University of LeedsDepartment of Philosophy

PHIL 1002 Introduction to Ethics

Level 1 Core Module 2010-11 – Semester 1

10 credits

Ms. Georgia Testa

Contents

Aims of the module Page 1Learning methods 2Lecture and tutorial programme 2-3Lecture and tutorial details and protocol 3-4Reading 4Module coursepack 4General additional reading 5-6Work to complete in advance of the first lecture 6Tutorial topics and readings 7-13Assessment 13-14Feedback 14Student-Staff Forum and Course Evaluation Questionnaire 14-15Guidance on essay writing 15For those of you who’ve studied Philosophy before 15-16Essay titles 16‘The Ring of Gyges’ by Plato – week 1 work 17-19Week 4 proctorial exercise 19-20

Aims of the Module

This module provides students with an introduction to some important issues in philosophical ethics (also known as ‘moral philosophy’). The main aims of this, as with all level-1 modules in the Department of Philosophy, are to give students a basic understanding of the issues in question, as well as to enable students to acquire basic critical, oral, writing and analytical skills, and in addition a degree of intellectual autonomy, developing their own views and discussing them both in tutor-led and student-led groups. In this module, students will acquire these skills through an introduction to the three main divisions in moral philosophy: meta-ethics, moral theory, and applied ethics. This will be approached through the reading of a number of important articles and extracts, including extracts from some of the central texts in the history of moral philosophy. Study is primarily theme-based. At the end of the module, students should have a clear grasp of the nature of the divisions within philosophical ethics, plus an understanding of the major moral theories in contemporary ethics, their relationship to one another and their philosophical grounding. Students should also have an understanding of the way in which moral philosophers apply the principles and conclusions that are derived from moral theories to particular contemporary moral problems, in order to yield practical conclusions about what we should and shouldn’t do.

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Learning Methods

As this is a 10-credit module, you should plan to spend a total of approximately 100 hours on it. That breaks down into:

1. Attending lectures. 1 hour per week listening, thinking, writing. (Total: 11 hours)

2. Proctorial and tutorial preparation. 1-2 hours per class completing the set reading and writing answers to the set study questions, and writing up your notes after the class. (Total: approximately 20 hours)

3. Attending proctorials and tutorials. 2 hours per fortnight thinking and discussing. (Total: 10 hours)

4. Additional reading/thinking and preparing/writing assessed essays: carrying out recommended additional reading for each proctorial/tutorial topic as the course progresses, thinking about what you have read, heard and discussed as you go along, and researching and writing each assessed essay. (Total: approximately 59 hours).

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Lecture and Tutorial Programme

The lecture and tutorial programme for PHIL1002 Introduction to Ethics is as follows:

Week

(Beginning)

PHIL1002 Lecture

Proctorial Tutorial

1

(September 27th)

Introduction:

The Amoralist

No Proctorial No Tutorial

2

(October 4th)

Relativism Introduction to Ethics

Introduction to Ethics

3

(October 11th)

Consequentialist Theories 1

(Introduction to Philosophy)

(Introduction to Philosophy)

4

(October 18th)

Consequentialist Theories 2

Introduction to Ethics

Introduction to Ethics

5

(October 25th)

Deontological Theories 1

(Introduction to Philosophy)

(Introduction to Philosophy)

The first assessed essay of 1000 words for PHIL1002 should be submitted by 4pm Monday 1st November.

Continued overleaf…

2

6

(November 1st)

Deontological Theories 2

Introduction to Ethics

Introduction to Ethics

7

(November 8th)

Virtue Theories 1 (Introduction to Philosophy)

(Introduction to Philosophy)

8

(November 15th)

Virtue Theories 2 Introduction to Ethics

Introduction to Ethics

9

(November 22nd)

Applied Ethics: Hunger and Affluence 1

(Introduction to Philosophy)

(Introduction to Philosophy)

10

(November 29th)

Applied Ethics: Hunger and Affluence 2

Introduction to Ethics

Introduction to Ethics

11

(December 6th)

The Objectivity of Moral Judgements

(Introduction to Philosophy)

(Introduction to Philosophy)

The second assessed essay of 1000 words for PHIL1002 should be submitted by 4pm Monday 10th January.

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Lecture and Tutorial Details and Protocol

The lecturer for PHIL1002 is Ms. Georgia Testa. My office is room G. 19 in the Department of Philosophy. My office hours for Semester 1 are:

Tuesday 12-1pm, Friday 10-11am

I can also be contacted by e-mail on: g.testa@leeds.ac.uk, or by phone on (0113) 343 3280.

There is one lecture per week for PHIL1002. PHIL1002 lectures are repeated - that is, two lectures with identical content are delivered each week. You only have to attend one of these lectures per week, and can attend at either of the times below:

Tuesday 10 am Roger Stevens Lecture Theatre 22Friday 12 pm Roger Stevens Lecture Theatre 21

There are two meetings of your group for PHIL1002 per fortnight - the first is a proctored tutorial (‘proctorial’) supervised by a third-year student; the second is a tutorial with a graduate tutor. These are always in the same week. You should consult the Guide for Level-1 Philosophy Students for general information on the nature and role of proctorials and tutorials. You should have been allocated a proctorial and tutorial group in Intro Week or during Week 1. If you have not been allocated a group by the end of Week 1 you should report to the Department of Philosophy Office.

Attendance at proctorials and tutorials for this module is compulsory. If for some good reason you are unable to attend, you must notify your tutor IN ADVANCE of the class. If your absence is a result of ongoing medical or personal circumstances you should notify either your personal tutor or the Head of First Year, Dr Nick Jones, and you should submit to

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the Department Office a completed Mitigating Circumstances Form (available from the Philosophy website http://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/Currentstudents/index.htm) together with any documentation relating to your absence (e.g. doctor's notes).

Persistent non-attendance or attending without adequate preparation may result in disciplinary procedures, which may result in your being excluded from the module or unable to continue on your degree programme. Completing the required set reading and study questions in advance of each proctorial and tutorial is also compulsory. If you haven’t completed the set work beforehand, you may still attend the class in question, but your tutor will mark you down as absent on the register.

