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BRIEFING PAPER

Number 7411, 30 November 2015

Pakistan: November 2015 update

By Jon Lunn

Inside: 1. Domestic developments 2. International relations

Number 7411, 30 November 2015 2

Contents Summary 3

1. Domestic developments 5 1.1 Politics 5

Overview 5 A weakening of civilian authority? 5 A military coup is unlikely 6 Anti-corruption drive 6 Local government elections taking place 7 Making federalism work 7 Human rights 8 The MDGs 8

1.2 Security 9 Military operations intensify – but against who? 9 Balochistan 10 The threat of climate change 10

2. International relations 11 2.1 The US 11

The UK 11 2.2 The neighbourhood 12

India 12 Afghanistan 14 China 14

Cover page image copyright: Pakistan national flag – no copyright required / image cropped.

3 Pakistan: November 2015 update

Summary Domestic developments The Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N) government, led by prime minister Nawaz Sharif, is now well into its third year in power.

In 2013, Sharif won a decisive mandate on promises that he would revive the economy and govern more competently than had the rival Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) over the previous five years. However, prices on basic goods and levels of unemployment remain too high for comfort for many ordinary Pakistanis. Power cuts, which the PML-N promised to end, remain common. There has also so far not been much improvement in the central state’s capacity to collect tax – another of the government’s manifesto pledges.

The PML-N’s tenure so far has arguably seen a weakening of civilian authority – an area where the PPP claims it made some limited progress between 2008 and 2013 – in a country where the military has always been a ‘shadow state’. Talk of another military take-over has recently revived amongst commentators, but a coup seems highly unlikely – the military seems to have decided that ruling directly is no longer worth the candle. However, the speculation is a sign that all is not well in Pakistan’s body politic.

In recent months, Sharif has launched an anti-corruption drive, with over 1,000 cases being prepared against public officials and businessmen. But some fear that the anti-corruption drive will turn out to be politically-motivated and that the opposition will be its main target.

Pakistan is currently holding several rounds of local government elections (the final round is on 5 December). For the first time political parties are being allowed openly to put forward candidates in the local government elections. The results will be the first electoral test of the popularity of the PML-N government. However, given the strength of Pakistan’s patronage politics, in many areas traditional party loyalties can be expected to determine the results almost regardless of the central government’s performance.

One of the biggest achievements of the previous PPP-led government was the passage of the 18th Amendment to the Constitution, which transferred further powers to the provinces from the centre. However, there remain many challenges in turning theory into practice. The central government announced several months ago that it is postponing a new financial ‘award’ to the provinces, which the latter hoped would increase their share of resources.

Pakistan’s human rights record under the PML-N government continues to be subject to strong criticism by human rights groups. At the end of 2014 the PML-N government lifted a 2008 moratorium on the death penalty. Officially it did so only for terrorism-related offences but in practice those convicted of other offences have been executed too.

The overall security situation within the country has improved markedly during 2015. Soon after the PML-N took office, the military finally launched military operations in North Waziristan, having appeared reluctant for years to do so. These have seriously weakened the Pakistan Taliban and other militant groups.

However, the International Crisis Group has suggested that the Pakistan army is still making a distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ jihadi groups, with groups more focused on India such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (now called Jamaat-ud-Dawa) being largely exempted from facing military operations, as well as long-standing allies involved with the Afghan Taliban such as the ‘Haqqani Network’.

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Although there have been some claims to the contrary, the indications are that Islamic State (IS) has not yet established a significant presence in Pakistan. But army chief General Raheel Sharif has said that IS now poses a bigger long-term threat to the region than al-Qaida. The army has also been conducting operations in Karachi to clamp down on criminal and terrorist activities in the city.

International relations Debate continues in the US about its relationship with Pakistan, which is estimated to have cost US $30 billion since 2002; for now it remains one of decidedly ambivalent interdependence. There have been suggestions that Pakistan is lobbying for a civil nuclear deal with the US that mirrors the one reached between the US and India. At the moment, this looks unlikely.

