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Pakistan National

Assembly

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Contents Letter from the Secretary General ................................................................................................................ 3

Letter from the Under Secretary General: .................................................................................................... 3

Letter from the Committee Directors ........................................................................................................... 4

Introduction to the committee ..................................................................................................................... 7

Introduction to the topic............................................................................................................................... 9

Previous Strategies........................................................................................................................................ 9

Financing ................................................................................................................................................... 9

Military Operations ................................................................................................................................. 10

Negotiations ............................................................................................................................................ 10

Current Strategies ................................................................................................................................... 11

National Action Plan ................................................................................................................................... 11

History and Formation ............................................................................................................................ 11

Implementation Mechanism ................................................................................................................... 13

The Military ................................................................................................................................................. 14

History of Political Intervention .............................................................................................................. 14

Powers and Responsibilities of the Military ........................................................................................... 15

Building Police Capacity .......................................................................................................................... 18

Reducing the Burden on Infrastructure .................................................................................................. 19

Helpful Links ................................................................................................................................................ 20

Questions a Bill Must Answer: .................................................................................................................... 21

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Letter from the Secretary General

My name is Daniyal Taufeeq Jangda and it gives me immense pleasure to welcome you to the 12th

iteration of LUMS Model United Nations.

At each LUMUN we begin with the ambition to inculcate intellectual responsibility and equip

students with the skills to initiate endeavors that go on to change the world. This year, however,

our theme is ‘Presenting Perspectives, Preparing Pakistan’ – to remind the delegates that their

journey starts at home.

A clear example of this shift in perspective is reflected in our committees, where we look at both

the tumultuous events in our country’s past as well as around the world to solve age-old problems,

while also simulating a rendition of our National Assembly. In any case, no matter how this theme

resonates with you, we ask that you allow LUMUN to become more than a Model UN conference,

and instead let it invoke a convergence of ideas, hopes and aspirations that transcend local, cultural,

economic and political boundaries.

Eventually, our ambition with LUMUN is not limited to instilling in each of you a wish to

transform the world: fix poverty, end the scourge of war, or erase tyranny. But instead, we wrap

up the conference contentedly if we have helped you see our own, local issues in a new light:

helping the poor in our neighborhood, ending gang wars in our slums, and erasing tyranny in our

feudal system alone.

As long as our work impacts you, the leaders of tomorrow, in this small way, it is worthwhile to

continue. Closing on this note, let me restate the value of listening to those who do not see the

world the way we do. Know that your perspective is bettered each time it meets and survives

disagreement, and only an empathetic outlook will help us prepare Pakistan for prosperity. Please

feel free to contact the Under-Secretary Generals or the Committee Directors should you need any

help along the way. On behalf of the entire Executive Council, Secretariat and Directorate, I look

forward to making your time at LUMUN a memory to keep.

See you all soon.

Regards,

Daniyal Jangda

Secretary-General

LUMUN 12

Letter from the Under Secretary General:

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Delegates,

It is with immense pleasure that I welcome you all to the 12th annual LUMUN Conference in my

capacity as Under Secretary General. Having previously served as an Assistant Committee

Director for this very MUN last year, I expect nothing but an uphill curve in the quality and style

of debate that awaits us.

My name is Hiba Fatima, and I am currently pursuing a degree in Law from LUMS. As Under

Secretary General, I shall facilitate constructive debate in LUMUN's simulations of the Pakistan

National Assembly, Social Cultural and Humanitarian Affairs Committee (SOCHUM), Arab

League, and World Bank. Each committee tackles pertinent issues that continue to plague the

world today, and introduces unique perspectives on contemporary problems.

The Committee Directors have laid the foundation for a productive, intellectually stimulating

discussion in each of their committees, and it is now up to the delegates to delve into the depth of

each argument to the best of their abilities and dissect the roots of each problem presented to them.

I look forward to seeing you all this winter at LUMUN XII, ready to engage, debate, and most

importantly, learn.

Happy researching!

Letter from the Committee Directors

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Hello.

My name is Aadil Azad Lalani and fortunately you will not hear me tell you about my Model

UN career and how it changed my life and made me an angelic human being because I know that

you won't be interested.

Instead let us talk about you, the delegates.

In recent years it has been disappointing to see how for many delegates the idea of participating

in a conference begins and ends with achieving an award. This has often led to plagiarized

resolutions, non-practical and unviable solutions, and an unrealistic representation of countries

and organizations. While strategizing and making tactical decisions is expected of delegates it

should not come at the expense of solving the issue at hand.

