1

Overcoming Psychological Barriers to

Peace Making: The Influence of Mediating

Beliefs about Losses

Daniel Bar-Tal

School of Education, Tel-Aviv University

and

Eran Halperin

Department of Psychology, Stanford University

Chapter to be published in M. Mikulincer & P. R. Shaver (Eds.), Prosocial motives, emotions

and behavior. Washington D.C.: American Psychological Association Press.

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One of the fundamental questions that preoccupies students of conflict resolution as

well as the international community is how to overcome the psychological barriers that are a

major obstacle to peace making and building in societies involved in serious and violent

conflicts. These conflicts are over real goods such as territories, natural resources, self-

determination, and/or basic values and the real issues of goals contradictions have to be

addressed in conflict resolution. But, no doubt it would be much easier to resolve them, had

they not been accompanied by an intense socio-psychological repertoire, which becomes an

investment in conflict and evolves into a foundation of culture of conflict. It is rigid and

resistant to change, fuels its continuation, inhibits de-escalation of the conflict and thus

serves as the major barrier to its peaceful resolution.

One of the basic challenges for societies involved in intractable conflict which aspire

to embark on the road of peace is to overcome this barrier and begin to construct a new

repertoire that facilitates the process of peace making and prepares the society members to

live in peace. The present chapter will examine ways of overcoming the psychological

barriers to peace process and outline initial ideas that may be helpful in stimulating further

thoughts and empirical research. The chapter will first briefly introduce the nature of

intractable conflict and the culture of conflict that evolves with it and gives rise to the

psychological barriers that prevent the peaceful conflict resolution and reconciliation. The

main part of the chapter will describe ways of overcoming the psychological barriers,

focusing on the role of mediating beliefs concerning losses of the parties involved in conflict.

This part will first discuss the process of unfreezing. Then it will present the notion of

mediating beliefs that instigate the reevaluation of the conflict situation. The focus will be

mostly on mediating beliefs that concern losses. Finally the chapter will present the

alternative societal beliefs of ethos of peace which are necessary for peace building.

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Evolvement of the Psychological Barriers.

Nature of the Conflict and Evolvement of the Culture of Conflict

Conflicts are an inseparable part of every intergroup relation but we focus on those

conflicts that are prolonged, harsh and violent, often called intractable1. In these conflicts the

involved societies evolve culture of conflict of which the dominant parts are societal beliefs2

of collective memories and of ethos of conflict, as well as collective emotional orientation

(Bar-Tal, 2007a). Collective memory of conflict evolves to describe the “history” of the

conflict to society members (Cairns & Roe, 2003; Halbwachs, 1992; Wertsch, 2002). Ethos

of conflict provides dominant orientation to a society at present and directs it for the future

societal challenges (Bar-Tal, 2000a; Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006)3. These narratives are

selective, biased and distorted as their major function is to satisfy the societal needs rather

than provide objective account of reality4. They therefore justify the position of the society in

conflict, portray it in very positive light and as the victim of the conflict and delegitimize the

1Intractable conflicts are characterized as lasting at least 25 years, over goals that are perceived as

existential, being violent, perceived as unsolvable and of zero sum nature, greatly preoccupying society

members, with involved parties heavily investing in their continuation (see Azar, 1990; Bar-Tal, 1998, 2007a;

Kriesberg, 1998).

2 Societal beliefs are defined as the society’s members shared cognitions on topics and issues that are of

special concern to society and contribute to its unique characteristics. They are organized around themes and

consist of such contents as collective memories, ideologies, goals, myths, etc. ( Bar-Tal, 2000a).

3 In earlier work it was proposed that the challenges of the intractable conflict lead to the development

of eight themes of societal beliefs that comprise ethos of conflict (Bar-Tal, 1998, 2000a). They include: Societal

beliefs about the justness of own goals, societal beliefs about security, societal beliefs of positive collective self

image, societal beliefs of own victimization, societal beliefs of delegitimizing the opponent, societal beliefs of

patriotism, societal beliefs of unity and societal beliefs of peace.

4 This idea is based on conceptual and empirical literature which suggests that successful coping with

threatening and stressful conditions requires construction of a meaningful world view (e.g., Antonovsky, 1987;

Frankl, 1963; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Taylor, 1983)

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opponent. In addition to societal beliefs, the socio-psychological repertoire in situations of

intractable conflicts includes collective emotional orientations. The most notable is the

collective orientation of fear (Bar-Tal, 2001), but in addition, they may be dominated by

hatred and anger (see also for example, Kaufman, 2001; Petersen, 2002; Scheff, 1994). These

emotions play a central role in perpetuating the conflict as they underlie distrust, hostility and

violence of society members (de Rivera & Paez, 2007). The described socio-psychological

repertoire is disseminated to society members, maintained and institutionalized by societal

institutions, transmitted to the young generations, permeates into cultural products and

eventually evolves into a culture of conflict (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2007b; Ross, 1998). It fuels the

continuation of the conflict, functioning as a major obstacle to peaceful resolution of the

conflict.

