Romae omnia venalia esse. Sallust's Development of a Thesis and the Prehistory of theJugurthine WarAuthor(s): Victor L. ParkerReviewed work(s):Source: Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 53, H. 4 (2004), pp. 408-423Published by: Franz Steiner VerlagStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436741 .Accessed: 06/11/2012 10:14

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ROMAE OMNIA VENALIA ESSE. Sallust's Development of a Thesis and the Prehistory of the Jugurthine War*

For most of the material covered in Sallust's Bellum Iugurthinum' we have no real independent control2 - unlike the Coniuratio Catilinae, for which we do have Cicero's speeches. With regard to that sordid episode of Roman history Cicero and Sallust provide useful checks upon each other. For the Romans' war upon Jugurtha we have nothing comparable as Livy's history survives only in the form of the miserable periocha,3 while Diodorus (who copied out Poseidonius), Cassius Dio, and Appian have but for a few fragments perished for the period in question. Incidental snatches of information come from Cicero and others, but nowhere do we find any detailed narrative. This is insofar unfortunate as the conquest of Numidia does represent an important step in the expansion of Roman

* For their comments on this paper I thank Prof. Fritz Gschnitzer and Dr. Wolfgang Blosel.

Simple numbers in both text and notes refer to the chapters of the Bellum lugurthinum.

I I have greatly profitted from the magisterial philological commentary of E. Koestermann,

Heidelberg 1971. In many cases his comments lie at the base of my translations and

paraphrases. - The most readable account of the period of history at issue here remains in

my opinion S. Gsell, Histoire ancienne de l'Afrique du Nord 7, Paris 1928. An exemplary

precis: M. Radnoti-Alfoldi, "Die Geschichte des numidischen Konigreiches und seiner

Nachfolger," in: Die Numider, Bonn 1979, 43-74. 2 As an elementary precaution, therefore, one should not write out Sallust's account as the

gospel truth (as does e.g. W.V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, Oxford

1979, 249-251, in an otherwise excellent work). On the other hand, it is not enough to

point out the tendentiousness of Sallust's constructions and on the basis of "Sachkritik" to

reconstruct the "real" situation (as does e.g. G. de Sanctis in his admittedly important

essay "Sallustio e la guerra di Giugurta," in: Problemi di storica antica, Bari 1932, 187-

214). The same, I feel, applies to another excellently argued article, this time by K. von

Fritz, "Sallust und das Verhalten der romischen Nobilitat zur Zeit der Kriege gegen

Jugurtha (112-105 v. Chr.)," in: V. Poschl (ed.), Sallust = Wege der Forschung 94,

Darmstadt 1970, 155-205 (first published as "Sallust and the Attitude of the Roman

Nobility at the Time of the Wars against Jugurtha," TAPA 74 [19431 143-168; as the later

translation [in the main presumably re-translation] is by the author himself, I cite accord-

ing to the German version). Too often von Fritz plays off details within Sallust against

each other, chooses which he prefers on the basis of "Sachkritik" and deftly reconstructs

the "real" version. 3 In the main the relevant sections of the epitome of Florus, Orosius' Aduersum paganos,

and Eutropius' Breuiarum are based on Livy. Owing to the brevity both of these and of

the Periocha we cannot judge the question of Sallust's possible influence on them,

whether direct or indirect. Their differing in some details from Sallust does not preclude

his influence in others. Cf. note 41.

Historia, Band LIII/4 (2004) ? Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart

Romae omnia uenalia esse 409

power. In addition to events in Numidia itself, Sallust in this work also provides us with much information on politics in Rome during the critical years of Marius' rise to power, information elsewhere unattested. Any historical assessment of this period rests then squarely on an attempt to interpret Sallustium e Sallustio. This first essay - of several the author hopes to set forth - proposes to undertake this with regard to selected episodes from the first third of the Bellum lugurthinum.

1. The first Roman division of the Numidian Kingdom

We begin by examining the chain of events which leads to the division of the Numidian Kingdom (16,5) into two halves between Jugurtha and Adherbal. The background information which the reader along the way has received from Sallust includes the following: Jugurtha, a member of the Numidian royal family and a good soldier, has acquitted himself well under Scipio at Numantia (7,4-7); unfortunately, Jugurtha has also fallen under the influence of unscrupu- lous Romans there who have informed him that in Rome everything is for sale (8,2). Since Sallust recurs again and again to this theme (Romae omnia uenalia esse), we should note that its occurrence at this early stage hardly seems coincidence - Sallust wants to put this flea into the reader's ear just as much as he wants the reader to appreciate that unscrupulous Romans had put that same flea into Jugurtha's ear right at the beginning of the latter's contact with them. Now Jugurtha, because he outshines Hiempsal and Adherbal, the two legitimate heirs to the Kingdom, has often aroused King Micipsa's4 distrust (6,2) - in fact, Micipsa has sent Jugurtha to Numantia in the hope that he will there meet his death Uriah-fashion in the fighting (7,2). However, when Jugurtha comes home with Scipio's commendation (9,2), Micipsa changes tack and seeks to win Jugurtha over by favours and flattery (9,3) - i.e. he adopts Jugurtha as his son5;

4 Micipsa to some extent is known from one of his own inscriptions (K[anaanaische und] A[ramaischel I[nschriften] 101) and from his epitaph (KAI 161). According to Appian, Libyca, 106 (following Polybius; cf. Zonaras, IX 27) the rule of Numidia, on King Massinissa's death, had first been divided amongst Micipsa and his brothers Mastanabal and Gulussa. KAI 101 shows that by his tenth regnal year Micipsa was ruling alone. This confirms the implication of Sallust's statement at 5,6. Micipsa's support of Roman military undertakings is well-attested outside of Sallust: Appian, Libyca, 107; Iberica, 67; 89 (cf. Velleius Paterculus, 11 9); Plutarch, C. Gracchus, 2. Strabo, XVII 3,13, p. 831, and Diodorus, XXXIV/XXXV 35, attest to Micipsa's interest in Hellenic culture. For his relations with his sons and nephews we have no evidence other than Sallust.

