Pentagon Papers Part IV a 2

8/6/2019 Pentagon Papers Part IV a 2

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

IV.A Evolution of the War (26 Vols.)U.S. MAP for Diem: The Eisenhower Commitments,1954-1960 (5 Vols.)2. Aid for France in Indochina, 1950-54


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I'V. A. 2.AID FOR FRANCE IN INDOCH INA -

1950 - 1954

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IV. A. 2.


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AID FOR I'RANCE IN INDOCHINA, 1950-1954SUMMARY

The United States decision to provide mili tary assistance to Franceand th e Associated States of Indochina ..Tas reached informally in February/March 1950, funded by the President on May 1, 1950, and ,vas announced onMay 8 of that year . The decision was taken in spite of the U.S. desire toavoid direct involvement in a colonial war, an d in spite of a sensing thatFrance's poli t ical-mil i tary si tuation in Indochina was ba d and was deteriorat ing. Moreover, predictions that U.S. aid would achieve a marked difference in th e course of the Indochina War were heavily ~ u a l i f i e d .

The si tuat ion in which the decision ..ms made was completely domina,tedby the take-over of and consolidation of power in China by the communists.Nationalist Chinese forces had been withdrawn from mainland China and Com-munist Chinese troops had arr ived on the border of Indochina in la te 1949.This period was the high water mark of U.S. fears of direct Chines e Com-mun:i.st in tervention in Indochina. NIE 5 of 29 December 1950 stated:"Direct intervention by Chinese Communi s t troops may occur a t any time . . .i t is almost certain to occur in strength whenever there i s danger eitherthat the Viet Minh wil l fa i l to maintain i t s mili tary objective of drivingthe French out of Indochina, or that th e Bao Dai Government is succeedingin undermining the support of the Viet Minh."

The rat ionale of the decision was provided by the U.S. v i ev; that theSoviet-controlled expansion of communism both in Asia and in Europe r e ~ u i r e d , in th e in terests of U.S. national security, a counter in Indochina. Th edomino th es is was ~ u i t prominent. On 6 March 1950, the Secretary of Defensewrote the President as follovTs: ItThe choice confronting the United Statesis to support the lega l government in Indochina or to face the extensionof communism over the remainder of the continental area of Southeast Asiaand possibly wesh;rard . . t Despite this statement , i t was a generallyaccepted proposit ion that Itregardless of current U.S. commitments for certain mili tary assistance to China, th e U.S. will not commit an y of i tsarmed forces to th e defense of Indochina against overt, for eign aggression,under present circumstances .1t

The decision to begin mili tary assistance to France and th e AssociatedStates of Indochina was not made under the i l lus ion of great expectations.In April 1950, the Joint Chiefs would go no fUrther than to say tha t promptdelivery of the aid would do no more than create the Itpossibility of success."In July 1950, General Erskine, af ter completing his Pr esident ia l missionto Indochina, reported that J1the amount of aid and th e scope of the assistance thus far reQuested by the French were inadeQuate to th e needs of th esi tuat ion. It All U. S. expectations seemed to have been underpinned by thei TOP SECRET - Sensitive


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Joint Chiefs' belief that "attainment of United States objectives in Asiacan only be achieved by ultimate success in China."Results of the decision were mixed. Although implementation of thedecision was par t ia l ly successful in that i t enabled the French to continuethe mili tary campaign in Indochina to the time of the Geneva Accords, military assistance vias by and large a fai lure as an instrument of U. S. policy:the U.S. neither assured the French a mili tary success, inf luenced . the

pol i t ica l si tuat ion to advantage, nor prevented the loss of North Vietnamto th e communists a t Geneva.The U.S. ~ ~ G Indochina was unable to perform even th e l imited funct ions assigned i t . The French, never eager for U.S. advice, succeededin l imiting the function of MAAG to order-taking in the commerc ia l sense.Contributing to th e i n i t i a l U.S. decision to aid the French, and tol imiting the effectiveness of the U. S. program of assistance, vlere (1)

setting i mpracticable preconditions for assistance upon the French, (2) theU.S. procl ivi ty to accept a slender chance of success without weighing al ter -natives, (3 ) the suppression of alternatives l eading to decisional circul ar i tyand reinforcement of existing pol icies , (4) repeated fai lures ofth e U.S. to bargain effectively with the French, and (5) the vulnerabil i tyof the U.S. policy-making machinery to spoofing, particularly as regardsU.S. credulity in accepting French information a t face value and in beingsusceptible to "r ed" scares.

The decision to provide assistance to France and th e Associated Statesis the focus of this discussion; i t was but one issue among hundreds preoccupying the United States Government in th e time period under considera t ion ~ the f a l l of China and th e Korean War -- and i t was probably notregarded by those who made policy as among their cr i t i ca l decisions. Thereis no evidence of an y high U.S. off ic ia l arguing that any significant commitment threshold 'vas being crossed. There were, however, those who maintainedthat the important anti-colonial stand of the U.S. was being undermined.These voice s (and they were basically from the public doma.in) were drownedout by those who advocated immediate security needs. The importance of thedecision vTas tha t when the U. S. 'vas faced with an unamb i guous choice betweena policy of anti-colonialism and a policy of anti-communism, i t chose thela t ter . And, although the decision 'vas not perceived as getting the U.S.more deeply "involved" in Indochina, i t did mark a tangible f i r s t step inthat direction.

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IV. A. 2.

Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NW D Date: 2011


AID FOR FRANCE IN INDOCHINA, 1950-1954TABLE OF CONTENTS AND OUTLINE

1. Th e U.S. and th e French Colonial War . . . o . . . . . . . o. . . . . . . 12. The Containment of Communism . . . . . . 0 . 23. "T he Line of Containment" and "The Domino Theory" . . . . . . 0 34. u. s. Perception of the Chinese Communist Threa t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45. u. s . Perceptions of the Situation ' r ithin Vietnam. . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

a. The Military Si tuation ................................ 0. . 5b. Th e Economic and Pol i t ical Si tua t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6c. French Objectives in Vi etnam. . . . . . . . . . 0 6d. French Resolve to Remain i n Vietnam...................... 6

6. The Decision to Assist France and the Associated States . . . . . . 6a. French Request Aid....................................... 6b. The Griffin M iss i on . . . . .. . . . .. . . . ........................ 8c J CS View s. . : . . . . . . . . . 0 8d. Presidential Approval . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . 10e . Er skine Mission ............................ ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11f' JCS Reevaluat ion ................... 0 11

7. MA.P for Indochina ............................. 14a . Magnitude ........................ " ....................... 14b. Effect ive"1.ess .......................... .......... o. l5

8. Critique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17a. Fr ench Misest.i.1nated................................... 0 17

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TOP SECRET - Sensitive1. Introduction: The U.S. and the French Colonial War

