Pak's Security Concerns and Options

8/13/2019 Pak's Security Concerns and Options

1/39

1RESTRICTED

PAKISTANS SECURITY CONCERNS AND OPTIONS

Introduction

1. The end of the Cold War and post 9/11 Scenario brought significant

changes in the overall poer structure of the orld. The rise of the !nited

States as the pre"e#inent poer$ the e#ergence of ne econo#ic poer

centres and overhel#ing significance of technolog% have deepl% influenced

the securit% environ#ent around the orld. Co#parative relegation of

geopolitical considerations and pro#inence of econo#ic interests in

international relations have considerabl% changed the geopolitical i#portance

of various &e% pla%ers in the orld.

'. In toda%(s global scenario$ )a&istan stands at the crossroads ith regard

to its future course of action in the face of changing geopolitical environ#ent of

the orld. )a&istan(s elusive *uest for securit% has e+perienced ne turbulence

in the post 9/11 Scenario. While the countr%(s traditional securit% dile##a vis","

vis its hostile neighbour$ India$ has been so#ehat attenuated b% )a&istan(s

ac*uisition of a nuclear deterrence$ ne areas of insecurit% b% a confluence of

negative do#estic$ regional and international trends have e#erged. These

develop#ents have tended to #udd% the national securit% aters #a&ing)a&istan(s securit% options #ore co#ple+.

Aim

-. To highlight )a&istan(s securit% concerns in the changing geo"strategic

environ#ent and suggest viable response options.

Scheme of Presentation

. The subect ill be covered in the folloing se*uence0"

a. )art I

12 The Concept of Securit%.

'2 Ele#ents of 3ational Securit%.

-2 4eo")olitical I#portance of )a&istan.

RESTRICTED


2/39

'RESTRICTED

b. )art II

12 )a&istan(s Securit% Concerns.

'2 4lobal and Regional 5actors in )a&istan(s Securit%

Environ#ent.

c. )art III Internal D%na#ics of )a&istan.

d. )art I6 Conclusions and Reco##endations.

RESTRICTED


3/39

-RESTRICTED

PART I

The Concept of Securit

7. Securit% has ala%s been a #ulti"di#ensional concept and is

s%non%#ous ith #ilitar% and defence concerns vis","vis political$ econo#ic

and ideological ra#ifications. The ter# securit% is ala%s relative$ conte+tual

and situational. Interestingl% enough$ the securit% of one nation tends to

generate the feelings of insecurit% a#ong others. 8 nu#ber of pro#inent

riters have tried to define securit% and a#ong the# ohn 4arnett concludes$

:securit% #eans freedo# fro# insecurit%;1. 8ccording to Walter

8h#ed Toor in The Citadel 3o. 1/99.- Ibid '. !S )olicies and Their I#plications for South 8sia b% Dr @aleeha


4/39

RESTRICTED

E!ements of Nationa! Securti

. The identification of the various ele#ents of 3ational )oer is a co#ple+

tas& as it is i#portant to consider all the aspects of poer and place the# in

their proper relative and situational conte+ts. Bnl% then can e begin to anser

the *uestion of ho is poerful and ho is not. To help ith that process our

ne+t step ould be to identif% so#e of the i#portant ele#ents of national

securit% hich affect )a&istan in the present global environ#ents70"

a. 3atural Resources.

b. )opulation.

c. 3ational 4eograph%.

d. @ilitar% Strength.

e. 3uclear capabilit%.

f. @edia and Infor#ation Tech IT2.

"eo#Po!itica! Imp of Pa$istan

9. )a&istan(s geographical location at the crossroads of histor% has

ala%s been stri&ing and attractive. Its geo"political i#portance lies in the

folloing facts 0"

a. "ate%a to South Asia and South &est Asia. The geo"

political i#portance of )a&istan is lin&ed ith trade$ geopolitical

configuration and #ineral ealth of the surrounding states.

5or#er secretar% of state of the !nited States$ 4eorge Schult>$

saidF :)a&istan occupies$ strategicall%$ one of the #ost

i#portant areas in the orld and its position in South 8sia is

re#ar&able for the securit% of free orld and apan ?;.

b. Access to the Persian "u!f. )a&istan(s close pro+i#it% to

the 4ulf and the straits of Gor#u> has a lot of attraction for the

West as )a&istan(s @a&ran Coast overloo&s the e+tre#el%

strategic and politicall% volatile gatea% to the 4ulf Region.

7 International )olitics on the World Stage =% ohn T. Rou&e? 5ra&el 6oseph$ International Relations$ 5orard !niversit% )ress$ 19?9

RESTRICTED


5/39

7RESTRICTED

c. The Indian Ocean and the Ara'ian Sea. The Indian

Bcean provides the Sea


6/39

?RESTRICTED

PART II

"(O)A( AND RE"IONA( *ACTORS IN PAKISTANS SECURITY

EN+IRON,ENT

Pa$istans Securit En-ironment

1. )a&istan(s Securit% concerns in the '1stcentur% are li&el% to be #ulti"

directional. )a&istan has been in constant struggle ith its li#ited available

#eans to cater both for its defence re*uire#ents and for its econo#ic

develop#ent needs. Gence$ the urge for oining various pacts and aligningher foreign polic%$ thereb% ensure a viable securit% environ#ent for )a&istan.

The changes in Iran and 8fghanistan$ groing tensions ith India$ and the

rise of the unipolar orld have radicall% changed )a&istan(s securit% scenario.

The collapse of the Soviet !nion and )ost 9/11 scenario has brought about

nu#erous changes at the global levelF it also transfor#ed the regional politics.

)a&istan no longer eno%s the status of a frontline state$ as it apparentl% no

longer serves an% vital interest in the region. Goever 8#erica still see#s

interested in #aintaining a li#ited strategic connection on issues li&e nuclear

non"proliferation$ drug traffic&ing$ terroris# and hu#an rights etc.

11. et another threat to )a&istan(s securit% co#es fro# ithin$ hich

poses grave challenges both to the countr%(s stabilit% and integrit%. )a&istan

toda% presents the i#age of a countr% pulverised b% political$ ethnic and

sectarian division$ threatened b% econo#ic collapse and e#aciated b% #oral

corrosion.

