DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

NAME OF STUDENT: - RAHUL KUMAR DUBEY

ROLL NO. : - 2014087

SEMESTER: - 2ND

SUBJECT: - SOCIOLOGY

TITLE OF THE PROJECT: - POWER AND AUTHORITY

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: - The researcher will have a doctrinal approach towards the

Project. Information for the Project will be collected from Books, Journals and Internet.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This Project couldn’t have been successfully completed without the support and guidance of

our Sociology Professor, M. Lakshmipati Raju Sir and we would like to express our immense

gratitude to him for his constant support and motivation that has encouraged us to come up

with this project.

Lastly, we would like to thank our classmates for their whole hearted support at all times

during the course of the Project.

Thanking You

Rahul Kr. Dubey

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CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………..4

2. WHAT IS

POWER?.......................................................................................................5

A. THE EMERGENCE OF POWER…………………………………………

6

B. THE DIVISION OF POWER……………………………………………..9

3. WHAT IS AUTHORITY…...…………………………………………………………9

A. POLITICAL AUTHORITY……...………………………………………11

4. THE DEMOCRATIC CONCEPTION OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY………..….15

5. THE RELATIONSHIP AND DISTINCTION BETWEEN POWER AND

AUTHORITY…………………...................................................................................2

0

6. WEBER’S ANALYSIS OF AUTHORITY…………………………………………22

7. THE CONSENT THEORY OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY.....................................23

8. THE ELITE THEORY………………………………………………………………24

9. CONCLUSION............................................................................................................24

10. BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................................25

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INTRODUCTION

Power and authority are closely related but conceptually distinct constructs. Weber noted that

the exercise of power is legitimated through authority. Authority is derived from real or

implied perceptions of the leader’s position in the organization or from the leader’s

knowledge and expertise. Heifetz defined authority as “power granted for a purpose.” As

particular beliefs, perceptions and positions become accepted within a group or organization,

those within that group are united in a common perspective and come to expect and value

certain patterns of influence. Authority may be either formal or informal. Formal authority is

derived from a recognized organizational structure with delineated lines of responsibility and

influence. Informal authority may exist outside of discernible organizational role definitions.

Barnard observed that authority is granted by subordinates and noted the conditions that

increased or decreased subordinates’ compliance. The concept of power can simply be put up

as an entity's ability to control the environment around itself, including the behavior of other

entities. Yet the society we live and the multitude of things which we surround ourselves with

require constant grooming and maintenance for we live in an almost precarious balance of

social and individual see-saws. There is no need to justify the need as to why we need to

understand the fundamental concepts and multifarious dimensions of power. Followers will

comply with authority if the orders are understood, are consistent with the objectives of the

organization, are compatible with the interests of the subordinate and are within the physical

and mental capabilities of the subordinate. Under these criteria, authority may be granted to

those whose knowledge or experience equips them for leadership, even if they are not

formally designated within the organizational structure. There are some things in nature

which exist universally in every living organism that influence every act they perform and

every reaction they experience. Structure, for instance is found even in the most fundamental

units of nature and is considered to be one of the most important factors in the existence and

survival of a living being. The concept of power can simply be put up as an entity's ability to

control the environment around itself, including the behavior of other entities. Yet the society

we live and the multitude of things which we surround ourselves with require constant

grooming and maintenance for we live in an almost precarious balance of social and

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individual see-saws. There is no need to justify the need as to why we need to understand the

fundamental concepts and multifarious dimensions of power. 1

WHAT IS POWER?

The concept of power for a better understanding has been divided into three main subtopics

the factors and characteristics related to the phenomenon have been given due emphasis.

Before that however, a clarification is required that the use of power need not involve

coercion (force or the threat of force). At one extreme, it more closely resembles what

everyday English-speakers call "influence", although some authors make a distinction

between power and influence - the means by which power is used.2

There is a need to understand the various types of power through which it can be held. They

include

Delegated authority (for example in the democratic process)

Social class (material wealth can equal power)

Personal or group charisma

Ascribed power (acting on perceived or assumed abilities)

Expertise (Ability, Skills) Persuasion (direct, indirect, or subliminal)

Knowledge (granted or withheld, shared or kept secret)

Money (financial influence, control of labour, control through ownership, etc)

Fame

Force (violence, military might, coercion).

Moral persuasion (including religion)

Operation of group dynamics (such as public relations)

Social influence of tradition (compare ascribed power)

In relationships; domination/submissiveness

1 https://www.academia.edu/3482786/Authority_Power_and_Legitimacy

2 https://www.boundless.com/sociology/textbooks/boundless-sociology-textbook/government-15/politics-power-and-authority-112/authority-620-8982/

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The phenomenon that a power vacuum is always filled by a power holder is constant

throughout the history of society. The reasons are not as obvious as the fact. Two of the

reasons are as follows:

The need for order at any level of society

Peace is a social necessity. Lacking peace, individuals or larger elements in a situation will

fly apart to seek a place in some order of things where they can live, work, or enjoy

themselves without being despoiled or interrupted. Professor George Catlin stated the

proposition concisely in The Story of the Political Philosophers: "To maintain peace has been

the justifying function of coercive government, despite all its tyrannies, since the days of the

Pharaohs." The human need of peace leads to acceptance of such government at any level.