At this year's simulation of the Pakistan National Assembly at LUMUN, we shall be discussing

two topics that are currently greatly hindering the progress of the country: education and the

energy crisis. While various governments of the country have been attempting to resolve these

issues for years and decades, they still remain prevalent and relevant. And that is where you

come in.

Pakistan National Assembly at LUMUN has historically attracted some of the brightest young

minds in the country, and this year we hope to push your minds to the limit to come with an

extensively detailed and practical plan to deal with these issues in the short term as well as the

long term. I will expect delegates to be fully knowledgeable about the topic area and to research

extensively as to why despite the efforts of the government these issues still exist.

I will be on the lookout for participants who possess and display considerable knowledge of the

topic area, speak eloquently and conduct themselves with the general grace that is expected of an

international diplomat. That means no more wild fish-market-like unmoderated caucuses that

seem to have become a staple of every Pakistani Model UN conference.

Come to PNA to make a difference.

Cheers,

Aadil Lalani.

Assalam-o-Alaikum Everyone!

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I'm Rida Ahmed and it is an honor to welcome all of you on behalf of the LUMUN society. I am

a Junior at LUMS and have been a part of LUMUN since 2010; only then I was a delegate like

yourself.

I, myself have been in the debtaing circuit since 2008, establishing myself as a parliamentary

debator as well as a delegate in various Model UNs. After having been the ACD for UNSC in

LUMUN X, an Under Secreatry General for LUMUN XI, this year, I am ever more privelaged to

be serving as a committee director for Pakistan National Assembly along with my co-chair

Aadil.

Pakistan National assembly is especially close to my heart, not only because i happened to chair

the committee on Health and education in The first Youth Leadership parliament and the khyber

Pakhtunkhwa Crises cell at LGSMUN'14, but because more than anything I can relate to it. It

pertains to all the relevant issues that Pakistan faces and gives us the oppurtunity to act as

Parlimentarians and look for feasible solutions that can become a part of a formal bill. Pakistan

National Assembly has the power to unleash reality, to speak to our moral-selves and shake from

slumber the Patriot within us.

It is empowering to know about our country and even more so, to know we can make a change.

I hope to see this spirit in each and every one of you when I see you in the fall and I hope that

you will table a debate that rings so loud and so true that it becomes a force to be reckoned with.

Best,

Committee Director PNA,

Rida Ahmed.

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Introduction to the committee Welcome delegates, to the Pakistan National Assembly at LUMUN 12.

The second simulation of PNA in LUMUN’s history, the inclusion of the committee this year

reflects the focus of the conference on furthering debate and learning that will positively affect

our country. Indeed, this is also the reason that the conference theme of ‘Presenting

Perspectives, Preparing Pakistan’ is being stressed on so much in the LUMUN society’s

promotional material (it also makes for some nice alliteration).

The focus of PNA this year will primarily be to promote an understanding of the way the

National Assembly functions, its powers and responsibilities, and its related entities; along with a

deep understanding of some of the most prominent issues affecting our country right now. This is

why, along with attaching a set of Special Rules of Procedure with this document, we have also

decided to explain a bit about the committee and how it will function here, while we still have

your limited attention.

Since PNA at LUMUN 12 is still a simulation being held at a Model UN conference, it will more

or less function under the usual rules that govern a Model UN, with a few changes.

There will be moderated and unmoderated caucuses as happens in any Model UN, and

the usual diplomacy and articulate speeches that are a staple characteristic of delegates at

LUMUN will also be expected.

One major change is that the committee will be bilingual. Hence delegates can choose to

address the committee in either English or Urdu, or a mixture of both. Provincial and

cultural languages, while certainly beautiful in their own regard, will unfortunately not be

allowed.

The Committee Directors will be referred to as Speakers and the Assistant Committee

Directors will be referred to as Deputy Speakers.

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Delegates will be expected to thoroughly read and understand the Special Rules of

Procedure, which include information relating to:

o Special Motions

o Secret Sittings

o Standing Committees

o Bills

The final documentation will be in the form of Bills.

We encourage you to read the Study Guide and Special Rules of Procedure carefully, and come

well prepared to the committee so that you may be able to give your best performance and

hopefully learn something new.

You are most welcome to email us at any time with any queries that you may have.

Happy researching!

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Topic Area A: Strategies and

the Role of the Military in the

Fight against Terrorism

Introduction to the topic

Terrorism is not something new.