5 The adoption appears also in Livy, Periocha, 62; Florus, I 36,3; and Orosius, Aduersum paganos, V 15,3. Eutropius, IV 26,1, calls Hiempsal and Adherbal Jugurtha's "brothers" without specifying "by adoption." The chronological mistake bound up with the adoption is of no interest here - see G.M. Paul, A Historical Commentary on the Jugurthine War = Arca 13, Liverpool 1984, 40-43.

410 VICTOR L. PARKER

on his deathbed King Micipsa exhorts his two sons and Jugurtha to keep the Kingdom united (10).

Since we have no control over any of this information, let us simply take it for granted - as indeed any reader coming to Sallust, whether ancient or modern, would almost certainly have to do. This is what Sallust wants us to know. Let us now follow closely Sallust's narration of the civil war which breaks out shortly after Micipsa's death. In chapter 11 Micipsa's three heirs fall out with one another. They soon decide to divide the Kingdom and treasure amongst themselves (12,2).6 Only Jugurtha soon has Hiempsal murdered (12,3- 6).7 Thereupon the Numidians split into two factions - one supports Jugurtha, the other Adherbal. Jugurtha defeats Adherbal easily enough, and Adherbal flees to the province of Africa and thence to Rome.8 Although Jugurtha is now master of all Numidia (omnis Numidiae potiebatur), he suddenly begins to fear the consequences of what he has done. He sends his agents to Rome to counter Adherbal's representations to Roman officialdom. Laden with silver and gold, Jugurtha's agents proceed to dole out bribes with an open hand to various senators and magistrates (13). Adherbal holds a speech before the senate, full of pathos; all persecuted innocence and justice ( 14). Jugurtha's agents on the other hand say very little, relying instead on their bribes (15). Much of the senate, well-bribed, mocks Adherbal's words and praises Jugurtha (senatus magna pars gratia deprauata Adherbalis dicta contemnere, Iugurthae uirtutem extol- lere laudibus). Only a handful prefer justice to money. Naturally, they make up a distinct minority, and the other side prevails (uicit tamen in senatu pars illa, quae uero pretium aut gratiam anteferebat). So an embassy of ten is sent to Numidia to divide it between Jugurtha and Adherbal (16,1-2); Lucius Opimius,9

6 This division amongst three rulers had precedent in Numidia (see n. 4), though we cannot

begin to answer the question as to what was customary for the succession in Numidia as we have too few examples to judge from. For discussion see e.g. C. Saumagne, La

Numidie et Rome, Paris 1966, 99-117. 7 Jugurtha's killing of Hiempsal appears in Livy, Perioc ha, 62; Orosius, Aduersum paga-

nos, V 15,3; and Florus, I 36,4 whereby Livy speaks not of an assassination (as does Sallust), but of an open battle.

8 The flight to Rome is mentioned by Florus, 1 36,4; Orosius, Aduersum paganos, V 15,3 speaks merely of an expulsion from Africa; Livy, Perioc ha, 62, only from Numidia.

9 Opimius' (even by the best accounts) bloody suppression of the supporters of C. Sempro- nius Gracchus is well-attested in the sources, not so, however, a susceptibility to bribes, which, frankly, seems out of character for someone who so single-mindedly and ruthless-

ly followed policies which he felt best served the interests of the state. Cicero was no

extremist, yet defended Opimius as praeclare uir de re public a meritus and seruator rei

publicae who domestico bello rem publicam liberarat (Pro Sextio, 140; Pro Planco, 69

and 70 respectively); cf. Pro Planco, 88, where Cicero places Opimius on the same level

as C. Marius in terms of fortes consules. This at least shows that we must take Sallust's

apodictic characterisations of his actors cum grano salis. Opimius was amongst those

convicted under the lex Mamilia (Cicero, Brutus, 128) - see below n. 47.

Romae omnia uenalia esse 411

its leader, quickly succumbs to Jugurtha's bribes; so do most of the remaining nine (16,3-4). So when the embassy makes its division, naturally enough Jugurtha receives that part - bordering Mauretania in the West - which is richer in land and in people (agro uirisque opulentior). To Adherbal, however, that part is given which is worth more in appearance than in actual use, having more ports and being rather more decked out with buildings (16,5).10

On the surface, everything seems in order and rigorously logical. Micipsa has always feared what Jugurtha might do to Hiempsal and Adherbal - on Micipsa's death Jugurtha shortly has Hiempsal done away with and attacks Adherbal. Jugurtha, whom we have seen as an excellent soldier at Numantia, does defeat the inexperienced Adherbal in combat. Since Jugurtha has learnt at Numantia that at Rome all is for sale, he naturally resorts to bribing senators when Adherbal takes his case to Rome. We then see that Roman senators can be bought, for Sallust tells us that the senators who preferred money to truth carried the day. And when the commission arrives to divide up Numidia, Jugurtha just buys the commissioners and ends up with the richer part.' 1

In contrast to almost everything which Sallust has told us, this very last detail we can check: we can independently control the topography of Numidia. Sallust has in fact told a blatant untruth when he says that Jugurtha received the better portion.12 In fact Jugurtha received the more arid, less prosperous, less populated regions, while Adherbal took possession of the far more fertile, productive, and populous regions in the East. If Jugurtha did bribe Opimius and the other commissioners, he certainly failed to get his money's worth. Either Jugurtha did not bribe Opimius or Opimius was not for sale. For that matter, we must ask ourselves, why was a commission even sent to Numidia to divide it

10 Florus, I 36,4 refers only to a division; Livy, Periocha, 62, phrases it that "Adherbal was reinstated by the Senate" and mentions no division.