The UK and Pakistan have a good bilateral relationship – the British High Commissioner recently reiterated that the UK remains “shoulder-to-shoulder” with Pakistan – but there are sometimes tensions beneath the surface. For example, on terrorism, the UK government position is that it remains “fully committed to working in partnership with Pakistan”. However, when the Pakistan authorities released one of the alleged planners of the 2008 Mumbai attacks on bail earlier this year, the UK government expressed deep concern. In 2015/16, Pakistan is the largest single recipient of UK aid money. The project budget for this year is £340.6 million.

India-Pakistan relations remain fraught with danger and mistrust, not least over Kashmir. Since October 2014, there have been regular exchanges of fire between their troops across the ‘Line of Control’ which runs through contested Kashmir. In September, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif launched a new “peace initiative” India has responded coolly, focusing again on the need for Pakistan to address the threat of terrorism effectively first.

There has been an uneasy and partial rapprochement between Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the former agreeing to cooperate more effectively on security and intelligence matters and undertaking to encourage the Afghan Taliban to join peace talks. There remain considerable divisions within the Pakistan elite (in particular between the civilian and military branches) on the issue of supporting the Afghan peace process. For parts of Pakistan’s security establishment, Afghanistan remains primarily a resource to be deployed in Pakistan’s existential struggle with India.

China has long been a key ally of Pakistan, although it does not take sides in the Kashmir dispute. It is now set to become the leading economic partner for Pakistan over the period 2016-20 as a result of the US$ 46 billion ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’, which involves massive investments in the spheres of energy, transport and telecommunications. But there remains considerable local mistrust about these initiatives in Balochistan, the most immediately affected province.

5 Pakistan: November 2015 update

1. Domestic developments

1.1 Politics Overview The Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N) government, led by prime minister Nawaz Sharif, is now into its third year in power.

In 2013, Sharif won a decisive mandate on promises that he would revive the economy and govern more competently than the rival Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) did over the previous five years. However, while there has been marginal improvement in the performance of the economy (annual growth rates remain at around 4-5%, which is lower than the performance of its South Asian neighbours), and the overall security situation has also got better over the last year or so, the PML-N is viewed by many observers as not much more competent than its predecessor. Prices on basic goods and levels of unemployment remain too high for comfort for many ordinary Pakistanis. Power cuts, which the PML-N promised to end, remain common. There has also so far not been much improvement in the central state’s capacity to collect tax – another of the government’s manifesto pledges.

More broadly – but not surprisingly, given how implicated it is in Pakistan’s structural ‘political dysfunctionality’ – the PML-N has so far done little to transform the political, economic and social dynamics that have left Pakistan in almost permanent crisis since its formation.

A weakening of civilian authority? The PML-N’s tenure so far has arguably seen a weakening of civilian authority – an area where the PPP claims it made some limited progress between 2008 and 2013 – in a country where the military has always been a ‘shadow state’.

Prime minister Sharif has long had a troubled relationship with the military; indeed, General Pervez Musharraf overthrew him back in 1999.1 The army seems barely to consult the government about its security operations – or, indeed, many of its other actions. In October, the army appointed a new National Security Advisor to replace Nawaz’s own appointee.2 The government was quick to pass a Constitutional amendment to allow the army to establish special military courts to handle high profile cases of terrorism. Some suspect that the government has also lost its appetite for trying Musharraf on treason charges in connection with the 1999 coup.

Sharif’s present passivity may in part reflect the fact that when he sought to assert his civilian authority in the months after his 2013 election victory – including by seeking to normalise relations with India – he quickly found himself in deep political difficulties. Months of opposition protests in the capital, Islamabad, called by the leader of the

1 “What is the Pakistan army’s game plan?”, FT.Com, 12 November 2015 2 “Former general to be Pakistan’s new national security advisor”, Eastern Eye, 23

October 2015

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Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), Imran Khan, and a populist cleric, Tahirul Qadri, over alleged election malpractices in 2013 and official corruption brought the country to a virtual stand-still in mid-2014. Only the horrific attack on a military school in Peshawar at the end of that year, in which over 150 people died, most of them children, eventually prompted Khan to call off the protests.3

