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Pacific Armies’ Management Pacific Armies’ Management Seminar 2004Seminar 2004
THE CONTEMPORARYTHE CONTEMPORARYCONFLICT CONFLICT
ENVIRONMENTENVIRONMENT
BRIG J. D. KellyBRIG J. D. Kelly
Australian ArmyAustralian Army
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Global War On Terror?Global War On Terror?
• War is politicsWar is politics
• Terrorism is merely a tactic
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How the Tactic WorksHow the Tactic Works
• Terrorism tries toTerrorism tries to
– Exhaust the will of those who would Exhaust the will of those who would resistresist
– Propagandise the populations that need to Propagandise the populations that need to be recruited to it.be recruited to it.• Propaganda of the wordPropaganda of the word
• Propaganda of the deedPropaganda of the deed
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Macro-PoliticsMacro-Politics
• De-colonialisationDe-colonialisation
• ModernisationModernisation
• GlobalisationGlobalisation
• Search for IdentitySearch for Identity
ProvidesProvidesRecruits Recruits
forforPolitical EndsPolitical Ends
Local Local
IssuesIssues
BeingBeingExploited toExploited to
PursuePursueGlobalGlobalEndsEnds
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‘‘Strategy Proposes but Tactics Strategy Proposes but Tactics Disposes’Disposes’
• US Forces dominate the conventional US Forces dominate the conventional warfighting battlespacewarfighting battlespace
• ‘‘Modern’ Forces are essentially invulnerable Modern’ Forces are essentially invulnerable and invincible in ‘conventional’ battleand invincible in ‘conventional’ battle
• This leads to tactics based on ‘avoidance This leads to tactics based on ‘avoidance behaviour’ - enemies seek other arenas than behaviour’ - enemies seek other arenas than conventional, force-on-force military conventional, force-on-force military confrontationconfrontation
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Conflict environmentConflict environment
• These factors generate a conflict These factors generate a conflict environment that is highlyenvironment that is highly
– complexcomplex
– diversediverse
– diffusediffuse
– lethallethal
7 Complex Environment - physical,
human, informational
ComplexityComplexity
Enemy armed forces
Organisedcrime
Insurgents
Terrorists
Militias
HostileIntelligence
Services
Intelligenceservices
Domesticopinion
Coalitionpartners
Police forces
Diplomaticagencies
Conventional
Regular
Forces
IrregularAuxiliaries
SpecialForces
Legalagencies
NGOs & Aid
Agencies
Media
World opinion
Hostile populace
Businessinterests
Neutralpopulace
Inter-national agencies (UN etc.)
Neutral forces
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Complex Human TerrainComplex Human Terrain
Militia
TradersCriminals
ADF
Police
Refugees
TNI UNMOs UNHCR UNTAET
IOM
NGOs
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Complex Human TerrainComplex Human Terrain
““Mogadishu was a bewilderingly complex web Mogadishu was a bewilderingly complex web of interlocking family and kin. It was of interlocking family and kin. It was protected not by any formal army or protected not by any formal army or battlements, but by hordes of gunmen. So battlements, but by hordes of gunmen. So anyone who came in after Aidid would pay anyone who came in after Aidid would pay an awful price. The general could vanish an awful price. The general could vanish deep into the thorny hollows of this nest for deep into the thorny hollows of this nest for a lifetime.”a lifetime.”
Mark Bowden, Mark Bowden, Blackhawk DownBlackhawk Down
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Complex Physical TerrainComplex Physical Terrain• Where people areWhere people are
• Urban terrainUrban terrain
• Urban/rural mosaicUrban/rural mosaic
• Littoral areasLittoral areas
• CultivationCultivation
• Swamps/estuariesSwamps/estuaries
• Jungles/MountainsJungles/Mountains
Typical engagementTypical engagement distance = 5-35 metresdistance = 5-35 metres
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Complex Informational TerrainComplex Informational Terrain
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DiversityDiversity
Enemy Regular Armed Forces
Tribal fighters
Mercenaries
Bandits
Local terrorists
Rural guerrillas
Enemy Irregulars
Looters
Rioters
Unarmed protesters
Urban guerrillas
Corporations
Hostile media
Issue Motivated
Groups
Militias
People smugglers
Intelligence services
Political factions
Armed factions
Drug traffickers
Environmental groups
Hostile alliances
Religious sects
Trans-national terrorists with WMD
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An Aspect of AsymmetryAn Aspect of Asymmetry
ARMIES
ENEMY
TACTICAL(ability to be win battles)
STRATEGIC(ability to win
protracted campaigns &
wars)
• Losses are strategic (even in victory)Losses are strategic (even in victory)
• Therefore: How we conduct ops is as Therefore: How we conduct ops is as important as winning individual battlesimportant as winning individual battles
DEFEAT THRESHOLD
ENEMY - LOW TACTICAL THRESHOLD (easily beaten in battle) but HIGH STRATEGIC THRESHOLD
STATES - HIGH TACTICAL THRESHOLD but LOW STRATEGIC THRESHOLD (vulnerable to political will and
public support)
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DiffusionDiffusion
• War / PeaceWar / Peace
• Levels of ConflictLevels of Conflict
• State/Non-state actorsState/Non-state actors
• Conventional / SpecialConventional / Special
• Home front/battle frontHome front/battle front
• Combatant/ Non-combatantCombatant/ Non-combatant
• Geography / TopographyGeography / Topography
• Virtual Theatres Virtual Theatres
• Disaggregated battlespaceDisaggregated battlespace
Result: Ambiguity, non-linearityResult: Ambiguity, non-linearity
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LethalityLethality
Conventional weapons
Biotoxins
Flameweapons
Handheldantitank weapons
MLRS
Improved conventional
munitions
Car bombs
Suicide bombers
UAVsDirected energy weapons
MANPADS
Rifle grenades
TanksGLATGMs
Landmines
Electronic warfare
Computer attack
Thermobarics
Radiological weapons
Nuclear weapons
Biological weaponsChemical
weapons
Eye damage
lasers
ASMs
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.
