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CognitiveSemiotics
QUESTIONANSWERSTRUCTURESINCOGNITION
AhtiVeikkoPietarinen
InstituteforArtResearch,UniversityofHelsinki
[email protected]
1.
FromacertainpointofviewthatIwouldliketoattempttocharacterizeanddefendinthispaper,Charles
Peircestheoryofsemiotics,orsemeioticifyouwant,wasallabout,andnotreallytoomuchmorenorless,
thantheworkingsoutofthedetailsofwhatthepropercognitivestudiesofthemindwouldlooklike;
couchedofcourseinhisoutlandishlyoriginalsemiotic,philosophical,logicalandmethodological
nomenclature.
Myreportisacondensedattempttojustifythisassertionofaverycloseassociation,virtuallythatofan
identification,ofsemioticsandthestudyofcognition,orcognitivescience.(Wemightevencoinandbegin
topromulgateaneoPeirceanstudyofascienceofcognitics.)Mypreliminaryjustificationtothis
characterizationofwhatPeircessemioticsintheendamountstoisthatweneedtotakeseriouslythekind
ofanthropomorphismPeircetendedtoappealtoindefendinghissemioticideas.
Hisanthropomorphismstatesthatanyscientificstudythatisconcernedwithwhateverstructuresand
featurestheworldhas,isnecessarilyfilteredthroughthestudyofthestructuresofthemindandwhichof
courseisthensomethingheavilyshapedbyexperience.Thisdoesnotmeananysimplemindedsentimental
recoursetoKantiantranscendentalism.Forthose,mostlyperhapsphilosophers,interestedinthestudyof
thebasicconstituencyoftheworldandImeanonesthatdonotdrawtoomuchfromthediscoveriesof
naturalsciencesassuchthissortofinvestigationwaslabelledasdescriptivemetaphysicsbyPeter
Strawsoninthe1950s.Itsoonbecameoneofthehallmarksincontemporarymetaphysics.
(LetmeremarkhereattheoutsetthatthecontrastingviewpointStrawsonsingledoutwasrevisionary
metaphysics,whichmeantthatthemindistakentoenjoysomedirectandprivilegedaccesstorealityin
thesenseofbeingcapableofformingsomekindofapictureoravisionofthatrealitythatreadily
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satisfiessomecriteriaofwhattheworldistobelike,suchasaesthetic,artistic,intellectual,abstract,formal,
orwhathaveyou.)
Sointhisanthropomorphicsense,whichIbelieveisshotthroughPeircesagenda,allsemioticstudiesarein
actualfactcognitivestudies,andallcognitivestudiesare,inturn,oratleastshouldinactualfactbe
regardedas,studiesinthefieldwhichisnowadayscharacterizedbydescriptivemetaphysicaltopics.And
letusalsorememberthatthiskindofdescriptivemetaphysicsisnotwhatPeircemeantbymetaphysicsas
such,sincehissemioticsisthenormativescienceoflogicinthewidesenseoftheterm.WhatPeircemeant
bymetaphysicsisthussomethingelse,namelyaspeculativestudyoftheuniversethatdrawsfromlogic
andphenomenology.
2.
Nowwhatcouldthemethodofsuchajointinvestigationofsemiotics,cognitivesciences,anddescriptive
metaphysicsbe?Orperhapsthequestioncouldbephrasedasfollows:Howdowegaininformationby
whichwelookfortheobjectsofsignsthatdeterminethesignsinterpretantsinthefirstplace?This,I
wouldliketoemphasise,isthekeyquestioninsemiotics,andIthinkalltoooftenaneglectedoneasthat.
Wecannotrestcontentwiththeideathatitissomehowthetheoryofsignsassuch,whateverthatistaken
tobemaybesomekindofaclassificationalexerciseofallkindsofsignsthatprovidesthecorrectmethod
forsemiotics.Noclassificationprovidesamethodpropersimpliciter.No,theentirepointofthetheoryof
signsandthealliednotionofinterpretationalprocesses(whichsometimesistermedsemiosis),isto
investigatethewaysandpossibilitiesinwhichsignsgiveusinformationthatwillgearusupwiththemeans
tolookforandfindtheirobjects.Signaresomethingbyknowingwhichweknowsomethingmore.