It is a phenomenon that Pakistan has been

dealing with for the past couple of decades.

Reports of mass shootings, suicide bombers,

arson and general violence caused by

individuals belonging to certain extremist

groups have come to be regarded as part of

regular life in the country. According to the

Global Terrorism Index (which ranked

Pakistan as the 3rd most affected country by

Terrorism in its 2014 report), between 2000

and 2013 the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan

(TTP) carried out 778 attacks, out of which

‘12% were carried out by suicide bombers’.

It is worth noting that the Global Terrorism

Index report for 2015 also stated that

Pakistan has been on the Index’s ‘Ten

Countries Most Affected by Terrorism’ list

for the past 13 years. These few statistics are

more than enough to emphasize how much

terrorism is a part of the everyday reality for

the citizens of Pakistan. The government of

the country has taken several different

approaches to combating this problem, the

most recent of which has been an aggressive

military campaign initiated after the

emotionally scarring school shooting in

Peshawar last year that claimed the lives of

144 innocent children.

Keeping the reality of this threat and the

long-term economic, social and political

damages that it has wrought in mind, the

Pakistan National Assembly at LUMUN 12

has been tasked with discussing current

strategies in place in the fight against

terrorism, as well as the roles,

responsibilities and powers of the military in

this regard. Members of this committee must

keep in mind that sufficient knowledge of

the current status-quo between the

government and the military, as well as a

general understanding of the different

stances that political parties have on this

matter, is critical. This Study Guide is only a

guiding document, meant to outline the

major factors and events. It is by no means

an exhaustive store of information on the

topic, and members are encouraged to carry

out extra research accordingly.

Previous Strategies

The government and military of Pakistan

have taken various steps and strategies to

deal with terrorism in the past. These have

ranged from extensive military operations to

attempts at peace talks to curbing the

influence of terrorist groups through various

means.

Financing

Pakistan’s response to terrorism financing

has focused mainly on low-level

inconspicuous activity, such as some

informal hawala (Informal money transfer)

money transfer services, mainly used by

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migrant workers, importers and traders. The

government has so far been able to freeze

certain accounts that have been used to

launder terrorism financing from abroad, the

total value of which is approximately $100

million. They also claim to have recovered

over $1 million from individuals belonging

to banned extremist outfits, that were

allegedly supposed to be used for terrorist

acts.

Terrorist groups also resort to crime in order

to raise funds for their operations. This has

included bank robberies, kidnappings, petty

theft and other such crimes. The government

has attempted to block off this source of

funding by enacting laws pertaining to the

biometric registration of all mobile SIM

cards in the country, and blocking off all

unregistered SIM cards. Since terrorist

groups have been known to make regular

use of untraceable or unregistered SIM

cards, this has been a step forward.

Military Operations

Operation Rah-e-Nijat: Operation Rah-e-

Nijat happened in the latter half of 2009. It

was a concentrated attack by the Pakistan

Armed Forces against Tehrik-e-Taliban

Pakistan (TTP) in South Waziristan and the

Federally Administered Tribal Areas

(FATA). Involving the Army, Navy and the

Air Force, the operation continued for six

months and was deemed a success.

Operation Black Thunderstorm: In early

2009, a temporary ceasefire was in place in

the Malakand region as the provincial

government had agreed to the terrorists’

demand for implementation of Sharia law in

the region. However, due to delays in the

signing of the bill, the terrorist groups

continued to expand their territory until they

had reached within 97 km of the capital city,

Islamabad. Operation Black Thunderstorm

was initiated in April 2009 in order to

reclaim all the lost territory.

Operation Zarb-e-Azb: This is the current,

ongoing operation being conducted by the

Pakistan Army against various militant

groups in the country. Launched in June

2014 in the wake of the attack on Jinnah

International Airport in Karachi, it is

described as a ‘comprehensive operation’ to

flush out all terrorists in the North-West

Pakistan region.

Negotiations

There have several instances of negotiations

taking place between the Pakistan

government and the militants.

2004: In 2004 the government of Pakistan

signed the first of three peace treaties with

militant groups operating in South

Waziristan. However, the treaty was

nullified when the militant leader who

signed the treaty was killed by an American

missile.

2006: In September 2006, the Waziristan

Accord was signed between the government

of Pakistan, tribal leaders, and militants in

North Waziristan. The agreement included

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clauses that called for the government to

reconstruct infrastructure and compensate

families for material and other losses, while

implementing a no-tolerance policy in the

region for any kind of terrorist activity.