Because the early phase (1946-1949) of th e Indochina war 'vas anovert attempt by the French to reasser t authority and control over theirI n d o c h i n e s ~ colonies, the United States, although aware that EuropeanRecovery Program (ERP) funds were indirectly used to finance the war,refused to support that war directly. However, American actions takento assure a neutral position -- refusal to se l l armaments to the Frenchfor use in Indochina; refusal to transport troops, arms, or ammunition"to or from Netherlands East Indies or French Indochina" -1.1 -- accompanied by .public and private statements of ant i -colonial is t sentiments, didconstitute, a t least in French eyes, a policy hostile to the French interestin Indochina. Therefore, early in 1947, the Department of Stateattempted to reassure the French Government, and to make U.S. policies andactions more palatable to them:

". . . In spite any misunderstanding which might have arisenin minds French in regard to our position concerning Indochinathey must appreciate that we have fully recognized France'ssovereign position in that area and we do not ,vish to have i tappear that we are in any way endeavoring undermine that posit ion, and French should knOlv i t is our desire to be helpfuland iie stand ready ass is t an y appropriate way we can to findsolution for Indochinese problem. At same time we cannot shutour eyes to fact that there are two sides this problem and thatour reports indicate both a lack French understanding of otherside (more in Saigon than in Paris) an d continued existencedangerously outmoded colonial outlook and methods in area . . . . " -.3./

Neither direct nor indirect assistance to the French effor t inIndochina was deemed "appropriate," however, unt i l the French took concrete steps to grant autonomy to Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The U.S.was prepared to support th e "Bao Da i solution" for Vietnam when and i fBao Dai acquired genuine independence. The U.S. warned France againstset t l ing for a "native government Lheaded by Bao D ay i ' h i c h _ b ~ fail ingto develop appeal among Vietnamese might become vir tual ly L a ~ - p u ~ e t g o v e r ~ e n t , separated from jJ,hi / people and existing only by L t h ~ presence Oil French mili tary forces." ..lJj

In March, 194,9, in the so-called Elysee Agreement, France cont racted with Bao Dai to grant "independence within the French Union" toVietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. -21 Despite U.S. urgings, the Elysee Agreement remained a potent ial ly empty and i l l-defined French promise for elevenmonths. In that period, t h e Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek weredriven from the China mainland, and in November, Mao's legions arrived atthe Indochina. border. In January, 1950, Ho Chi Minh declared that his wasth e "only legal government of th e Vietnamese people" and indicated hiswillingness to cooperate with any nation willing to recognize i t on thebasis of "equality and mutual respect of national sovereignty and terr i tory.")

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3NND Project Number: NND 63316. By : NWD Date: 2011

TOP SECRET SensitiveThe Communist Chinese promptly responded with recognition, followed bythe Soviets. In France, there was a sharp debate in th e National Assemblybetween Left is t advocates of an immediate t ruce with the Viet Minh, andGovernment supporters of ra t i f ic at ion for th e Elysee Agreement. On2 February 1950, the French Government prevailed, and the Elysee Agreementwas formally ra t if ied. Under the circumstances, the United States determined that this action met i t s minimum requirements for t angible Frenchprogress towards Vietnamese autonomy. On 3 February, President Trumanapproved recognition of the States of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. -11Within three months the United States decided to extend economic andmili tary aid to the new States. On 8 May 1950, the Secretary of Stateannounced that :

"The United States Government, convinced that neithernational independence nor democratic evolution exist in anyarea dominated by Soviet imperialism, considers the si tuationto be such as to warrant i t s ac cording economic aid and military equipment to the Associated States of Indochina and toFrance in order to ass is t them in restoring s tab i l i ty andpernritting these states to pursue the i r peaceful illld democraticdevelopment." .!lIThe U.S. involvement in the Vietnam "rar originated with i t sdecision to provide assistance to Franc e and the Associated States, andto form ~ ~ G Indochina. Therefore, i t is of par t icular importance tounderstand th e reasons for th e decision, the form of i ts execution, andi t s effects .

2. The Containment of CommunismU.S. chagrin and increasing concern over the post-World War I Iexpansion of the Soviet Union in Europe, together with fear of furthergains by communism, set the tone of U.S. policy toward Asian communistnations in th e 1 9 L ~ 8 - 1 9 5 0 period. As the Secretary of State s statementabove indicates, these were th e days of the IImonolithic Communist bloc,"dorllnated by the Soviet Union. A National Security Council policy paperof 1949 stated that:"The USSR i s now an Asiatic power of the f i r s t magnitudewith expanding influence and interest extending throughoutcontinental Asia an d into th e Pacific. Since the defeat ofJapan . . . th e Soviet Union has been able to consolidate i t sstrategic position unt i l the base of Soviet power in Asia

comprises not only th e Soviet Far East, but also China northof the Great Wall, Northern Korea, Sakahalin, and the Kuriles." 21The question of how best to oppose the expansion of communismin Asia was raised to cr is is proportions by the "loss" of China. Anextensive and acrimonious national debate on foreign policy viaS st i r red,conducted in th e midst of grmring public apprehension over communis tpenetration, espionage , and subversion in Europe and within the UnitedStates i t s el f . In Congress, a par t icular ly active and vocal group



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advocated increased aid to the Chinese Nationalists , who \-Tere regarded bymany, even a t th is la te date, as the bulwark containing communism inAsia. lQ/ Although no major emphasis was given Indochina in 1949, NSCpapers did discuss the importance of th e Franco-Viet Minh struggle, andl ink the future of Indochina ..lith that of the res t of the \-Torld:"In an y event, colonial-nationalist confl ict provides a

fer t i le field for subversive communist ac t iv i t ies , and i t isnow clear that Southeast Asia is the target of a coordinatedoffensive directed by the Kremlin. In seeking to gain controlof Southeast Asia, the Kremlin is motivated in par t by a desireto a c ~ u i r e Southeast Asia's resources and communication l ines ,and to deny them to us. But th e pol i t ica l gains which wouldaccrue to the USSR from communist capture of Southeast Asiaare e ~ u a l l y signif icant . The extension of communist authorityin China represents a grievous pol i t ica l defeat for us: i fSoutheast Asia also is swept by communism we shal l have suffereda major pol i t ica l rout the repercussions of which will be fe l tthroughout th e res t of the world, especially in th e Middle Eastand in a then cri t ical ly exposed Australia. 1t -QJ

I t was precisely the extension of communist authority over China referred toabove that led to increased emphasis in U.S. policy on Indochina in la te1949 and 1950.Following the Chinese Communist victories of 1949 and th e movementof Chinese Communist troops to the border of Indochina in November of thatyear, NSC 64 (February 7, 1950) concluded that Itthe Departments of State

and Defense should prepare, as a matter of priori ty , a program of a l lpracticable measures designed to protect U.S. security in terests in Indochina. 1t W On the same day, following the Communist Chinese(January 18) and the Soviet (January 30) recognition of th e Ho Chi Minhregime, the United States announced i ts recognition of th e Baa DaiGovernment. Theretofore, the U.S. had remained neutral , hesi tat ing tochoose between supporting France, a friendly colonial power engaged inre-e stablishing i ts authority, or s u p p o r ~ i n g the Viet Minh, a communistdominated independence movement in opposition to that European ally .This dilemma had been resolved by the victory of the Chinese Communistsover the Nationalists , and by the threat posed to Indochina. The UnitedStates policy of support for the French and the Associated States wasadjudged one befi t t ing an anti-colonial democracy: support of nationalismand independence; opposition to attempted encroachments thereon by in ternational communism.

