Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-20865,December 29, 1967ASELA P. TACTAQUIN,plaintiff-appellant,vs.JOSE B. PALILEO,defendant-appellee.F. D. Regalado and Associates for plaintiff-appellant.Celso A. Fernandez for defendant-appellee.R E S O L U T I O NDIZON,J.:Before Us is a motion filed by plaintiff-appellant praying that We reconsider our decision promulgated on September 29, 1967, upon the ground that the reservation to file a separate civil action made at the trial of Criminal Case No. 4736 was timely made and that, therefore, the doctrine ofres judicatadoes not bar the action (Civil Case No. Q-6601) filed by her in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.As stated in our original decision, appellant filed the action aforesaid to recover from appellee the total sum of P37,636.35 as damages for the death of her daughter, Norma Tactaquin, and serious physical injuries inflicted upon her on June 16, 1961 when a car recklessly driven by appellee hit them at Marulas, Valenzuela, Bulacan. In connection with this accident, appellee was charged criminally (Criminal Case No. 4736; Court of First Instance of Bulacan) and was found guilty of homicide, with serious physical injuries, through reckless imprudence, and was sentenced not only to suffer imprisonment but also to pay the sum of P4,000 to appellant as damages. Because of this, appellee moved to dismiss the civil case for damages, upon the ground that the action was already barred by the final judgment rendered in the criminal case just mentioned. Sustaining this motion the lower court dismissed the case, and appellant appealed to Us. Our original decision affirmed the order of dismissal with costs.itc-alfUpon consideration of the motion for reconsideration now before Us, we find that, according to the record, appellee, when arraigned in connection with Criminal Case No. 4736 mentioned heretofore, pleaded not guilt. However, when the case was called for trial on August 14, 1962, he was allowed to withdraw said plea and he immediately entered a plea of guilty, the provincial fiscal forthwith recommending the imposition of the corresponding penalty and civil liability.lawphil.netThereupon, the private prosecutor, Atty. Sundiam, made this statement for the record:May this representation be heard because we reserve the right to civil liability.to which the Court replied That manifestation of the private prosecutor be recorded. (T.s.n., pp. 1-3, session of August 14, 1962)The record further discloses that notwithstanding the above reservation and the Court's corresponding statement, the latter subsequently proceeded to render judgment as stated heretofore.Upon the foregoing facts it is clear, firstly, that the private prosecutor timely made a reservation on behalf of the offended party in connection with the filling of separate civil action; secondly, that such reservation was duly recorded by order of the Court; thirdly, that, as a result thereof, the question of civil liability was automatically taken out of the case and was not before the court any longer.itc-alfUpon these premises, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the portion of the decision of the Court in Criminal Case No. 4736 concerning civil indemnity was a nullity, and being so, it can not be accorded the authority ofres judicata.The rule in this connection is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it "unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately." While the rule does not say when or at what stage of the criminal proceeding the reservation should be made, it seems logical to presume that for the reservation to be timely and legally effective, it must be made as in present case beforethe rendition of judgment.Upon the other hand, it has been held that once the offended party has reserved his right to institute a separate civil action to recover indemnity, he thereby loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case (Gorospe vs. Honorable Gatmaitan, 52 O.G. p. 2526).lawphil.netFor this reason, herein appellant no longer had any right nor should she had been expected to move for the consideration of, much less to appeal from the decision the criminal case in so far as it decided the question civil indemnity. She no longer had any standing in the case.WHEREFORE, ruling upon appellant's motion for consideration, the Court hereby sets aside its original decision and directs that the present case be remanded low for further proceedings.Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ.,concur.Fernando, J.,took no part.

epublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-40486 August 29, 1975PAULINO PADUA and LUCENA BEBIN PADUA,plaintiffs-appellants,vs.GREGORIO N. ROBLES and BAY TAXI CAB,defendants-appellees.Alberto R. de Joya for plaintiffs-appellants.Cardenas & Peralta Law Office for defendants-appellees.CASTRO,J.:Resolving this appeal by the spouses Paulino and Lucena Bebin Padua, we set aside the order dated October 25, 1972 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales dismissing their complaint, in civil case 1079-O, and remand this case for further proceedings.In the early morning of New Year's Day of 1969 a taxicab (bearing 1968 plate no. TX-9395 and driven by Romeo N. Punzalan but operated by the Bay Taxi Cab owned by Gregorio N. Robles) struck ten-year old Normandy Padua on the national road in barrio Barretto, Olongapo City. The impact hurled Normandy about forty meters away from the point where the taxicab struck him, as a result of which he died.Subsequently, Normandy's parents (Paulino and Lucena Bebin Padua), by complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Zambales (civil case 427-O), sought damages from Punzalan and the Bay Taxi Cab; likewise, the city Fiscal of Olongapo, by information filed with the same court (criminal case 1158-O), charged Punzalan with homicide through reckless imprudence.On October 27, 1969 the courta quo, in civil case 427-O, adjudged for the Paduas as follows:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant Romeo Punzalan to pay the plaintiffs the sums of P12,000.00 as actual damages, P5,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; anddismissing the complaint insofar as the Bay Taxicab Company is concerned. With costs against the defendant Romeo Punzalan. (Emphasis supplied)Almost a year later, on October 5, 1970, the courta quo, in criminal case 1158-O, convicted Punzalan, as follows:WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Romeo Punzalan y Narciso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence, as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY ofprision correccional, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY ofprision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the cost.The civil liability of the accused has already been determined and assessed in Civil Case No. 427-O, entitled Paulino Padua, et al. vs. Romeo Punzalan, et al.' (Emphasis supplied)After the judgment in civil case 427-O became final, the Paduas sought execution thereof. This proved futile; the corresponding court officer returned the writ of execution unsatisfied.Unable to collect the amount of P27,000 awarded in their favor, the Paduas instituted action in the same court against Gregorio N. Robles to enforce the latter's subsidiary responsibility under the provisions of article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Robles filed a motion to dismiss based on (1) bar of the cause of action by a prior judgment and (2) failure of the complaint to state a cause of action.Thereafter, the courta quo, in an order dated October 25, 1972, granted Robles' motion to dismiss on the ground that the Paduas' complaint states no cause of action. This order the Paduas questioned in the Court of Appeals which, by resolution dated March 5, 1975, certified the case to this Court for the reason that the appeal involves only questions of law.The Paduas predicate their appeal on eighteen errors allegedly committed by the courta quo. These assigned errors, however, raise only one substantial issue: whether the judgment dated October 5, 1970 in criminal case 1158-O includes a determination and adjudication of Punzalan's civil liability arising from his criminal act upon which Robles' subsidiary civil responsibility may be based.The sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment must be tested by its substance rather than its form. In construing a judgment, its legal effects including such effects that necessarily follow because of legal implications, rather than the language used govern. Also, its meaning, operation, and consequences must be ascertained like any other written instrument. Thus, a judgment rests on the intention of the court as gathered from every part thereof, including the situation to which it applies and the attendant circumstances.It would appear that a plain reading, on its face, of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O, particularly its decretal portion, easily results in the same conclusion reached by the courta quo: that the said judgment no civil liability arising from the offense charged against Punzalan. However, a careful study of the judgment in question, the situation to which it applies, and the attendant circumstances, would yield the conclusion that the courta quo, on the contrary, recognized the enforceable right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense committed by Punzalan and awarded the corresponding indemnity therefor.Civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility. In negligence cases the offended party (or his heirs) has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based onculpa criminalunder article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for recovery of damages based onculpa aquilianaunder article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based onculpa criminalsection 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court deems simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for a separate application by the offended party. Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however, precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission.In the case at bar, the Court finds it immaterial that the Paduas chose, in the first instance, an action for recovery of damages based onculpa aquilianaunder articles 2176, 2177, and 2180 of the Civil Code, which action proved ineffectual. The Court also takes note of the absence of any inconsistency between the aforementioned action priorly availed of by the Paduas and their subsequent application for enforcement of civil liability arising from the offense committed by Punzalan and consequently, for exaction of Robles' subsidiary responsibility. Allowance of the latter application involves no violation of the proscription against double recovery of damages for the same negligent act or omission. For, as hereinbefore stated, the corresponding officer of the court a quo returned unsatisfied the writ of execution issued against Punzalan to satisfy the amount of indemnity awarded to the Paduas in civil case 427-O. Article 2177 of the Civil Code forbids actual double recovery of damages for the same negligent act or omission. Finally, the Court notes that the same judge*tried, heard, and determined both civil case 427-O and criminal case 115-O. Knowledge of an familiarity with all the facts and circumstances relevant and relative to the civil liability of Punzalan may thus be readily attributed to the judge when he rendered judgment in the criminal action.In view of the above considerations, it cannot reasonably be contended that the courta quointended, in its judgment in criminal case 1158-O, to omit recognition of the right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense of which Punzalan was adjudged guilty and the corollary award of the corresponding indemnity therefor. Surely, it cannot be said that the court intended the statement in the decretal portion of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O referring to the determination and assessment of Punzalan's civil liability in civil case 427-O to be pure jargon or "gobbledygook" and to be absolutely of no meaning and effect whatever. The substance of such statement, taken in the light of the situation to which it applies and the attendant circumstances, makes unmistakably clear the intention of the court to accord affirmation to the Paduas' right to the civil liability arising from the judgment against Punzalan in criminal case 1158-O. Indeed, by including such statement in the decretal portion of the said judgment, the court intended to adopt the same adjudication and award it made in civil case 427-O as Punzalan's civil liability in criminal case 1158-O.There is indeed much to be desired in the formulation by Judge Amores of that part of the decretal portion of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O referring to the civil liability of Punzalan resulting from his criminal conviction. The judge could have been forthright and direct instead of circuitous and ambiguous. But, as we have explained, the statement on the civil liability of Punzalan must surely have a meaning and even if the statement were reasonably susceptible of two or more interpretations, that which achieves moral justice should be adopted, eschewing the other interpretations which in effect would negate moral justice.It is not amiss at this juncture to emphasize to all magistrates in all levels of the judicial hierarchy that extreme degree of care should be exercise in the formulation of the dispositive portion of a decision, because it is this portion that is to be executed once the decision becomes final. The adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties, and the dispositions made as well as the directions and instructions given by the court in the premises in conformity with the body of the decision, must all be spelled out clearly, distinctly and unequivocally, leaving absolutely no room for dispute, debate or interpretation.We therefore hold that the Paduas' complaint in civil case 1079-O states a cause of action against Robles whose concommitant subsidiary responsibility, per the judgment in criminal case 1158-O, subsists.ACCORDINGLY, the ordera quodated October 25, 1972 dismissing the complaint in civil case 1079-O is set aside, and this case is hereby remanded to the courta quofor further proceedings conformably with this decision and with law. No pronouncement as to costs.Makalintal, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.Fernando, J., concurs and submits a brief opinion.Barredo, J., concurs with a separate opinion.Muoz Palma, J., took no part.Antonio, J., is on leave.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-24837 June 27, 1968JULIAN C. SINGSON and RAMONA DEL CASTILLO,plaintiffs,vs.BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and SANTIAGO FREIXAS, in his capacity as President of the said Bank,defendants.Gil B. Galang for plaintiffs.Aviado and Aranda for defendants.CONCEPCION,C.J.:Appeal by plaintiffs, Julian Singson and his wife, Ramona del Castillo, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing their complaint against defendants herein, the Bank of the Philippine Islands and Santiago Freixas.It appears that Singson, was one of the defendants in civil case No. 23906 of the Court of First Instance, Manila, in which judgment had been rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants therein, namely, Celso Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay the sum of P105,539.56 to the plaintiff therein, Philippine Milling Co. Singson and Lobregat had seasonably appealed from said judgment, but not Villa-Abrille & Co., as against which said judgment, accordingly, became final and executory. In due course, a writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon the Bank of the Philippine Islands in which the Singsons had a current account insofar as Villa-Abrille's credits against the Bank were concerned. What happened thereafter is set forth in the decision appealed from, from which we quote:Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank in charge of all matters of execution and garnishment, upon reading the name of the plaintiff herein in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party defendants, without further reading the body of the said garnishment and informing himself that said garnishment was merely intended for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille & Co., Valentin Teus, Fernando F. de Villa-Abrille and Joaquin Bona, prepared a letter for the signature of the President of the Bank informing the plaintiff Julian C. Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in that case. Another letter was also prepared and signed by the said President of the Bank for the Special Sheriff dated April 17, 1963.Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one for the amount of P383 in favor of B. M. Glass Service dated April 16, 1963 and bearing No. C-424852, and check No. C-394996 for the amount of P100 in favor of the Lega Corporation, and drawn against the said Bank, were deposited by the said drawers with the said bank. Believing that the plaintiff Singson, the drawer of the check, had no more control over the balance of his deposits in the said bank, the checks were dishonored and were refused payment by the said bank. After the first check was returned by the bank to the B. M. Glass Service, the latter wrote plaintiff Julian C. Singson a letter, dated April 19, 1963, advising him that his check for P383.00 bearing No. C-424852 was not honored by the bank for the reason that his account therein had already been garnished. The said B. M. Glass Service further stated in the said letter that they were constrained to close his credit account with them. In view thereof, plaintiff Julian C. Singson wrote the defendant bank a letter on April 19, 1963, claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. The defendant President Santiago Freixas of the said bank took steps to verify this information and after having confirmed the same, apologized to the plaintiff Julian C. Singson and wrote him a letter dated April 22, 1963, requesting him to disregard their letter of April 17, 1963, and that the action of garnishment from his account had already been removed. A similar letter was written by the said official of the bank on April 22, 1963 to the Special Sheriff informing him that his letter dated April 17, 1963 to the said Special Sheriff was considered cancelled and that they had already removed the Notice of Garnishment from plaintiff Singson's account. Thus, the defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been inadvertently committed, resulting in the temporary freezing of the account of the plaintiff with the said bank for a short time.x x x x x x x x xOn May 8, 1963, the Singsong commenced the present action against the Bank and its president, Santiago Freixas, for damages1in consequence of said illegal freezing of plaintiffs' account.1wph1.tAfter appropriate proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment dismissing the complaint upon the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover from the defendants upon the basis of a quasi-delict, because the relation between the parties is contractual in nature; because this case does not fall under Article 2219 of our Civil Code, upon which plaintiffs rely; and because plaintiffs have not established the amount of damages allegedly sustained by them.The lower court held that plaintiffs' claim for damages cannot be based upon a tort or quasi-delict, their relation with the defendants being contractual in nature. We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefor.2Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, inAir France vs. Carrascoso,3involving an airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the relation between a passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature ... the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort".In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering, particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake he and his subordinate employee had committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal damages the amount of which need not be proven4 in the sum of P1,000, in addition to attorney's fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiff's rights.5WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered sentencing the defendant Bank of the Philippine Islands to pay to the plaintiffs said sums of P1,000, as nominal damages, and P500, as attorney's fees, apart from the costs. It is so ordered.Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.Fernando, J., took no part.Footnotes1P100,000 as moral damages, P20,000 as exemplary damages, P20,000 as nominal damages, and P10,000 for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, plus the costs.2Cangco v. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil. 768; Yamada v. Manila Railroad, 33 Phil. 8; Vazquez v. Borja, 74 Phil. 560.3L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966.4Ventanilla v. Centeno, L-14333, January 28, 1961.5Articles 2208 and 2221 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. L-27730 January 21, 1974PRIMA MALIPOL, in her own behalf and as guardianad litemof her minor children, LYDIA MALIJAN, JOSEFINA MALIJAN, TEODORA MALIJAN, and SEBASTIAN MALIJAN,plaintiffs-appellees,vs.LILY LIM TAN and ERNESTO LABSAN,defendants-appellants.Edgardo Moncada for plaintiffs-appellees.Achacoso, Ocampo and Simbulan for defendants-appellants.ZALDIVAR,J.:1wph1.tAppeal on questions of law from the decision dated July 1, 1966, a judgment by default, and from the order dated October 10, 1966, of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in its Civil Case No. 1732 which denied defendants-appellants' motion to lift the order of default and for a new trial and which considered the judgment by default as standing with full force and effect.In the evening of February 6, 1965, at about 8:35 o'clock, Pantaleon Malijan, who was walking with his companion Leonardo Amante on the shoulder of the road in Barrio San Felix, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, was hit by a gasoline tanker and was thrown to the ground. While he was sprawling on the ground Malijan was run over by the tanker's right wheel that got detached from its axle. Malijan's companion, with the aid of the barrio captain, brought Malijan to the San Pablo City Hospital where he died that same night, the cause of death being "possible traumatic cerebral hemorrhage due to vehicular accident."The gasoline tanker with Plate No. T-52573, series of 1964, driven at the time of the accident by herein appellant Ernesto Labsan, was being used in connection with the gasoline business of the owner, the herein appellant Lily Lim Tan.Representations and demands for payment of damage having been ignored by appellants, appellees filed on May 18, 1966 a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas praying that appellants be condemned to pay, jointly and severally, the damages as specified in said complaint. The appellees are the mother and the minor brothers and sisters of the deceased Pantaleon Malijan.Appellants were duly served with summons on May 19, 1966, but they failed to file their answer within the reglementary period. Upon appellees' motion of June 8, 1966 the trial court, in an order dated June 10, 1966, declare the appellants in default, and appellees were permitted to present their evidence in the absence of the appellants. The trial court rendered a decision, dated July 1, 1966, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:WHEREFORE, finding the averments in the complaint as supported by the evidence to be reasonable and justified, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. The defendant driver, Ernesto Labsan, is ordered (1) to pay the sum of P2,100.00 to the plaintiffs for expenses for hospitalization, medical treatment, vigil and burial of Pantaleon Malijan; (2) to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P6,000.00 for the death of said victim; (3) to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 for the loss of earnings of said deceased for a period of five years; (4) to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages; (5) to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of P2,000.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 for incidental and litigation expenses; and (6) to pay the costs of the suit. Should Ernesto Labsan not be able to pay the foregoing damages, they shall be paid for by defendant Lily Lim Tan, who by law, being the owner and operator of the gasoline tanker that featured in the accident, is subsidiarily liable.Copy of the decision was received by the appellees August on 23, 1966.A motion for execution was filed on August 26, 1966 by appellees but the trial court held its resolution in abeyance until September 22, 1966 when the judgment would become final.On September 21, 1966 appellants filed a verified motion to lift the order of default and for a new trial, alleging that they were deprived of their day in court when the order of default was issued and a decision rendered after; that they had good and valid defenses, namely: (a) that the accident which gave rise to the case was due toforce majeure; (b) that appellant Ernesto Labsan was without fault in the accident that gave rise to the case; and (c) that appellant Lily Lim Tan had exercised the due diligence required of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Finding said motion to be without merit, the trial court denied the same on October 10, 1966. Hence, this appeal wherein appellants made assignment of errors, as follows:(a) The trial court erred in finding that appellants took the complaint for granted by reason of the fact that appellants referred to their lawyer the complaint for answer only after the lapse of eleven (11) days from receipt thereof ;(b) The trial court erred in not holding that the mistake committed by the late Atty. Daniel Chavez in giving the wrong date of receipt by appellants of the summons and the complaint to Atty. Romulo R. de Castro on June 10, 1966 due to the abnormal mental condition of the late Atty. Daniel Chavez on June 10, 1966 which thereafter resulted in the commission of suicide by the latter on June 17, 1966, constitutes the mistake and accident in law which warrant the relief from default and the granting of the new trial;(c) The trial court erred in not holding that the fact that appellants, through Atty. Romulo R. de Castro, filed on June 10, 1966 a motion for extension of time to file answer, and thereafter actually did file their answer to the complaint on June 20, 1966 wherein they alleged good, valid and meritorious defenses against the claim of plaintiffs in the complaint, should warrant favorable consideration of appellants' motion to lift order of default and for new trial; and(d) The trial court erred in not holding that the fact that appellants' motion to lift order of default and for new trial.1. In support of their first assignment of error, counsel for appellants contends that the finding of the trial court, that the appellants took the complaint for granted when they referred the complaint to their lawyer only on the eleventh day after receipt thereof, was unwarranted, because appellants had 15 days from receipt of the summons and complaint to answer and their lawyer, the late Atty. Daniel Chavez, after the complaint was referred to him on the eleventh day, had still four days to file the answer, which he could very well do inasmuch as he was well acquainted with the facts because he was the lawyer of appellant Ernesto Labsan in Criminal Case No. 2200 of Court of First Instance of Batangas for homicide thru reckless imprudence which case arose from the very accident subject of appellees' complaint; that appellant Lily Lim Tan, furthermore, had instructed her employee, Eleuterio Dizon, to handcarry the summons and to deliver it to nobody except to Atty. Chavez; that Atty. Chavez, in a distance telephone conversation with appellant Lily Lim Tan, assured the latter that he would attend to the complaint.We do not find merit in the contention of counsel for appellants. It is within the sound discretion of the court to set aside an order of default and to permit a defendant to file his answer and to be heard on the merits even after the reglementary period for the filing of the answer has expired, but it is not error, or an abuse of discretion, on the part of the court to refuse to set aside its order of default and to refuse to accept the answer where it finds no justifiable reason for the delay in the filing of the answer. In the motions for reconsideration of an order of default, the moving party has the burden of showing such diligence as would justify his being excused from not filing the answer with the reglementary period as provided by the Rules of Court, otherwise these guidelines for an orderly and expeditious procedure would be rendered meaningless.1Unless it is shown clearly that a party has justifiable reason for the delay the court will not ordinarily exercise its discretion in his favor.2In the instant case, We agree with the trial court that appellants have not shown that they exercised such diligence as an ordinary prudent person would exercise, to have the answer filed within the reglementary period. Appellant Lily Lim Tan admitted in her affidavit3that she received the summons and copy of the complaint on May 19, 1966, and that having read the complaint she found out that she was being sued, together with her driver, for damages in connection with the accident of February 6, 1965 at Sto. Tomas, Batangas. The damages asked in the complaint amounts to P36,600.00. The summons required them to answer the complaint within 15 days from receipt thereof, and warned them that should they fail to answer within said period the plaintiffs would take judgment against them for the relief demanded in the complaint. The damages demanded was not a negligible sum, and appellant Lily Lim Tan, who is a business woman, should have considered the matter a serious one. Ordinary prudence would dictate that she should concern herself about the matter, that she should refer said complaint with the least possible delay to her lawyer. But, for reasons she did not explain, she referred the complaint to her lawyer only after the lapse of ten (10) days from receipt thereof, i.e., on May 30, 1966. She should have considered that four days might not be sufficient time for her lawyer to prepare and file the answer.Appellants, however, contend that their lawyer, Atty. Chavez, could very well prepare the answer within the remaining four days of the reglementary period, for he was conversant with the facts of the case. Be that as it may, the fact was that Atty. Chavez failed to file the answer. Because Atty. Chavez assured her, in their long distance telephone conversation that he would take care the complaint, appellant Lily Lim Tan took for granted that the answer would be filed on time. Said appellant should have checked before the expiration of the period for filing the answer whether the complaint was really taken care of, or not. But this, appellant Lily Lim Tan failed to do, and this is another instance showing her lack of concern over the complaint. There was, therefore, no showing of due diligence on the part of appellants which would excuse their failure to file their answer on time. There is no showing either that the other appellant, Ernesto Labsan, had taken any step to have an answer filed in his behalf evidently he was relying on his employer.2. In support of the second assignment of error, appellants contend that the facts show that on June 10, 1966, Atty. Chavez, who was then acting strangely, endorsed the summons and complaint to Atty. Romulo R. de Castro; that upon