The "!o'a! *actors in Pa$istans Securit En-ironment

1'. To ascertain the effects of international political s%ste# on )a&istan(s

Securit%$ it is #andator% to understand the &e% pla%ers in this s%ste# 0"

Ibid 7.

RESTRICTED


7/39

RESTRICTED

a. Supranationa! Actors. The% have individual countries as

#e#bers and authorit% of the organi>ation transcends that of its

individual #e#bers. These include the !3$ regional

organisations and alliances and various regi#es. Go these

supranational actors affect )a&istan is discussed belo 0"

12 The UN. In the past e have seen the !3 polic% has

been do#inated b% the !S$ ho used it as far as

possible for furthering 8#erican polic% obectives. This

has been a#pl% de#onstrated in the 4ulf War $ Cold War

afghan ar and Ira* ar. The inabilit% of the !3 Securit%

Council to get its Resolution on Hash#ir i#ple#ented is

another e+a#ple of it being a toothless bod%.

'2 Re.iona! A!!iances. Defence associations that stress

#ilitar% cooperation for# a serious threat to )a&istan(s

securit%. The Russo"Indian defence pact ould further tilt

the balance in favour of India. The Indo"Israeli defence

cooperation and the recent atte#pts b% India and Iran to

oin the Shanghai 5ive ould also increase their regional

clout and lead to diplo#atic isolation of )a&istan.

-2 CT)T and *,CT Re.imes. The !S and the West have

#ade the resu#ption of bilateral or #ultilateral lending

contingent on a nu#ber of non"proliferation conditions.

These include de#onstrated )a&istani support for

negotiations on 5@CT and a co##it#ent to sign the

CT=T. It is our econo#ic vulnerabilit% that the 8#ericans

see& to e+ploit on this account.

2 Re.iona! Or.ani/ations. 8 variet% of #ulti purpose

regional organi>ations e+ist toda% e.g. ECB$ 8SE83$

S88RC and the European !nion. S88RC and 8SE83

have failed to achieve their obectives and bring a #aor

RESTRICTED


8/39

RESTRICTED

change in the Region. India probabl% thought of S88RC as

an opportune platfor# to do#inate the proceedings and

behave li&e a big brother in the region. Ger drea# has not

co#e true because of the refusal b% )a&istan to accept her

hege#onic role. The European !nion assu#es i#portance

in trade and develop#ental assistance and in see&ing

resolution of the Hash#ir dispute. The E! being a #aor

i#porter of )a&istani cotton could seriousl% eopardi>e our

econo#% b% evo&ing anti du#ping las against )a&istani

e+ports.

b. Transnationa! Actors. These include organisations that are

organised for specified functions and operate across

international boundaries ithout being bound to the vies or

interests of an individual state. These enco#pass the I4Bs

Intergovern#ental Brgani>ations2 and the 34Bs 3on"

4overn#ental Brgani>ations2. The I4Bs Intergovern#ental

Brgani>ations2 include International @onetar% 5und I@52$

International 8to#ic Energ% 8genc% I8E82 and International

Cri#inal )olice Brgani>ation I3TER)B


9/39

9RESTRICTED

propping up their so#eti#es"sha&% regi#es than

pro#oting long ter# social and econo#ic develop#ent.

Slo groth rate$ ra#pant une#plo%#ent$ higher

inflation and e+tre#el% lo foreign e+change reserves

are so#e of the #aor discouraging factors. 8ll these

have brought us to the verge of financial ban&ruptc% and

being declared as a defaulter state. In these critical

conditions e do not have sufficient funds to #eet our

securit%/develop#ent needs and hence further

dependence on I@5 and World =an&.

'2 ,u!ti#Nationa! Corporations. In the changing global

econo#%$ ea& econo#ies li&e )a&istan have to adust to

the orld econo#ic environ#ent on conditions set b%

global institutions. 3ational fir#s have lost their place to

#ultinationals and national ban&ing s%ste#s have beco#e

subordinate to #ultinational finance houses operating in

global financial #ar&ets.

The Re.iona! *actors in Pa$istans Securit En-ironment

1-. Re.iona! En-ironment. )a&istan has seldo# eno%ed a #ore

co#ple+ securit% environ#ent. Toda% she finds herself located in a region

intensel% sensitive and volatile. 8fghan i#broglio$ Iranian Revolution ith its

after effects has destabilised estern borders$ hich previousl% use to be

considered as depth fro# an% threat fro# east. China in north is herself

e#broiled in ar of econo#% and poer ith !S8. The s#aller countries li&e

3epal$ =hutan$ etc are either land loc&ed or so ea& #ilitaril% that the% have

settled don as satellite states to India. IndiaJs hege#onic design of beco#ing

a regional super poer and global #ini super poer has posed a continuous

threat to )a&istanJs securit% in the east. This geographic location puts

)a&istan ith to #aor Regional super poer i.e. China and India$ hich can

be ter#ed as an earthenare pot s*uee>ed a#ong iron pots.

RESTRICTED


10/39

1RESTRICTED

1. Pecu!iarities and Sa!ient *eatures of the Re.ion .. This Region is

uni*ue ith three hostile nuclear poers sharing borders$ thus creates

repercussions of an% #ilitar% or diplo#atic develop#ent"ta&ing place in either of

diplo#atic develop#ent ta&ing place in either of the countries. China being

engaged ith !S in global poer politics has left the region to so#e e+tent for

India to pla% a do#inant role. India hich clai#s to be the largest de#ocrac% in

the orld has e+hibited orst t%pe of genocide of #inorities$ aggression against

neighbours and her on highest rate of population living belo the povert% line.

Due to her ever conflicting interest ith )a&istan$ she favours to have

govern#ents of her choice in the neighbouring countries for hich heav%

a#ount is spent in a bid to isolate )a&istan. IndiaJs interference in =hutan$

=angladesh$ Sri


11/39

11RESTRICTED

establish its hege#on% over the subcontinent ste#s various securit% threats to

)a&istan. To identif% the Indian threat an obective stud% of India as a hole is

re*uired to be carried out.

a. Contemporar Indian Doctrines

12 Chani$a Doctrine. Chani&i%a as )ri#e @inister

of Chandar 4upt @uria$ an ancient great Indian ruler =C. In

his boo& J8arth ShastraJ )rinciples of 4overnance2 laid

don folloing guideline for the governance0"

a2 When %our countr% is ea&$ pursue the polic% of the

peace.

b2 When %our countr% beco#es #ilitaril% strong$ follo

the polic% of ar.

c2 When another state see&s %our help$ appl% double

standards.

d2 Ge further reco##ends si+ principles as the basis

for foreign polic%0"

i. )eace should be established ith the other

states through agree#ents.

ii. War should be persuaded through relentless

attac&s on the ene#%.

iii. 3eutralit% #eans co#placence and

indifference.

iv. The poer of the state$ should be enhanced

b% e+panding #ilitar% preparedness.

v. Bther states should be lured and forced into

for#ation of alliance or friendship to see&

co##on shelter and securit%.

vi. Dual polic% #eans to #a&e peace

friendship2 ith one and en#it% ith the

other.