2008: A ceasefire was implemented in North

Waziristan in 2008 by negotiating peace

deals with the TTP. The provincial

government was able to make a 15-point

peace deal with the Taliban that included

points ensuring the free movement of

workers, the expulsion of ‘foreign’ militants

by the Taliban, the immediate halt of any

anti-state, anti-government, or anti-military

activities, and the removal of the Pakistan

Army troops from the region.

2014: In January 2014, negotiations between

representatives of the Pakistan Taliban and

the government of Pakistan began in

Islamabad. The talks were aimed at

resolving the ongoing insurgency in the

country by the TTP. However these talks fell

apart a few days later when a U.S. drone

killed the TTP chief, Hakeemullah Mehsud.

Current Strategies

Currently, Pakistan’s counter-terrorism

strategy has not yet been able to eradicate

terrorism in all its forms. Terrorism is still

very much rampant across the country, from

the tribal areas of Western Pakistan to the

major port city of Karachi. Reports of

military or police personnel being injured or

killed in events related to terrorism or

terrorist outfits have become increasingly

common over the years, prompting action

from the authorities. The most recent of

these is the implementation of the National

Action Plan (NAP). Considered and drafted

in the aftermath of the school shooting

incident in Peshawar, the National Action

Plan reflects the new found aggressiveness

that the government and military have been

displaying since then. Containing clauses

pertaining to the regulation and registration

of madrassas, execution of terrorists,

establishment of special courts for speedy

trials of terrorists, enforcing a ban on armed

militant groups in the country and several

other points, the NAP has become a sort of

license for the military to engage in war-like

campaigns against targeted terrorist groups

that are currently carrying out attacks

against the state and its people.

There are many critics of the National

Action Plan that state that the huge amount

of power and autonomy bestowed upon the

military by the implementation of the plan

can only lead to trouble. Given the history of

the military inferring in politics and

overthrowing the government on more than

a couple of occasions, this is a valid

concern.

National Action Plan

History and Formation

The National Action plan is the most recent

strategy of the government of Pakistan. It

builds upon the points in the policies

previously signed into law by the PML-N

led government. These include the 64-point

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National Internal Security Policy (NISP) and

the Protection of Pakistan Act (PPA). These

two policies, both signed into law in 2014,

provided for steps and actions aimed at

increasing the short and long term ability of

dealing with extremism in all its forms, as

well as modernizing aspects of the criminal

justice system. While the NISP had points

pertaining to better regulation and oversight

of madrassas, building institutional capacity

and other ‘soft’ forms of intervention and

policy prescriptions, the PPA allowed for

short-term solutions such as increasing the

power and authority of certain security

agencies, detaining suspects without

revealing their locations, hiding reasons for

detention and other harsh and controversial

actions. Military and police personnel (grade

BPS-15 and above) were given the authority

to exercise shoot-to-kill actions. The

creation of special courts for trials was also

one of the points in the PPA.

Following the 16th December 2014

Peshawar incident, the government was

pressurized by the military to continue and

expand upon policies that gave military

forces greater autonomy in the choice of

strategies employed against extremists.

Yielding the increasing pressure from the

military, the government developed the PPA

further and drafted a new policy that would

build upon previous policies that allowed the

use of coercive and aggressive actions to

combat terrorism. Following the Peshawar

attack, the government lifted the moratorium

on death penalties for cases of terrorism on

17th December. On 19th December, in a

closed meeting between bureaucrats,

military personnel, lawyers, civil society

representatives and political party

representatives, the framework for the NAP

was drafted. After presiding over an all-

parties conference, the Prime Minister,

Nawaz Sharif, announced the 20 point

National Action Plan in a televised address.

The 20 points of the National Action Plan

are as follows, according to the website of

the National Counter Terrorism Authority

(NACTA):

1. Execution of convicted terrorists

2. Establishment of special trial courts

3. Ensuring no armed militias are

allowed to function in the country

4. Strengthening and activation of

National Counter Terrorism Authority

(NACTA)

