Port State control vflag State control: UK government position

Douglas Bell

The context and identification of the problem is considered, followed by a discussion of the nature of flag and port State control. The arguments for flag State control v port State control are oulined. In conclusion the various current moves to deal with substandard ships are reviewed.

The accident rate in the UK fleet has dropped dramatically over the last 40 years. The current rate is approximately one-third of that in 1950. In world terms accident rates are difficult to come by. However, loss rates can give some indication of the change in the safety record and it can be seen that the rate has declined consistently over the same period. Given that there has been this continual decline in accident rates, loss rates and, therefore, an improvement in safety standards, why is it the general perception that the problem is getting worse?

Public perception is coioured to a large extent by what it sees in the world around it and what it reads in the press. Shipping has become a low profile industry in recent years. Most shipping activities have moved away from the main centres of population. Ports have moved to the mouths of rivers rather than the centres of cities. Oil and other bulk loading terminals tend to be in remote spots. Larger ships have meant fewer ships. New loading and discharging techniques have meant that ships remain shorter periods of time in port. The result of all this has been that people see ships less frequently than they used to. It is a common perception that ships are no longer a major part of our trading pattern.

Reporting in the press tends to be confined to disasters and bad news. Television reporting concentrates almost exclusively on these aspects of the shipping industry. The combination of a low profile and disaster reporting result in shipping becoming regarded as being old fashioned and prone to causing major accidents and environmental pollu- tion. Those associated with the industry know that the converse of this is in fact the case; more than 90% of the 1JK’s overseas trade is carried by sea. Ships tend to be environmentally friendly in comparison to other forms of transport and a ship’s output of pollutants per tonne of cargo carried is very small

Having tried to put the problem in context it has to be recognized that there is a problem and some aspects can be dealt with. Therefore, it is worth spending some time trying to see if there is a better way forward.

Captain Douglas Bell is Deputy Surveyor General, Marine Directorate, Department of Transport, Southampton, UK.

Owner, master and crew

Responsibility for ship safety lies in a number of hands, but the primary responsibility must always lie with the owner, the master and the crew.

The owner must provide a ship which meets recognized safety standards and which is in good condition. He must also provide sufficient freedom in the operation of the ship to allow the master to take safe operational decisions. The owner also has a responsibility to choose his crew with care, ensuring that they are properly qualified and have proper experience on the types of ships and with the types of cargoes with which they are going to sail. The master and crew have a responsibility to ensure that the ship is properly maintained within the limits of their own abilities and the resources provided and they also have a respons- ibility to operate the ship in a safe manner.

There have been an increasing number of ships owned by non-ship owners and managed by separate companies, a number of which operate by providing the cheapest service rather than the one which produces the safest and most satisfactory result. Consequently there has been a diminution of primary safety control by owners. At the same time there has been an increasing use of crews, and especially of officers, from the Third World. There has been a tendency for training to be less thorough than used to be the case. Consequently there has been a dinlinution of on-board management ability.

Flag State

Primary responsibility for setting and monitoring safety standards lies with the flag State. Nowadays most flag States take as their basic standards those which are set in the international maritime conventions. However, the level of enforcement of those standards varies greatly from administration to administration. In the more traditional maritime fleets, standards are tightly controlled and care- fully monitored, proper provision for training is provided for officers and crew and the examinations for certificates of coinpetcncy are rigorous.

Over recent years an increasing proportion of the world’s fleet has been put under flags of convenience or open registers, some of which are less than rigorous in their application of standards and their monitoring of conditions on-board ship. Few have their own training establishments for officers or crew and many will accept certificates of competency which meet very low standards.

0308-597X/93/050367-04 0 1993 Butterworth-Heinemann Ltd 367

In the less well regulated ~~dministr~~tions there has been a level ot hurc;~ucr;~cy which would impose additional hur-

tendency for more work to he delegated to less reputable den\ upon them. The former set of concerns ctiminishccl

classification strcietit3 and for owners to hc ahlc to t’xc’i-- considerably long hcfor-e the hreah up of the IJSSR and

ciw ;I greater control on the standartlx which arc applied. the Eastern Bloc ;I\ \ucti. In fact negotiations wc21-c under-

\\;I\ for the LISSR to hecomc ;I Ggnatory of the Memoran-

Decline of standards

If stmdarcl\ h:r\:c declinctl 2s drani;~tic;illy ;I\ the preuiing

rcniarla indicate. it would Ix rea\on;ihle 10 expect that

this cleclinc woutct he rcflectetl in the accident t-ate\. So

\+hv hax thi\ not heen the tax? Three clenwnts help to

malntxin wfety c‘\‘cii untlcr- adverse conditions. First, the

fact that W;IITICII art‘ poorly trained does not n~can that

they xc foolhardy. They ha\,e the wnlc wise of xclf-

prcscrvation which \e;umen have alway had. Second, the

majority of ship are classed Lbith rcputahle ctas\ification

\ocictie\ and despite the prex\urc\ which are put on them.

the more reputable societies ;~ppl> stantlard~ which xc

higher than those which the administr~ltionx would prow

ihl) apply left to theii- on ii clevice~. Third, thcrc ha4 hccn

an incrc’asc in the euercisc of control hv pot-t Statch.

