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Post-Tsunami Resettlement in Sri Lanka and India: Site Planning, Infrastructure and Services
I., Ahmed,
RMIT University, Australia,
D., McEvoy,
RMIT University, Australia,
Abstract
After the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, major resettlement programmes were implemented in
the affected countries including Sri Lanka and India. Studies of such programmes were
conducted in Sri Lanka and India where new settlements were built from scratch on vacant
land, which consisted of building new houses and provision of infrastructure and services.
Based on interviews of residents and representatives of agencies involved in planning and
implementing the programmes, critical aspects of settlement development are reviewed here
including site planning, transport, drainage, water supply, sanitation, waste management and
security. Notwithstanding the difficulty of implementing such programmes within the
constraints of a post-disaster situation, the drawbacks revealed in the studies indicates that
residents are confronted with great challenges in inhabiting these settlements. The paper
concludes by highlighting the resourcefulness, resilience and adaptive capacity of communities
in these settlements for making the settlements more habitable, and the potential for
organisations to build more successful settlements by taking these qualities into account.
Keywords: Post-tsunami resettlement, site planning, infrastructure, Sri Lanka, India.
1. Background
The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, among the most devastating global disasters in recent history,
severely impacted Sri Lanka and India. After Indonesia, Sri Lanka was the most affected
country with more than a million people affected and more than 35,000 people killed
(PreventionWeb, 2008); nearly 90,000 houses were completely or partially damaged (DCS,
2005). Extensive reconstruction was carried out in the aftermath by international humanitarian
agencies and governments. A post-tsunami buffer zone policy in Sri Lanka, restricting
rebuilding along the coast, resulted in resettlement plans to build 43,000 new houses on 387
sites outside the buffer zone. This paper is derived from an AusAID-funded study that
investigated such resettlement programmes in Sri Lanka and India (Shaw and Ahmed, 2010).
The bulk of studies on post-tsunami resettlement focus on the relocation process and associated
politics, and adjustment or lack thereof of communities to the new settlements and related
social aspects (for example, Abe, 2011; Hettige, 2007). In comparison there are very few
studies that examine issues relating to site planning, infrastructure and services, which are
essential in land development for new settlements. This paper addresses this gap and offers
insights gained from primary investigations.
2. Case studies
The cases studies are from two locations in southern Sri Lanka – Hambantota and Seenigama –
and Chennai, India, informed by interviews of residents and representatives of implementing
agencies, and on-site observations. A checklist of questions guided the interviews across the
case studies and allowed comparing the different schemes, and responses by households and
agency representatives. The names of agencies have been kept anonymous to protect their
identity. Key information on the case studies is given below in Table 1 and Figure 1 shows
some views of the settlements. Given the large scale of the resettlement intervention, a
comprehensive survey with a representative sample would have been beyond the scope of the
study. Rather the objective was to examine key issues in detail through selected case studies;
whilst in-depth interviews of a limited number of households was conducted, these were
interpreted in relation to the wider settlement through observation, informal discussions and
interviews of implementing agency staff members.
Figure 1: (Each row left to right) Scheme in Hambantota New Town with the typical
barrack-type layout; Scheme in Hambantota New Town with careful landscaping and site
planning; Apartment housing scheme in central Hambantota town; Case 1, Seenigama with
townhouses laid out around a central communal area; Case 2, Seenigama with single storey
houses; Apartment housing scheme in Chennai.
In Hambantota investigations were carried out in New Town, a new urban development of
2,330 houses - the largest post-tsunami resettlement project in Sri Lanka. Implementing
agencies included various international and local NGOs, and philanthropic, political and
religious organisations. Another programme by an international NGO consisted of 4-storey
apartment blocks in a central location in Hambantota town. In Seenigama, the two case study
programmes were implemented by a local NGO with funding from various international donors.