inquiry by Atty. de Castro from Atty. Chavez the latter informed him that the summons was served on appellants on May 30, 1966; that appellant Lily Lim Tan, who was assured by Atty. Chavez in their long distance telephone conversation that the complaint would be attended to, could not, by the exercise of ordinary diligence, have foreseen, and avoided, the circumstance that at the time she referred the summons to Atty. Chavez, the latter was already in an abnormal condition which later resulted in his committing suicide on June 17, 1966; that it was Atty. Chavez's abnormal condition and his having given to Atty. de Castro the wrong date of the receipt of the summons by the appellees that caused the delay in the filing of the answer; that said circumstances constituted mistake and accident which entitled appellants to relief from default and a grant of new trial.Appellants' contention that the delay in filing the answer was due to mistake and accident is untenable.The mistake, according to appellants, consisted in Atty. Chavez's having told Atty. de Castro on June 10, 1966 that appellants received the summons and complaint on May 30, 1966. Even if Atty. Chavez had told Atty. de Castro the correct date, that is, that appellants received the summons on May 19, 1966, the answer could not have been filed on time by Atty. de Castro, because the reglementary period for filing the answer expired on June 3, 1966, and it was already June 10, 1966, when the complaint was endorsed by Atty. Chavez to Atty. de Castro.The accident, according to appellants' counsel, consisted in Atty. Chavez's being in an abnormal condition at the time the complaint was given to him on May 30, 1966. This claim of appellants is not supported by the record.The record does not show that Atty. Chavez was suffering from an abnormal mind on May 30, 1966. His actuations on May 30 were those that could be expected of a normal person. Atty. Chavez asked the employee of appellant Lily Lim Tan about the date when his employer received the summons and complaint, and because the employee could not give him the desired information Atty. Chavez placed a long distance telephone call to appellant Lily Lim Tan to ask about said date. This action of Atty. Chavez showed that he was very much aware that the reglementary period within which the answer should be filed was to be computed from the date of the receipt of the summons and the complaint. It also showed that Atty. Chavez knew the easiest and the most practical means to get the information that he needed that was by a long distance telephone call to his client, Lily Lim Tan. These actuations of Atty. Chavez showed that he knew the importance of the matter at hand, and he was exercising the ordinary and reasonable care over the interests of his client. These specific actions of Atty. Chavez indicated that as of May 30, 1966 he had a sound mind.It is claimed by appellants that on June 10, 1966 Atty. Chavez endorsed the complaint to Atty. de Castro, and told the latter that the summons and complaint were received by the appellants on May 30, 1966. It is further claimed by appellants that this information given by Atty. Chavez that the summons and complaint were received by the appellants on May 30, 1966 was the mistake that caused the delay of the filing of the answer. But it should be noted that on June 10, 1966 when Atty. Chavez endorsed the complaint to Atty. de Castro and informed the latter that the summons and complaint were received by the appellants on May 30, 1966, the period within which the answer should be filed had already expired the expiry date being June 3, 1966.There is no showing that between May 30, when Atty. Chavez received the summons and complaint from the employee of Lily Lim Tan, and June 3, 1973 Atty. Chavez was incapacitated to file the answer. And so it is clear that before the case was endorsed to Atty. de Castro, the appellants were already in default. The failure to file the answer on time may well be attributed to the mistake or "negligence of Atty. Chavez. The appellants are bound by the mistakes, and may suffer by the negligence, of their lawyer. In fact, on June 8, 1966, or two days before Atty. Chavez endorsed the case to Atty. de Castro, the appellees had filed a motion in court to declare the defendants (now the appellants) in default. The moves taken by Atty. de Castro in filing a motion for extension of time to file an answer on June 10, 1966, and in finally filing an answer on June 20, 1966 were already late.The fact that Atty. Chavez committed suicide on June 17, 1966 does not necessarily prove that he was abnormal, incompetent or insane on May 30, 1966. Although there is a judicial declaration that a sane man would not commit suicide, cognizance is nevertheless taken of the fact that circumstances at some given time may impel a person to commit suicide.4The probative value of suicide in determining the sanity of a person is dependent on the factual situation in each case. Such matters as the reasons for the act of self-destruction, the circumstances indicating the person's state of mind at the time, and other pertinent facts must be considered. The appellants had not indicated to the trial court any circumstance from which the trial court could form an opinion of the mental condition of Atty. Chavez before he committed suicide. The trial court, therefore, did not err when it did not favorably consider the claim of the appellant that their failure to file their answer to the complaint was due to accident or mistake, as contemplated in Section 3 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court.3. In support of the third assignment of error, appellants argue that acting on the wrong information given by Atty. Chavez, Atty. Romulo de Castro filed on June 10, 1966 a motion for an extension of 20 days within which to file an answer and that he did file the answer with good, valid and meritorious defenses on June 20, 1966; that on June 27, 1966 when appellees were allowed to present their evidenceex-parte, the motion for extension of time and the answer already formed part of the records of the case; that inasmuch as the late filing of the answer was due to accident and mistake, and appellants had good, valid, and meritorious defenses, the motion to lift the order of default and for new trial should have been favorably considered by the court.5Let it be noted that the lower court rendered its decision on July 1, 1966, and the appellees received notice of said decision on August 23, 1966. The decision would have become final on September 22, 1966. On September 21, 1966 the appellants filed their motion to lift the order of default and for new trial. The motion of the appellants therefore, was in the nature of a motion for a new trial based on fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence under paragraph (a) of Section 1 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 2 of said Rule 37 the moving party must show that he has a meritorious defense. The facts constituting the movant's good and substantial defense, which he may prove if the petition were granted, must be shown in the affidavit which should accompany the motion for a new trial.6In the instant case, the motion to lift the order of default and for new trial as well as the affidavit of merits accompanying the motion did not contain clear statements of the facts constituting a good and valid defense which the appellants might prove if they were given a chance to introduce evidence.The allegations in the motion that defendants have good and valid defenses, namely: that the accident which gave rise to the case wasforce majeure; that defendant Ernesto Labsan is absolutely without fault in the accident that gave rise to the case; and that defendant Lily Lim Tan has exercised due diligence required of a good father of a family to prevent damage7, are mere conclusions which did not provide the court with any basis for determining the nature and merit of the probable defense. An affidavit of merit should state facts, and not mere opinion or conclusions of law.Hence the trial court correctly denied the motion to set aside order of default and for new trial.We must, however, point out a flaw in the decision of the lower court. It is stated in the decision appealed from that the driver, Ernesto Labsan, was primarily liable for the payment of damages adjudged therein, and the appellant Lily Lim Tan, being the owner and operator of the gasoline tanker that figured in the accident, is subsidiarily liable, that is, liable only in case Ernesto Labsan was not able to pay. This is not correct. The action in the instant case was brought not to demand civil liability arising from a crime. The complaint makes no mention of a crime having been committed, much less of the driver Ernesto Labsan having been convicted of a crime. But there is an allegation in the complaint that Ernesto Labsan was the authorized driver of the truck that figured in the accident, which truck was operated by appellant Lily Lim Tan in connection with her gasoline business. The prayer in the complaint, furthermore, sought to hold appellants jointly and solidarily liable for damages. The instant action, therefore, was based, as the complaint shows, onquasi delict.8Under Article 218 of the Civil Code, which treats ofquasi delicts, the liability of the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise for damages caused by their employees is primary and direct, not subsidiary.9The employer, however, can demand from his employee reimbursement of the amount which he paid under his liability.10The employer, appellant Lily Lim Tan, must be held primarily and directly, not subsidiarily, liable for damages awarded in the decision of the lower court. This is, of course, without prejudice to the right of appellant Lily Lim Tan to demand from her co-appellant Ernesto Labsan reimbursement of the damages that she would have to pay to appellees.WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, dated July 1, 1966, as modified in accordance with the observations We made in the preceding paragraph, and the order, dated October 10, 1966, denying appellants' motion for the lifting of the order of default and for new trial, in Civil Case No. 1732, are affirmed. Costs against defendants-appellees.It is so ordered.Fernando, Barredo, Antonio and Aquino, JJ., concur.1wph1.tRepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. L-34529 January 27, 1983MAXIMO MARCIA, AMALIA MOJICA, TIRSO YAP, DAMIANA MARCIA, EDGAR MARCIA, and RENATO YAP,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS, FELARDO PAJE, and VICTORY LINER, INC.,respondents.Ricardo J. Francisco, for