MyanswertothemainmethodologicalquestionthatIwouldliketobrieflygoontosketchhereproceeds
asfollows.Peircethoughtthatallourknowledgeseekingactivitiesareconductedintermsclosely
reminiscentofSocraticprocessesofquestionsandanswers.Thathereallythoughtthattheappropriate
methodofstudyinsemioticshastodowithsuchavenerableancientapproachofquestionsandanswersis
justifiedbyhisoftenemphasizednotionthatthemindisacreatoryofallsigns.Thisis,Peircemaintains,
thekeyfunctionofthemind,toproduceandcreatesigns.Thischaracterizationcomesfromoneofhislate
unpublishedpapers,wherehewritesthatamindisasigncreatoryinconnectionwithareactionmachine
(MS318:18,1907).
Nowsuchacreatoryworksbywayofdialogicprocesses.Dialogicisindeedtheothermaincharacterof
Peircesunderstandingofcognition:Thereisalwaysoneaspect,phaseorcharacterofthemindthat
submitsthesigns(andbysignsweshouldthinkofselfcontrolledthoughtsandotherintellectualconcepts)
tothecontemplationofother,ornext,aspect,phaseorcharacterofthemind,tobefurtherinterpreted
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andfurthersubmittedtothecontemplationofyetanotheraspectsorphasesofthemind.Somehow,mind
comestobeengagedinaconstantdialoguewithitself.
Butherethewholepointoftheideaofhavingsuchcreativeinterrogativeanddialogicalprocessesinplace
isnothingbutareflectionoftheageoldideaofthefundamentalnatureofthemannerofscientific
investigation,includingbothempiricalandtheoreticalinvestigation,whichcannicelybeglossedasthe
inquirersactivityofputtingquestionstothesourceofinformation(Hintikka2007).Theinquirerof
coursedoesthatinhopeofgettingsomeanswersfromthesource.Nowthesourceiscommonlythought
tobeNature.However,themethodofsemiotics,orcognitivestudies,ordescriptivemetaphysicsandall
thesetermsreallyamountmoreorlesstothesamemethoddiffersfromthisesteemeddepictioninthe
sensethattheprinciplesourceofinformationisnotNaturebutMind.Andso,thefundamentalmethodof
semioticsseemsreallytobeverycloselyrelatedtothemethodofstudyofwhatthereistobeteasedout
fromthenotionofputtingquestionstomind.
Nowhowonearthcanweaccomplishthatsortofastudy?Whatistheprimarynatureofsuchactivitiesin
whichthemind,sotospeak,interrogatesitselforitsowncontent?Letmetrytotacklethisquestioninthe
followingmanner.RecallthatPeirce,inhislateryears,attemptedseveraltimestoprovehismethodof
pragmaticism.Pragmaticismwasthegeneraltheoryofthemeaningofallintellectualconcepts,signs,
thoughts,andgeneralities.Now,inthereconstructionofhislateproofofpragmaticismcomingroughly
from1907,wheretheproofislaidoutintoopeninsemioticterminology,therearetwocrucialsteps
towardstheendoftheproof.(Iwillnotgointoexplainingthereconstructionofthatlengthyproofitself
here,Ihavedoneitelsewhere,seee.g.Pietarinen2007,Pietarinen2009;Pietarinen&Snellman
2006.)ThesestepsareintendedtocharacterizethePeirceanGrailofAbduction.Inotherwords,theproof
attemptstocharacterizeabductionintermsofreferringtosuchkindsofsignsthatgivetheirobjectsas
conclusiveanswerstorightkindsofquestions.
Inthelightofthisapproach,then,questionsarecertainkindsofexperiments.Sincetheyareplacedonthe
sourceofinformationwhichisthemind,thefundamentalnatureofquestionsboilsdowntotheideaof
experimentationonvariouswaysoffindingsolutionsinourthoughts(because,remember,thoughtsare
signscreatedbythemind).Soifthisreasoningisindeedcorrect,thentheentirenotionofsemiosisis
nothingbutageneralizationoftheoldideaofacontrolledexperiment,whichisnotlimitedonlyto
experimentingonNaturesnaturebutencompassesthemind,too.
