G.R. No. L-20530, Inc. v. Appeals, 20 SCRA 463Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANCJune 29, 1967

G.R. No. L-20530MANILA SURETY and FIDELITY COMPANY, INC., petitioner, 

vs.TRINIDAD TEODORO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

De Santos and Delfino for petitioner.V. J. Francisco and R. F. Francisco for respondents.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

The Manila Surety & Fidelity Company, Inc., filed this petition for review by certiorariof the decision of the Court of Appeals in its Case No. CA-G.R. 30916. The case relates to the execution of a joint and several judgment for money obtained by the said company against the Philippine Ready-Mix Concrete Co., Inc. and Jose Corominas, Jr., in a litigation started in 1952 in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 17014), whose decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals with only a slight modification in respect of the award for attorney's fees.The proceedings which took place thereafter are narrated in the decision sought to be reviewed as follows:When said decision became final, respondent Manila Sure secured on September 20, 1961, from the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 17014 a second alias writ of execution addressed to respondent provincial sheriff of Rizal whose deputy, together with counsel for respondent Manila Surety, repaired to the residence of herein petitioner at No. 794 Harvard Street, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and levied upon a car, some furniture, appliances and personal properties found therein belonging solely and exclusively to the petitioner with the exception of sewing machine which belonged to a maid by the name of Nati Fresco, a G.E. television set which was the property of the minor Jose Alfonso Corominas, and a baby grand piano as well as a Columbia radio phonograph which belonged to Jose Corominas, Jr. As the petitioner was then abroad, her sister Josefina Teodoro, to whom she had entrusted the custody and safekeeping of the properties, had made representations to the deputy sheriff and to the counsel of respondent Manila Surety regarding the ownership of the petitioner over certain personal effects levied upon, but they ignored the same and proceeded with the levy.Thus, respondents caused the posting at several places notices of sale, preparatory to disposing petitioner's properties at public auction.To stay the sale at public auction of petitioner's properties, she filed on November3, 1961, with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a complaint with injunction, entitled "Trinidad Teodoro vs Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal," praying among other things, for damages and a writ of preliminary injunction which was accordingly issued upon petitioner's filing of a bond in the sum of P30,000.00 enjoining the provincial sheriff of Rizal from selling at public auction the properties claimed by said petitioner.However, on November 9, 1961, respondent Manila Surety filed an "Omnibus Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and to Dissolve Injunction" to which an opposition was filed.After the parties had adduced their evidence in support of their respective claims and after hearing their arguments, the lower court

declared that the properties in question are community properties of Trinidad Teodoro (herein petitioner) and Jose Corominas, Jr., dissolved on May 12, 1962, the writ of preliminary injunction it had issued and dismissed the complaint (Civil case No. 6865, CFI Rizal).Not satisfied, Trinidad Teodoro (as plaintiff in said civil case No. 6865 of Rizal) interposed an appeal. In the meanwhile, however, the Manila Surety filed on May29, 1962, in the Court of First Instance of Manila a motion for the issuance of a third alias writ of execution for the satisfaction of the judgment debt in civil case No. 17014. Acting upon said motion the Court of First Instance of Manila issued onJune 2, 1962, the "Third Alias Writ of Execution."Thus, on June 7,1962, deputies of the provincial sheriff of Rizal again repaired to the residence of herein petitioner at No. 794 Harvard St., Mandaluyong, and levied upon the same properties, with the exception of the baby grand piano and the "Columbia" phonograph which were the properties of Jose Corominas, Jr. and which had already been sold at public auction November 6, 1961 for P3,305.00, the Regal sewing machine owned by Nati Fresco, the beds found in the boy's and girl's rooms, a marble dining table and chairs, a stereophonic phonograph and the G.E. television set. And on the following day, June 8, 1962, respondent provincial sheriff of Rizal advertised the sale at public auction of the aforementioned properties claimed by herein petitioner, setting the date thereof for June 16, 1962.Trinidad Teodoro thereupon filed an original petition for injunction in the Court of Appeals to stop the scheduled sale. On October 24, 1962 the said Court rendered the decision now under review, granting the writ prayed for and permanently enjoining respondent provincial sheriff of Rizal from selling at public auction the properties in question for the satisfaction of the judgment debt of Jose Corominas, Jr.The case for herein petitioner rests on the proposition that the said properties, claimed by respondent Teodoro to be hers exclusively, pertain to the co-ownership established between her and Jose Corominas, Jr., pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code, and consequently may be levied upon on execution for the satisfaction of the latter's judgment debt. The facts relied upon in support of this theory of co-ownership are stated in the decision of the court a quo and quoted by the Court of Appeals, as follows:Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares were married in Iloilo on January 5, 1935. On November 29,1954, a decree of divorce was granted by the Court of the State of Nevada dissolving the bonds of matrimony between Sonia Lizares and Jose Corominas, Jr. . . .Trinidad Teodoro met Jose Corominas, Jr. in Hongkong on October 30, 1955. . . . On March 26,1956, they went through a Buddhist wedding ceremony in Hongkong. Upon their return to the Philippines they took up residence in a rented house at No. 2305 Agno Street, . . . Manila. On September 5, 1961, plaintiff and Jose Corominas, Jr. were married for a second time on Washoe County, Nevada. U.S.A.Additional Pertinent facts, also mentioned in the decision under review and controverted by the parties, are that Sonia Lizares is still living and that the conjugal partnership formed by her marriage to Corominas was dissolved by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila upon their joint petition, the decree of dissolution having been issued on October 21, 1957.The principal issue here is the applicability of Article 144 of the Civil Code to the situation thus created. This Article provides:When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through then work or

industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.There is no doubt that the decree of divorce granted by the Court of Nevada in 1954 is not valid under Philippine law, which has outlawed divorce altogether; that the matrimonial bonds between Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares have not been dissolved, although their conjugal partnership was terminated in 1957; and that the former's subsequent marriage in Hongkong to Trinidad Teodoro is bigamous and void.While Article 144 speaks, inter alia, of a void marriage without any qualification, the Court of Appeals declined to apply it in this case on two grounds: (1) the subsisting marriage of Corominas to Sonia Lizares constitutes an impediment to a valid marriage between him and respondent Trinidad Teodoro, which impediment, according to a number of decisions of the Supreme Court, precludes the establishment of a co-ownership under said article, and (2) the funds used by said respondent in acquiring the properties in question were "fruits of her paraphernal investments which accrued before her marriage to Corominas."The decisions cited under the first ground are Christensen vs. Garcia, 56 O.G. No. 16, p. 3199; Samson vs. Salaysay, 56 O.G. No. 11, p. 2401; and Osmeña vs. Rodriguez, 54 O.G. No. 20, p. 5526. In a proper case, where it may be necessary to do so in order to resolve an unavoidable issue, the precise scope of the "no impediment to a valid marriage" dictumin said decisions will undoubtedly deserve closer examination, since it establishes an exception to the broad terms of Article 144. For one thing, a situation may arise involving a conflict of rights between a co-ownership under that provision and an existing conjugal partnership formed by a prior marriage where, for instance, the husband in such marriage lives with another woman and with his salary or wages acquires properties during the extra-marital cohabitation. A ruling would then be in order to determine which — as between the co-ownership and the conjugal partnership — could claim ascendancy insofar as the properties are concerned.In the present case, however, we find no need to pass on this question. The particular properties involved here which were admittedly acquired by respondent Teodoro, cannot be deemed to belong to such co-ownership because, as found by the trial court and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, the funds used in acquiring said properties were fruits of respondent's paraphernal investments which accrued before her "marriage" to Corominas. In other words they were not acquired by either or both of the partners in the void marriage through their work or industry or their wages and salaries, and hence cannot be the subject of co-ownership under Article 144. They remain respondent's exclusive properties, beyond the reach of execution to satisfy the judgment debt of Corominas.Several procedural questions have been raised by petitioner. First, that the injunction issued by the Court of Appeals was improper since it was not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; second, that respondent Trinidad Teodoro having elected to appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, she may not pursue the remedy of injunction as she did in this case; third, that respondent's petition for injunction in the Court of Appeals failed to state a cause of action; fourth, that the proper remedy available to respondent was by filing a third-party claim; and finally, that the trial judge should have been included as party respondent in the petition for injunction.As to the first in second points, the fact is that respondent Trinidad Teodoro perfected her appeal to the Court of Appeals, which found that there were questions of fact involved therein, one of them being

