CHREA vs.CHRG.R. No. 155336

FACTS: Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission.By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification.The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the request.In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum, recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees association (CHREA) in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a Resolution and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same.CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHR’s fiscal autonomy.

ISSUE: Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions

in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?

HELD: the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the CA and its are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling CSC-National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The 3 CHR Resolutions, without the approval of the DBM are disallowed.1.  RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law, provides that it is the DBM that shall establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification System.The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is flawed considering that the coverage thereof encompasses the entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification.This power to “administer” is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by the CA. The word to administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to direct or superintend the execution, application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to administer the government of the state.2.  The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of PRA v. Buñag, this Court ruled that compensation, allowances, and other benefits received by PRA officials and employees without the requisite approval or authority of the DBM are unauthorized and irregularIn Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the sole power and discretion to administer the compensation and position classification system of the national government.In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the charter of the PPC grants it the power to fix the compensation and benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from the coverage of the rules and regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification Office, by virtue of Section 6 of

P.D. No. 1597, the compensation system established by the PPC is, nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM.(It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting the compensation structure of its personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board of Directors and deprive the latter of its discretion on the matter. Rather, the DBM’s function is merely to ensure that the action taken by the Board of Directors complies with the requirements of the law, specifically, that PPC’s compensation system “conforms as closely as possible with that provided for under R.A. No. 6758.” )3. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in government. This is consonant to the mandate of the DBM under the RAC of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Department of Budget and Management shall assist the President in the preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of the National Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement of more economy and efficiency in the management of government operations, administration of compensation and position classification systems, assessment of organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational implications.Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and creation of additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve the proposed reclassification of positions as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM requesting approval thereof. As such, it is now estopped from now claiming that the nod of approval it has previously sought from the DBM is a superfluity

4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a constitutional commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.Palpably, the CA’s Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to the species of constitutional commissions. But the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy.Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional commissions shall include only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA, which are granted independence and fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of similar powers to the other bodies including the CHR. Thus:SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. – The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.SEC. 29. Other Bodies. – There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman, a Commission on Human Rights, and independent central monetary authority, and a national police commission. Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may establish an independent economic and planning agency.From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.

Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to time.22 In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon,23 it is understood that it is only the Judiciary, the CSC, the COA, the COMELEC, and the Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy.Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by membership.We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while cited under the heading of the CHR, did not specifically mention CHR as among those offices to which the special provision to formulate and implement organizational structures apply, but merely states its coverage to include Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomyAll told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law. We are of the same mind with the DBM on its standpoint, thus-Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and

Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law.5. The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is the provision of Rep. Act No. 8522 “that the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws.”26

NOTES:1. Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no locus standi considering that there exists no official written record in the Commission recognizing petitioner as a bona fide organization of its employees nor is there anything in the records to show that its president has the authority to sue the CHR.On petitioner’s personality to bring this suit, we held in a multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. Here, petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR, protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in the Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHR’s upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails eating up the Commission’s savings or that portion of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the employees, including those in the rank and file, are derived.Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance of the CHREA’s request to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-National Capital Region Office. CHREA’s personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the CA when it passed upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither should our hands be tied by this technical concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the complaint nor in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.

2. In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary Standardization Law of “providing equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions,” the DBM, in the case under review, made a determination, after a thorough evaluation, that the reclassification and upgrading scheme proposed by the CHR lacks legal rationalization.The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general provisions of the General Appropriations Act FY 1998, which the CHR heavily relies upon to justify its reclassification scheme, explicitly provides that “no organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by the President.” Here, the DBM discerned that there is no law authorizing the creation of a Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent CHR’s proposal to upgrade twelve positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28, and four positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office, the DBM denied the same as this would change the context from support to substantive without actual change in functions.This view of the DBM, as the law’s designated body to implement and administer a unified compensation system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. CA, we echoed the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS

Facts: The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Issue(s):Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.

Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by

means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the

power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be made between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen over the former.The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.  

KILOSBAYAN VS GUINGONA

GR No. 113375, May 5, 1994FACTS:Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the authority to hold and conduct “charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities,” the PCSO decided to establish an on-line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, “a multinational company and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia,” “became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO.” As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through its individual nominees) organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which “was intended to be the medium through which the technical and management services required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO.”Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease Contract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO. On 15 August 1993, PGMC submitted its bid to the PCSO. On 21 October 1993, the Office of the President announced that it had given the respondent PGMC the go-signal to operate the country’s on-line lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract would be submitted not later than 8 November 1993 “for final clearance and approval by the Chief Executive.”

