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Nicomachean Ethics, I, 1096 b 26-29

W. W. FORTENBAUGH

n Chapter 6 of Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues

against the Platonic form of Goodness. At 1096b25 he thinks his

case won and concludes that the good is not a universal corre-

sponding to a single idea. This conclusion, however, is not wholly satisfactory so that Aristotle adds (1096b26-29) :

The previous polemic against the Platonists might suggest that the different uses of the word "good" are fortuitously equivocal. Aristotle now moves to counter this impression. Two ways are suggested in which different uses of "good", while remaining equivocal, are not fortuitously equivocal. The second suggestion, that of analogy, Aristot- le explains by means of an example. The first suggestion, Tw elvi i npos 9V auvTeaEw is not elucidated by Aristotle.

It has been generally2 supposed that this first suggestion introduces the focal analysis by which "being" and "one" are analyzed in the central books of the Metaphysics. According to this supposition, Aristotle suggests that "good" can be analyzed like "being". Different senses of "good" can be shown to be conceptually dependent upon some primary sense which first must be comprehended if the other senses are in turn to be understood. The logoi of the secondary senses will include the logos of the primary sense but the primary sense can be defined without reference to the dependent senses. (Cf. Met. 1004a25, 1028 a 34-36, 1077 b3-4)

Recently this interpretation has been incorporated by Professor G. E. L. Owen into arguments concerning Aristotle's intellectual

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development. In the early Eudemian Ethics focal analysis is only present in Book VII where Aristotle applies the analysis to different kinds of friendship.3 As yet Aristotle has not seen the extended appli- cation of the analysis to general expressions like "one", "being", and "good" so that in his criticism of Plato's form of Goodness, Aristotle makes no use of focal analysis and refers (1217bl6-19) to dialectic as the appropriate mode of inquiry concerning the good.4

In the later Nicomachean Ethics the case is different. Not only is focal analysis employed to explain different kinds of friendship but its

application has been extended to include the general term "good" (1096b27-28). Moreover, a reference is added (1096 b 30-31 ) to another philosophy which is more appropriate for inspecting the different senses of the word "good". This other philosophy is generafly5 under- stood to be the focal analysis of Metaphysics, r. In keeping with this understanding the Greek commentator Alexander in his remarks on Book r of the MetaPhysics (242.5-6) names "good" along with "being" among terms used in several senses, not equivocally but

Therefore in the use of focal analysis, Owen finds a closer relation- ship between the Nicomachean Ethics and the Metaphysics than be- tween the Eudemian Ethics and the MetaPhysics. Lines 1096 b 27-28 of the Nicomachean Ethics suggest focal analysis of the general term "good" and mark an important step forward in Aristotle's intellectual development.

This picture of Aristotle's development is attractive but it leans heavily upon the common interpretation of lines 1096 b 27-28. These lines, I believe, have never been adequately explicated and so have been regularly misunderstood. It is my purpose in this paper to con- sider afresh these cryptic lines and to offer a new and, I hope, correct interpretation.

First I shall state briefly and without argumentation my own under- standing concerning Aristotle's two suggestions for the avoidance of fortuitous equivocation. Then I shall attempt to support my under- standing by an analysis of the Greek terms used in 1096 b 27-28. Third

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I shall point out that my interpretation conforms with Aristotle's handling of similar problems in the Posterior Analytics. Aristotle's suggested analysis of "good" will be shown not to relate primarily to the central books of the Metaphysics. Rather two modes of analysis familiar to readers of the Posterior A nalytics are suggested by Aristotle for the avoidance of fortuitous equivocation. Finally, I shall consider the Eudemian Ethics' analysis of "good", showing that this analysis, too, relates to the Posterior A nalytics and that it is wholly compatible with my interpretation of the Nicomachean Ethics. The conclusion is that lines 1096b27-28 of the Nicomachean Ethics introduce no advance in conceptual analysis beyond the Posterior Analytics. These lines are not evidence for a development in Aristotle's intellectual history.

My own understanding may be stated as follows. At 1096 b 7 Aristotle makes a fresh start in his criticism of the Platonists by entertaining a

possible objection. "Good" is predicated of two kinds of subjects, things desirable in their own right and things desirable only inasmuch as they produce or protect things desirable in their own right. Although "good" will not have the same sense when used to describe these two different kinds of thing, it will, it is suggested, have only one sense when used to describe things desirable in their own right. But is there some way in which these desirable things are alike and so subjects of a single unequivocal predication? If a single predicate is applied to several subjects, like honor, pleasure, reason, these subjects must be in some way the same or the predicate will be used equivocally. An

analysis of things desirable in their own right reveals no common

ground for the common predication. Their logoi in respect to being good differ so that "good" must be predicated equivocally of these different subjects.

