Bemoans the fact that there is no seljuq historyDoesnt proceed to write oneWants to uncover the ideology of Seljuq powerHis story: making his ideology un-invisibleAlthusser & Foucault1. Deconstructing the Great Saljuq Mytha. Some background history (even here legitimization is already at work)i. Descend from the Oghuz, a Turkic tribal confederation who migrated to the Iranian plateau in the 10th century.1. Reason for coming not clear: court dispute, pastural lands. Some depict it as hijra.ii. Superficially Islamic, uncivilized contrasted with the Muslim, refined Persians. 1. Depicted as nomadic, customary raiding into Islamic lands, and fierce temperament.2. Picture is somewhat complicated after all, they were astute rulers and knew how to deal with the notables when they came to power. a. But then he does present the viziers, particularly Nizam al-Mulk and Kunduri, as mediating between them and the caliph, them and the scholars, etc. iii. Origins: descendants of kings (later projections), Safi: most likely of humble originsiv. Ancestor Tuqaq: said to have spared Muslim lives1. Seljuqs said to have come to the aid of Muslims simple skirmish turns into ghazw. v. Seljuq: converted his people to Islam; depicted as eager converts. 1. Bar Hebraeus: Seljuq had a politically expedient reason to convert, so as to blend in to the conquered peoples. b. Engaged in inter-Turkic warfare, they end up coming out on top.c. Unlike Abbasids, cant claim genealogical legitimacyd. The Seljuqs made use of five modes of legitimization in historical narratives (not clear how, since he doesnt explicitly claim that the Seljuqs solicited the narratives)i. Obedient to Sunni Islamic principlesii. Loyal to the Abbasid Caliphs1. Tughril is the right hand of the Commander of the Faithful2. Early Ghaznavid source presents Seljuqs as clients of the Abbasids and dedicated to putting down corruptiona. Indication that the Seljuqs themselves were involved in the dissemination of ideology3. Bar Hebraeus preserves letter from the Abbasid caliph to the Seljuqs ordering them to desist their acts of pillage and murdera. Safi dismisses Tughrils claim that he cant control his tribesmen4. Seljuq response replete with claims to loyalty to Abbasids, to holding onto Islamic principles, and so on. 5. Upon entering Baghdad, Bar Hebraeus records further massacres by Turghil against the Iraqi Turks and the Daylamis. 6. Interestingly, numismatics seems to confirm this notion7. I killed my brother for him sounds like loyalty to me8. Marriage relationshipsiii. Promoted social order; protected Muslim lives & property1. Early sources depict the Seljuqs as having a devastating impact on the cities. Tughril himself is implicated in the plunder and murder in Rayy.a. Written by a source under Seljuq patronage!i. Part of a cover up: other pro-Seljuq sources are silent about this2. Close connection between orthodox religion and social order3. Qazwini: Unlike others, they were of pure doctrine and thus they witnessed no rebellions.a. Not history since even Nizam al-Mulk bemoans heretical insurrections but legitimizing Seljuq ruleiv. Patronized orthodox religious scholarship1. Rawandi: The base reason for why Seljuq rule is successful is baraka gained from building mosques, madrasas, khanaqahs, water-stations for pilgrims, hospices, and so forth. As well as patronizing religious scholarship. v. Put down heretics. 2. Nizam al-Mulka. Glue between sultans and caliphs, intellectuals, soldiersb. Helped systematize and order the realmc. He didnt create the institutions, but he did string them in such a way for the optimal benefit of the regime2. viziers were an important institution, they were the glue between sultans and caliphs, intellectuals and soldiers, Sufis and jurists; Nizam al-Mulk was a unique

kind of vizier, he helped systematize and order the realm, he went above and beyond, he was the sultanate; Safi says that he didn't create the institutions such as

iqta', surveillance, madrasa and khaniqah, but he did 'string' them together to the optimal benefit of the regime; He is Abu Ali Hasan b. Ali b. Ishaq al-Tusi, of

landowner background; spent his youth studying Qur'an, hadith and Shafi'i fiqh; he thinks this might be an attempt by Shafi'i hagiographic sources to bolster the link

of Shafi'is to Qur'an and hadith, which would be reflected in the fact that a politician would show interest in these two sources because of his Shafi'i background.