Unlike the Hambantota schemes on public land, in Seenigama the programmes were
implemented on private land. In Chennai, India, residents of informal coastal settlements
destroyed by the tsunami were resettled inland by the government in 4-storey apartment blocks
in two locations on reclaimed land in an industrial area.
Table 1: Key aspects of the case studies
Programme
Locations
Total beneficiary
households
No. of households
interviewed
Programme features
New Town,
Hambantota
(various schemes)
2330 25 Mostly 1-storey houses on ~500m2
lots built by various agencies on new
resettlement site
Hambantota town 40 4 Three 4-storey blocks, two with 16
apartments each and one with 8
apartments within a walled compound
Case 1, Seenigama 84 7 21 nos. 2-storey townhouses each with
2 units around a central open space
within a walled compound
Case 2, Seenigama 50 6 Two donors each funded 25 1- storey
houses on ~150 m2 lots within a
walled compound
Case 1, Chennai 960 11 40 nos. 4-storey apartment blocks
each with 24 units (6 per floor) within
a walled compound in urban location
Case 2, Chennai 432 9 18 nos. 4-storey apartment blocks as
in Case 1, Chennai
Total 3,766 62 Resettlement programmes on new
land and contractor-built housing
3. Site planning
Very little site planning guidelines were available specifically for resettlement programmes; in
both countries general planning guidelines were applied. In Sri Lanka, guidelines of the Urban
Development Authority were expected to be followed, providing minimal guidance mainly in
the form of recommended land coverage to be allocated to different elements [Housing 65%
(max); Common area 10% (min); Roads, drains, etc 20% (min); Social infrastructure 5% (min)]
(NHDA, 2005). This did not provide any guidance on the nature and quality of key communal
areas such as playgrounds, parks and community centres, and thus it was up to individual
implementing agencies to incorporate these aspects into their site plans, resulting in varying
quality of such spaces across the different programmes. Some schemes barely had any
communal spaces; others that did were not functional, while a few had invested significant care
in developing such spaces. It appears that the bulk of the effort for most agencies was invested
mainly in building houses; the linkage of the private domain of the house to the semi-private
space around the house, and in turn to the public domain of communal spaces, that is, a
sequential hierarchy of spaces as an essential aspect of site planning had largely not been
considered. Instead of establishing and linking a variety of communal spaces of different scales
to create a varied and engaging outdoor living environment, unimaginative and regimental grid-
iron or barrack-type layouts had been implemented in most of the schemes (see Figure 1).
In New Town, only one scheme was found where care was taken to align houses and roads
along existing site contours and variety in layout and design of houses, communal areas and
open spaces was attempted. Several residents of this scheme expressed satisfaction with the
quality of open and communal spaces, and the variety of the built environment. However in
other schemes even where parks, playgrounds or other community facilities (meeting halls,
library, etc) had been provided, they became neglected because of the way they were designed
and positioned. Not comprehending that the problem was primarily with the design, an annoyed
agency staff member blamed the beneficiaries: “They are boors, they don‟t know how to value
these things; they even broke the windows of the community centre!”
In one of the Seenigama schemes, whilst the site plan included a central rectangular communal
area (see Figure 1), 152 square metre plots were too small to have much open space around the
houses. In such a context, it is common to plant trees and grow vegetables around the house,
which in the warm climate serves as outdoor extensions of the house, but scope for this was
very limited in both the cases in Seenigama, resulting in widespread complaints by
beneficiaries. Although children did play in the central area, most adults ignored it and instead
tried their best to utilise the small spaces around their houses for socialising and relaxing.
Despite the space limitations, households managed to grow some vegetables and fruit trees in
these spaces, though not to the extent they would have preferred, indicating their adaptive
capacity and initiative to utilise whatever minimal resources were available to them.
