G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I), FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias "Taba,"respondents.Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.CASTRO,J.:pI. Statement of the CasePosed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-SubversionAct,1which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other "subversive associations," and punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member" of the Party or of any other similar "subversive" organization.On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding aprima faciecase against Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information. The twice-amended information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27, recites:That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and domination of an alien power, by being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of the New People's Army, the military arm of the said Communist Party of the Philippines.That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating circumstances are present, to wit:(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities;(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford impunity.(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court, sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary investigation was had, an information was filed, which, as amended, reads:The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors duly designated by the Secretary of Justice to collaborate with the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac, pursuant to the Order dated June 5, above entitled case, hereby accuse Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy Reyes alias TABA, ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY) CASIPE, ABELARDO GARCIA, MANUEL ALAVADO, BENJAMIN BIE alias COMMANDER MELODY and several JOHN DOES, whose identities are still unknown, for violation of REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, committed as follows:That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter, in the Province of Tarlac, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and elsewhere in the Philippines, the above-named accused knowingly, willfully and by overt acts organized, joined and/or remained as offices and/or ranking leaders, of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as defined in Republic Act No. 1700; that BENJAMIN BIE and COMMANDER MELODY, in addition thereto, knowingly, willfully and by over acts joined and/or remained as a member and became an officer and/or ranking leader not only of the Communist Party of the Philippines but also of the New People's Army, the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines; and that all the above-named accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of the aforestated subversive organizations, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there knowingly, willfully and feloniously commit subversive and/or seditious acts, by inciting, instigating and stirring the people to unite and rise publicly and tumultuously and take up arms against the government, and/or engage in rebellious conspiracies and riots to overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means among which are the following:1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the accused conducted meetings and/or seminars wherein the said accused delivered speeches instigating and inciting the people to unite, rise in arms and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means; and toward this end, the said accused organized, among others a chapter of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in barrio Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac for the avowed purpose of undertaking or promoting an armed revolution, subversive and/or seditious propaganda, conspiracies, and/or riots and/or other illegal means to discredit and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to established in the Philippines a Communist regime.2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias TABA, together with FRANCISCO PORTEM alias KIKO Gonzales and others, pursued the above subversive and/or seditious activities in San Pablo City by recruiting members for the New People's Army, and/or by instigating and inciting the people to organize and unite for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines through armed revolution, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means, and establishing in the Philippines a Communist Government.That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense: (a) aid of armed men or persons to insure or afford impunity; and (b) craft, fraud, or disguise was employed.On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied him the equal protection of the laws.Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the informations against the two accused. The Government appealed. We resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action forcertiorari.II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder orex port factolaw shall be enacted."2A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial.3Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt.4The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers5by confining legislatures torule-making6and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.7History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities,8and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatizea statute as a bill of attainder.9In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the courta quoas a bill of attainder because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of attainder because it has expressly created a presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to overthrow."1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" issued solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.10This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S. Federal Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 195911which, in U.S. vs. Brown,12was held to be a bill of attainder and therefore unconstitutional. Section 504 provided in its pertinent parts as follows:(a) No person who is or has been a member of the CommunistParty ... shall serve (1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar governing body, business agent, manager, organizer, or other employee (other than as an employee performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any labor organization.during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the Communist Party....