You can view all of your lecture, proctorial and tutorial times and locations on your personal timetable, which can be accessed via the Student Portal. You should check your timetable regularly throughout the term in case of any location changes.

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Reading

Every week in which you have an Introduction to Ethics proctorial and tutorial there is a set reading for each, typically taken from the readings coursepack for the module (see below). This is the absolute minimum reading required for this course. Also provided below are lists of additional readings, both of general texts which cover the whole or most of the course, and more specific readings tailored to particular topics that the course covers. For reasons of space particular chapters of books recommended as general additional reading are not included in the selections of specific readings, unless particularly helpful. You are not of course expected to read everything on these lists - attempting this would almost certainly be counter-productive - but students are strongly encouraged to do some additional reading for each topic, especially if you plan to write an essay on the subject.

These lists of additional reading are by no means exhaustive. There is an enormous amount of published material in this area of philosophy, of varying degrees of difficulty, and both the Brotherton and Edward Boyle libraries are well stocked with both primary and secondary texts on ethics. You should be aware that several hundred students are standardly registered for this course, and there is a great deal of pressure on library resources. Unless of course you buy it, there can be no guarantee that any particular item on these lists will be available, particularly shortly before an essay deadline.

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Module coursepack

I have produced a readings coursepack for this module, which you will need to buy as soon as possible, as you will be using it extensively from the start of the course onwards. Copies are available at cost price in Union Books in the Leeds University Union building (you’ll need to take your Student Union card with you). Again, each of the compulsory readings for your proctorials and tutorials is contained in this coursepack (with one exception, which is reproduced at the back of this document).

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General Additional Reading

An excellent beginners’ guide to studying Philosophy at university is:

Clare Saunders et al., Doing Philosophy: A Practical Guide for Students (Continuum, 2007)

There are two recommended secondary texts for PHIL1002 Introduction to Ethics:

1) Christina Sommers & Fred Sommers (eds.), Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life (6th

edition; Thomson Wadsworth, 2004)

This book will be referred to as VVEL6. A fair number of the additional readings recommended for specific topics below can be found in this book. There are multiple copies of the 6th edition available in the library, as well as copies of previous editions. The previous editions often, but don’t always, contain the readings in question, and they also contain some useful articles and extracts which are not in the 6 th edition. Unfortunately VVEL6 has just gone out of print, so you won’t find new copies for sale anywhere. However, copies of the various editions of VVEL are often available second-hand – I would suggest checking on www.amazon.co.uk or www.abebooks.co.uk, as well as on the walls of the Philosophy Department foyer, if you want to buy a second-hand copy.

2) Piers Benn, Ethics (University College London Press, 1998 – Fundamentals of Philosophy Series)

The following general introductory books on ethics are also very useful:

Harry J. Gensler, Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction (Routledge, 1998) James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy (3rd edition; McGraw Hill, 1999) Bernard Williams, Morality (Cambridge University Press, 1972) D.D. Raphael, Moral Philosophy (2nd edition; Oxford University Press, 1994) E.J. Bond, Ethics and Human Well-Being (Blackwell, 1998) Brenda Almond, Exploring Ethics (Blackwell, 1998) Fred Feldman, Introductory Ethics (Prentice-Hall, 1978)

Particularly good, but difficult, is:

Stephen Darwall, Philosophical Ethics (Westview Press, 1998 – Dimensions of Philosophy Series)

The following introductions to the history of moral philosophy have useful chapters on some of the major historical figures covered in the course:

Richard Norman, The Moral Philosophers (Clarendon Press, 1983; 2nd edition OUP, 1998)

Robert Arrington, Western Ethics: An Historical Introduction (Blackwell, 1998) Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics (Routledge, 1967; 2nd edition 1998)

Also available are a number of anthologies which include both extracts from primary texts and a number of good articles on particular topics covered by the course. They include:

Peter Singer (ed.), Ethics (Oxford, 1994 – Oxford Readers Series)

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Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics (Blackwell, 1991 - Blackwell Companions to Philosophy Series)

Mark Timmons (ed.), Conduct and Character (2nd edition; Wadsworth, 1995) Joel Feinberg, Reason and Responsibility (8th edition; Wadsworth, 1992) James Sterba, Ethics: The Big Questions (Blackwell, 1998)

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Work to complete in advance of the first lecture (on Egoism)

The first lecture of the course addresses the challenge that the egoist (sometimes called the amoralist) poses for moral philosophy. Ethical egoism is the view that what each of us has most reason to do is pursue our own self-centred ends. (Ethical egoism must not be confused with psychological egoism - this is the view that, as a matter of fact, all of us do act selfishly all the time, even when we think we are being altruistic). The egoist is a person who doesn't care about morality - all the egoist cares about is his or her own advantage and happiness, and he or she will be prepared to break any of our standard moral rules in order to secure it - just as long, that is, as he or she can get away with it. Very few people have defended ethical egoism - after all, someone who doesn't care at all about morality is unlikely to care about moral philosophy! But egoism has worried moral philosophers since the beginning of philosophy. One of the very first moral philosophers, Plato, wrote his famous dialogue, the Republic, in an attempt to show that the egoist is wrong, and that what we all have most reason to do is act morally.

In advance of the first lecture you should read ‘The Ring of Gyges’ by Plato, which is an extract from the Republic – this reading is reproduced at the back of this booklet. Before the lecture you should also jot down some of your initial thoughts about how Socrates should go about answering Glaucon’s challenge. This will help you get the most out of the first lecture.

Additional reading:Section 6 of VVEL6 contains a number of good articles and extracts on this issue, including:

Peter Singer, ‘Why Act Morally?’ James Rachels, ‘Egoism and Moral Skepticism’

Also helpful are:

Bernard Williams, Morality (CUP, 1972) – relevant chapters Thomas Nagel, ‘The Objective Basis of Morality’, in Peter Singer (ed.), Ethics

(Oxford, 1994) Wilfrid Sellars & John Hospers (eds.), Readings in Moral Theory (Prentice-Hall,

1970), part 5 section C

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Tutorial Topics and Readings

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In advance of each proctorial or tutorial, in addition to completing the set reading, you should write down your own answers to the study questions that are detailed for each class below. You should then bring your written answers along to the relevant proctorial or tutorial, and be prepared to discuss them with the other students in your class.