11 As K. Vretska, Studien zu Sallusts Bellum lugurthinum = SOAW 229,4 (1955) 40, notes, "es wuirde die Geschlossenheit des bisherigen Aufbaus empfindlich storen, wenn nun nicht bei der Teilung Numidiens der Vorteil Jugurthas gewahrt wurde, die Teilung wurde ihren Sinn geradezu verlieren."

12 Many have pointed this out: from e.g. Gsell (n. 1) 146 to e.g. Paul (n. 5) 70-71. W. Steidle, Sallusts historische Monographien = Historia Einzelschriften 3, Stuttgart 1958, 40, n. 2, attempts to justify Sallust's verdict. As indicated in the previous note, Sallust must claim that Jugurtha got the better part thanks to his bribes. As de Sanctis (n. 2) 201 has put it: "Non c'e nessun dubbio che se egli [the Roman delegation] avesse assegnato a Giugurta la parte delle Numidia vicina alla provincia di Africa e ad Aderbale quella piui lontana, Sallustio avrebbe detto egualmente che egli s'era lasciato corrompere. Aderbale segregato dalla provincia sarebbe stato facile vittima dell'avversario senza che per la distanza e la barbarie del sito i Romani potessero esserne informati se non troppo tardi, e i commercianti italici di Cirta sarebbero stati consegnati ai barbari, e la parte piii ricca e piu civile della Numidia sarebbe data (perche, se non perche egli aveva i mezzi di corrompere?) all'avversario di Roma."

412 VICTOR L. PARKER

into two parts? Sallust has told us that Jugurtha has defeated Adherbal in battle; Adherbal has fled the country; and Jugurtha is now master of all Numidia. If Jugurtha did send his agents to Rome to buy the senate, they either failed miserably; or again the senate was not for sale. If Jugurtha really had made himself undisputed master of Numidia and had bought the senate, then surely all the senate would have done was to confirm the status quo. Instead the senate sends out a commission to divide Numidia between the two claimants of the throne; and that commission even saddles Jugurtha with the worse half.

Sallust's account, divided against itself, cannot stand. Yet need we dispense with all of it? Sallust tells us that ten commissioners were sent to Numidia; and he tells us that Jugurtha received as his half territory which we can objectively determine as the worse part of Numidia. These two details contradict the rest of Sallust's narration - in particular they allow us to see that something is wrong with the general account; because they show clearly that neither the Senate nor the Commission was in Jugurtha's pocket. Yet this especially Sallust is trying to make us believe. Already in 8,1 he has told us Romae omnia uenalia esse. 13 He will tell us this again and again throughout this section of the work (20,1; 28,1; 31,25; 35,10). Why then does Sallust include in his argumentation two details which give the lie to his thesis in this particular case? We can hardly avoid the answer that he included them because they really did happen and because his immediate readers might ascertain these two facts for themselves.

We have in actuality traced a simple rhetorical trick for dealing with inconvenient facts. The author suggests to the reader a thesis first (Romae omnia uenalia esse) and only then proceeds to give the reader the details of a "test case." The reader naturally enough views the "test case" through the lens of the thesis already insinuated. The inconvenient fact is then presented and interpreted so that it fits the thesis (in this case: Jugurtha gets the western half of Numidia; the western half is the richer). If the reader cannot check it for himself - which part of Numidia is richer -, so much the better. If the reader does know a little bit about Numidia and assumes that the eastern part was richer, then Sallust tells him that this may have been true, but only with regard to appear- ance rather than actual practice (specie quam usu). Let us recall that Sallust was writing as the former Governor of Africa Nova,14 the province which the old Numidian Kingdom would eventually become when incorporated into the Roman Empire. Surely he could deliver such an opinion ex cathedra and have it stand unchallenged? 15

13 On the literary purpose of placing this statement here see e.g. E. Koestermann (n. 1) 51

and K. Vretska (n. I1) 26-27. 14 On Sallust's career see Sir Ronald Syme, Sallust, Berkeley/Los Angeles 1964, 29-42.

15 We may as well note here that Sallust often displays a shocking ignorance of the

topography of Numidia. The siege of Cirta (see n. 18) represents an important case.

Romae omnia uenalia esse 413

II. The diplomatic negotiations concerning the siege of Cirta

We proceed to the diplomatic negotiations to which Sallust introduces us on the occasion of the siege of Cirta: Jugurtha has attacked the hapless Adherbal16 (whom only the quick thinking of Italian traders in Cirta has saved) and trapped him in that city (21,1-2).17 When the Senate learns of this, it sends three young men (tres adulescentes) to speak with both kings. Jugurtha appeases the youths with words, sees them off, and then begins to besiege Cirta (21,3-23,1).18 Thence Adherbal sends a pathetic letter to the Roman senate (24).19 Jugurtha's partisans at Rome immediately spring into action and, as is customary, private interest defeats the public good (ita bonum publicum, uti in plerisque negotiis solet, priuata gratia deuictum). (Again, this is what Sallust wants us to believe and has led us to expect will happen.) All the same (tamen), another embassy is sent. This time it consists of maiores natu nobiles (in direct contrast to the tres adulescentes of the previous mission).20 We are thereby led into first assuming that this time the Senate does mean Jugurtha to take it seriously. Sallust then raises the stakes yet further - the nobiles are amplis honoribus usi - and then adds the piece de re'sistance: in quis fuit M. [Aemilius] Scaurus, the princeps

16 Livy, Periocha, 64, also has Adherbal attacked by Jugurtha; Diodorus, XXXIV/XXXV 31, however, writes xapataIagvov 6XXiXot TC;rV ,BaotX&ov, "when the Kings drew up battle-lines against each other." The fragmentary nature of Diodorus' account, however, forbids concluding that Poseidonius did not depict the war between Jugurtha and Adherb- al as an attack by the former against the latter.