petitioners.Flors, Macapagal, Ocampo & Dizon for private respondents.RELOVA,J.:Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which dismissed the complaint filed by tile petitioners against private respondents in the concept of an independent civil action for damages for physical injuries resulting from reckless imprudence.On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a passenger bus operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee. private respondent Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Felardo Paje in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal Case No. 2745).On January 23, 1957, an action for damages (Civil Case No. 4425) was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap, together with their respective parents. against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, alleging that, the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus.While said Civil Case No. 4425 was in progress in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the criminal action proceeded in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Criminal Case No. 2745). The accused Felardo Paje was convicted of the offense charged. However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, he was acquitted in a decision promulgated on November 3, 1982, based on the findings, to wit:1 That the Victory Liner bus left its post, kilometer post no. 156, in San Marcelino, Zambales, at about 2:00 AM2 That on the highway at Lubao, Pampanga, between Posts Nos. 83 and 84, the appellant driver thereof, saw a cargo truck parked in the middle of the right lane of the road to Manila, without3 That appellant slackened the speed of his truck from 60 km. p.h. to 35 or 40 km. p. h. in order to pass said truck;4 That the appellant did not see the oncoming jeep until it swerved to the left.5 That the jeep was still far so appellant attempted to pass the truck but before he could do so, the jeep came very fast at the center of the road and out of its lane.6 That the passengers of the bus shouted at the appellant to bring the bus to the side so as to avoid a frontal collision with he jeep, and appellant brought his bus to the right shoulder of the road going to Bataan;7 That the jeep driven by the deceased Clemente Marcia was running at a fast pace for which reason the driver lost control and veered sharply to the right shoulder of the road and crashed into the bus, parked thereat a few seconds before.8 That appellant was not speeding, was diligent, and hence, not liable for the collision which at the least, was a fortuitous event for which no one was responsible.and the conclusion that"CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCEisWANTINGin this case, and that appellant was NOT even guilty of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE, Insofar as appellant was concerned, it was a case of PURE ACCIDENT."As a consequence, herein private respondents, defendants in Civil Case No. 4425 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, moved for the dismissal of the complaint invoking the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting Felardo Paje and citing Section I (d), Rule 107 of the Rules of Court now Section 3 (c), Rule I I I of the New Rules of Court), which reads:SECTION 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses. Except as otherwise provided by law, the following rules shall be observed:xxx xxx xxx(d) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In the other cases, the persons entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damages suffered.The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and, thereafter, continued to hear defendants' (herein private respondents) evidence. The following were presented as defendants' evidence in chief:(a) the whole record of Criminal Case No. 2745 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in which defendant Felardo Paje was by reason of the occurrence prosecuted criminally and convicted of homicide with serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence;(b) the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 01691 Cr, acquitting the accused; and(c) copy of the brief of the said defendant as accused-appellant in the said Court of Appeals case.On August 10, 1966, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision dismissing plaintiffs' complaint against the defendants Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, without pronouncement as to costs.Petitioners appealed the case to the (Court of Appeals CA-G.R. No. 38964-R) alleging that the acquittal of Paje in the criminal action for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence "is not a ground for dismissing the complaint in the instant civil action; that the instant civil action is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action and shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, so that whatever may have been the result of the criminal action is irrelevant to this civil action; that Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and not Section 3, paragraph (c) of the said rule applies; that the statement in the decision of the Court of Appeals in the criminal action that defendant Paje as accused therein was not guilty of civil negligence is without the jurisdiction of the said Court to make and is to be completely disregarded as an extraneous, officious and void statement which cannot affect in any way the instant civil action; that the records of the criminal action against defendant Paje are inadmissible evidence; that it has been established in the case at bar, not only by preponderance of evidence but by uncontradicted, conclusive evidence that petitioners suffered damages as a proximate result of the negligence of respondent Paje and that it has been established, not only by preponderance of evidence but by uncontradicted, conclusive evidence, that the damages suffered by petitioners as a result of the negligence of private respondents is in the amount of P250,817.96, and that the latter should be sentenced, jointly and severally, to pay the same to petitioner.In the meantime, the heirs of Clemente Marcia who, as aforesaid, died as a result of the collision, instituted a separate civil action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 6880) for damages based on the alleged reckless imprudence of bus driver Felardo Paje, praying that the driver and the Victory Liner, Inc. be ordered to pay jointly and severally the amount of damages claimed. The complaint of the heirs of Clemente Marcia was dismissed by the trial court. Appeal on questions of law was taken to this Court (Laura Corpus et al vs. Felardo Paje at al, 28 SCRA 1062) which, however, affirmed the order for the reason, among others, that "(1) The acquittal of the defendant Felardo Paje by the Court of Appeals in the criminal action on the ground that the reckless imprudence or criminal negligence charged against him did not exist and that the collision was a case of pure accident, was a bar to the civil action for damages for the death of Clemente Marcia, which action was based upon the same criminal negligence of which the defendant Felardo Paje was acquitted in the criminal action."Following the ruling of this Court in theCorpus vs. Pajedecision, respondent Court of Appeals held that the private respondents Cannot be held civilly liable after it had ruled in the criminal action that negligence was wanting and that the collision was a case of pure accident.Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners have come to US alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:I.IN NOT HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR PHYSICAL INJURIES RESULTING FROM NEGLIGENCE IS AN INDEPENDENT ONE, ENTIRELY SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE CRIMINAL ACTION, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 33, 2176 AND 2177 OF THE NEW (CIVIL CODE AND SECTION 2 OF RULE 111 OF THE RULES OF COURT. AND IN INSTEAD HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT ACTION IS NOT AMONG THE INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS AUTHORIZED BY THE SAID PROVISIONS.II.IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACQUITTAL OF RESPONDENT FELARDO PAJE, DRIVER OF RESPONDENT VICTORY LINER, INC., IN THE CRIMINAL ACTION BASED ON THE SAID PHYSICAL INJURIES AND NEGLIGENCE IS ENTIRELY IRRELEVANT TO THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES BY VIRTUE OF THE AFORECITED PROVISIONS OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND THE RULES OF COURT, AND IN INSTEAD HOLDING THAT THE SAID ACQUITTAL IS A BAR TO THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION UNDER SECTION 3 (c) OF RULE I I I AND SECTION 49 (c) OF RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT.III.IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES, CONSISTING OF THE RECORDS OF THE CRIMINAL ACTION IN THE TRIAL COURT, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ACQUITTING RESPONDENT PAJE AND THE COPY OF THE BRIEF OF THE SAID RESPONDENT AS ACCUSED-APPELLANT, ARE INADMISSIBLE IN THE INSTANT CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES.IV.IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE CASE AT BAR, NOT ONLY BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE BUT BY UNCONTRADICTED, CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE, THAT PETITIONERS SUFFERED DAMAGES AS A PROXIMATE RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF RESPONDENT PAJE.V.IN NOT HOLDING THAT IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, NOT ONLY BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE BUT BY UNCONTRADICTED, CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE, THAT THE DAMAGES SUFFERED BY PETITIONERS AS A RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANTS IS IN THE AMOUNT OF P250,817.96, AND IN NOT SENTENCING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY TO PAY THE SAME TO PETITIONERS.It is the stand of herein petitioners that Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, not Section 3 (c) thereof, should apply in the case at bar.Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.We do not agree, Section 2 of Rule 111 merely refers to the institution of an independent civil action without waiting for the filing or termination of the criminal action and requires only preponderance of evidence to prosper and not proof beyond reasonable doubt as required for conviction in criminal cases. However, an acquittal based on the finding that the facts upon which civil liability did not exist, bars the filing of an independent civil action if it is based on the crime. As early as 1952, We have held in the case ofTan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Company91 Phil. 672, that "the acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Where the court states 'that the evidence throws no light on the cause of fire and that it was an unfortunate accident for which the accused cannot be held responsible,' this declaration fits well into the exception of the rule which exempts the accused, from civil liability. " Likewise, inAlbornoz vs. Albornoz,98 Phil. 785, it was the ruling that "where the judgment in a criminal action contains an express declaration that the basis of claimant's action did not exist, the latter's action for civil liability is barred under section 1 (d) Rule 107 of the Rules of Court." And, inDe Mesa vs. Priela24 SCRA 582, this Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, ruled that extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered (Sec. 3 [c], Rule 111, Rules of Court.)"As held inCorpus vs. Paje, supra, reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code, which provides:ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.The above article speaks only of defamation, fraud and physical injuries. The injuries suffered by herein petitioners were alleged to be the result of criminal negligence; they were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in connection therewith. Further, Section 3 (c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that "(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist." Otherwise stated, unless the act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be nonexistent in the final judgment, the extinction of the criminal liability will not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability. Thus, if a person is charged with homicide and successfully pleaded self-defense, his acquittal by reason thereof will extinguish his civil liability. He has not incurred any criminal liability. On the other hand, if his acquittal is, for instance, due to the fact that he was not sufficiently Identified to be the assailant, a civil action for damages may be maintained. His acquittal is not due to non-existence of the crime from which civil liability might arise, but because he was not, in the eyes of the court, sufficiently Identified as the perpetrator of the crime.InPeople vs. Buan,22 SCRA 1383, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, said that "the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the offense.The charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and physical injuries suffered by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. They are not one of the three (3) crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.The case ofLaura Corpus vs. Felardo Paje(supra) is the same as the case at bar, the only difference being the party-plaintiffs or petitioners. Clemente Marcia died, while Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap suffered physical injuries in the same accident. The heirs of Clemente Marcia filed Civil Case No. 6880 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against herein respondents. The case was dismissed and appealed directly to this Court.1wph1.tThe order appealed from was affirmed, as recorded in LauraCorpus vs. Felardo Paje, 28 SCRA 1062.The case at bar (Civil Case No. 4425) was filed by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap against the same defendants in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. After trial, the case was dismissed and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is now before Us on appeal by certiorari from the said decision.Relative to the admissibility of the documents, to wit; (a) the records of the criminal case against Paje, (b) the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting the latter; and (c) copy of the brief of the respondent Paje as accused-appellant, suffice it to say that since petitioners' cause of action is based on the alleged recklessness and imprudence of respondent Paje it necessarily follows that his acquittal by the Court of Appeals and its declaration that the mishap was "pure accident" are relevant and material evidence. In fact, the lower court may even take judicial notice of the decision of the Court of Appeals in said criminal case.Finally, with respect to the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, well settled is the rule that the same are final and cannot be disturbed by Us, particularly where they are based, as they are in the case at bar, upon substantial evidence.WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMEDin toto. With costs against the petitioners.SO ORDERED.Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 104408 June 21, 1993METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS AND NENITA CUSTODIA,respondents.Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioner.Renato P. Decena and Restituto Abjero for private respondent.REGALADO,J.:This appeal calls for a review of the legal validity and sufficiency of petitioner's invocation of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees as its defense against liability resulting from a vehicular collision. With the facility by which such a defense can be contrived and our country having reputedly the highest traffic accident rate in its geographical region, it is indeed high time for us to once again address this matter which poses not only a litigation issue for the courts but affects the very safety of our streets.The facts of the case at bar are recounted for us by respondent court, thus At about six o'clock in the morning of August 28, 1979, plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio boarded as a paying passenger a public utility jeepney with plate No. D7 305 PUJ Pilipinas 1979, then driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his co-defendant Victorino Lamayo, bound for her work at Dynetics Incorporated located in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, where she then worked as a machine operator earning P16.25 a day. While the passenger jeepney was travelling at (a) fast clip along DBP Avenue, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila another fast moving vehicle, a Metro Manila Transit Corp. (MMTC, for short) bus bearing plate no. 3Z 307 PUB (Philippines) "79 driven by defendant Godofredo C. Leonardo was negotiating Honeydew Road, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila bound for its terminal at Bicutan. As both vehicles approached the intersection of DBP Avenue and Honeydew Road they failed to slow down and slacken their speed; neither did they blow their horns to warn approaching vehicles. As a consequence, a collision between them occurred, the passenger jeepney ramming the left side portion of the MMTC bus. The collision impact caused plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio to hit the front windshield of the passenger jeepney and (she) was thrown out therefrom, falling onto the pavement unconscious with serious physical injuries. She was brought to the Medical City Hospital where she regained consciousness only after one (1) week. Thereat, she was confined for twenty-four (24) days, and as a consequence, she was unable to work for three and one half months (31/2).1A complaint for damages2was filed by herein private respondent, who being then a minor was assisted by her parents, against all of therein named defendants following their refusal to pay the expenses incurred by the former as a result of the collision.Said defendants denied all the material allegations in the complaint and pointed an accusing finger at each other as being the party at fault. Further, herein petitioner Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC), a government-owned corporation and one of the defendants in the courta quo, along with its driver, Godofredo Leonardo, contrarily averred in its answer with cross-claim and counterclaim3that the MMTC bus was driven in a prudent and careful manner by driver Leonardo and that it was the passenger jeepney which was driven recklessly considering that it hit the left middle portion of the MMTC bus, and that it was defendant Lamayo, the owner of the jeepney and employer of driver Calebag, who failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees and should thus be held solidarily liable for damages caused to the MMTC bus through the fault and negligence of its employees.Defendant Victorino Lamayo, for his part, alleged in his answer with cross-claim and counterclaim4that the damages suffered by therein plaintiff should be borne by defendants MMTC and its driver, Godofredo Leonardo, because the latter's negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the accident and that MMTC failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.By order of the trial court, defendant Calebag was declared in default for failure to file an answer.5Thereafter, as no amicable settlement was reached during the pre-trial conference,6trial on the merits ensued with the opposing parties presenting their respective witnesses and documentary evidence.Herein private respondent Nenita Custodia, along with her parents, were presented as witnesses for the prosecution. In addition, Dr. Edgardo del Mundo, the attending physician, testified on the cause, nature and extent of the injuries she sustained as a result of the vehicular mishap.7On the other hand, defendant MMTC presented as witnesses Godofredo Leonardo, Christian Bautista and Milagros Garbo. Defendant Lamayo, however, failed to present any witness.Milagros Garbo testified that, as a training officer of MMTC, she was in charge of the selection of the company's bus drivers, conducting for this purpose a series of training programs and examinations. According to her, new applicants for job openings at MMTC are preliminarily required to submit certain documents such as National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) clearance, birth or residence certificate, ID pictures, certificate or diploma of highest educational attainment, professional driver's license, and work experience certification. Re-entry applicants, aside from the foregoing requirements, are additionally supposed to submit company clearance for shortages and damages and revenue performance for the preceding year. Upon satisfactory compliance with said requisites, applicants are recommended for and subjected to a Preliminary interview, followed by a record check to find out whether they are included in the list of undesirable employees given by other companies.Thereafter, she continued, if an applicant is found to be acceptable, a final interview by the Chief