RESTRICTED


12/39

1'RESTRICTED

e2 Indian diplo#atic doctrine is based on the principles

laid b% the Chan&i%a centuries ago$ of hich deceit$

coercion$ and treacher% are the #ain pillars around

hich entire diplo#atic policies revolve. The clear

#anifestation of Chani&%a doctrine can be seen in

the region b% anal%sing Indian diplo#atic efforts

launched to stabilise L pro#ote relations ith China$

Iran and C8Rs$ thus isolating )a&istan. The change

of posture in relations of Indo" China clearl% shos

shift in Indian polic% fro# hostilit% to friendship as

China is an e#erging super poer. The second

application in the region can be seen in Indo"Iran

relations in the bac& drop of deteriorating )a&"Iran

alliance. @ore over India(s diplo#atic efforts to

establish friendl% relations ith C8Rs$ Tur&e% and

other South Eastern countries also ai#s at isolating

)a&istan in the over all fra#e or& of her foreign

polic% in consonance ith Chani&%a )rinciples of

4overnance.

'2 ,onroe doctrine. It is #odern #anifestation of

Chani&%a doctrine. It ai#s at de"stabili>ing the

neighbouring countries throing all international codes of

#oralit% over board. In India has displa%ed its blatant sho

of force dealing ith its s#aller neighbours. The

anne+ation of s#all Gi#ala%an state of Si&&i# in s is an

e+a#ple to be *uoted. The outbrea& of ethnic violence in

Sri


13/39

1-RESTRICTED

organising centrifugal forces$ ethnic$ racial and sectarian

violence to &eep )a&istan internall% destabilised.

-2 Indra doctrine. In 19s$ India unofficiall% enunciated

the Indra doctrine envisaging the establish#ent of an Indo"

centric poer structure in the region. Interestingl% at about

the sa#e ti#e S88RC as for#ed ith the avoed ai# of

upholding the e*ualit% of the states in the region. In loud

and clear ter#s$ it professed to offer an alternative #odel

for South 8sia. While e+plaining the Indra Doctrine$

=ahbani Sen 4upta stated publicl% that India ill not

tolerate an e+ternal intervention in an% conflict situation in

an% South 8sian countr% if the intervention has an% i#plicit

or e+plicit anti"India bias. It clearl% dictates Indian role in

the region as a police#an.

2 "u0ra! doctrine. 5or#er Indian )ri#e @inster @r I.H

4ural ho is considered an intellectual thin& tan& and

earned fa#e for his #oderate policies for#ulated another

doctrine far India to pla% its role in regional and global

poer politics. Doctrine entails trac& ' policies that enable

India to portra% herself as neutral and non"violent peace

loving countr%. This doctrine encouraged bilateral tal&s

ithout definite results offering India sufficient ti#e to pave

a% for diplo#atic and #ilitar% offensive$ hereas other

countr% is involved in trade and co##erce as ell as

#utual e+change of cultural troupe/delegations. 8t the

sa#e ti#e$ ournalists and intellectuals of other countries

are subected to the non"violent ca#paign of the #edia

and influence the# b% the e+change of delegations at non"

govern#ental level. This doctrine has affected the

intellectuals on either side of the border$ advocating sub

continent as one entit% having sa#e histor%$ culture and

RESTRICTED


14/39

1RESTRICTED

routes. This clearl% defies to nation(s theor% on hich

)a&istan(s e+istence is based.

b. Nuc!earisation of India and Its Effects. India(s inventor%

of nuclear facilities is i#pressive a#ongst the unrecognised

nuclear states. It is one of the #ost advanced a#ong developing

countries other than China. =readth and depth of its nuclear

progra##e$ sophistication of technolog%$ research and poer

reactors and re"processing plants #a&es India a leading nuclear

state. India has a ell"developed infrastructure for producing

large *uantities of unsafe guarded eapon grade plutoniu# and

enriched uraniu#. Its nuclear infrastructure co#prises the largest

unsafe guarded group of nuclear facilities outside the five nuclear

poer states. 8long ith this nuclear capabilit%$ India is also

concentrating on develop#ent of nuclear eapon deliver% #eans$

hich are not onl% her neighbour specific but are capable of

engaging continental targets. This capabilit% ill grant India a

do#inant role not specific to )a&istan but in the region including

Iran$ @iddle East$ China and 5ar Eastern countries.

c. ,i!itar Stren.th and Comparison %ith Pa$istan. India is

holding fourth largest standing 8r#% in the World. The close

alliance ith the ersthile Soviet !nion during the cold ar era

enabled India to build up a for#idable #ilitar% arsenal as ell its

indigenous defence capabilities. The conventional #ilitar% force

along ith its nuclear and #issile capabilities puts India in a

position to e+tend its poers and influence ell be%ond South

8sia. 8fter influencing all other neighbouring countries India

considers )a&istan her onl% i#pedi#ent in acco#plish#ent of her

hege#onic design$ thus brining the focus of her conventional

forces toards )a&istan.

d. India1s ,oti-es and Attitude. Indian intelligencia and polic%

#a&ers identif% )a&istan as a hurdle in her desire to beco#e

RESTRICTED


15/39

17RESTRICTED

Regional Super )oer and pla% Kbig brotherK role in the Region.

This fact has forced Indian polic% #a&ers to target )a&istan for

isolating her internationall%. This ai# is being achieved through

various #eans including @edia ca#paigns$ diplo#atic efforts$

propaganda arfare$ and


16/39

1?RESTRICTED

-2 Depriving )a&istan fro# South East 8sian #ar&ets and

creating an econo#ic stagnation in )a&istan.