Enjoyed the company of Sufis (Sufism not a marginalized phenomenon that was the mainstay of illiterate masses). Learned Arabic and Persian, accounting, administrative

skills; needs to compose court documents elegantly; His siyasatnama is a literary masterpiece; he was raised in the Ghaznavid divan, and picked up administration from

them. Nizam al-Mulk leaves the Ghaznavids, and embraces a relationship with the Seljuqs, he is responsible for establishing their rule. Amid al-Mulk Kunduri, a rivalry

develops; Mediated between caliphs, intellectuals, administrators. Vizierate as a necessary institution. Alp Arslan takes over from Turghil, and he replaces Kunduri

(who might have threatened Arslan's rule; oldness and ties to brother). Kunduri was hanafi muta'assib, cursed Shi'a and Ash'aris; some contradictions about Juwayni;

his attacks on Ash'arism a result of politics rather than theology; Nizam al-Mulk, too, was depicted as muta'assib, but then again as realpolitik, since the Turks were

largely Hanafi. Nizam al-Mulk aimed at balance where Kunduri aimed for conflict. Kunduri 'strongarms' the caliphs; Nizam al-Mulk 'radi amir al-mu'mineen.' Nizam al-

Mulk not favor of the abbasids: practical concerns, they need the latters' legitimacy. Nizam al-Mulk had Kunduri die a gruesome death (including castration), and is

warned that he is initiating a bad sunna (what happened to legitimization?) First order of business: cement relationship with Abbasid caliphs (particularly through

marriage). Trusted by Alp, and even had many administrative responsibilities handed over to him. Man of the sword as well. Brought the Shafi'is back. He had to take on challenges to the vizierate from many, including his son-in-law Abu al-Mahasin. It appears, however, that a wife of Malik Shah, Tarkan Khatun, was the cause of his downfall. When Nizam al-Mulk suggested that her son was not fit to succeed his father, she waged war (through Taj al-Mulk) against Nizam. This actually explains his counsel not to follow the counsel of women, and that women can only bring about the kings downfall its not a timeless attack on women, but a thinly veiled attack on a particular woman. Why was he killed? Not by Ismailis or by Hassan al-Sabbah, but perhaps by Malik Shah himself there had been an estrangement, and Malik even suggested that the Abbasids move to Damascus or Hijaz so as to be further distanced from the center of power. Nizam al-Mulk opposed this move, and paid for it with his life. He then cites Subkis account of Malik Shah having Nizam killed (but what about the carefully constructed image!) Malik Shah, however, was killed shortly afterwards (perhaps by the caliph), Tarkan tried to get her son recognition as sultan, but to no avail and Taj al-Mulk was killed by military servants loyal to Nizam al-Mulk.

3. Foucault wrote much about the nexus between power and knowledge production, and how the ruling elite constructs a paradigmatic notion of what 'normal' is and

enforces it through both repressive and coercive means. True, he's writing about the modern period, but Safi feels this model is also valid for how Seljuqs did things;

in his writings, Nizam al-Mulk spoke of surveilling two groups of people, rebels and political and intellectual elite. Used the barid system to track movements on

highways and Sufis and beggars who were able to move around more freely than other goups; need to know everything, spy on tax collectors, viziers; stability depends on

it; if he doesn't, the people will attribute fasad to the king; particularly judges; Charles Tilly: statecraft is analogous to organized crime; can't claim it was

effective, the barid didn't produce good information, rebellions were usually crushed after they had appeared. IQTA': Different from feudalism: not hereditary, no lord

and vassal relationship. 'Land grant' seems more appropriate. Nizam al-Mulk didn't invent it, but did restructure it so that it functioned more efficiently. Merged

military and administrative iqta's. A way of paying skilled military soldiers, servants were not entitled. A beneficiary of it himself. Move the grantees around so

they don't build up power. Also, intended to limit the excesses of the grantees against peasants. Settling nomadic Turks, avoid their disgruntlement. Nizam al-Mulk

suggested using secret agents to monitor grantee activity, linking it to surveillance system. MADRASA: Meisami disputes the notion that the Seljuqs established all of

the madrasas attributed to them, he takes this as evidence of legitimizing narrative; Nizam al-Mulk central here, Baghdadi Nizamiya, he even taught there. one in