(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes disability and penalties on its members. Membership in the Party, without more,ipso factodisqualifies a person from becoming an officer or a member of the governing body of any labor organization. As the Supreme Court of the United States pointed out:Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly possesses power under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keep from positions affecting interstate commerce persons who may use of such positions to bring about political strikes. In section 504, however, Congress has exceeded the authority granted it by the Constitution. The statute does not set forth a generally applicable rule decreeing that any person who commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and characteristics which, in Congress' view, make them likely to initiate political strikes) shall not hold union office, and leaves to courts and juries the job of deciding what persons have committed the specified acts or possessed the specified characteristics.Instead, it designates in no uncertain terms the persons who possess the feared characteristicsand therefore cannot hold union office without incurring criminal liability members of the Communist Party.Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1, 6 L ed 2d 625, 81 S CT 1357, lend a support to our conclusion. That case involved an appeal from an order by the Control Board ordering the Communist Party to register as a "Communist-action organization," under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat 987, 50 USC sec. 781et seq. (1958 ed). The definition of "Communist-action organization" which the Board is to apply is set forth in sec. 3 of the Act:[A]ny organization in the United States ... which (i)is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title, and(ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of such world Communist movement... 64 Stat 989, 50 USC sec. 782 (1958 ed.)A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill of attainder, reasoning that sec. 3 does not specify the persons or groups upon which the deprivations setforth in the Act are to be imposed, but instead sets forth a general definition. Although the Board has determined in 1953 that the Communist Party was a "Communist-action organization," the Court found the statutory definition not to be so narrow as to insure that the Party would always come within it:In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court of Appeals has sustained its conclusion, that the Communist Party, by virtud of the activities in which it now engages, comes within the terms of the Act. If the Party should at anytime choose to abandon these activities, after it is once registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act provides adequate means of relief. (367 US, at 87, 6 L ed 2d at 683)Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power.As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless imputed despite the requirement of proof of knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has been referred to as a "dragneet device" whereby all who participate in the criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the Party.13But the statute specifically required that membership must beknowingor active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts."14The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts."15This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives.2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of securities underwriting firms from serving as officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be subject to the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy, has been declared not to be a bill of attainder.16Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of such society which fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared valid even if in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux Klan.17In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace Act,18requiring labor unions to file with the Department of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and that they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method," was upheld by this Court.19Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder.20It is upon this ground that statutes which disqualified those who had taken part in the rebellion against the Government of the United States during the Civil War from holding office,21or from exercising their profession,22or which prohibited the payment of further compensation to individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding that they had engages in subversive activities,23or which made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or employee of a labor union,24have been invalidated as bills of attainder.But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such determination.25InNew York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman,26the New York legislature passed a law requiring every secret, oath-bound society with a membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who joined or remained a member of such a society failing to register. While the statute did not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its operation the law applied to the KKK exclusively. In sustaining the statute against the claim that it discriminated against the Ku Klux Klan while exempting other secret, oath-bound organizations like masonic societies and the Knights of Columbus, the United States Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of the nature and activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court said:The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases just cited and reached the conclusion that the classification was justified by a difference between the two classes of associations shown by experience, and that the difference consisted (a) in a manifest tendency on the part of one class to make the secrecy surrounding its purpose and membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to personal rights and public welfare, and (b) in the absence of such a tendency on the part of the other class. In pointing out this difference one of the courts said of the Ku Klux Klan, the principal association in the included class: "It is a matter of common knowledge that this organization functions largely at night, its members disguised by hoods and gowns and doing things calculated to strike terror into the minds of the people;" and later said of the other class: "These organizations and their purposes are well known, many of them having been in existence for many years. Many of them are oath-bound and secret. But we hear no complaint against them regarding violation of the peace or interfering with the rights of