Supervisor is scheduled and followed by a training program which consists of seminars and actual driving and Psycho-physical tests and X-ray examinations. The seminars, which last for a total of eighteen (18) days, include familiarization with assigned routes, existing traffic rules and regulations, Constabulary Highway Patrol Group (CHPG) seminar on defensive driving, preventive maintenance, proper vehicle handling, interpersonal relationship ,and administrative rules on discipline and on-the-job training. Upon completion of all the seminars and tests, a final clearance is issued, an employment contract is executed and the driver is ready to report for duty.8MMTC's Transport Supervisor, Christian Bautista, testified that it was his duty to monitor the daily operation of buses in the field, to countercheck the dispatcher on duty prior to the operation of the buses in the morning and to see to it that the bus crew follow written guidelines of the company, which include seeing to it that its employees are in proper uniform, briefed in traffic rules and regulations before the start of duty, fit to drive and, in general, follow other rules and regulations of the Bureau of Land Transportation as well as of the company.9The reorganized trial court, in its decision of August 1, 1989,10found both drivers of the colliding vehicles concurrently negligent for non-observance of appropriate traffic rules and regulations and for failure to take the usual precautions when approaching an intersection. As joint tortfeasors, both drivers, as well as defendant Lamayo, were held solidarily liable for damages sustained by plaintiff Custodio. Defendant MMTC, on the bases of the evidence presented was, however, absolved from liability for the accident on the ground that it was not only careful and diligent in choosing and screening applicants for job openings but was also strict and diligent in supervising its employees by seeing to it that its employees were in proper uniforms, briefed in traffic rules and regulations before the start of duty, and that it checked its employees to determine whether or not they were positive for alcohol and followed other rules and regulations and guidelines of the Bureau of Land Transportation and of the company.The trial court accordingly ruled:WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint against the Metro Manila Transit Corporation and ordering defendants Agudo P. Calebag, Victorino Lamayo and Godofredo C. Leonardo to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following:a) the sum of P10,000.00 by way of medical expenses;b) the sum of P5,000.00 by way of expenses of litigation;c) the sum of P15,000.00 by way of moral damages;d) the sum of P2,672.00 by way of loss of earnings;e) the sum of P5,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;f) the sum of P6,000.00 by way of attorney's fees; andg) costs of suit.SO ORDERED.11Plaintiff's motion to have that portion of the trial court's decision absolving MMTC from liability reconsidered12having been denied for lack of merit,13an appeal was filed by her with respondent appellate court. After consideration of the appropriate pleadings on appeal and finding the appeal meritorious, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court's decision by holding MMTC solidarily liable with the other defendants for the damages awarded by the trial court because of their concurrent negligence, concluding that while there is no hard and fast rule as to what constitutes sufficient evidence to prove that an employer has exercised the due diligence required of it in the selection and supervision of its employees, based on the quantum of evidence adduced the said appellate court was not disposed to say that MMTC had exercised the diligence required of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver, Godofredo Leonardo.14The Court of Appeals was resolute in its conclusion and denied the motions for reconsideration of appellee Custodio and appellant MMTC in a resolution dated February 17, 1982,15thus prompting MMTC to file the instant petition invoking the review powers of this Court over the decision of the Court of Appeals, raising as issues for resolution whether or not (1) the documentary evidence to support the positive testimonies of witnesses Garbo and Bautista are still necessary; (2) the testimonies of witnesses Garbo and Bautista may still be disturbed on appeal; and (3) the evidence presented during the trial with respect to the proof of due diligence of petitioner MMTC in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly driver Leonardo, is sufficient.Prefatorily, private respondent questions the timeliness of the filing of the petition at bar in view of the procedural stricture that the timely perfection of an appeal is both a mandatory and jurisdictional requirement. This is a legitimate concern on the part of private respondent and presents an opportune occasion to once again clarify this point as there appears to be some confusion in the application of the rules and interpretative rulings regarding the computation of reglementary periods at this stage of the proceedings.The records of this case reveal that the decision of respondent Court of Appeals, dated October 31, 1991, was received by MMTC on November 18, 199116and it seasonably filed a motion for the reconsideration thereof on November 28, 1991.17Said motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent court in its resolution dated February 17, 1992, which in turn was received by MMTC on March 9, 1992.18Therefore, it had, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, fifteen (15) days therefrom or up to March 24, 1992 within which to file its petition, for review oncertiorari. Anticipating, however, that it may not be able to file said petition before the lapse of the reglementary period therefor, MMTC filed a motion on March 19, 1992 for an extension of thirty (30) days to file the present petition, with proof of service of copies thereof to respondent court and the adverse parties. The Court granted said motion, with the extended period to be counted from the expiration of the reglementary period.19Consequently, private respondent had thirty (30) days from March 24, 1992 within which to file its petition, or up to April 23, 1992, and the eventual filing of said petition on April 14, 1992 was well within the period granted by the Court.We digress to reiterate, in view of erroneous submissions that we continue to receive, that in the case of a petition for review oncertiorarifrom a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which has long since been clarified inLacsamana vs. The Hon. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,20allows the same to be filed "within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or of the denial of the motion for reconsideration filed in due time, and paying at the same time to the corresponding docket fee." In other words, in the event a motion for reconsideration is filed and denied, the period of fifteen (15) days begins to run all over again from notice of the denial resolution. Otherwise put, if a motion for reconsideration is filed, the reglementary period within which to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court is reckoned from the date the party who intends to appeal received the order denying the motion for reconsideration.21Furthermore, a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review may be filed with this Court within said reglementary period, paying at the same time the corresponding docket fee.1. The first two issues raised by petitioner shall be correlatively discussed in view of their interrelation.In its present petition, MMTC insists that the oral testimonies of its employees were presented as witnesses in its behalf sufficiently prove, even without the presentation documentary evidence, that driver Leonardo had complied with all the hiring and clearance requirements and had undergone all trainings, tests and examinations preparatory to actual employment, and that said positive testimonies spell out the rigid procedure for screening of job applicants and the supervision of its employees in the field. It underscored the fact that it had indeed complied with the measure of diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees as enunciated inCampo, et al. vs. Camarote, et al.22requiring an employer, in the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family, to carefully examine the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, experience and record service, and not merely be satisfied with the possession of a professional driver's license.It goes on to say since the testimonies of these witnesses were allegedly neither discredited nor impeached by the adverse party, they should be believed and not arbitrarily disregarded or rejected nor disturbed on appeal. It assiduously argues that inasmuch as there is no law requiring that facts alleged by petitioner be established by documentary evidence, the probative force and weight of their testimonies should not be discredited, with the further note that the lower court having passed upon the relevancy of the oral testimonies and considered the same as unrebutted, its consideration should no longer be disturbed on appeal.23Private respondent, on the other hand, retorts that the factual findings of respondent court are conclusive upon the High Court which cannot be burdened with the task of analyzing and weighing the evidence all over again.24At this juncture, it suffices to note that factual findings of the trial court may be reversed by the Court of Appeals, which is vested by law with the power to review both legal and factual issues, if on the evidence of record, it appears that the trial court may have been mistaken25particularly in the appreciation of evidence, which is within the domain of the Court of Appeals.26The general rule laid down in a plethora of cases is that such findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon and beyond the power of review of the Supreme Court.27However, it is now well-settled that while the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even finality at times, that rule is not inflexible and is subject to well established exceptions, to wit: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.28When as in this case, the findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contrary to each other, this court may scrutinize the evidence on record,29in order to arrive at a correct finding based thereon.30A perusal of the same shows that since there is no dispute as to the finding of concurrent negligence on the part of the defendant