Nishapur as well. Not the first to invent madrasas (though this misunderstanding was alive even in Subki's time), but perhaps the first to assign stipends to

students.Did not like inter-madhhab strife, and sought to restore Shafi'i presence (after a long bout of pro-Hanafi, anti-Shafi'i patronage) while standing in the way

of Shafi'i attempts to threaten other madhhabs. WHAT DO MADRASAS DO? Counter Isma'ili propaganda, disseminate 'orthodox' Islam (fiqh, not theology), administrative

issues. KHANAQAH: fluid boundaries between it and madrasa. Ulama could be Sufis and vice versa. Ghazali. Motif of beginning in madrasa and ending up in khanaqah later

in life. Ghaznavids are said to be huge on spies, but the Seljuqs are not. CONTESTED: Spies weren't liked, iqta's were deemed ghasb (people afraid to offer prayers),

4. Ghazali, born in Tus in 450, student of Juwayni, he was invited to the presence of Nizam al-Mulk, and Ghazali was a loyal Seljuq agent ever since. (When/where?)

Ghazali was challenging different trends (Sufis, jurists, theologians, philosophers, Isma'ilis). Nizam al-Mulk is Ghazali's patron. Nizam al-mUlk and Ghazali

liked/disliked the same people. Fada'ih al-batiniya, Tahafut al-falasifa, Nizamiya madrasa, Ghazali went to work upholding the Seljuq-sponsored interpretation of

Islam. Following the assassination of his patron in 487, he gave up his position in 488. Skeptical of the 'spiritual path' story told in Munqidh, and thus some have

suggested that the reason Ghazali left was to escape an unlikeable sultan or the Isma'ilis. A madrasa is a watchtower (see: Surveillance system). That's why Ghazali

needed to fake his move to Jerusalem. He made a thing to avoid munazaras and meeting sultans (might be because he wanted to avoid prestige and power!). He says that he

refused to travel back to Baghdad because of his family and mentoring responsibilities. Safi suspects a strong surveillance network. agrees to teach in Nishapur (!!).

Wants to study Ghazali's political writings. No focusing on one text, doesn't see consistency in his different writings. Fada'ih: written for al-Mustazhir around 488.

A refutation of Isma'ilism, which concludes with a statement that the true Imam is al-Mustazhir. Seljuqs holders of power, and Ghazali acknowledges that display of raw

power is needed. Whereas Seljuqs are praised for their loyalty to the caliphs, they aren't a 'thing' in their own right yet. Iqtisad: Theological tract written in 488.

Ghazali freely uses 'imam' and 'sultan' interchangeably, signaling that Ghazali is hedging his bets. Ihya': masterpiece, composed between 489 and 495. Brings up the

tyrannical but powerful sultan: public good demands that we obey him. Implicitly says that Seljuq sultans are unjust (?!) Here, for the first time, a clear distinction

between caliphate and sultanate, the people of shawka are obedient to caliph, and the latter possesses judgment. Seljuqs: bute force, Abbasids: legitimizing. Nasihat al-Muluk: said to be written between 499 and 503, perhaps one of his last works. Authenticity is disputed. Safi prefers to see it as authentic - but his argument does ride on its authenticity. Legitimation of Seljuq rule switches from 'service to the imamate' to 'dispensing justice.' Justice is closely tied with orthodoxy and close ties with the scholarly class. In the second part (authenticity disputed), Ghazali says that the sultan must not only be upright in doctrine himself, but actively suppress heresy in the midst of his realm. The sultans become the center of religious authority here, being the 'shadow of God on earth.' As for the brute force, it is now justified as well: people are undisciplined, and the sultans need to retain this force in order to keep them in line. 'The whip of 'Umar would have been sufficient to keep the world safe.' TUHFAT AL_MULUK: Debate about authenticity. Incorporates material from first part of Nasiha, so Safi deems it likely to be authentic. The sultan-i adl with his pak doctrines carries over. What effect does it have on people as a whole? Written for the elite. But just because its for elite doesnt mean its not of importance. True, but then how is this a legitimizing tactic?