3.
Butatanyrate,certainfurtherquestionsareboundtoarisehereatthispoint.Weallprobablywouldlike
toasknow:preciselywhatarethesewaysoffindingsolutionsoranswersinourthoughtbyputting
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questionstothemind?Furthermore,whatisitthatinfactcountsasaconclusiveanswertosucha
question?
Peircesanswertotheformerseemstobe:thewaysoffindingsolutionsinourthoughtsaregivenbyhabits,
ashabitsaregeneralrulesofactingandthinkingincertainwaysincertainkindsofsituations.Andhabits,
moreover,arecertaingeneralitiesthatareonlypartlyconnectedwiththeworldofexperienceandfortheir
mostpartpointouttowardsmerelypossibleandhypotheticaloutcomes.
Well,thisallseemsfineanddandy,butwhatexactlyarethesehabitstakentobe?Whatistheirreal
constituency?How,whereandwhendotheyemerge?Iwillnotattemptanyeloquentanswertothis
difficultquestion,andsomyproposalissolelythatweshouldcontinuetolookfortheanswerswhere
Peircehadleftusoff,namelytotakethetheoryoftheinnernatureofhabitstobelogic,andcontinuethe
studyofsuchlogicalongthelinesindicated.Thenatureofhabitcannotbeansweredonlybystudyingof
thenatureofaction,becauseactionsarenotrealgeneralsbutsingulars.Itis,therefore,thetheoryoflogic
whichseemstocatersforthosesolutionsthatweattempttofindbyourputtingquestionstothesourceof
information,wherethatsourceisatthesametimethefactorythatcreatesthesignswhoseobjectswe
wishtodetermineaswellasthesourceofanswersthattheinquirerwishestogleanfromitby
experimentalandabductivemeans.Andweshouldjustaddthatwhatkindoflogicrevealsthetruenature
ofhabitsiscertainlynotthecommonplacedeductivelogic,butanampliative,abdutiveone.Wecould,it
seemstome,considerhabitsasstrategicplansofactionsinthesenseofgametheory(Pietarinen2006).
Letmethensayalittleabouttheissueofconclusiveanswersinclosing.Whatcharacterizesagoodanswer
theessenceofwhichisderivedfromthesourceofinformationisthatsuchasourceissomehowareliable
one.Nowhowdoweassessthat?Well,quiteeasily.Whatelsecouldbeamorereliablesourcethanthe
onethathasbeenthesourceofsignsinthefirstplace?Themind,mindyou,istheoriginator,the
creatoryofallintellectualsigns(thoughts).Itisthusonlynatural,andnotinanystraightforwardsense
circular,thatsuchacreatoryofsignsisreallythesourceofinformationwewanttoconcentrateallour
effortsoninourinterrogativeactivities.For,thoseactivitiesarepreciselytheeffortsconcernedwith
teasingoutmoreinformationfromthesource,andaccordingtowhichinformationtheobjectsofthesigns
producedbythemindcouldeventuallybehituponwith.
Toputthispointinabriefform,conclusiveanswersarethosethatarenecessitatedbythesuitably
arrangedcontrolledandselfcontrolledexperimentationthatputsquestionstothemindconcerningthe
objectsofsigns.
Finally,whatkindsofanswersdoesthemindprovideforingeneral?Whatistheendresultofquestion
answerprocessesincognition?Accordingtopragmaticism,theendistheformationofastablehabit,which
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istheultimatemeaningofthesigninquestion.Atthesametime,habitsareusedasstrategicrulesto
choosebetweenseveralalternatives.Ifthesourcetrulyisareliableone,newstablehabitswilleasily
emergetotakeplaceoffinalinterpretants,andtodosointhetimeandspacelessthantheideallimitcase
ofthelongrun.For,aconclusiveansweristheonethatcatersuswithenoughinformationtofindout
whattheobjectsofthesignare.Andwheneverwegatherenoughinformationabouttheobjects,thefinal
interpretantsareboundtoarise.Andwhenevertherearefinalinterpretants,newhabitsareboundto
emerge.