In the Chennai schemes, although open space was kept as communal parks and playgrounds, as
in the Seenigama scheme, beneficiaries did not feel a sense of ownership and these areas
quickly became neglected. These supposed parks had become places for garbage disposal and
even for keeping cattle, and were frequented by nocturnal drug-users and drunkards. For the
beneficiaries mainly from informal coastal settlements, the concept of a communal park was
unfamiliar, as indeed was living in apartment block compounds. Despite having a system of
municipal garbage collection, albeit somewhat inadequate, there was widespread and
indiscriminate open dumping of garbage, particularly at the backside of the apartment buildings
that were negative spaces with no functional appeal. Residents of ground floor apartments kept
their windows closed despite the heat to avoid the unpleasant odour and view, and hence
compelled to use electric fans and lights, even during the day, thus incurring expenses that
many of them could ill-afford. Nonetheless because of the small apartment size and the warm
climate, communal and open spaces were used extensively – particularly the stairwell and
spaces in front and the sides of buildings – for a variety of activities – sitting, relaxing, chatting,
playing, running small stalls, etc. The capacity of these communities to informally adapt such
spaces for communal use is noteworthy, whilst the formal parks and playgrounds were ignored.
Significant challenges remain for such communities to make the transition to urban multi-storey
apartments from a village or urban slum lifestyle. In traditional settlements, clustering
according to caste, religion or social grouping is common, which becomes disaggregated in
apartment schemes with random allocation of residents. However traditional prejudices and
divisions persist. In the Hambantota apartments Buddhist residents blamed the Muslims for
littering and being dirty. In Chennai, Hindu higher caste residents generally remained aloof and
communicated only with others of their caste, even if in distant apartments; most hardly
mingled with the rest of the community and seldom frequented the communal spaces.
In the apartment compound in Hambantota town, there was also a communal park, which was
initially ignored and became overgrown. With subsequent support of community development
agencies local leadership was fostered, resulting in voluntary initiatives by residents to improve
the area. Residents began viewing it as their responsibility, as one of them mentioned,
“Residents are to blame, not agency [for the neglect].” Children were beginning to play there
and a sense of community ownership was being established. This indicates that such schemes,
essentially a “community of strangers”, as a resident described, consisting of beneficiaries
without a background of such a living pattern, require support and organising by agencies, often
over a long term, to function as a cohesive community with a sense of ownership of communal
spaces and facilities. Such a strategy should be included at the outset of programme design,
otherwise well-intentioned communal areas are likely to fail and become negative spaces.
4. Infrastructure and services
Provision and management of infrastructure and services presents great challenges in
developing countries as high capital investment and good technical skills for design,
implementation and maintenance are required. The issues discussed below, though specific to
the case studies, represents a general state of affairs in developing countries such as Sri Lanka
and India, offering lessons of wider relevance. This assessment brings into focus shortcomings
and also any achievements so as to inform future such programmes in developing countries.
4.1 Transport
The urban apartment schemes in Hambantota town and Chennai had the advantage of being
centrally located and hence had access to schools, health centres and other facilities. However
the Seenigama programmes and particularly Hambantota New Town were in isolated locations
and beneficiaries faced problems in accessing basic facilities. In Seenigama, the town centre
was about three kilometres away and there was no public transport. Motorised rickshaws were
not frequently available, and not all could afford them. Some residents owned a bicycle, but
many could not afford one and thus had to walk, often arduous in the warm climate and rainy
season, particularly for children, the elderly and disabled. Nonetheless, the schemes in
Seenigama were relatively well-located compared to many other resettlement schemes in Sri
Lanka (UNOCHA, 2008) - the transport problem seems intrinsic in varying extents to this mode
of settlement that relocated communities from their earlier established settlements near the
coast to usually remote areas, only where vacant land could be found.