Over their long history, intractable conflicts are not only managed, but there often are

attempts to resolve them peacefully, -- a difficult, complex, and challenging mission. The

mere attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully require major changes in the previously

described repertoire. But this repertoire cannot and does not change overnight. Even when

the groups’ leaders resolve the conflict peacefully and sign a peace agreement, this repertoire

continues to inhibit the development of peaceful relations until sometimes it changes slowly

via reconciliation process5, if and when it takes place. Changing the repertoire that was

dominant during the conflict era into one conducive to the peace process, is therefore not a

naturally occurring process, but one that requires active efforts.

5 Reconciliation process goes beyond the agenda of formal conflict resolution to changing the

motivations, goals, beliefs, attitudes and emotions by the great majority of the society members in order to

achieve as the outcome mutual recognition and acceptance between the rival societies (Bar-Tal & Bennink,

2004).

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Nature of the Psychological Barriers

If the needed change was simple, many of the conflicts could have been resolved and

the involved societies could establish new amiable and peaceful relations. However the

contents do not easily change when alternative arguments are provided. The reality is very

complicated and painful because it is extremely difficult to change the repertoire that is

central, held with great confidence, fulfills many functions for the individual and the

collective during the conflict and has been continuously supported by the channels of

communication and the institutions (see for example Bar-Tal, 2007b).

The reason for the above described difficulty is the combination of the specific

contents regarding the conflict (as described above) and the rigid and closed structure of the

socio-psychological repertoire; that is, of its beliefs and attitudes, fueled by emotions (see for

example the role of fear, Bar-Tal, 2001)6. The rigid and closed structural characteristics of the

socio-psychological infrastructure constitute the foundations of the barriers because they are

directly responsible for the freezing state of the contents, preventing even an entertainment of

alternative information that suggests peaceful resolution of the conflict. The state of freezing

is reflected in continuous reliance on the held repertoire of the conflict, the reluctance to

search for alternative information and resistance to persuasive arguments which contradict

held positions (Baron, 1988; Kruglanski, 2004; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Kunda, 1990).

This state is underlined by specific closure needs (see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & Sulloway,

2003) which means that society members tend "to freeze on their prior knowledge if such

knowledge was congruent with their needs" (Kruglanski, 2004, pp.17-18). The specific

closure needs are elevated by the perceived benefits of being in closure and/or costs of

6 Recently the causes for the rigidity and closure of the societal repertoire in the context of intractable

conflicts were presented and elaborated by Bar-Tal and Halperin, (in preparation).

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lacking them (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996, see examples of empirical evidence provided by

Bar-Joseph & Kruglanski, 2003; Golec & Federico, 2004). In this situation the handling of

information is characterized by top-down processing: It is affected more by what fits the

contents of the held socio-psychological repertoire and less by the evidence of incongruent

information which even when is absorbed is processed selectively and in biased and

distorting manner (Bar-Tal, 2007a). That is to say, harsh and prolonged conflicts with the

evolved repertoire tend to "close minds" and facilitate tunnel vision, thus precluding the

consideration of alternative approaches to continuation of the conflict.

The Process of Overcoming the Psychological Barriers

In order to pave the route to a resolution of the conflict and later to a lasting peace,

a new repertoire must be formed and disseminated among society members. This

repertoire should include ideas about the need to resolve the conflict peacefully, optional

solutions for conflict resolution that could be accepted by both sides, trust of the rival,

beliefs that the agreement can be implemented, and eventually recognition of the need to

reconcile and readiness to carry it out (Bar-Tal, in press). These ideas have to be adopted

by society members who then should be mobilized for the peace process.

A very general framework of political information processing proposed by the

political scientist, Sniderman (1975), can be useful for our analysis. He proposed three phases

to the process of changing the held political repertoire into a new one. The first phase is the

phase of exposure in which society members are exposed to alternative new beliefs and

attitudes. Exposure depends on various internal societal factors -- among them availability of

communication channels in the society and their openness to free speech, extent and type of

pressure to conformity and the readiness of society members to be exposed to new alternative

information. Once society members absorb the new beliefs, they have to comprehend them in

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order to store them in their memory. Finally, in order to adopt them, they have to be

motivated.