Week 2 – Relativism

It is undeniable that there are considerable variations between the moral codes of particular societies - this variation is both historical and geographical. Moral relativism is the view that what is actually right and wrong (not just what is thought to be right and wrong, but what actually is right and wrong) varies from society to society. So what a particular society deems to be right actually is right for that society. However, many moral philosophers think that it is possible to make objective moral judgements - judgements that apply to human beings or rational beings as such and not merely in particular cultural contexts - and that these judgements can be used to criticise the values of particular societies (including, potentially, the philosopher's own). Week 2 of the course addresses some of these issues.

Proctorial reading: Ruth Benedict, ‘A Defence of Moral Relativism’, in the readings coursepack

Proctorial questions:1. What are Benedict’s main philosophical claims in the article, and how does she go about trying to defend them?2. Are you convinced by Benedict’s reasoning here? Why or why not?3. In life in general, does it always follow from the mere fact that people disagree on a given issue that there’s no one true fact of the matter? Can you think of any examples where despite the fact that people disagree, there is one true fact of the matter? 4. When it comes to moral questions (e.g., “is Apartheid immoral?”), does it follow from the mere fact that people disagree that there’s no one true fact of the matter?5. What reasons might somebody give for claiming that a moral question such as “is torturing animals morally wrong?” is merely a subjective matter of opinion? Do you think these reasons are any good, and why?6. What reasons might somebody give for claiming that a moral question such as “is torturing animals morally wrong?” has an objective matter of fact answer? Do you think these reasons are any good, and why?

Tutorial reading: Mary Midgley, ‘Trying Out One’s New Sword’, in the readings coursepack

Tutorial questions:1. What are Midgley’s main philosophical claims in the article, and how does she go about trying to defend them?2. Are you convinced by Midgley’s reasoning here? Why or why not?3. Do you think it is possible for us to understand why a Samurai considered it acceptable to test out his new sword by cleaving an innocent bystander in two? What kind of explanation might a (talkative) Samurai give for his behaviour here? Do you understand his explanation?4. Assume for sake of argument that you have accepted the challenge of trying to persuade a medieval Samurai that killing innocent bystanders in this way is morally wrong. What kinds of things might you say in your attempt?5. Is working out your own view of another culture’s moral beliefs and practices consistent with an appropriate level of tolerance of those beliefs and practices? Explain your answer.

Additional reading:

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Section 3 of VVEL6 contains a number of good articles and extracts on this issue. See also:

John Hospers, ‘The Problem With Relativism’, in Sommers & Sommers (eds.) VVEL (3rd edition; Thomson Learning, 1993)

James Rachels, ‘The Challenge of Cultural Relativism’, in Mark Timmons (ed.), Conduct and Character (2nd edition; Wadsworth, 1995) and Joel Feinberg, Reason and Responsibility (8th edition; Wadsworth, 1992)

David Wong, ‘Relativism’, in Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics (Blackwell, 1991)

Bernard Williams, Morality (CUP, 1972) – relevant chapters

An in depth but difficult discussion of the problems with claims to objectivity in ethics is:

John Mackie, ‘The Subjectivity of Values’ – chapter 1 of Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Penguin, 1977); reprinted in numerous places, including Peter Singer, Ethics (Oxford, 1994)

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Week 4 – Consequentialist Theories

Consequentialist moral theories are forward-looking – that is, they consider the future consequences of our actions to be the most important factor in determining what we should and shouldn't do. Standardly those consequences are measured in terms of the overall amount of happiness that the action produces. Consequentialists argue that the right action to perform in any particular situation is the action which will produce the greatest overall amount of happiness. The most important influence on consequentialist moral philosophy is the English philosopher John Stuart Mill.

Proctorial reading: ‘The Pleasure Machine and Other Thought-Experiments’

This reading is reproduced at the back of this booklet. There are no set study questions as such – instead, in advance of the proctorial you should write down what you think the protagonist in each situation should do, and why.

Tutorial reading: John Stuart Mill, ‘Utilitarianism’ John Rawls, The Separateness of Persons Objection to Utilitarianism

Both readings are in the readings coursepack

Tutorial questions:1. Mill defines happiness as “pleasure, and the absence of pain”. Do you agree that this is what happiness ultimately consists in? Do you agree with Mill that happiness is the ‘be-all-and-end-all’, morally-speaking?2. Why might it be claimed that utilitarianism is a “doctrine worthy only of swine”? What is Mill’s response to this charge? Do you think his response gets utilitarianism ‘off the hook’ here?3. Some people think that Mill’s theory is unacceptably snobbish, despite the fact that utilitarians believe that everyone’s happiness is of equal value, because Mill distinguishes between higher and lower qualities of pleasure. What does Mill mean by higher and lower qualities of pleasure? Do you think he is just being a snob here, or is there something else at stake? What method does he give us for working out which are the higher pleasures?

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4. Why might it be claimed that utilitarianism is too demanding to be an acceptable moral theory? Do you agree?5. Summarise Rawls’ criticism of utilitarianism. Do you think that it is a telling criticism? How do you think a utilitarian might try to defend the theory against this criticism?

Additional reading: Phillip Pettit, ‘Consequentialism’, in Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics

(Blackwell, 1991). [See also article 20] J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against [extracts reprinted

in various editions of VVEL and Peter Singer (ed.), Ethics (Oxford, 1994)] J.L. Mackie, ‘The Ethics of Fantasy’, in Mark Timmons (ed.), Conduct and

Character (2nd edition; Wadsworth, 1995) Thomas Nagel, ‘War and Massacre’, in Mortal Questions (CUP, 1979) George Kerner, Three Philosophical Moralists: An Introduction to Ethics (OUP,

1990), part 1 Susan Wolf, ‘Moral Saints’, in Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982). [Reprinted in Peter

Singer (ed.) Ethics (Oxford, 1994)]

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Week 6 – Deontological Theories

In contrast to consequentialist moral theories, deontological theories are backward-looking. For the deontologist, the most important question in determining our moral assessment of an act is 'What kind of act is it?'. Deontologists argue that there are some kinds of actions which we should never perform, just because of the kind of acts they are - and this is so whatever the consequences of those actions would be. Examples might include murder, theft, torture and the like. For deontologists, it is much more important that we respect our duties and other peoples' rights than that we produce the best overall consequences. Contemporary deontologists have very often been influenced by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant.