Many saw the hand of the military behind these protests and believe that Sharif subsequently decided to mend fences with the army in order to survive in office.4 The International Crisis Group argues that this capitulation has involved “the militarisation of counter-terrorism strategy”, putting “at risk Pakistan’s evolution toward greater civilian rule, which is itself a necessary but not sufficient condition to stabilise the democratic transition”.5

A military coup is unlikely Until recently, the PML-N and the PPP have been relatively temperate in their criticisms of each other. The government has been much more hostile to the PTI, which has long had hopes of challenging it in its heartland, Punjab Province. But the rising political temperature has revived talk of another military take-over amongst commentators. The army chief General Raheel Sharif has a much higher public profile than his civilian namesake at the moment. A coup seems highly unlikely – the military seems to have decided that ruling directly is no longer worth the candle – but the speculation is a sign that all is not well in Pakistan’s body politic.6

Anti-corruption drive In recent months, Sharif has launched an anti-corruption drive, with over 1,000 cases being prepared against public officials and businessmen. Some of the cases extend to the financing of terrorists. Critics accuse Sharif and his family of being ‘first amongst equals’ when it comes to the corruption stakes. He and his brother have long faced allegations of this kind, denying them all. Not long ago, the National Accountability Bureau identified 150 potential corruption scandals implicating Sharif and his brother, Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif, and senior PPP politicians, amongst others.7

The World Bank has given the government some credit for strengthening openness and transparency, noting the passing of access to information laws in some provinces, the publication of more budgetary information and the strengthening of ombudsman institutions.8

3 For more on events in 2014, see: “Pakistan in 2014”, Asian Survey, January/February

2015 4 “Sharif bolstered by Pakistan’s ‘civil-military’ accord”, Financial Times, 19 August

2015 5 ICG, “Revisiting counter terrorism strategies in Pakistan: opportunities and pitfalls”,

Asia Report No. 271, 22 July 2015 6 “What is the Pakistan army’s game plan?”, FT.Com, 12 November 2015 7 “The corruption debate”, Weekly Cutting Edge”, 25 October 2015 8 “WB projects Pakistan’s economic growth up at 4.8%”, Daily Times, 2 November

2015

7 Pakistan: November 2015 update

But some fear that the anti-corruption drive will turn out to be politically-motivated and that the opposition will turn out to be its main target; for example, provincial politicians in PPP-controlled Sindh Province are currently under investigation. The Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) is also being targeted in its stronghold of Karachi. Its members of the National Assembly, Senate and Sindh Assembly have recently resigned in protest at the army’s counter-crime and –terrorism operations in the city. However, some expect them eventually to withdraw their resignations if enough of their grievances are addressed.9

Local government elections taking place Pakistan is currently holding several rounds of local government elections (the final round is on 5 December). Local government structures were created on a non-party basis under General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008), largely to build up the legitimacy of the then military administration by undercutting the power of existing provincial government structures. Now, for the first time political parties are being allowed openly to put forward candidates in the local government elections.10

The results will be the first electoral test of the popularity of the PML-N government. However, given the strength of Pakistan’s patronage politics, in many areas traditional party loyalties can be expected to determine the results almost regardless of the central government’s performance.

Making federalism work One of the biggest achievements of the previous PPP-led government was the passage of the 18th Amendment to the Constitution, which transferred further powers to the provinces from the centre. However, the overall impression given since 2013 is that some provincial governments – in particular, Sindh and Balochistan – have struggled to make much of these powers due to bureaucratic weakness and political in-fighting.11

The difficulties being experienced in implementing devolution have been highlighted by the fact that the central government has announced that it is postponing a new financial ‘award’ to the provinces. Many of them were expecting a new settlement in the 2015/16 financial year but this now looks unlikely. The provinces had said that they were hoping for a greater share of resources, but the central government was unwilling to consider this. For the moment, the current arrangements will remain in force.12

Of course, such major political and fiscal changes in the ‘rules of the game’ are always complex and challenging and can take some time to

9 “Democratic infighting”, Daily Times, 2 September 2015 10 “People’s problems are better solved by local govts”, Dawn, 31 October 2015 11 “Sindh, Balochistan still without agriculture policies”, Daily Times, 12 October 2015 12 “Govt not bound to give NFC award: minister”, Dawn, 13 May 2015; “NFC award

may be extended for one year”, Dawn, 29 May 2015

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bed down; defenders of the changes will ask the critics need to bear this in mind.