2 )ropagating )a&istan as an Isla#ic funda#entalist countr%

thus restricting foreign invest#ent$ especiall% fro# West

and !.S.

f. *ai!ure of SAARC. S88RC as founded ith an ai# to pro#ote

trade$ social and cultural relations a#ong the South 8sian states.

Indian desire to influence the region has di#inished the role of the

S88RC thereb% reducing its role to a cere#onial annual #eeting

beteen the heads of the states ith little or no results. The

basic reason of its failure is IndiaJs Indo"centric attitude$ hich

has spread hopelessness a#ong the other #e#ber countries.

g. (o% Intensit Conf!ict 2(IC3. India is using


17/39

1RESTRICTED

accession of states to one or the other of the ne Do#inion as

left to the discretion of the ruler. Goever$ the discretion of the

ruler as subected to the Kgeographic situation and co##unal

interests$K hile deciding accession b% the rulers of these states.

The accession of Hash#ir to )a&istan as logical and legiti#ate

in &eeping ith the logic behind the partition of Indian

Subcontinent into @usli# and non"@usli# portions vis","vis

de#ographic structure and her contiguousness to )a&istan on

three sides.

b. Importance for Pa$istan. The i#portance of Hash#ir for

)a&istan can be ell understood b% having a loo& at the #ap.

Three out of si+ rivers that run through )a&istan originate fro#

Hash#ir na#el% Rivers Indus$ helu# and Chenab.

Econo#icall%$ the aters of these rivers are vital to the

agricultural life of )a&istan. Hash#ir assu#es added i#portance

for )a&istan fro# #ilitar% point of vie. Without Hash#ir$ Sil&

route to China ill be greatl% endangered. There ill be no

ground lin& ith China. The ground defence of )a&istan ill be

endangered$ if the rivers and canals are dried up. Bing to

these reasons the )ri#e @inister of )a&istan described the

strategic value of Hash#ir to )a&istan in folloing ords in 1971.

KHash#ir is ver% i#portant$ is vital to )a&istanF to India it is hat

%ou #ight call a lu+ur%$ ith us it is a vital necessit% for our

survival;.

c. Importance for India. 8s per the IndianJs clai#s$ there are

historical and cultural ties of the state ith India of hich it has all

through the ages been an integral part. @r 4opal$ a Gindu riter

e+plains the strategic i#portance of Hash#ir to India in folloing

ords in his article$ KConsideration of defence K published in an

Indian periodical KCaravanK in 5ebruar% 197. KIndia ithout

Hash#ir could cease to occup% a pivotal position on the political

RESTRICTED


18/39

1RESTRICTED

#ap of Central 8sia. Strategicall%$ Hash#ir is vital to the

securit%F it has been so ever since the dan of histor%. Its

northern provinces give direct gatea% to the 3orth West province

of )a&istan and 3orthern )unab. It is IndiaJs onl% indo to the

Central 8sian Republics of !SSR in the north$ China on the east

and to 8fghanistan on the WestK. If criticall% anal%sed$ the

presu#ed strategic i#portance of Hash#ir as per Indian

viepoint$ is #ore based on desire to have hege#on% in the

region rather than based on securit% co#pulsions$ as is the case

ith )a&istan.

d. Kashmir 4 A Threat to Re.iona! Securit. Resurgence of

freedo# #ove#ent in 199s$ has given ne di#ensions to

Hash#ir proble#. Hash#ir is the focal issue beteen India and

)a&istan. This issue has beco#e #ore sensitive since the

nuclari>ation of both the states because of hich orld

co##unit% also vies it ith concern and consider it as a nuclear

flash point in an% future ar in the region.

1. China *actor in Pa$istan1s Securit. )a&istanJs relations ith China

began to gro closer after the China )a&istanJs boundar% agree#ent of 19?-.

)a&istan Chinese friendship reached its >enith during the 19?7 Indo")a&istan

War$ then their relationship as so#ehat affected b% the acceptance of

Soviets #ediation role at the Tash&ent conference on Hash#ir issue in 19??

and 5ield @arshal 8%ub #oving closer to @osco for getting ar#s for )a&istan

during 19?"?. Despite their do#estic upheavals caused b% Cultural

Revolution$ China continued his econo#ic and #ilitaril% support to )a&istan

!nli&e the !S China has been an all eather friend of )a&istan. The Chinese

aid to )a&istan has been constant and consistent. )a&istan has been able to

counter Indian hege#on% in the region to a considerable e+tent on account of

her close and cordial relationship ith China and the support that both of the#

have been lending to each other in international foru#s. @ain thrust of China

for ne+t decade is its econo#ic groth and industriali>ation. Chinese leaders

RESTRICTED


19/39

19RESTRICTED

are prag#atic and ould not confront !.S.8. before the% are full% developed.

)a&istan and China continue to have identit% of vies on issues pertaining to

the region. Sign of Russian i#prove#ent in relation ith China can be ta&en as

positive develop#ent to help neutrali>e the Russian hostilit% toard )a&istan.

I#prove#ent in Sino"Indian relations has ruled out the possibilit% of a #ilitar%

conflict beteen the to. Goever$ in the future Indo" )a& conflict$ China can

be e+pected to provide diplo#atic and #aterial support to us$ but ill not ris&

direct confrontation ith India.

1. Af.hanistan Situation and Re.iona! Interests

a. Iranian Interest. Iranian apprehensions originate fro# the fear

of contain#ent b% !S8$ )a&istan and Saudi 8rabia ith Taliban

ruled 8fghanistan$ therefore$ Iran is *uite sensitive to govern#ent

ith different religious ideologies that clashed during the battle for

@a>ar"e"Sharif. Iran is no supporting anti Taliban alliance

created ith active Russian support. It has provided sanctuaries

to pro Iran leaders and is also helping the# raise forces for

operations against Taliban in Western 8fghanistan.

b. Centra! Asian Repup!ics 2CARs3 Apprehensions. Declaration

of independence b% the si+ predo#inantl% @usli# Republics has

created a ne geo"political factor in the region. Econo#icall%

the% are still under the effective influence of Russia and the% still

depend on Russia for regional securit%$ therefore$ an% securit%

irritant to Russia ill have direct bearing on these states too.

