PKI Session Overview

1:30 pm edt - Welcome, etiquette, session outline

1:40 pm edt - HEPKI-TAG Update (Jim Jokl, Virginia)

2:00 pm edt - HEPKI-PAG Update (David Wasley, UCOP)

2:20 pm edt - FBCA and NIH Pilot Update (Peter Alterman, NIH)

2:40 pm edt - Discussion

3:00 pm Break

3:15 pm edt - Sean Smith, Dartmouth PKI Lab

3:30 pm edt - Keith Hazelton, Wisconsin PKI Lab

3:45 pm - Discussion

Some general comments

There are campus and corporate successes

• Corporations use internally for VPN, some authentication, signed email (with homogenous client base)

• MIT, UT medical, soon VA, UCOP

Key is limited application use, lightweight policy approaches

There is very limited interrealm, community of interest or general interoperable work going on

• Federal efforts

• Healthkey

• Higher Ed

• Some European miches

Why X.509/PKI?

Single infrastructure to provide all security services

Established technology standards, though little operational experience

Elegant technical underpinnings

Serves dozens of purposes - authentication, authorization, object encryption, digital signatures, communications channel encryption

Low cost in mass numbers

Why Not X.509/PKI?

High legal barriers

Lack of mobility support

Challenging user interfaces, especially with regard to privacy and scaling

Persistent technical incompatibilities

Overall complexity

D. Wasley’s PKI Puzzle

The Four Planes of PKI

on the road to general purpose interrealm PKI

the planes represent different levels of simplification from the dream of a full interrealm, intercommunity multipurpose PKI

simplifications in policies, technologies, applications, scope

each plane provides experience and value

The Four Planes are

Full interrealm PKI - (Boeing 777) - multipurpose, spanning broad and multiple communities, bridges to unite hierarchies, unfathomed directory issues

Simple interrealm PKI - (Regional jets) - multipurpose within a community, operating under standard policies and structured hierarchical directory services

PKI-light - (Corporate jets) - containing all the key components of a PKI, but many in simplified form; may be for a limited set of applications; can be extended within selected communities

PKI-ultralight (Ultralights) - easiest to construct and useful conveyance; ignores parts of PKI and not for use external to the institution; learn how to fly, but not a plane...

Examples of Areas of Simplification

Spectrum of Assurance Levels

Signature Algorithms Permitted

Range of Applications Enabled

Revocation Requirements and Approaches

Subject Naming Requirements

Treatment of Mobility

...

PKI-Light example (HEPKI)

CP: Wasley, etal. Draft HE CP stubbed to basic/rudimentary

CRL: ?

Applications: (Signed email)

Mobility: Password enabled

Signing: md5RSA

Thumbprint: sha1

Naming: dc

Directory Services needed: Inetorgperson

PKI-Light example (Texas-Houston)

CP: Verisign

CRL: Verisign

Applications: authentication

Mobility: USB dongl;e

Signing: md5RSA

Thumbprint: sha1

Naming: X>500

Directory Services needed: I?

Deployment: 5,000 medical students

PKI-Ultralight (MIT)

CP: none

CRL: limit lifetime

Applications: Internal web authentication

Mobility: one per system; also password enabled

Signing: md5RSA

Thumbprint: sha1

Naming: X,500

Directory Services needed: none

Deployment: approximately 350,000 over five years

Healthkey snippets

Organizational commitment to pilot is difficult without more senior level support. Have had significant staff turnover. Biggest concern is impact of system on users ("non-transparency). Given lessons learned, will be investigating "encryption at the border and organizational certificates" rather than encryption and certificates at the desktop.

Healthkey snippets

· Managing individual digital certificates can be expensive· Digital certificates on the desk top can be vulnerable· Organizations can lose some control with individual certificates · Organizations may not want to accept pre-issued certificates· Checking for revoked certificates puts a burden on e-mail correspondents· Current implementations of digital certificates are not transparent to e-mail users· Vendor contracts do not support community initiatives

Interesting recent developments

Microsoft bundled root program

RSA buys Securant

...