On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to President Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of

the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. Considering the denial by the Office of the President of its protest and the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that “only a court injunction can stop Malacañang,” and the imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in February 1994, KILOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition.

Petitioner claims that it is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders. The rest of the petitioners, except Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Tañada and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as members of the Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens. Senators Webb and Tañada and Representative Arroyo are suing in their capacities as members of Congress and as taxpayers and concerned citizens of the Philippines. The public respondents, meanwhile allege that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit, citing the Court’s resolution in Valmonte vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi2. Whether or the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign.” is legal and valid.

HELD:We find the instant petition to be of transcendental

importance to the public. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.The language of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169 is indisputably clear. The PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither can it assign, transfer, or lease such franchise. Whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.

Undoubtedly, from the very inception, the PCSO and the PGMC mutually understood that any arrangement between them would necessarily leave to the PGMC the technical, operations, and management aspects of the on-line lottery system while the PSCO would, primarily, provide the franchise. The so-called Contract of Lease is not, therefore, what it purports to be. Woven therein are provisions which negate its title and betray the true intention of the parties to be in or to have a joint venture for a period of eight years in the operation and maintenance of the on-line lottery system.

We thus declare that the challenged Contract of Lease violates the exception provided for in paragraph B, Section 1

of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to law. This conclusion renders unnecessary further discussion on the other issues raised by the petitioners.

SANIDAD VS COMELEC

On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.  Twenty days after, the President issued another related decree, PD No. 1031, amending the previous PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in “barangays” applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD No. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its “whereas” clauses that the people’s continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.

The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.

HELD: The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question.  This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: “All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . ..” The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of

treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself.  The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time.

LAMP VS SECRETARY OF DBM

FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. “It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction,”8 and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance.RESPONDENT’S POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel.

ISSUES: 1) whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case; and 2) whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal.

HELD:I.A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual

challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court.LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.II.The Court rules in the negative.In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because “to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.”The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion.

Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioner’s request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.PORK BARREL:The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive.”33 This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact._______________NOTES:POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW:(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS COMELEC

FACTS:Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a “Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative” (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached “Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation; and (3) Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is a valid exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A. No. 6375 failed to be an enabling law because of its deficiency and inadequacy, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void.

ISSUE:Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2) R.A. No. 6735 is adequate to cover the system of initiative on amendment to the Constitution, and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid. .

HELD:NO.  Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silence in subtitles simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation. Provisions COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution are declared void.

RATIO:Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No. 6735 failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people’s initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law. The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits, and voters’ identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:

PUNO, concurring and dissenting

I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it orders the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view that R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot implement the people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)

VITUG, concurring and dissenting

I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by the Court did not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign for constitutional amendments.[T]he TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made permanent under the ponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be so understood as having intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people initiative.

FRANCISCO, concurring and dissenting

There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a scholarly and well-written ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (MELO and MENDOZA concur)PANGANIBAN, concurring and dissentingOur distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:

(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the “initiatory” Delfin Petition.(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to “be directly proposed by the people through initiative,” there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is “incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.”(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, “insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void.”I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required number of signatures — in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in every legislative district — no public funds may be spent and no government resources may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the majority’s two other rulings.

SALONGA VS PANO

FACTS: A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. On September 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost killed himself and injured his younger brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building in Manila. Found in Lovely's possession by police and military authorities were several pictures taken sometime in May 1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb. Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were among those whose likenesses appeared in the group pictures together with other guests, including Lovely. As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought by military and police authorities to the AFP Medical Center (V. Luna Hospital)where he was place in the custody and detention of Col. Roman P. Madella, under the over-all direction of General Fabian Ver, head of the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA). Shortly afterwards, Mr. Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely where charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and damage to property. Bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted in the death of an American lady who was shopping at Rustan's Supermarket in Makati and others which caused injuries to a number of persons. The President's anniversary television radio press conference was broadcast. The younger brother of Victor Lovely, Romeo, was presented during the conference. The next day, newspapers came out with almost identical headlines stating in effect that Salonga had been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila. Meanwhile, Lovely was taken out of the hospital's intensive care unit and transferred to the office of Col. Madella where

he was held incommunicado for some time. More bombs were reported to have exploded at 3 big hotels in Metro Manila. The bombs injured 9 people. A meeting of the General Military Council was called for 6 October 1980. Minutes after the President had finished delivering his speech before the International Conference of the American Society of Travel Agents at the Philippine International Convention Center, as mall bomb exploded. Within the next 24 hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons, including Salonga, who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. Elements of the military went to the hospital room of Salonga at the Manila Medical Center where he was confined due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed him under arrest. The arresting officer showed Salonga the ASSO form which however did not specify the charge or charges against him.