3. "The Line of Containment" and "The Domino TheoryltThe logic of th is shif t in U.S . policy is found not only in thedirect threat to Southeast Asia posed by Communist China (and th e SovietUnion), but also in th e broader strategic concept of a l ine of containment, and in the early ar t iculat ion of what la te r became known as th e



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IIdomino theory." Discussion of the l ine of containment centered about .wherethat l in e VlaS to be drawn: Indochina, a..rld, l a ter , -Korea, fe l l on the freeside of that l ine . The domino notion had been advanced by General ClaireChennault, among others , in the reference to Nationalist . China 16/; the dominotheory as applied to Indochina reinforced the decision of vThere to draw thel ine of containment. Both ideas were embodied by the Joint Chiefs of Staffin a 1950 memorandum to the Secretary of Defense evaluating "the strategicimportance, from the mili tary point of view, of Southeast Asia":

"c. Southeast Asia is a vi ta l segment in the l ine ofcontainment of Communism stretching from J apan southvTard andaround to the Indian Peninsula . . The security of the threemajor non-Communist base areas in this quarter of the world -Japan, India, and Australia -- depends in a large measure on. the denial of Southeast Asia to the Communists. I f SoutheastAs ia is los t , these three base areas wil l tend to be isolatedfrom one another;

"d. The fa l l of Indochin a would undoubtedly le ad to thef a l l of the other mainland states of Southeast Asia . .lie. The fa l l of Southeast Asia ,wuld resul t in th e

vir tual ly complete denial to the United States of the PacificLit toral of Asia . . IIf . . . Soviet control of a l l the major components ofAsia's war potent ia l might become a decisive factor affectingthe balance of pmver bet"\veen the United States and th e USSR . .IIg. A Soviet posit ion of dominance over the Far Eastwould also thre aten the United States posit ion in Japan . . . Thefea s ib i l i ty of retention by the United States of i t s offshoreisla.l1d bases could thus be jeopardized . 11 !11

This th eory , Ivhether more or less completely articulated, appears in therelevant NSC papers of the Indochina l\Tar period, and underlies a l l majorU.S. policy decisions taken relevant to the area . lj4. u.s. Perception of the Chinese Communist Threat

In the words of NSC 64 (February , 1950), liThe presence of ChineseCommunist troops along the border of Indochina makes i t possible for arms,material and troops to move freely from Communist China to the northernTonkin area now controlled by Ho Chi Minh. There is already evidence ofmovement of arms. II 19/ NIE 5 maintained somewhat l a ter , as the decisionto help the Fren.ch was being re-examined, that : "The Communist Chineseregime is already furnishing the Viet Minh mate r ie l , t ra ining, and technicalassistance" Officia l French sources report that Chinese Communist troops .are already present in Tonkin in some stren gth . . 20/ Direct interventionby Chinese Conrrnunist troops ma,y occur at any tinle.-:: I t is almost certain



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Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011


to occur in strength vlhenever there is danger either that the Viet Minhwill fa i l to atta in i ts mili tary objective of driving the French out ofIndochina, or that the Bao Dai Government is succeeding in underminingthe support of the Viet Minh.1t W NIE 5 appeared on December 29, 1950.Although the threat of intervention to be expected from COIT@unist

China did not again reach th is intensity or certainty during the r emainderof the war -- the estimated probabili ty of intervention declined consistentlyafter the pUblication of NIE 5 -- estimates throughout the period indicatecontinuing Communist Chinese provision of mili tary arms, materiel, andt ra ining to the Viet M i n ~ , and the existence of Communist Chinese potent ialfor direct intervention. No direct reference was made to possible VietMinh resentment toward, or resistance to , direct Chinese intervent ion.In sum, the U.S. perceived a major Chinese threat a t the timethe decision to support France and the Associated States was made; a highprobabili ty was assigned direct Chinese Communist intervention a t the time

this decision vTaS being confirmed ; th is assigned probabili ty declined rapidly,and i t r emained low through the post-Korean war period. I t was believedthat the Chinese were providing assistance to the Viet Minh throughoutth e period la te 1949-1954.5. u.s. Percept io ns of the Situation within Vietnam

On April 5, 1950, th e Joint Chiefs of Staff , referr ing to in te l l i -gence estimates, indicated to the Secretary of Defense their view thatItthe situation in Southeast Asia has deteriorated,1t and that , further ,"without United States assistance, this deteriorat ion vli11 be accelerated . It m(The implica t ion that U.S. assistance would result in improvement over andabove the present situation cannot be detected in this carefully vTordedstatement.) The Joint Chiefs of Staff went on to s ta te that : ItIn general,the basic conditions of pol i t ica l and economic s tabi l i ty in th is area, aswell as the mili tary and internal security conditions, are unsatisfactory .Thes e factors are clos ely i 'nterrela ed, and i t i s probable that , from th elong-term point of view, pol i t i ca l and economic stabi l i ty is the controllingfactor. On the other hand, the mili tary si tuation in some areas, part icular ly Indochina, is of pressing urgency .1t

NIE 5 was the over-al l U.S. assessment of the si tuation in Vietnamclosest in time to the U.S. decis ion to support the French and th e As sociatedStates. I t estimated th e French position as I tcr i t ical ly endangere d by theViet Minh," and as Itprecarious .II?J.1 Combining the more detailed estimatesof th is document w'ith statements and estimates contained in other U. S. documents contemporary with NIE 5, th e follm


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(2 ) Force rat io - French between 1.5 and 1.6 to 1 Viet Minh;vi s - a-vis regular forces in the Tonkin Delta, the ra t iovlaS reversed - approximately 1.15 Viet Minh to 1 French(NIE 5).

(3) Equipment status - French superiori ty, but Viet Minhimproving due to Chinese aid.(4) Mobility - Viet Minh superior; French roadbound.(5) Strategy - French strategy lacking in aggress iveness ,defensive, of doubtful value.(6) Status of Vietnamese National Army - essential ly none;lIonly a slight ch ance that the French can maintain theirmilitary posit ion long enoughll ?l!J to build such an army .(7) Relative capabil i t ies - danger of a major mili tary defeatof the French by the Viet Minh in Tonkin vlithin six tonine months, \vhich would jeopardize the French posit ionin the remainder of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

b. Th e Economic and Poli t ic al SituationFrench re sources badly strained; litt l e or no re a l nat ional i s tVietnamese leadership, government; l i t t l e popular support of Bao Dai regime

pol i t i ca l and economic si tuat ion generally poor.c. French Objectives in Vietnam

French slo"mess and obstructionism over the years in creatinga Vietnamese national government and national army (March 8, 1949, agreements vrere not ra t i f ied by France unt i l February 2 , 1950), and continuedslovmess in giving control of the bureaucracy to the Vietna.mese , indicatea reluctant departure, i f any departure, from colonial objectives.d. French Resolve to Remain in Vietnam

11 there are grounds for questioning the French wil l toremain in Indochina. 1I 26/Thus, the American perception of the situation in Vietnam in 1950 was generallyone of gloom, vlith l i t t l e l ight at th e end of the tunnel; in retro spect , i tseems reasonably accurate .

