes a conference-study program on a matter ofst rategic signifi cance, wi th several object ives. The topicrelates to USAREUR’s mission; anticipates futurerequirements; contributes toward building democraticnorms within the mil i tari es of emerging democracies; andserves to inform the USAREUR staff, higher headquartersand other U.S. Government agencies of act ive measur es to

improve cur rent pract ices. Examples of topics in the lastseveral years are Preventive Diplomacy, Planning andConducting Large Scale Emergency Operations, andMil i tary Support to Democratization in Europe.

In 1996, USAREUR undertook to study “Problems andSolut ions in Future Coali t ion Operations.” That topic wasgermane not only because of the U.S. Government’spart icipat ion in several cur rent coali t ions, but also becauseUSAREUR wi l l con t inue to be in the vanguard ,part icipat ing in a wide var iety of mul t inational operations.While coalitions may be a way of life for most militaries,changes in the geostrategic environment over the pastseveral years have created new challenges and opport-uni t ies for U.S. par t icipat ion. Protect ing the Kurds in Iraqafter the Gulf War, supporting humanitarian reliefoperations in Rwanda, deploying a preventive diplomacyforce to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia toguard against a spillover of the Balkan conflict, andproviding forces to support the implementation of theDayton Accords for Bosnia have tested the United States’ability to work with new partners, in support of newmissions, in unfamil iar parts of the world.

There are important similarities and differences

between these new coali t ion operations, and large mi l i taryoperations and bygone NATO plans for operations inEurope against the Warsaw Pact . In fact , some of theformer Warsaw Pact states are now partners in coalitions

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with the Uni ted States Other count r ies from Afr ica andAsia Minor have part icipated as well. These new partnershave not only not trained together, but often have verydifferent mil i tary tradit ions and cultures.

Another new issue is the activity of nonmilitary andnongovernmental actors in t he area of coali t ion operations.Civil organizations including large engineering firmsbrought into contract support services and privatevolunteer organizations implementing a variety ofprograms may impact on coali t ion operat ions. Mediaorganizations are act ive and unfet tered, which would not bethe case in large-scale mi l i tary operations. Furthermore,

rather than being under the direct ion of a st rong lead nat ionor exist ing all iance, some operations may be mandated byan international organizat ion such as the Uni ted Nations,with an ad hoc command structure subordinated to aregional organization.

Although similarities exist between new coalitionoperations and large scale mil i tary operations, many factors

have a stronger influence in a coalit ion situation.Differences in languages, terminology, military doctrine,equipment , capabil i t ies, and command organizat ion may allhave been present in previous operations, but may beexacerbated by the level of interaction among units andlimi ted preparation t ime available to most coali t ions.

The 1996 USAREUR program addressed coalitionoperations at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, aswell as typical peacekeeping and humanitarian assistanceoperat ions. The program was not designed to address large-scale combat intensive mi l i tary operations on the order of aDesert Shield/Desert Storm. Whi le some of the findings andrecommendations from this study apply to largeroperations, the focus was on improving lower leveloperations which are becoming more frequent, have ahigher probabil i ty for confusion and misunderstanding, lessplanning time, and a myriad of participants in addition tothe mil it ary.

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There were two stages to the program. The fi rst stageconsi st ed of t wo wor k shops. One wor k shop dr ewparticipants from Eastern Europe, Russia, Georgia, andUkraine; the second from Afr ica (see List of Part icipant s).The overall purpose of the workshops was to define theproblems in future coalition operations, drawing from theexper ience of recent and potent ial future part icipant s. Eachworkshop had the same core group of facilitators andWestern Eur opean at tendees. Six topics were addressed atthe workshops, each facil i tated by a U.S. mil i tary expert inthat area. The topics were: history and cul ture; forces andorganization; technology; training and doctrine; logistics

and resources; and command and cont rol. Whi le the topicsthemselves are important, the selection of the six distincttopics was a device for organizing the effort and does notimply separation in pract ice. In fact , many of the areasover lapped and are interrelated. For that reason, theauthors have selected four areas to report on, subsumingforces and logistics within the context of the overalldiscussion. For each of these topic areas a “guidel ines”

paper was prepared as a read-ahead that laid out the issuesto be addressed and what product the workshops shouldproduce. The resul ts of t he workshops were used to fr ameissues and propose possible solutions, presented at stagetwo of the program—a high-level mult inat ional conferenceat Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, in Heidelberg,Germany. Following the Heidelberg conference a report offindings and recommendations for improving future

operations was widely disseminated.This book reports in greater depth on four significant

aspects of coalition operations: historical and culturalinfluences, command, technology, and doctrine andt raining. Steve Bowman ident ifies point s of fr ict ion causedby histor ical and cul tural differences among forces, and howthey influence the decision t o join a coali t ion, agreement ongoals, and organizat ion of operations, among other things.Some of the challenges are logistical problems caused byreligious and cultural requirements, equipment avail-abi l i ty, and the capabil i ty of various forces. Language andterminology differences can cause miscommunications and

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negat ively affect operations. An example related to manytypes of peace operations is the role to be played by policeforces as opposed to mi l itary forces. Mil itary forces shouldnot be used for missions out side their normal operations. I tmay be necessary to integrate the police forces ofpart icipating states int o the coali t ion, or engage the police ofthe host nation. How effect ively this is accompl isheddepends on an appreciation by the lead nation commanderof the recipient nation’s culture and experience.

Command and cont rol issues wi l l cont inue to dominatethe formation and operation of future coali t ions. Thomas-Durel l Young discusses the difficul ty of establ ishing uni ty of

command and suggests that the best that planners maypresume a leader wi l l achieve is unity of effor t . Nations arereluctant to place their forces under foreign command, andwi l l seek to retain the greatest amount of cont rol over themas possible. This may pose severe problems if the situat ionescalates in intensity, requiring additional leadershipauthor ity dur ing an operation. Young also addresses threemodels for command and control — lead nation, parallel,

and integrated command — and the difficul t task of t ransferof author ity. One clear finding that could be addressedtoday, within NATO, is the lack of common defini t ions andgraphics among potent ial coali t ion partners.

Asymmetries in technology among coalition partnerspose the greatest threat to cohesion and effectivenessdur ing combat operations. Steven Metz examines many

issues of asymmetry, including different degrees of r el ianceon technology, utilization of different forms of technology,and using i t for different purposes. Interoperabil i ty ofcommunicat ions equipment is one specifi c example noted byt he aut hor . The rapid development of commer cialtechnology offers the means to standardize communicationsamong disparate part ners, given t he wi l l ingness of t he moreadvanced states to share such t echnology.

Military doctrine is so closely associated with nationaltraditions there is little hope of standardization amongpartners in a coali t ion. Avoiding the t rap of at tempting toforce one’s doctrine on a coalition, commanders should

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concentrate on seeking agreement on generaladministrative and operational principles for the givenoccasion. Michael Smi th suggests preparing regionaldoctrinal considerations that take into account nationaldifferences and provide a template that can be customizedfor a specifi c operation. L ikewise, dict ionar ies could beprepared that would provide common understanding oftermino logy. Permanent ins t i tu t ions for reg ionalinformation exchange and training would help developtrust among potent ial coali t ion members that would pay offwhen a cr isis requir ing quick coali t ion formation occurs.

Generally speaking, analyzing the obstacles, and

preparing, planning, and training to address them, willmi t igate their effects on coali t ion operations. Developingcommon operating principles and institutionalizingcoali t ion t raining wil l improve the l ikel ihood of success.

The authors express their appreciation t o the U.S. ArmyWar College for undertaking to publi sh this modest effor t tounderstand an issue that is likely to be of increasing

importance to U.S. mi l i tary forces in t he foreseeable future.

THOMAS MARSHALLMcLean, Virginia

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CHAPTER 1

HI STORICAL AND CULTURAL I NFL UENCESON COAL I TI ON OPERATI ONS

St eve Bow man

SETTI NG TH E CONTEXT

Coalitions have been part of warfare since the earliestt imes. Both Troy and the Greeks had their own coali t ionsdur ing the Trojan War. The wars of Alexander t he Greatversus the Persians were l ikewise coali t ions on both sides.Frederick the Great's European wars included threedifferent coalitions—with countries changing partners inthe var ious coali t ions. The Napoleonic wars eventual ly had

seven di fferent coali t ions, which cont inuall y changed wi ththe for tunes of war. The last coali t ion had 14 nat ionsworking together t o defeat Napoleon. Al l of the Uni tedStates' overseas wars have been fought as part of a coali t ion,except the Spanish-American War.

Before the 20th century, coalitions usually formed on at ransitory basis to fight a war, then were disbanded. Thecurrent century has seen the development of long-termalliances in peacetime, as well as short-term coalitions int imes of war . All major wars in the 20th century have beencoali t ion wars except for t he Russo-Japanese and I ran-I raqwars. In the last major confl ict , the 1990-91 Persian Gul fWar, a coalition of 37 diverse nations pulled together toaccomplish common goals, then disbanded once again.

Histor icall y, the main r eason coali t ions have formed has

been to overcome a common threat or situation that anindividual nat ion could not face alone. Fear oft en has beenthe driving factor holding a coali t ion together. To defeat t hecommon threat coali t ion members usually have had to give

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up some prerogatives of independence for the good of thewhole. When the threat i s severe, nat ions have given upmore sovereignty. When the threat has receded, individualpoli t ical goals oft en have changed wi thin the coali t ion.

This chapter will address some of the major points offr ict ion histor icall y affect ing coali t ions. Examples areprimari ly taken from the wars of the 20th century. Theintent is to allow the reader to understand that there arenumerous friction points in coalition operations that arecommon to nearly al l coali t ions.

H I STORICAL POI NTS OF FRI CTI ON

Goals.

The fi rst f r ict ion point is goals . A common goal or goalsmust be an overr iding interest for a nat ion to join a coali t ion.The more serious the threat, the easier for a nation tosacr ifi ce some nat ional goals for common ones. Poli t icalgoals must drive military goals—and must be agreed upon

before execut ion of coali t ion operat ions begins. Reachingagreement on goals and t he means to achieve them is oft endiffi cul t . Dur ing Wor ld War I I , the United States and GreatBr itain agreed on the goal of overthrowing Nazi Germany.However, the Uni ted States wanted a direct assault into theEuropean cont inent to accompl ish this; the Br it ish wantedto go through the “soft underbelly” of the Balkanarea—common goals, dif fer ing means of at taining them.

Goals also change over time within a coalition, aspoli t ical and mil i tary situations change. Smaller coali t ionpartners often feel bullied and under-appreciated by thelarger power(s), which tend t o take cont rol of the coali t ion.This is to be expected in coali t ion operations. Bismarckmade this point when he stated that there always must be ar ider to direct the horse. At the same t ime larger coali t ion

part ners may feel they carry inequitable r isks and burdens,both in number of casualties and amount of nationalt reasure spent in the coali t ion effor t .

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Logistics.

After common goals, logistics is probably the mostimportant, and difficult, single friction point in moderncoali t ion operations. As shown in Wor ld War I I , logist icalproblems can affect the strategic direction of a coalitionoperation. For example, the Al l ied invasion of southernFr ance had t o be postponed because, logist ically, there werenot enough landing craft available to support the landingswhen they were or iginally planned. Generall y speaking, notwo nations have the same logistical or administrativedoctr ine. Larger coali t ion part ners oft en must supportsmaller allies, causing significant strains on resources.

Logistics also must be considered from a coalitionperspect ive, not a nat ional perspect ive. Planners mustensure that national mi l i tary forces wi thin the coali t ion donot compete with each other for scarce supplies within thearea in which the coalition is operating, driving up prices

and denying the resources to the local population.

Capabil i t ies.

Another fr ict ion point is capabilities . Within any givencoali t ion, al l ied partners are not equally capable. Coali t ionleadership must be sensitive to this and give individualcoalition forces missions they are able to accomplish

successful l y. Understanding t hat al l nat ions in thecoalition do not have the same capabilities, the variouscoalition partners can then share the burdens of thecoalition equitably—not equally—as each nation con-t r ibutes what i t can to accompl ish the coali t ion mission.

Tra in ing .

Training is the glue which holds a military forcetogether. However, training levels vary in different armieswi thin a coali t ion, and represent a four th point of fr ict ion.Resources and standards for t raining are widely divergent .

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I n some cases, as in Desert Storm, circumstances may allowforces to train before commencement of actual operations,bringing the various nat ional forces closer to a common levelof t raining. Those forces which are t rained to different orlesser standards must be used within the limits of theirt raining state. For combat forces, it is bet ter t o t rain to atough, high intensity standard, than “t rain down” to a lessercombat ready standard for units designated for coalitionpeace support operations. This standard should be usedinstead of t raining to a “peace support level” and having tobuild up to a higher combat level i f t he situat ion changes, orif a new crisis requires re-employment of combat forces

elsewhere. I t is a coali t ion leadership problem to assignmissions appropriately and diplomatically.

In some cases, as in Desert Storm, circumstances may allowforces to train before commencement of actual operations,bringing the various nat ional forces closer to a common levelof t raining. Those forces which are t rained to different orlesser standards must be used within the limits of theirt raining state. For combat forces, it is bet ter t o t rain to atough, high intensity standard, than “t rain down” to a lessercombat ready standard for units designated for coalitionpeace support operations. This standard should be usedinstead of t raining to a “peace support level” and having tobuild up to a higher combat level i f t he situat ion changes, orif a new crisis requires re-employment of combat forces

elsewhere. I t is a coali t ion leadership problem to assignmissions appropriately and diplomatically.

Equipment .

Equipment quality, quantity and interoperability aresignificant challenges for coalitions, with interoperabilitybeing the most significant single factor that may cause

friction. Planners must exploit interoperability where itexists and make allowances where i t does not. As anexample of the problems of mixing types of equipment,planners must ensure that former Soviet-equipped units donot operate adjacent to western-equipped units. The dangerof fratr icide from inst inct ive t raining react ion on the part oftroops under the stress of combat could be disastrous.Communications equipment interoperability is another

signi fi cant problem for modern coali t ions. Unequalcommunications capabilities may require lead nations tocompose specialized communications units for multi-national operations. Where severe interoperabil ityproblems exist, the coalition commander may choose toemploy geographically separate zones for nat ional forces inorder to lessen t he impact of t he interoperabil i ty gap.

Even such basic equipment as footwear must beanalyzed for coali t ion operations. “Standard” footwear forall UN forces was furnished by the United States to thevarious cont ingents dur ing the Korean war. However,Turks needed extra wide boots, while Asian personnel

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required boots that were extra narrow and short. Bootsdeveloped for U.S. feet simply did not fi t other members ofthe coalition.

Doctr ines.

Histor icall y, coali t ion leaders have had to consider theimpact of dif fer ing doctrines within the coalit ion. Doctr inereflects national character and determines force structureand procedures. Understanding and adjusting for thedifferences in nat ional doct r ines are required. Somedifferences can be overcome through training exercises.Liaison officers with exceptional skills also can helpovercome doct r inal fr ict ion within the coali t ion forces. TheGerman army in World War II was highly successful inusing such l iaison t eams to ensure smooth operations withnon-German units. The Desert Shield t raining is anotherexample of how national armies learned more about how tooperate wi th other forces. The use of t he Combat ManeuverTraining Center , in Hohenfels, Germany, to help train uni ts

in current doctrine for peacekeeping or peace enforcementoperations is another example of how mul t inational uni tscan learn common doct r inal procedures. Coali t ion leadersmust understand that some coali t ion forces may have to beassigned special missions or be augmented from othernat ional forces because of significant doctr inal differences.

Intel l igence.

Another factor that must be considered is intelligence .Sharing intelligence is always a sensitive issue, involvingnational collection rules that make full sharing extremelydi ff i cul t . Al t hough t hi s can sever el y t est coali t i onleadership, st rong coalit ions can make it work. The besthistor ical example of this is the sharing of the ULTRA datain Wor ld War I I .

The histor ical and cul tural differences between nationswithin the coalition and in the country to which the forcewil l be deployed must be part of the Intel l igencePreparation of the Operation which will be used by al l

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planning staffs, at the coali t ion and national levels, logist icas well as tactical staffs.planning staffs, at the coali t ion and national levels, logist icas well as tactical staffs.