17 Adherbal's entrapment in Cirta is confirmed by Diodorus, XXXIV/XXXV 31, and also appears in Livy, Periocha, 64. Strabo, XVII 3,12, p. 831, places it (by accident) in Utica instead.

18 In 21 Sallust casually tells us that haud longe a mari prope Cirtam oppidum. The information is totally irrelevant to the context - Cirta's propinquity or otherwise to the sea has no bearing whatsoever on what follows. That said, Cirta lies some forty miles from the sea as the crow flies; and rather more if one follows the windings of the River Ampsaga through the hilly country which separates Cirta from the Sea. Nor does Sallust have any real appreciation of the position of Cirta on a 650 foot high cliff surrounded on three sides by a bend of the Ampsaga (see e.g. the picture on p. XVI of Die Numider [n. 1]). The narrowness of the approach to the city gives the lie to Sallust's entire narrative of Jugurtha's alleged siege. As the commentators point out, Caesar had handed over this particular city to P. Sittius (Appian, Bellum ciuile, IV 54) when Sallust became Governor of Africa Nova, so Sallust does have an excuse for never having seen it. We must however go one step farther: Sallust's never having seen this city did not prevent him from writing up a conventional siege narrative. A priori then we cannot necessarily accept as accurate any battle description of Sallust's without substantiating argumentation. Nor can we accept any geographical statement of Sallust's at face value: we must check every single one. - On the problems surrounding Cirta see Paul (n. 5) pp. 80-81 with literature.

19 Diodorus, XXXIV/XXXV 31, confirms that Adherbal sent envoys to Rome. 20 Diodorus, XXXIV/XXXV 31, also refers to two embassies, the second having d4icoga

Ait ov.

414 VICTOR L. PARKER

senatus.21 Sallust has told us that private interest has won again, but then we see the Senate throwing all its authority into the balance it would appear against Jugurtha. Soon however we see behind the faqade: Sallust reminds us of what sort a person M. Aemilius Scaurus really is (de quo supra memorauimus). At the indicated passage (15,4) Sallust has told us that Scaurus is energetic; partisan; and greedy for power, office, and riches; but nonetheless knows well to hide his vices.22 That description Sallust now recalls to our minds when mentioning Scaurus' presence on the embassy. We immediately suspect that behind the grand show and accumulated honours foul intentions are being hidden - in other words, Sallust has puffed the embassy up, only to deflate it.23 Now we see how it is that private greed is winning. The embassy then sets sail for Africa within three days (25,5); but instead of commenting on its haste, Sallust tells us that the ambassadors left so soon because the affair was arousing outrage and the Numidians kept urging them on. Naturally, the embassy has no effect on Jugurtha - exactly what we expect.

We have traced the development of the story and have carefully noted how Sallust's narration continually suggests interpretations to us or even forces them upon us before the story is told: e.g. we hear that private greed has won before Sallust even tells us what happened. We have that flea in our ear as we read the description of the second embassy - wondering how private greed has won/will win; then Scaurus' name drops, the cross-reference falls, and we understand.

Let us now strip away from this passage every Sallustian interpretative comment and rhetorical trick and let stand only the bare facts as Sallust tells them. Upon first hearing of the situation in Numidia:

1.) a minor delegation is sent to Numidia to no effect; 2.) more disturbing news arrives from Numidia; 3.) the princeps senatus heads a second delegation; 4.) the delegation leaves on the third day after its constitution.

Having abstracted those four facts, we might incline to conclusions completely different from Sallust's, uidelicet, that the Senate was responding quickly,

2 1 On the rhetorical effect of ever raising the stakes see Koestermann (n. 1 ) 1 10. 22 Cicero on the other hand held generally favourable views on Scaurus (e.g. princeps et

senatus et ciuitatis or pater tuus [= Scaurusi ... qui a C. Graccho usque ad Q. Varium seditiosis omnibus restitit, quem numquam ulla uis, ullae minae. ulla inuidia labefecit -

Pro Sextio, 39 and 101 respectively). Scaurus is, however, even outside of Sallust, accused of improperly enriching himself: Cicero, De oratore, II 283 (acquisition of a wealthy man's property without testament upon the latter's decease - though this accusa-

tion is actually made by none other than C. Memmius - see below n. 29 - when Scaurus defended Calpurnius Bestia against Memmius) and Pliny, Naturalis historia, XXXVI 1 16 (helping himself to goods plundered by Marian partisans in the provinces). Of course,

none of this need even imply susceptibility to bribes. 23 This point none of the commentators whom I have been able to check has appreciated.

Romae omnia uenalia esse 415

frequently, and with increasing alarm at the developing situation; and certainly the second embassy went beyond any token gesture. The senate was in deadly earnest.