Proctorial reading: Thomas Nagel, ‘The Objective Basis of Morality’ The United Nations Charter: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Both readings are in the readings coursepack.

Proctorial questions:1. What do you think it means to say that morality is “objective”? What is the alternative to claiming that morality is “objective”?2. Which acts (if any) do you think are always and everywhere morally wrong? What is it about such acts that makes them morally wrong? 3. Nagel claims to be able to show that it is objectively true that, for example, one should not steal. How does he go about it? Are you persuaded? If not, try to say exactly what is wrong with his argument.4. Pick three articles from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that you think are particularly important. Do you think that all human beings have the rights in question? If so, why do all human beings have these rights? If not, why do some human beings not have these rights?5. With respect to the same three articles, how might you go about arguing against someone who claimed that, for example, people with blond hair, or thin people, or old people didn’t have the rights in question?

Tutorial reading:

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Immanuel Kant, ‘Good Will, Duty and the Categorical Imperative’ [Extract from the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals], in the readings courspack

Tutorial questions:1. Why does Kant say that ‘[n]othing can possibly be conceived in the world […] which can be called good, without qualification, except a Good Will.’ (p170)?2. Explain what Kant means when he says that ‘I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law’ (p172). Give an example of a maxim that would fail this test, and another example of a maxim that would pass this test.3. What is the difference between a categorical and a hypothetical imperative? Give some examples of each kind of imperative.4. What do you think Kant means when he says that ‘in order that an action should be morally good, it is not enough that it conform to the moral law, but it must also be done for the sake of the law’ (p169)? Try to think of an example that would flesh out his point.5. Can you think of any counterexamples to Kant’s claim that an action only has moral worth if it is done for duty’s sake? If so, what kind of challenge do you think this presents to his moral theory? What might Kant’s reply be?

Additional reading:VVEL contains a number of interesting though quite difficult articles on this topic, including:

Rae Langton, ‘Maria von Herbert’s Challenge to Kant’ [N.B. – in VVEL 5th edition; Thomson Learning, 2000]

Jonathan Bennett, ‘The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn’

You could also try:

Robert Arrington, Western Ethics: An Historical Introduction (Blackwell, 1998), chapter 10

Richard Norman, The Moral Philosophers (Clarendon Press, 1983; 2nd edition OUP, 1998), chapter 6

Onora O’Neill, ‘Kantian Ethics’, in Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics (Blackwell, 1991). [See also articles 17 and 22]

Thomas Nagel, ‘War and Massacre’, in Mortal Questions (CUP, 1979) A.C. Ewing, Ethics (Free Press, 1953), ch. 4. George Kerner, Three Philosophical Moralists: An Introduction to Ethics (OUP,

1990), part 2

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Week 8 – Virtue Theories

In philosophical ethics, the term ‘virtue’ refers to a praiseworthy character trait – its opposite, 'vice', to a reprehensible character trait. Unlike consequentialists and deontologists, virtue theorists argue that the most important ethical question is not 'What should I do?' but rather 'What sort of person should I be?'. Virtue theorists are much more interested in qualities of character than in what the right action is - they tend to think that a person of good character will know what the right thing to do is and will want to do the right thing. Important questions for virtue theorists include: which qualities are virtues and which are vices and why, how is virtue acquired, and whether we are responsible for the expressions of our characters. Virtue theorists tend to look further back in the philosophical tradition for inspiration than other moral philosophers - particularly to ancient philosophers, most importantly Aristotle. Following Aristotle, contemporary virtue theorists think that in order to be morally

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praiseworthy we have to feel good when we do the right thing, so provoking a debate with those deontologists who think that emotion is irrelevant to moral assessment.

Proctorial reading: Philippa Foot, ‘Virtues and Vices’, in the readings courspack

Proctorial questions:1. In what sense might my possession of a virtue be beneficial to me? In what sense might my possession of a virtue be beneficial to other people? Do you agree with those who claim that virtue ethics is an unacceptably self-centred theory?2. In addition to being beneficial, what other characteristics does Foot think a disposition must possess in order to qualify as a virtue?3. How would you define wisdom? What is Foot’s definition of the wise person? How does she relate wisdom to the other virtues?4. Foot claims that ‘[o]n this view of the virtues and vices everything is seen to depend on what human nature is like’ (p336). Do you think that there are any behavioural tendencies that are common to human nature world-wide? If so, do you think that there are any character traits that would be beneficial for any person to possess?5. Why does Foot claim that there can be no such thing as a courageous murderer? Do you agree with her?

Tutorial reading: Aristotle, ‘Happiness and the Virtues’ and ‘Habit and Virtue’ [Extracts from the

Nicomachean Ethics]Both readings are in the readings coursepack.

Tutorial questions:1. Why should human beings be interested in using reason when deciding how to behave?2. What does Aristotle think human happiness consists in? To what extent do you agree with him?3. Explain Aristotle’s doctrine of “the mean”. Do you think he’s on to something here? 4. Which rules of thumb does Aristotle give us for deciding where the mean state falls for a given sphere of behaviour?5. According to Aristotle, what does possessing a virtue involve, and how do we go about acquiring the virtues? Do you accept his analysis?6. Do you agree with Aristotle’s list of the virtues? Does he miss any out? Does he include any that wouldn’t make your list?