others." Another of the courts said: "It is a matter of common knowledge that the association or organization of which the relator is concededly a member exercises activities tending to the prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes of our citizens. But the legislation is not confined to this society;" and later said of the other class: "Labor unions have a recognized lawful purpose. The benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent Orders Law have already received legislative scrutiny and have been granted special privileges so that the legislature may well consider them beneficial rather than harmful agencies." The third court, after recognizing "the potentialities of evil in secret societies," and observing that "the danger of certain organizations has been judicially demonstrated," meaning in that state, said: "Benevolent orders, labor unions and college fraternities have existed for many years, and, while not immune from hostile criticism, have on the whole justified their existence."We assume that the legislature had before it such information as was readily available including the published report of a hearing, before a committee of the House of Representatives of the 57th Congress relating to the formation, purposes and activities of the Klu Klux Klan. If so it was advised putting aside controverted evidence that the order was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an earlier time with additional features borrowed from the Know Nothing and the A. P. A. orders of other periods; that its memberships was limited to native-born, gentile, protestant whites; that in part of its constitution and printed creed it proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full adherence to the Constitution of the United States; in another exacted of its member an oath to shield and preserve "white supremacy;" and in still another declared any person actively opposing its principles to be "a dangerous ingredient in the body politic of our country and an enemy to the weal of our national commonwealth;" that it was conducting a crusade against Catholics, Jews, and Negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious and race prejudices; that it was striving for political power and assuming a sort of guardianship over the administration of local, state and national affairs; and that at times it was taking into its own hands the punishment of what some of its members conceived to be crimes.27In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object of continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an illegal association.28In 1969 we again found that the objective of the Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines a communist form of government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red China."29More recently, inLansang vs. Garcia,30we noted the growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of Communist fronts among youth organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of the New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the evidence, we said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. As Justice Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of attainder was ... doubly objectionable because of itsex post factofeatures. This is the historic explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in oneclause 'No Bill of Attainder orex post factolaw shall be passed.' ... Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of attainder it is also anex post factolaw. But if it is not anex post factolaw, the reasons that establish that it is not are persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder."31Thus inGardner vs. Board of Public Works,32the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles which provided:... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any public office or employment in the service of the City of Los Angeles, in any office or department thereof, either elective or appointive, who has within five (5) years prior to the effective date of this section advised, advocated, or taught, or who may, after this section becomes effective, become a member of or affiliated with any group, society, association, organization or party which advises, advocates or teaches or has within said period of five (5) years advised, advocated, or taught the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States of America or of the State of California.In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of the Act to the petitioner therein, thus:... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the charter provision insofar as it purported to apply restrospectively for a five-year period to its effective date. We assume that under the Federal Constitution the Charter Amendment is valid to the extent that it bars from the city's public service persons who, subsequently to its adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or reach the violent overthrow of the Government or who are or become affiliated with any group doing so. The provisions operating thus prospectively were a reasonable regulation to protect the municipal service by establishing an employment qualification of loyalty to the State and the United States.... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under which petitioners were removed, the statute in the Lovett case did not declare general and prospectively operative standards of qualification and eligibility for public employment. Rather, by its terms it prohibited any further payment of compensationto named individuals or employees. Under these circumstances, viewed against the legislative background, the statutewas held to have imposed penalties without judicial trial.Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is thatCongress thereby assumed judicial magistracy, them it mustbe demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of attainderreaches past conduct and that the penalties it imposesare inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court observedwith respect to the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities ControlAct of 1950:Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of attainderby the fact that the conduct which it regulates is describedwith such particularity that, in probability, few organizationswill come within the statutory terms. Legislatures may act tocurb behaviour which they regard as harmful to the public welfare,whether that conduct is found to be engaged in by manypersons or by one. So long as the incidence of legislation issuch that the persons who engage in the regulated conduct, bethey many or few, can escape regulation merely by altering thecourse of their own present activities, there can be no complaintof an attainder.33This statement,mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAnti-Subversion Act. Section 4 thereof expressly statesthat the prohibition therein applies only to acts committed"After the approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly,willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with,become or remain members of the Communist Party of thePhilippines and/or its successors or of any subversive association"after June 20, 1957, are punished. Those whowere members of the Party or of any other subversive associationat the time of the enactment of the law, weregiven the opportunity of purging themselves of liability byrenouncing in writing and under oath their membershipin the Party. The law expressly provides that such renunciationshall operate to exempt such persons from penalliability.34The penalties prescribed by the Act are thereforenot inescapable.III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that the Communist Party of the Philippinesis an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of theGovernment is inteded not to provide the basis for a legislativefinding of guilt of the members of the Party butrather to justify the proscription spelled out in section 4. Freedom of expression and freedom of association are sofundamental that they are thought by some to occupy a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of constitutional values.35Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise mustbe justified by the existence of a substantive evil. This isthe reason why before enacting the statute in question Congressconducted careful investigations and then stated itsfindings in the preamble, thus:... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines althoughpurportedly a political party, is in fact an organized conspiracyto overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippinesnot only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversionand other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in thePhilippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien dominationand control;... [T]he continued existence and activities of the CommunistParty of the Philippines constitutes a clear, present andgrave danger to the security of the Philippines;... [I]n the face of the organized, systematice and persistentsubversion, national in scope but international in direction,posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its activities,there is urgent need for special legislation to cope withthis continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country.In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento question if, instead of making these findings in enactingthe statute, Congress omitted to do so.In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial magistracy, the trial courd failed to takeproper account of the distinction betweenlegislative factandadjudicative fact. Professor Paul Freund elucidatesthe crucial distinction, thus:... A law forbidding the sale of beverages containingmore than 3.2 per cent of alcohol would raise a question of legislativefact, i.e., whether this standard has a reasonable relationto public health, morals, and the enforcement problem. Alaw forbidding the sale of intoxicating beverages (assuming itis not so vague as to require supplementation by rule-making)would raise a question of adjudicative fact, i.e., whether thisor that beverage is intoxicating within the meaning of the statuteand the limits on governmental action imposed by the Constitution. Of course what we mean by fact in each case is itselfan ultimate conclusion founded on underlying facts and oncriteria of judgment for weighing them.A conventional formulation is that legislative facts those facts which are relevant to the legislative judgment will not be canvassed save to determine whether there is a rationalbasis for believing that they exist, while adjudicativefacts those which tie the legislative enactment to the litigant are to be demonstrated and found according to the ordinarystandards prevailing for judicial trials.36The test formulated inNebbia vs. new York,37andadopted by this Court inLansang vs. Garcia,38is that 'if laws are seen to have a reasonable relation to a properlegislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a courtfunctus officio." The recital of legislative findings implements this test.With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Actof 1950 (that "Communist-action organizations" are controlledby the foreign government controlling the worldCommunist movement and that they operate primarily to"advance the objectives of such world Communist movement"),the U.S. Supreme Court said:It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of theselegislative findings and reject them....They are the productof extensive investigation by Committes of Congress over morethan a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.502, 516, 530. We certainly cannot dismiss them as unfoundedirrational imaginings. ... And if we accept them, as we mustas a not unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the threatwhich Communist organizations pose not only to existing governmentin the United States, but to the United States as asovereign, independent Nation. ...we must recognize that thepower of Congress to regulate Communist organizations of thisnature isextensive.39This statement,mutatis mutandis, may be said of thelegislative findings articulated in the Anti-Subversion Act.That the Government has a right to protect itself againstsubversion is a proposition too plain to require elaboration.Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of society. It surpasses and transcendes every other value, "forif a society cannot protect its very structure from armedinternal attack, ...no subordinate value can be protected"40As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said inDennis vs. United States:41Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argumentthat there is a 'right' to rebellion against dictatorial governmentsis without force where the existing structure of government provides for peaceful and orderly change. We rejectany principle of governmental helplessness in the face of preparationfor revolution, which principle, carried to its logical conclusion,must lead to anarchy. No one could conceive that it isnot within the power of Congress to prohibit acts intended tooverthrow the government by force and violence.2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly described in sectin 4 thereof), Congressreaffirmed its respect for the rule that "even throughthe governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stiflefundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved."42The requirement ofknowingmembership,as distinguished fromnominalmembership, hasbeen held as a sufficient basis for penalizing membershipin a subversive organization.43For, as has been stated:Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the organization; and when membership is acceptedor retained with knowledge that the organization is engaged inan unlawful purpose, the one accepting or retaining membershipwith such knowledge makes himself a party to the unlawfulenterprise in which it is engaged.443. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad because section 2 merely speaks of "overthrow"of the Government and overthrow may be achieved bypeacefulmeans, misconceives the function of the phrase"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is merely a legislative declaration; the definitionsof and the penalties prescribed for the different acts prescribedare stated in section 4 which requires that membershipin the Communist Party of the Philippines, to be unlawful, must be acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." Indeed, the first "whereas" clause makes clear thatthe overthrow contemplated is "overthrow not only by forceand violence but also be deceit, subversion and other illegalmeans." The absence of this qualificatio in section 2 appearsto be due more to an oversight rather than to deliberateomission.Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe use of violent and other illegal means. Only in a metaphoricalsense may one speak of peaceful overthrow ofgovernments, and certainly the law does not speak in metaphors.In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the use ofthe word "overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is hardlyconsistent with the clearly delineated objective of the "overthrow,"namely, "establishing in the Philippines a totalitarianregime and place [sic] the Government under thecontrol and domination of an alien power." What thisCourt once said in a prosecution for sedition isappropos: "The language used by the appellant clearly imported anoverthrow of the Government by violence, and it should beinterpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it wasevidently intended to be understood. The word 'overthrow'could not have been intended as referring to an ordinarychange by the exercise of the elective franchise. The useof the whip [which the accused exhorted his audience to useagainst the Constabulary], an instrument designed toleave marks on the sides of adversaries, is inconsistentwith the mild interpretation which the appellant wouldhave us impute to the language."45IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free ExpressionAs already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by force, violence orother illegal means. Whatever interest in freedom of speechand freedom of association is infringed by the prohibitionagainst knowing membership in the Communist Party ofthe Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to beclearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding considerationsof national security and the preservartion of democraticinstitutions in his country.The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Actis similar in many respects to the membership provision ofthe Anti-Subversion Act. The former provides:Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize anysociety, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, orencourage the overthrow or destruction of any such governmentby force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliatedwith, any such society, group or assembly of persons, knowingthe purpose thereof Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned notmore than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for emplymentby the United States or any department or agencythereof, for the five years next following his conviction....46In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said inScales vs. United States:47It was settled inDennisthat advocacy with which we arehere concerned is not constitutionally protected speech, and itwas further established that a combination to promote suchadvocacy, albeit under the aegis of what purports to be a politicalparty, is not such association as is protected by the firstAmendment. We can discern no reason why membership, whenit constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group engagingin this same forbidden advocacy, should receive anygreater degree of protection from the guarantees of that Amendment.Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problemsof accommodating the exigencies of self-preservationand the values of liberty are as complex and intricate as inthe situation described in the legislative findings stated inthe U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,the legislative judgment as to how that threat may best bemet consistently with the safeguards of personal freedomsis not to be set aside merely because the judgment of judgeswould, in the first instance, have chosen other methods.48For in truth, legislation, "whether it restrains freedom tohire or freedom to speak, is itself an effort at compromisebetween the claims of the social order and individual freedom,and when the legislative compromise in either case isbrought to the judicial test the court stands one step removedfrom the conflict and its resolution through law."49V. The Act and its TitleThe respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional commandthat "no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."50What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle of the Act is the last proviso of section 4 which reads:And provided, finally, That one who conspires with anyother person to overthrow the Government of the Republic ofthe Philippines, or the government of any of its political subdivisionsby force, violence, deceit, subversion or illegal means,for the purpose of placing such Government or political subdivisionunder the control and domination of any lien power, shallbe punished byprision correccionaltoprision mayorwith allthe accessory penalties provided therefor in the same code.It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes notonly membership in the Communist Party of the Philippinesor similar associations, but as well "any conspiracyby two persons to overthrow the national or any local governmentby illegal means, even if their intent is not to establisha totalitarian regime, burt a democratic regime, evenif their purpose is not to place the nation under an aliencommunist power, but under an alien democratic power likethe United States or England or Malaysia or even an anti-communistpower