Insummary,findingsolutionstothequestionanswerexperimentationtakingplaceinourthoughtsare
givenbythehabitsofthinkinginacertainwayincertainkindsofsituations,andthosesolutionsinturngive
risetonewhabitsandhabitchangingbehaviour.ThisishowcognitionappearstoworkinPeircessemiotic
theory.
4.
Donotbeafraidofbecomingschizophrenicwhenyouaccepttheideaofthebasicmethodsofsemiotics
havingtodowiththenotionofmindsomehowinterrogatingmind.Thereisnothingwobblyand
psychological,psychoanalytic,letalonepsychosemioticinthatnotion.Itisnotstrictlyspeakingyourmind
thatisinterrogatingexactlythesamementalentityofyours.MindisnotasingularterminPeircestheory.
Ithasacommunalandcollectivecharacter.Itassociateswiththenotionofapersonratherthanwitha
singularagent,andwhatapersonisisnotabsolutelyanindividual.Thenotionofdialoguecomes
togetherwiththistemporallyextendedandfutureorientedunderstandingofpersonsengagedinitrather
thanmentalagents.Thepronouninthefollowingsentencemustbeliterallyinterpretedasreferringtoa
personal,notsingular,pronoun:Histhoughtsarewhatheissayingtohimself,thatis,issayingtothat
otherselfthatisjustcomingintolifeintheflowoftime(CP5.421,1905,WhatPragmatismIs).Persons
liveinalternativepossibleworldsasmuchasinthisoneactual,currentworldofours.
Whatisthemechanismofmindtoaccomplishthetask?Surelythereisnoundemandingnaturalor
symboliclanguageofthoughtbehindtheactionsthatcandothetrick.Ibelievethebestwayof
understandinghowexperimentationcanbeoperationalisedisthroughacomprehensiveunderstandingof
thenatureofdiagrammaticthinking,somethingwhichforexampleStjernfelt(2007)hasmuchtosayabout.
Theappropriateandexpressiveenoughtheoryofdiagramsisneverthelesslikelytobenotalinguisticone
anymore,eventhoughsomesimplerformaldiagrams(suchasPeircesexistentialgraphsonthefirst
intentionallevel)canwellbeseenasalternativekindsofheterogeneousornonsymbolic(iconic)languages.
Moreexpressivediagramsarenolongerlanguagesatall.
UniversityofHelsinki
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5.References
Hintikka,Jaakko(2007).SocraticEpistemology:ExplorationsofKnowledgeSeekingbyQuestioning.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Peirce,CharlesS.(193158).TheCollectedPapersofCharlesSandersPeirce,8vols.,editedbyCharlesHartshorne,PaulWeiss,andA.W.Burks.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress.
Peirce,CharlesS.(1967).Manuscripts.HoughtonLibraryMicrofilms.
Pietarinen,AhtiVeikko(2006).SignsofLogic:PeirceanThemesonthePhilosophyofLanguage,Games,andCommunication.Dordrecht:Springer.
Pietarinen,AhtiVeikko(2007).AbductiveIssuesinPeircesProofofPragmaticism,inO.PomboandA.Gerner(eds),AbductionandtheProcessofScientificDiscovery,Lisboa:CentrodeFilosofiadasCinciasdaUniversidadedeLisboa,303320.
Pietarinen,AhtiVeikko(2009)."MovingPicturesofThought:Graphs,Games,andPragmaticismsProof",Semiotica.
Pietarinen,AhtiVeikkoandSnellman,Lauri(2006).OnPeircesLateProofofPragmaticism,inTuomoAhoandAhtiVeikkoPietarinen(eds),TruthandGames,Helsinki:ActaPhilosophicaFennica78,275288.
Pietarinen,AhtiVeikkoandStjernfelt,Frederik(2009).DiscussiononDiagrammatologyandSignsofLogic,CognitiveSemiotics,toappear.
Stjernfelt,Frederik(2007).Diagrammatology:AnInvestigationontheBorderlinesofPhenomenology,Ontology,andSemiotics.Dordrecht:Springer.