6. The Decision to Assist France and the Associated Statesa. French Request Aid

United States involvement in the bleak Indochinese si tuat ionwas hastened ,'Then, on February 16, 1950, the French requested U.S. mili tary6 TOP SECRET - Sensitive


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and economic assistance for the prosecution of the Indochinese war . TheFrench fonvarded their r equest af ter deciding "to set forth to the UnitedStates Government fully and frankly the extreme gravity of the s i tuat io nin Indochina . . "

" the t ruth of the matter was that the effor t in Indo-china was such of a dr ain on France that a long-term programof as s i s t ance was necessary and i t was only from the UnitedStates that i t could come . OtheTITise . i t viaS very l ikelyth at France might be forced to reconsider her entire pol i cywith the possible vi e1" to cutting her losses and withdrawingfrom Indochina . . . looking i nto th e future i t \vas obvious . . .that France could not continue indefinitely to bear this burden alone i f the expected deve lopments in regard. to i ncreasedassistance to Ho Chi Minh came about . In any event the FrenchGovernment was confronted with necessity of reducing the presentFrench forces in Indochina by at leas t 25,000 not only forbudgetary reasons, but because additional men were urgentlyneeded in c o n n i o n 1.-rith French national military program ." 27/

Yet th is appeal for aid, i ts thinly-vei led r einforcing arguments referringto \vithdrawal and th e defen se of Europe (on the day follovling the severingof U. S. -Bulgar ian re l at ions) , IvaS unaccompanied by a \-Tillingness to satisfya U. S . request for France to announce the "evolutionary nature ll of thegovernments of the Associated States , or to clar i fy otheTITise the Frenchintentions to \-rard I ndochi na .On February 27 , a Departmen t of s t ate report on the posit ionof the United States with r espect to I ndochina viaS submitted for the NSC I Sconsideration . I ssued on February 27 as NSC 6 L ~ , the report concluded

that :"10. I t i s important to United States security in t erests

that all practicab l e measures be t aken to prevent furtherCommunist expansion in Southeast Asia. Indochina is a keyarea of Southeast Asia and is under immed i ate th reat .

1111. The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burmacould be expected to f a l l under Comnuni s t domination i f I ndo china were controlled by a Communist-dominated government .The ba l ance of Southeast Asia \-loul d then be in grave hazard ..1112 . Accordingly , th e Departments of State and Defense

should prepare as a matter of prior i ty a program of a l l prac t ic able meaS1ITeS designed to protect Unite1 States securityinteres ts in Indochina. 1ITo "faci l i tate ll Department of Defense consideration of NSC 64 , then DeputyUnder Secretary of State Dean Rusk provided Major General J ames H. Burnsof OSD a br ie f statement of Department of State po l icy in I ndochina andSoutheas t Asia:



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"The Department of state believes that vri thin thel imitat ions imposed by exist ing commitments and strategicpriori t ies , the resources of the United states should bedeployed to reserve Indochina and Southeast Asia from furtherCommunis t encroachment. The Department of State has accordingly already engaged a l l i t s pol i t ica l resources to the endthat th is object be secured. The Department i s now engagedin the process of urgently examining what additional economicresources can effect ively be engaged in the same operation.

" I t is now, in the opinion of the Department, a matter ofthe greatest urgency that the Department of Defense assess thestrategic aspects of the si tuat ion and consider, from the military point of vievT, hm


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the United States military point of vievT, might prevent communist expansionin Southeast Asia. The six most important points made by the Chiefsare these:

(1) A recommendation for early implementation of mili taryaid programs for Indochina and the other state:: of Southeast Asia, , 'lithfW1ds already allocated to the states of Southeast Asia, to be delivered atthe ear l ies t practicable date and to be augmented as a matter of urgency vlithfunds from the unallocated portion of the President 's emergency fund. Forthe next f iscal year, an estimated $100 million wil l be required for themili tary portion of this program.(2 ) "In view of the history of mili tary aid in China, theJoint Chiefs of Staff urge that these aid programs be subject, in any event,to the follo ,ving conditions:

"a. That United States mili tary aid not be grantedunconditionally; rather that i t be carefully controlled and that the aidprogram be integrated with pol i t ica l and economic progrruns; and

"b. That requests for mili tary equipment be screenedf i r s t by an officer-designated by the Department of Defense and on duty inthe recipient state . These requests should be subject to his determina -t ion as to the feas ibil i ty and satisfactory coordination of specific mili taryoperations. I t should be understood that mili tary aid "Till only be consideredin connection with such coordinated operational plans as are approved by therepresent ative of the Department of Defense on duty in the r ecipient country.Further, in conformity "\-Tith current procedures, the f inal approval of a l lprograms for mili tary materiel will be subject to the concurrence of theJoint Chiefs of Staff ."(3) "Formation of a Southeast Asia Aid Committee is recom-mended.(4) "The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the pol i t ica limplications involved in mili tary aid to Indochina. I t must be appreciated,however , that French armed forces . . . are in the f i eld and that i f thesewere to be "\-Tithdrawn this year because of pol i t ica l considerations, the BaoDai regime probably could not survive even vlith United States aid. I f theUnited States were nOl'1 to ins is t upon independence for Vietnam and ct phasedFrench withdrawal from that COQDtry, this might improve the pol i t ica lsi tuation. The French could be expected to interpo se objections to , andcert ainly delays in such a program . Conditions in Indochina, ho,rever, are

unst able and the si tuation is apparently deteriorat ing rapidly so that theurgent need for le ast an in i t i a l increment mili tary and economic aidis psychologically overriding. The Joint Chiefs of Staff , therefore,recommend the provision of mili tary aid to Indochina at the ear l ies t pract ic able dat e under a program to implement the President 's action approvingthe allocation of $15 million for Indochina and that corresponding increments of pol i t ica l and economic aid be programmed on an interim basis vTith out prejudice to the pattern of the policy for additional mili tary, pol i t ica land economic aid that may be developed la te r . "



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(5) " . . the Joint Chiefs of Staff reconunend the immediateestablishment of a small United States military aid group in Indochina . .The Joint Chiefs of Staf f would expect the senior member of this group tos i t in consultation vlith mil i tary represent at ives of France and Vietnam andpossibly of Laos and Cambodia. In addition to screening requests for materiel ,he would be expected to insure fu l l coordination of mili tary plans and effortsbetween the French an d Vietnamese forces and to supervise the allocation ofmateriel . "

(6) "The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe in the possibi l i tyof success of a prompt coordinated United States program of mil i tary,pol i t ica l , and economic aid to Southeast Asia and feel tha.t such a successmight well lead to the gaining of the in i t ia t ive in the struggle in thatgeneral area."