That any unbiassed person would draw only that conclusion from those bare facts emerges from the elaborate precautions which Sallust takes to make sure no reader will draw them. The first delegation of the unnamed "three youths" is easily enough dismissed. But with the second, Sallust must contrive to undermine our confidence in it. Again, the facts Sallust mentions fly in the face of his interpretation; and Sallust has taken great care in how he introduces them, so that we get the "right" impression of them. Surely, then, we can accept the basic facts; we will, however, again have to draw the exact opposite conclusion to the one Sallust wishes to foist on us.24

III. Preparations for war at Rome

On to the aftermath of the embassy's activity in Numidia: According to Sallust a meeting between the embassy and Jugurtha does take place, but it accomplish- es nothing. The embassy returns to Rome (25). Meanwhile, in Numidia Jugurtha finally gets his hands on Adherbal. Sallust gives us an explanation - the Italians in Cirta persuaded Adherbal to surrender in reliance on the respect in which Rome was held -, but we can probably disregard this completely for several reasons: the other accounts of Adherbal's surrender make no mention of it25; Sallust could not possibly have any genuine information on what motivated Adherbal to hand himself over to Jugurtha; and, finally, the explanation given fits too neatly with Sallust's melodramatic casting of Adherbal as someone doomed to being constantly let down by the Roman Senate.26 One may as well suggest that if the Italian traders did hand Adherbal over to Jugurtha, they did so because the civil strife detracted from business and they saw little advantage in protecting Adherbal from the more powerful Jugurtha. Whatever they may have thought, Jugurtha had them killed too (26).27

24 D.C. Earl, "Sallust and the Senate's Numidian Policy," Latomus 24 (1965) 532-536, has discussed these negotiations (which he views to be traditional policy) and has emphasised Sallust's extreme bias against leading "anti-Gracchan" politicians involved in them.

25 Diodorus, XXXIV/XXXV 31 (with a far more dramatic story of Adherbal's surrender); Strabo, XVII 3,12, p. 831.

26 The first time: 14-16; the second: 24-25. Steidle (n. 12) 54, n. 6 fails to appreciate how much of Sallust's work is literary construction: "Sallust ist nun einmal kein Dichter, sondern Historiker; als solcher muf er analysiert und gewertet werden." These are modem words with modem meanings attached which for us differentiate "Dichtung" from "Geschichte."

27 Diodorus, XXXIV/XXXV 31, confirms the slaying of the Italians.

416 VICTOR L. PARKER

In Rome, however, the Senate was laying the groundwork for a war in Numidia.28 We skip ahead to the fact with which Sallust at the end of the next chapter (27) makes us acquainted: in accordance with the lex Sempronia the Senate arranges which provincial commands the incoming consuls will receive after their term in office, in this case Numidia and Italy. Now an unbiassed reader might wish to connect this with the report which the returning embassy must at some point have made. Lest we come to such thoughts, Sallust, first, omits any mention of the embassy's report. Instead he refers to Jugurtha's agents' springing into action yet again. If we have been faithfully following Sallust's interpretation of events in his narrative, we now have to expect that once again private greed will triumph. Sallust, however, again has an inconven- ient fact to deal with: he knows that the Senate will take an action that shows it is about to undertake war. That step is somewhat too drastic for him to obfus- cate or to undermine with the means he has previously used. The venal Senate cannot - on the basis of everything Sallust has led us to believe - of its own accord prepare war against Jugurtha. So Sallust brings someone else onto the stage, the in-coming tribunus plebis C. Memmius.29 The Senate would yet again have given way to Jugurtha's agents, had not Memmius held a series of spirited speeches before the Roman people, the fear of which forced the Senate to determine Numidia as one of the provincial commands. Again, we are dealing with a simple dramatic trick: what we expect (the embassy's report) fails to materialise, instead someone new and unexpected enters from stage left; we focus on him and forget what we just had in mind.

Now Sallust is aware that readers will be surprised by the Senate's actions which directly contradict his thesis - those actions again we may accept as

28 Sallust, incidentally, omits to mention the actual declaration of war: Livy, Periocha, 64,

just mentions it; Orosius, Aduersum paganos, V 15,1 and Valerius Maximus, VII 5,2, date

it to Ill. On the legal principles involved at this time see S.I. Oost, "The Fetial Law and

the Outbreak of the Jugurthine War," AJP 75 (1954) 147-159.

29 We know very little about Memmius' politics besides what Sallust tells us. In Cicero's

opinion (Brutus, 136) he was an aggressive prosecutor, but a mediocre speaker (differing

starkly from Sallust's judgement: Memmifacundia clara pollensque). Cicero does tell us

that Memmius at some point prosecuted the first Roman commander in the Jugurthine

War, L. Capurnius Bestia, whom M. Aemilius Scaurus defended (de Oratore, II 283), so

we can at least confirmn that Memmius was a political enemy of some of the nobiles

involved in Numidian affairs. According to Cicero, Pro Fonteio, 24 (cf. Valerius Max-

imus, VIII 5,2) Scaurus testified against Memmius when the latter was accused of

extortion (presumably after his praetorship which, at the latest, fell into the year 102 as

Memmius was a candidate for the consulship in 100 when Saturninus had him killed

(Cicero, In Catilinam IV 4; Livy, Periocha, 69; Florus, Epitoma, II 4,4; Orosius, V 17,5;

Appian, 1 142-143). - I will simply render my opinion that Memmius' interventions in

the Bellum lugurthinum are almost entirely literary constructs designed by Sallust for

argumentative purposes.

Romae omnia uenalia esse 417

historical. For despite the elaborate care taken to displace the credit for this action from the Senate to C. Memmius, Sallust still feels he must do something to settle the reader's awakened suspicions that perhaps all was not for sale at Rome. We read (28,1):

At Jugurtha contra spem nuntio accepto, quippe quoi Romae omnia uenire in animo haeserat, filium et cum eo duos familiaris ad senatum legatos mittit iisque uti illis, quos Hiempsale interfecto miserat, praecipit, omnis mortalis pecunia adgrediantur.

"But when Jugurtha received this news, contrary to his expectation [and the reader's!], since it had stuck in his [and the reader's!] mind that everything at Rome was for sale, he dispatched his son and with him two close associates to the Senate as ambassadors. He enjoined them, as he had those whom he had sent after the death of Hiempsal, to make an attempt on every soul with money."