Human rights Pakistan’s human rights record under the PML-N government continues to be subject to strong criticism by human rights groups. While Islamic extremists are responsible for many violations, the state is also often implicated by them.

For example, the authorities have on occasions harassed and intimidated journalists. In 2014, the private broadcaster Geo News was threatened with being shut down after it accused the country’s main spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of an attempted assassination of one of its presenters. A new ‘code of conduct’ has recently been imposed on broadcasters by the authorities that restricts how terrorist attacks can be reported. Pakistan was ranked the most dangerous country in the world to be a journalist in 2014 by the International Federation of Journalists. Self-censorship is increasingly common.13

Non-governmental organisations in Pakistan also report that the political climate has become more hostile for them. In June, Save the Children, which has in the past been accused of acting as a cover for a fake CIA vaccination programme used to track down Osama bin Laden in 2011, was expelled from the country.14

Critics claim that the crack-down on Islamist terrorism during 2015 has been accompanied by a rise in extra-judicial executions, ‘disappearances’ and other human rights abuses.15 The special military courts now being established do not sit in public and have been accused of violating international fair trial standards.16

At the end of 2014 the PML-N government lifted a 2008 moratorium on the death penalty. Officially it did so only for terrorism-related offences but in practice those convicted of other offences have been executed too. Human rights groups have claimed that amongst the over 200 people executed since then have been a disabled man and juvenile offenders. There are an estimated 8,000 people on death row in the country.17

The MDGs The agreement in September of the new global ‘Sustainable Development Goals’ has prompted debate about Pakistan’s poor performance in achieving their predecessors, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Of Pakistan’s provinces, Punjab is the best performer. But overall, the country has been the poorest performer in South Asia in meeting the MDG’s social sector indicators.18 Analysts

13 “Pakistan’s long war on the media”, International New York Times, 16 September

2015 14 “Pakistan expels Save the Children charity”, FT.Com, 12 June 2015 15 ICG, “Revisiting counter terrorism strategies in Pakistan: opportunities and pitfalls”,

Asia Report No. 271, 22 July 2015 16 “The cost of Pakistan’s war on terrorism”, FT.Com, 17 August 2015 17 “Pakistan executes Ansar Iqbal despite claims he was 15 at the time of arrest”,

Independent, 29 September 2015 18 “Lack of capacity is the culprit: UNDP”, Dawn, 13 September 2015

9 Pakistan: November 2015 update

attributed Pakistan’s poor performance to a range of factors, including the state’s prioritisation of security over development, lack of capacity, and corruption and maladministration.19

Under the Constitution, the state is given the responsibility for providing primary and secondary education, but this responsibility has never been adequately discharged. The PML-N government has been feeling growing pressure over the rising cost of private education, where almost 50% of children are currently being educated. It has responded by trying to cap price rises – which in turn appears to have alienated some owners of private schools.20

1.2 Security Military operations intensify – but against who? The overall security situation within the country has improved markedly during 2015. Soon after the PML-N took office, the military finally launched military operations in North Waziristan, having appeared reluctant for years to do so. These have seriously weakened the Pakistan Taliban, which reportedly suffered a split in 2014, and other militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi; many militants have reportedly been forced to retreat across the border into Afghanistan.

The Pakistan Taliban and other armed militant groups have continued to launch attacks during 2015 but so far there has been nothing on the same scale as the shocking attack on the military school in Peshawar at the end of 2014. This attack created a wave of revulsion and greatly stiffened civilian and military resolve to tackle terrorism. Within a week of the attack, the PML-N government had unveiled a new counter-terrorism strategy. Meanwhile, US drone attacks against militants in the tribal areas have continued and Pakistan has recently begun to conduct its own drone attacks.