In New Town, some new schools and places of worship had been built, but other than that most
facilities were located about five kilometres away in Hambantota town. This was expected to
change once the urban boundary was extended and new commercial developments in the area
were completed. There was a tarred road with a bus service, but the schedule was reportedly
erratic. As in Seenigama, better-off households could afford motorised rickshaws, but others
faced difficulty in accessing services and employment in the main town, and several interview
respondents cited poor transport linkages as their primary reason for not taking up full-time
residence in New Town. As the internal roads within the schemes were not yet paved, they
became very muddy during the rainy season, rendering them inaccessible to most vehicular
traffic - a significant inconvenience and constraint on local development. Because of the sandy
nature of the topsoil and the windy openness of the area due to clearing of trees and vegetation,
during the dry season dust from the unpaved roads blew into houses - a further aggravation.
Even in schemes with paved internal roads, such as the urban programmes in Hambantota town
and Chennai, they had not been constructed properly. Being designed without any edge
containment, over time the sides of such roads became worn by water running along the sides,
creating furrows and scouring the road edges from below, resulting in crumbling and gradual
reduction of road width. Sometimes the roads were simply not wide enough. In one of the
schemes in Seenigama, because the land was privately purchased, as many houses as possible
was squeezed into it, with a bare minimum left for roads. With internal road widths of about 2½
metres, cars could barely pass each other and had difficulty turning at the corners. On the other
hand, the internal roads in the Chennai schemes were planned with accurate widths, but
ironically there were hardly any cars in these urban poor settlements.
4.2 Drainage
In the Sri Lankan case studies, most sites were not adequately prepared before establishing the
settlements. In New Town, most schemes did not have any surface drainage plan; low areas had
not been elevated, slopes not levelled, and land not compacted before construction. Thus in the
rainy season water flowed through the area from higher places to those at lower elevation,
washing away topsoil, silting drains and homesteads, inundating gardens and homes and
causing various such problems. In some cases, flowing water was found to have exposed and
undermined the house foundations by scouring, greatly weakening the structure and making the
houses liable to eventual collapse in flash floods and storms that were frequent in the area.
Only in one scheme, the same one where attention was paid to site-planning and landscaping,
mentioned above in section 3, was there an attempt at designing a surface water drainage plan
for the whole site. Here a network of drains flowed into a water reservoir from which water was
used for nurturing the extensive vegetation retained and planted on the site. The reservoir
allowed other functions such as bathing, collection of household water (for gardening, washing
utensils, etc) and to rear water buffaloes, an important source of income. To prevent washing
away of topsoil and consequent sedimentation in the drains, many of the main internal roads
had been carpeted with gravel made from locally available lateritic rocks.
Where provision for drainage had been made, open drains were the norm. In both Seenigama
and Chennai, blockage of surface and household wastewater drains was common, not surprising
given the prevalence of indiscriminate littering. “Children throw stuff in the drains, which is
why they get blocked,” a resident in Chennai reported, but that was only part of the reason;
widespread littering throughout the compound indicated that it was part of a wider behavioural
pattern. During the rainy season, the drains overflowed due to blockage, and often inadequate
depth, creating very unhygienic conditions, particularly from the overflow of wastewater
drains. Stagnant drains allow mosquito breeding; in Sri Lanka and India mosquito-borne
diseases are common, thus such open drains created a public health hazard. Because of the
small size of apartments in Chennai, many household members were compelled to sleep outside
and mosquitoes were a persistent source of irritation and risk.
4.3 Water supply
Electricity and water supply had been provided in all the programmes, but conditions and
quality varied. In Chennai although rooftop water-tanks had been built and apartments
connected with supply pipes and taps, piped water was eventually not provided for various
institutional reasons, so these provisions ended up as a waste of resources. Alternatively, water
was pumped to an underground reservoir from which it was collected by hand-pumps installed
in front of each apartment block. The quality of water was reportedly poor; some residents
complained of bad odour and strange colour, others of a chemical smell, possibly linked to the
nearby industries. Such contamination and the general absence of household level water
treatment created a health risk. Water was supplied for only a few hours each morning and
women formed queues from dawn to collect water. Because of the limited supply, conflicts and
disputes arose, spoiling relations between neighbours and creating rifts within the community.