Port State control

Port State contr-ol. which i\ the ability to inspect foreign

ships in one‘s own port. ha\ existed for ;i very long tinic. In

the LJK it certainly pee\ back to the 1HO4 Act and prohahl>

hetore then. It was also built into the 1929 Safety of Life at

Sea (SOLAS) Convention. 1 lowcver. the rigorou\ and

cc~ordinated applic;ition of port Slate control i\ 2 relati\el!

recent phenonicnon antI to somt extent i\ ;I reaction to the

various point\ which ha\c heen outlinctt carlici-. The initial

f laguc Menioranduni of 197s which w;i\ signed h) eight

coiintric\ u’;i% the fir4t attempt hy Europcdn coiintr.ic\ to

ccqxratt’ to cn\iit-e a coot-tlinated approach to port State

control. Llnfortuniitet\; hcforc it could he pi-opcrl) in-

plcnicntecl the Af~loco (‘ctrliz went aground on the Brittany

coast in IOH2 and ;L\ ;I coilscq~icilct’ intcrc\t in port State

control dc\elopcd ;~nd qre;d. The Pal-is Mcmmndum ot

IJntl~r~tandiri~. which w;i\ ;I more coinpi-chcnG\c CIOCII-

nicnt \igncd hy 11 coiintric‘5. wa\ rapidly clc\~cloped and

put into effect. l‘hi\ ic the docun~cnt unclcr which we

currently operate. Thei-c is nou ;I 15th nienil~cr~~ Poland

xid a nuniher of cooperating partner\ - the I ISA. (‘anacla.

<‘roati;l and Japn. (‘roatin and <‘ailad;~ at-e likcl) to

hcccmc fidl menil~crs iti the not too distant firturc.

It it impot-tant to ~rccognizc that the Pat-i\ Menlot-arldum \eth no iic’w ~tandarcl~. it simply \ccl\\ to cn\uI-c that all

\hip\ operating in the hlemorandunl art‘2 nicct the intcr-

n;ltiorially agreed xtand;ird~. It5 rcle\.ant docunlcnt~ iii-c

the \;il-ioil\ Intc‘r’i~;rtionaI Maritime 0rganizatic)n (IMO) convcntionx. ;i numhet- of IMO re\olutionh and Interna-

tional I.aboiir Office (11.0) <‘c)nvcnlion 147.

It i\ perhap” bar-d to re;lliLc noi\ lhat when port State

control. in the form of Ihe Men~orantlunr. U;I\ first intro-

duccd it \va\ met with ;I good deal of suspicion. This c‘amc

from two main u)iircc\. The Cil\lerN bloc countries felt it

\v;I\ ;I iliciin\ of controlling tl-a& :~ntl discrimin~rting

against their dips. Ship o\\ncr\ felt that it \\;I\ a further

dum ;tt the time it collapsccl. The Ru\\ian Ftxkration i\

now con\idcring taking up this application. The ~ccond

\ourcc of \u\picion from \hip owner\ h;i\ aI\0 din~inished

01 c‘r the y;~r\. The reputahlc ownc’r ncnz realize\ that hc

ha\ little to fear from port State control. kle also rccog-

iii/c\ that if port State control can Icniovc suh~tandarcl

\hip from tr’xle~ then the playin, ~1 ficid ha\ heen Icvelled

to \omc CYtl‘nt.

The Memorandum has dcvelol~ed over the la\t IO years

and I a111 pleased to say that the UK has pl;~yxt ;I Icacling

I-olc 111 pl-educing the change. Port State control inspec-

tion\ ilou covet- both operational niattcr\ 2nd inspections

of the \hip and it\ cquipnicnt. Initially only the I;ktTer tuo -.

hlore rc’cintlv still. ;iii anlcndmcnt to ltle Meniorantluni

(11 Clntler\tantl~ng ha\ hc’c11 atloptcd which ;IIIoN\ the

targeting of \hip\ which fly the flag\ of St;ltc\ which ha\c

po0rc.I than ;i\cLr-age \;ltct\ rcc01-dx. This \\‘;I\ re\i\rcd for- ;I

loii~ l~nic ;I\ it cc)ntr;ivcntion of the pt-o\ ision of the

hlcnioraiitl~~~ii which \tatc\ that there \houltl Ix no tli\cri-

mination 011 the groundx ot flag. I lowc\cl-. the IIE: was

\uccc\\ful in pcr\u;idin g it\ parHner\ that tli\crimin;ltion ;I\

c~riginall) intended wit\ tli~crimin;~lion on economic 01.