However, the International Crisis Group has suggested that the Pakistan army is still making a distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ jihadi groups, with groups more focused on India such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (now called Jamaat-ud-Dawa) being largely exempted from facing military operations, as well as long-standing allies involved with the Afghan Taliban such as the ‘Haqqani Network’,

Although there have been some claims to the contrary, the indications are that Islamic State (IS) has not yet established a significant presence in Pakistan. But there have been pro-IS leaflets and graffiti in the tribal areas and army chief General Raheel Sharif has said that IS now poses a bigger long-term threat to the region than al-Qaida.21

The army has also been conducting operations in Karachi to clamp down on criminal and terrorist activities in the city. MQM complaints about these operations have largely been ignored, with the PML-N government’s efforts to mediate so far proving ineffectual.

19 “What went wrong where?”, Dawn, 13 September 2015 20 “Twisted education debate”, Hindustan Times, 29 September 2015 21 “Pakistan’s ‘Daesh danger’”, Eastern Eye, 9 October 2015

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Balochistan In Balochistan, the security situation has also improved over the last year or so. The provincial government (a coalition of the Baloch National Party and the PML-N) has been encouraging reconciliation initiatives. But not all separatist groups have joined and there remains considerable local mistrust of the motives of the central government as it moves ahead on joint economic projects with China under the auspices of the ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’, which is set to increase energy-generation and build transportation routes between Xinjiang Province in China and the Balochi seaport of Gwadar, which China has built and which it runs.22

In July it was reported that Allah Nazar, the leader of the banned Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), had been killed. But these reports remain unconfirmed and the group has denied it.

In September, there was a bomb blast in Multan which the authorities attributed to the BLF.23

The threat of climate change Pakistan faces ‘non-traditional’ security threats too. Indeed some view these as a greater threat in the medium- to long-term than terrorism. The country is ranked third on the Global Climate Risk Index, so it should be a keen participant in the forthcoming Paris conference. However, its national pledges ahead of the conference have been called neither ambitious nor imaginative and it is yet to make a specific commitment on reducing its carbon emissions. In recent years, the country has become increasingly vulnerable to large-scale flooding.24 A few months ago, northern Pakistan was hit by an earthquake, leading to about 250 Pakistani deaths and a wider humanitarian emergency.

22 “Misleading the Baloch people”, Pakistan Observer, 8 November 2015 23 “Decision taken to set up JBF”, Frontier Post, 17 September 2015 24 “UNDP helps Pakistan gear up for a make-or-break climate conference”, UNDP

Pakistan, 13 October 2015

11 Pakistan: November 2015 update

2. International relations

2.1 The US Debate continues in the US about its relationship with Pakistan, which is estimated to have cost US $30 billion since 2002, but for now it remains one of decidedly ambivalent interdependence.25

In truth, there is mistrust on both sides – but neither has been prepared to contemplate a complete break-down in relations. There are fears in the US that its influence over Pakistan may reduce as China-Pakistan ties increase.26 Meanwhile, Pakistan looks on anxiously as ties deepen between the US and India.

There have been suggestions that Pakistan is lobbying for a civil nuclear deal with the US that mirrors the one reached between the US and India. At the moment, this looks unlikely. India would be angered by such a step. But the US, which has over the last decade or so provided considerable financial support to Pakistan’s efforts to secure its nuclear arsenal, is reportedly concerned that Pakistan may be intending in future to deploy tactic nuclear weapons that might be harder to protect from falling into the hands of militants. Paradoxically, such a threat could give Pakistan some extra leverage in discussions with the US over a potential civil nuclear deal.27

Prime minister Nawaz Sharif visited the US in October and, as always, called on the US to take a more active stance on Kashmir. He came away with nothing substantive on that front, but in advance of the visit, the Obama administration announced that it will be selling an additional eight F16 fighter jets to Pakistan. Critics argue that these jets will be far more useful in fighting India than in fighting terrorism.28 Army chief of staff Raheel Sharif made his own visit to Washington, DC, in November.