Emotional makeup of men

Instinct for power exists to some degree in every human. Often individuals will encounter

others on the same search then they must either conquer them or secure their adherence,

usually by offering hope of a share of power in the structure he proposes to create. The

process may be rational and studied. This occurs when the organizer of a party recruits

adherents from among possible rivals by promising them positions in the government he

hopes to establish.

THE EMERGENCE OF POWER

Power is brought into existence by the coalescence of three elements: men, a philosophy, and

a group capable of organization into institutions.

Birth may occur with implosive speed. Most of us have seen small organizations come into

being less sublimely, whether insignificant, as in the founding of a club or the launching of a

political movement. Review of any such experience will show the three elements always

present. A few men, including some with an instinct for power meet in agreement on a

common idea. Purpose becomes evident to attempt its realization. At the behest of the man

with the strongest instinct for power, the group organizes. The process frequently occurs on

battlefields after a military formation has been shattered and the strongest remaining

individual remakes an organization out of the survivors. The government about to be formed

had not merely to take over existing traditional institutions, but also to extend them and

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improvise new ones in vast fields of economic organization traditionally considered no

function of the federal government. President Roosevelt achieved added organization and

power structure before the Congress of the "hundred days" recessed. The substance of that

structure remains intact to this day.

Swiftly or gradually, a power structure comes into existence as men with an idea system set

up new or take over existing institutions. Normally, power is allocated through operation of

the existing institutions a president is elected, cabinet ministers appointed, key posts in

Congress or Parliament are filled. Institutional processes place individuals "in power." They

must establish their personal grip and control over the institutions they head. Until he

organizes his personal position, he is impotent. Connecting the power position with the idea

structure and with his subordinate officers and perhaps with outside allies is his first task.

When the combination is made, a power structure exists and he is able to use it.3

POWER AS A PERSONAL ATTRIBUTE

Power is invariably personal. However attained, it can be exercised only by the decision and

act of an individual. Attribution of power is often made to an institution the power of a

nation-state, of a corporation, of a church, of a bank, of a professional association, of a

newspaper, of a political party. Or power is attributed to an unorganized group to a "class" of

some kind, upper or lower, to the "proletariat," to the "intellectuals," the "press," the

"masses," the "people," the "Blacks."

Sociologists discover "elites," and speculate on their power. By taking various blocs of

statistics, they discover a relatively small group who has higher positions, greater education,

or greater wealth. These are then entitled a "class" or an "elite group." To them, power is

ascribed.

No collective category, no class, no group of any kind in and of itself wields power or can

use it. Another factor must be present: that of organization. The collective group must put

itself together, must develop formal or informal structure, and must establish stated or

unstated rules by and through which power to decide and act is assigned to someone and, as a

rule, distributed through a hierarchy of subordinates. Without this organization, whatever its

common interest or background, no collective group can or ever does act. History and

contemporary politics are littered with illustrations of unorganized groups, whose members

3 http://sociology.about.com/od/P_Index/g/Power.htm

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have had much in common, ignored or ridden over roughshod or sometimes destroyed by in-

dividuals having power derived from groups that did have organization. Lacking it, there is

no effective exercise of power, quite simply because there is no individual or hierarchy of in -

dividuals who can exercise it.

In feudal times, noble birth or military capacity, and sometimes both, were required. From

the group of men possessing the needed qualifications, power holders are usually drawn, or

made, or make themselves. It may have been the tenth century when Karl Marx wrote Das

Kapital that wealth was an essential qualification for power holding. But it is one thing to say

that and quite another to suggest that a group or class having certain attributes exercised

power. More often than not, though their members have parallel or similar attitudes or

interests, they are fiercely competitive, fight among each other, are unable to organize and

unwilling to designate power holders. Rulers may predominately be drawn from classes.

Classes do not rule. Power holders may be drawn from elites. Elites do not exercise power.

Elites and classes may have influence. This is an entirely different affair. The sentiments or

opinions of a particular category of people may and often do affect the decisions and actions

of the men who have power. Their conceptions, their value judgments, their desires, their

emotions about the world in which they would like to live may be and often are extremely

persuasive. But they can be blocked by a simple decision of the power holder not to act along

these lines to do nothing, or to do something different. The group, whatever it is, if seriously

offended, may be stimulated to organize and oppose to become a power structure.

Consequently, views that may represent its body of sentiment are taken into account. But this

is far removed from power to decide and cause others to concur.

THE EFFECTS OF POWER ON PERSONALITY

The personal quality of power introduces an element baffling scientific analysis. The power

process itself follows definite laws. But since power is made effective through individuals,

the personality of the power holder is always a factor and the content of personality is a vast

unknown.

Power holding is itself an emotional experience. The greater the power, greater the impact

made. One of the first impacts is realization that the obligation of power takes precedence

over other obligations formerly held nearest and dearest. The effect of power on its holder is

unpredictable. Men who have ascended to power gradually, or have been vaccinated by

previous experience, are in a safer position than those suddenly thrust into it. Power

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forcefully introduces itself into personal development. Yet the rules of power are the same in

all cases, as is the fact that it affects the personality and that its impact on the power holder

can rarely be foretold.