Although the predication of "good" may involve equivocation, Aristotle does not think that it involves fortuitous equivocation. He, therefore, indicates two ways in which a single predicate might be used without fortuitous equivocation to characterize the different things desirable in their own right. First, the desirable things may possess a common generic character and it is this generic character which is signified by the predicate "good". In the different kinds of desirable things the common character is differentiated so that their goodness appears different. But the different kinds of goodness are still related generically so that all things desirable in their own right may be labeled "good" without fortuitous equivocation.

The second suggestion is that of analogy. Whenever two different

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things are one by analogy, they can be characterized by a single predicate without fortuitous equivocation. For example, sight and nous are not species of a single genus but each is similarly related to something else: sight to body and nous to soul. They are analogous and may be characterized by a single predicate just as if they possessed a single nature. Similarly, things desirable in their own right might be characterized by a single predicate, because they are by analogy members of a quasi-genus possessing a common nature.

The immediate question which this interpretation must face is philological. Can the notion of generic affiliation be drawn from the Greek phrase: &q/vo eivi i Ev avvTeaEw (1096b27-28)? The answer to this question depends primarily upon a correct inter- pretation of auvreXeZv 7tp. Although these two words are often correct- ly translated by a phrase like "to contribute toward", they need not convey the idea of motion toward. They may simply mean "to belong to". The phrase cruv't"Edv xp6q is like the phrase cruv't"Edv ais. In Attic Greek of the fourth century, the latter phrase can mean "to contribute toward" (Demosthenes 20.28), but it frequently means "to belong to" (Demosthenes 23.213). Likewise in Aristotle's treatises, this latter phrase may mean "to contribute toward", 't'&v d 't"1v Yevsaw avvV (H.A. 509a29), but it may lose all idea of motion toward. For example, there is a passage in the Parts of Animals 667 b 22 which is verbally very similar to the Nicomachean passage 1096 b 27-28, and which seems to be incompatible, with the idea of motion toward. Aristotle asks why the aorta and great blood vessel begin from one source. He begins his answer as follows : Tov o5v Eis auvrz-

The cause of both vessels belonging to and stemming from one source is that all animals possess in actuality one sensory soul. There seems to be no notion of motion toward in this usage of the Greek phrase av

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upon" or "to belong to". The phrase may describe belonging to a physical source as in the Parts o/ Animals 667b221 or it may indicate one conceptual source or common genus. In the Nicomachean Ethics passage, 1096 b 27-28, the phrase means, I think, "to belong to" one genus, so that the whole passage: cp' 7tpoc:; IV auvTe- xeiv means "all being from one genus or belonging to one genus."

It is instructive to compare the list of equivocals given in the Nico- machean Ethics with a similar list found in Book VII of the Physics, 249a23-25.

Simplicius' comments (1096.28-1097.2) consciously or unconsciously relate this passage from the Physics to the Nicomachean Ethics.8 For he explains 7to &*Eyouaoct by means of the Nicomachean phrase

and - what is more important - he explains EYYuS yvei by means of roc. xon 7tp Equivocals close in genus are things called from one thing or in relation to one thing. They are things called by a common name because they stem from and belong to one genus. Locomotion and alteration, for example, are specifically different but both are called change because they unite in a common generic nature. Similarly, the different things desirable in their own right might all be called good because they stem from and belong to a single genus, because they possess a common generic character which is differentiated in the different kinds of desirable things.

It is, of course, possible that Simplicius knew both lists of equivocals and erroneously tried to interpret the one in terms of the other. It is possible that the Nicomachean Tw 7tp 'CV &7t(Xv't'(x ouvre- 7?Ew does not have the same significance as Yevec in the Physics and that Simplicius' comment is misleading or wrong. But Simplicius' testimony should not be quickly rejected. Book VII of the Physics is usually regarded as an early composition pre-dating the composition of the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle might well recall his earlier catalogue of equivocals and introduce it into the Ethics with one omission (equi- vocals possessing some similarity, 249a24) and with several changes in mode of expression. The likelihood of such a recall can be increased and the omission can be explained by a study of two passages in the Posterior Analytics.