Those living on the ground floor were in an advantageous position, while those on upper floors
had the tedious task of carrying water up the stairs on a regular basis. For elderly residents, it
was really a hardship. In some upper floor apartments, pulleys had been installed by residents to
lift the water, but that was also not an easy task. As one woman narrated, “I have really hurt my
back pulling up water everyday and can hardly do it anymore because of the pain.”
In programmes with piped water supply such as the apartment housing scheme in Hambantota
town, water supplied into underground reservoirs by the National Water Supply and Drainage
Board (NWS&DB) was then pumped to rooftop tanks to supply water to the apartments. The
pumps however did not work sometimes and residents then had no water supply for several
days. Some of them had to go to relatives‟ houses to bathe and wash, and collect water. It was
unclear whether the pumps were of poor quality or if they were not being repaired properly. To
add to this problem, water leaked from the rooftop tanks and pipes, and in many places
dampness had penetrated the walls and roofs, evident by blistering and peeling of paint and
plaster, thereby weakening the building structure.
In one of the Seenigama schemes, a water purification plant was built within the compound
with the well-meaning intention of providing clean water to residents. Because houses were
provided free, beneficiaries expected to also get free water from the plant, but when informed
that they would have to pay, most beneficiaries refused and instead connected to the municipal
water supply. Out of 84 households, only 24 agreed to receiving water from the plant, but none
of them paid for it. To teach them a lesson, the agency managing the programme temporarily
discontinued the supply, but that did not help. With an estimated 30,000 Sri Lankan Rupees
(about US$300) per month operating cost of the plant and so few households using it, and not
even paying for it, the future of the plant was uncertain.
In Hambantota New Town water supply was provided by NWS&DB a few years after
resettlement, causing inconvenience in the interim. Even after provision, in some of the
schemes the supply was reportedly erratic. Nonetheless, to be able to provide running water to
more than 2,000 houses in a newly established settlement in an outlying area within a few years
after its inception represents success in the context of a developing country like Sri Lanka. As
the area was gradually being drawn into the fold of a larger urban development plan, the minor
problems experienced with water supply can be expected to be resolved eventually.
4.4 Sanitation
In many of the schemes in New Town and Seenigama, sanitation presented a problem. Standard
size septic tanks had been built without taking into account household size. Thus in larger
households, the tanks filled up quickly and overflowed during the rainy season – another public
health hazard. In many cases, no soak pit was provided, so liquid waste from the septic tank
overflowed into the backyard during the rainy season. Many households were found draining
the liquid waste into the backyard garden, with the hope it of serving as fertiliser, resulting in
very unhygienic conditions and breeding of mosquitoes and other insects. With blocked open
drains and overflowing septic tanks, the environment in these settlements often became highly
unpleasant and unhealthy, especially during the rainy season.
In Chennai, the sewage system worked well and this was one achievement all interview
respondents praised. This represents a success story in the context of a low-cost housing
scheme in a developing country like India. Good sewage contributes to public health, especially
in such high density settlements where epidemics can spread rapidly. On the other hand, in the
apartment housing scheme in Hambantota town, original septic tanks did not have sufficient
capacity and hence larger septic tanks began to be built through the initiative of a community
development organisation. However a dispute with the contractor developed mid-way during
the work, resulting in the contractor abandoning the half-finished work, which remained lying
in that condition for a long time, observed at the time of fieldwork for this study.
A problem cited by apartment residents both in Chennai and Hambantota was having only one
toilet, especially in large households; long waiting times resulted in household squabbles. In
their previous situation, they could go to the bush to relieve themselves, not an ideal situation,
but common practice for a large segment of the population in South Asia. This was no longer
an option within the confinement of an apartment, necessitating adaptation to a new way of life.