The UK The UK and Pakistan have a good bilateral relationship – the British High Commissioner recently reiterated that the UK remains “shoulder-to-shoulder” with Pakistan – but there are sometimes tensions beneath the surface.29

For example, on terrorism, the UK government position is that it remains “fully committed to working in partnership with Pakistan”. However, when the Pakistan authorities released one of the alleged planners of

25 D. Markey, “It’s time for a frank talk with Pakistan’s army chief”,

www.defenseone.com, 17 November 2015; C.C. Fair and S. Ganguly, “An untrustworthy ally: time for Washington to cut Pakistan loose”, Foreign Affairs, 18 August 2015

26 “Outlook for 2016-20: international relations”, Economist Intelligence Unit, 1 November 2015

27 “Focus on nuclear safety in Asia”, Eastern Eye, 23 October 2015 28 X. Wickett, “US taking wrong approach to building relationship with Pakistan”,

Chatham House, 26 October 2015 29 “British High Commissioner commits that UK will remain ‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ with

Pakistan”, 17 November 2015

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the 2008 Mumbai attacks on bail earlier this year, the UK government expressed deep concern.30

In 2015/16, Pakistan is the largest single recipient of UK aid money. The project budget for this year is £340.6 million. According to the 2011-16 Operational Plan, the UK’s top priorities currently are: building peace and stability; making democracy work; promoting macroeconomic stability, growth and jobs; and effective delivery of more equitable, inclusive and quality public services.31

This plan offers a good insight into UK official thinking on Pakistan, including on human rights issues. Pakistan is one of the FCO’s countries of concern in its 2014/15 annual human rights and democracy report.

Considerable UK aid is also channelled to Pakistan through multilateral organisations. DFID has funded UNDP Pakistan’s ongoing voter education programme for the local government elections that are currently taking place.

In July, the Mail reported allegations by the group Reprieve that UK aid money being provided for anti-narcotics operations was increasing the number of people on death row – violating the UK’s opposition to the death penalty. The UK government said that it was not aware that anybody arraigned in connection with the anti-narcotics operations had received a death sentence.32

Around the same time, there were reports that five Britons faced hanging in Pakistan. The FCO said that it was aware of two and that there were a further 20 Britons who potentially faced the death penalty but had either not yet been sentenced or had a chance to appeal. The FCO also confirmed that Pakistan regularly fails to comply with its obligation under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to notify it whenever somebody with British nationality has been detained.33

UK interest in Pakistan is not solely reflected through the prisms of security and development. It wants to use its close historical and personal ties (over one million UK nationals are of Pakistani heritage) to increase economic ties. In 2014 bilateral trade reportedly increased by 15% on 2013.

There was a short debate on Pakistan in the House on 27 October.

2.2 The neighbourhood India India-Pakistan relations remain fraught with danger and mistrust, not least over Kashmir. Since October 2014, there have been regular exchanges of fire between their troops across the ‘Line of Control’ which runs through contested Kashmir. For example, in August 2015,

30 PQ 14509, 5 November 2015 31 2015/16 DFID Operational Plan (last updated December 2014) 32 “British aid funds Pakistan hangings”, Daily Mail, 28 July 2015 33 “Five Britons face hanging as Pakistan empties death row”, Mail on Sunday, 21 June

2015

13 Pakistan: November 2015 update

an exchange between border guards left nine civilians dead and 62 injured.

The two nuclear-armed governments accuse each other of responsibility for these skirmishes. There have also been Indian claims that militant groups based on the Pakistan side of the Line of Control are seeking to infiltrate Indian Kashmir in larger numbers. During the course of 2015 there have also been battles in Indian Kashmir between militants and the security forces. For example, in July, armed separatists attacked a police barracks on the Indian side of the border, leaving at least seven people dead.

Hopes that India and Pakistan might resume talks in earnest following the electoral victory of Narendra Modi in India last year have not yet been realised. He is currently acting like a man for whom a deal with Pakistan is desirable but not essential. His government’s stance is that Pakistan must take effective steps to deal with terrorism before serious talks can take place; the 2008 Mumbai attacks and Pakistan’s failure to take effective action against Lashkar-e-Taiba, which masterminded them, still looms large in Indian minds. In April, the Pakistan authorities released on of the alleged planners on bail.