Additional reading:VVEL6 section 4 has a number of useful readings in this area. You could also try:

William Frankena, ‘A Critique of Virtue-Based Ethical Systems’, in Sterba (ed.), Ethics: The Big Questions (Blackwell, 1998)

James Wallace, Virtues and Vices (Cornell University Press, 1978), ch. 1 Robert Louden, ‘On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics’, in Mark Timmons (ed.), Conduct

and Character (2nd edition; Wadsworth, 1995) [Difficult]

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Week 10 – Applied Ethics

The final tutorial on this course is devoted to applied ethics, which is the application of moral theory to concrete ethical problems. Important issues in applied ethics include: the morality of

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abortion, whether and under what circumstances euthanasia might be acceptable, whether it is morally permissible to experiment on human embryos, whether animals have rights, what we owe to future generations, and many other questions. Moral philosophers hope that through the application of the conclusions of moral theory they can help to bring clarity to these often very muddled debates - for example, many people support their moral views on different issues by appealing to diametrically opposed moral principles - and help to advance them towards sound conclusions. The issue that the tutorial will be focussing on is that of famine and affluence - what, if anything, do the inhabitants of the affluent nations like our own owe to the poor, destitute and starving in other countries?

Proctorial reading: Peter Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’, in the readings coursepack

Proctorial questions:1. Singer claims that those of us with disposable income should give it away to the poor up to the point that continuing to do so would do more harm than good. What is his argument for this claim? Try to be as precise as you can in spelling out the reasons (a.k.a. premises) he gives us for this conclusion.2. Do you think that Singer’s argument is a good one? If not, try to be as precise as you can in saying what is wrong with it – where exactly do you think his reasoning falls down?3. Do you accept Singer’s analogy whereby failing to give money to help the starving in poor countries is akin to failing to rescue a drowning child in a puddle because you would muddy your trousers? If not, say why.4. Singer is a utilitarian thinker – for him, the consequences of an action are all-important, morally-speaking. “The consequences of not sending food to starving people are the same as sending them poisoned food: in both cases the people die. Are you guilty of the moral equivalent of murder? Why or why not?” [Question adapted from VVEL6, p519]5. It is sometimes claimed that ‘charity begins at home’. Are there any good reasons for thinking that we have more of a duty of concern for people who live closer to us than for people who live further away? What is Singer’s view?6. ‘There’s no point giving money to the starving in poor countries – their corrupt governments will only spend it on guns’. Do you think this kind of claim is a cop-out?

Tutorial reading: John Arthur, ‘World Hunger and Moral Obligation: The Case Against Singer’ Garrett Hardin, ‘Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor’

Both readings are in the readings coursepack.

Tutorial questions:1. Singer thinks that we are morally obliged to give charity to the poor. Hardin thinks that we should not give charity to the poor. What does Arthur think?2. Arthur coins the term ‘greater moral evil rule’ to describe one of Singer’s claims. (N.B. it’s Singer’s claim, and Arthur’s name for it). What is the claim in question?3. Arthur thinks that Singer’s argument fails to take account of an important feature of our everyday, common-sense moral thinking. What is the feature in question, and do you agree with Arthur that it is more important, morally-speaking, than Singer’s focus on the consequences of our actions?4. What is the difference between “negative” and “positive” rights? Why does Arthur think that the starving in poor countries have no right to our charity? Do you agree with him?5. What is Hardin’s “lifeboat” analogy? Do you think that it is an accurate analogy?6. What is the “tragedy of the commons”? Do you agree with Hardin’s claim that helping the poor will only make matters worse? Why or why not?

Additional reading:

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There are various anthologies devoted to applied ethics available. On the issue of hunger and affluence, see:

Hugh Lafollette (ed.), Ethics in Practice: An Anthology (Blackwell, 1997), Part IV. James White (ed.), Contemporary Moral Problems (3rd edition; West Publishing

Company, 1991), chapter 5. James Rachels, (ed.), Moral Problems (Harper and Row, 1979), part III

Plus:

Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics (Blackwell, 1991), article 23

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Assessment

Assessment for this module is by two essays of 1000 words each, each counting for 50% of the overall mark. Essays must be word-processed, and you must provide an accurate word count at the end of your essay. You must also keep to the word limit: essays of more than 1100 words or less than 900 words (including footnotes and quotations, but excluding essay title and bibliography) will not be accepted for marking.

A list of essay titles is given below. The first assessed essay should be handed in by 4pm on Monday November 1st. The second assessed essay should be handed in by 4pm on Monday January 10th.

ALL ESSAYS MUST BE TYPED OR WORD-PROCESSED, and accompanied by a fully-completed Essay Submission Form (available from the Philosophy foyer).

How to SubmitOn each day that there is an essay deadline, there will be a desk in the Philosophy foyer which will be staffed from 10am until 4pm. You must hand your essay(s) in at that desk. The tear-off portion of the Essay Submission Form (which you must also complete) will be signed by a member of staff at the desk, and returned to you as a receipt. KEEP THESE RECEIPTS CAREFULLY. The only way you can prove that you submitted the essay, and when you submitted it, is if you can produce your receipt, and if you can’t prove you handed your essay in, WE WON’T TAKE YOUR WORD FOR IT, and you won’t get a mark.

If you are submitting your essay early (before the date of the deadline) or late (after 4pm on the date of the deadline, or at a later date) you must hand it in at the Department Office (G10) and obtain a signed receipt from a member of staff.

DO NOT put essays in your tutor’s pigeon-hole, email them, fax them, send them through the mail or hand them in at a tutorial. You must follow the procedure above so that your submission can be properly recorded. IF YOUR ESSAY GOES ASTRAY BECAUSE YOU HAVE NOT HANDED IT IN CORRECTLY, YOU WILL USUALLY INCUR PENALTY MARKS.

You need to submit ONE copy of your essay with a completed Essay Submission Form stapled to the front. You should put your name, your tutor’s name, and module title in the header of your essay.

Late essays will be penalised by the loss of 5 marks per calendar day late. It is Department policy that no assessed work will be accepted after the end of week 13 of the semester in which the module is assessed.

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The above penalties for late essays are strictly enforced. If you think you have good grounds for requesting an extension, this may only be approved by the Head of First Year, Dr Nick Jones. You must complete a Mitigating Circumstances Form (available from the Philosophy website http://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/Currentstudents/index.htm) and submit it to Dr Jones together with supporting evidence, e.g. a doctor’s note.