Language.

From the earliest coalition operations, language problems have remained a constant point of fr ict ion. Lack ofunderstanding in day-to-day operations can equate todisastrous miscommunications in combat actions. Mostanalysts agree that English should be the common languageof future coalitions. All coalition partners must thusimprove language capabilities at key levels within theirmi l i tary forces, although not necessari ly at all levels. One ofthe problems alr eady being encountered by several EasternEuropean armies is that young officers are learning Engli shso well that they are being hired away from the mi li tary andinto the civilian sector. Many English speakers fromEastern Europe have no, or very limited, troop and fieldexperience. Highly experienced older officers speakRussian, not English.

While English appears to be the common language offuture coalitions, consideration of a second language,Russian or French for example, could greatly improvecommunications for some future coalition operations.Virtually all senior leaders in Eastern European armiesspeak and understand Russian. In some coalit ionoperat ions, there may be a conscious choice, because of thecomposition of the coalition force, to make Russian the

primary common language, with English as a secondarycommon language. English-speaking nations must beprepared with sufficient language-qualified personnel toreact t o such requirements. A simi lar situat ion could bet rue for a coali t ion made up most ly of Afr ican nat ions. Alarge number of African militaries educate their officersusing the French language. There may be situat ions whereFrench is the designated primary language for the coali t ion.As a minimum, there will be situations where Russian orFrench, or another language, will be used as a secondcommon language for cer tain coali t ion operations. Eachsituation should be evaluated on its own merits, with

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consideration of forces available as a critical factor indetermining the language or languages that should becommon t o the coali t ion.

L inguists alone cannot overcome the problem. Trained

liaison teams knowledgeable in military terminology anddoctrine, as well as in the language are important forsuccess. Such teams can greatly assist wi th understandingof such concepts as “commander's intent” that may beunclear to personnel with English as a second language.Developing these skil ls is expensive and diff icul t ; however,it is nothing compared to the cost of not having thosepersonnel at a cr i t ical moment .

Lack of common terminology is another type of languageproblem that hampers effect ive coali t ion operations dur ingboth preparat ions for and conduct of mil i tary operations ofall types. Acronyms and extensive use of abbreviationscreate a special problem for military forces joining acoalition. In a crisis situation, language and terminologydisconnects could mean the di fference between success and

failure. Coalition operations may require orders to bedeveloped with a ful l and accurate descr ipt ion of tasks to beaccompl ished, instead of working for brevi ty as is the case inmost NATO operations—and certainly is the case for U.S.operations orders.

Leadership.

Another common histor ical fr ict ion point in coali t ions isleadership . General Eisenhower discussed the diff icul t iesof coalition leadership in a memorandum to Lord LouisMountbatten, who had been designated Supreme AlliedCommander, Southeast Asia, in 1943. Some of his thoughtsare important to coali t ion leaders in the modern wor ld.

The wr i t ten basis for allied unity of command is found in

directives issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The t r ue

basis lies in the earnest cooperation of the senior officersassigned to an al l ied theater. Since cooperation, in turn,

implies such things as selflessness, devotion to a common

cause, generosity i n at t i tude, and mutual confidence, i t is easy

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to see that actual unity in an all ied command depends direct ly

upon t he i nd i v idua lsin the field. . . . I t wi ll never be possible tosay the problem of establ ishing uni ty in any al li ed command is

ever completely solved. This problem involves the human

equation and must be met day by day. Pat i ence, t olerance,

fr ank ness, absolut e honest y i n al l deal i ngs, par t i cular lyw i t h a l l p e r s o n s o f t h e oppos i te na t i ona l i t y , and

fi r mn ess, ar e absolu t el y essent i al.“ [emphasis added] ”. . .

never permi t any problem to be approached i n your staff on the

basis of national interest." 1

[emphasis in or iginal]

The requirements for leading a coalition are far moredifficul t t han leading a national force. Coali t ion pol i t icsoverride coalition military logic—a factor future coalitionleaders must clearly understand. Coali t ion leadership mustbe persuasive, not coercive, and sensit ive to nat ional needs.Future coa l i t ions wi l l requ i re new Eisenhowers,Schwarzkopfs, or Khalids. National forces, especially inpotential lead nations, must consider how to develop suchleadership tr aits in future mi l i tary leaders.

A coalition commander usually will not have unity of

command. The best that usually can be hoped for is unity ofeffor t within the command. I f uni ty of command is notpossible, however, at least a clear chain of command is anabsolute necessity. Common rules of engagement and asingle controller for airspace are also necessary commonprinciples. The coali t ion commander must ant icipate andplan for national vetoes of controversial or culturallydivergent plans or operat ional concepts. In some cases, the

coalition may opt not to accept forces from a nation whichcould be expected to severely l imi t the power of the coali t ioncommander over i ts forces.

Coali t ion leadership can be in a number of forms. Theideal command would be an integrated standing command.However, the ad hoc nature of most coalitions will meanthat a lead nation approach will probably be the best that

can be ant icipated. At t imes, a paral lel command st ructuremay be the best that can be achieved, as occurred duringOperat ion Deser t Shield/Deser t Storm. Whatever thecommand arrangement, the coalition commander must be

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responsible for coordinating all military infrastructurewi thin the theater of operations. The presence of civi l iangroups, NGOs and PVOs, will make the coordinationrequirements even greater and may require co-location ofthe civilian “command group” with the military com-mander. As the level of int ensity of operations gets higher,the command authori ty required by the coal i t ioncommander gets greater . Prudent planning should alwaysconsider the requirement to escalate the level of int ensit y asdictated by the situation.

CULT URAL DI FFERENCES AS POI NTSOF FRI CTI ON

Another major area of potential friction for futurecoali t ions comes from cul tural di fferences . Again, these arenot new problems but have existed in coali t ions throughouthistory. Each member of a coali t ion has i ts own cul ture thatis different—to a greater or lesser extent—from any othernation. These differences—in religion, class, tolerance,work ethic, standards of living, and national tradition—must be considered and planned for in future coalitions.

Religion.

A coalition may consist of a great variety of religions:Protestant , Catho l ic , Or thodox Chr is t ian, Is lam,Buddhism, Judaism, Hindu, and others. Each may havespecial requirements that must be considered whenplanning coalition operations, including religious holidaysand festivals and different types of food which may or maynot be consumed. Planners should consider what wouldhave happened to the coalition formed against SaddamHussein in 1990 if I srael had decided to join t he war effor tagainst I raq.

Another example of r el igious requirements relates to the

Greek cont ingent in the UN coali t ion in Korea. The Greeksrequired l ive lambs for a rel igious r i te. U.S. Quart ermasterpersonnel made great efforts to comply with this unusualrequest. However, they did not understand that Greek

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cul ture for this r i te requir ed al l l ambs to be female. Thusthe Greeks felt slighted for the insensitivity to theirreligion—and the Americans felt unappreciated for theprodigious efforts they expended just to get any kind oflambs to the Greek t roops.

In the same vein, Muslims could not eat pork and Hinduscould not eat beef. I n addit ion to rel igious requirements,cul tural t radit ions may also lead to dietary demands. Forexample, in the coali t ion in Korea, Asians want ed more r ice,and Europeans wanted more bread.

Class and Gend er Di st i nct i ons.

Other cultural differences involve class and genderdist inct ions. U.S. officer /soldier dist inct ions are not nearlyas great or as str ict ly enforced as many armies of the wor ld.Regarding gender issues, women make up near ly 20 percentof t he Amer ican Army, yet are not even al lowed to serve inthe armed services of many other nat ions. Planners mustassess what impact these issues may have on a coali t ion and

how such distinctions may be incorporated into coalitionplanning.

Di sci pl i ne and Cult ur al Toler ance.

Levels of discipline and cultural tolerance vary greatlybetween armies. Some armies may not be able to work nextto each other. Planners must determine which forces can

relieve each other during coalition operations, and whichones must be kept apart .

Wor k Eth i c.

The work ethic is another cultural factor that varieswidely between nat ions. Al though one nat ion's army has adifferent work ethic than another, it wi l l not necessari ly be

super i or or i nfer i or . H owever , t he di ffer ence maycomplicate cooperative efforts.

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St andar ds of L i v i ng.

Standards of l iving are another cul tural factor that canhave an impact on future coali t ions. A great number ofpossible coalition partners for the United States would

probably consider U.S. soldiers to have a wastefully “rich”standard of l iving, even in field operations. Yet Americansoldiers generally operate under much poorer standardsthan their U.S. civilian counterparts—the society fromwhich they come. So, relat ively, U.S. soldiers do notconsider themselves to be pampered, even if t he cul tur es ofsome other nat ions may think U.S. troops l ive too well .

Nat ional Tr adi t ions.

One more example of cultural differences has to do wi thnat ional t radit ions. For example, casualt ies are a majorarea of concern to the Uni ted States. A relatively smallnumber of casualt ies caused the U.S. mil itary to wi thdrawfrom Lebanon in 1983 after the bombing of the Marinebarracks. There was a simi lar react ion to casualt ies inSomalia in 1993. Planners and policymakers must take intoconsideration that the U.S. Congress and public are verysensitive to this issue, even though to other cultures suchreact ions may be difficul t to understand.

In t he Korean War, the large coali t ion of nations fight ingproduced several examples of cultural misunderstandings.For instance, Abyssinian troops came to Korea with

whatever weapon they had when called into service. TheU.S. Army then issued them all new American-madeweapons. No one in the U.S. Army understood that theEthiopian cul ture required a warr ior to return home withthe same weapon he departed with—not to do so was anindicator of personal defeat.

In dealing with problems of various cultures, it is

important to remember that “different” has nothing to dowi th “bet ter” or “worse.” Avoiding such value judgementswill require both education and training. The morepersonnel available who are exper ienced in the cul tures of

11



various coalition partners, the smoother the operations ofthe coalition are likely to be. Yet maintaining suchqualifications is very difficult, especially during periods oftight budgetary restrictions.

The importance of understanding the language andculture of the nation in which the coalition is operatingcannot be ignored. In some cases, such preparat ion may beas important as ensuring a common language among thecoali t ion partners. I t is cr i t ical that commit ted mil i taryforces adopt the local language as soon as possible in orderto conduct day-to-day operations. This is part icularly tr uefor forces who will be in daily contact with the local

population. I f local t ranslators are used, as they cer tainlywill be in many cases, lower level leaders must clearlyunderstand that these translators know little or nothingabout mi l i tary terminology or doctr ine. Ext reme care mustbe taken to ensure that accurate information is exchangedwith the local populati on.

Other examples of cultural differences came to light

dur ing the Gulf War in 1990. The Br it ish and French,t radit ional world powers, needed to be given “major power”status in the operations for political reasons, even thoughthey had relatively small forces in the theater . BecauseFrench law prohibited conscr ipts fr om being forced to serveout side of France, the French uni ts had less manpower thanexpected by planners, even though the “entire unit” wascommitted to the operation. The Arab forces, because of

their unique culture, language, religious, and, in somecases, logistic similarities were grouped together underparal lel command and cont rol arrangements. Culturalaspects thus played a significant role in the execution ofoperations.2

COMBI NI NG NATIONAL FORCESI NTO SUCCESSFUL COAL I TI ONS

Because nations wil l only part icipate in future coali t ionoperations if it is in their own national interest, it isimportant to determine the best fit for national forces.

12



Forces of all nations are structured for national purposes,not necessari ly those of the coali t ion. Whi le i t is desirablethat national force contributions meet specific needs forforce balance and minimum size requirements forintegration into the coalition effort, these conditions oftenwill not be met. The force commander must integrate allelements into the coalition force and maximize theircont r ibut ion regardless of need, size, or special competence.Nations may also contribute to future coalitions in otherways than commi t t ing forces, e.g., faci l i t ies, infrastructure,funding, and other resources. Future coali t ions wi l l need torecognize such contributions clearly, demonstrating that

such contributions greatly add to the capabilities of theoverall coali t ion.

Forces of all nations are structured for national purposes,not necessari ly those of the coali t ion. Whi le i t is desirablethat national force contributions meet specific needs forforce balance and minimum size requirements forintegration into the coalition effort, these conditions oftenwill not be met. The force commander must integrate allelements into the coalition force and maximize theircont r ibut ion regardless of need, size, or special competence.Nations may also contribute to future coalitions in otherways than commi t t ing forces, e.g., faci l i t ies, infrastructure,funding, and other resources. Future coali t ions wi l l need torecognize such contributions clearly, demonstrating that

such contributions greatly add to the capabilities of theoverall coali t ion.

During wartime, determination of whether to join acoali t ion can be based on relat ive success on t he batt lefi eld.For example, during World War II Italy and Romaniaswitched sides moving from the Axis to the Allies. Thisoccurred as Axis prospects for victory dimmed, and thegovernments of these two nations changed.

Deciding whether t o join a coalit ion in peacet ime can bemuch more difficult. Multiple factors must be taken intocons iderat ion inc lud ing: the impact on nat iona lsovereignty; costs in resources and manpower; the impacton the nation's military forces caused by placing assetsunder coalition, not national, control; potential political-economic benefi ts to be gained; pol i t ical factors, such as the

impact joining the coalition will have on internal politicalopposit ion part ies—wil l t he mi l i tary forces returning from acoali t ion operation return to f ind the governmentoverthrown and severe poli t ical di fficul t ies facing them; andthe overall impact on national interests. 3

Perceived affi l iat ions of some members of t he coali t ion t ovarious fact ions in the confl ict by the local population couldbe a problem for the coalit ion. Members must be perceivedas neut ral to be acceptable to a host nat ion in which peaceoperations are being conducted. Former colonial powers inAfr ica carry a cer tain amount of “baggage” wi th them. Caremust be taken when put t ing them into a count ry which st i l l

13



harbors host i l i ty toward i ts former rulers. On the otherhand, in some cases a former colonial power understandsthe cul ture and history of a region in confl ict and may be theideal coalition partner.

It is necessary to understand historical and culturalissues when consider ing when to use or not use neighbor ingstates as part of an operational coalition. Neighboringstates should be considered for use in conflict preventionoperations. However, neighboring nations should not beused in any type of enforcement operations, because of thedanger—whether perceived or real—that the neighboringnat ion could make poli t ical or economic gains at the expense

of the country in which the operation is being conducted.

A significant effort must be made to prepare the localpopulation to understand and accept the coalition forcesoperating in their count ry. Public information programsthat are cul turally att uned to the local population, and highvisibility improvement projects, must be implementedearly. Information operat ions wi l l r equire t raining, but wil l

become a force multiplier when local populations areprepared for coalition operations.

Tr ain i ng for Successfu l Coali t i ons.

Training wi l l cont inue to be a national responsibil i ty. I tshould focus on basic soldier ski l ls and generalized trainingwhich can support coali t ion and peace support operations.

Special ized training in support of future coali t ionoperations should be conducted aft er assignment of specifi cmissions. The potential exists for increased sharing ofresponsibility for training of coalition forces at theoperational and strategic echelons. Because most potent ialcoalition partners have conscript forces with relativelyshort per iods of service, training to decrease histor ical andcultural differences should be concentrated on officers and

NCOs.Training for coalition operations should concentrate on

two major areas: headquar ters elements which should betrained through use of command post exercises, and

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t raining and education of officers and NCOs. Experiencehas shown that headquarters elements, whether existingmultinational headquarters or a national headquartersthat has been designated to assume a lead nat ion r ole in afut ure coali t ion operation, requir e addit ional preparation tocommand coalit ion operations. In addit ion to enhancedcommunications and augmented language capabilities,specific mission t raining is necessary. Much of this t rainingcan be done in advance through the use of command postand computer assisted exercises, and seminars andworkshops for key personnel. Emerging distance learningtechniques may enhance training and education of

individuals and uni ts. Training in public affairs and civilmi l i tary operations can be added to this package. Suchtraining is rare or nonexistent in most of the nationalmi li tary forces of Eastern Europe and Afr ica.

As stated earlier, experience has shown that fieldtraining exercises have transient value because of rapidturnover of short -term conscr ipts in t he major ity of armiesof Eastern Europe and Afr ica which wi l l take part in fut ure

coali t ion operations. Nat ional armies should t rain their ownsoldiers in national doctr ines and tact ical execut ion.