A man in power can cause events to happen at short range. He commonly does so to execute

a longer-range plan, aiming to bring about a series of events leading to a result he has in

mind. Short-range events do occur as directed. The long-range result may be entirely

different. This led Tolstoy to the conclusion that while historical forces do not control

immediate events, they implacably dictate results quite apart from the power holder's will.

Intelligent power holders learn this almost at once. Failure to do so would, and frequently

does, lead them to live in a world of illusion, in which realities ultimately impose themselves,

often in a manner quite contrary to the conception of the power holder.

THE DIVISION OF POWER

Charles de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu claimed that without following a principle of

containing and balancing legislative, executive and judiciary powers, there is no freedom and

no protection against abuse of power. Separation of power must be in such grade, that any of

the branches can operate without excessive limitations from the others; but interdependency

between them must also be in such grade, that one single branch cannot rule out the other's

decisions. This is the separation of powers principle.

A similar concept, termed "division of power", also consists of differentiated legislative,

executive, and judicial powers. However, while separation of powers prohibits one branch

from interfering with another, division of power permits such interference. For example, in

Indonesia, the President (who wields executive power) can introduce a new bill, but the

People's Consultative Assembly (holding legislative power) chooses to either legalize or

reject the bill.4

AUTHORITY

WHAT IS AUTHORITY?

4 http://sociologytwynham.com/2013/06/04/webers-definition-of-power/

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There are some things in nature which exist universally in every living organism that

influence every act they perform and every reaction they experience. Structure, for instance is

found even in the most fundamental units of nature and is considered to be one of the most

important factors in the existence and survival of a living being.

Man, through his evolution has remained the most intelligent living being and he has built

complex mechanisms around himself to help himself exist and progress ahead. The

formulation of a mechanism to possess the ability to influence and control other men forms

the central pillar of politics and the phenomenon of power and authority. Authority can thus

briefly be defined as the act or the ability to influence someone with power or position. It is

important to observe in the context of the definition that the show of power and authority is a

seminal and significant occurrence and every organism with some kind of structured

organization shows traits of authority and dominance, The Human being and the modern man

in particular has built a whole institution on the concepts of power and authority on which he

subsists.

The show of authority has a history which is as deep rooted as man and his society itself and

this is observed by the social thinker Bertrand de Jouvenel who says in his work “The

phenomenon called authority is at once more ancient and more fundamental than the

phenomenon called state; the natural ascendancy of some men over others is the principle of

all human organizations and all human advances”.

Authority can be understood as the derived form of power and a position in a sociological

institution is acquired as a result of the power a person wields and exercises. Authority is

today recognized most readily with political institutions and bodies of administration and

governance. Man has become heavily dependent on political or authoritative control

mechanisms for order in society and therefore in the study of political science, authority

directly corresponds to political authority and is generally referred in the political context.

Many an attempt has been made to understand the meaning, the factors and ultimately the

legitimacy of political authority.5

LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY, DE FACTO AUTHORITY AND POLITICAL POWER

For most contemporary theorists to say that the state has authority in the descriptive sense is

to say that the state maintains public order and that it issues commands and makes rules that

5 http://sociology.about.com/od/A_Index/g/Authority.htm

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are generally obeyed by subjects because many of them think of it as having authority in the

normative sense. We should note here that the attitudinal component of de facto authority is

not accepted by everyone. For both Thomas Hobbes and John Austin, political authority in

the de facto sense simply amounts to the capacity of a person or group of persons to maintain

public order and secure the obedience of most people by issuing commands backed by

sanctions. Subjects need not think of the authority as a legitimate authority, on this account.

Also, the distinction between de facto and morally legitimate authority is not universally

accepted or at least it is not accepted that the distinction makes a difference. Hobbes insists

that any entity capable of performing the function of de facto authority is necessarily justified

and deserves the obedience of the de facto subjects. But most have argued that there is an

important distinction between de facto authority and legitimate authority. We will explore in

what follows the conceptions political and legal philosophers have had of legitimate political

authority.

De facto authority, on anyone's account, is distinct from political power. The latter is

concerned with the state's or any agent's ability to get others to act in ways that they desire

even when the subject does not want to do what the agent wants him to do. Political power

does not require any kind of pro attitude toward the agent on the part of the subject, nor does

it require that the state is actually successful at securing public order. It operates completely

in the realm of threats and offers. No doubt for the state to have de facto authority or

legitimate authority requires that the state have the power to compel those subjects who do

not wish to go along. This is necessary for the state's ability to maintain public order and to

assure those who do see it as an authority that it will be able to do what it is supposed to do.6

POLITICAL AUTHORITY

The rubric under which the normative notion of political authority is normally known is the

idea of legitimate political authority. It is important here to note the distinction between

theoretical and practical authority. A theoretical authority in some area of intellectual inquiry

is one that is an expert in that area. Theoretical authorities operate primarily by giving advice

to the layman, which advice the layman is free to take or not. The judgments of theoretical

authorities give people reasons for belief while the judgments of political authorities are

6 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/authority/

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normally thought to give people reasons for action. Theoretical authorities do not normally

impose duties on others, although they might give advice on what a person's duty is.