whether the properties in question were acquired before or after her void marriage to Corominas. In aid of its appellate jurisdiction, therefore, the said Court could issue a writ of injunction. Of course, what happened here was that before the record on appeal could be filed (on June 18, 1962) or approved (on September 8, 1962) a third alias writ of execution was issued by the trial court (on June 2, 1962) and the properties in question were again levied upon by the sheriff and advertised for sale on June 16, 1962. It was impracticable for respondent to first wait for the appeal to be elevated to and docketed in the Court of Appeals and there secure the ancillary remedy of injunction therein. An independent petition for injunction, under the circumstances, was not unjustified.Respondent could, indeed, have filed a third party claim instead as indicated in Rule 39, Section 15.[[*]] But then her sister Josefina Teodoro did make such a claim in her behalf after the second alias writ of execution was issued, but it was ignored and the sheriff proceeded with the levy. In any event, a third party claim is not an exclusive remedy: the same rule provides that nothing therein contained "shall prevent such third person from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper action.We do not deem it to be a reversible error for Trinidad Teodoro not to include the trial Judge as party-respondent in her petition for injunction in the Court of Appeals. The trial Judge would have been merely a nominal party anyway, and no substantial rights of petitioner here have been prejudiced by the omission.In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with costs.

BELCODERO v. COURT OF APPEALSSeptember 25, 2012 §   Leave a comment

BELCODERO v. COURT OF APPEALS

October 20, 1993 (227 SCRA 303)

FACTS:

This case involves the question of ownership over a piece of land acquired by a husband while

living with a paramour and after having deserted his lawful wife and children. The property had

been bought by the husband on installment basis prior to the effectivity of the Civil Code of

1950 but the final deed, as well as the questioned conveyance by him to his common law

spouse, has ensued during the latter Code’s regime. Now, of course, we have to likewise take

note of the new Family Code which took effect on 03 August 1988.

The prpoerty was acquired by Alayo then transferred title to the name of the second wife.

Alayo Bosing died and left the property to his paramour turned second wife (first marriage still

subsisting). First wife petitioned.

HELD:

The property remained as belonging to the conjugal partnership of Alayo and his legitimate

wife Juliana. Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407),

“all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be

proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” This presumption has not

been convincingly rebutted.

It cannot be seriously contended that, simply because the property was titled in the name of

Josefa at Alayo’s request, she should thereby be deemed to be its owner. The property

unquestionably was acquired by Alayo it was just transferred to Josefa.

Uy vs CAGR No. 109557, November 29, 2000

FACTS:

Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose.  Gilda, wife of the latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his functions.  She further contest that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that would require her to sell their property in Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet such necessities.  RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on summary proceedings.

The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the petition made by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of his father.  As such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits.  He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading on “Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife” contemplating a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind.  Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in their case.

During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law.  Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular accident rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements.

HELD:

SC ruled in favor of Teodoro.  The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent.  In this case, trial court found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem infract.  Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court.  The law provides that wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian.  Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as administrator of the conjugal property, must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under FC.  SC further held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due process.

ARTURO SARTE FLORES V. SPOUSES LINDO

G.R. No. 183984 April 13, 2011

Facts: Edna Lindo obtained a loan from Arturo Flores amounting to Php 400,000.00 with monthly interest and surcharge in case of late payment. Edna executed a deed of real mortgage and promissory note to secure the said loan. Edna issued three checks as partial payments which were dishonored later for insufficiency of funds. This prompted petitioner to file a complaint for the foreclosure of mortgage with damages against the respondents. RTC branch 33 held that Flores was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of the mortgage because it found out that the Deed was executed by Edna without her husband‘s consent. Special Power of Attorney by Enrico was only constituted days after the Deed. However, it further ruled that petitioner Flores was not precluded from recovering the loan from Edna as he could file a personal action against her. Petitioner then filed a complaint for Sum of Money with damages against respondents. It was raffled to Branch 42. Respondents admitted their loan but in the tune of Php340,000.00 and prayed for dismissal on the grounds of improper venue, res judicata, and forum shopping. RTC Branch 42 denied the motion to dismiss. CA set aside decision of RTC Branch 42 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. CA ruled in general that the creditor may institute two alternative remedies: either a personal action for the collection of debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, but not both.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner can no longer file complaint for collection of sum of money onthe ground of multiplicity of suits