C8Rs still have either secular or co##unis# as their socio"

political s%ste#$ hich #a&e the# sensitive to the 8fghan

situation ith Taliban govern#ent and possible spill over in the

shape of an% Isla#ic resurgence #ove#ent ithin these states.

c. Russian Interest. Russian interests can be su##arised as

follos0"

12 To prevent for#ation of an Isla#ic state in 8fghanistan.

RESTRICTED


20/39

'RESTRICTED

'2 5avours an unstable 8fghanistan to prevent C8Rs to have

transit facilities through 8rabian Sea$ hich ill have

serious repercussions on Russian econo#%.

'2 !se 8fghanistan case as an e+cuse for its presence in

Chechn%a and Tai&istan to #ould orld opinion in her

favour as a state"fighting funda#entalis#.

d. Indian In-o!-ement. 8n%thing that favours )a&istan beco#es

an issue for India. India ants 8fghanistan either divided or ith

a govern#ent hostile to )a&istan due to strategic fle+ibilit%$ that

)a&istan achieves if her Western borders are secure. @aor

Indian interests in 8fghanistan issue can be su##arised as 0"

12 To &eep )a&istan access to C8Rs bloc&ed.

'2 @a&e Western borders hostile.

-2 Create gulf of differences beteen Iran and )a&istan.

e. The geo"strategic i#portance of 8fghanistan cannot be over

e#phasised. 3evertheless$ the continued strife a#ongst her

arring factions has serious econo#ic and securit% ra#ifications

for )a&istan. War torn 8fghanistan is favoured not onl% b% India$

but also b% Iran and Russia. !nstable 8fghanistan suits Russia

and Iran in the conte+t of their politico"econo#ic obectives in

C8Rs. Goever$ 8fghanistan in tur#oil poses no #ilitar% threat

to )a&istan. Goever$ for econo#ic and political reasons$ peace

and stabilit% in 8fghanistan are i#portant to the securit% and

econo#ic interests of )a&istan.

19. Iran. Ever since the Iranian revolution of 199$ the !S and its Western

allies have tried to isolate Iran in an effort to li#it and contain the spread of its

influence. Conse*uentl%$ to brea&out of its diplo#atic isolation$ Iran

endeavoured to develop close econo#ic relations ith India$ and politico"

#ilitar% relations ith Russia. Its co"operation ith India for the develop#ent of

the port of Chah =ahar should also be seen in the sa#e conte+t. Bnce

considered a strategic depth or relief >one for )a&istan$ Iran has been issuing

RESTRICTED


21/39

'1RESTRICTED

threatening political state#ents and #oving closer to India. 8ctive diplo#ac%

in re*uired to restore cordial relations beteen )a&istan and Iran.

a. Ta!i'an *actor. The #ost serious clash of interests beteen

)a&istan and Iran has e#erged over the 8fghanistan issue. This$

coupled ith sectarian polarisation in )a&istan has caused an

environ#ent of deep #istrust beteen the to countries. It has

concerns about e+tre#ist Sunni religious groups in )a&istan and

8fghanistan and is deepl% interested in the securit% of Shia

#inorities in both the countries. Iran is no supporting anti"

Taliban alliance created a#id active Russian support. It has

provided sanctuaries to pro"Iran leaders and is also helping the#

to raise forces for operations against Taliban in estern

8fghanistan. )a&"Iran friendship has ala%s been e+e#plar%$

hoever$ the gulf beteen good relations is beco#ing clearl%

visible ith the increasing econo#ic and #ilitar% corporation

beteen Iran and India. Iranian leadership does not thin& of

e+porting revolution an%#ore and favours e+pansion of ties ith

the West. The% have displa%ed profound prag#atis# to end their

international isolation. With the ne approach of the leadership

and potential econo#ic #ight$ Iran is li&el% to retain its pivotal

position in the regional conte+t.

b. Di-er.ent *orei.n Po!icies. Iran underscores the need for

forestalling the influence of big poers in the region$ especiall%

the !.S. Bn other hand$ )a&istan$ nurtures continuing desire to

assist the !S pla%ing a greater role in the region. These divergent

vies #a% estrange Iran fro# )a&istan.

c. Iranian ,o-es On Dip!omatic *ront. It is abundantl% clear that

the close relationship beteen India and Iran ill certainl% go

against the interest of )a&istan as ell as the Hash#ir cause.

The tripartite agree#ent signed in 8pril 1997 a#ongst India$ Iran

and Turenistan for #utual trade is the final hu#iliation for

RESTRICTED


22/39

''RESTRICTED

)a&istan and the ECB. 8t the sa#e ti#e$ triangular relationship

beteen Iran$ India and China is developing hich ill influence

the strategic balance in the region. Bne the other hand$

i#prove#ent in relations ith !S8 ill further isolate )a&istan in

the region.

'. Centra! Asian Repu'!ics 2CARs3# An Emer.in. Economic Rea!it

a. Declaration of independence b% the si+ predo#inantl% @usli#

Republics has created a ne geopolitical factor in the region.

Econo#icall%$ C8Rs have ver% deep and e+tensive lin&age ith

Russia covering co##unication s%ste# and trade outlets.

8lthough all the states e+cept H%rg%>tan are rich in #ineral and

h%drocarbon resources$ their econo#ies are in tatters. C8Rs

depend upon Russia for regional securit% but increasingl% loo&

toards Europe and 8sia )acific region for capital and advanced

technological inputs.

b. )a&istan can e+ploit the prospects onl% hen a clear"cut polic%

approach is adopted in dealing ith the Central 8sia @usli#

republics. )a&istanJs #aor dile##a in her advance toards

Central 8sia is unstable 8fghanistan. The future of our geo"

strategic e+cess to Central 8sia depends on it. )eace in

8fghanistan is a pre"re*uisite for the options for )a&istan.

RESTRICTED


23/39

'-RESTRICTED

PART III

INTERNA( SECURITY DYNA,ICS

'1. Identification of Interna! Threats to the Securit of Pa$istan.

)a&istan(s national securit% i#peratives in the '1stcentur% are li&el% to be #ulti"

directional. In addition to the traditional threat fro# India that can be deter#ined

and *uantified M the #ain securit% concern ill be internal rather than e+ternal.