Most theorists of political authority view it as a species of practical authority rather than

theoretical authority, though this view is not held by all. Those who hold that political

authority is a species of practical authority maintain that political authorities issue directives

that give people reasons for action and not reason for belief. The thought is that political

authorities impose duties on their subjects and thereby give them reasons for action. These

theorists argue that it is the function of political authorities to get people to act in certain

ways so as to solve various collective action problems such as a variety of different types of

coordination problems, assurance problems and free rider problems. There have been some

dissenting views on this of late. Some have argued that the account of practical reason

required by the idea that political authority is a practical authority is incoherent and so they

have opted for the idea that political authorities, when legitimate, are theoretical authorities

regarding the existence and nature of the duties and reasons for action that people have. Since

this view is unusual this entry will concentrate on conceptions of political authority that treat

it as a species of practical authority.

The rest of this section will discuss a number of different analyses of political authority.

There are three basic types of conceptual account of legitimate political authority: legitimate

political authority as justified coercion, legitimate political authority as the capacity to

impose duties, and legitimate political authority as the right to rule. First, many people have

understood legitimate political authority as a political authority that is justified in coercing

the subjects of its authority. The notion of justification here is a moral one. The thought is

that a political authority might have moral justification in coercing those who come under its

authority. This is a particularly thin conception of legitimate authority. For instance, a state

can have this kind of authority when it legitimately occupies a territory as a result of a just

war. It is morally justified in coercing the inhabitants of the occupied territory.

The moral justification of a group of people in coercing others may be more or less

systematic. For instance, a group of people may be morally justified in engaging in just a few

actions of coercing others. Or a group may be morally justified in engaging in coercion more

generally as in the case of a morally justified military occupation.

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This notion of authority need not involve duties on the part of the population that is being

coerced. Indeed, they may be justified in trying to escape coercion. This could be the case in

a military occupation of a country that is justified on the grounds that it is necessary to stop a

third country from engaging in morally indefensible aggression. This conception of morally

justified coercion therefore involves no conception of a moral community among persons. In

this first conception of authority as justified coercion, the authority may not even issue

commands let alone make laws. It may simply justifiably issue threats and offers. The

difference between legitimate and illegitimate political authority on this account is that the

actions of the illegitimate political authority are not morally justified while the coercive

actions of the legitimate authority are justified.

A second conceptual account of legitimate political authority implies that those over whom

authority is exercised have some kind of duty with regard to the authority. Or the authority

has the capacity to impose duties on the subjects. This duty can be merely a duty not to

interfere with the activities of the political authority. Or it can involve the more significant

duty to obey the authority. This conception of authority involves the authority and the

subjects in a weak kind of moral relationship. The authority is justified in issuing the

commands and attempting to force people to comply with the commands while the subjects

have some kind of duty not to interfere with these activities or comply with the commands.

The duty of the subjects need not be owed to the authority. It may merely be that the subjects

have a duty to obey where that duty is not owed to anyone in particular or where that duty is

owed ultimately to people who are not the authority. For instance, if one thinks that one is

likely better to respect others' rights by complying with the authority's directives, the action is

ultimately owed to those others.

Some have stressed the idea that the holding of justified political authority may only involve

a duty on the part of others not to interfere with the political authority and they argue that the

duty of non-interference is much weaker than a duty to obey. It is not clear how great the

difference between these two duties is in practice at least as far as citizens are concerned. For

many cases of failing to obey an authority are cases of interference with the authority. An

analogy may be helpful here. If one is playing a game of baseball with an umpire and one

refuses to comply with the directives of the umpire, one is in effect interfering with the

umpire's carrying out of his duties by not complying with the directives of the umpire.

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While a duty to obey seems to imply a duty not to interfere, there are cases of duties of non

interference that are not duties to obey, such as the duties of foreign powers not to interfere in

the activities of a legitimate state. Furthermore, the duty to obey is clearly the more

contentious issue in the question of authority since it requires that one make one's actions

conform to the specific directives of the authority.

A third conceptual account of authority or set of conceptions of legitimate authority involves

the idea that the authority has a right to rule. Strictly speaking, an authority can have a right

to rule without the subjects having a duty to comply. The authority may have a “justification”

right to rule. This means that the authority has a permission to issue commands and make

rules and coerce others to comply and its possession of this right is justified on moral

grounds. This “justification right” is not much more than the first notion we discussed above.

A more robust right to rule includes a duty owed to the authority on the part of the subjects

not to interfere with the activities of the authority. The subjects owe it to the authority not to

interfere with it. This is connected with the right of the authority to rule. Finally, an authority

can have a right to rule in the sense that it may issue commands and make rules and require

subjects to comply with these rules and commands and the subjects have duties, which they

owe to the authority, to comply with the rules and commands.