ISSUE: Whether the Court may still elaborate on a decision when the lower courts have dropped the case against petitioner Salonga.

HELD: The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions. The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. In dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a P1,195,200.00 bail bond as excessive and,therefore, constitutionally void, escaped from the

provincial jail while his petition was pending. The petition became moot because of his escape but we nonetheless rendered a decision. In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree 15, the Center's new charter pursuant to the President's legislative powers under martial law. Still, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture for national identity. In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile (59 SCRA183), during the pendency of the case, 26 petitioners were released from custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner was facing charges of murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent the Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decision sever printed in the Reports. Herein, the prosecution evidence miserably fails to establish a prima facie case against Salonga, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of any subversive organization. The respondents have taken the initiative of dropping the charges against Salonga. The Court reiterates the rule, however, that the Court will not validate the filing of an information based on the kind of evidence against Salonga found in the records.

TANADA VS ANGARA

I.      THE FACTS

 Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO).  They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.” Further, they contended that the “national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”

II.    THE ISSUE

Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?

III.   THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]

NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade

liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.

There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.

[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either.In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.                                                                                           xxx                              xxx                              xxx

[T]he constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy” does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the

national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities.

The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles — while serving as judicial and legislative guides — are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a “trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity” and the promotion of industries “which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international

law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.

That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no “patent and gross” arbitrariness or despotism “by reason of passion or personal hostility” in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.

SANLAKAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued. 

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the

Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion. 

Issue: 

Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional? 

Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit? 

Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.

The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present. 

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

DAVID VS MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

FACTS:On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP

No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,†� and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal

arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. 

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:Whether or not the PP 1017  and G.O. No. 5 is

constitutional.

RULING:

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion”

Second provision:   “and to enforce obedience to all the laws  and  to  all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”

Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.”

PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.

First Provision: Calling Out Power.The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out

power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or

suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)

President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written.  In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that.  In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.  She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest.   Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power.  Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.

To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.The second provision pertains to the power of the

President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.  This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads: 

SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature.  Section 1, Article VI categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which

shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.”  To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. 

Third Provision: The Power to Take Over Distinction must be drawn between the President’s

authority to declare “a state of national emergency” and to exercise emergency powers.  To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised.  But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers.  This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it.  However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:

(1)   There must be a war or other emergency.(2)   The delegation must be for a limited period only. (3)  The delegation must be subject to such

restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.(4)  The emergency powers must be exercised to

carry out a national policy declared by Congress.          Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an

aspect of the emergency powers clause.  The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress.  Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with

public interest,”  it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.

Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress. 

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a   state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased.  Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over.   In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress. 

As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.”  Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.

FORTUN VS MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

I.      THE FACTS

On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family of Maguindanao gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians.  In response to this carnage, President Arroyo issued on November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.

On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. On December 6, 2009, President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress. On December 9, 2009, Congress convened in joint session to review the validity of the President’s action.  But two days later, or on December 12, 2009, before Congress could act, the President issued PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

II.    THE ISSUES

Did the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, render the issues moot and academic?

III.   THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions on the ground that they have become MOOT and ACADEMIC.]

YES, the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao, rendered the issues moot and academic

Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government dictate that the Court should be cautious in entertaining actions that assail the constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the Legislative department.  The issue of constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, must be the very issue of the case, that the resolution of such issue is unavoidable.            

The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two reasons:          

One.  President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same. xxx.

                        xxx                              xxx                              xxx

[U]nder the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.  They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.

Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated.  Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should

the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart.  The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same.  Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review.  The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.

Two.  Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented.  The military did not take over the operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao.  The President did not issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by Congress.  No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported.  Those who were arrested during the period were either released or promptly charged in court.  Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight days.  The point is that the President intended by her action to address an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated province.  In her judgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and amply armed government presence. 