5. Countering hate speech and

extremist material

6. Choking financing for terrorists and

terrorist organizations

7. Ensuring against the reemergence of

proscribed organizations

8. Establishing and deploying a

dedicated counter-terrorism force

9. Taking effective steps against

religious persecution

10. Registration and regulation of

madrassas

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11. Ban on glorification of terrorism and

terrorist organizations through print and

electronic media

12. FATA reforms

13. Dismantling communication

networks of terrorist organizations

14. Measures against abuse of internet

and social media for terrorism

15. Zero tolerance for militancy in

Punjab

16. Taking the ongoing operation in

Karachi to its logical conclusion

17. Balochistan reconciliation

18. Dealing firmly with sectarian

terrorists

19. Policy to deal with the issue of

Afghan refugees

20. Revamping and reforming the

criminal justice system

Implementation Mechanism

In order the implement the diverse points of

the National Action Plan, numerous bodies

have been formed. The policy guidelines for

these bodies are provided by a central

committee that is presided over by the Prime

Minister. This central committee includes

nine Cabinet members. There are also 15

sub-committees designed to oversee

particular NAP constituents. Eleven of these

sub-committees are chaired by the Federal

Minister for the Interior. The

implementation of the NAP is supervised on

the provincial level by an ‘apex’ committee

that is led by the Chief Minister among other

bureaucrats, military officials and

representatives from civilian and military

intelligence agencies.

However, it is worth noting that while this

framework seems well placed to work on

implementing the National Action Plan,

there was no mention of the formation of

these bodies or their powers and limits in the

NAP or in the policies guiding NACTA. As

a result, fears of authorities abusing their

powers have grown over the past few

months. There have been allegations that the

implementation of the NAP only furthers the

interests of the military officials by granting

them more power with low accountability

mechanisms in place. Responding to a

question after holding a press conference on

3rd January 2015, the Director General of

the Inter Services Press Relations (ISPR)

wing of the military stated that the existence

of the military courts and the ongoing

Operation Zarb-e-Azb would continue until

all of the extremism in the country has been

eliminated. This reflects the determination

of the military to continue their aggressive

tactics in the foreseeable future. Critics of

the NAP’s implementation mechanism point

out such examples to warn against the

growing influence and ultimate takeover of

the government by the military.

The main arguments presented revolve

around the opportunity that the

implementation mechanism of the NAP has

provided military officials with to ‘get

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involved in police administrative issues’.

The Leader of the Opposition in the

National Assembly has also issued warnings

that these provincial apex committees were

fast becoming an equivalent government.

The Military

History of Political Intervention

The Pakistan Armed Forces is the seventh

largest military force in the world in terms

of number of active personnel. It is divided

into three different inter-services branches:

the Army, the Airforce, and the Navy. The

different branches are led by their own

Chiefs who have full operational command

of the troops under their division. The three

Chiefs are also part of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff Committee, which is headed by the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Committee (CJCSC). While the CJCSC is

the highest-ranking military official in the

country, he is only responsible for

supervising and coordinating the Chiefs of

staff, and does not wield any operational

command over them or any of the troops.

Historically, the Pakistan Army has played a

very active role in the politics of the

country. Exerting political clout has become

an almost expected characteristic of any

general who is appointed as the Chief of

Army Staff. This immense influence in

political matters stems from the several

times that the Pakistan Army has

overthrown the government and assumed

control of the country.

The very first instance of this toppling of the

government was in 1958 when President

Major General Iskandar Mirza dismissed the

Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and the

government of Prime Minister, appointing

army Commander-in-Chief Gen. Ayub Khan

as the Chief Martial Law administrator.

Ayub Khan then proceeded to carry out his

own plan against Mirza, forcing him to

resign from his post as President and

transfer it to Khan.

In 1969, General Yahya Khan succeeded

Ayub Khan when the latter fell ill and was

unable to deal with the increasing pressures

from political parties. Yahya Khan appeared

in a televised address and imposed Martial

Law across the country. In true military

fashion, Yahya stated, ‘I will not tolerate

disorder. Let everyone remain at his post.’

The third, and perhaps most infamous,

instance of Martial Law was enforced when

Operation Fair Play took place on 4th July

1977. Then Chief of Army Staff General

Zia-ul-Haq devised a coup against the

government of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali

Bhutto. Zia-ul-Haq also dissolved the

Parliament and all provincial assemblies and

suspended the Constitution. He retained his

power for a period of 10 years, despite

constant assurances of having elections in

the next 90 days. He remains Pakistan’s

longest serving head of state.

The most recent instance was when General

Pervez Musharraf assumed control of the

country by suspending the Constitution and

declaring Martial Law on 15th October

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1999. He did so after successfully staging a

coup against then Prime Minister Nawaz

Sharif who had attempted to keep

Musharraf’s plane from landing at Karachi

airport. Musharraf proceeded to appoint

himself President of the country and held

elections according to the Supreme Court

ruling, which resulted in him retaining the

post until 2008.