4.5 Solid waste management
Hambantota New Town lacked many services; a housing-first-infrastructure-later approach was
followed (Dunn, 2006). Because it was then not under the jurisdiction of the Urban Council,
there was no waste collection as the Provincial Council did not manage garbage, and residents
were required to manage their own waste; only in the more dense urban areas was waste
management a civic services issue. There was a garbage dump south of New Town within the
boundary of Hambantota town, which was managed by the Urban Council. That was too far for
households living in the northern part of New Town, and even for those in the southern part it
required significant effort to take household waste there, though some households did claim to
be doing that. Although some households burnt and buried non-biodegradable waste and used
organic waste as compost for backyard gardening, there was widespread littering in communal
areas and on the fringes of New Town. This was a public health issue and a matter of
institutional misfit between the Urban and Provincial Councils. In addition, the garbage
attracted wild elephants from the nearby woods, leading to a safety problem.
Indiscriminate littering of communal areas within the apartment compounds in Chennai has
been described above in section 3. There were communal garbage bins outside the main gates
of the compounds, and households were expected to dispose their waste there for municipal
collection. However the widespread littering of communal spaces indicated this practice was
not being followed properly. Even the collection areas near the gates appeared neglected with
overflowing bins and garbage piles on the ground, and stray animals scavenging in the rubbish -
indicating insufficient or irregular municipal collection. Mere provision of a waste collection
service is not adequate. With communities making the transition to a new settlement and way of
life, in a context of rapid urbanisation, densification of settlements and increasing amounts of
industrial waste products, communities need other forms of support such as awareness raising,
waste management training, access to recycling and compost plants and even economic
incentives and employment opportunities for effective solid waste management.
On the other hand, in the apartment housing scheme in Hambantota town, the environment was
clean and there was very little littering. As discussed above in section 3, the implementing
agency had provided support and basic training on sanitation and environmental management to
the community. Additionally, being in a central urban area, and also being a smaller and less
dense city than Chennai, there was reportedly regular collection of waste by the Urban Council
from the built-in bins near the main gate. The bins were colour-coded for separation of organic
and non-organic wastes and households reported separating and bringing their waste in plastic
bags for disposal in the bins. This example represents another success story, particularly in the
context of a developing country like Sri Lanka where such waste management practices and
institutional support are generally weak.
The implementing agency of the resettlement schemes in Seenigama had also attempted to
incorporate to some extent such household level garbage management within its programme.
Each beneficiary household was given two plastic garbage bins of different colours for waste
separation and basic training on waste management was given. Several households reported
their good waste management practice: separation of garbage, using organic waste as compost
in home gardens, regularly placing bins next to the road for waste collection by Urban Council
trucks, with some households even washing the bins afterwards. However this initiative was not
without its problems: Erratic waste collection by the Urban Council and persistence of former
habits of poor waste management threatened to undo the progress made. Nonetheless, the
initiative was definitely a step forward and the problems experienced are characteristic of a
transitional stage of moving away from earlier unorganised waste disposal patterns.
4.6 Security
The original woodlands cleared to build Hambantota New Town consisted of an elephant
corridor and wild elephants continued to inhabit the nearby woods, often foraging outside.
Although in New Town there was electricity supply, there were no street lights, hence
contributing to the elephant hazard after dark. Getting about at night presented a problem and it
was not considered safe for women and children to venture outside after dark. In some schemes,
posts for future streetlights had been provided at the back of houses because it was perceived by
the service provider that placing them on the unpaved streets in front might cause problems
when roads would be paved later and drains built. However placing the lights at the rear served
little purpose as the streets remained dark and consequently restricted movement. Additional
hazards of proximity to the woods included monkeys that damaged roof tiles and stole food and
other items, and infestation by poisonous snakes and insects. Residents lived in constant fear,
especially at night, and despite the warm climate usually kept doors and windows closed.
The lack of, or inadequate, street lighting presented a security problem in several programmes.