The main advant age of f ield t raining exercises betweennational forces is that cultural and historical differencesbetween nations decrease greatly after working together.After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Polish and Germanarmy uni ts began training together, for the fi rst t ime since

the German invasion in 1939. The initial training wast raumat ic for the Poles. But as t ime passed, the units beganworking better and better together, overcoming culturaland historical differences. These kind of bilateral trainingexercises should work for any nation. Such training is ofgreat value to uni ts which wi l l work together in designatedcoalition operations.

NEW MI SSI ONS AND PARTI CI PANTS

A key factor to keep in mind is that military forces,historically and culturally, are not always well-suited to

15



civil conflicts of the type that future peace-supportoperations may deal wi th. Mil i tary forces in the major ity ofnat ions are organized, t rained and maintained to fight andwin wars, using all available force to be victorious in theshortest possible t ime. Such a “confl ict /victory” cul ture maybe just the opposite of what is desired for peace supportoperations as cur rent ly envisioned. Coali t ion mi l i taryforces should not be used in ways that are outside theirnormal operations. As an example, mi l i tary units shouldnot be used as pol ice in hunt ing war cr iminals. There areorganizat ions t rained to conduct pol ice operations. UseMil i tary forces should be used in the roles for which they are

intended wi thin t he coali t ion operations.Another challenge for future coalitions will be the

prob lem o f in te rac t ion w i th Non-Governmenta lOrganizations (NGOs) and Private Volunteer Organiza-t ions (PVOs). In peace support operat ions, NGOs and PVOsmake up the thi rd corner of a tr iangle which has the peacesupport coali t ion and t he contending forces at the other twoangles. This is much different from convent ional mi l i tary

operations and has its own “culture shock” for untrainedforces. NGOs and PVOs have their own agendas and meansof operating, which may clash wi th “convent ional mi l i tarythought ” processes. In peace support operations, NGOs andPVOs have every right to operate in the same areas ascoali t ion mi l i tary forces. Therefore, mi l i tary planners mustprepare for interact ion wi th these organizations.

Still another factor which has become an essential partof peace support operations, that is outside the normalculture of virtually all military organizations, is nego-tiation. For peace support operations, coalition militaryunits must learn to persuade, not force. This includeslearning to use one of the most effective means ofpersuasion, the media. This is a challenge with which allfuture coali t ions wi l l have to contend.

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CONCLUSI ONS AND FI NDI NGS

Problems in forming coali t ions because of histor ical andcultural differences are a common theme throughouthistory. I t should not surprise anyone that such problems

wi l l exist for fut ur e coali t ion operat ions. Successfu loperations of coali t ions are diff icul t at best . Nations ofunequal strength and different mind-sets must worktogether to achieve coalition goals—which are set bypolitical decisionmakers who control the various militaryforces. The poli t ical mandate must be “t ranslated” into aclear and achievable mission statement . Each nat ion wi l lhave its own national interests, political realities, andhistor ical exper iences which wi l l determine how that nat ionreacts in a future coali t ion operation.

A broad base of coalition partners is needed to assuresufficient support for the operation and perceivedimpart iali ty wit hin the nat ion where the coali t ion wi ll becommit ted to act ion. As the coali t ion begins to take form,national interests, which always take priority, wil l

influence the ability of political leaders of the variousnat ions must agree on t he goals for the coali t ion operationthat the mi li tary can then implement .

Mil i tary doctr ine is embedded in the ethos, t radit ions,heritage and national roles of the various armies of theworld. Because of thi s, common doct r ine is not achievable inthe short term. Nevertheless, development of common

operating principles for peace support operations canreduce the potential for friction within the coalition forcecaused by cultural and historical differences.

Common operating principles must be developed beforethe requirement to commit actual forces. In order to developgeneric common operating principles for the conduct ofpeace support operations, workshops need to be conductedto defi ne agreed-upon pr inciples. Wi th such gener icprinciples already accepted, coalition partner nations canrefine specifi c requirements for the conduct of operations tomeet the impending cr isis.

17



Organizations which have the ability to develop andcoordinate such agreements on common principles includeNATO, the Organization for Security and Cooperation inEurope (OSCE), and perhaps the WEU for Europeannations. In Afr ica, funct ioning sub-regional por t ions of theOrganization of Afr ican Uni ty (OAU) may be the agencies toaccomplish the requirements. The UN could likewiseassume the role in Afr ica or elsewhere.

The agreements attained would al low coali t ion partnersto have basic principles that serve as templates for futurecoal i t ion operat ions. Such t emplates shoul d includeorganizational frameworks and logist ic support . With such

common operating principles already agreed upon, themi l i tary wil l be bet ter able to take the poli t ical goals given tothe coali t ion and turn them into an achievable operationalmission quickly and efficiently.

A generalized template might specify, for example, thatcombat units should be deployed in brigade strength as aminimum. Brigade-sized units are capable of serving in a

mixed-nat ion higher uni t , because tact ical implementationof orders will follow national tactical doctrine. This isdependent on the intensit y of t he confl ict . The more intensethe level of conflict, the less capable mixed units willperform. Logistical units can be employed in smallerpackets than combat units, as specialized units can beincorporated into the overall logist ical plan. This wi l l allowmost interoperability and technological problems to be

addressed at the brigade and higher level, helping avoidfragmentation of coalition command and control capa-bilities.

Lower level integration exacerbates differences incapabil i t ies, communications, and cul ture. Focus can beplaced on critical areas to improve interoperability:communications, intelligence, computers, munitions andfuels. Developing protocols and other common procedureswill help resolve differences among the various nationalforces and may eventually lead to common doctrine forcoalition peace support operations.

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Strong consideration should be given to creating astanding headquarters for coalition operations, usingalready established organizations such as NATO, WEU,OSCE, or the UN. Specifi ed national headquar ters could bedesignated to become the lead nation for coalitionoperat ions in spec i f ied reg ions. As a min imum,multinational planning exercises using a regional leadnat ion concept could signi f icant ly improve ini t ia loperational response to emerging crises. Such trainingexercises wi l l help overcome the ini t ial confusion of coali t ionoperations and wi l l assist in overcoming cul tural problemsby ident ifying them in a tr aining situation before an actual

cr isis occurs. Such t raining exercises must look beyond theproblem of ini t ial ent ry into a peace support operation andmust carry the scenario into worst case situat ions where thecharacter of the operation degenerates into higher intensit ycombat.

Education of officers and NCOs will help changepreconceptions and misperceptions concerning the rolesand abil i t ies of other nat ional forces. The Marshall Center

has shown this to be the case for the nations of EasternEurope. Training along the lines of that offered by theMarshall Center should be expanded into national mi l i taryschools. Something li ke the Marshal l Center or the Schoolof the Americas in Fort Benning, Georgia, should beconsidered to support education and t raining of officers andNCOs fr om Afr ican nations. The focus on education andtraining to overcome cul tural and histor ical biases wi l l paydividends both within the coali t ion and wi thin the count r iesin which the coali t ion wi l l conduct operations.

The act ivi t ies of t he Marshall Center are doing a greatdea l to overcome the po ten t ia l fo r fu tu remisunderstandings. However , the cent er is cur rent lyrest r icted to relat ively senior personnel. The level ofparticipation should be expanded to include more junior

military personnel from Eastern European nations, eitherat the Marshall Center or another location in Europe.

Current logist ics planning for coali t ion operations showsthat logistics is one of the weakest elements of such

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operations. Part of this is because the great majority ofnational armies cannot support themselves logisticallyout side their own national boundaries. This requires eithera lead nat ion to fi l l the logist ics gap or an inordinate amountof t ime for ini t ial deployment of forces and great di ff icul t iesfor logistical sustainment. NATO or the United Statesshould sponsor an assessment of logist ics requi rements forpotential coalition operations. With this assessment,logistic planning forums should be initiated with thosenations which could be expected to participate in futurecoalitions. This planning should identify initial logisticrequirements with which coalition units should deploy,

determine reasonable national logistic support require-ments, and discuss such difficult issues as cost sharing forcoa l i t ion operat ions. Log is t ic command postexercises(CPXs) could exercise nat ional logist ic capabil i t iesand develop templates which could provide generalguidel ines for future operations.

In addition to language training there are other,simpler, concepts concerning the use of language that

should be adopted for coalition operations. Dictionaries ofcommon terms must be developed and distributed,including logist ical as well as tact ical terms. Acronyms andabbreviations should be avoided in order to assure a clearunderstanding of terms within a coali t ion. Operational andlogist ic plans and orders should be wr it ten in greater detailand clarity to ensure that there are no misunderstandings.This is dir ect ly count er to cur rent U.S. pol icies, which t ry tominimize verbiage and attempt to make plans as brief aspossible, while still being complete. Coalition plans anddir ect ives must be wr it ten so that i t is nearl y impossible tomisunderstand what is supposed to happen. This willrequire conscious effort, especially on the part of thosenations which use English as a first language.

Changes in the world situation since 1989 provide

opportuni t ies for Western nat ions to work in coali t ion wi thformer adversaries from Eastern Europe in peace supportoperations. These opportunit ies are new and chal lenging.The leaders of mil i tary forces fr om throughout Europe and

20



Africa are now working in partnership with the UnitedStates to prepare for future coali t ion operations. The ideaspresented here are not the answers to the issues. Butperhaps they will broaden the thought processes of thosetasked to form a future coali t ion and al low them to plan andconduct operations more effectively and efficiently. Stepstaken now, to develop common operating procedures, totrain together, and to educate future leaders will helpensure that future coali t ions wi l l have a much bet ter chanceof successfully accomplishing the assigned mission.Perhaps someday histor ians wi l l look at this per iod of t imeand determine that a new era of successful coalition

operations resulted from the actions that are now in theirearliest stages.

END NOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Al fr ed D. Chandler , Jr ., ed., The Papers of Dwight David Ei senhower: The War Years I I I , Balt imore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970,pp. 1420-1422.

2. Wayne A. Si lket t , “Al l iance and Coali t ion Warfare,” Parameters ,Summer 1993, pp. 74-83, passim . This is an excellent article forconsider ing a wide variety of factors concerning coali t ion warfare.

3. Thomas R.Stone, “On Coalitions,” Mil i tary Review , September1984, pp. 31-32.

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CHAPTER 2

COMM AND I N COAL I TI ON OPERATI ONS

Th omas Du r el l-Youn g

I t is a truism that effect ive command is a sine qua non forthe successful prosecut ion of mi l i tary operations. Whi lesuperb generalship may not ensure a successful militaryengagement or campaign, there are precious few examplesof poor command leading to victory. I f one accepts theproposition, widely held among Western militaries, that“unity of command” is a crucial element of effectivecommand, then one must ponder why it is that it is sodiff icul t to achieve. Whether due to pol i t ics, personali t ies,or a combination of both, achieving unity of commandconsistently presents itself as a difficult aspect of civil-mi l i tary relati ons in democratic governments.

One should not assume, however, that achieving unity ofcommand is a problem t hat should only be associated wi thunsophisticated military establishments. In the UnitedKingdom, for example, it was only in spring 1996 that the“Permanent Joint Headquarters” was established toprovide a permanent st ructure over which a joint command

of British forces will be effected in peace supportoperations.1 In the Federal Republic of Germany, despitesome recent organizational reforms, which by Bonn'sstandards are qui te signi ficant, that count ry st i l l does notpossess a standing “J-3 operations directorate” as one wouldexpect of a power of Germany's standing. 2 Even in theUnited States, it was only following the enactment of the1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act that

clar i ty was establ ished concerning the commandrelationship between the combatant commanders and theNational Command Authorities. 3 Clearly, effecting anunambiguous national command structure is an ongoing

23



challenge even to democratic governments with stronginst i tut ions and tr adit ions of ensur ing civi l ian cont rol overthe mil it ary.

An understanding of t he difficul ty of achieving unity of

command at the national level is essential in order toappreciate the seemingly insurmountable problems ofcreating an effective command organization within acoali t ion of sovereign states. To the exist ing diff icul t iesnat ions bring to these operations must be added compet ingnational interests (i.e., polit ics), sensitivit ies (i.e.,personalities), and less than unified national politicalobjectives.4 Moreover, internat ional secur ity organizations,

which are essent ial in providing needed poli t ical legit imacyto coalitions, have also become increasingly active ininfluencing coalition operations, often with their ownagenda, (e.g., UN Protect ion Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina).

Finally, in the post-Cold War world, it is evident thatmilitary forces, within coalitions, are being increasinglyused for peace support operations. Due to the lack of strong

politically-unifying forces in such operations, developingcoalition command arrangements has often provenfrustrating.

While not minimizing the problems associated withascertaining clear command lines at the national level, itmust be acknowledged that all of the difficulties presentwi thin nations are compounded wi th new ones in coali t ions.Simply stated, the task that confronts coali t ion leaders is toovercome justif iable national polit ical and militarysensit ivi t ies to enable the designated coali t ion commanderto accompl ish his assigned mission. The pur pose of thisessay is to out l ine potent ial solut ions for pol i t ical-mil i taryofficials in their approach to the nettlesome issue of“command.”

First, it is important that readers have a clear

understanding of command authority terminology andappreciation of the subtleties and nuances that plaguethem. Second, a discussion of the l imi tations under whichforeign commanders must operate wi l l be present ed. Third,

24



a case wi l l be made that command aut hor it ies for coali t ionland operations should be determined from the mission(s)assigned to the force. Implicit in this statement is that t hecommand author it ies recommended by mi l i tary author it iesfor the coali t ion force should be based, as much as possible,upon mi l i tary considerations. Four th, the issue of commandstructures and coali t ion operations wi l l be examined, wi th aview toward assessing some of their specifi c st rengths andweaknesses in specific coalition operations. Finally, theessay will conclude with observations about why coalitionplanning should provide for the eventuali ty that only uni tyof “effort,” rather than unity of “command,” is politically

possible.

Ter mi nology: Def i ni t i ons.

Command authorities must be one of the most widelymisunderstood of mi l i tary subjects. Whi le there has been aplethora of essays and books written on “command andcontrol,”5 command author it ies are rarely sharply defined,

let alone analyzed from the perspective of a commander'srequirements as determined by his missions. 6 Indeed,otherwise groundbreaking essays dealing with multi-national military operations often deal only superficiallywith this subject.7 What has been missing is a systematicand disciplined approach to ascertaining which commandauthorities are appropriate for commanders, particularlywithin a multinational context.

In a rather contradictory fashion, in workshops anddiscussions with senior Eastern European and Africanoff icers, the cur rent wr iter has discovered a tendency to useterms common to NATO command authorities, yet (likethe i r NATO count ry counterpar ts ) there is lessunderstanding of their exact definit ion. Indeed, afundamental problem in addressing command authoritiesin coalitions is that there is no universally acceptedinternat ional nomenclature. Thus, per force, one must r elyupon Western, i.e., NATO, terms, given the lack of anyviable alternatives. Yet, one should not assume thatadopt ing Al l iance terminology wil l prove a panacea. Even

25



as sophisticated and well-developed an alliance as NATOhas difficul t ies in this regard.

In NATO-agreed usage, there are four levels of Al l iancecommand authorit ies. These are:

• Operational Command (OPCOM)

• Operational Cont rol (OPCON)

• Tactical Command (TACOM)

• Tactical Control (TACON)

In Chart 1, the official definitions of the terms arepresented as they appear in AAP-6. 8 A comparison of thefour terms is presented in Chart 2. In its most simplisticform, OPCOM provides to a commander the greatest degreeof aut hor ity over his assigned forces, whi le TACON providesthe least .

An important distinction must be made between

OPCOM and OPCON. The principal dist inguishing factorbetween these two levels of command authority is thatOPCOM allows a commander to assign and reassignmissions of subordinate forces, as well as task organize (or“fragment ”) subordinate assigned uni ts, in addit ion to thoseauthorities found in OPCON (e.g., to assign and reassigntasks, dir ect local movement ). TACOM and TACON providethe least author ity to a commander by al lowing him only to

exercise tactical level control, such as deploying forces,direct ing movements and maneuvers for a short or specifiedduration, or l imi ted to a specific area.