Powers and Responsibilities of the

Military

Given the previous coups at the hands of the

military, it is only natural that there is

general mistrust and confusion about the

actual powers and responsibilities of the

military. While a segment of the country’s

citizens view it as the last bastion of honest

and uncorrupted patriotism, there are also

many who believe that the military has its

own agenda that it is constantly looking to

advance. In the past, military leaders such as

Zia-ul-Haq have taken and kept power by

wielding their power as Chief of the Army

Staff for many years. This has led to the

general perception that there is a seemingly

constant struggle between the government

and the military for control of the country.

As far as the powers of the military goes,

one must keep in mind the guiding

principles observed by Muhammad Ali

Jinnah, Pakistan’s founding father. The

Quaid, on the occasion of the country’s

independence, said,

‘Do not forget that the armed forces are the

servants of the people. You do not make

national policy; it is we, the civilians, who

decide these issues and it is your duty to

carry out these tasks with which you are

entrusted.’

These words clearly reflected the

unambiguous views that Jinnah held

regarding civil-military relations. However,

over time it has been proven that the military

has repeatedly ignored these words and done

as they have please to ‘make national

policy’. It has also been argued that these

historic interventions in the country’s

politics have left remnants of a strong sense

of protectionism amongst the soldiers of the

army – so much so that a large number of

them believe that it is only the military that

consistently stood between Pakistan and its

destruction whenever it assumed control of

the country. This view, articulated in several

articles and books, shows that there is

clearly a sort of doctrinal belief system that

is impressed upon individuals when it comes

to the military, and specifically the army.

This belief system usually either condemns

the extrajudicial actions of the army, or

celebrates them as a mark of true patriotism

and love for the country.

Part XII, Chapter 2 of the Constitution of

Pakistan is dedicated to the Armed Forces,

and lays out the command and functions of

the military. A few important clauses of the

Constitution are mentioned below:

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1. Clause 243 (1): ‘The Federal

Government shall have control and

command of the Armed Forces’

2. Clause 245 (1): ‘The Armed Forces

shall, under the directions of the Federal

Government, defend Pakistan against

external aggression or threat of war, and,

subject to law, act in aid of civil power when

called upon to do so’

These two clauses of the Constitution

emphasize how the Federal Government has

the power to control and command the

Armed Forces. It is these clauses that are

often overlooked, ignored, or not taken into

full consideration when undue pressure is

applied by the military to get their way. A

prime example is the undue pressure that

was applied by the Pakistan Army to

implement the National Action Plan in the

aftermath of the attack on the Army Public

School in Peshawar (an institution owned

and managed by the army).

Another interesting official document is the

oath taken by Members of the Armed

Forces, as per the Third Schedule. This oath,

taken by all troops that enlist in the military,

clearly states that they

‘… will not engage (themselves) in any

political activity whatsoever …’

And will

‘… Serve Pakistan … as required by and

under the law…’

Since the military is known for its sense of

discipline and adherence to rules, it would

seem that the oath is not taken too seriously,

at least by the upper echelons of the

hierarchy.

The question here is whether or not there is

a need to enact laws further safeguarding the

continued existence of a democratic

government by limiting the powers of the

chiefs of the military.

Relations between Political Parties and the

Military

Over the years, different political parties

have developed different core agendas, on

the basis of which they contest elections.

These different core agendas also have led

to alliances between specific parties, and

enmity between others. This disparity has

meant that while a few political parties view

the military in a favourable light, others

outright condemn many of its actions and do

not enjoy particularly good relations with

them.

The Pakistan army also appears to have

chosen a few parties that it believes it could

work well with, and allegedly lends

unofficial support to those parties. While

this may seem to be a logical outcome in the

scenario of the military supporting a party

that vocally champions it, it must be

remembered that the military is not

supposed to play favourites. It is supposed to

keep any favourable or unfavourable

relations aside and only follow the

instructions and guidelines provided by the

Federal Government.

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Anti-Terrorism Bills Passed by the National

Assembly

Given below are a few of the bills relating to

terrorism and counter terrorism efforts that

the National Assembly has passed over the

years.

1. The Pakistan Army (Amendment)

Act, 2015: An act to further amend The

Pakistan Army Act, 1952. President

Mamnoon Hussain approved an ordinance

which amends the Pakistan Army Act 2015

to offer security to the recently established

military courts, their presiding officers and

military prosecutors and also lawyers and

witnesses appearing before them. The

amendment visualizes in-camera trial of

terrorists and a provision for proceedings

through video link. It will be applicable to

areas where military courts have been set up

or will be set up.