The distinction between a right to rule that is correlated with a duty not to interfere and one

that is correlated with a duty to comply comes in handy when we consider the difference

between the duties owed to a legitimate political authority by the subjects of that authority

and the duties owed to it by other states and persons who are not subject to that authority. A

state with a right to rule in the strongest sense may be owed obedience by its subjects but it is

usually owed only a duty of non interference by those who are not a part of the state such as

other states and persons in other states. It is worthwhile drawing a distinction here between

internal legitimacy and external legitimacy.

It is not a useful aim of philosophers or political thinkers to determine which one of these

conceptual accounts of political authority is the right one. Each one of them grasps a kind of

legitimacy of political authority that is worth taking into account and distinguishing from the

others. The idea of legitimate authority as justified coercive power is a suitable way of

getting at the authority of hostile but justified occupation powers. And the idea of legitimate

authority as an authority that has a right to rule over subjects who owe obedience to the

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authority and that has a right not to be interfered with by foreigners is surely an importantly

distinct and perhaps ideal type of authority, which is rarely implemented. The kind of

legitimacy that is merely correlated with duties to obey or not to interfere is a useful

intermediate category between those two.

What is worth noting is that the idea of legitimate authority as a right to rule in the strong

sense described above does describe a kind of ideal of political community. The idea of

legitimate authority as a right to rule to which citizens owe obedience gives each citizen a

moral duty to obey, which it owes to the authority. So this form of legitimacy is grounded in

a moral relationship between the parties that goes beyond the fact that they are fellow human

beings. The establishment of a robust right to rule depends on the fact that each citizen

rightly takes as a reason for obedience that it has a moral duty owed to the authority. Since a

legitimate political authority with a right to rule is predicated on the fact that citizens have

moral reasons grounded in the right to rule to obey it, the right to rule engages citizens at a

deep moral level. The exercise of political power is founded in a moral relationship between

moral persons that recognizes and affirms the moral personality of each citizen.

By contrast, a society in which it is merely the case that coercion is justified is one in which

the subjects are permissibly treated as means to morally defensible purposes. The subjects do

not owe anything to the authority or have any duties to obey it. So, in the case of an authority

as merely justified coercion, the subjects' reasons for obedience are merely their desires to

avoid punishment. And that is the level at which the authority deals with them. Such a society

does not engage the subjects as moral persons; it merely attempts to administer the activities

of persons so as to bring about in a morally justified way a desirable outcome. At the

extreme, a prisoner of war camp or even a hostile but justified military occupation gives the

authorities justification for coercion. The people who are subjected to that treatment often

have no duties to obey and they do not regard each other or the authorities as members of a

unified political community. They are merely fellow human beings. To the extent that a

political society is best when it involves the mutual recognition and affirmation of the moral

status of each person, the kind of society that involves merely justified coercion of some by

others is a pale shadow.

And the intermediate form of political authority is incomplete in the respect in which the

exercise of political power involves the mutual recognition and affirmation of the status of

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each person. It is the case that subjects have duties but those duties are not essentially

connected to anything in the authority. The subjects instead act more in accordance with

reasons that are independent of the authority when they obey the authority. So to the extent

that a society ruled by an authority that has the right to rule is an ideal of a moral community,

the other types of authority are lesser forms of a morally ideal political community.7

Conceptions of the Legitimacy of Political Authority

Few theorists after Thomas Hobbes and David Hume have argued that there is a general duty

to obey the law or that political authority is generally legitimate. Most theorists have argued

that the legitimacy of political authority is one that holds only when the political authority

satisfies certain normatively important conditions. What we will review here are some of the

main theories that attempt to explain when a political authority has legitimacy.

General theories are theories that identify general properties that virtually any kind of

political regime can have that give them legitimacy. Special theories are ones that mark off

particular classes of regimes that have legitimacy or that have a particularly high level of

legitimacy. There are really four types of general theory of political authority and then there

are a variety of special theories of political authority. The four types of general theory of

legitimacy are consent theories, reasonable consensus theories, associative obligation theories

and instrumentalist theories. The two historically important forms of special theory in the

West have been the Divine Right of Kings theories and democratic theories.

Concerning the incompatibility of moral autonomy and political authority the problem is

really only connected with the kinds of political authority that imply content independent

duties to comply with authoritative commands. The basic idea is that it is incompatible for a

subject to comply with the commands of an authority merely because it is the command of

the authority and for the subject to be acting morally autonomously. Wolff thinks that each

person has a duty to act on the basis of his own moral assessment of right and wrong and has

the duty to reflect on what is right and wrong in each particular instance of action. Such a

person would be violating his duty to act autonomously if he complies with authoritative

commands on grounds that are independent of the content of the commands. So the duty of

autonomy is incompatible with the duty of obeying political authority. This is the challenge

of philosophical anarchism.