The two countries foreign ministers met in March 2015 and they agreed that the two sides should work towards re-starting talks. Prime ministers Modi and Sharif met in the margins of a summit in Russia in July as exchanges across the Line of Control escalated. A date for talks between their respective National Security Advisors was set for August but close to the date the meeting was cancelled. Efforts at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) session in September to hold informal talks also came to nothing.

In September, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif launched a new “peace initiative” while at the UNGA session. Sharif’s initiative contained four action points:

• We propose Pakistan and India formalise and respect 2003 understanding of a complete ceasefire in Kashsmir and Line of Control

• We propose Pakistan and India reaffirm that they will not resort to the threat of force under any circumstances

• Steps must be taken to demilitarise Kashmir

• Agree to mutually withdraw troops from Siachen34

Point one suggests that Sharif was trying to reactivate proposals tabled during the 2003-07 negotiations, during which significant progress was apparently made. But this time around India has responded coolly, focusing again on the need for Pakistan to address the threat of terrorism effectively first.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s influence over the politics of Indian Kashmir has received an unexpected boost over the past year. State elections at the end of 2014 eventually produced a coalition

34 India and Pakistan also both claim sovereignty over the Siachen Glacier, which is just

northeast of the Line of Control. It is known as the “world’s highest conflict”.

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government involving his party, the BJP – an outcome which few observers would have predicted until very recently. The BJP is the junior partner in a coalition led by the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). The more moderate Kashmiri separatist leaders will share the dismay of the Pakistan government about this development. However, the armed militant groups – whose influence and reach had waned for a while – are likely to be delighted that the BJP is now sharing power, as increased political polarisation could act as a recruiting-sergeant for them.

There are claims that in recent months Hindu nationalists have begun to conduct vigilante attacks on Muslims in Indian Kashmir. In September 2015, the state government was ordered by Jammu and Kashmir High Court, following a petition by Hindu nationalists, to enforce a beef ban. This has led to clashes and protests. It has also been reported that, with Hindu-Muslim relations tense in some parts of the region, there has been an increase this year in Muslim volunteers joining the armed groups – most notably, in south Kashmir.

Pakistan has also continued to complain that India supports armed Baloch separatist groups.

Afghanistan There has been an uneasy and partial rapprochement between Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the former agreeing to cooperate more effectively on security and intelligence matters and undertaking to encourage the Afghan Taliban to join peace talks.

Although a first round of direct talks between the Afghan Taliban and the Afghan government took place in July, momentum was quickly lost following the announcement of the death of Mullah Omar and the internal tensions that this created within the Afghan Taliban.

There remain considerable divisions within the Pakistan elite (in particular between the civilian and military branches) on the issue of supporting the Afghan peace process. For parts of Pakistan’s military, Afghanistan remains primarily a resource to be deployed in Pakistan’s existential struggle with India.

Nawaz Sharif visited Kabul in May.

China China has long been a key ally of Pakistan, although it does not take sides in the Kashmir dispute. It is now set to become the leading economic partner for Pakistan over the period 2016-20 as a result of the US$ 46 billion ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’, which involves massive investments in the spheres of energy, transport and telecommunications. There are growing numbers of Chinese Nationals in Pakistan working on construction projects, mineral concessions and farms. While primarily intended to boost trade, the seaport of Gwadar, which China has built and runs, is also an important port for its naval ships.

One long-term observer of Pakistan has said that the Corridor could be a turning-point for Pakistan but that the biggest challenge to its success

15 Pakistan: November 2015 update

lies in the “dysfunction and incompetence of Pakistan’s governing structures.”35

China and Pakistan recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding to cooperate against corruption.

Background reading Here are links to previous Library briefings by us that may be of interest.

Pakistan in 2013 (December 2012)

In brief: Baluchistan - Pakistan's forgotten conflict (November 2011)

In brief: Pakistan - probable disintegration or underlying resilience? (May 2011)

The 'AfPak policy' and the Pashtuns (June 2010)

35 “The China-Pakistan corridor: a fate-changer?”, The Statesman, 20 November 2015

BRIEFING PAPER Number 7411, 30 November 2015

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