Students who fail this module are eligible to resit in August 2011. The resit will take the same form as the original assessment, i.e. by two 1,000-word essays. The University will charge you a fee for every resit you take, and in normal circumstances the maximum mark you can get for any module passed at resit is 40. Students who are required to pass this module in order to enter the next year of their degree programme, and who fail to pass at the second attempt in the August resit, are given one final opportunity to pass as an External Student during the following academic year. Since this is a Compulsory Module, students on Philosophy programmes who fail to pass it after three attempts will not be able to continue to level-2.

(Students who fail the module as a result of medical or other adverse personal circumstances may be permitted to take the August resit as a ‘first attempt’. Permission to do so can only be granted by the Progress Committee of a student’s home department (e.g. the relevant Centre for Joint Honours, in the case of Joint Honours students), to which students must apply. First attempt status is not an automatic entitlement for those who have submitted relevant documentation to the Office. Students wishing to make a case for a first attempt must contact either Roz Walsh (l.r.walsh@leeds.ac.uk) or the Head of First Year (Dr. Nick Jones n.o.jones@leeds.ac.uk) at the earliest opportunity, who will advise you how to proceed. Students who have been awarded first attempt status submit two essays rather than sit an exam, do not pay a fee, and do not have their resit mark capped at 40).

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Feedback

Your first assessed essay will be returned in your week 8 tutorial with mark and comments, which you may discuss with your tutor if you wish. Your second assessed essay will not be returned (because unlike the first assessed essay, it is a “summative” rather than a “formative” assessment, akin to an exam script – see the Philosophy Student Handbook for further details). However, you are strongly encouraged to obtain feedback on your second assessed essay, which is available from me on request.

According to the University’s Learning and Teaching Partnership agreement (see http://www.leeds.ac.uk/qmeu/tsg/1pa.htm), you must:

Complete all assessed work and attend examinations as specified for your programme of study.

Take up the opportunities for diagnostic and formative assessment. Obtain and reflect on feedback on assessed work.

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Student-Staff Forum and Course Evaluation Questionnaire

The Philosophy Department has a Student-Staff Forum, which is a consultative committee for learning and teaching matters, composed of student module and programme representatives and staff representatives, including a representative for the level-1 Philosophy programme (which includes this module). The level-1 Philosophy programme rep will be appointed early

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in the Semester, and I will let you know who this is asap. If you have any concerns about the module, please see me, your class tutor, or the level-1 Philosophy programme rep.

At the end of the module, you will have the opportunity to fill in a Course Evaluation Questionnaire, in which you will be invited to assess your own experience of your development during the module, and also comment on the module content, structure and teaching.

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Guidance on essay writing

A section on study skills which you can consult for guidance in writing your essays is available in the Guide for Level-1 Philosophy Students, and information about how to present and format your essay (including how to give references) is contained in the Department of Philosophy’s Style Guide for Essays and Dissertations.

You must also familiarise yourself with the Department of Philosophy’s Plagiarism Document, so that you are fully aware of what plagiarism is, the severity of the offence, and the penalties that it carries. This document also gives advice about how you can avoid committing plagiarism inadvertently. Copies of the Plagiarism Document will be distributed in the lecture in week 4.

For a further, general summary of the Department of Philosophy’s procedures and advice concerning essay writing and submission, as well as on other issues, please consult the Department of Philosophy Student Handbook.

Electronic copies of all of these documents are available on the Department of Philosophy’s website at http://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/Currentstudents/index.htm

I will also post an electronic document outlining what I am looking for in a good essay, along with essay-writing tips on the PHIL1002 Introduction to Ethics page of the Virtual Learning Environment (VLE).

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For those of you who’ve studied Philosophy before

Some of you will have studied Philosophy before, perhaps at AS- or A-level, or perhaps as a component part of a Religious Studies qualification. If you have, then you may have a certain advantage, but you will also face some potential pitfalls. The advantage that you may have is this: while all of our level-1 Philosophy modules (including this one) are designed for beginners coming to the study of Philosophy for the first time, you may well have encountered some of the topics that we cover before, and consequently you may well have a head start when it comes to mastering those topics. This also means that on occasion the material you hear in lecture will serve primarily as a reminder of what you’ve heard previously.

However, some students who have studied a particular topic before make the mistake of thinking that they have ‘done’ that topic, in the sense that they have thought everything that needs to be or can be thought about the topic in question, and that consequently they don’t need to put any effort into studying it afresh. Students who adopt that attitude tend to score (at

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best) barely adequate marks for their university work, marks well below what they could achieve if they were to do themselves justice by working to their full potential.

The fact of the matter is, there are university professors who dedicate their entire academic careers to the study of a given topic – so it is absurd for anyone (let alone a first-year university student) to think that they’ve thought everything that needs to be or can be thought about the topic in question. However good your previous understanding of (for example) Utilitarianism happens to be, there are books and journal articles out there that you won’t have read, and which challenge whatever view you happen to have of Utilitarianism’s worth. Whatever arguments for or against a given claim you’ve encountered before, there are counter-arguments out there that you won’t have come across yet, and so your study of the topic in question will be incomplete.

Consequently, the challenge for those of you who have studied Philosophy before is to press on. Don’t simply assume that because you’ve encountered a given topic before you don’t need to do any further work – get stuck into the additional recommended reading for the topic in question, get to grips with material that you haven’t come across before, and in that way test whatever thoughts you happen to have had about a given topic in the past. That’s the way to set off down the path to really good marks in Philosophy at university.

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Essay titles

Essay titles for the first essay deadline (4pm Monday 1st November):

Answer ONE of the following questions:

1. Outline and evaluate the argument presented by the character Glaucon in Book II of Plato’s Republic, that it is better to merely seem rather than to actually be good.

2. What arguments have been advanced in defence of moral relativism? How strong are they?

3. What reasons have been advanced for thinking that utilitarianism fails to provide a satisfactory account of our moral obligations? How persuasive are these claims?