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

xxx. In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took off.  The Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it having become moot and academic.

BAYAN VS ERMITA

Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880.

Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words “lawful cause,” “opinion,” “protesting or influencing” suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase “maximum tolerance” shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.

Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.

Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.

However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign “police power,” which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.

B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither the words “opinion,” “protesting,” and “influencing” in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a

recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plaza in every city or municipality that has not yet complied with section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED

ROQUE VS COMELEC

Facts

On 23 January 2007, Congress passed RA 9369 amending the first automated election law, RA 8436.[2] Section 5 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, which amendment took effect on 10 February 2007, authorized the COMELEC to:Use an automated election system or systems in the same election in different provinces, whether paper-based or a direct recording automated election system as it may deem appropriate and practical for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation and transmittal of results of electoral exercises: Provided, that for the regular national and local election, which shall be held immediately after effectivity of this Act, the AES shall be used in at least two highly urbanized cities and two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, to be chosen by the Commission x x x x In succeeding regular national or local elections, the AES shall be implemented nationwide. (Emphasis supplied)

The COMELEC did not use any automated election system in the 14 May 2007 elections, the national and local elections held after RA 9369 took effect.

On 10 July 2009, the COMELEC, on the one hand, and TIM and Smartmatic (Provider), on the other, signed the Contract for the automated tallying and recording of votes cast nationwide in the 10 May 2010 elections. For P7,191,484,739.48, the COMELEC leased for use in the 10 May 2010 elections 82,200 optical scanners (and related equipment) and hired ancillary services of the Provider.

On 9 July 2009, petitioners, as taxpayers and citizens, filed this petition[4] to enjoin the signing of the Contract or its implementation and to compel disclosure of the terms of the Contract and other agreements between the Provider and its subcontractors.[5] Petitioners sought the Contract's invalidation for non-compliance with the requirement in Section 5 of RA 8436, as amended, mandating the partial

use of an automated election system before deploying it nationwide. To further support their claim on the Contract's invalidity, petitioners alleged that (1) the optical scanners leased by the COMELEC do not satisfy the minimum systems capabilities" under RA 8436, as amended and (2) the Provider not only failed to submit relevant documents during the bidding but also failed to show "community of interest" among its constituent corporations as required in Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC(Infotech).

Issue

Whether or not, the COMELECgravely abuse its discretion when it entered to contract with Smartmatic TIM Corporation and assailing to an automated election.

Ruling

Assayed against the provisions of the Constitution, the enabling automation law, RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, the RFP and even the Anti-Dummy Law, which petitioners invoked as an afterthought, the Court finds the project award to have complied with legal prescriptions, and the terms and conditions of the corresponding automation contract in question to be valid. No grave abuse of discretion, therefore, can be laid on the doorsteps of respondent COMELEC. And surely, the winning joint venture should not be faulted for having a foreign company as partner.

The COMELEC is an independent constitutional body with a distinct and pivotal role in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its awesome functions as overseer of fair elections, administrator and lead implementor of laws relative to the conduct of elections, it should not be stymied with restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the case of an organization of lesser responsibility.[103] It should be afforded ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in

devising means and initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the great objective for which it was created--to promote free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections. This is as it should be for, too often, COMELEC has to make decisions under difficult conditions to address unforeseen events to preserve the integrity of the election and in the process the voice of the people. Thus, in the past, the Court has steered away from interfering with the COMELEC’s exercise of its power which, by law and by the nature of its office properly pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on comelec’s part, as here, the Court should refrain from utilizing the corrective hand of certiorari to review, let alone nullify, the acts of that body.

There are no ready-made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of the laws relative to the conduct of elections, x x x we must not by any excessive zeal take away from the comelec the initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it. Due regard to the independent character of the Commission x x x requires that the power of this court to review the acts of that body should, as a general proposition, be used sparingly, but firmly in appropriate cases.

.This independent constitutional commission, it is true, possesses extraordinary powers and enjoys a considerable latitude in the discharge of its functions. The road, however, towards successful 2010 automation elections would certainly be rough and bumpy. The comelec is laboring under very tight timelines. It would accordingly need the help of all advocates of orderly and honest elections, of all men and women of goodwill, to smoothen the way and assist comelec personnel address the fears expressed about the integrity of the system. Like anyone else, the Court would like and wish automated elections to succeed, credibly.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.