Ruling: The Court ruled that generally, it is true that the mortgage-creditor has the option of either filing a personal action for collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. An election of the first bars recourse to the second,otherwise there would be multiplicity of suits in which the debtor would be tossed from one venue to another depending on the location of the mortgaged properties and the residence of the parties.In this case, however, there are circumstances that the Court takes into consideration. Accordingly since the Deed was executed by respondent Edna without the consent and authority of her husband, it is void pursuant to Article 96 of the Family Code.Any disposition or encumbrance without the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also state that “the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.” The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.However, as the Court of Appeals noted, petitioner allowed the decisions of the RTC, Branch 33 and the RTC, Branch 93 to become final and executor without asking the courts for an alternative relief. The Court of Appeals stated that petitioner merely relied on the

declarations of these courts that he could file a separate personal action and thus failed to observe the rules and settled jurisprudence on multiplicity of suits, closing petitioner‘s avenue for recovery of the loan. Nevertheless, petitioner still has a remedy under the law.In Chieng v. Santos, this Court ruled that a mortgage-creditor may institute against the mortgage-debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. The Court ruled that the remedies are alternative and not cumulative and held that the filing of a criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was in effect a collection suit or a suit for the recovery of the mortgage-debt. In that case, however, this Court pro hac vice, ruled that respondents could still be held liable for the balance of the loan, applying the principle that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another.The principle of unjust enrichment is provided under Article 22 of the Civil Code which provides:Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.There is unjust enrichment ―when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.‖ The principle of unjust enrichmentrequires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of another.The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another without just cause or consideration. The principle is applicable in this case considering that Edna admitted obtaining a loan from petitioners, and the same has not been fully paid without just cause. The Deed was declared void erroneously at the instance of Edna, first when she raised it as a defense before the RTC, Branch 33 and second, when she filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC, Branch 93. Petitioner could not be expected to ask the RTC, Branch 33 for an alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he should have done, because the RTC, Branch 33 already stated that it had no jurisdiction over any personal action that petitioner might have against Edna.Considering the circumstances of this case, the principle against unjust enrichment, being a substantive law, should prevail over the procedural rule on multiplicity of suits. The Court of Appeals, in the assailed decision, found that Edna admitted the loan, except that she claimed it only amounted to P340,000. Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich herself because of the erroneous decisions of the two trial courts when she questioned the validity of the Deed. Moreover, Edna still has an opportunity to submit her defenses before the RTC, Branch 42 on her claim as to the amount of her indebtedness.

Ugalde v Ysasi

         Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property results in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains:

         Art. 175.  The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

                 (1) Upon the death of either spouse;

                 (2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

                 (3) When the marriage is annulled;

                 (4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.

The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil Case No. 4791 approving the   parties’ separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code.  Hence, when the trial court decided Special Proceedings No. 3330, the conjugal partnership between petitioner and respondent was already dissolved.

Hontiveros vs RTCGR No. 125465, June 29, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson.  The petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case.  In the reply, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single.  They also denied depriving petitioners of possession of and income from the land.  On the contrary, according to the private respondents, the possession of the property in question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of possession.  Trial court denied petitioner’s motion that while in the amended complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in Article 151.

ISSUE: WON the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted towards a compromise as stated in Article 151.

HELD:

SC held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of the scope of Article 151.  Under this provision, the phrase “members of the same family” refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters whether full or half-blood.  Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effects in this jurisdiction.  Teodora and Maria as spouses of the Hontiveros’ are regarded as strangers to the Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151.

Mondequillo vs BrevaGR. No. 86355, May 31, 1990

FACTS:

The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latter’s name.  A motion to quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated.  With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority.  The residential house in the present case became a family home by operation of law under Article 153.

ISSUE: WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home.

HELD:

The petitioner’s contention that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken.  Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.  It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code.  The said article simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC.  The debt and liability which was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code.  This does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the FC.

As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.  Petition was dismissed.