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The essay titles for the second essay deadline (4pm Monday 10th January) will be released in Week 9. Details of where and precisely when will be given in lecture.

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Week 1 – work to complete in advance of the first lecture

Read the following passage and jot down on a piece of paper some of your initial thoughts about how Socrates should go about answering Glaucon’s challenge.

This is a passage from Plato’s Republic, one of the oldest works of moral philosophy, in which Plato discusses the nature of justice in the individual and the state. The work is in the form of a dialogue, between Socrates, who expresses Plato’s own views, and various other characters. This extract is from book II. In book I Socrates has argued that the life of the just person is the best kind of life. In the extract the character Glaucon is outlining, as a kind of devil’s advocate, what he calls the common opinion, that justice is merely a bargain struck between those too weak to get away with injustice, and that anyone with any sense who is strong and cunning enough to get away with injustice would not be just.

‘Splendid,’ said Glaucon. ‘And now for my first heading, the nature and origin of justice. What they say is that it is according to nature a good thing to inflict wrong or injury, and a bad thing to suffer it, but that the disadvantages of suffering it exceed the advantages of inflicting it; after a taste of both, therefore, men decide that, as they can’t evade the one and achieve the other, it will pay to make a compact with each other by which they forgo both. They accordingly proceed to make laws and mutual agreements, and what the law lays down they call lawful and right. This is the origin and nature of justice. It lies between what is most desirable, to do wrong and avoid punishment, and what is most undesirable, to suffer wrong without being able to get redress; justice lies between these two and is accepted not as being good in itself, but as having a relative value due to our inability to do wrong. For anyone who had the power to do wrong and was a real man would never make any such agreement with anyone – he would be mad if he did. ‘This then is the account they give of the nature and origins of justice; the next point is that men practice it against their will and only because they are unable to do wrong. This we can most easily see if we imagine that a just man and an unjust man have each been given the liberty to do what they like, and then follow them and see where their inclinations lead them. We shall catch the just man red-handed in exactly the same pursuits as the unjust, led on by self-interest, the motive which all men naturally follow if they are not forcibly restrained by the law and made to respect each other’s claims. ‘The best illustration of the liberty I am talking about would be if we supposed them both to be possessed of the power which Gyges, the ancestor of Gyges the Lydian, had in the story. He was a shepherd in the service of the then king of Lydia, and one day there was a great storm and an earthquake in the district where he was pasturing his flock and a chasm opened up in the earth. He was amazed at the sight and descended into the chasm and saw many astonishing things there, among them, so the story goes, a bronze horse, which was hollow and fitted with doors, through which he peeped and saw a corpse which seemed to be of more than human size. He took nothing from it save a gold ring it had on its finger, and then made his way out. He was wearing this ring when he attended the usual meeting of the shepherds

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which reported monthly to the king on the state of his flocks; and as he was sitting there with the others he happened to twist the bezel of the ring towards the inside of his hand. Thereupon he became invisible to his companions, and they began to refer to him as if he had left them. He was astonished, and began fingering the ring again, and turned the bezel outwards; whereupon he became visible again. When he saw this he started experimenting with the ring to see if it really had this power, and found that every time he turned the bezel inwards he became invisible, and when he turned it outwards he became visible. Having made his discovery he managed to get himself included in the party that was to report to the king, and when he arrived seduced the queen, and with her help attacked and murdered the king and seized the throne. ‘Imagine now that two such rings existed and the just man put on one, the unjust the other. There is no-one, it is commonly supposed, who would have such iron strength of will as to stick to what is right and keep his hands off other people’s property. For he would be able to steal from the market whatever he wanted without fear of detection, to go into any man’s house and to seduce anyone he liked, to murder or to release from prison anyone he felt inclined, and generally behave as if he had supernatural powers. And in all this the just man would differ in no way from the unjust, but both would follow the same course. This, it would be claimed, is strong evidence that no man is just of his own free will, but only under compulsion, and that no man thinks justice pays him personally, since he will always do wrong when he gets the chance. Indeed, the supporter of this view will continue, men are right in thinking that injustice pays the individual better than justice; and if anyone who had the liberty of which we have been speaking neither wronged nor robbed his neighbour, men would think him a most miserable idiot, though of course they would pretend to admire him in public because of their own fear of being wronged. ‘So much for that. Finally, we come to the decision between the two lives, and we shall only be able to make this decision if we contrast extreme examples of just and unjust men. By that I mean if we take each of them perfect in his own line, and do not in any way mitigate the injustice of the one or the justice of the other. To begin with the unjust man. He must operate like a skilled professional – for example a top-class pilot or doctor, who know just what they can and can’t do, never attempt the impossible and are able to retrieve any errors they make. The unjust man must, similarly, if he is to be thoroughly unjust, be able to avoid detection in his wrong-doing; for the man who is found out must be reckoned a poor specimen, and the most accomplished form of injustice is to seem just when you are not. So our perfectly unjust man must be perfect in his wickedness; he must be able to commit the greatest crimes perfectly, and at the same time get himself a reputation for the highest probity, while, if he makes a mistake he must be able to retrieve it, and, if any of his wrongdoing comes to light, be ready with a convincing defence, or when force is needed be prepared to use force, relying on his own courage and energy or making use of his friends or his wealth. ‘Besides our picture of the unjust man let us set one of the just man, the man of true simplicity of character who, as Aeschylus says, ‘wants to be and not to seem good’. We must, indeed, not allow him to seem good, for if he does he will have all the rewards and honours paid to the man who has a reputation for justice, and we shall not be able to tell whether his motive is love of justice or love of the rewards and honours. No, we must strip him of everything except his justice, and our picture of him must be drawn in a way diametrically opposite to that of the unjust man. Our just man must have the worst of reputations for wrong-doing, so that we can test his justice and see if it weakens in the face of unpopularity and all that goes with it; we shall give him an undeserved and lifelong reputation for wickedness and make him stick to his chosen course until death. In this way, when we have pushed the life of justice and of injustice each to its extreme, we will be able to see which is the happier.