The l as t of these points is clearly fundamental to the undertaking of any program of assistance; yet in the Chiefs' memorandum i tappears only as the concluding portion of the paragraph (paragraph 15)recommending establishment of a mili tary aid group in Indochina, and is subsequently subjected to the qualificat ion that "attainment of United Statesobjectives in Asia ca n only be achieved by ultimate success in China. 1tMore remarkable, hO'Never, is the rar i ty with "'hich even such equivocalpredictions of success appear in the available documents relating directlyto the decision to provide assistance to Indochina. Direct statements onthe probable effectiveness of such United States programs of the periodare typical ly absent; indirect statements are typical ly of the impliedimperative ("we must do X i f Asia is to be saved"), or the negative-imperative( i f vle do n o ~ do X, Asia wil l be los t") . There was no assurance of militarysuccess given; and the calculus of the decision-making process relating tothe "l-reighing of the probabil i ty of success against the costs of failUre ofU.S. programs in the 1950 period is not evident, unfortunately, in availabledocuments.

d. Presidential ApprovalOn May 1, 1950, President Truman approved the allocation of$10 million to the Department of Defense to cover the early shipment ofurgently needed mili tary assistance items to Indochina, 35/ thus takingthe f i r s t crucial decision regarding U.S. mili tary involvement in Vietnam.On May 8, the Secretary of State, in a statement at the minister ia l levelmeeting in Paris, announced United States assistance to th e Associated

States and France. And on May 24, the governments of France and theAssociated States , .;rere notif ied of the United States intention to establ ishan economic aid mission to the Associated State8, thus marking the implementation of the reconrrnendations of the Griffin Mission.On June 27, 1950, President Truman, in announcing the onsetof the Korean war, also stated that he had "dir-ected acceleration in thefurnishing of mili tary assistance to the forces of France a..nd the AssociatedStates in Indoch:i.na and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close



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working relat ions with those forces." 36/ The concept of a mili taryassistance advisory group had also been-approved, although the Presidentdid not refer to MAAG in his public statement . J1/ Also, in June,fol lo "ring the recommendat ion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , the SoutheastAsia Aid. Policy Committee "TaS established.

e. Erskine MissionThe miJitary mission dispatched by the President and headedby Ma


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formation of nat ional armies in Indochina: (1) French Union Forceswould not be withdraHn from Indochina unti l such Associated Statesarmies are ful ly t rained and ready to act effect ively in replacement; ( 2) France would not decrease i t s outlays for Indochinabelow th e 1950 rate during the period of the American mili taryaid reques ted; (3) the national armies project would have theapproval of the three Associated States governments; (if) theHigh Commiss ioner for Indochina, the French Corrand, and thethree Associated States vlOuld ma intain ful l consultative re lat ions "rith the Legation and MAAG during the period of theformation of the armies ."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff reevaluation appeared on October 27 :military aid should be continued on an expedited basis . Again the judgmentvlaS offered that genuine autonomy and self-government had to be ,extended tothe people of Indochina to ameliorate the basic cause of the deteriorationof securi ty in Indochina: lack of popular support for the authori t ies 41/But the most clearly articulated and complete expression of the Joint - Chiefs ' over-al l posit ion at year end is found in NSC 64/1, 42/ a November '28 paper by the Chiefs which takes account of a report from General Brink 43/and the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee's draft of October 11 ; in fact-,this statement of short- and long-run objectives contained in NSC 64/1 wasto remain the basis of United States policy toward Indochina for the durat ion of the French-Indochina war.

"SHORT TERM OBJECTIVES"a. The United States should take action, as a matter ofurgency, by a l l means practicable short of the actual employment

of United states mil i tary forces, to deny Indochina to Communism.-lib. As long as the present situation exis ts , the UnitedStates should continue to insure that the primary responsibi l i tyfor the res torat ion of peace and security in Indochina restsI' d h the French.

"c. The United States should seek to develop i t s mili taryassistance program for Indochina based on an over-al l mil i taryplan prepared by the French, concurred in by the Associatedstates of Indochina, and acceptable to the United States.

II (1 ) Bot.h the plan and the program should bedeveloped and implemented as a matter of urgency. I t shouldbe clearly understood, hm'lever, that United States acceptanceof the plan limited to the logis t ical support which theUnited States may agree to furnish. The aid provided underth e program 'should be furnish ed to the French in Indochinaand to the Associated states . The allocation of United Statesmili tary ass i s t ance as between the French and the nationalarmies of Indochina should be approved by the French andUnited States authori t ies in Indochina"



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"(2) Popular support of the Government by theIndochines e people i s essent ial to a favorable settlement ofthe security problem of Indochina. Therefore, as a conditionto the provision of tho se further increases in mil i taryassistance to Indochina necessary for the implementation ofan agreed over-al l mil i tary plan, the United States G o v e r n ~ ment should obtain assurances from the French Government that :

"(a) A program providing for the eventual.self-government of I ndochina ei ther "rithin or outside of theFrench Union will be developed, made public, and implementat ion in i t i ated a t once i n order to strengthen the nationalsp i r i t of the Indochinese in opposition to Conunism.

"(b) National armies of the AssociatedStates of Indochina vTill be organized as a matter of urgency.While i t is doubtful that the buildup of these armies c ~ n beaccomplished in time to contribute signif icantly to thepresent mil i tary s i tuat ion, the direct pol i t ical and psychological benefits to be derived from this course wou ld be great andwould thus resul t in immediate, although indirect , mil i tarybenefi ts.

"(c) Pending the formation and t raining ofIndochinese national armies as effective uni ts , and as aninterim emergency measure, France wil l dispatch suff icientadditional armed forces to Indochina to insure that th erestorat ion of peace and internal security in that countrywil l be accomplished in accordance .vith the timetable ofthe over-al l mil i tary plan for Indochina .

I'(d) France vTill change i t s pol i t ical andmili tary concepts in Indochina to:i . Eliminate i t s policy ofIcolonial i sm . '

i i . Provide proper tu telage tothe Associated States.111 . In sure that a suitable mili tarycommand structure, unhampered by po l i t i c a l interference, isestablished to conduct effective and appropriate mili tary

operat ions . . "(3) At an appropriate time the United Statesshould ins t i tute checks to sat isfy i t se l f that the condit ion s se t forth in subpara.graph ;2. ( 2) above are being ful

f i l led."d. The United States should exert a l l practicable

p o l i t i c a ~ a n d diplomat ic measures required to obtain theTOP SECRET - Sensitive


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recognition of the Associated States by the other nonCommunist s tates of Southeast and South Asia.lie. In the event of overt attack by organizedChinese Communist forces against Indochina, the UnitedStates shoulu not permit i t se l f to become engaged in ageneral ,val' 'with Communist China but should, in concertwith the United Kingdom, support France and the Associateds tates by a l l means short of the actual employment ofUnited States military forces. This support shouldinclude appropriate expansion of the present mili taryassistance program and endeavors to induce States inthe neighborhood of Indochina to commit armed forces to

res i s t the aggression." f . The United States should immediately

reconsider i t s policy tOvrard Indochina whenever itappears tha t the French Government may abandon i tsmili tary position in that country or plans to refer theproblem of Indochina to the United Nations. Unless thesi tuation throughout the ivorld generally, and Indochina. speci f ical ly, changes materially, th e United Statesshould seek to dissuade the French from referr ing theIndochina question to the United Nations.IIg. Inasmuch as the United States-sponsoredresolution, 'Unit ing for Peace, ' has been adopted by the

General Assembly of the United Nations , and should asi tuation develop in Indochina in a manner similar to tbat inKorea in which United Nations forces i'Tere required, the United. States would then probably be morally obligated to contributei ts armed forces designated for service on behalf of theUnited Nations. I t is , therefore, in the interests of theUnited States to take such action in Indochina as ivouldforest all the need for the General Assembly to invoke theprovisions of the resolution, 'Unit ing for Peaceo' ... "

The JCS also proposed long-term ob j ectives , urging the development of anunderground guerr i l la warfare capabili ty, a psychological warfare program(lito demonstrate the evils of Cormnunism . . . . and to warn of renevTedChinese irnperialism lf ), and encouragement of an appropriate regionalsecurity arrangement . These concepts formed the heart of an NSC StaffStudy qf December 28. 44/ The in i t ia l decision to give assistance was confirmed af ter nearly one year ' s continual re-examination,and remained basicto U. S. policy fo.!' the remainder of the ivaI'.