To compl ica te th is o therw ise s t ra igh t fo rwarddescription of NATO command authorities, there aredistinctions between national and NATO definitions ofcommand authorities. France, for example, defines“OPCOM” (“commandement operationnel”) as consti tut ing“national command,” and therefore not transferable to acoalition or Alliance commander. 9 The Uni ted States doesnot have national doctrinal definitions for OPCOM orTACOM, but its definition for TACON is identical to

26



NATO's definition.10 However, the U.S. definition ofOPCON substantially differs from the NATO defini t ion.

CHART 1

D E F I N I T I O N S O F N A T O CO M M A N DAUTHORITIES

OPERATIONAL COMMAND:

The authority granted to a commander to assignmissions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deployunits, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegateoperational and/or tactical control as may be deemed

necessary. I t does not of itself include responsibil i ty foradministration or logistics. May also be used to denote theforces assigned t o a commander.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL:

The authority delegated to a commander to direct forcesassigned so that the commander may accomplish specificmissions or tasks which are usually limited by function,

t ime, or location; to deploy uni ts concerned, and t o retain orassign tact ical cont rol t o those units. I t does not includeauthor ity t o assign separate employment of components ofthe units concerned. Neither does i t , of i tself, includeadminist rati ve or logist ic cont rol.

TACTICAL COMMAND:

The author ity delegated to a commander to assign tasks

to forces under his command for the accompl ishment of themission assigned by higher author ity.

TACTICAL CONTROL:

The detailed and, usually, local direction and control ofmovements or maneuvers necessary to accompl ish missionsor tasks assigned.

Source: AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms 1992,pp. 2-0-2;2-T-1.

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(See Chart 3 for a comparison of NATO and U.S.defini t ions.) This variance in defini t ions exists despiteWashington's agreement to the NATO defini t ions by vir tueof it's acceding to AAP-6, “NATO Glossary of Terms andDefinitions.”

These differences, as recognized in the U.S. Army'srecently published, FM 100-7, Decisive Force , resulted innot inconsequential difficulties for NATO forces (despitetheir long history of cooperation) operating together dur ingOperations Desert Shield/ Desert Storm . Even a key U.S.

policy document dealing wi th peace support operat ions doesnot st r ict ly adhere to establ ished defini t ions. PresidentClinton's President ial Decision Di rect ive (PDD)-25, whichexplicitly addresses U.S. policy toward multilateral peaceoperations, uses a definition of OPCON which does not conform to that establ ished by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS) in the Unified Action Armed Forces Joint Pub 0-2 .Rather, it resembles the JCS's defini t ion of TACON, or the

NATO defini t ion of OPCON. One could quest ion whetherthere are now three U.S. recognized defini t ions of “OPCON.”Indeed, although not official, the initial and second draftJoint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, Joint Pub 3- 16 , uses the descr ipt ion as given by PDD-25, in place of t hatwhich is off icially sanct ioned by the JCS (see Chart 4).

In short , there is no end in sight among NATO nat ions tothe lack of universally-accepted definitions of commandauthor it ies. Addit ionall y, one should not conclude that theadoption of internationally-accepted nomenclature anddefini t ions wi l l necessari ly solve this problem. I t is notinfrequent for a nation to add or remove authorities fromthe command authority granted, e.g., OPCOM(-), orOPCON(+). In sum, both officials and planners need to beaware that command authority definit ions are notinternationally standardized, conflict with many similarnational definitions, and are often modified for specificoperations.

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Nuances of Mult inat ional “Command.” Five keypoints need to be understood at the outset to comprehendproblems associated wi th command in coali t ion operations.First, and foremost, nations only surrender national command (“Full Command” in NATO parlance) of theirforces in the face of the most extreme circumstances, andtherefore, i t i s quit e rare. Important matters of discipline,pay, promotion, etc., remain solely within nationalcommand channels as inherent manifestations of nationalsovereignt y. Thus, one must dist inguish between national command and the possible operational employment ofarmed forces. For example, in addressing the issue of the

operational employment of the U.S. armed forces, theClinton administration's PDD-25 makes the point quiteclear that “American forces have served under theoperational control of foreign commanders since theRevolut ionary War, including in World War I , World War I I ,Operation Desert Storm and in NATO since its inception.”Conversely, the document st resses, “The President retainsand will never relinquish command authority over U.S.

forces.”Second, nations and politicians are generally loath to

assign their forces to a foreign commander. Becausemilitary forces are a sine qua non of a state's most basicmanifestation of sovereignty, it is not surprising that theyare not l ight ly delegated to foreign commanders. I t is oft enthe case that instead of ascertaining which levels ofcommand a coali t ion commander requires to accompl ish hismission, national author it ies att empt to rel inquish the leastamount of author ity, thereby retaining as much cont rol overtheir forces as possible. Moreover, once authority has beendelegated to the coali t ion commander, national author it ieshave histor icall y been reluctant to reexamine and expandthese author it ies. For example, a study among Cent ralRegion NATO armies was unable to find one cont emporaryinstance where a multinational force commander engagedin peace support operations had his command authoritieschanged when his mission changed, consciously or as aresul t of “mission creep.” Thus, i t is safe to assume that the

29



command authorities a coalition commander begins withare what he wi l l have throughout his command.

Third, and related str ict ly t o NATO (albeit informat ivefor coalition considerations), a combination of these two

important national sensit ivi t ies has resul ted in a reluctanceon the part of some NATO states to place their nationalforces under OPCOM of all ied commanders, part icularly i npeacet ime. This is despite the fact t hat t here are noconstitutional or legal impediments in Central Regioncountries to placing their forces under the OPCOM of anall ied commander. The key sensit ivi ty among many al l iedofficials is the fear of an inability to control mission

assignments and that their forces wi l l be “fragmented”.

However , a st rong case can be made for the operat ionalrequirement that land coalition commanders require agreater , level of command author ity. Unl ike their naval andair counterpart, armies have their own sui generis characteristics when assigning them to a non-nationalcommander. Land combat forces consist of combined arms

teams, made up of var ious subset format ions, each of whichmay have different mission-essential tasks assigned tothem. Ships and aircraft , on the other hand, can be thoughtof as integral platforms of weapons and capabilities whichcan be delegated in their entirety to non-nationalcommanders to carry out specifi ed tasks. Hence, for naviesand air forces, TACOM and TACON are ent i relyappropriate.

Depending upon the missions and mission-essentialtasks, a land coalition commander (who might haveformations located over a wide geographic area) could wellrequire a wide-range of command authorities in order toaccompl ish his assigned object ives. For instance, he mayneed to assign new missions and tasks, reassign forces, ortask organize subordinate forces. Indeed, given potentialmission instability in some peace support operations, agreater level of command authori ty than ini t ia l lyanticipated could be needed in order to protect the force.These conditions dictate that coalition commanders must

30



possess sufficiently strong command authorities to permitthem to perform such t asks.

Four th, perhaps as a resul t of t his reluctance on t he partof nations to cede command authorities to foreign

commanders, there is a problem of delegating commandauthorities.

Because of the lack of internationally-recognized andaccepted command authority definitions, this condition isNATO-specific. NATO command authorities do notuniversally allow their delegation to a subordinatecommander . For example, under cur rent provisions,

OPCOM can only be returned to i ts or iginat ing source andcannot be delegated by a commander to a subordinate. Anallied commander possessing OPCOM can only delegateOPCON to a subordinate commander. Conversely, an all iedcommander with OPCON can delegate OPCON, but onlyafter obtain ing nat ional consent (see Chart 2). Thislimitation is yet another manifestation of countries'insistence upon retaining authority over their national

forces.Fifth and finally, there is no consensus within NATO

regarding whether an allied commander can do somethingnot explicit ly proscr ibed under his command author ity. Oneschool interprets command authority definitions in astrictly catholic sense, i.e., unless specificall y st ipulated, aNATO commander cannot exercise other authorit ies, statedor implied (e.g., under OPCOM, a multinational forcecommander can assign mi ssions). The ot her schoolinterprets command author it ies as allowing for the NATOcommander to exercise his command unless it is expli cit lystated otherwise (e.g., under OPCON, a mul t inat ional forcecommander cannot employ unit components separately).While no unified interpretation exists, the first schoolappears to be more fr equent ly accepted in the All iance.

While acknowledging that the NATO experience incommand author it ies is not applicable to all other all iances,let alone coali t ions, it is instruct ive nevertheless. That oneof history's most celebrated and highly-integrated

31



peacetime alliances has been unable to overcome thesecommand problems illustrates the inherent difficulty ofall iance and coali t ion command. Therefore, one shouldapproach the issue of command authorities in coalitionoperations with an informed view regarding the lack ofagreement over terminology and the sensitivities nationspossess when delegating command of their forces to aforeign commander.

Def in ing Command Au tho r i t y Requ i remen ts.From the above review of the nuances and problems which

surround commanding coalition operations, one shouldhave a better appreciation of the difficulty of achieving“uni t y of command”. Si mpl y st ated, coun t r i es arefrequently more concerned with maintaining control overtheir national cont r ibutions than they are wi l l ing to accedeto the common coali t ion effor t . An exception to this rule,however, is that in offensive, high-intensity and politicallyperilous operations (e.g., Desert Storm ), countries have

proven capable of overcoming their reluctance to grantsufficient command authorit ies to the coali t ion commanderin the interest of achieving a successful campaign.Achieving this elusive goal has perhaps been aided by theWestern practice of the military force commanding thecoalition subordinating some of its own units to thecommand of foreign force commanders, thereby fostering adegree of reciprocity and trust.

Where most contemporary coalition operations arel ikely to face command author ity chal lenges, however, is theconduct of peace suppor t operat ions. There is l i t t leinternational consensus as to exactly which missions fallunder t he t i t le of peace support operations. The mostcomprehensive and probably widely acknowledgeddefinition of these types of missions is found in NATOdocument MC 327, “Peace Suppor t Operat ions.” Thisdocument ident i fi es six peace support operational missions:

Confl ict Prevent ion

32



Peacemaking

Peacekeeping

Humanitar ian Aid

Peace Enforcement

Peacebuilding

A challenge to senior mi l i tary leadership is to argue onmi l i tary grounds that a seemingly innocuous peace supportmission could well require high command authorities (e.g.,to protect the force should conditions/missions change).Thus, in peace support oper at ions, or i ndeed even

warfighting, it is imperative that sound militarily-derivedrationales for the appropriate command authorities bepresented to senior political leadership.

Notwithstanding acknowledging the authority ofpolitical considerations and guidance, in principle, theplanning of all military operations should begin with thedefini t ion of the exact mission(s), from which flows stated

and impl ied tasks. A hypothet ical phasing of missionplanning should include the following:

Ph ase O: Planning and Preparation ( N.B .: a coali t ionforce commander will have planning responsibilities,however, he may have: 1) l i t t le or no author ity over assignedforces, 2) only limited knowledge of the number of forcesassigned, and their arrival time in theater, and 3) littleguidance when Tr ansfer of Author ity (TOA) wi l l take place.)

Ph ase 1: Deployment

Ph ase 2:Employment

Ph ase 3:Operations

Ph ase 4:Redeployment

From the planning phases of a specific mission (be itwarfighting or a peace support operation), mission-essent ial tasks can be der ived. Part icularly as regardsphases 2 and 3, the expected intensity of mil itary operationscan be discerned. I t is also in these phases in peace support

33



operations that a coalition is most likely to experiencemission instabil i ty and “mission creep”.

Before assessing directly the command authoritiesrequired in warfighting campaigns and peace support

operations, in a generic sense, there are a number ofimportant considerations which should be addressed.These include:

the composit ion and size of the forces under the coalit ioncommander's authority (i.e., a battalion, brigade, etc.);

the li kel ihood of a change in mission;

the state of rules of engagement—ROE (which ideallyshould be universally employed by coali t ion forces);

the potent ial need to task organize forces; and,

whether there may be a need to conduct offensiveoperations.

Start ing wit h warfight ing campaigns, an examinat ion ofcommon mission-essential tasks in the phases of anoperation will demonstrate the necessity to plan foroffensive operations. The coali t ion commander wil l requirethe abil i ty, for example, to reassign missions, task organizehis forces, delegate sufficient author ity when required, andbe prepared to protect the force. Thus, from a militaryperspective, he should have the highest level of commandauthorities possible, political realities allowing.

While defining command authority requirements isstraightforward for warfight ing campaigns, i t is much morecomplicated when approaching peace support operations.At the political level, nations are not as willing to submittheir political interests to the common objective as theywoul d be dur i ng a warf i ght i ng campai gn. At t heoperational level, in addition to common tasks, which aregeneric for all peace support operations, there are also tasks

(both stated and implied) which are specific for eachmission. In a general sense, a coali t ion commander wi l l onlyneed a low level of command author ity for missions such asHumani tarian Aid. Conversely, a coali t ion commander

34



charged with conducting a Peace Enforcement mission,which could include offensive operations, would require ahigh level of command author ity. Engaging in the otherfour peace support missions identified in MC 327 (ConflictPrevent ion, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, andPeacebui lding), would necessitate a coali t ion commander tohave author i t ies a t a leve l somewhere betweenHumanitarian Aid and Peace Enforcement .

Greater specificity in the definition of commandauthor it ies for peace support operations is difficul t to makein a general sense. However, essent ial considerat ionswhich may not be immediately obvious to civilian officials

include:

How can the coalition commander respond to “missioncreep” with his given command author ity? For example,protection of the force may require the ability to taskorganize which is only allowed within NATO underOPCOM.

Are coalition political mechanisms established to allow

the coali t ion commander to have his request for changes incommand author ity addressed in a timely fashion? I f not ,then a higher command authority than that immediatelyforeseen may be required by the commander in order to havethe flexibil i ty t o respond t o changing circumstances.

Are both national and coali t ion ROE in accordance wi ththe command authorities given to the commander?

Restr ict ive nat ional ROE could well negate a high level ofcommand author ity. An endorsed, format ted, menu of ROE,even i f individual nations' ROE are different , would enablethe commander to have a full understanding of nationalrestrictions.

Finally, are ROE, command authorities, and theforces/resources available to the coalition commander in

agreement, to enable him to accomplish his mission(s)?In sum, the primary factor in assessing common

authority requirements in peace support operations is theabil i ty of the coali t ion force commander to:

35



possess command authority necessary to execute hismission(s),

protect the force, and

have his request for changes in command authorityaddressed in a timely fashion.

Given the extreme political sensitivity nations haveconsistent ly shown when placing their forces under foreigncommanders, and their concomitant reluctance to revisitcommand authority decisions, prudence dictates thathigher authorities than are necessarily required toaccomplish the mission should be requested in the initial

pl anni ng phase. Th i s woul d enable t he coali t i oncommander to ensure the secur ity of his force, as well as bein a position to react swiftly to an unforeseen change inmission.

Such a proposal may be novel and impoli t ic for mi l i taryauthorities to recommend to their national politicalauthorities. However, one must consider two compelling

factors. Fi rst , the fr equency of par t icipat ion in peacesupport operations, at least from the perspective of somecountries (e.g., the United States), has increasedconsiderably since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, thereis no indication that this is about to change in theforeseeable fut ur e. Second, land forces employed in theseoperations tend t o be battalion or brigade size, and oft en donot possess a combined-arms, self-sufficient capability to

provide adequately for their own self-defense, part icularlyin the case of a change of mission, (i.e., to one of greaterintensity).

A seemingly benign Humanitarian Aid mission canquickly become unstable and turn violent, as the BelgianArmy discovered in Apr i l 1994 in Rwanda. Nationalpol i t ical and diplomat ic author it ies need to be made aware

of the impact of the command author ity requirements, pr iort o cont r ibut ing to coali t ion operati ons. Barr ing t hi ssolution, it is imperative that coalitions create politicalconsul tati ve arrangements that wi l l enable rapid at tent ion

36



to the coalition commander's requests to changes in hiscommand author ity.