Yet even this attempt fails when the Senate refuses even to hear the embassy. Jugurtha and the reader are by now scratching their heads: why this time is the Senate incorruptible?30 Sallust does not bring Memmius into play; but perhaps we are to remember his influence on affairs? At any rate, at the beginning of 28,4 the "truth" as Sallust gives us to see the "truth" suddenly dawns on us:

Interim Calpurnius3l parato exercitu legat sibi homines nobilis factiosos, quorum auctoritate quae deliquisset munita fore sperabat. In quis fuit Scaurus, quoius de natura et habitu supra memorauimus.

"In the meantime [L.] Calpurnius [Bestia], having outfitted an arny, chose as his officers partisan nobles with whose reputation he was hoping to cover up his misdeeds. Among them was [M. Aemilius] Scaurus, concerning whose character and bearing I have spoken above."

Now the reader grasps the situation. Once again, all has been for show. The rhetorical trick is the same as in the account of Scaurus' mission. Forced into action, the venal nobles only pretend to do the right thing, for behind the scenes they prepare to sell Rome again. Calpurnius appoints as officers nobles behind whose reputation he can hide; amongst them is Scaurus of whom we know that he understands to conceal his vices (and once again Sallust will not omit the cross-reference in case we have forgotten).32 It comes then as no surprise that

30 Vretska (n. 1 1) 48, rightly summarises this interpretation with the rhetorical question, "Hat sich Rom gewandelt?"

31 Calpurnius Bestia is the first commander in the so-called "Livian" tradition also: Livy, Periocha, 64; Orosius, V 15,4; Florus, I 36,7; Eutropius, IV 26,1.

32 We have already seen Sallust use this trick (above to nn. 21-24). We should now note that at 15,4 Sallust, on introducing Scaurus, tells us that Scaurus publicly opposed Jugurtha's

418 VICTOR L. PARKER

Jugurtha, as soon as a Roman army arrives in Numidia, once again resorts to bribery; that in short order Calpumius and then Scaurus succumb to the lavish bribes (29,1-2)33; and that Jugurtha again assumes that he will be able to effect some arrangement at Rome through bribes or favours (existumans sese aliquid interim Romae pretio aut gratia effecturum). And sure enough Sallust soon shows us the war in Numidia grinding to a halt (29,3-7). That practical reasons and other considerations may have dictated the halt, Sallust will not even deign to consider.34

IV. Jugurtha at Rome: the urbs uenalis35

Sallust has now almost finished preparing us for the great culminating scene, the depiction of the urbs uenalis. Jugurtha, having by means of bribery achieved a delay in the war and thereafter favourable conditions of peace from Bestia, offers deditio (formal unconditional surrender)36 and has it accepted (in dedi- tionem accipitur). Peace breaks out in Numidia (29).37 Shortly thereafter Jugur-

designs in Numidia when Jugurtha became master of Numidia for the first time. Sallust's

explanation of Scaurus' public (and known) behaviour turns on Scaurus' private (and

hidden) vices. In other words, Sallust simply interprets a known fact so that it conforms to

his thesis (another trick that we have already seen - above to nn. 12-14).

33 It must be admitted that much of the "Livian" tradition accuses Calpurnius of having

accepted bribes as well: Orosius, V 15,4; Eutropius, IV 26,1; Florus, I 36,7. We cannot

judge whether this be due to Sallustian influence on Livy. Certainly, Bestia's known

conviction under the lex Mamilia may have played a r6le as well (Cicero, Brutus, 128 -

see below n. 47). Plutarch, Marius, 9,3, on the other hand, lets Marius speak only of

Bestia's inexperience and unwarlike nature. The Greek Plutarch is far less likely than the

Roman historians to have bent to Sallust's influence and far more likely than they to have

followed Poseidonius (whom he cites at Marius 1,2 and 45,3 = FGrHist 87, Frr. 60 and 37

respectively). If this be so, then Plutarch represents an entirely independent tradition, one

which had no recourse to explaining Bestia's performance in other than military terms.

34 Simply put, Bestia and Scaurus may have preferred "peace with honour" (cf. de Sanctis,

p. 206) to a long, costly, and draining guerilla war (which in the end Metellus and Marius

did have to wage). But we have no way of reconstructing what really happened. On the

topographical difficulties of fighting in Numidia see e.g. Paul (n. 5) 94-95.

35 On the phrase urbs uenalis itself and its pejorative connotation(s) see J. Hellegouarc'h,

"Vrbem uenalem ... (Sall., (<lug.)) 35,10)," Bulletin Bude 1990, 163-174.

36 On deditio see now D. Norr, Aspekte des romischen Volkerrec hts = ABAW 101, Munchen

1989; also E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae, Oxford 1958, 4-7. For discussion with regard

to Jugurtha's specific case: von Fritz (n. 2) 174-188; Steidle (n. 12) 45-47 (against von

Fritz); H.W. Ritter, Rom und Numidien. Untersuc hungen zur rechtlichen Stellung abhan-

giger Konige, Luneburg 1987, 93-101. 37 For discussion of the phrase pax agitabatur see Paul (n. 5) 96. Orosius, Aduersum

paganos, V 15,4, speaks of "conditions of peace"; cf. Eutropius, IV 26,1.

Romae omnia uenalia esse 419

tha travels to Rome under a safe passage,38 arranged by the tribune Memmius who wants Jugurtha to give evidence against Scaurus (32,1). Jugurtha appears without any royal insignia and miserably dressed. He promptly proceeds to bribe another tribune, G. Baebius,39 to ensure his safety (32,1-2). The Roman people, incensed at Jugurtha, demand his head, and it is only through the energetic speech of Memmius in a contio40 that Jugurtha's safe passage remains intact (33,3-4). But Memmius also demands that Jugurtha speak at the contio: here the bribing of Baebius comes into play when Baebius stops Jugurtha from speaking (34,1). Once again, then, depravity triumphed (uicit tamen impuden- tia), Sallust says. Or did it?