7. MAP for Indochinaa. Magnitude

The U.S. mili tary assistance program to the French andAssociated States ivas implemented rapidly , considering the major U. S.14 TOP SECRET - Sensitive


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commitment to the Korean "rar. In a somevrhat premature judgment of outcomes, a progress report on the implementation of NSC 6Lf (March 15, 1951) 'stated that IIAmerican mili tary aid furnished the States ' forces B.nd theArmy of the French Union may have been the decisive factor in the preservat ion of the area against Communist aggression . 1I 45/ Through 1952 and into1954 the }IDAP s h i ~ m e n t s to Indochina increased 3teadily 46/: by February 3,1953, the United States had shipped 137,200 long tons of mater ial (2 24ship s ' cargoes); by July 1954, approximately 150,000 long tons had beensent , including 1,800 combat vehicles, 30,887 motor transport vehicles,361,522 small arms and machine gun s , 438 naval craf t , 2 World War I I air craf t carr iers , and about 500 aircraf t . By the conclusion of the Genevaagreements in July, 1954, the U.S. had delivered aid to Indochina at anoriginal cost of $2,600 million . 47/ Nonetheless, protests of the Frenchat the slmmess of deliveries andthe lIinterference" of MAAG with Frenchrequests were recurrent, and peaked, during the cr is is days of 1954. Yetthese complaints probably reflected less genuine U.S. shortcomings thanFrench resentment of American effor ts to advise, screen, inspect , andverify, and sheer frustrat ion. Moreover, the vagaries of the French logis t icsystem not only made the MAAG job more di f f i cu l t , but further impeded combat supplies.

b. EffectivenessIn spite of the conditions under which U.S. assistance toFrance and the Associated States was given , the MAAG during the period of

the Indochina "rar was l i t t l e more than a small (70 in 1950, 342 in 1954)supply-support group ivhich exerted far more influence upon U. S. decisionsthan on the French. The French, never eager for American advice, notonly succeeded in l imiting the function of MAAG to order-taking in thecommercial sense, but in fact -- through adroit pressuring of off ic ia l sabove the MAAG - - sometimes reduced MAAG to the position of taking thei rmili tary orders. A v ~ i l a b l e data do not permit detailed evaluation of theefficiency of MAP, but i t seems clear that French res tr ic t ions on the U.S.~ f f i A G reduced i t to vir tual impotence.

However , to relate any judgment of th e effectiveness of theUnited States assistance program simply and directly to the outcome of thewar ivould clearly be inappropriate. For th e most part , U,S. expectationswere not high. In the words of the American Ambassador to France in February, 1950, 1I0bviously any program of external assistance was marginal incharacter and entirely dependent for i t s success upon the sol idi ty of thebase -- in this case, th e firmness of French policy and actions in Indochina. II ':!2J French determination to res i s t American advice "ras not matchedby firraness in proceeding with granting independence to Vietnam, or otherwise meeting the I J l i t i ca l si tuation in In dochina . Hence, as the U.S.apparently expected, a favorable outcome to the Indochina war continuedto elude France, even with Anlerican material and financial help, U,S.assistance enabled France to "rage a mili tary bat t le while i t los t i t spol i t ical war -- in Saigon and in Paris. (The mili tary defeat a t DienBien Phu was important primarily from the point of view of i t s psychological and pol i t ical impact on the French, and was so in terpreted in the relevant U,S. in tell igence estimates.) 221



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' I f i t would be an error to evaluate the effectiveness of theU.S. program in terms of war outcome, and i f th e efficiency of MAP andMAAG cannot meaningfully be analyzed, i t remains to evaluate the degreeto which France met the conditions under which assistance was tendered,which presumably impinged directly on U.S. pol i t ical objectives:

(i) The United States objective of insuring "that the .primary responsibil i ty for th e restorat ion of peaceand securi ty in Indochina res ts ,'lith the French"was ful f i l led; in fact, i t was insisted on by theFr ench. On the one hand, U.S. mili tary forceswere never directly engaged in the Indochina war.On the other hand, the French, in retaining thisprimary responsibil i ty, preserved the prerogativeto determine policy and the freedom to reject U.S.advice. U.S. "leverage" was minimal.

(2 ) The condition of basing the assistance program on"an urgently prepared French plan acceptable tothe Associated States and to the U.S." was frustrated in several ways. At the ojitset no overallplan was presented, and those o r ' ~ i o n s of existingplans to which U.S. authori t ies were privy ( ~ , Allessandri 's pacif icat ion plan for the TonkinDelta) were not acceptable to U.S. thinking. Second,.when the Letourneau-Allard and Navarre plans weref inal ly prepared (in 1953, three years af ter th eU.S. decided that a plan was a necessary precondit ion for aid) , some U.S. observers realized thatthese were more concepts than plans. U.S. acceptance of the plans 1-TaS more reluctant than thegranting of $385 million in additional assistancemight indicate. Finally, the plans, once"accepted," were not vigorously carried out. 2Y(3) The French met pro forma the condition that theyprovide the U. S. assurances that they ,


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continually pointed to i t s European defense posturein explanation. In a t least one case, U.S. per-sonnel were requested ( ~ . , as aircraf t mechanics),and 200 were provided, when a pool of suitablepersonnel existed in Metropolitan France.

(:?) Statements to the contrary nohIi hstanding, theFrench did not ameliorate neo-mercantilism or othercolonial pol icies , or provide IIproper tutelage"to the Associated States; nor did it develop acommand structure suitable to the United States.(6) The U.S. "checks to sat isfy i t se l f that the conditions" imposed were being sat isf ied, were, by andlarge, few and far between, and were conducted a tthe pleasure and within th e specifications of theFrench.(7) The French chose not to refer Indochina to th eUnited Nations. Certainly the U.S. assistanceprogram bore on th is decision; whether or not i twas th e deciding factor is unclear.