Command St r uctu r e Consi der at i ons. I f one acceptsthe proposition that from a military perspective commandauthor it ies in coali t ions should be made or at least st ronglyinfluenced, by the mission(s) and composition of the force,then this should also hold true for the part icular commandstructur e chosen. As in the case of matching ROE to thedelegated command authority, a command structure shouldbe selected that best sui ts the poli t ical reali t ies and mil i tary

requirements of a specifi c operation.In a general sense, one can identify three types of

structures: lead nation, parallel or integrated. I t should benoted that these structures are not necessarily mutuallyexclusive. The Russian cont r ibut ion to IFOR/SFOR inBosnia-Herzegovina and the “sui generis” commandrelationships of i ts brigade commander to the U.S. divisioncommander and the Deputy for Russian Forces in

IFOR/SFOR, almost defy st r ict str uctural defini t ion. To besure, as is the case with command authorities, a choice incommand structures will be highly dependent upondecisions made by national political, and perhaps eveninternational, author it ies. Yet , pol i t ical-mil i tary adviceshould be prepared for consideration by pol i t icalauthorities.

Probably most important, given that each coalition isalmost by defini t ion unique, it makes l i t t le sense to attemptto establish guiding principles for selection of commandstructures which would be universal in their application.Rather, what may be more useful is to identify somestrengths and weaknesses which may surface in selectingan appropriate st ructure.

An integrated coalition command structure probablyprovides the most pol i t ical advantages. Par t icipat ingcountr ies are represent ed in t he command headquar ters inprincipal staff bi l lets, not solely as l iaison officers, thereby

37



a l low ing con t r i bu t ing governments to mon i to rdecisionmaking. An obvious disadvantage is the varyinglevels and types of staff training throughout the world,which could have an adverse effect upon the efficientworkings of the headquar ters. I f a coali t ion consists ofstates with a history of close military cooperation andsimilar staff procedures, an integrated structure may beappropriate, although, even in this case, creating aneffect ive integrated staff could st i l l t ake t ime. For aheterogeneous, ad hoc coalition with a high-intensitymission, an integrated structure may be inappropriate.

A lead nation command st ructure, conversely, may bring

certain pol i t ical disadvantages. Normally, a large nat ionwill provide the command headquarters, staffed withl iaison officers (which may or may not be integrated into thestaff elements), and wil l exercise command over operations.While some nations might chafe at such an arrangement,there may be less obvious advantages. For instance, if t helead nation is the Uni ted States or a major European state,smaller contributing nations may feel reassured that

should the operation change for the worse, the lead nat ioncould respond quickly and effect ively, as well as provide thebest protect ion for the force. However, many count r ies thatcont r ibute forces to peace support operations have coloniallegacies that could reduce their wi l l ingness to accept such astructure because of national political sensitivities, if thelead nat ion is i ts former colonial master .

A parallel command almost appears to be a counter-intuitive structure, given the apparent lack of unity ofcommand. Yet , as demonstrated in t he case of Desert Storm ,where Western and Arab/Muslim forces had their ownseparate chain of command, such a command organizat ioncan be successful. I t should be noted, however, that giventhe sizeable presence of U.S. forces and the role taken byGeneral Schwarzkopf in planning the campaign, one could

make the argument that a paral lel st ructure worked in thiscase, due to the presence of a lead nat ion. In other words, aparal lel st ructure without an explici t or implicit lead nat ion

38



may not be able to develop and maintain an essent ial unityof purpose in the conduct of operations.

Conclu si on: Un i t y of Command, or Effor t ?In recentyears, one can observe a noticeable move toward descr ibingand defining “command” in a technological manner, i.e.,“command, control and communications” (C3), and morerecently, “command, control, communications, computers”(C4). Given t he phenomenal increase in t he capabil i t ies andcapacities of microprocessors, such emphasis on the meansto increase and (hopeful ly) manage informat ion provided to

a commander is both understandable and warranted.Superior knowledge of the battlefield and the ability toconcent rate forces at the most opportune t ime to close uponthe enemy is, wit hout doubt , a capabil i ty that should not beunderrated, or ignored.

Yet “command”, whether exercised nationally, or wi thina coalition, is an inherently politically-bound activity.Military forces, one of the most basic manifestations of

national sovereignty, are jealously guarded by nationalauthorities, who only reluctantly surrender them to afor eign commander . Hence, obtain ing t he requisi t ecommand authority for a coalition force commander toenable him to accomplish his mission is likely to be bothcompl icated and hindered by pol i t ical considerations. Inaddition, the issue of command in coalition operations canbe complicated by the lack of internationally-recognizednomenclature of command authorities, let alone anappreciation of the nuances which govern the issue ofcommand.

Thus, while not disparaging the importance of “C3" or”C4", “command” remains at its most basic foundation, apolitical, not technological, issue and its nuances andsubt let ies can only be ful ly understood within this context .

An appreciation of this fact is essent ial when approachingcommand in coali t ion operations. Normal nat ional pol i t icalsensitivities over the command of armed forces iscomplicated and compounded by contending national

39



interests and objectives, let alone, different approachescount r ies take toward mi l i tary operations.

The reason for stressing the importance of politicalconsiderations and nations' natural sensitivities over the

matter of command is key in understanding why “uni ty ofcommand”, a widely accepted principle of war in Westernmi l i taries, is so diff icul t t o achieve. To be sure, in awarfighting campaign, national political sensitivities areoft en subject ed t o mi l i t ary necessi t y. For i nstance,although Paris placed its land and air forces operating inDesert Storm in the Arabian peninsula “only” under theTA CON of t he U .S. t heat er comm ander , Gener al

Schwarzkopf, the fact remains the French government didso, despite a bruising debate in French National Assembly.

Where achieving unity of command is likely to be themost difficult is within the context of peace supportoperations. Governments and international organizationshave all too often discounted the potent ial for mission shiftin these operations (the experience of UNPROFOR in

Bosnia-Herzegovina comes to mind) and the concomitantneed for the coali t ion force commander to protect the forcewhen threatened. Notwi thstanding the best effor ts ofmilitary officials to argue for military rationales forappropriate command author it ies to support the object ive ofunity of command, the historical record does not supportoptimism.

It is for this reason that in the planning process forcoalition operations, it would be prudent to presume thatthe best the coalition commander may hope to achieve isunity of effor t , vice unity of command. Whi le this may seemto be unduly determinist ic, pol it ical-mil itary officials needto be aware of the political challenges they will face whenproposing the need for unity of command in a coali t ion. Inconsequence, should “unity of effort” be the most thecoalition commander can hope to have, then he can advisehis political authorities of his need for some conditionalauthority which wi ll enable him, in extremis , to protect theforce. To be sure, this is hardly an ideal solut ion to acomplex and crucial aspect of “commanding” an operation.

40



Nonetheless, acceptance of this political reality could beinstrumental i n fore-arming a future coali t ion commanderfor the reali t ies he is l ikely to face.

Nonetheless, acceptance of this political reality could beinstrumental i n fore-arming a future coali t ion commanderfor the reali t ies he is l ikely to face.

CHART 1

D E F I N I T I O N S O F N A T O CO M M A N DAUTHORITIES

OPERATIONAL COMMAND:The authority granted toa commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinatecommanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to

retain or delegate operational and/or tact ical cont rol as maybe deemed necessar y. I t does not of i t sel f incl uderesponsibility for administration or logistics. May also beused to denote the forces assigned to a commander.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL:The author ity delegated toa commander to direct forces assigned so that thecommander may accomplish specific missions or taskswhich are usuall y l imi ted by funct ion, t ime, or location; todeploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tacticalcont rol t o those units. I t does not include author ity to assignseparate employment of component s of t he units concerned.Neither does i t , of i tself, include administ rati ve or logist iccontrol.

TACTICAL COMMAND:The authority delegated to acommander to assign tasks to forces under hi s command for

the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higherauthority.

TACTICAL CONTROL:The detailed and, usually, localdirect ion and cont rol of movements or maneuvers necessaryto accompl ish missions or tasks assigned.

Source: AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms 1992,pp. 2-0-2;2-T-1.

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CHART 2

C O M P A R I S O N O F N A T O C O M M A N D

AUTHORITIESM OST CONTROL L EAST CONTROL

A U T HORITY

O P C OM

O P C ON

T A C OM

T A C ON

A S S I GNMISSION

YES

A S S I GN TASKS

YES YES

REASSIG NFORCES

YES

GRANT

ED TO ACOMMANDER

YES

EMPLOY U N I TC O M P O NENTS

SEPARATELY

NO

REASSIG NOPCOM

YES

R E T A IN OPCOM

YES

DELEGA T EOPCON

YES Y E SW / A P P RVL

42



DELEGATE TO ACOMMANDER

YES YES

SUPERIOR TOTACOM

YES

A S S I GN TACOM

YES

R E T A I

N TACON

YES YES

DELEGA T ETACON

YES YES

D I R E CT FORCES

YES

DEPLOY FORCES

YES YES

LOCALDIRECTION &CONTROLO FM O V E M E

NTS ANDM A N E U VER

YES

A D M I NISTRATIVECOMMAN

D

NO

43





R E T A IN OPCOM

NATO U.S.

DELEGA T EOPCON

NATO N A T O

w / a p r v l /U.S.

DELEGATE TO ACOMMANDER

NATO NATO

SUPER

IOR TOTACOM

NATO

A S S I GN TACOM

NATO

R E T A IN TACON

NATO NATO

/U.S.

NATO/

U.S.

DELEGA T ETACON

NATO NATO

A S S I GNMISSION

NATO

A S S I G

N TASKS

NATO U.S. NATO

D I R E CT FORCES( G I V EORDERS)

NATO

/U.S.

REASSIG NFORCES

NATO

DEPLOY FORCES

NATO NATO NATO/

U.S.

45





“ FUL L COMMAND ” (NATO ONL Y: NO NATOC O M M A N D E R H A S F U L L C O M M A N D O V E RFORCES ASSIGNED TO HIM BECAUSE NATIONSASSI GN ONL Y OPCOM OR OPCON

K EY: - “ NATO” - SPECI FI CAL L Y PERMI TTED I NA NATO PUBL I CATI ON

- “ NATO-NO” - SPECI FI CAL L Y PROH I BI TED I NA NATO PUBL I CATI ON

- “ U.S.” - AUT H ORI ZED I N U .S. DOCTRI NE

- BLANK - NOT MENTIONED IN ANY NATO

PUBLICATION

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

CHAPTER 3

T H E E F F E C T O F T E C H N O L O G I C A LASYMM ETRY ON

COAL I TI ON OPERATI ONS

St even M et z

O v e r v i e w . Americans have an infatuation withtechnology so deep that i t borders on obsession. This has

deep roots in history. As the Uni ted States grew andmatured throughout the 19th century, the rapid expansionof the fr ont ier led to persistent labor shortages. Technology,by substituting machinery for human muscle, offered apart ial solut ion. What began, then, as a pract ical react ionto an economic problem eventual ly had a profound impacton nat ional percept ions and att i tudes. Today, the bel iefthat technology can solve social, economic, or even polit ical

problems is ingrained. Amer icans reach for technology asan inst inct ive react ion to a whole range of dilemmas.

This t rust in the curative power of technology has been amajor influence on American thinking about national

47



secur i ty . Key e lements o f the Amer icanweltanschauung —the high value of individual life, aninward-looking orientation, and a willingness, albeit areluctant one, to accept global responsibi l i ty—have led to agreat demand for economy in American strategy,part icularly an economy of blood. The stress on technologyin American defense policy must be seen in this context.Qualitative superiority—of which technology is animportant part—allows the U.S. military to meet thenation's many global security commitments with thesmallest possible force, deter aggression through strength,and limit casualties when deterrence fails and force

becomes necessary. Given the strategic situat ion that theUnited States currently faces with its combination ofwidespread responsibilities and the need to retain publicsupport by minimizing costs, trust in t echnology is a logicaland pragmatic react ion.

Today, the connection between technology and securityis codified in Amer ican strategy. For instance, the 1992National Military Strategy of the United States stated,

“advancement in...technology is a national securityobligation.” Whi le the 1995 version of the national mi l i tarystrategy dropped this phrase, nearly all the currentprograms and activities of the U.S. Department of Defenseremain premised on technological superiority (howeverdefined). “[W]e wi l l cont inue,” stated Undersecretary ofDefense Paul G. Kaminski, “to maintain technologicalsupremacy on the bat t lefield...Our forces are being designedto achieve dominant battlefield awareness and combatsuperiority through the deployment of fully integratedint el l igence systems and technologically super ior weaponssystems.” This is not empty rhetor ic. Programs areunderway to bui ld concepts, doct r ine, and force structure tomake maximum use of emerging technology including theArmy's Force XXI and Army After Next Project, the AirForce's Spacecast, and the Marine Corps' Project SeaDragon.

If the acquisition and fielding of advanced technologywere the only requirements of U.S. national security

48



strategy, the l ives of Amer ican policymakers would be mucheasier . But st rategy is always an uneasy compromisebetween competing needs and demands. For instance, theability to operate with coalition partners is equally vital.According to General John M. Shalikashvi l i , “Al though ourArmed Forces will maintain decisive unilateral strength,we expect to work in concert wi th all ied and coali t ion forcesin nearly all of our future operations, and increasingly, ourprocedures, programs, and planning must recognize thisreali ty.” This is a t radit ional theme in Amer ican strategyand, l ike the st ress on technology, is a pragmat ic response topressing problems. Coali t ions st retch defense resour ces

and spread costs among the part icipants. A well-designedand well-led coalition blends the skills of its componentforces to make the whole greater than t he sum of t he parts.Coalitions can also bring political and strategic benefitssuch as an increased abil i ty t o mobil ize and sustain publicsupport.

Despite the trends toward increasing use of technologyand coali t ions, the two are not always perfect ly compat ible.

Under some circumstances, the quest for technologicalsuperior i ty can erode the effect iveness of coali t ions. As ageneral rule, the greater the similarity between militaryforces, the easier i t is for them to work together. Technologycan create major differences between the techniques,capabilities, preferences, doctrine, and force structure ofcoali t ion partners. To ensure that technological differencesdo not erode the effectiveness of a coalition, requiresdel iberate effor t and wel l -designed programs. I n thecur rent global secur ity envi ronment , this should be a highpriority for American military leaders and strategicplanners, and for the leaders of other militaries whoanticipate operating in coali t ion wi th the Uni ted States.

Fr ami ng t he Issue. Taken alone, the type or amount oftechnology that a military force possesses does notdetermine whether i t can operate effect ively wi th any other.Technological asymmetry between coali t ion partners is thekey variable. When assessing technological asymmetry, it

49



is easy to fall into a mental trap and conclude that somecoalition partners are “more advanced” or “superior” toothers with the implication that the “backward” partnersmust be brought up t o the level of the more advanced. Suchnot ions attach dist ract ing value assessments and assume ar igidly linear pattern of technological development . Reali tyis more complex.

From the perspective of political decisionmakers andmi l itary st rategists building a coali t ion, it is more useful tothink in terms of three types of technological asymmetry.The fi rst is when coali t ion partners have a different degreeof rel iance on technology. Some mi l i taries may be unable to

perform basic funct ions such as planning, movement , andtarget acquisit ion without complex technology, whi le othersare less dependent . A second type of asymmetry ariseswhen coali t ion partners rely equally on complex technologybut ut i l ize different forms. For i nstance, the U.S. mi l i tary isnow exploring nonlethal weapons such as low-energy laserweapons, isotropic radiators, non-nuclear electromagneticpulses, high-power microwaves, infrasound, liquid metal

embrittlement, supercaustics, anti-traction technology,polymer agents, combustion alteration technology,calmative agents, and visual stimulus and illusiontechnologies. Whi le event ual ly many of these wi l l berejected as impractical, illegal, or unethical, some have orwi l l be integrated into the arsenal of the U.S. mi l i tary. Tomake use of them, the U.S. Department of Defense isdeveloping doct r ine, procedur es, and st r ategy. I t i scer tainly logical to use new t echnology t o meet the demandsof a security environment which demands a minimumhuman cost in the application of mi l i tary force. Butnonlethal weapons could generate complications for futurecoali t ions. I t is easy to imagine a peace support coali t ion afew years fr om now where the U.S. component makes greatuse of nonlethal weapons whi le other coali t ion part ners donot, thus creating considerable planning and executionproblems for the force commander. A thi rd variant oftechnological asymmetry arises when coalition partners,equally reliant on similar technology, use it for differentpurposes. For example, two partners might both have

50



advanced nonlethal weapons, but one might use themstr ict ly for force protect ion and rear area secur ity while theother uses them in conjunction with lethal fires duringoffensive operations (e.g., to immobil ize armored vehicles orenemy soldiers before destroying them with conventionalfires).