7 http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/444282?sid=21106221616163&uid=3737496&uid=2&uid=4

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The worry is that authority is never legitimate because the kind of obedience associated with

authority is inconsistent with the autonomy of the subject. We can see, however, that this

worry applies only to certain accounts of authority, which imply duties to obey on the part of

the subjects. The account of authority as justified coercion is not affected by this argument

nor is the account of legitimate authority consisting of a justification right affected by this

worry. Still, most accounts of the nature of authority do imply content independent duties on

the part of the subjects. We can see that any content independent duty, whether it is a duty

not to interfere with the authority's command or it is a duty to obey the authority, is called

into question by this argument.8

Reasonable Consensus Conceptions of Legitimate Political Authority

Reasonable consensus views of political authority attempt to find a kind of mean between the

extreme individualism of consent theory and the lack of respect for people's opinions of the

instrumentalist views. John Rawls argues that the liberal principle of political legitimacy

requires that coercive institutions be so structured that they accord with the reasonable views

of the members of the society. As long as they do so they have the right to impose duties on

their members. The members may not demur on the basis of unreasonable views.

Furthermore, it is not necessary on this view that the persons over whom authority is wielded

have voluntarily acted or given any sign of agreement. All that need be the case is that the

basic principles that regulate the coercive institutions be ones that the reasonable members

can agree to.

This view seems to be a kind of middle position between consent theory and the

instrumentalist views. It does not allow individuals to divest themselves of obligations on

spurious or merely self-interested bases because it specifies what is and is not a reasonable

basis for agreement to the basic principles of the society. At the same time it evinces a

respect for the opinions of the members of society since it requires that the basic principles

that regulate the society accord with the reasonable views of the members.

This account of legitimacy is based on an adherence to a principle of reasonableness. The

basic principle asserts that reasonable persons will propose fair terms of cooperation with

other reasonable persons only on condition that the terms can be justified to those others on

the basis of premises that they can reasonably accept. There has been much discussion of this

8 http://www.academia.edu/3482786/Authority_Power_and_Legitimacy

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principle and its underpinnings but this entry will focus on a central worry concerning this

idea.

A Democratic Conception of Legitimate Political Authority

The basic idea behind the democratic conception of legitimate authority is that when there are

disagreements among persons about how to structure their shared world together and it is

important to structure that world together, the way to choose the shared aspects of society is

by means of a decision making process that is fair to the interests and opinions of each of the

members. When there is disagreement about how to organize the shared system of law,

property, public education and the provision of public goods, no one can have his way

entirely in this context without someone else not getting her way. Each person thinks that the

ideas about justice and the common good with which the others wish to organize their shared

world are mistaken in some way. Yet there is a need for collective action. The only way to do

this that is reasonably fair to all the members is to make the decision democratically.

The thought is that when an outcome is democratically chosen and some people disagree with

the outcome, as some inevitably will, they still have a duty to go along with the decision

because otherwise they would be treating the others unfairly. If they refuse to go along and

disrupt the democratically chosen arrangements, they are assuming for themselves a right to

determine how things should go that overrides the equal rights of all the others. They are, in

Peter Singer's words, assuming the positions of dictators in relation to the others. For if they

turned out to be in the majority, they would demand the compliance of the others.

The idea of fairness that underpins the democratic process is grounded in different ways in

different theories. The basic idea of equality is shared by most democratic theorists. Some

argue that there is a fundamental duty of equal respect for the opinions of others that grounds

democratic decision making in the context of pervasive disagreement. Others wish to ground

this duty of respect for the opinions of others in a deeper principle of equal concern for the

interests of each member of society.

On this kind of view the democratic assembly has a right to rule and to the obedience of its

members. This right of the democratic assembly is grounded in the right of each member of

the assembly to be accorded equal respect. The duty of equal respect requires that the

collective decision process gives each a vote in a broadly majoritarian process and a robustly

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equal opportunity to participate in the deliberations and negotiations leading to decisions.

The equal rights of each of the members are in effect pooled in the democratic assembly so

that because one owes each person equal respect, and the democratic way of making

decisions embodies this equal respect, one owes the democratic assembly respect.

The democratic assembly can be understood as the assembly of all adult citizens or better as

the assembly of all the democratically chosen representatives of citizens. A conception of a

democratic assembly requires, on this view, an account of the appropriate form of democratic

representation. In addition, the democratic assembly is only one part of the complete system

of government. It is concerned with legislation only. In addition to this a government requires

executive and judicial functions whose legitimacy may depend in part on other factors better

grasped by the instrumentalist view.

The duties that are owed the democratic assembly are content independent and preemptive

duties. They are content independent duties because each member has the duty, with a class

of exceptions we will review in a moment, just because the assembly has made a decision.

The duties are preemptive because the citizen must put aside the considerations she initially

planned on acting on in order to treat the rest of her fellow citizens with proper respect. The

idea of equal respect requires, on this account, deference to the decision of the majority and

not acting on one's own judgment when the majority disagrees. So the decision of the

majority gives a reason to obey that preempts or replaces the considerations one might act on

were there no majority decision.

It is important to note that this conception of authority is what was described as a special

conception above. The fact that democratic assemblies have authority does not imply that all

other forms of regime never have authority. One might go along with a regime on the basis of

the instrumentalist conception of authority or even the consent approach even if it is not

democratic. It is clear nevertheless that democratic assemblies have a special kind of

authority.

Limits to Democratic Authority

The question that arises for a democratic theory of authority is when do the considerations of

the justice or injustice of the outcome override the considerations connected with the fairness

of the process of decision making?