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‘...These being our two characters, it is not, I think, difficult to describe the sort of life that awaits each. And if the description is somewhat brutal, remember that it is not I that am responsible for it, Socrates, but those who praise injustice more highly than justice. It is their account that I must now repeat. ‘They will say that the just man, as we have pictured him, will be scourged, tortured and imprisoned, his eyes will be put out, and after enduring every humiliation he will be crucified, and learn at last that one should want to seem and not be just. And so that remark which I quoted from Aeschylus could be more appropriately applied to the unjust man, for he, because he deals with realities and does not live by appearances, really wants not to seem but to be unjust. He “reaps thought’s deep furrow, for therefrom spring goodly schemes” – schemes which bring him respectability and office, and which enable him to marry into any family he likes, to make desirable matches for his children, and to pick his partners in business transactions, while all the time, because he has no scruples about committing injustice, he is on the make. In all kinds of competition public or private he always comes off best and does down his rivals, and so becomes rich and can do good to his friends and harm his enemies. His sacrifices and votive offerings to the gods are on a suitably magnificent scale, and his services to the gods, and to any man he wishes to serve, are far better than those of the just man, so that it is reasonable to suppose that the gods care more for him than for the just man, And so they conclude, Socrates, that a better life is provided for the unjust man than for the just by both gods and men.’ (Republic II, 358e-362c, translated by Desmond Lee)

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Week 4 – Proctorial Exercise: ‘The Pleasure Machine and Other Thought-Experiments’

Consider the following ethical thought experiments. Come to your proctorial prepared to discuss your view of what the protagonist in each situation should do. Be prepared to back up that view with reasons. You should write down your view and your reasons in advance of the proctorial.

1. George, who has just taken his Ph.D in chemistry, finds it extremely difficult to get a job. He is not in very robust health, which cuts down the number of jobs he might be able to do satisfactorily. His wife has to go out to work to keep them, which itself causes a great deal of strain, since they have small children and there are severe problems about looking after them. The results of all this, especially on the children, are damaging. An older chemist, who knows about this situation, says that he can get George a decently paid job in a certain laboratory, which pursues research into chemical and biological warfare. George says that he cannot accept this, since he is opposed to chemical and biological warfare. The older man replies that he is not too keen on it himself, come to that, but after all George’s refusal is not going to make the job or the laboratory go away; what is more he happens to know that if George refuses the job, it will certainly go to a contemporary of George’s who is not inhibited by any such scruples and is likely if appointed to push along the research with greater zeal than George would. Indeed, it is not merely concern for George and his family, but (to speak frankly and in confidence) some alarm about this other man’s excess of zeal, which has led the older man to use his influence to get George the job... George’s wife, to whom he is deeply attached, has views (the details of which need not concern us) from which it follows that at least there is nothing particularly wrong with research into CBW. What should he do?

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2. Jim finds himself in the central square of a small South American town. Tied up against the wall are a row of twenty Indians, mostly terrified, a few defiant, in front of them several armed men in uniform. A heavy man in a sweat-stained khaki shirt turns out to be the captain in charge and, after a good deal of questioning of Jim which establishes that he got there by accident while on a botanical expedition, explains that the Indians are a random group of inhabitants who, after recent acts of protest against the government, are just about to be killed to remind other possible protestors of the advantages of not protesting. However, since Jim is an honoured visitor from another land, the captain is happy to offer him a guest’s privilege of killing one of the Indians himself. If Jim accepts, then as a special mark of the occasion, the other Indians will be let off. Of course, if Jim refuses, then there is no special occasion and Pedro here will do what he was about to do when Jim arrived, and kill them all. Jim, with some desperate recollection of schoolboy fiction, wonders whether if he could get hold of a gun he could hold the captain, Pedro and the rest of the soldiers to threat, but it is quite clear from the set up that nothing of that kind is going to work: any attempt at that sort of thing will mean that all the Indians will be killed, and himself. The men against the wall, and the other villagers, understand the situation, and are obviously begging him to accept. What should he do? Would it matter if the person Jim is invited to shoot is a different individual from those lined up against the wall?

3. Suppose there were a machine you could be attached to, which would stimulate the pleasure centres of the brain. Using this machine would be a way of guaranteeing continuous intense pleasure for as long as the individual remained attached to it. We could imagine various forms the machine might take – maybe it would simply generate physical pleasure of such intensity that an individual would want nothing else, or perhaps it might generate a virtual world in which all of an individual’s desires are satisfied. Whatever its exact specification, would you agree to be attached to this machine for life? Why, or why not? Are there any intrinsic reasons why not?

4. Lisa, a medical researcher, is on a sailing trip with her husband, to whom she is deeply attached, and a number of colleagues. Amongst these colleagues is the brilliant Dr. Schwartz, an internationally renowned medical researcher who is widely believed to be on the brink of producing a cure for the AIDS virus. (Suppose Lisa has good evidence for this.) Should anything happen to Dr Schwartz, this research could be expected to be put back by up to five years or more. During the trip there is an accident, and the boat sinks. Lisa, through good fortune, finds herself in an overcrowded lifeboat full of exhausted people. In the water near to the boat, exhausted and needing help to climb into the lifeboat, are both her husband and Dr Schwartz. There is only enough room for one more person in the lifeboat. What should she do?

You should ideally spend about ten minutes of your proctorial discussion on each thought experiment. Then you should use the final ten minutes discussing the relationship between the thought experiments, and the thought experiments and utilitarianism.

(Some of the above are extracts from or adaptations of thought-experiments found in the work of Bernard Williams and Robert Nozick. Fuller versions plus discussion of them can be found in extracts in VVEL, as well as in Peter Singer (ed.), Ethics (OUP, 1994) – see reading list above)

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If you want to discuss any aspect of the module, talk to your class tutor after a tutorial, or fix an appointment to meet him or her. You can also speak to me in one of my Office Hours (given above). If you have any kind of problem that is preventing you from working on this module, speak to your class tutor, to me, to your Personal Tutor, or to the Director of Undergraduate Studies, Dr. Chris Kenny, in one of the Office Hours posted on his door (Room G.16 in the Department of Philosophy).

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