...almost every technological advance works to ...almost every technological advance works to the terrorists' advantage: an old-fashioned the terrorists' advantage: an old-fashioned European army – Belgium's, say – is European army – Belgium's, say – is incapable of projecting itself to Saudi Arabia; incapable of projecting itself to Saudi Arabia; but a terrorist group in Saudi Arabia, through but a terrorist group in Saudi Arabia, through now humdrum innovations like e-mail, cell now humdrum innovations like e-mail, cell phones, and automated bank machines, can phones, and automated bank machines, can easily project itself to Belgium.easily project itself to Belgium.
Mark Steyn, Mark Steyn, Jerusalem PostJerusalem Post, 12 Jul 04, 12 Jul 04
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Individualised LethalityIndividualised Lethality• Lethality (in the land environment) is becoming a Lethality (in the land environment) is becoming a
characteristic of characteristic of individualsindividuals not not platformsplatforms
• Lethality resides in weapons not forcesLethality resides in weapons not forces
• Carried, concealed, operated by one personCarried, concealed, operated by one person
• Individuals with high lethality occur in any operation Individuals with high lethality occur in any operation without warningwithout warning– ‘‘High lethality’ no longer means state actorsHigh lethality’ no longer means state actors
– High lethality no longer means detectable ‘tactical signature’ or High lethality no longer means detectable ‘tactical signature’ or large scale conflictlarge scale conflict
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Approaches to complexityApproaches to complexity
Deterrence
Major WarLimitedConflict
Counter-Insurgency
Counter-Terrorism
Military Government
HumanitarianOperations
Support toLaw Enforcement
‘CLASSICAL’ APPROACH: IGNORE ALL BUT WAR
COMPLEX WAR: SAME TIME, SAME PLACE
3-BLOCK WAR: SAME TIME, DIFFERENT PLACE
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Detection ThresholdDetection Threshold
Detection ThresholdDetection Threshold
ISR
GR
AN
ULA
RIT
YIS
R G
RA
NU
LAR
ITY
‘‘Deliberate’, ‘Pre-Planned’, ‘Stand-off’Deliberate’, ‘Pre-Planned’, ‘Stand-off’‘‘Precision’Precision’
Encounter BattlesEncounter Battles
KEY DEDUCTION
The enemy will hide from our stand-off weapons in complex terrain
Land forces will need to develop the battle from a start point already in close contact with the enemy.
Pre-planning ops, from standoff range, before contact, will be the exception, not the norm.
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FORCES-ON-FORCES
FORCES-ON-POPULATIONS
HYBRIDISTAR
HYBRIDISTAR
HUMANISTAR
TECHISTAR
Land Force Tasks:- DETECT- LOCATE- IDENTIFY- FIX- DESTROY
1990s ‘Network Centric Warfare’
Joint Land Manoeuvre
Land Force Tasks:- FIND- FIX - SHAPE- EXPLOIT
Network Supported Warfare:Land Force Tasks:
- FIND- DISCRIMINATE- APPLY EFFECTS
CONTROL OPSBROAD AREA SURVEILLANCE
COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS SIMPLEX ENVIRONMENTSMARKETMARKETFORCESFORCES
21
Close Combat Remains the Close Combat Remains the Core Business of ArmiesCore Business of Armies
• All Land Force outcomes ultimately rest All Land Force outcomes ultimately rest on the capability for sustained close on the capability for sustained close combatcombat
• Precision is not enough -discrimination is Precision is not enough -discrimination is necessarynecessary
• Close combat forces need to be Close combat forces need to be survivable, discriminate and jointly survivable, discriminate and jointly connectedconnected
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Deductions from the EnvironmentDeductions from the Environment• ComplexityComplexity - become better at orchestrating - become better at orchestrating
effects in an agile, whole of government mannereffects in an agile, whole of government manner
• DiversityDiversity - become more adaptable - become more adaptable
• LethalityLethality - joint connectivity, precision, - joint connectivity, precision, situational awareness, survivabilitysituational awareness, survivability
• DiffusionDiffusion - prepare individuals & small teams for - prepare individuals & small teams for the disaggregated, complex battlespacethe disaggregated, complex battlespace
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InsightsInsights not Conclusions not Conclusions• Nothing we used to do has gone awayNothing we used to do has gone away
– counter insurgencycounter insurgency
– conventional warconventional war
– peace making/ keepingpeace making/ keeping
• Some trends are making these traditional activities more complex Some trends are making these traditional activities more complex and pressing and pressing
• Tactical Excellence and close combat are the bedrock of successTactical Excellence and close combat are the bedrock of success
• We need to counter enemy propagandaWe need to counter enemy propaganda
• PeoplePeople
• PeoplePeople
• PeoplePeople
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““We know we're killing a lot, We know we're killing a lot, capturing a lot, collecting arms …capturing a lot, collecting arms …
We just don't know yet whether We just don't know yet whether that's the same as winning.”that's the same as winning.”
Donald Rumsfeld, US SecDefDonald Rumsfeld, US SecDef
There are limits to the utility There are limits to the utility of military forceof military force
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