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The claim that a democratic assembly has a right to rule is not incompatible with the idea that

there are limits to that right. Indeed, theorists have argued that the very same principle that

grounds democratic authority also ground limits to that authority. The principle of public

equality on which the argument for democracy is founded also grounds a set of liberal rights

(freedom of conscience, association, speech and private pursuits). The reason for this is that

democratic assembly that fundamentally denied these liberal rights to individuals would

publicly violate the duty of equal respect to those individuals. Those who violate the basic

liberal rights of others are publicly treating them as inferiors. To the extent that the

democratic assembly's claim of authority is grounded in the public realization of the principle

of equal respect, the authority would run out when the democratic assembly makes law that

undermines equal respect. This establishes, at least for one conception of democratic

authority, a substantive set of limits to that authority.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN POWER AND AUTHORITY

While understanding the concepts of power and authority is vital in the smooth running of

social and political institutions, there must also be an understanding that they are both

seminally different at their cores. While being interdependent on each other at a higher level,

these concepts rely on completely different factors at their organic level.

As mentioned earlier, Power is the ability to get things done by others. The principle of

power is to punish and reward. Power can exist with or without authority. For instance an

armed robber has power but no authority. Authority, on the other hand is the power to

enforce law and take command, and to expect obedience from those without authority.

Authority can exist with or without power, for example a teacher has authority over the

pupils but no real power. Steven Lukes states that there are three dimensions of power

namely decision, non decision making and manipulating desires. For instance, In parliament

when a law is being discussed by MP's and any other form of political group there must be a

body which has power so that they can actually come to a decision. The significant

differences in the most objective form include the nature of the terms and the differing types

of each concept. The first of these differences being the nature of the concepts of power and

authority as illustrated in the earlier case. Other distinctions include the sources from which

each derives the power or authority, and finally, the many types of each concept.

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A clear distinction can be derived from between the types of power to be addressed such as

social power, cultural power, economic power, political power and legal power while the

different types of authority include customary authority, statutory authority, common law

authority and delegated authority. As mentioned earlier, the concepts of power and authority

and the need to form a distinction between are formed in the context of political institutions

and political rule.

At the root of our ideal-types, however, no separation exists between society and politics.

The Indo-European king, to whom some people trace back the concept of authority, is at once

a social and a political leader. But we are dealing with what one might flippantly call post-

Hegelian society, where a division between “political domain” and “civil society” is

considered a relatively consolidated fact.

There seem exist three ideal types that can be discerned linking political power to social

authority: a) the ideal type of a notables system (waxing strong in nineteenth-century society

but not only there); b) what I would call the ‘ecclesial’ or ‘church’ ideal type which I suggest

is not so much a fruit of transposing institutional fidelity to religious systems onto a socio-

political plane as of organizing the political authority vested in an institution for salvation; c)

the bureaucratic-distributional ideal type where power descends from the ability to create

equilibrium (or re-equilibrium) in the social realm by distributing the resources produced by

the political realm.

To begin, the first ideal type is a system in which power stems from the ability of the political

decision-makers to auger the position of the subjects under them and doing so via the

mediation of the “notable”. In this case the subject relating to public power lacks the

resources to be sure of being taken seriously. That obviously means the public power system

is failing to supply distributional justice. I note that this may happen for opposite reasons:

public power may lack the organization to field the “non-accredited” subject’s requests, or it

may have too much bureaucratic organization, designed to guarantee access for all, but

actually a self-defeating labyrinth. In either case a priority pathway is needed to obtain a

hearing, creating the demand for a “mediator” to activate it. The problem here is that

“discretionary power” lies more or less in the hands of political power itself. The mechanism

gets activated on behalf of someone either when prompted by the need to find supporting

covers from someone with enough social clout to trigger it or when it serves to strengthen the

hold on political power over part of society.

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Both such aims can be secured through the “notable”, thanks to his investiture with

“authority” as a “social representative”. He (traditionally he, of course,) is not just the

“advocate” of whoever he represents but an “interpreter” filtering certain claims and thereby

changing the response by political power into “legitimating” where it would otherwise

remain a mere ex-officio duty of the public domain.

In the modern society with all its complex functioning’s, it is vitally important to locate the

thin line which separates the phenomenon of power and authority. There exists a need to

study and assimilate the various factors and the influences exerted upon and by them and the

interdependence and distinction for the better progress of society and its social beings.9

WEBER’S ANALYSIS OF AUTHORITY

Max Weber, in his sociological work, identified and distinguished three types of legitimate

domination (Herrschaft in German, which generally means 'domination' or 'rule'), that have

sometimes been rendered in English translation as types of authority, because domination

isn't seen as a political concept in the first place. Weber defined domination (authority) as the

chance of commands being obeyed by a specifiable group of people. Legitimate authority is

that which is recognized as legitimate and justified by both the ruler and the ruled.10

Weber divided legitimate authority into three types.

The first type discussed by Weber is Rational-legal authority. It is that form of authority

which depends for its legitimacy on formal rules and established laws of the state, which are

usually written down and are often very complex. The power of the rational legal authority is

mentioned in the constitution. Modern societies depend on legal-rational authority.