8s the sa%ing goes$ e are our orst ene#%. Consolidating national cohesion

and social fabric$ #anaging ethnic and sectarian tendencies$ spreading

#eaningful and *ualit% education and health care$ i#proving econo#ic

conditions$ and #ore i#portant than all$ defusing the population ti#e bo#b$ are

so#e of the securit% challenges of the '1stcentur%. 3o e shall discuss

each of the factors effecting the internal securit% d%na#ics of )a&istan.

''. Ethnic Conf!icts. Ethnic differences appear to be the #ost recent

threat to the alread% destabilised internal securit% situation of the countr%. Due

to one reason or the other$ #ost of the ethnic groups ho did not de#and a

separate identit% before have surfaced in the past couple of decades. There is

no den%ing the fact that )a&istan has been ho#e to #an% ethnic co##unities

since her inception$ but the% did e+ist peacefull%. The proble#s are recent and

the% are the result of continuous #is#anage#ent of the issues b% thegovern#ent. It ill be fair to sa% that despite other factors$ 4overn#ents at one

ti#e or the other are largel% responsible for the present situation. The ethnic

conflicts that have lost #o#entu# in the past but are still capable of reviving

are anal%sed in succeeding paragraphs.

a. )a!ochistan ,o-ement. This #ove#ent surfaced in #id

seventies$ and as suppressed successfull% b% the 8r#%. The

#aor causes that have developed over a period of ti#e as

enu#erated belo$ if not addressed b% the govern#ent has the

capacit% to revive the uprising and fuel the alread% e+isting ethnic

divide.

12 Reduced share in develop#ent proects.

'2


24/39


25/39

'7RESTRICTED

2 Serai$i Su'a ,o-ement. This ethnic group surfaced in

recent %ears and de#anded a separate province :Sarai&i

Suba;. 8bout 9.- percent Serai&i spea&ing population of

=ahaalpur$ @ultan$ Dera 4ha>i Hhan Division of )unab$

have a #i+ed )unabi and Sindhi culture. These people do

not have an% territorial identification li&e other ethnic

groups. So far the idea has failed to generate an% popular

de#and and is confined to intellectual Serai&i circles.

Goever$ the #ove#ent #a% at an% ti#e i#plicate the

national integration adversel%.

'-. Sectarianism.


26/39

'?RESTRICTED

of the Iranian Revolution as a #orale booster for the Shia %outh

in )a&istan.

b. Po!itica! *actors. The long periods of @artial ation gave rise to #ilitanc% in various

religious groups. Resultantl% sectarianis# gained #o#entu# and

assu#ed dangerous proportions.

c. Deeni ,adaris. Deeni @adaris are pla%ing a pivotal role in

fanning sectarianis# because the% are producing a large nu#ber

of students ith sect oriented educational bac&ground. These

#adaris indoctrinate students against a particular sect and have

assu#ed the role of nurser% for #ilitant ings of different religious

groups.

d. *orei.n *actor7 It is fair to assu#e that Indian 4overn#ent

through its intelligence agenc% Research and 8nal%sis Wing

R8W2 is penetrating the sectarian organisations. It is not a

surprise to us$ hoever$ hat concerns us the #ost are our

relations ith Iran and 8fghanistan. )olitical develop#ents in the

region in the past decade have caused differences ith these

4overn#ents. There are strong indications that so#e factions

fro# these countries are supporting certain sectarian groups in

)a&istan through R8W.

'. Po!itica! Insta'i!it7 The contours of internal threat revolve around

the role of de#ocratic institutions. Strong political institutions chec& ra#pant

corruption$ nepotis# reduce the do#inance of feudal fro# political parties and

prepare the #asses for participator% politics. !nfortunatel% de#ocraticinstitutions of )a&istan have not gained sufficient strength to counter the

internal securit% threats due to political instabilit%. So#e of the ea&nesses of

De#ocratic Institutions are0"

RESTRICTED


27/39

'RESTRICTED

a. *ramin. of Constitution. It too& #ore than three decades to

arrive at the constitution of 19-. The provincial and parochial

tussle is vivid in this regard.

b. ,i!itar Inter-entions. 5re*uent #ilitar% interventions have never

alloed the political institutions to flourish and produce the

desired results. It is also obvious that even civilianised #ilitar%

regi#es cannot genuinel% cater to arouse the aspirations of those

ho# the% govern because of the si#ple reason that e+pansion

of political participation i#perils their on future.

c. (eadership Crisis.


28/39

'RESTRICTED

'?. Economics7 The econo#ic situation of the countr% is

su##arised as 0"

a7 E8terna! De't. Since ul% 1971 volu#e of debt has shon

continued groth. The outstanding level of e+ternal debt as O

?.1 billion at the end of '1-$ although level as O -' =illion in

1999 . Share of grants and grant li&e assistance have steadil%

declined and substituted b% hard ter# loans repa%able in foreign

currenc% ithhigher interest rates and shorter grace periods. The

result of all this is a groing burden of debt servicing.

b. Domestic De't. 4overn#ent has heavil% relied on do#estic

borroing to finance its deficits. 5inancing deficits b% borroing

rather than b% ta+ing #eans have shifted the burden to the future

generations. =% 1999 do#estic debt as Rs 117.' billion. The

interest pa%#ent on do#estic debt is 17'.? billion$ hich is '9.?

percent of current e+penditure and --. percent of total revenue.

c. )ud.et Deficit7 )a&istan faces toda% a serious fiscal

i#balance. Debt servicing accounts for 7?.7 percent$ defence

'9.- percent and running of civil ad#inistration . percent. @ain

i#pedi#ents in reducing the deficit are the current e+penditures$

large debt servicing and li#ited revenue. To ite#s i.e. debt

servicing Rs '7.? billion2 and defence Rs 17 billion2 consu#e

Rs '.7 billion and leave onl% a #eagre a#ount of Rs 11.?

billion for develop#ent.

d. (oan Defau!ts. 5inancial institutions suffered because loans

ere offered due to political pressure ithout chec&ing the

credentials of borroer$ his capabilit% to refund and guarantees.