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Posterior Analytics, Book II, Chapter 14, reveals two ways in which a single predicate can be applicable to several different subjects and these two ways match, I believe, Aristotle's suggestions concerning "good". First, any essential attribute possessed by a genus is possessed by the different species, so that if, for example, it is proper to ascribe

sensitivity to animals it is also proper to ascribe it to horses and men. Aristotle is careful to point out that some genera may lack a simple generic name and can only be picked out by description. These genera, like classes bearing a simple generic name, possess attributes which are also possessed by the different species. Among genera picked out by description we can, I think, place the class of things desirable in their own right. And if this class possesses the common attribute of goodness, so do the different kinds of desirable things. If it is proper to ascribe

goodness to the generic class of desirable things, it is also proper to ascribe it to the species without bald equivocation.

The second way in which a single predicate can be applicable to several different subjects involves analogy. Sometimes when different subjects cannot be unified under a single generic description, they can still be one by analogy. For example, pounce, spine, and bone are not

species of a common genus. Nevertheless, they are related by analogy, so that just as if they enjoyed a single nature (lluxep ?cvoS rpluemq 1'1) 98a22; cf. Topics 108 b 27-28) they possess common properties and can be described by the same predicates without simple equivocation. Therefore if things desirable in their own right cannot be unified under a single genus, they might be unified by analogy and so shown to possess the common property of goodness.

In Chapter 17 of the Posterior Analytics, Book II, Aristotle considers whether one attribute can have a plurality of causes. This plurality of causes he denies. Three cases (99a6-16) are selected in which a single attribute is predicate of several subjects so that a plurality of causes might be suspected. In all three it is found that for each attribute there is one primary subject and one primary cause. The cases selected are of especial interest because they match Aristotle's list of equivocals at 1096b26-29. First the attribute may be equivocal so that there is not one but several attributes possessed by several different subjects. For example, "similar" is predicated equivocally when it is used of colors and figures. In respect to figures, it means "possessing propor- tional sides and equal angles." In respect to colors, it means "affecting our senses in one way." There is no relation between these different senses of "similar" so that the predicate "similar" is simply equivocal.

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The second case is that in which the several subjects and several causes of a common attribute are generically related so that the at- tribute is predicated of the several subjects without fortuitous equi- vocation. "Convertible" is predicable of both "linear proportions" and "arithmetical proportions". The predication is not simply equivocal because the two subjects are species of a single genus which is the primary subject of the predicate "convertible". When the subjects are taken specifically the statement of the cause will vary, but when they are taken generically there is a single statement of the cause.

The third case is, of course, that of analogy. When two different things which cannot be properly placed within one genus are called by one name, the predication need not be simply equivocal. For the subjects may be related by analogy. And similarly if one states the reasons why this attribute belongs to these different subjects, the stated reasons will be analogous. Analogous things belong to a quasi- genus (II .14.98 a 22, Topics 108b27-28) so that they can be described by a single predicate without fortuitous equivocation.

Aristotle's suggestions in the Nicomachean Ethics should now be clear. He expresses himself with extreme brevity because he is simply recalling two stock ways for avoiding simple equivocation. If things desirable in their own right can be unified generically or by analogy, fortuitous equivocation can be denied. If the different causes or reasons which explain the possession of goodness by different subjects are related generically or by analogy, then the predications are not simply equivocal. Things desirable in their own right possess different logoi in respect to their goodness. But these logoi need not be totally un- related. They may enjoy a generic or analogous affiliation so that "good" may be predicated of the different desirables without fortuitous equivocation.

In the Nicomachean Ethics (1096 b26-29) Aristotle is operating with a classification of equivocals which is as old as the seventh book of the Physics, 249 a 23-25. Only in the Nicomachean list, Aristotle omits one kind of equivocal noticed in the Physics, namely equivocals which possess a certain similarity; e.g. a model and its image, or a live hand and a clay hand. But for Aristotle this kind of equivocation was always a case of simple, unmitigated equivocation, so that it is omitted in the Nicomachean passage which is seeking to mitigate equivocation. Aristotle wishes to avoid fortuitous equivocation and toward this end he suggests two ways already noted in the earliest book of the Physics and familiar to his audience from use in the Posterior Analytics.