5. Studies on Sufi personalities don't pay sufficient attention to their social dealings with the institutions and personalities of their social landscape; question

asked here is: how is the authority and charisma of the saints appropriated to legitimize Seljuq authority? Real saint is one who 'mixes with people.' Depiction of

Sufis today (as private mystics) is inconsistent with their historical experience and is likely based on the modern, Protestant view of what 'piety' and 'mysticism'

should look like. Firasa: they predict a politician's success before it actually happens. Second, giving baraka to established politicians for continued success;

politicians devotion to the saint and his followers. Power derived from sanctity, walaya (with God) and wilaya (with people). Who cares about fact or lack thereof?

These stories are true to a certain community, so we can get a sense of the meaning these narratives had for them. This makes the fantastic character of the stories

irrelevant. Baba Tahir `aryan: We dont know much about time. We're not even sure when he lived, which means he's elusive (or a fairy tale). Skilled poet. 'Thus I have

handed you dominion of the world. Stand for justice.' Prefers to see mediation rather than subjugation. Just as quickly as he appears, he disappears. [seems to confirm

the marginality of Sufis?] Mountain (on high), called khidr (ladunni knowledge), other saints serve as witnesses. Vizier is on the side of Turghil, indicating he

mediated the exchange. His giving him a ring signals a physical 'proof' of the exchange. Seal of Kingship [but perhaps the Sufis were trying to ride the people's love of the Seljuqs, not the other way around?] Abu Sa'id Abu al-Khayr: hagiography written in trying times, touches on all the themes alluded to, seems to be trying to 'reshape behavior.' "I have given you dominion over Khurasan...over Iraq." They treat HIM as a king. (Chaghri and Turghil) In turn, notable must show gratitude and support khanaqahs. "I need you" the hagiographies are just that: hagiographies OF shaykhs, not a tribute to Nizam al-Mulk. 'Whatever I have attained is because of Shaykh Abu al-Khayr" 'Dust under their feet' 'All his earthly successes are due to him.'

Conclusion: 'politics of representation and depiction,' not history strictly speaking. Questions at 201.Disclaimers: Prof. Safi is the sweetest human being on Earth. Its easy to tear down an argument, not easy to construct one. That he took 15 years doing so is not something I take lightly. Im ordinarily sympathetic to the narrative advanced here Im not saying hes wrong: I dont know enough about Saljuq history. Im saying that the evidence he proffers appears to allow for alternative explanations that seem consistent with his findings. Im not adopting any of these explanations as my own. Like a judge. Criticisms:1) Safi admits that the narratives that he adduces are found in later sources that are engaged in pious mythmaking. If later, it isnt clear why these narratives need to be seen as legitimizing if later than the events in question, its not clear why it needs to be legitimized. Perhaps: (1) parable and discourse on proper behavior; (2) An attempt to explain why things are bad now; (3) Advice to the new rulers. In fact, Safi alerts us to fragments of earlier sources that are found in the later sources that are inconsistent with the image that the Seljuqs would have wanted to build for themselves this indicates that the Seljuqs are not commissioning these works. 2) Safi appears to be too willing to believe the claims of pillage and massacre, while contrary reports as ideology. Might the groups killed have been Qarmati loyalists? That later sources tend to pass over these events in silence assuming they are true - might be later historians idealizing the past, not necessarily a function of state-sponsored ideology. 3) How is the relationship of the Seljuqs to the Abbasids any different from that of any military contingent and a caliph? As it were, a caliph would rely on the loyalty and obedience of a military corps he cant, as it were, force them to do anything if they happen to rebel against him except to pitch them against another military corps that is more loyal (is an analogy between this scenario and that of the Marwanids and Hajjaj in order?)4) It is sometimes not clear whether he is in fact simply doing a study of the politics of representation, or writing a history of the Seljuqs5) Whatever happened to the limits of religious inquiryA professor is calling Saljuq chronicles dullAs much as we want to be