We have seen Sallust play this game already on several occasions. Sallust has stage-managed the contio so that we must assume that Jugurtha does not wish to speak. Through his bribery, then, he avoids it. We can be fairly certain that Sallust had no real evidence that Baebius had accepted a bribe from Jugurtha; but Sallust can have known, since the contio was a highly public event, that the tribunus plebis G. Baebius had silenced Jugurtha as the latter opened his mouth. That fact allows at least one other interpretation than Sallust's: Jugurtha attempted to speak in his own defense, but was hushed. On the face of it, being silenced in public scarcely approximates to a pleasant affair - surely, if Jugurtha had been bribing tribunes, he might have gotten a little more for his money.

But let us continue. When Baebius forbids Jugurtha to speak, the latter as well as Calpurnius and others disturbed by Memmius' investigations breathe more easily (34,2). Then Jugurtha has a member of the Numidian royal house, who has been living for some time as an exile in Rome, assassinated when that member, Massiva, stakes his own claim to the throne.41 The authorities, howev- er, apprehend the assassin; the thread leads back to one of Jugurtha's party, Bomilcar; and a new scandal erupts (35,1-7). Considering the brevity of his work and his tightly compressed style, Sallust spends a surprising amount of time on this tawdry affair. On the surface he surely means us to see Jugurtha abusing his safe conduct by committing a murder under the very nose of the Roman people. His success at bribing everyone has encouraged him to believe that he can truly get away with anything. Still, by now we have seen enough of Sallust to suspect that he is quite possibly diverting our attention (perhaps from asking questions about the affair at the contio). At any rate, for 26 lines in the Teubner text we have a chance to be shocked at the Numidian King's effrontery and cold-bloodedness.

38 The safe passage appears in Livy, Periocha 64, and Florus, I 36,8. 39 Otherwise unknown: for a possible identification see Paul (n. 5) 105. 40 On contiones see now F. Pina Polo, Las contiones civiles y militares en Roma, Zaragoza

1989, esp. 71 and 126 with reference to our example (nr. 202 in Pina Polo's catalogue). 41 The assassination appears in Livy, Periocha 64, and Florus, I 36,8.

420 VICTOR L. PARKER

Thereafter the pace of the narrative picks up and in just nine brief lines (35,8-9) we learn the following: this time the outrage reaches such a pitch, that Jugurtha cannot bribe his way free. So he sends Bomilcar back to Numidia in secret, and leaves himself a few days later when the Senate demands his departure.42 Then (35,10) on the return journey from Rome the Numidian King pauses several times to look back at Rome in silence. Finally he renders his verdict: urbem uenalem et mature perituram, si emptorem inuenerit.43

It is amazing how commentators have failed to understand how totally inapt this sentence is at this point.44 First, Jugurtha has just been ejected from Rome by the Senate; second, he has failed to get his way through bribery in the affair concerning Bomilcar; third, he has aroused an enormous amount of hatred against himself; fourth, the war against him continues. We could add that he has been officially and publicly silenced by a tribune into the bargain. Whom has Jugurtha bought? What has he gotten for his money? What has happened to make him think that the city is for sale? The famous saying makes no sense at all in its immediate context (Jugurtha's trip to Rome) if we look closely at Sallust's arrangement of events.

It may, however, be held to work in the broader context of the first 35 chapters in which on five separate occasions Sallust has shown us how Jugurtha got his way by bribery (15-16 [bis], 29-30 [bis], 33). By the final scene we are meant to be so used to Jugurtha's buying senators and stacking them like cordwood that we will probably concentrate on the lovingly detailed political assassination rather than on the perfunctory and quick sentences which inform us that Jugurtha's bribes did not work this time. Besides, the five previous occasions are ringing in our ears as it is. Only, if we look closely at those five occasions, we can see that on two of them Sallust can be shown to have falsified events to prove his point45; on three others, as we have seen, events can plausibly be reconstructed so that they give the lie to Sallust's views.46 This

42 Appian, Numidica, 1, also refers to Bomilcar's and Jugurtha's subsequent departure from

Rome. 43 This statement appears either in identical or in only slightly altered form in the Periocha,

64; Florus, I 36,18; Orosius, V 15,5; and Appian, Numidica, 1. It evidently rapidly

became part of the tradition of the war against Jugurtha, and may well be due to Sallust.

44 Paul (n. 5) 108 has this to say: "The famous taunt, accepted as genuine by other ancient

writers ..., is pointless if no bribery had occurred at Rome" with reference to the

arguments of Steidle (n. 12) for the historicity of Jugurtha's large-scale bribery (Paul's

reference to Steidle is not in order, by the way - he means pp. 47-51, not 51-54 which

have nothing to do with the bribery). Koestermann (n. 1) 150: "Der Abschied Jugurthas

von Rom, das er nur als dem Tode geweihter Gefangener wiedersehen sollte, ist von

Sallust mit bewundemswerter Kunst zu einem Bilde von mitreilender Gewalt gestaltet

worden." 45 5-16 (bis): see above, section 1.

46 29-30 (bis): see above, section Il; 33: see above, section III.

Romae omnia uenalia esse 421

being so, Sallust's cleverly argued thesis concerning the urbs uenalis comes apart completely.47 Above all, we must acknowledge that Sallust is arguing a thesis cum ira et studio.