2. The Protection of Pakistan Act,

2014: The bill defines “militant” as “any

person who wages war or insurgence against

Pakistan, or raises arms against Pakistan, its

citizens, the armed forces or civil armed

forces; or takes up advocates or encourages

or supports or abets the raising of arms or

waging of war or a violent struggle against

Pakistan; or threatens or acts or attempts to

act in a manner prejudicial to the security,

integrity or defense of Pakistan; or commits

or threatens to commit any planned offence;

and includes; a person who commits any act

outside the territory of Pakistan for which he

has used the soil of Pakistan for preparing to

commit such act that constitutes scheduled

offence under this act”.

3. The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2014:

Inroduced to amend the Anti-terrorism Act

1997.The Anti-terrorism (Amendment) Bill

2014, moved by Minister for Kashmir

Affairs and Gilgit Baltistan, Chaudhry Birjis

Tahir, would oblige security forces to seek

permission from a Grade-17 officer or a

magistrate before opening fire on suspects.

4. The National Counter Terrorism

Authority Bill, 2013: The bill addresses the

need for a pivotal institution to integrate and

synergize national counter terrorism and

counter extremism struggle in view of the

nature and magnitude of terrorist threat,

present strategic policy options to the

government for

consideration/implementation by the

shareholders after scientifically studying the

phenomenon of extremism and terrorism.

The bills aims at forming the national

counter terrorism authority (NACTA) which

is also at par with best international

standards to unity and organize national

counter terrorism and counter extremism

measures and provide for their more

effective and efficient enforcement.

5. The Anti-Terrorism Act, 2005:

Further amendment of Anti- Terrorism act

of 1997. To deliver for the making of

'control orders' imposing obligations on

individuals suspected of being involved in

terrorism-related activity. These are

preemptive orders which are designed to

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restrict or prevent the further involvement

by individuals in such activity.

Mapping a New Counter-Terrorism Policy

Following the Peshawar attack, the

newfound aggression of the authorities in

the fight against terrorism has been reflected

in the resumption of the execution of

terrorists, ramping up of the ongoing Zarb-e-

Azb campaign, and the increase in powers

and authority given to military and police

personnel. While this may appear to be a

positive step in the way that the government,

military, and general citizens all seem to be

fully supportive of the response to extremist

groups, it may not be the most effective and

beneficial strategy in the long term.

Currently, the National Action Plan provides

for a short term response to terrorists and

terrorist groups. It does not go beyond

giving propositions for legal and

constitutional amendments to improve the

criminal justice system, deploy a dedicated

counter-terrorism force, or enact reforms in

FATA. There is a lack of details that are

necessary in order to implement these

propositions. In order to map an effective

counter-terrorism policy, the government

must look into a holistic approach that

involves capacity building for lower level

security personnel, reducing the burden on

hugely strained security facilities, and

combating corruption and politicization of

government and military forces.

Building Police Capacity

Police personnel are often ignored when

considering actions to be taken against

terrorist outfits. This appears to be a major

oversight on the part of the authorities

involved, as these police offers are

permanent residents in the areas that they

are tasked with protecting. Not only does

this have the potential to give them greater

incentive in carrying out their tasks

responsibly and professionally, this also can

prove to be a good source of intelligence and

expertise. Since police officers are more

familiar with the people and places in the

areas that they are posted in, they have the

potential to be the first and strongest

deterrent against any possible incidents of

terrorism.

However, this is sadly not the case. Instead

of investing in this highly valuable resource,

the government instead relies on the military

and rangers to protect cities and towns. If

resources are instead spent on improving the

training and intelligence of police officers, a

number of potential incidents of terrorism

could be proactively stopped. Simply

increasing the number of police officers will

not work, as this was already done on a large

scale in Sindh in the 1990s. The practice

resulted in scored of underpaid,

underperforming personnel. Since 2005, the

number of police personnel across the

country has nearly doubled from 220,000 to

430,000, yet it has not seemed to have had

any visible impact on the law and order

situation of the country, which has

progressively gotten worse.