Of course, asymmetries of one kind or another haveaffected mili tary coali t ions throughout history, but they area mounting problem in the contemporary strategicenvi ronment . This is par t icularly t rue of technologicalasymmetry. In an absolut e sense, the range of availablemilitary technology is wider than ever; its development

cont inues unabated, part icularl y in the Uni ted States. Infact , some analysts argue that a technological r evolut ion isunderway that wi l l fur ther add to the gap between armedforces that master i t and those who do not . This carr iesprofound impl ications for the commanders and archi tects offut ure coali t ions.

The military-technical revolution, or revolution in

mi l itary affair s, promises to alter all dimensions of mi l i taryact ivity from the tact ical to the strategic. At the tact icallevel, scientists, engineers, and military planners aredesigning new technologies to supplement humancapabilities and make the soldier an integrated sensorsystem and str ike platform. This has spawned a number ofprograms. The U.S. Army's Project Land Warr ior , forinstance, is blending advanced communications, new

weapons systems, and an ar ray of defenses to augment thecapabil i t ies of dismounted soldiers. The high-tech headgearof future soldiers wi l l include audio-visual communications,eye protection from tunable laser and ballistic injuries,night vision, respiratory and auditory protect ion, chemicaland biological protection, and a heads-up display with aweapons inter face. Project Land Warr ior is one part of thebroader and more ambit ious Force XXI Program. This is

designed to develop the doctr ine, concepts andorganizations to make maximum use of new technologies,especially those based on digit al informat ion. Some parts ofthe Force XXI Army are far along in the development

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process. Element s of what is being called the “digit ized”U.S. Army of the next century have been field tested inexercises where scout s are equipped with the DismountedDigitized Solder System which enable spot reports andinstr uct ions to be sent to lower and higher echelons withinseconds without voice communication.

Emerging technology promises even more profoundchange in comi ng decades. The r apidl y developingtechnology of command, control, communication, andintelligence (C3I), in conjunction with high-technologytraining using simulations, promises to give advancedmilitaries the ability to find and strike targets over long

distances, synchronize highly complex operations, andoperate at a much faster pace than previously possible.Optimists hold that technology may soon provide militarycommanders a near-perfect picture of the battlefield withthe abil i ty to know where all fr iendly and most enemy forcesare at any given time and, more importantly, to trulyunderstand what is happening across the battlefield.Eventually t he integration of advanced C3I technology, new

doctrine, and new force structures may allow a radicalalteration of the basic design of the battlefield withcommanders hundreds or even thousands of miles awayfrom subordinate units still able to retain effective tacticalcont rol. Rather than the t radit ional linear archi tecturewith clearly defined fronts, the future battlefield may seesmall, networked units operating in a nonlinear fashion,each acting semi-autonomously but contributing to theattainment of common goals in super fast-paced and t ight lysynchronized operations. As Bar ry R. Schneider phrased it ,Desert Storm- type operations may give way t o a “DispersedStorm.” Some analysts are already talking of chaos theory,fuzzy logic, and other forms of nonl inear t hink ing replacinglinear, Newtonian logic as the foundation for 21st centurymil it ary operat ions.

Even t oday, emerging technology is opening the way forprofound changes in operat ional concepts. According toGeneral John Shalikashvi l i :

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By 2010, we should be able to change how we conduct themost intense joint operations. Instead of r elying on massedforces and sequential operations, we will achieve massedeffects in other ways. Information super ior i ty and advancesin technology will enable us to achieve the desired effectsthrough the tailored application of joint combat power.Higher lethality weapons will allow us to conduct attacksconcur rent ly that formerly required massed assets, appli edin a sequent ial manner.

By 2020, all operations by military forces which have

integrated the latest technology may r eflect concepts suchas “pop up” warfare where str ike platforms are hidden andquiet except during engagement or movement, or “fire antwarfare” where large numbers of small, relatively cheap,unmanned weapons plat forms swarm on enemy targets.

Stealth and the technology associated with precision,stand-off weapons systems already all ow the United Statesand some other nations to strike with near-impunity

against al l but the most advanced opponent s. The sametechnologies, in conjunct ion wi th ongoing improvements inforce protection, whether missile, nuclear, biological, andchemical (NBC) defenses or individual soldier protection,will probably decrease the risk to the soldiers, marines,sailors, and airmen of those states that develop andimplement them. Robots and other unmanned “bri l l iant”systems will increasingly assume the most dangerousbat t lefield tasks. This is already underway in mine clearingand reconnaissance, but eventually unmanned systemsmay take over nearly al l close engagement s. As atechnology forecast prepared for the U.S. Army stated, “Thecore weapon of twentieth-century land war has been thetank, but the core weapons of the twenty-first century manybe unmanned systems, operating mostly under computercont rol .” Al ready, technology is making possible the“deconstruction” of weapons systems where the sensor,system controller, and the strike platform itself arephysically dispersed, thus making it extremely diffi cul t foran opponent to locate the human directing the system.

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Advances in information war fare may al low mi l i tary forcesto erode the effect iveness of an opponent electronically, thusrendering the application of traditional force much easieror , in the most optimist ic scenarios, ir relevant. I t may nolonger be necessary to destroy the armed forces or industryof an enemy or even t o seize terr i tory, but only to demolishthe enemy's command and communication system fr om afarusing nonlethal means. Added to other forms of nonlethalweapons, information warfare has the potential to make“dirty” combat based on killing and physical destructionobsolete.

Advances in information war fare may al low mi l i tary forcesto erode the effect iveness of an opponent electronically, thusrendering the application of traditional force much easieror , in the most optimist ic scenarios, ir relevant. I t may nolonger be necessary to destroy the armed forces or industryof an enemy or even t o seize terr i tory, but only to demolishthe enemy's command and communication system fr om afarusing nonlethal means. Added to other forms of nonlethalweapons, information warfare has the potential to make“dirty” combat based on killing and physical destructionobsolete.

If all this technology matures and is fielded by the

Uni ted States and others, it is easy to imagine how di ff icul tit would be to forge a coalition combining some partnerswhich have adopted the new forms of warfare and otherswhich cont inue to rely on t radit ional techniques. Eventoday, the gap between armed forces pursuing newtechnology and new forms of warfare and those who are notis turning into a chasm. And key character ist ics of thecurrent strategic environment amplify the problems of

technological asymmetry. Dur ing the Cold War, all iancesdesigned for warfighting were the most important form ofmul t inational mil i tary cooperation. The formali ty and longlife span of such organizations gave their architects theopportuni ty to ident i fy and t ranscend dangerousasymmetr ies, whether technological or not . This is less t ruein t he cur rent st rategic envi ronment where a convergence ofpol i t ical int erests among most nat ions of the wor ld causesvery diverse armed forces to join together with very littlenot ice. For the t ime being, at least , heterogeneous, ad hoc coalitions have replaced longstanding, formal alliances asthe dominant form of multinational military cooperation.Not only do contemporary coalitions sometimes combinepartners unaccustomed to working together, but they oft enmust act so quickly after formation that t here is l i t t le t imeto work out incompatibil i t ies. Time can serve as a pal l iativefor many asymmetries, but contemporary mil i tarycoali t ions oft en do not have the luxury of t ime.

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Other character is t ics o f the cur rent s t ra teg icenvironment also amplify the potentially debilitatingeffects of technological asymmetry. Because they oft en areformed for peace support rather than warfighting,contemporary coali t ions are pol i t icall y fragi le. Nationsinvolved in a peace support operation seldom have a dir ect ,vi tal interest in the confl ict they seek to resolve. As a resul t ,their willingness to bear costs and risks is lower than int radit ional warfight ing, thus forcing a coali t ion commanderto take al l possible effor ts to minimize casualt ies on the partof all par t icipants. In addit ion, contemporary coali t ions donot lend themselves to a hierarchical organization with

junior partners forced to assume a role dictated by seniorpar tners. Thi s has profound st r ategic impl icati ons.Asymmetr ies, whether caused by technology or some otherfactor, are easier to deal with in hierarchical coalitionswhere the lead nat ion can impose discipl ine or compl iance.Neither Napoleon nor Hitler, for instance, had qualmsabout forcing their junior par tners to accept tasks that thecoali t ion leader deemed appropr iate. This has seldom been

replicated in t he post -Cold War strategic envi ronment .The political costs of withdrawal from contemporary

coali t ions is often small for all except the major part icipant sor lead nation, particularly in coalitions formed forhumanitar ian rel ief or peace support rather thanwarfighting. This means that even when there is a greatdispar ity between the lead nat ion's nat ional power and themilitary prowess of coalition partners, the perception ofequity is a pol i t ical necessity. A coali t ion commandercobbling together a force from participants with variedmotives and a weak commitment to the common cause mayhave to eschew the most militarily effective solutions totechnological asymmetries and accept greater tactical andoperational risk to preserve unity and sustain politicalsupport . Under such condit ions, asymmetr ies that mighthave been only minor nuisances under other circumstancescan prove debil i tating.

Admittedly, even in heterogeneous, fragile, andvoluntary coali t ions, not all technological asymmetr ies are

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debilitating and not all debilitating asymmetries can bet raced to technology. But enough adverse effects der ive fr omtechnological asymmetry that the issue warrants carefulconsideration by strategists and coalition commanders.Identifying potentially debilitating asymmetries anddeveloping solut ions is thus a vit al part of the planning andleading of modern coali t ions.

In a general sense, the danger to a coalition posed bytechnological asymmetry is determined by fi ve factors. Thefi rst (and most obvious) is the aggregate level of asymmetry.It might seem that a little asymmetry would be easier toover come t han a large amount . Bu t when glar ing

differences exist, it is easier for national components to begiven independent missions and for force commanders totake the difficult steps needed to overcome the problems.Moreover, asymmetr ies which ini t iall y appear less pressingcan be more diff icul t to t ranscend i f for no other reason t hanthat their effect is easi ly underest imated. In NATO, forinstance, i t has been harder to overcome minor variation inthings such as communications systems than i t was to solve

maj or d i f fer en ces. Wh en obvi ou s t echn ol ogi calasymmetries exist in a coalition, the participant rich intechnology oft en assumes responsibi l i ty for t ranscending orbypassing the problems which emerge fr om the gap. Whenthe asymmetries are important but not glaring, it is moredifficul t to assign responsibil i ty for overcoming them.

The second factor determining the danger that

technological asymmetry might pose to a coalition is theperiod of time between the deployment of forces and thecommencement of operations. The more t ime avail able, thegreater the chances that solut ions can be found for the mostdebil i tati ng asymmetr ies. Thi rd is the intensity and pace ofthe operations the coali t ion wi l l undertake. The moreintense and fast-paced the operations, the greater thedanger that technological asymmetry will complicate or

prevent completion of key strategic and operational tasks.H is to ry i s rep le te w i th i ns tances whereasymmetries—some technological and some related totraining and leadership—forced a coalition to act more

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slowly than the commander would have wished. Examplesinclude Rommel's experience with the Italians or vonManstein's with the Rumanians. The fourth factordetermining the danger that technological asymmetryposes to a coali t ion is the technology of the enemy. Atechnologically proficient enemy will be better able toidentify and manipulate technological asymmetries in acoali t ion. The fi ft h factor i s the pol i t ical st rength or fragi l i tyof the coali t ion. A warfight ing coali t ion where the nationalsurvival or vital interests of the participants are at stakewill be more likely to take difficult steps to overcometechnological asymmetry or to bear its costs than a more

fragile coalition where participants will withdraw if thecosts and risks of the operation exceed fairly low limits.Taken together, these factors allow coalition planners todevelop an overall assessment of r isks posed by asymmetry.Such an assessment should be a standard part of planningfor contemporary mi l i tary coali t ions.

Prob lems. Technological asymmetry can generateproblems for coalitions both in terms of support and theemployment of forces. A coali t ion commander whose force isr iven wi th such asymmetr ies may be forced to use his assetsin a way that increase r isks and diminishes the probabil i tyof success. This can happen in several ways. At the mostbasic level, technological asymmetry can complicate orprevent effect ive interoperabil i ty by hinder ing coordinat ion

between units from different nations and increasing thecoalition's logistics, maintenance and support burden byforcing it store and move a wider range of mater ial. But , atthe same time, technology also provides help with thecomplexities of managing an extensive inventory ofsuppl ies, parts, and other mater iel. More ser ious problemscan arise when a coalition commander must shape hisconcept of operations to the capabil i t ies of t he partner which

had done the least to acquire and field the technologynecessary for fast-paced, complex operat ions. While slowerand simpler operations are not always inferior, anythingthat limits the choices available to a commander has the

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potent ial t o compl icate the complet ion of key missions or toincrease r isk and cost .

Technological asymmetry can also generate strategiclevel effects that threaten alliance cohesion, primarily by

creating a perception of unequal burden-sharing or riskamong the part icipants. For instance, i f some mi l i tariesdevelop and field advanced technology for soldier protect ionand then join a coalition with partners lacking it, thecoali t ion commander would have three opt ions. He couldignore the asymmetry and hope that the coali t ion partnerswithout soldier protection technology do not abandon thecause when t heir casual t ies exceed those of par tners which

do have such technology. He could design the operation sothat coalition partners with advanced soldier protectiontechnology assumed the most dangerous roles. Or he couldattempt to have the nations with advanced soldierprotection technology share it with those lacking it, thusincreasing the r isk of casualt ies for the nat ions which gaveup the equipment and boosting the chances that theirpublics might demand withdrawal from the coalition.

Clearly, none of these is desirable.

Technological asymmetry, then, can generate a range ofproblems for a coalition from the tactical to the strategiclevels. Many of these are ext raordinar i ly complex, wi th thesame technology that augments military capabilitiessomet imes generating new di lemmas.

S o l u t i o n s. Specif ic solutions to technologicalasymmetry, whether operational or st rategic, wi l l naturallydepend on the circumstances. The poli t ical mandate of thecoalition, its military mission, composition, and enemy alldetermine to what extent and in what ways a commanderhandles internal technological dif ferences. I t is possible,though, to sketch some general approaches to asymmetry

that pol i t ical leaders, coali t ion commanders, and planningstaffs might consider. These approaches fal l int o threecategories: (1) activities prior to forming a coalition; (2)activities during the diplomatic activities associated with

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the formation of a coalition; and, (3) activities during theplanning and execut ion of coali t ion mi l i tary operations.

Prior to forming a coalition . While i t is impossible tofully prevent technological asymmetries among coalition

partners, it is both possible and important to keep themfrom becoming debilitating or posing an obstacle to theaccompl ishment of key missions. This can best be done inadvance of the format ion of a coali t ion. Because the Uni tedStates will often assume the role of lead nation in futuremultinational coalitions, the Office of the Secretary ofDefense, the Joint Staff, and the regional unified commandsshould pay part icular attent ion t o establ ishing a conceptual

and doctrinal framework for dealing with technologicalasymmetr ies. Each of the regional unified commands, forinstance, should develop long-term programs to assess theasymmetries that exist between the United States andpotent ial coali t ion par tners in their area. The uni fiedcommands (especially At lant ic Command) and t he servicesshould develop exercises, simulations, and wargamesdesigned specifi cally t o ident i fy the most dangerous forms of

technological asymmetry in existing and future militaryforces. This wi l l r equire U.S. planning staffs such as theJoint Staff, the service staffs, and the J-5 sections of theregional unified commands to pay particular attention toany long-term, future-or ient ed force development programsimplemented by potential coalition partners. At the sametime, historical studies should be undertaken to develop adata base of r esponses to asymmetr ies that have been usedin the past . And, officers who might someday command acoalition or work on a high-level coalition staff should bemade aware of the effects of technological inequality andpossible solut ions. To faci l i tate this, the various U.S. warcolleges should incorporate the study of the problemsassociated with coali t ion operations into their cur r icula andwargames (i f this has not already been done).