V. Conclusion

Throughout this section we have seen, however, that certain events are clearly historical in that Sallust expends a great deal of effort in minimising their importance or in re-interpreting them or in explaining them away so that his thesis may stand.48 In brief:

47 It will not do to make, as Steidle (n. 12) 47-51, does, a circumstantial case that some Roman officers and senators may have accepted "bribes" or "gifts" from Jugurtha. (For Roman politicians' habit of accepting gifts from client states see Badian [n. 36] 161-163; Florus, I 36,3, for what it is worth, does refer to Numidia as a "Kingdom in the faith and clientage of the Senate and People of Rome.") The Numidian King almost certainly sought to gain support for his cause at Rome (as all clients who made gifts surely did; and this alone may account for the topos of Jugurtha's bribery in the so-called "Livian" tradition [see nn. 33 and 43]), but the hard fact is, as we have seen, that by and large Jugurtha repeatedly failed (on Sallust's presentation of actual events) to get his way. It is one thing for a Roman senator to accept a "gift," quite another to be corrupted by it. Nor can one argue (as does Steidle, loc. cit.) on the basis that some of the Roman commanders were tried (and convicted) of acting against the public interest (allegedly because of bribes) under the lex Mamilia (Cicero, Brutus, 128, confirming Sallust, 40) - the history of the Republic does not evince any lack of politically motivated prosecutions and convic- tions. Hostility owing to perhaps only perceived mismanagement of the war will account for both prosecution and convictions as easily as actual guilt. Nor need we have recourse to e.g. the apologetic argument advanced by Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic, Oxford 1968, 25, that "what Sallust describes as venality was, in the main, merely the natural unwillingness to think ill of an old friend ... we may call this gullibility; it is at least a vice common to oligarchies ... - and one due to what is basically an amiable human trait." As we have seen, the Senate can hardly be seen to be favouring Jugurtha at any point and rather frequently renders judgements unfavourable to him.

48 Here, at the end of this essay, a word may be said about why Sallust could not just pass over these events. Various authors (now mostly lost) had written about this period, some of whom had been principals in the affair. M. Aemilius Scaurus (H[istoricoruml Rlomanorum] R[eliquiae] 1, 185-186), P. Rutilius Rufus (HRR 1, 187-190), and L. Cornelius Sulla (HRR 1, 195-204) all composed memoirs. At least three other Roman writers had covered the period: Sempronius Asellio (HRR 1, 178-184), Q. Claudius Quadrigarius (HRR 1, 205-236), and Valerius Antias (HRR 1, 237-276). The Greek continuator of Polybius, Poseidonius of Apamea, FGrHist 87, had also dealt with the events involved. Sallust had to reckon with senatorial readers (cf. von Fritz [n. 21 188) who knew of these works (especially those of fellow senators) and could, in case of doubt, check. See further below note 50.

422 VICTOR L. PARKER

1.) when Rome intervened in the civil war between Jugurtha and Adherbal, it favoured Adherbal in its division of Numidia (carried out by ten commis- sioners sent to this end);

2.) when civil war again broke out and Jugurtha trapped Adherbal in Cirta, the Senate sent at least two embassies to Numidia, the last headed by the princeps senatus, M. Aemilius Scaurus;

3.) after the embassy returned to Rome, the Senate arranged for Numidia to be one of the provincial commands for the incoming consuls and prepared for war in Numidia;

4.) a Roman army arrived in Numidia under the command of L. Calpurnius Bestia with M. Aemilius Scaurus as a legate;

5.) Jugurtha went to Rome under a safe passage, but was not allowed to speak at a contio where various accusations were being made;

6.) Jugurtha left Rome and the war resumed.

Anyone writing the prehistory of the Jugurthine War on the basis of these facts would produce an account very different from Sallust's. Instead of a senate which favours Jugurtha, we now see a senate which continually opposes and frustrates his intentions: it intervenes in a civil war (which it might very well have stayed out of49) to his detriment just when he has managed to unite Numidia under his control; when he has again united Numidia, Rome interferes again and sends an army against him; he attempts to negotiate a settlement, but fails; and the war continues. We cannot here and now follow other strands of this investigation - e.g. on what practical considerations and on what legal or ethical basis Rome wished to intervene in Numidia and what this means for our views on Roman Imperialism. We have merely attempted to see how Sallust arranged his arguments50 and to distil from this what facts we could. We trust

49 As we have seen (n. 5) Micipsa too brought the originally divided government of the

Kingdom again under one man's hand - yet Rome did not intervene. The Numidians had

loyally supported Rome's endeavours for a long time (see above n. 5), so Rome might just

have let Jugurtha be for the nonce until it knew him by his deeds - or did it feel it already

knew his deeds well enough?

50 It should be clear that I disagree completely with von Fritz (n. 2) 189, n. 72, who claims

(following an oral communication from E. Kapp), "daB bei einem Politiker wie Sallust die

Auslegung und Anordnung der Fakten in solcher Weise, daB der von ihm gewunschte

Eindruck erzielt werde, wahrscheinlich zum grofen Teil unbewuBt vor sich gehe." In

particular the investigations of literary scholars such as Koestermann, Vretska, or Karl

BUchner, Der Aufbau von Sallusts Bellum Jugurthinum = Historia Einzelschriften 9,

Wiesbaden 1953, have made very clear how carefully Sallust structured his work and how

little of anything in it is due to chance. One thing Steidle has seen very clearly (p. 53):

"Die modeme Forschung neigt gerade bei der Vorgeschichte des jug. Kriegs dazu, das

meiste Sallust zuzuschreiben, obwohl es doch aus der Tacitusforschung langst bekannt

ist, daB die wesentlichen Fakten bereits in der vortaciteischen Tradition feststehen und

daB dessen Leistung so gut wie ganz in der besonderen Art der Gestaltung und gedankli-

Romae omnia uenalia esse 423

that these facts will help us to construct a securer basis for the presentation of Roman-Numidian relations in the years leading up to the outbreak of the Jugurthine War.

University of Heidelberg - University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand Victor L. Parker

chen Durchdringung des Stoffes liegt." Although Steidle does not take his own point, this summarises the situation of the Bellum lugurthinum exactly; in my view recognising this allows us to extract some of the "wesentliche Fakten."