political grountl\. It had nc\cr hecn the intzntiorl of the

c)rigiil;ll dratrcr\ th;kt tli\cl’imiii;rtiol~ on mfctv ground\

should Ix c~cludctl. .l‘hi\ nc’\z pro\ i5ion c’;~nlc into eftect in

.luly lY).3. The nic’;~\iii~c of the \afct! rccot-tl cd the flag i\

rhc ;ippcar;incc of th;il tlag on the Table of /\bo\c

;\vcr-;I~C I)el;~!\ ~tncl Dctcntion\ in the Annii;il ficport c)t

the ~lemor~inclrini. R iicn t:ll>lc i\ hcing prcp;it-cd which

\\iJI g\c’ ;I rolling avcr;igc of the I;l\t three vc‘;Ir\ of dcl;l\,\

arid dcti’iition5 lo csn;ihle courllric\ 10 taryct ths Ion$-term

p~‘l~lcill flag\.

Coastal State control

Of courw flag State and porT State r-~sl”)tl~ihiliti~~ ;incI

right\ I~;I\c lo he \ct 111 the wide contest. The Hrclcr

illustrated perfectly the prol~lemx of the coastal St:ltc.

C‘oa\~al State rights arc‘ limitc‘tt and many of the solutions

\ought 10 prevent :I rccui-i-once of the Hrtrcr tyc incident

h;i\,c iriin into legal pl-ohlthms. (‘oa\tal St:ltcs have to

repect the iright of innocc‘nt passage end~rlnccl in the Ia\\

of the \e;i ;ind they h;i\,c no real control over the \hip

MARINE POLICY September 1993

ity booklet he can verify that its layout meets the required standards but he has no way of checking the background calculations.

Even when he is looking at standard safety items such as lifeboats, he can ascertain that the boat can be lowered and launched safely. But he cannot check whether that boat would be stable in a seaway when fully laden with passengers, nor can he verify the standard of construction of the boat and therefore its strength.

Port State control has distinct limitations. In theory, of course, it would be possible to go back to basics on every single ship and to carry out the same sort of checks which a flag State would do. However. apart from the cost, which would be enormous, the conventions stipulate that a ship should not be unduly delayed or detained and give scope for penalizing any State which does unduly delay or detain another administration’s ship. Therefore, in practice this is not an option.

If port State control is so limited. how can it be made to be effective? Fortunately, most ships arc built in reputable yards and their construction is supervised by reputable administrations or classification societies. Therefore, most ships start life complying with the current Conventions. Problems tend to arise because of less than vigilant supervision or management of the ship, poorly trained crews or undetected or unrepaired deterioration of the hull or equipment. These are all areas which port State control is either addressing or through IMO is attempting to address. IMO is starting a new subcommittee on flag State implementation. A working group is developing a safe management certificate. The STW Committee is beginning a revision of the 1978 STCW Convention to bring the thinking on training and qualifications up to date. The UK is taking an active role in all of these changes and in many more besides. If the changes are developed as we foresee them then at least some aspects will be able to be monitored through the port State control system.

As has been made clear above, tlag State control cannot be readily replaced by port State control. The UK govern- ment has continually stressed the importance of flag States exercising their full convention functions. Llnfortunately, until such time as all flag State administrations do fully take on their convention responsibilities. it will be neces- sary for any port State which values its environment and the safety of its seas to exercise some measure of a monitoring function to try to impose recognized interna- tional standards onto those who arc reluctant to follow them voluntarily.

It is perhaps worth spending a short while seeing what port State inspectors can achieve. An inspection starts before an inspector leaves his office. He checks the records of the ship which he is about to examine on the port State control computer to see what has happened to it during previous inspections. He also tries to ascertain whether it is carrying any dangerous cargoes and if it is. he checks on the regulations governing the carriage of those particular goods. By the time the inspector walks to the ship he is already in possession of at least some basic

which pass their coast. Clearly, the UK is concerned about all aspects of this. It is concerned to protect its environ- ment but it is also conscious of the need to allow ships to trade as freely as possible.

Flag State control v port State control

It is sometimes argued that flag State control is being superseded by port State control. Indeed it is sometimes argued that if the flag States won’t do the job the port States must.

There are two strong arguments against the replacement cjf flag State control by port State control. First. port State ccmtrol is a subsidy of the ineffective by the effective. Second, without the total cooperation of the flag State it c;m never be a full substitute for a flag State regime.