The effectiveness of th e United States assistance programas an instrument of United States policy -- quite aside from th e outcomeof the war - - was thus quite low.8. Critique

As ear l ier sections of th is paper have suggested, the U.S. waspersuaded to involve i t se l f in the Indochina war by th e perceived need,following the fa l l of Nationalist China, to hold a l ine against communists.This strategic drawing of the l ine a t th e Chinese-Indochina border wasreinforced by th e belief that the fa l l of Indochina would undoubtedly leadto the fa l l of th e other mainland states of Southeast Asia, and that ttefa l l of Southeast Asia would eventuate in the virtually complete denialto the United States of the Pacific Lit toral of Asia. Prospects for aFrench victory in Indochina were assessed in contemporary U.S. in te l l i gence documents as poor; nonetheless, the U.S. provided mili tary andeconomic assistance to th e French and the Associated States in th e beliefthat a prompt, coordinated United States program of mili tary, pol i t ical ,and economic aid offered some prospect that France might succeed in gaining the in i t iat ive in the struggle in that area. Six major points ofcri t ique of U.S. ~ o l i c y follow:

a. The-U.S. Misestimated FranceU.S. policymakers apparently realized that the conditionsthey imposed upon th e French were impracticable to some degree. Nonetheless, they believed that pre-conditions were necessary and could assis t

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in convincing the French to mend their colonial ways and to pursue thewar with American methods, dil igence, and aggressiveness. The French,long noted for proficiency and precision in logic, -required no Descartesto realize that the United States was thus asking France (1 ) to regain ful lresponsibil i ty for the Indochina War, and in par t icular for fighting andtaking casualties in that war; (2) to follo"T the "guidance ll an d "advice llof the United States on the exercise of this French responsibil i ty; and(3) having fought the "Tar, presumably to a successful conclusion, to relinguish control over Indochina. In view of the French willingness toretain responsibil i ty for the war, i t is not surprising that they werereluctant , a t best , to accept propositions (2) and (3). Despite Frenchpronouncements on their role in fighting communism, there is l i t t l e reasonto believe that they regarded the Indochina war in the same l igh t as theU.S. viewed th e Korean War. Rather, their behavior resembled that ofother colonial pOl-lers who had fought to retain profi table colonies.

b. Slim Chance Accepted by the U.S.Had U.S. policymakers recognized the slimness of the chanceof persuading France to accept the three propositions specif ied above,they might have sought alternative courses of action in Indochina. Asi t was, the possibi l i ty (as opposed to the probabili ty) of success wastheir prime consideration, and, overestimating U.S. leverage for influencing a favorable outcome, alternatives were not considered.

c. Circular U.S. PolicySuppression of al ternat ives, both on the general and thepar t icular level (see Note 48 for an example of th e la t ter ) , led to acircular i ty in and reinforcement of existing policies - - constant forcedchoices betw'een llbadll and llworse." '23.1

d. Poor BargainingHaving taken a hard policy l ine toward the French, the UnitedStates fai led to bargain effectively. Thus, in circumstances not to ta l lydissimilar from those prevail ing in Vietnam in subsequent time periods,the U.S. continued to provide assistance disregarding infractions of pre-.condit ions; moreover, th e pre-conditions for aid "Tere not modified. Wi th out modification, the conditions became worse than meaningless: . standing

t e s t a ~ e n t s to U.S. impotence, to be recognized only when and how the Frenchchose. The U.S. became vir tual ly a prisoner of i t s own policy. Containment of communism, concern for the French in relation to the postwar Europeof NATO, EDC,and the Soviet threat in the West, combined with a fear,based on World Ha:r I I strategy, that a French withdrawal from Indochinawould leave exposed the U.S. flank in Korea, a l l compelled the U.S. tocontinue aid. Yet none of these considerations should have precludedmodification of th e U.S. bargaining strategy.e. Misinformation

The U. S. policymaking machinery '-Tas highly vulnerable tospoofing, on a t leas t three counts: (1) the very strength of the U.S.18 TOP SECRET - Sensitive


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position regarding communism must have been a constant temptation, notalways res is ted, for other part ies to cry "red ll and thus to manipulatethe U.S.; (2 ) dependence on off icial French sources for intelligence andot.her information was potential ly misleading; (3) reliance on the high-level mission technique for gathering information to be used as a directinput to policy decisions proved unsatisfactory.f . Costs Not Weighed

Finally, there is l i t t l e indication that U.S. policymakers,their thoughts dominated by the objective of containing the monolithiccommunist bloc, faced up to the costs of winning the Indochina war, evenwhile direct U.S. intervention was being considered. d2! Nor does theevidence suggest that consideration was given to the tangible and intangi-ble cos ts of providing U.S. mili tary assistance to a power losing a war,including the potent ial impact on th e U.S. posit ion in Asia. And, finally,available documents f a i l to reveal any consideration given to the notionof sunk costs. There were, of course, voices in the wilderness. An un-signed, undated memo randum posed eight key questions to be ansvTered bythe NSC during the spring of 1954. 2/ Comment on the following fourquestions , in relation to th e time a t which they were raised, is unneces-sary:

Just how important is Southeast Asia to th e securi tyinterests of the U.S.? Is the analysis in NSC 5405s t i l l valid? Is the area important enough to f ight for?HOi" important i s Indochina in the defense of SoutheastAsia? Is the "domino theory" valid? Is Indochina important enough to fight for? I f not, what are the stra-tegic consequences of th e loss of a l l or par t of Indochina?I f th e U.S. in tervenes in Indochina, can we COWlt on thesupport of the natives? Can we fight as al l ies of theFrench and avoid the stigma of colonialism?Is there a stra,tegic concept for the conduct of a war inIndochina which offers promise of early success . ?

The decision of the United States to provide assistance to France andthe As sociated States during the Indochina War is usually t reated l ight ly ,i f a t a l l , in current his tor ies . Yet, both the taking of the decision andi t s imp;t.ementation were signif icant for and remarkably similar. to subse-quent U.S. experiences in Vietnam.

TOP SECRET - Sensitive19


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TOP SECRET - SensitiveIV. A. 2. FOOTNOTES

1 . Department of State Circular to certain American diplomatic andconsular off icers , January 23, 1946. The association of the Netherlands East Indies with French Indochina c 0 1 . ~ l d not have been los t onthe French.2. Department of State, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Memo for Mr. Achesonfrom J.C.V., January 8, 1947.

Department of State outgoing telegram to ~ 1 B Paris 431, February 3,19Lf7 (SECRET).4. Department of State outgoing telegram to AMEMB Paris 145, January 17,1949 (SECRET).5. Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled (New York: Praeger, 1967,2 vols) , I I , pp . 706-707.6. Bernard B. Fall , ed., Ho Chi Minh on Revolution (New York: Praeger,1967), pp . 197-198.7. Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of State, February 2,1950.8. Department of State Bullet in, May 22, 1950.9 NSC 48/1, Report by the Executive Secretary, December 23, 1949, p. 3

(TOP SECRET).10. Cf. McCarran b i ~ l , introduced February 25, 1949, to provide $1.5 bil l ionloan to Nationalist China, subsequent Bridges ca l l for investigation ofU.S.-China policy.11. NSC 48/1, p. 13.12. NSC 6 L ~ , Report by the Department of State, February 7, 1950, p. 3(TOP SECRET).13. The French Assembly rat i f ied th e b i l l which in effect established theAssociated States on January 29, 1950. The reasons for recognitionadvanced by the Secretary of State to the President are encouragementto national aspirations under non-communist leadership; establishmentof stable nOL-communist governments in a r e ~ s adjacent to CommunistChina; support to France; demonstration of displeasure with communist

tact ics . Department of State, Memo randum for the President from theSecretary, subject IIU.S. Recognition of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia,1IFebruary 2, 1950.