Calebag, the driver of the passenger jeepney, and co-defendant Leonardo, the bus driver of petitioner MMTC, both of whom were solidarily held liable with defendant Lamayo, the owner of the jeepney, we are spared the necessity of determining the sufficiency of evidence establishing the fact of negligence.31The contrariety is in the findings of the two lower courts, and which is the subject of this present controversy, with regard to the liability of MMTC as employer of one the erring drivers.The trial court, in absolving MMTC from liability ruled that On the question as to whether defendant MMTC was successful in proving its defense that indeed it had exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of defendant Leonardo, this Court finds that based on the evidence presented during the trial, defendant MMTC was able to prove that it was not only careful and diligent in choosing and screening applicants for job openings but also strict (and) diligent in supervising its employees by seeing to it that its employees were in proper uniforms, briefed in traffic rules and regulations before the start of duty, checked employees to determine whether they were positive for alcohol and followed other rules and regulations and guidelines of the Bureau of Land Transportation as well as its company. Having successfully proven such defense, defendant MMTC therefore, cannot be held liable for the accident.Having reached this conclusion, the Court now, holds that defendant MMTC be totally absolved from liability and that the complaint against it be dismissed. . . .32whereas respondent court was of the opinion that It is surprising though that witness Milagros Garbo did not testify nor present any evidence that defendant-appellee's driver, defendant Godofredo Leonardo has complied with or has undergone all clearances and trainings she referred to. The clearances, result of seminars and tests which Godofredo Leonardo submitted and complied with, if any, were not presented in court despite the fact that they are obviously in the possession and control of defendant-appellee. Instead, it resorted to generalities. The Court has ruled that due diligence in (the) selection and supervision of employee(s) are not proved by mere testimonies to the effect that its applicant has complied with all the company requirements before one is admitted as an employee but without proof thereof. . . .On the part of Christian Bautista, the transport supervisor of defendant-appellee, he testified that it is his duty to monitor the operation of buses in the field; to countercheck the dispatchers' duty prior to the operation of the buses in the morning; to see to it that bus crew follows written guidelines of the company (t.s.n., April 29, 1988, pp. 4-5), but when asked to present in court the alleged written guidelines of the company he merely stated that he brought with him a "wrong document" and defendant-appellee's counsel asked for reservation to present such written guidelines in the next hearing but the same was (sic) never presented in court.33A thorough and scrupulous review of the records of this case reveals that the conclusion of respondent Court of Appeals is more firmly grounded on jurisprudence and amply supported by the evidence of record than that of the court below.It is procedurally required for each party in a case to prove his own affirmative assertion by the degree of evidence required by law.34In civil cases, the degree of evidence required of a party in order to support his claim is preponderance of evidence, or that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party. It is, therefore, incumbent on the plaintiff who is claiming a right to prove his case. Corollarily, defendant must likewise prove own allegation to buttress its claim that it is not liable.35In fine, the party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of presenting at the trial such amount of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable judgment.36It is entirely within each of the parties discretion, consonant with the theory of the case it or he seeks to advance and subject to such procedural strategy followed thereby, to present all available evidence at its or his disposal in the manner which may be deemed necessary and beneficial to prove its or his position, provided only that the same shall measure up to the quantum of evidence required by law. In making proof in its or his case, it is paramount that the best and most complete evidence be formally entered.37Coming now to the case at bar, while there is no rule which requires that testimonial evidence, to hold sway, must be corroborated by documentary evidence, or even subject evidence for that matter, inasmuch as the witnesses' testimonies dwelt on mere generalities, we cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there was observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.38Petitioner's attempt to prove itsdiligentissimi patris familiasin the selection and supervision of employees through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony.39Our view that the evidence for petitioner MMTC falls short of the required evidentiary quantum as would convincingly and undoubtedly prove its observance of the diligence of a good father of a family has its precursor in the underlying rationale pronounced in the earlier case ofCentral Taxicab Corp. vs. Ex-Meralco Employees Transportation Co., et al.,40set amidst an almost identical factual setting, where we held that:. . . . This witness spoke of an "affidavit of experience" which a driver-applicant must accomplish before he is employed by the company, a written "time schedule" for each bus, and a record of the inspections and thorough checks pertaining to each bus before it leaves the car barn; yet no attempt was ever made to present in evidence any of these documents, despite the fact that they were obviously in the possession and control of the defendant company.xxx xxx xxxAlbert also testified that he kept records of the preliminary and final tests given him as well as a record of the qualifications and experience of each of the drivers of the company. It is rather strange, therefore, that he failed to produce in court the all important record of Roberto, the driver involved in this case.The failure of the defendant company to produce in court any "record" or other documentary proof tending to establish that it had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its drivers and buses, notwithstanding the calls therefor by both the trial court and the opposing counsel, argues strongly against its pretensions.We are fully aware that there is no hard-and-fast rule on the quantum of evidence needed to prove due observance of all the diligence of a good father of a family as would constitute a valid defense to the legal presumption of negligence on the part of an employer or master whose employee has by his negligence, caused damage to another. . . . (R)educing the testimony of Albert to its proper proportions, we do not have enough trustworthy evidence left to go by. We are of the considered opinion, therefore, that the believable evidence on the degree of care and diligence that has been exercised in the selection and supervision of Roberto Leon y Salazar, is not legally sufficient to overcome the presumption of negligence against the defendant company.Whether or not the diligence of a good father of a family has been observed by petitioner is a matter of proof which under the circumstances in the case at bar has not been clearly established. It is not felt by the Court that there is enough evidence on record as would overturn the presumption of negligence, and for failure to submit all evidence within its control, assuming the putative existence thereof, petitioner MMTC must suffer the consequences of its own inaction and indifference.2. In any event, we do not find the evidence presented by petitioner sufficiently convincing to prove the diligence of a good father of a family, which for an employer doctrinally translates into its observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees but which mandate, to use an oft-quoted phrase, is more often honored in the breach than in the observance.Petitioner attempted to essay in detail the company's procedure for screening job applicants and supervising its employees in the field, through the testimonies of Milagros Garbo, as its training officer, and Christian Bautista, as its transport supervisor, both of whom naturally and expectedly testified for MMTC. It then concluded with its sweeping pontifications that "thus, there is no doubt that considering the nature of the business of petitioner, it would not let any applicant-drivers to be (sic) admitted without undergoing the rigid selection and training process with the end (in) view of protecting the public in general and its passengers in particular; . . . thus, there is no doubt that applicant had fully complied with the said requirements otherwise Garbo should not have allowed him to undertake the next set of requirements . . . and the training conducted consisting of seminars and actual driving tests were satisfactory otherwise he should have not been allowed to drive the subject vehicle.41These statements strike us as both presumptuous and in the nature ofpetitio principii, couched in generalities and shorn of any supporting evidence to boost their verity. As earlier observed, respondent court could not but express surprise, and thereby its incredulity, that witness Garbo neither testified nor presented any evidence that driver Leonardo had complied with or had undergone all the clearances and trainings she took pains to recite and enumerate. The supposed clearances, results of seminars and tests which Leonardo allegedly submitted and complied with were never presented in court despite the fact that, if true, then they were obviously in the possession and control of petitioner.42The case at bar is clearly within the coverage of Article 2176 and 2177, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil Code provisions onquasi-delictsas all the elements thereof are present, to wit: (1) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (2) fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond, and (3) the connection of cause and effect between fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by plaintiff.43It is to be noted that petitioner was originally sued as employer of driver Leonardo under Article 2180, the pertinent parts of which provides that:The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.xxx xxx xxxEmployers shall be liable for damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of