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The first suggestion is not a murky hint concerning some new focal

analysis. Rather he recalls a familiar mode of mitigating equivocation. His manner of expression is not clear and needs expansion. But this crabbedness is perhaps excusable when the point conveyed is some-

thing already familiar to Aristotle's audience. The Eudemian Ethics' analysis of goodness supports, I think, what

has been argued. After showing that ethics is concerned neither with a Platonic Form of goodness nor with universal goodness, Aristotle states (1218b9-18) that the subject of ethical inquiry is the practical good or goal (ou vex, which is the cause of things under it. That the goal is the cause is made plain by teaching method. For

having defined the goal, teachers demonstrate that each of the other

things is good. Aristotle's point is simple. If I define the "good" as, for example, "eudaimonia" and then substitute a paronymous form for the definition, I can demonstrate that other things which are conducive to eudaimonia are good. Aristotle is advocating a procedure identical to that found in the Posterior Analytics, Book II, 94 b 1 1 -23 . If the goal is health and is defined as "food not rising", I can demonstrate that whatever is conducive to food not rising, namely walking after dinner, is healthful. The only requirement is that the major premise be transformed by substituting appropriate coordinate or paronymous forms for both the goal and its definition.9 The major term "health" is altered to "healthful" and the middle term "food not rising" is altered to "productive of food not rising" (94 b 14-16). The minor term remains "walking after dinner". These terms form a syllogism1 whose conclusion is that walking after dinner is healthful. So long as the

major and middle terms remain unaltered it is not clear how the middle term applies to the minor. But when "food not rising" is altered to "productive of food not rising", the relationship of the middle term to the minor becomes more apparent. ill

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The Eudemian passage, which also uses health as an example, should be similarly interpreted. If the goal is the good and is defined as eudaimonia, then whatever promotes eudaimonia, say virtuous action, can be shown to be good. The unexpressed requirement is that if possible the major and middle terms be appropriately altered. The middle term may be altered to the paronymous form eudaimonikon. The major term, however, remains the same because it does not belong to a family of paronymous forms. "Good", unlike "health", does not assume different forms which signal a change in sense or usage. There is only a single form. 12 "Good" applies to "eudaimonikon" and "eudaimonikon" applies to "virtuous action" so that the conclusion is reached: "virtuous action is good".

The analyses of the Posterior Analytics and the Eudemian Ethics make clear how several different things can be called "good". If the good is defined as eudaimonia, whatever counts as eudaimonia, say a life of contemplation, may be called the "good", because it is eudai- monia. Whatever is productive of eudaimonia, like virtuous action may be called "good", because it is eudaimonikon. These predications of good are related because the logoi which explain and justify the predictions are related. The predications are not baldly equivocal but differ in logoi as "health" and "healthful" or "white" (= "white- ness") and "white" differ in their logoi. 13

Aristotle's major problem is not showing how various uses of "good" are related but how all uses of "good" are related. If the "good" is defined as eudaimonia, a series of related uses can be easily derived. The problem is that the "good" seems to have several unrelated de- finitions so that there are several independant series of related uses which lack a common focus.14 It is this lack of a common focus for all uses of

"good" which causes Aristotle to label the word "good" equivocal. I can define the goal and then demonstrate how certain other things are called "good", but not how all other things are called

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"good". The "good" has several competing logoi so that there are several series of related uses of "good". It is with this in mind that Aristotle in the Eudemian Ethics goes on to say (1218 b 25-27): in regard to the good as goal for man and in regard to the best of the practicables one must consider in how many ways the best of all is said. 15 In other words one must ascertain the number of ways in which the "good" as goal can be defined. If the collected definitions cannot be shown to relate then there will be several independent series of related uses of "good".

Similarly in the Nicomachean Ethics (1096 b 7-29) Aristotle is not pri- marily concerned to show how different things which produce or pre- serve some goal are called "good". Their goodness may be demonstrated by the syllogistic analysis found in both the Eudemian Ethics and the Posterior Analytics. Aristotle's primary concern is with the goals, with things desirable in their own right. For if these goals are called "good" for unrelated reasons, then it is impossible to relate all pre- dications of "good". There will be several series of related uses of "good". Therefore Aristotle makes two suggestions on how the goals may be related: generically or by analogy. And these two ways in- troduce no new mode of analysis but simply recall in shorthand form two modes of analysis familiar to the readers of the Posterior A nalytics.

Douglas College, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, U.S.A.