PPEEEERR Older Hazardous Concrete Buildings

Policy Issues

Peter J. MayCenter for American Politics and Public Policy

University of Washington

Laurence KornfieldChief Building Inspector

City and County of San Francisco

Policy Challenges for Addressing Older Hazardous Concrete Buildings

• Insufficient information for guiding policy development – How many? What condition?

• Inappropriateness of “one size fits all” regulatory solutions – too costly, politically unacceptable

• Limited willingness of owners to undertake retrofits “voluntarily” – not our problem!

California Un-reinforced Masonry Programs

• California Law 1986 – inventory and planning requirements for 25,000 buildings

• By 2004, some 55% retrofitted, 14% demolished – many remain unaddressed

• Cities are participating as required, but voluntary programs are not working well

• 85% retrofit in mandatory programs addressed, only 10 to 21 % in other programs

• Mandatory warning placards prior to 2004 were not posted – no enforcement mechanism

Lessons from Un-reinforced Masonry Programs

• 2004 placard law – posting of placards about unsafe buildings

• More teeth added to notification requirements

Lessons from URM experience(Alesch and Petak; Berke and Beatley; Olson)

Barriers

• Limited problem recognition – not our problem!

• Lack of technically feasible, affordable, solutions

• Legal challenges to ordinances

• Limited enforcement abilities for regulations

Hospital Retrofit ExperienceSB 1953

California mandatory hospital retrofits enacted in 1994 (regulations 1998)

Lengthy policy development and negotiation(diagram – Alesch and Petak 2004)

California Hospital Retrofit ExperienceSB 1953 (Alesch and Petak 2004, CA SSC 2001)

• Notable for risk classification of facilities – but, arguably too many classified as high risk

• Circa 40 % initially classified as highest risk category of imminent danger of collapse

• High costs of compliance for the industry – inducing delays –

• Some 260 facilities seeking “diminished capacity” exemptions as of 2006 for meeting initial 2008 deadline

• Shakeout in the health care industry due to economics of the industry – 50 % or more facilities with revenue shortfalls

• More feasible to close facilities than upgrade in many instances; premature closure?

Political Realities

• Retrofit as a tough sell – costs are up front and benefits are perceived as uncertain Comment cited by Alesch and Petak re LA URM:

• Who pays, when, and for what?

Political Realities (con’t)

Other consequences that are often unintended can dominate -- potential impacts for:

• Tenant costs, property conversions, affordable housing, housing displacement, open space, costs of construction

• Retrofits become excuses for owners to achieve other desired ends – that in the aggregate exacerbate other policy problems

Solutions require intervention – of some form – in complex markets for employment, housing, and services

What NOT to Do?

• No quick fix – will take decades to ameliorate the risks posed by older hazardous concrete buildings

• No one-size solution – impossible to mandate a uniform retrofit program

• No need to wait for the perfect solution – it will not arrive in our lifetimes; the risk is real

What to Do?

• Work toward a mix of solutions:

• Mandated actions for the “worst” buildings, yet to be defined

• Realistic voluntary actions for other buildings

• No action for lowest risk structures

• Solutions should come from coalition-building among stakeholders; not imposed from above

What to Do?Some Potential Directions

• Seek to foster markets for seismic safety –

• Akin to “green building” movement – coalition building for green buildings

• Use of rating systems, information disclosure, building credits, and other policy incentives

• Foster demands for seismically “safe” structures

• The Societal Challenge: How to foster a seismic safety ethic among building owners, tenants, suppliers, and others?