20 TOP SECRET - Sensit ive


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14 . The import of Secretary Acheson's statement of February 1 is madeclear by the f i r s t paragraph of th e Department of State pressrelease of tha t date: "The recognition by the Kremlin of Ho ChiMinh's communist movement in Indochina comes as a surprise. TheSoviet acknmdedgment of this movement should remove any i l lusionsas to the 'na t ional is t ' nature of Ho Chi Minh's aims and revealsHo in his true colors as the mortal enemy of independence in Indo-china . . . I15 As President Truman was la ter to vlrite concerning his view of Chi-nese operations in November 1950, "The situation in Korea . . .wasnot the only instance of a new aggressiveness on the part of Com-munist China. There vlas evidence that the communist rebel forcesin Indochina were receiving increasing aid from Peiping. Also,in the las t days of October, Communist China had moved against th eancient theocracy of Tibet. We were seeing a pattern in Indochina

and Tibet timed to coincide with the attack in Korea as a challengeto th e Western world." Memoirs of Harry S. Truman, Volume 2, p. 380.16 . On May 3, 1949, General Chennault told two Congressional Committeesthat unless the U.S. took immediate steps to save the Nationalists ,

a l l Asia would fa l l to the communists.17. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, from Joint Chiefs of Staff ,Subject: Strategic Assessment of Southeast Asia, April 10, 1950 (TS).18. NSC 48 , 64 ser ies , 12 4 series, 177, 5405.19 . NSC 64, p.2.20 . NIE 5, Indochina: C1ITrent Situation and Probable Developments,December 29, 1950, p.2 (TS).

' 21. NIE 5, p. 2. Lucien Bodard in his The ~ u i c k s a n d War (pp. 228-229)contends that the French High Command "systematically put out falseintel l igence that was meant to end up in Washington" on th is andrelated issues. Only subsequent events showed th e French that therewas a real Chinese threat .22. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, April 5, 1950 (TS).23 NIE 5, pp . 1, 2.24 . Ibid. , p. 1.25 See Department of State Outgoing Telegram to Al4 Consul Saigon 25,Personal for Jessup from Butterworth, January 20, 1950, 1I markedopposition ha s been encountered vlhich demonstrates a t leas t thatBao Dai's popular support has no t yet widened. 1I26 . NIE 5, p. 1.



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27 Department of State Incoming Telegram from Paris 837, February 22,1950.28 . NSC 64 , The Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina,February 27, 1950, p. 3 (TS).29 Department of State le t te r from Deputy Under Secretary Rusk to

Major General James H. Burns, March 7, 1950 (TS).30 . Memorandum for th e President from the Secretary of Defense, approvedby SecDef, March 6, 1950 (TS).31. By March 6, State and Defense had agreed on a mili tary assistanceprogram for Indochina and Thailand in the amounts of $15 and 10 millionrespectively. Draft memorandum to the President, "Allocation of' Fundsto Provide Military Assistance to Thailand and Indochina Under Section

303 of Mutual Defense Assistance Act, March 6, 1950 (TS).32. Ninth Report to Congress of ECA, 1951, p. 99.33 Q,uoted in Memorandum for th e Secretary of Defense from Secretary ofthe Navy, "Aid to Indochina," March 28, 1950, p. 2. (TS)3 ~ ~ . Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from th e Joint Chiefs of Staff ,I1Strategic Assessment of Southeast Asia,11 April 5, 1950 (TS).35 Department of State Outgoing Telegram to AmEmbassy London 2049, May 3,1950 (TS).36. Statement of the President, June 27, 1950.37 . Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from Secretary of Defense,June 6, 1950. .Cited in U. S_. Policy TO'ilard Vietnam Since 1945, OCMHDraft TS-62-5-3 (TS).38. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff ,Annex 2, October 16, 1950 (S); see also The U.S. Pu'my Role in the Con

f l i c t in Vietnam, OCMH Draft Ts-64-7-1 (TS), pp . 22-23; th e generallypessimistic conclusions of the mission are also presented in Annex 2to Southeast Asia Policy Committee "Proposed Statement of U.S. Policyin Indochina for NSC Consideration," October 11, 1950 (TS).39 OCMH Draft Ts-64-7-1, p. 23.40. In their com-nent on this paper, the Joint Secretaries recommendedstrengthening this restr ict ion by including in i t the contingencyof "augmented internal communist offensives." Memorandum for theSecretary of Defense from the Joint Secretaries, October 18, 1950(TS) .



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Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NW D Date: 2011

41. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff ,Subject: Possible Future Action in Indochina, October 27, 1950 (TS).42. Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense

on the Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina,December 21 , 1950 (TS).43 . Department of State Incoming Message from U.S. Minister Saigon 763,November 4, 1950 (TS).44. NSC Staff Study on Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina, December 28, 1950 (TS).45 . Progress Report by the Under Secretary of State to the National SecurityCouncil on the Implementation of NSC 64 , March 15 , 1951 (TS).46. OCMH TS-64-7-1, pp . 36, 47-48. A ll numbers are taken to be approximations.47. Irving Heymont, e t. a l . , .:::.C.:::.o.:::.s...::t-=..:A:.::n:.::a...::l;JL' - = s . . . : : i : . : ; s ~ o . . . : : f ~ : " ' : : " ' : ' : : ' : " ' : = - = : ' = = " ' : = . . 5 0 " - = . : ; . . ; . . , . , - - , - , , , - e . . . : r : . . . . a _ t _ i _ o _ n _ s ,RAC-TP- 232 , June 1967, Vol 1, p. 10 (S48 . C.f. , informal memorandum from Mr. Max Lehrer to General Bonesteel ofApril 21, 1954: "This Lattachei/ report makes it clear that the U.S.

Ml\AG has l i t t l e information available on which i t could operate. Thewrit ten report actual ly understates the deficiencies in information.Our people find that the morale of the Ml\AG in Indochina is vir tual lynon-existent and the Ml\AG is reduced to relat ive impotence."49. Department of State Incoming Telegram from Paris 837, February 22,

1950 (S).50. NIE 63-54, Consequences Within Indochina of th e Fal l of Dien Bien Phu,April 30 , 1954(s) .51 . Regarding the Letourneau-Allard plan, General Trapnell, Chief Ml\AG,reported, ",,'hile this plan i s slow and expensive, the other courseof action i s to accept a stalemate which is also not only expensive,but in the long run, favors the Viet Minh and offers no solution."(Memorandum from General Trapnell, OSD f i les, March 31, 1953)52. Although General O'Daniel, in his report of July 15, 1953 (TS) waxed

enthusia.stic over the successor Navarre Plan, broadly and at tract ivelydescribed to him by General Navarre himself, i t was clear to othersthat the plan was hollow. "There i s no concrete evidence that theFrench Union forces "I'Till be able to take decisive action to win thewar in the foreseeable future . . " (Cornments by Army Attache, Saigon,N o v e m b ~ r 24, 1953 (S



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Documents

Pentagon Papers Part IV a 2