5eudal lords got the loans that had no e+perience of industr%$

resulting in bad loans or surrender of sic& units.

e. (o% (e-e! of In-estment7 )a&istan is investing onl% one fifth of

its 4D). In addition$ the invest#ent is less productive than the

rapidl% groing econo#ies of Southeast 8sia. 5oreign direct

RESTRICTED


29/39

'9RESTRICTED

invest#ent stood at O17. #illion during first - #onths of 199"

99 as against O99'.9 of si#ilar period in 199"9 due to

sanctions. 5oreign portfolio invest#ent as O. #illion as

opposed to O1'7. #illion for the sa#e period.

f. De-a!uation7 Devaluation of currenc% is ala%s unpopular in

)a&istan because it raises the price of foreign goods and puts

pressure on real consu#ption and invest#ent. Devaluation

should be done$ hen the countr% has a si>eable e+port surplus

or hen do#estic goods can co#pete in price and *ualit% as ell.

Bur econo#% has none of these essential tributes. Bur e+ports

are generall% li#ited to cotton and rice hich is fi+ed due to

*uotas and also restricted to certaincountries. Devaluation is not

the anser to increase e+ports.

g. Trade Deficit7

12 E8ports7 The e+port groth in )a&istan has been uneven.

E+port during 1999 stood at O.' billion. The foreign trade

deficit has re#ained high. Recentl%$ e+ports have

stagnated. Developed countries offset fast econo#ic

groth of developing countries b% appl%ing non"tariff

barriers$ i#port substitution and involution of the WTB.

'2 Imports7 The i#ports have e+ceeded e+ports$ enlarging

the gap and creating a trade deficit. Industr% depends on

foreign ra #aterials and capital goods. Due to rapid

depletion of crude oil$ the i#port of petroleu# products has

been groing O1.7' billion in 199"992. The recent #ove

to encourage canola and increase heat production and

issue of licences for e+plorations of oilare the steps in the

right direction7

h. Ta8ation7 )a&istan could not #obilise ta+ and other revenue

resources to cover its e+penditure. Ta+ revenues proected in

budget '1'"'1- are Rs --.1 billion. Ideall% the share of

RESTRICTED


30/39

-RESTRICTED

direct ta+es should be #ore than indirect ta+es. In 1997"9? share

of direct ta+es in ta+ of 4D) ratio as increased to -. percent as

co#pared to 1. percent of indirect ta+es. 8nnual rate has

shon a considerable decline in ta+pa%ers.

'. Education. Education is critical for econo#ic and social

develop#ent. Without education$ develop#ent can be neither broad based nor

sustained$ it also acts as a vital ingredient in building a nation. Education is also

a basic co#ponent of social cohesion and national identit%. Education in

)a&istan has suffered due to rapid population groth$ resource constraints$

internal inefficienc% of the s%ste#$ lo enrol#ent and high dropout$ lac& of

ade*uate political ill$ despite of the fact that spending on education has been

graduall% increasing in all develop#ent plans.

'. Popu!ation E8p!osion. The unplanned and uncontrolled groth of

population is an area of concern for us. Bur #eagre resources and

develop#ent capabilities cannot support the high rate of population groth.

Due to short fall in resources$ sense of deprivation has surfaced in the

populace.

PART I+

RESTRICTED


31/39

-1RESTRICTED

CONC(USIONS AND RECO,,ENDATIONS

Conc!usions'9. Econom. Wea& econo#ic base coupled ith lac& of farsightedness

of the successive govern#ents$ resulted in acceptance of strict conditions

i#posed b% I@5/ World =an& in order to avoid default$ thus causing econo#ic

tur#oil and internal unrest. Wea& econo#ics ill render )a&istan subservient to

international donors ith serious repercussions for its securit%.

-. Importance of "eo#Po!itics. In spite of the global shift fro# geo"

politics to geo"econo#ics$ geo"politics still re#ains #ore i#portant for )a&istan$

due to its peculiar securit% environ#ents.

-1. Indian Am'itions. !S recent inclination toards India even after her

nuclear e+plosion and her refusal to sign CT=T has long ter# interest in India

to counter China in the region. This shift in the !S polic% is a securit% concern

to )a&istan as it gives a go ahead signal to India to pursue her hege#onic

goals in the region and ratif% India(s polic% toards Hash#ir. IndiaPs ai# ould

be to reduce )a&istan politicall% and #ilitaril% into a subservient state. 5or this

purpose India is li&el% to propagate folloing 0"

a. The#e of funda#entalis# in )a&istan.

b. Sponsoring terroris# in the region and across entire globe.

c. Supporting Isla#ic resurgence #ove#ents in the orld.

RESTRICTED


32/39

-'RESTRICTED

-1. Af.han Issue. 8n unstable 8fghanistan favours India and Russia. If

a pro" )a&istan govern#ent is for#ed in 8fghanistan$ it ould afford

tre#endous econo#ic opportunities for )a&istan b% opening an access to

C8Rs. Goever this situation illnot be acceptable toIndia or Russia$ hich

for#s the basis of their interests in 8fghanistan. The fear of its beco#ing a

breeding ground of the so called @usli# 5unda#entalists and international

terroris# is vieed ith concern b% the West and !S8.

-'. China *actor. China being a #aor pla%er in global poer politics

ill not li&e to have strained relations ith an e#erging poer in the

neighbourhood. Instead$ she ill tr% to chec& the increasing influence of

West and !S8 b% establish#ent of regional bloc&. This #a% create to

different t%pes of effects for )a&istan0"

a. It ill deprive )a&istan its onl% trusted alliance ith a #aor

regional and global poer.

b. It #a% also increase )a&istan(s i#portance for China to chec&

Western and !S8 influence in her neighbourhood b% establishing

regional bloc& consisting )a&istan$ Iran and 8fghanistan.

--. Pa$#Iran Re!ations. Iran a one ti#e reliable friend of )a&istan

no loo&s at )a&istan ith suspicion and anger$ due to support of e+tre#ist

Sunni group in 8fghanistan and &illing of Iranian diplo#ats in @a>ar"I" Sharif.

RESTRICTED


33/39

--RESTRICTED

This gives Iran enough reasons to loo& toards India hich should be a source

of concern for )a&istan. This situation if further deteriorated ould #a&e

)a&istan(s estern borders unsafe$ hich once use to provide depth to

)a&istan fro# an% threat fro# east.

-?. S88RC is not li&el% to bring an% #aor change in the region. India is

using it as a platfor# to do#inate region as a :big brother;$ hoever so far it

has been not been successful due to refusal of )a&istan to accept its

hege#on%.

-. Inco#petent and selfish political leaders have ala%s politicised the

linguistic$ ethnic and sectarian issues for their on interests hich has

ea&ened the fibre of national integration and e+posed )a&istan to internal

securit% threats.