Government officials are the best example of this form of authority, which is prevalent all

over the world.

The second type of authority is Traditional authority, which derives from long-established

customs, habits and social structures. When power passes from one generation to another,

then it is known as traditional authority. The right of hereditary monarchs to rule furnishes an

obvious example. The Tudor dynasty in England and the ruling families of Mewar, in

Rajasthan (India) are some examples of traditional authority.

9 http://www.extension.org/pages/42913/what-is-the-difference-between-power-and-authority-in-an-organization#.VRDx_fmUeME10 http://danawilliams2.tripod.com/authority.html

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The third form of authority is Charismatic authority. Here, the charisma of the individual or

the leader plays an important role. Charismatic authority is that authority which is derived

from "the gift of grace" or when the leader claims that his authority is derived from a "higher

power" (e.g. God or natural law or rights) or "inspiration", that is superior to both the validity

of traditional and rational-legal authority and followers accept this and are willing to follow

this higher or inspired authority, in the place of the authority that they have hitherto been

following. Some of the most prominent examples of charismatic authority can be politicians

or leaders, who come from a movie or entertainment background. These people become

successful, because they use their grace and charm to get more votes during elections.

Examples in this regard can be NT Rama Rao, a matinee idol, who went on to become one of

the most powerful Chief Ministers of Andhra Pradesh.

History has witnessed several social movements or revolutions, against a system of

traditional or legal-rational authority, which are usually started by Charismatic authorities.

What distinguishes authority, from coercion, force and power on the one hand and leadership,

persuasion and influence on the other hand, is legitimacy. Superiors feel that they have a

right to issue commands; subordinates perceive an obligation to obey. Social scientists agree

that authority is but one of several resources available, to incumbents in formal positions. For

example, a Head of State is dependent upon a similar nesting of authority. His legitimacy

must be acknowledged, not just by citizens, but by those who control other valued resources:

his immediate staff, his cabinet, military leaders and in the long run, the administration and

political apparatus of the entire society.

THE CONSENT THEORY OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY

The consent theory of political authority states only a necessary condition of the legitimacy

of political authority. It states that a political authority is legitimate only if it has the consent

of those who are subject to its commands. Many have argued that in addition to consent, a

state must be minimally just for it to be legitimate.

A number of arguments have been presented in favor of this view. Locke's argument is that

each person has an equal natural right to freedom and that this implies that at the age of

maturity no one may be subordinated to anyone else's commands by nature. Let us call this

the natural right argument. Such subordination would violate the equal freedom of the

subordinated person. To the extent that political authority involves issuing commands and

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requiring others to follow the commands, it seems to involve subordinating one person to the

commands of another and thus violates the natural right to freedom of the subordinated

person.

ELITE THEORY

The study of concentrations and distributions power and authority and the dynamics of

political institutions has come a long way from the early Greek and roman civilizations to the

largely democratic and republic governments of today. There exist many theories concerning

the state and relationships of power in the modern society. The elite theory is one such theory

which attempts to explain the power relationships of individuals and groups in the modern

society.

The elite theory’s main argument holds that it is a small minority, consisting of members of

the economic elite and policy-planning networks, that hold the most power, all this while

being independent of a state's democratic elections process. Through positions in

corporations or on corporate boards, and influence over the policy-planning networks through

financial support of foundations or positions with think tanks or policy-discussion groups,

members of the "elite" are able to exert significant power over policy decisions of

corporations and governments.

The main opposition to this theory is the pluralism theory which suggests that democracy is a

utopian ideal and the state autonomy theory.

The Elite theory was suggested many centuries ago and there have been several social

scientists who have conceived many forms of the elite theory. These theories are applicable

even today from the very fact that while the forms of governance have undergone changes,

the essence of power and authority over society and as a political instrument have long

remained through the ages.11

CONCLUSION:

We can conclude the study of power and authority by stating that they are phenomenon

deeply embedded into the fabric of human existence. The destruction of that intellectual and

moral consensus which has restrained the struggle for power for almost three centuries

deprived the balance of power of the vital energy that has made it a living principle of

international politics. Battle for power started many millennia back and civilizations have

fallen and grown through the pages of history. In the post-industrialized world battle between

11 http://www.sociologyguide.com/political-system/elite-theory.php

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the European juggernauts for territorial and political power and sovereignty gave way to

colonization of the rest of the world. European hegemony and aristocratic imperialism gave

way to the bipolar world after the World wars and the cold war ended with the supremacy of

United States and the breakup of the USSR. Pursuit of power and authority has dictated the

winds of growth of man and his society.

There is no need to repeat the fact that power and authority play one the most influential and

important roles in maintaining the balance and progress in society and ultimately in nature.

These concepts are powerful beyond the imagination of the human mind and can never be

ignored or forgotten and we can only strive to channel the potential of theses phenomenon

into a positive and progressive building force.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology: Introduction to Political Thought

On Max Weber, the Encyclopedia Britannica

2. The Concept of Law, H.L.A.Hart

WEBSITES:

1. www.jstor.org

2. www.sociologyguide.com

3. www.extension.org

4. www.academia.edu

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