In Chennai, street lights had been provided, but frequently did not work. Drugs and heavy
drinking was common in these settlements, as well as crime and unreliable police service. Unlit
areas were thus off-limits. A “planning flaw” admitted by an implementing agency official was
to build a wall around the apartment compounds. The outside of the wall was quickly
encroached upon by informal and illegal developments, using it as structural support for lean-to
structures. Without a formal security system the compounds were generally porous, so other
than a symbolic representation of security, the walls did not have any real function. There was
however, to some extent, an informal security system. Young men of the community usually
interrogated any suspicious-looking visitor before they were allowed to enter the compound.
In one of the Seenigama programmes, there were no street lights. Because this scheme was
inserted as a resettlement programme within a wider community, it was viewed by the
neighbouring communities as receiving many free benefits, creating a sense of disparity.
Frequent robbery and theft and the lack of street lights added to the atmosphere of insecurity.
Some beneficiaries commented that although this was a walled compound, there were three
entry points, none guarded, thus along with burglars, stray animals also came into the
compound from the surrounding areas, eating and damaging trees and gardens, defecating and
causing other forms of nuisance. A simple and inexpensive „cow-trap‟ at the gates, a design
commonly used in nearby India, could have kept at least the stray animals away.
5. Conclusion
Although these resettlement programmes might eventually receive more services and some of
the above problems are addressed, many of the planning flaws would be very difficult and
expensive to rectify. Many beneficiaries might continue to abandon, lease or transfer ownership
– common in all the programmes – unless further efforts are invested soon. Where some effort
has been given to build awareness and strengthen community cohesion, results have been
positive. There is thus scope for continuing to work with the communities, for example through
re-education programmes for solid waste management, and supporting the development of
community-based institutions such as residents‟ cooperatives and micro-enterprises.
Residents of the settlements were resilient and adaptive, and sought ways to improve their
living conditions. Many nurtured home gardens and grew food, evident even in the apartment
schemes. In the absence or inadequacy of waste collection systems, many households managed
their own solid waste by separating organic waste for garden compost and burning and burying
non-biodegradable waste. Home-made rattles, wind chimes and scarecrows were placed to scare
wild elephants in Hambantota New Town. One household was found to have dug out its
malfunctioning septic tank to build a larger and better one. Another household, allocated a
condemned house in New Town, spent more than 400,000 SL Rupees (about $4,000) from
personal savings and loans, a significant amount in that context, to improve the property; the
front yard of this house was transformed into a small banana plantation, bringing income.
These examples underscore that such communities have inherent adaptive skills and are able to
maximise them with some support; whereas top-down heavy-handed processes usually
undermine such skills. In the case studies of this paper, representative of typical post-tsunami
settlement programmes, there was none or minimal community consultation; most beneficiaries
were simply allocated a property for resettlement. Consultation and participation of
communities at all stages of decision-making, planning and implementation together with
appropriate technical and management support could enhance the quality of the programmes. A
synthesis of local/informal knowledge with global/professional knowledge through
participatory dialogue between beneficiary communities and implementing agencies offers
potential for better results, as found in action-research projects elsewhere is South Asia (see
Ahmed, 2001) and in owner-driven projects by some agencies (see UN-Habitat, 2009).
However making such improvements was usually possible, at least over the short term, for
households that had dispensable income or access to funds. For the many subsistence-level
households, there was often little recourse but to continue living in an unsatisfactory state until
funds became available. Future agency efforts should begin by conducting a needs assessment
of such vulnerable households and build upon the inherent adaptive skills of such communities.
There is much scope for rethinking at the institutional and policy level, within and outside Sri
Lanka and India. In a context of climate change, and increasing frequency, magnitude and
intensity of disaster events, reconstruction and resettlement may continue as significant urban
development interventions in the coming future. Experiences such as in the case studies allow
drawing lessons that can guide future policy and practice for sustainable urban development
and settlement planning in a post-disaster context.
Acknowledgement: Emergency Management Network of the National Climate Change
Adaptation Research Network (NCCARF) for funding to attend the conference.
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