like Spain, Japan, Thailand or Taiwanor Indonesia."The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe Communist Party of the Philippines and SimilarAssociations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and forOther Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1 providesthat "This Act shall be known as theAnti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short title of the statuteunequivocally indicates that the subject matter is subversionin general which has for its fundamental purpose the substitutionof a foreign totalitarian regime in place of theexisting Government and not merely subversion by Communistconspiracies..The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its contents, and need not recite the details of the Act.51It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but clear termsthe nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed lawand its operation.52A narrow or technical construction isto be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and reasonablyin order not to thwart the legislative intent. We holdthat the Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these requirements.VI. Conclusion and GuidelinesIn conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-Subversion Act, we cannot overemphasize the needfor prudence and circumspection in its enforcement, operatingas it does in the sensitive area of freedom of expressionand belief. Accordingly, we set the followingbasic guidelinesto be observed in any prosecution under the Act.The Government, in addition to proving such circumstancesas may affect liability, must establish the following elementsof the crime of joining the Communist Party of the Philippinesor any other subversive association:(1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that thepurpose of the organization is to overthrow the presentGovernment of the Philippines and to establish in thiscountry a totalitarian regime under the domination of aforeign power; (b) that the accused joined such organization;and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully and byovert acts; and(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines,(a) that the CPP continues to pursue the objectiveswhich led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an organizedconspiracy for the overthrow of the Government by illegalmeans for the purpose of placing the country under thecontrol of a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined theCPP; and (c) that he did so willfully, knowingly and byovert acts.We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime or remaining a member of the Communist Party ofthe Philippines or of any other subversive association: weleave this matter to future determination.ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set aside, and these two cases are herebyremanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits. Costsde oficio.G.R. Nos. L-32613-4 April 30, 1974PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.HON. SIMEON N. FERRER, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I; FELICIANO COalias"Leoncio Co"alias"Bob" and NILO S. TAYAGalias"Romy Reyes"alias"Taba",respondents.Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. for petitioner.R E S O L U T I O NCASTRO,J.:pThe respondents Feliciano Co and Nilo Tayag separately seek a reconsideration of our decision in this case dated December 27, 1972. The motion for reconsideration filed by Co, being a mere reiteration of arguments previously advanced, need not detain us. It is the motion filed by Tayag that requires detailed consideration.The burden of Tayag's motion is that knowing membership alone in the Communist Party of the Philippines or in any other subversive organization cannot, consistently with the Constitution, be made the basis of criminal prosecution under the Anti-Subversion Act. He argues that such membership must be coupled with direct participation by the defendant in the illegal activities of the organization. Thus, he seeks the inclusion in the guidelines set forth in our decision of a requirement that in prosecutions under the Act the State must prove that the defendant joined or remained a member of the CPP or of the subversive organization, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objectives as shown by direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities.1. The respondent Tayag's submission would nullify the legislative policy embodied in the Anti-Subversion Act and frustrate prosecutions under it. On the basis of Congressional findings that the Communist Party of the Philippines is "an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime ... under the control and domination of an alien power,"1the Act provides for the punishment of any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines."2The Act is thus aconspiracy statute. Thegistis the agreement itself rather than action taken pursuant to it.3Obviously, to require proof of direct participation of the defendant in the substantive offenses constituting the object of the conspiracy, in addition to proof of agreement, would render ineffectual the conspiracy device in penal law. The law is primarily concerned with conduct and will not intervene as long as the actor withdraws from what lie has planned to do. But where the act or acts in concert with others, the likelihood of a change of heart or of a misreading of his intention is minuscule. He is less likely to desist from the criminal enterprise where others are also involved. On the contrary, the encouragement and moral support of others in conspiracy with him fortifies his perseverance. The resulting collective action toward an anti-social end gives rise to a graver danger to society than individual action toward the same end, and justifies the intervention of the law at an earlier stage.4Indeed, section 4 of the Act distinguishes one who only joins or maintains his membership in the CPP or other subversive organization, for whom the penalty provided isarresto mayor, from one who not only does so but as well takes up arms against the Government, for whom the Act provides a heavier penalty, namely,prision mayorto death. The respondent Tayag's thesis would obliterate this distinction. The Court's traditional avoidance of constructions of doubtful constitutionality cannot be turned into an instrument for the evisceration of a plain legislative policy.2. Moreover, a requirement that the prosecution must prove direct participation by the defendant in the objectives of the conspiracy would run counter to another established principle in the law that where conspiracy is proved, the act of one is deemed to be the act of all.5That is why we referred to criminal conspiracy