Where a ship is detained it is a provision of the appropriate conventions that the flag State should always be informed. With certain flag States a detention of one of their ships always brings a response. Very often this response is to say .thank you for the action which you have taken against our ship. We wish to maintain high standards and fully support you in the action that you have taken’. On the surface this sounds like the response of a caring administration. However, behind it is an administration which fails to enforce proper standards and relies on the port State control regime to prevent accidents on its ships.

The ship owner on the reputable flag pays twice for this. Ile pays, first of all, for his own flag State administration and the survey regime which it establishes. IIe also has to pay taxes for the port State control regime which allows the flag of convenience owner to pay even smaller taxes to maintain its flag State administration. Therefore, it can be seen that port State control is both a subsidy and a penalty. A subsidy to the poorer administration and a penalty on the owner that flies the respectable flag.

If the financial implications are ignored, the question then has to be asked - can port State control ever be as effective as that of the flag State’?

By the time a ship arrives in a port State, it is already built and the port State therefore has no control over the standards of design, construction or equipment. The ship i\ fully crewed and the standards of training and qualifica- tion of that crew have already been determined. Any deficiencies in these basic elements are very difficult for the port State to detect and even if they can be detected, correction is not easy.

To take a simple example: when structural fire protec- tion is installed in a new ship the specification includes standards for heat and fire resistance. It also includes guidance or instructions on the methods of installation. When the ship is in operation, structural fire protection is covered by decorative facings and is inaccessible to a port State control inspector. Even if he were able to look at the tire protection materials, he would be unable to detect visually the standards to which it had been made or installed.

A second example would be in the area of stability. If the port State control inspector examines the ship’s stabil-

MARINE POLICY September 1993 369

information about the ship and possibly its history and the cargoes that it is carrying. Depending on the size and type of ship he may well take a stroll along the quay to look at the general external condition of the ship. Walking up the gangway very often tell\ a great deal about the general way in which ;I ship is run. A sound gangway which is well

secured and properly \et out and carefully tended dots

display a certain care for the ship which is probably going

to be reflected in other aspects.

Inspector\ often look like lost souls when they stand

around on board a ship. It is not unusual for a member of

crew to come up and ask them if they are lost. However,

appearances can be deceptive. What the inspector is

doing, even if he cannot necessarily articulate it, is making

an assessment of the managerial competence of those who

run the ship. He looks at the general condition of the deck

and the deck appliances. He looks at the general state of

the accommod~~tioii. the mooring arrangements and so on

and forms a general view of the competence of those on

board. This i\ a very important part of the whole inspec-

tion. For it is in these initial minutes on board that hc

determines the course of the whole examination of the

ship.

He will then probably go to the master’s cabin and

examine the ship’s paperwork. This is also ;I necessary part of the inspection; not only is it the apect which is laid

down in the conventions. but a ship whose paperwork

reflects ;i casual attitude towards carrying out surveys on

time probably indicates poor management.

The convention says that if at this stage the ship’s

paperwork i\ in order, then the inspection should end

unless there are clear grounds for going further. Clear grounds means that ;I report has been received of prob-

lems on the ship; the surveys have not been carried out as

required by statute or there are some obvious defects

which the surveyor has already picked up. In practice even

if such clear grounds have not been found, the inspector

will a\k the master if he would mind him taking ;I look

around his chip. It would be very rare indeed for such a

request to be refused. What the inspector looks at from

this point onwards depends very much on what he has seen

during his initial moments on board and what he finds as

he walks around the ship.

Conclusion

The UK strongly supports the various move’s that are

being made to strengthen flag State control. especially the

work of the new TM0 Flag State Implementation Commit-

tee. This body will have a very difficult task to achieve

anything worthwhile, but if it fails there is really no

alternative. Ultimately. flag States must be able to control

their own ships.

The UK government is also backing moves to increase

the effectiveness of port State control both in Europe and

throughout the world. In Europe the EC is pushing for ;I

more uniform application of port Stntc control and is in

the position of being able to put pressure on those EC

countries which don’t currently enforce as rigorously as others. The Port State Control Committee is discussing the

adoption of common criteria for the detention of ships and

i\ looking at further ways to ensure common inspection

standards. It is alscl looking at ways of targeting its efforts

more effectively. However. targeting should never be

total. Good flag and good companies have defects that

should never be ignored. Targeting also tends to distort

the statistics which can result in the wrong ships cventuallq

being targeted.

Worldwide. there has been a great deal of interat

shown in regional port State control agreements. Latin

America now has an agreement and the Asian Pacific

region hopes to be in ;I position to sign an agrecmcnt in

I994 or Ic)OS.

With the two-pronged attack of pushing for increased

flag State control and tighter Port State control, perhaps

WC’ can sustain the worldwide downward trend in accident

statistics. If we are not successful, then perhaps ;I few years

from now the graph may bc moving not downwards but

upwards, and that would be a real tragedy.

370 MARINE POLICY September 1993