-7 Ethnic divide has destabilised the socio"econo#ic and socio"ethnic

order. The to regional pla%ers have #ade )a&istan a battlefield of their

conflicting ideologies and a third pla%er see&s this opportunit% to e+ploit the

situation in order to pursue her on hege#onic designs.

-9. TheSind proble# is accentuated b% une#plo%ed %outh$ inept civil

ad#inistration and vested foreign interests.

RESTRICTED


34/39

-RESTRICTED

Recommendations

. The folloing reco##endations are #ade to enable us to #eet the

challenges of the ne #illenniu# successfull%0"

a7 *orei.n Po!ic 7 The foreign polic% should foster on the

folloing linesF

293 The !S desire for constructive relations ith )a&istan$

especiall% in the econo#ic and co##ercial field$ can be

encouraged to #utual benefit. )a&istan should also

support"in a #easured a%" the !S desire for arresting a

nuclear and conventional ar#s race in South 8sia and$

therefore$ restraining India(s #ilitar% a#bitions. )a&istan

should be able to utili>e China(s groing global strategic

i#portance to secure #ore Pe*uitable( treat#ent fro# the

!S and other poers.

'2 We #ust e+plore avenues for i#proving relations ith Russia$

to re#ove the #istrust and to foster #ore cordial relations.

-2 3or#alisation beteen Iran and 8fghanistan through

)a&istan(s diplo#atic #oves ill favour securit% and

develop#ent of these sister countries$ hereas

i#prove#ent of relations ith Russia ill help not onl% in

stabilising the situation in 8fghanistan but also help in

#a&ing ECB #eaningful organisation. 3egotiations be

engineered to establish a friendl% govern#ent in

8fghanistan$ to ensure the return of refugees and the

opening of trade routes to C8Rs7

b. Economic Re-i-a!7 Toda%(s orld is engulfed in an

econo#ic ar. These ars are #ore destructive in nature as

co#pared to the conventional ars. )a&istan is presentl%

e+periencing the orst t%pe of econo#ic stagnation of its histor%.

This poor state can effect its ar#ed forces$ value of our

conventional and nuclear deterrence$ national securit%$ and

RESTRICTED


35/39

-7RESTRICTED

ulti#atel% its ver% e+istence as a free and sovereign state.

Therefore$ econo#ic revival should be our fore#ost agenda point

hen considering securit% threats7

c. Institution )ui!din.7 The trust and confidence in the national

institutions has eroded. State depart#ents have failed to provide

securit%$ ustice$ and a stable political s%ste# for nation and

countr% to progress. Drug #one% and eapons running have

brought our societ% to a state of anarch%. Institutions need to be

re"established and cleaned up to &eep )a&istan a viable and

progressing countr%.

d. Education7 The #aor cause of our #ost of the social evils is

the lo literac% rate. 3ational education standards have to be

revived$ education up to pri#ar% level should be #ade

co#pulsor% and on govern#ent e+penses. We have to do aa%

ith the dual education s%ste#$ here selective bod% of the

societ% onl% get a chance of #odern education and #aorit% of

population is deprived of *ualit% education.

e. Arms Contro!7 The international pla%ers to target specific

countries have used ar#s control particularl% the nuclear ar#s

control. )a&istan ill have to adopt a balanced approach to the

proble# in ter#s of ar#s production as ell as diplo#ac% to not

co#pro#ise its securit% and also avoid being targeted b% an%

negative diplo#atic #ove.

f. Restricted So-erei.nt7 Through the tools of international

restrictions and constraint of financial assistance$ )a&istan is

li&el% to e+perience restrictions in ter#s of polic% options.


36/39

-?RESTRICTED

direct conflict ith India in the event of an Indo")a&istan ar. et

the #ore e develop our relation ith the#$ the #ore e ill

co#plicate India(s securit% calculation.

h. Corruption7 The viruses of corruption$ inefficienc% and tight

bureaucratic controls have #anifestl% degraded our political and

national s%ste#s. This proble# #ust be identified and suitable

corrective #easures #ust be ta&en.

. ,edia and Information Techno!o.7 Bur archene#% India has

over a period of ti#e has ta&en large leap in this i#portant field.

@edia and IT in toda%(s #odern era is pla%ing i#portant role in

the rise and don fall of the nations. We #ust in this regard #a&e

a national polic% for #a&ing best use of this latest and #ost

effective eapon of #odern era.

&. Response to (IC7 5olloing actions are advocated 0"

12 8 coherent national polic%.

'2 8rticulation of co##and especiall% beteen ar#% and

civilian set"ups.

-2


37/39

-RESTRICTED

17 Conc!usion7 )a&istan occupies a special location in the region$

hich bestos it strategic i#portance as a #aor regional pla%er. It also faces

#ulti di#ensional threat )h%sical$ ps%chological$ ideological$ econo#ic etc2

due to internal and e+ternal factors. In toda%(s global environ#ents$ there are

no per#anent ene#ies or friendsF hoever$ India re#ains archene#% of

)a&istan. 8s long as India &eep pursuing her national ai# of :4reater India;$

the to nations ill do little toards achieving peace in the region. It is

i#perative for s#all nations li&e )a&istan to do their ut#ost for their national

securit% hen pitched against a big$ strong and nuclear neighbour having

e+pansionist designs$ as India. 5or )a&istan an established internal cohesion$ a

credible conventional deterrence and a #atching nuclear/ #issile response

capabilit% is the onl% viable and cost effective solution to its sovereignt%.

RESTRICTED


38/39

-RESTRICTED

)I)(IO"RAP:Y

1. Dr I&ra# 8>a#$4lobal Gu#an 5uture$ 4eopolitics$ )olitical 4eograph%

and )a&istan$ 199'.

'. AWorld )olitics and South 8sia$ =eginning of an End($ Current 8ffairs

Digest$ ul 199.

-. 8.N. Gilali$ A 4eo"Strategic I#portance of )a&istan($ Defence Revie

199.

. Wasee# Saad$ Econo#% of )a&istan. 3efine )rinting )ress$ 8h#ed Toor in The Citadel 3o. 1/99.

9. !S )olicies and Their I#plications for South 8sia b% Dr @aleeha


39/39

-9RESTRICTED

Documents

Pak's Security Concerns and Options