As appropriate concepts and attitudes are developed toalleviate or forestall the debil i tating effects of technologicalasymmetry, nations which might play a central role infuture coalitions—again with the United States in the

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lead—should move toward more concrete programs. Undercertain condi t ions, technology sharing might prove useful.Most often, though, this option will only work with fairlysimple things such as communications equipment . Recentconflicts such as the Gulf War showed that possession ofcomplex technology alone does not always lead to dramat icimprovements in military effectiveness. Technology issimply one part of a synergistic system that includesresearch, development , t raining, doctr ine, support systems,concepts, att i tudes and leadership. Given this, shar ingtechnology with potential coalition partners will not helpunless the other components of the system can also be

exported and absorbed by the recipient . Many mi l i taryforces are simply not capable of undertaking the rapid andradical change in training, force structure, and doctrinethat new, complex technology requires. In the future, theinformation revolution may create technologically savvysubcultures in all states from which mil i tary leadership canbe dr awn. Today, t hough, onl y mi l i t ar y for ces oftechnologically-focused cultures like the American,

Japanese, German, and a few others can do thi s. For most ,complex or st range technology would be under-ut i l ized andmoney bet ter spent on simpler but more usable equipment .

There are also political problems with technologysharing. States wi th complex technology wi l l oft en hesitateto share i t wi th potent ial coali t ion partners. With all ies,there is some expectation of continued cooperation and afoundation of shared interests, so technology sharing ispoli t icall y feasible. But this does not always hold in asecur ity envir onment where i t is diffi cul t to predict futurefriends and enemies, and where ad hoc coalitions are therule. There is always the r isk t hat shared technology wil l beturned against its originators or transferred to a thirdparty. Because of t his, the focus of any programs to forestalldebilitating technological asymmetry should be onprocedural solut ions rather than t echnology sharing.

During the formation of a coalition . Dur ing the actualprocess of forming a coali t ion, the nature of t he mission andthe enemy or threat become clearer, so potentially

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damaging technological asymmetr ies can be ident ified withgreater cer taint y. At this stage, mi l i tary planners andadvisers must make the archi tects of the coali t ion aware ofsuch asymmetries as civilian leaders balance the politicaladvantages of including as many partners as possible in acoali t ion against the cost in mil i tary effect iveness that canarise in an asymmetr ic force. Poli t ical leaders must be opento the idea of reject ing a potent ial part ner when the mi l i tarydisadvantages of participation greatly outweigh thepoli t ical gains. I f pol i t ical leaders do decide to include amilitary force that adds technological asymmetry to acoalition, they should consider specifying a role that

minimizes the degree to which t hat par tner erodes mi l i taryeffect iveness and l imi ts the choices available to the coalit ioncommander. In general, technology is most crucial for C3Iand offensive operations. Mil i tary st rategists should advisepolitical leaders to seek a contribution outside these areasfrom states that have done a less comprehensive job atintegrating the latest technology.

During planning and execution. Once a coalition is

formed and operational planning begins, the role of thecoalit ion commander and his staff in dealing withtechnological asymmetry increases. The object ive is st i l l t obalance military effectiveness with the political objectivesand parameters of t he coali t ion. In less r isky and dangerousoperations or where a coalition is particularly fragile, thecommander may decide that political conditions justifyaccepting reduced effectiveness and shape the operationaccording to the least profi cient coali t ion part ner . Theresul t would be a plan of operation t hat unfolds more slowlyand is less complex than one that might be undertaken by acoalition composed solely of more technology-reliantpartners. Under some condi t ions, this may provide anadvantage to the adversary.

In peace enforcement or war fight ing where the dangers

and r isks are greater , a coali t ion commander is less l ikely t oallow the l imi tati ons of t he least capable partner to dictateactivities and will, instead, seek ways to transcend anydebil i tating technological asymmetr ies. In a broad sense,

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there are two ways to do this. The commander can attemptto ameliorate asymmetr ies by improving the capabil i t ies ofcoali t ion par tners which have done a less compr ehensive jobof acquir ing and fielding technology. Again, technologyshar ing might seem the most obvious way of doing this, butthe t ime it takes a mil i tary force to absorb new technologyand develop the expertise to make maximum use of itdiminishes the utility of technology sharing. In mostinstances, some sort of liaison relationship will be morefrui t ful . This is par t icular ly t rue for the technologyassociated with communications and intel l igence. I t wouldbe fa i r ly s imple to a t tach a C3I ce l l f rom more

technologically proficient coalit ion partners to theheadquarters of others. But , such a l iaison system must beplanned in advance. Technologically proficient coalitionpartners must deploy enough communications andintelligence units that some can be detached to serve asl iaisons without eroding the effect iveness of t heir own units.And, effective liaisons must have language and inter-cul tural ski l ls. Because of this, things l ike the U.S. Army's

foreign area officer program and Special Forces wi l l be vi talto the success of future coalitions.

The second approach is to use some sort of division oflabor rather than attempting to make the coalitionhomogenous. Th i s coul d be geographi c, wi t h mor etechnologically proficient coalition partners assigned thesectors of the bat t lefield where their abi l i ty to operate at arapid tempo, strike deep, and engage a greater number ofenemy targets and units would have the greatest utility.Deser t Storm used this technique. But , a bat t lefield divisionof l abor could also be based on t asks rather than geography,wi th more technologicall y adept coali t ion part ners assigned

jobs best suited to their skills such as battle management,intelligence, deep strike, and missile defense. Clearly, thespecifi c approach taken wi l l depend on circumstances, but acoalition commander aware of the advantages anddisadvantages of alternative approaches to technologicalasymmetry wi l l always have an advantage over one who hasnot considered them.

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Conclusions. How much and what kind of technology amilitary force acquires reflects a number of factorsincluding available funding, the national technical and

scient i fic base, national cul ture, and the strategic situat ion.Dur ing protracted wars, combat serves as the final arbit erof what works and what does not , so all nat ions, combatantsand noncombatants, tend to move toward similartechnology. In the cur rent st rategic envi ronment , mostmi li tary technology has not faced the ul t imate test . Thisencour ages technological heterogeneit y. Each of t hetechnologicall y-focused mi l i taries around the wor ld has i ts

own vision of fut ure armed confl ict . This, in combinat ionwi th t he fact that most of t he wor ld's armed forces are notundergoing rapid technological change at the present t ime,cont r ibutes to an ingrained asymmetry that wi l l cont inue togrow for the foreseeable future.

St i l l , technological asymmetry is not always an obstacleto effect ive and smoothly funct ioning coali t ions. Generall y,

the more intense the operations, the greater the risks posedby asymmetry while, at the same time, the greater theincent ives to deal with any problems arising from it . Inhumanitar ian rel ief or peace support operat ions,techno log ica l asymmetry w i l l se ldom genera teinsur mount able pr oblems. I n peace enfor cement orwarfighting, though, it could prove very dangerous.Political decisionmakers and coalition commanders must

remain sensitive to technological differences in suchsituations.

As with any problem, the more that technologicalasymmetr ies can be foreseen and solut ions implemented inadvance, the bet ter. Whi le i t is impossible to predict whichstates will join the United States in all future coalitionoperations, the current strategic environment does allowU.S. leaders to identify likely partners and attempt toforestall problems. This requires a coherent , long-termprogram which includes exercises, simulations, andwargames designed specifically to identify and findsolut ions to debil i tating technological asymmetr ies. This

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program should help potential coalition leaders andcommanders—both U.S. and foreign—understand theimpact of such asymmetr ies on mili tary operations in par tthrough production and dissemination of a catalog of thetypes of technological asymmetr ies that have affected pastcoalitions and the solutions that commanders employed.For the United States, such a program to minimize thedeleterious effects of technological asymmetry on militarycoalitions would be a useful step, given the persistentstrategic imperatives to make maximum use of advancedtechnology whi le operating in coali t ion whenever possible.

ENDNOTES - CHAPT ER 3

CHAPTER 4

DOCTRI NE AND TRAINI NG:

TH E FOUNDATI ON OF EFFECTI VE COAL I TI ONOPERATIONS

M i chael Smi t h

A coalition is, by definition, an ad hoc arrangementbetween two or more states for common act ion. I ts act ionstake place outside the bounds of established alliances,usually for single occasions, or longer cooperation in anarrow sector of common interest . Di fferences in nat ional

histories, command and control procedures, logisticalconcepts, technological capabil i t ies, and force composit ionsand organizations combine to present coalitions withimposing obstacles to effectiveness. However, the commonthread among these obstacles and the greatest confoundingfactor coalit ions face is their ad hoc nature.

There can be l i t t le doubt that the abi l i ty of coali t ions to

overcome these challenges is directly proportional to thecommitment that potential coalition partners give todeveloping general doctrinal principles to guide their

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operations, and to t raining. No other factors hold as muchpotent ial for successful mission execut ion.

T h e I m p o r t a n c e o f Co m m o n D o ct r i n a lConsiderat ions.

Limited warning, limited time until execution ofoperations, language difficulties, and differing nationalcul tures and defense policies add compl ications that wouldchallenge even long-standing, well-trained alliances.NATO has been in existence for approximately 50 years,and, as an alliance, is a higher form of multinational

organization than a coali t ion. Despite their long associationwith one another, NATO members still meet on a regularbasis to develop and refine doctrinal concepts.

This underscores the doctrinal challenge facingcoalitions which rarely have weeks, let alone years, tocoordinate the most fundamental operational principles.When a mili tary organization lacks a common doctr ine i t is

dif ficul t t o achieve uni ty of effor t . There may not beagreement on, or a mutual understanding of, fundamentalm i l i t a ry ac t i v i t i es such as maneuver , mob i l i t y ,countermobility, fire support, command and controlprocedures, intel l igence operations (especially intel l igencesharing), force protect ion, support operations, civi l affairs,and rules of engagement.

To overcome the problems associated with the lack of acommon doctrine, regional organizations should developregional doctrinal publications which identify doctrinal“considerations” for commanders and planners. The term“considerations” is used because it is unl ikely that anythingmore detailed or prescriptive would be adopted andendorsed by all potential coalition members from a region.Moreover, coalition partners may come from outside the

region of operations and may not be inclined to adopt theregional organization's doctr ine.

The publication would catalogue key considerations forcommanders and planners to evaluate for applicability to

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mili tary situation develops. In addit ion, the mission to beper formed is usually a hybrid of tasks. Because thecoali t ion did not exist prior to the cr isis that spawned it , thecomplete composit ion of the coali t ion is unforeseeable. Thecoali t ion, quickly const i tuted, wil l not have t rained togetherfor even the most fundamental tasks. So, just when thecomplexity of the military situation requires flexibility,adaptability, and versatility, coalitions, which owing totheir ad hoc nature lack a common doctrinal and trainingfoundation, find themselves grossly unprepared for thetask-at -hand. This is where regional doctr inal publicationsand t raining wi l l pay off.

Th e Chall enge of Ter mi nology and Gr aphi cs.

Those famil iar wi th joint operations of the U.S. mi l i tarycan at test to the chal lenges the U.S. Services face even withone another in terms of terminology and graphics.Coalitions, normally already separated by differentlanguages, face signi f icant problems of di f fer ing

terminology and graphics. This may undermine the goal ofachieving unity of effort, and generally create confusion.

L ike the doct r inal considerations publi cation referred toabove, regional organizations need to develop andd is t r ibu te a pub l i ca t ion wh ich s tandard izes theterminology and graphics a coali t ion would need to conducta wide range of operations. Building on an existing

publi cation would markedly r educe the travails associatedwi th such an effor t . This document would need to be moreprescriptive than the doctrinal considerations publication.When complete, this too should enjoy standard use bypotential coalition members in their routine trainingexercises.

What’s i n a Name?—UN Pr otecti on For ce Bosn i a.Peace support terms are not understood well, and aremarkedly different between the United States, othernat ions, and NATO. Dur ing the U.S. Army’s Bat t le

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Command Training Program’s (BCTP) Peace OperationsSeminar at the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC),concerns were raised about peace support terms usedthroughout the workshop and in the different headquart ers’operat ions plans. Of par t i cul ar impor tance was t heinsistence of the ARRC commander and his staff that theterm “enemy” does not fi t in peace support operations. Theysensed the term had negative political and militaryover tones. For t he sake of graphic clari t y it becamenecessary to develop a standard symbology for terms whichapplied to peacekeeping organizations and factions so theycould be shown on a map. In mult inat ional organizations,

clarity and simplicity are essential in communicating themessage. The following terms also generated discussionand requir ed clari fication:

Enemy vs complying fact ions

Rules of engagement vs rules of employment

Lead nat ion

Role specializationMutual support

OPCON vs OPCOM

Peace support

Peace implementation

PSYOPS vs operational information

The Impor tance of Ins t i tu t iona l iz ing RegionalEducat i onal Exchange and Tr aini ng .

Where regional organizations exist, they attest to some

commonali ty of out look and interests upon which mi l i taryleaders can build. However, most regional organizations(with the exception of NATO and a few others) havevirtually no infrastructure to support the education and

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t raining of potent ial coali t ion partners. As a resul t , eacht ime a coalit ion is formed, there is a tremendous chal lengein developing trust and confidence between coalitionmembers, and in developing efficiency and effect iveness inmil it ary operat ions.

Mil i tary leaders generally recognize the need to enhancethe level of interaction between potential coalitionmembers. Senior officer dialogues, officer exchanges,education of potent ial l iaison officers, and simi lar act ivi t ieshave been suggested as programs which would improvecoordinat ion between regional armed forces. Addi t ional ly,it would be wise for regional organizations to establish

permanent o r semi -permanent o rgan iza t ions o rinst i tut ions for information exchange and interact ion. Low-level events like platoon exchanges are not advisable asthey are of little value in enhancing the ability to conductcoalition operations.

Training, is the “center of gravity” for successfulcoali t ion operations. In order to be effect ive, coali t ion

training must be based on some form of doctr ine, must havestandards, and should be routinely assessed to ensurecompl i ance wi t h st at ed object i ves. Command PostExercises (CPXs) are the overwhelming t raining vehicle ofchoice. This is largely due to the requirement of coali t ionoperations to solve inter-armed forces integrationchallenges. Most of these challenges center on the act ions ofcommanders and planners at higher echelons. Field

Training Exercises (FTXs) which are extremely expensiveand resource intensive, do little to address the challengesthat most coalitions face.

Doct r i ne and Tr aini ng: Chal l enges and Solut i onsFor Lack of Common Doctr ine and Training . . .UN OSOM I I (1993).

Approximately 9,000 U.S. mi l i tary personnelparticipated as part of the multinational United Nationsforce of about 28,000 peace enforcement troops from 29

69



nations in the United Nations operation in Somalia(UNOSOM I I ).

UNOSOM I I fol lowed the UNOSOM mission of 1992 andthe formal deployment of U.S. military personnel to

Somalia in December of 1992 (UNITAF). The overallcommander was a Turkish general who was assisted by aU.S. deput y. This coali t ion, in some measur e, faced everychallenge ment ioned in this chapter .

The planning and conduct of combined operations wasadversely affected by the organization of UNOSOMheadquarters and the differences in training and doctrine

among na t i ona l con t i ngen t s. The U N OSOM I Iheadquarters was staffed in accordance wi th t he t radit ionalUN model of determining staff positions based on nationalcontributions rather than with an eye toward optimizingstaff per formance. The staff was composed of more thantwenty of the part icipating nations, and was assembled “onthe ground” in Mogadishu over the course of four months.On 4 May 1993, when UNOSOM assumed control of

operations in Somalia, less than 25 percent of t he staff hadarr ived in theater .

To ameliorate the problems of planning in a multi-national headquarters, the United States placed its staffoff icers in many key posit ions. To avoid the impression ofU.S. dominat ion, staff sect ion heads were provided by othermajor part icipants, but the deput ies were U.S. officers. TheU3 plans cel l was dominated by U.S. officers. As a resul t ,UNOSOM II was able to follow U.S. procedures in thecommand estimate process to great effect. While there wasconcern about causing fr ict ion wi thin the staff or wi thin thecoalition because of the appearance of the United Statesdominating the UNOSOM staff, any adverse impact waseventual ly overcome. Despite all of this, the conduct ofplanning and execut ion remained at an unacceptable levelbecause it did not solve the problem of effectivelycommunicating orders to subordinate headquarters.