as a dragnet device for effectively dealing with the growth of organized crime. A contrary requirement would render society powerless to repress widespread criminality.3. Indeed, as we noted in our decision, the requirement that membership in the CPP or in any other subversive organization be shown by overt acts was intended no more than to preclude the possibility that conviction may be obtained solely on the basis of incriminating evidence rather than positive acts of the defendant. As Senator Cea explained in the course of the deliberations on the bill: "I have inserted the words "overt acts" because we are punishing membership in the Communist Party. I would like that membership to be proved by overt acts, by positive acts, because it may happen that one's name may appear in the list of membership."6Thus, where one is shown to have taken an oath of membership or signed affiliation papers in a subversive organization, knowing its illegal purposes, the requirement of the law is satisfied. Of course where, as it often happens, it cannot be shown that the defendant explicitly or expressly entered into the conspiracy, his agreement may be inferred from circumstances demonstrating concert of action. It is then that the defendant's participation in the illegal activities of the organization would constitute proof of his specific intent.4. But the over-act requirement may also be satisfied by proof of non-criminal and relatively minor acts.7Such acts may consist in signing membership papers, paying dues, attending meetings, and the like, which, although in themselves may not be illegal, are nevertheless acts in pursuance of the objectives of the conspiracy. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Yates vs. United States:8... It is not necessary that an overt act be the substantive crime charged in the indictment as the object of the conspiracy. Nor, indeed, need such an act, taken by itself, even be criminal in character. The function of the overt act in a conspiracy prosecution is simply to manifest "that the conspiracy is at work," and is neither a project still resting solely in the minds of the conspirators nor a fully completed operation no longer in existence.Indeed, the rationale of the Anti-Subversion Act, like that of the Smith Act involved inYates, is that the existence of the conspiracy by itself creates the danger to national security. As held in Dennis vs. United States,9"the formation ... of such a highly organized conspiracy, with rigidly disciplined members subject to call when the leaders ... felt that the time has come for action, ... disposes of the contention that a conspiracy to advocate, as distinguished from the advocacy itself, cannot be constitutionally restrained because it comprises only the preparation. It is the existence of the conspiracy which creates the danger ... If the ingredients are present, we cannot bind the Government to wait until the catalyst is added." In the case of the CPP and other subversive groups, the danger posed is deemed in the Anti-Subversion Act to be so "clear, present and grave" as to warrant the prosecution of those engaged in the conspiracy.5. Nor is there a constitutional compulsion that the overt acts of conspiracy be evidenced by direct participation of the defendant in the illegal objectives of the organization. In the first place, there is no reason why one who actively and knowingly works in the ranks of the organization, intending to contribute to the success of its specific illegal activities, should be any more immune from prosecution than one to whom the organization has assigned or entrusted the task of carrying out the substantive criminal acts. InUnited States vs. Vergara,10for instance, it was shown that the defendants organized theKatipunan, a society for the purpose of overthrowing the Government by force, and that in pursuance of the conspiracy the defendants solicited public contributions. No overt acts of insurrection were shown, but the defendants were nevertheless held guilty of conspiracy to overthrow the Government.In the second place, the requirement of proof of specific intent precisely limits the operation of the statute only to illegal conduct. There need be no apprehension that unless direct participation by the defendant in the illegal activities of the association is shown, the statute may sweep unnecessarily broadly into protected activities, as the association may have both legal and illegal aims. In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines, this apprehension is without basis, for the very nature of that organization as a conspiracy for the violent overthrow of the Government defines the character of its objectives.Indeed, as was held inScales vs. United States,11in answer to a similar contention,If it is said that the mere existence of such an enactment tends to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights, in that it engenders an unhealthy fear that one may find himself unwittingly embroiled in criminal liability, the answer surely is that the statute provides that a defendant must be proven to have knowledge of the proscribed advocacy before he may be convicted. It is, of course, true that quasi-political parties or other groups that may embrace both legal and illegal aims differ from a technical conspiracy, which is defined by its purpose, so thatallknowing association with the conspiracy is a proper subject for criminal proscription as far as the First Amendment liberties are concerned. If there were a similar blanket prohibition of association with a group having both legal and illegal aims, there would indeed be real danger that legitimate political expression or association would be impaired, but the membership clause, as here construed, does not cut deeper into the freedom of association than is necessary to deal with "the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52. The clause does not make criminal all association with an organization which has been shown to engage in illegal advocacy. There must be clear proof that a defendant "specifically intend[s] to accomplish [the aims of the organization] by resort to violence." Noto v. United States [367 U.S. at 299]. Thus the member for whom the organization is a vehicle for the advancement of legitimate aims and policies does not fall within the ban of the statute; he lacks the requisite specific intent "to bring about the overthrow of the government as speedily as circumstances would permit." Such a person may be foolish, deluded or perhaps merely optimistic, but he is not by this statute made a criminal.'ACCORDINGLY, the two motions for reconsideration are denied. Our decision of December 27, 1972 is hereby declared final and executory.