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Along with this, the general perception that

the citizens have of the police is not at all

flattering. The police force as a whole is

seen as corrupt, inefficient, politicized and

always out to do more harm than good at the

expense of the citizens. While it is true that

the issues of corruption, politicization, and

inefficiency are prevalent within the police

force, the lack of a concentrated effort to

project a more positive image of the police

force makes things worse. If the government

and other civil society institutions take the

lead in organizing outreach programs,

training workshops, motivational activities

and other such actions, then the resultant

improvement in relations between the police

and the general population will definitely be

a positive factor in the fight against

terrorism.

Improving training regimes, raising

standards for police recruitment and police

work, and working towards improving the

popular perception of the police are a few

steps that the government can take to ensure

that police personnel find that they have the

motivation and ability to actively seek out

and eliminate elements of terrorism on a

grass roots level in cities and towns that the

military is not active in.

Reducing the Burden on Infrastructure

The country’s courts and prisons are

overburdened, understaffed, and not

managed properly. This leads to a number of

problems, not the least of which is the

economic cost of maintaining such an

inefficient system. Currently about 80% of

the prison population is on trial, with the

courts having more cases than they can

handle. In this scenario, obtaining speedy

and fair justice is a near impossible task for

the common man. Not only are the police

and courts unable to meet deadlines for

delivering judgements, they are also not

very motivated to be alert and aware of the

fairness of their judgements and actions.

Lawyers and judges argue that the number

of courts needs to be doubled at the very

least. While this may seem irrelevant to the

war on terror, it must be understood that

overburdened prisons are often recruiting

grounds for terrorist and extremist groups.

Since the facilities are very over populated,

these prisons are also seen as ‘think tanks’

of militant groups, where networks are

established and operations are planned. Add

to this the lack of sufficient staff to

supervise inmates and it leads to a quite

permissive environment in which these

prisoners are able to continue planning and

executing terrorist actions.

Apart from courts and prisons, police

stations are also overburdened and

inadequately equipped. There are reports of

police officers building makeshift police

stations under bridges and on public land

due to lack of funding and facilities. Since

the process of allocating police budgets is

also flawed, many police stations do not get

the necessary funds to be able to function

20

properly. Police officers often pay from their

own salaries to buy stationery, petrol and

other such items necessary for operating.

This lack of funding for police stations is

also because of a long and inefficient chain

of police officials in a very inefficiently

formulated hierarchy. This seeming lack of

support from the government is bound to

demotivate the police officers who do

initially have a strong sense of duty and

patriotism.

All of these issues only further worsen the

problem of dealing with terrorists. While the

police does not have the ability of funding to

be able to actively ward off against terrorist

attacks, the courts and prisons are also too

overcrowded to effectively and correctly

root out terrorists and be able to hold fair,

transparent, and free from controversy trials.

Helpful Links

While this study guide covers only a few

areas of special interest in the topic area, it is

highly recommended that delegates engage

themselves fully with all of the ideas,

propositions, bodies and policies mentioned

here. To this end, you must extensively

research on how the information given here

can apply to the Questions a Bill Must

Answer. Given below are a few links that

will serve to improve your understanding of

the topic.

1. Constitution of the Islamic Republic

of Pakistan (official pdf National Assembly

version)

http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1

333523681_951.pdf

2. Constitution of Pakistan (Searchable

website version)

http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constituti

on/

3. Global Terrorism Index report

(2014)

http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/defau

lt/files/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20R

eport%202014_0.pdf

4. Global Terrorism Index report

(2015)

http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-

content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-

Index-2015.pdf

5. Revisiting Counter-Terrorism

Strategies in Pakistan – Crisis Group

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asi

a/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-

terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-

opportunities-and-pitfalls.pdf

6. National Counter Terrorism and

Extremism Strategy – Institute for Policy

Reforms

http://ipr.org.pk/wp-

content/uploads/2015/03/National-Counter-

Terrorism-and-Extremism-Strategy.pdf

7. Pakistan’s Fight Against Terrorism –

Centre of Excellence-Defence Against

Terrorism

21

http://www.tmmm.tsk.tr/publication/datr/vol

ume7/02-

Pakistans_Fight_Against_Terrorism.pdf

Questions a Bill Must Answer:

1. To what extent are the current

strategies in the fight against terrorism

effective?

2. How likely is it that the military will

once again strive to impose Martial Law?

3. To what extent is the current political

influence of the military justifiable?

4. How can the National Action Plan be

expanded and made more detailed?

5. How can a new, more

comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy be

implemented?

6. How can the government ensure the

survival of democracy in the current

scenario?

7. To what extent and how must the

government strive to limit the powers of the

army?

8. How can the justice system and

police be facilitated to implement the NAP?