Although contingents from NATO nations brought ahigh level of staff t raining and compatible procedures, and

70



the off icers of many nations proved to be highlyprofessional, the significant disparity in training anddoctrine among other participants made the planningprocess slower and more complicated than the situationrequired. Fi rst , planners had to determine what var iouscontingents were capable of doing before assigningmi ssi ons. Second, negot i at i ons were conducted t odetermine what various contingents were wil l ing to dobased on guidance from t heir nat ional capitals or the viewsof the cont ingent commanders.

Each nat ion providing mili tary forces to Somalia underthe UN Charter placed certain restrictions on their forces

(to include the Uni ted States). These rest r ict ions, combinedwith differ ing views on basic mi li tary doct r ine requir ed theUNOSOM II staff to consult extensively with nationalcontingents in an effort to build consensus for a proposedmil i tary act ion, a task that many mil i tary staff officers werenot accustomed to performing. Whi le such effor ts slowedthe planning process, fai lur e to do so produced orders thatresul ted in l i t t le act ion being accomplished.

To compl icate matters fur ther , many coali t ion forces didnot recognize or accept the concept of “implied” tasks in anorder, thus requir ing UNOSOM I I planners to “specify” al ltasks in orders to subordinate uni ts. This was not ini t iallywell-understood by U.S. officers on the UNOSOM II staff,and they prepared operational orders in the style andformat used by the U.S. Army. Over t ime, orders became

much more detailed and specific.Al though English was the official l anguage of UNOSOM

I I , language barr iers within t he UNOSOM I I staff as well asbetween UNOSOM II HQ and national contingents madeplanning and execut ion of combined operations much moredifficul t . U.S. doctr inal t erms were not universall y acceptedor even understood, and when combined with basiclanguage problems, made translation of the commander’sintent a difficul t challenge. Language barr iers, combinedwi th a heavy rel iance on interpreters and li aison officers topass command information, resul ted in cr i t ical informat ionbeing fi l tered and port ions invar iably lost . To overcome this

71



problem, U.S. staff officers had to limit their reliance onU.S. doctrinal terms and make extensive use of the“briefback” process, in which contingent commandersbriefed their understanding of the orders back to theUNOSOM I I staff.

Though there is no substitute for clear commander-to-commander communication in a combat operation, theprovision of high quality liaison officers from nationalcont ingents to the UNOSOM I I staff was very important tothe success of combined operations during both theplanning process and subsequent execut ion. Fortunately,nations uniformly provided talented officers with the best

avai lable Engli sh abil i t y as l iaison offi cers. Dur ingcombined combat operations controlled by UNOSOMheadquarters, they were present in the Joint OperationsCenter and were an invaluable asset in promoting clearunderstanding of orders and uni ts requirements.

A Fin al Word . The international system of today and

the foreseeable fut ure is character ized by t he preeminenceof the United States. Despite its strength and militarycapab i l i t ies , the Un i ted Sta tes has repeated lydemonstrated its desire to defer to regional organizat ions tosolve regional problems. When it senses i ts involvement isrequired, the United States, as a matter of policy, willnormal ly seek the assistance of other countr ies. Most of t hecountries and regional organizations of the world havearr ived at t he same conclusion regarding the importance ofregional coali t ions. The Organization for Afr ican Uni ty(OAU) has brokered sub-regional coalition responses toconfl icts throughout the cont inent . I ts interact ions wi th themembers of the Economic Community of West AfricanStates(ECOWAS) led to deployments of armed forces inLiberia, Rwanda, and elsewhere. Even the newlyreorganized Republic of South Africa has adopted policieswhich embrace the notion of forming regional militaryorganizations to assist in solving regional and extra-regional conflicts.

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This penchant for regional solut ions and coali t ions isalso present in South Amer ica, where Rio Protocol countr iesorganized a force to respond to the 1995 Peru-Ecuadorborder dispute. Likewise in Asia, ASEAN, the Association ofSoutheastern Asian Nations now-routine discussions ofregional mi l i tary interact ions provide addit ional examples.

However, articulating a common objective, achievingunity of effort, and directing and coordinating all forcestoward the common object ive, is very difficul t . Historyprovides examples of possible solut ions, but each operat ionand coali t ion is different . As a resul t , achieving unity ofeffort overarches each coali t ion's conduct of operations.

The chal lenges posed by di fferences in nat ional cul turesand histories, command and control procedures, logisticalconcepts, technological capabil i t ies, force composit ions andorganizations, and doctrine and training all relate to oneanother i n coali t ion operations. Some factors cannot bechanged—they are inherent to multinational coalitions.But doctrine and training can be developed and modified,

and hold the most promise to improve the efficiency andeffect iveness of coali t ion operat ions. Publ icat ion of regionalcoali t ion doctr ine considerations, common t erminology, andinstitutionalized training and exchange for coalitionoperations would be significant steps to improve suchoperations. Implementation of these steps would enhancethe chance for successful missions, and would mostassuredly save lives.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1996 USAREUR Wor k shop on

“Prob lems and So lu t ions in Fu ture Coa l i t ion

Operations”L ist of Par t i cipants

73



Lieutenant Colonel Jean d'Andurain

French Mil i tary M ission to Al l ied Land Forces Cent ralEurope

Lieutenant General Anyu Anguelov

Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the BulgarianArmed Forces

Colonel Mohamadine Bahamou

Liaison Offi cer of Morocco to SHAPE

Captain Craig I . Bell

International Programs Manager

International Operations Division

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

HQ, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army

Major General David L . Benton

Chief of Staff


Linda Blodget t

Act ing Deputy, Poli t ical Mil i tary Branch



Admiral Claude Borgis

74



Director

Operations Planning Division

Joint Staff, France

Colonel Stephen Bowman Di rector

U.S. Army Mil it ary History Inst it ute

U.S. Army War CollegeCar l isle Barracks, PA

Mr. James Boyle

Office of t he Chief of Public Affairs


Colonel George Brock

Director General, Joint Operations and Plans GeneralHeadquarters, Burma Camp, Ghana

Major General Adem Copani

Defense Advisor to the President of Albania

Colonel William David Crosson

Chief, Civi l Affairs Operational Planning Team (CINCSupport)

Colonel Er ich Dall inger

75



Liaison Officer to the Partnership Coordinat ion Cell

PCC SHAPE

Brigadier General Constantin Degeratu

Deputy Chief

Operations Directorate of the General Staff

Minist ry of National Defense, Romania

Colonel Cheick Diarra

Cheif, Malian Group of Observes in Rwanda

Minist ry of Defense, Mali

Major General Peter Dobo

Deputy Chief of Mater ial-Technical Main Directorate

Hungar ian H ome Defense Forces

Colonel John P. Dr inkwater

Chief




Dr. Mart in Falk

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Science Advisor to the Commander in Chief


Colonel M baye Faye

Deputy Chief of Joint Staff for Operations

Senegalese Army

Colonel Roger Ferrando

Operations Planning DivisionJoint Staff, France

Colonel (Ret .) Wil l iam G. Foster , Consul tant

L ieutenant Colonel Peter FrancesconPlans Di rectorate (J-5)

HQ, U.S. European Command

Major Ray Gamble

International Relations Specialist

Office of the Political Advisor


77



Lieutenant General Robert E. Gray

Deputy Commander in Chief


Major General Gunther Greindl Di rector General,International Policies

Minist ry of Defense, Austr ia

Lieutenant Colonel Russell B. Hall

Deputy Director of Training

7th U.S. Army Training Command

Dr . Kenneth Hamburger

Adjunct Professor

St. Thomas Aquinas College

Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Hamilton

Chief, Plans Branch

Plans, Operations and Systems Division

Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff fo Logistics


Robert D. Kaplan

Contr ibuting Editor of t he At lanti c Monthly

Colonel Vladimir Karaffa

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Deputy Chief

Defense Study Institute of the Armed Forces of theCzech Republic

Lieutenant General Richard F. Keller

Chief of Staff

HQ, Uni ted States European Command

Lieutenant Colonel Peter Kertesz

Deputy Head of Operational

Department

General Staff Operational Directorate

Hungar ian Home Defense Forces

Jon A. Kessmeier

Analyst

Strategic & Arms Cont rol Policy Division

Science Applications Internat ional Corporation

Br igadier Ivan Koreta

Commander 1st Division

Uganda People's Defense Forces

Br igadier General Stanislaw Koziej

Di rector , Defense System Department

Minist ry of Defense, Poland

79



Bruce Laferr iere, Commander

1st Transportat ion Movement Control Agency,Germany

Vice Admi ral (Ret .) John B. LaPlante, Consultant

Br igadier Jacobus A. L aubscher

Commander, 7th South African Division

Colonel Jay E. Lawson

Chief, European Division, Plans & Policy Directorate

(J-5)

HQ, US European Command

Colonel Daniel H. Layton

Office of International Security and PeacekeepingOperations

Bureau of Poli t ico-Mi l i tary Affairs

U.S. Depart ment of State

Colonel Vell o Loemaa

Chief of Staff of the General Staff of the EstonianDefense Forces

Zurab Lomashvi l i , Ph.D.

Deputy Director

Department of International Organizations

Minist ry of Foreign Affair s, Georgia

80



Colonel Isaac Longwe

Director of Mil i tary Operations

Headquarters Malawi Army

Major Ross Lozon

International Program Manager


Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for OperationsHQ, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army

Thomas J. Marshall

Assistant Vice President and Manager

Strategic & Arms Cont rol Policy DivisionScience Applications Internat ional Corporation

Lieutenant Colonel Thulaganyo Masisi

Bat talion Commander

Botswana Defense Force

John W. McDonald

Assistant Vice President and

Division Manager


Dr . Steven Metz

81



Henry L . St imson Professor of M il i tary Studies

Strategic Studies Inst i tute

U.S. Army War College

Car l isle, PA

Colonel Mahmoud Mezoughi

Commander, 2nd Mechanized Br igade

Minist ry of Defense of t he Republi c of Tunisia

Rachel T. MokelkePolitical-Military Advisor




Helmut Muhl

German Liasion Officer




Br igadier Elton Mwaketa

Director of Operations

Zimbabwe National Army

Mr. Er ic D. Newsom

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political-Mi lit ary Affair s

82



U.S. Depart ment of State

Ing. Jaromir Novotny

Chief of Foreign Affairs Directorate

Minist ry of Defense, Czech Republic

Captain Michael Pene

Delegation aux Affair es Strategiques

Ministere De La Defense, France

Major General Daniel Petrosky

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations


Car la L. Post

Coordinator , Conference Services


Colonel Valer iy S. Prokudin

Deputy Chief

Chief of Staff of the Operations Group of the RussianArmed Forces General Staff at SHAPE

Paul N. Quintal

Deputy Chief I nternational Operations Division



83



Dr . Ronald L . Rasch

International Relations Specialist

HQ, U.S. Army, Europe and Seventh Army CommandGroup

Br igadier General Richard Retout

Chief, French Military Mission to Allied Land ForcesCentral Europe

Colonel Sebastian John Roberts

Di rectorate General of Development & Doctr ine

Minist ry of Defense,

United K ingdom

Lieutenant Colonel Henry Scharpenberg

Cont ingency Plans Branch

Operation DirectorateHQ, U.S. European Command

Joel Selzer

Executive Assistant to the Commander

1st Transportat ion Movement Control Agency,Germany

Colonel General Leonity Shevtsov

84



Deputy IFOR Commander for Russian Forces

IFOR Coordinat ion Center (ICC)

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

Major James Shumway

Chief, Engineer Operations

Office of t he Deputy Chief of Staff for Engineering

Topography Office


Major General Ihor P. Smeshko

State Expert, Director of Strategic Planning andAnalysis

National Security Council of Ukraine

Colonel Michael Smith, Di rector

Joint Doctr ine Directorate (ATDO-J)

HQ, U.S. Army Tr aining and Doctr ine Command

Lieutenant Colonel Sergei Stepanov

IFOR Coordinat ion Center (ICC)

Supreme Headquarters Al l ies Powers Europe

Thomas W. Sweeney

Professor of Strategic Logistics

Center for St rategic Leadership


85





Plans Division



Kar in Wolf lova, Interpreter

Minist ry of Defense of the Slovak Republic

Dr . Thomas-Durel l Young

Research ProfessorNational Secur ity Studies

Strategic Studies Inst i tute


Car l isle, PA

Colonel Walter L. Zink

Federal Armed Forces Office for Studies & Exercises,Germany

CONTRIBUTOR

THOMAS J. MARSHALL is Assistant Vice Presidentand Manager of the Strategic and Arms Control PolicyDepartment at Science Applications InternationalCorporat ion (SAI C). Mr . Marshal l has an extensivebackground in national security planning with particularemphasis on strategic policy, European security, and all

87



aspects of arms cont rol t reaties. Prior t o his ret irementfrom the U.S. Army in 1983, Mr. Marshall served as thesenior mi l i tary advisor to the INF delegation. Recent ly, Mr .Marshall has been active in supporting Partnership forPeace Programs with U.S. Army Europe and researchingconcepts on democratization, as well as managing adeveloping national secur ity program at SAI C.

JON KESSMEIER is Principal Investigator in theRegional Security Division at Science ApplicationsInternational Corporation. Mr. Kessmeier’s background is

in European security and arms control. He has conductednumerous studies and analyses for the U.S. Army, Europe,the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the StateDepartment.

STEPHEN L. BOWMAN served as Director of theUni ted States Army Mi li tary History Inst it ute at the U.S.

Army War College. Colonel Bowman's recent assignmentsinclude Deputy Br igade Commander of t he Ber l in Br igade,a separate infantry brigade in Ber l in, Germany (1990), andDirector of War Studies, on t he facul ty of t he U.S. Army WarCollege (1992).

M ICHAEL SMITH i s D i rec to r , Jo i n t Doc t r i ne

Directorate, Headquarters, U.S. Army Training andDoctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia. Colonel Smithis responsible for developing Joint Doctr ine on behalf of theDepartment of the Army and the Joint Staff. He is a L ightInfantry officer whose past assignments have included:Associate Professor, U.S. Mil i tary Academy; Chief, G3Exercises; Infant ry Bat talion S3 and Infant ry Br igade S3;Commander, 5-21 Infantry Battal ion (Light ); Chief, Future

Infantry Concepts, Dismounted Batt lespace Bat t lelab.

88



THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG is Research Professor ofNational Security Affairs with the Strategic StudiesInsti tute at t he U.S. Army War College. From 1992 to 1995Dr. Young held the U.S. Army War College's Henry L.Stimson Chair of Military Studies. During 1994-95 he wasExecut ive Commi t tee Chairman, CR-CAST Working Groupon Command Requirements of a Multinational ForceCommander. From 1988 to 1992, he was a National Secur ityAffair s Analyst in the Strategic Studies Inst i tute. Pr ior tothat he was a country risk analyst, consultant, and staffmember in the U.S. Congress.

STEVEN METZ is the Henry L. Stimson Professor ofMil itary Studies at the U.S. Army War College. Dr . Metzhas been with theStrategic Studies Institute since 1993.Prior to that, he was Associate Professor of Low IntensityConfl ict and Third Wor ld Studies at the Air War College andProfessor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College. He has also served as

an advisor to U.S. political organizations and campaigns,and has test i fied in the U.S. Senate. Dr . Metz's cur rentresearch deals wi th Afr ican secur ity affair s and the fut uresecurity environment.

U.S. ARM Y WAR COL L EGE

M ajor Gener al Rober t H . Scales, J r .

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUD I ES I NSTI TUT E

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Director

Colonel Ri char d H . Wi t her spoon

Di r ector of Resear ch

Dr . Ear l H . T i l for d , J r .

Ed i to r

M r . Th omas J . M ar shal l

Di r ector of Publ i cat i ons and Pr oduct i on

M s. M ar i anne P. Cow li ng

Publ i cat i ons Assi st antM s. Ri t a A. Rummel

*****

Composit ion

Documents

Problems and Solutions In Future Coalition Operations Pub315