Indeed the most important psychological process involved in unfreezing is creating

the motivation, first to reevaluate the held beliefs and attitudes, then to search for new

information and ideas, and finally to accept the new alternatives. Hence, overcoming the

psychological barriers that prevent a change of the repertoire that fuels the conflict is a two

stage process: 1. The first is unfreezing of the held repertoire which amounts to an arousal of

a motivation to evaluate the held repertoire. 2. The second is seizing7 which refers to the

readiness to accept alternative repertoire which facilitates peace making and eventually

becomes the foundation of culture of peace. This new repertoire which includes recognizing

the need to compromise, posing new goals, forming new view and relations with the rival,

developing new view of the conflict, and so on has to be first formulated and later

disseminated among society members. This endeavor is especially challenging because in

most of the conflict situations, there is need also for courage to become different than the

majority of society members in addition to motivation to accept the new beliefs and attitudes.

We suggest that the process of unfreezing usually begins as a result of appearance of a

new idea (or ideas) that is inconsistent with the held beliefs and attitudes and therefore

creates some kind of tension, dilemma or even an internal conflict, which may stimulate

people to move away from their basic position and look for alternative ideas (e.g., Abelson,

Aronson, McGuire, Newcomb, Rosenberg, & Tannenbaum, 1968; Bartunek, 1993; Festinger,

1957; Kruglanski, 1989). This new idea, which we call Mediating Belief, motivates to

reevaluate the held beliefs and in fact it leads to their unfreezing on the way to possible

7 On the basis of Kruglanski and Webster (1996) work, we define seizing as the tendency to form

beliefs.

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adoption of alternative beliefs (that is, their seizing). These mediating beliefs may appear

spontaneously in the mind of people without any special circumstances, but usually they

come into mind as a result of external conditions, which force a reevaluation of the held

repertoire. In our case of conflict, once the mediating beliefs appear and spread among

society members, they motivate them for intensive evaluation of the held repertoire and

searching for alternative beliefs that may motivate the society members to change the

situation and encourage peaceful solution of the conflict. Eventually on a very general level

of description, we suggest that when the peaceful context is well established after peaceful

conflict resolution, then, with time and through a long process of reconciliation, a new ethos

of peace may be solidified. This process is depicted in Figure 1.8 We will now describe the

process in more detail, focusing mostly on the unfreezing part with the mediating beliefs of

losses.

Insert Figure 1 about here

The Unfreezing Process

According to the classic conception offered by Lewin (1947) every process of

cognitive change, in individuals and groups, requires unfreezing. Hence a precondition for

the acceptance and internalization of any alternative content about the conflict or its

resolution depends on the ability to destabilize the rigid structure of the socio-psychological

repertoire about the conflict.

We suggest that the idea that fuels the motivation to unfreeze is based upon the

recognition in the incompatibility between the current state and/or the perceived past on the

8 We realize that the described process is the desired one and not all the processes follow this path.

Unfortunately many of the processes stop at different stages because of various reasons, and some even regress

to early stages. In essence the process does not have to be linear but may be dynamic with progress and

regression.

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one hand, and the desired future, on the other hand. To state the matter differently, motivation

to evaluate the held beliefs and entertain alternative ones is based on the understanding that

the continuation of current situation (that is of the conflict), will not lead to a better or a

desired future but even may hurt the fundamental goals and/or needs of the society (Bartunek,

1993). In such situations, the forces that push towards change (driving forces) must be

stronger than the restraining ones (see Marcus, 2006 for elaboration). One of the most

important challenges of every attempt to remove or even to moderate the psychological

barriers to peace is to identify both kinds of forces and to strengthen the driving ones as a

substitute to the restraining ones. Moreover, a necessary precondition for the creation of such

motivation is widespread societal beliefs among society members in the inner strength of the

collective and in its capability to cope with the expected challenges that peace process brings

(Marcus, 2006).

From a cognitive point of view, Kruglanski and his colleagues (Kruglanski & Freund,

1983; Freund, Kruglanski, & Shpitzajzen, 1985) proposed a meta cognitive –motivational

theory that explains the process of unfreezing. They point to two major potential contributors

to move the society from the situation of motivation for specific content to motivation for

openness to alternative ideas. The first mechanism is the fear of invalidity also defined by

Kunda (1990) as "accuracy motivation". According to it, when individuals get the impression

that they will be held responsible for their decision, they tend to use a more thorough

information processing strategies. The second mechanism is the appearance of a conclusional

and directional motivation that suggests that the present way of thinking is detrimental to

important goals (see also Tetlock, Peterson, & Lerner, 1996). By and large, both mechanisms

reduce closure by presenting different methods that emphasize the costs of freezing and/or

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the benefits of openness (Kruglanski, 2004).9 Hence, highlighting the costs of misperceptions

or biased and distorted information processing may induce openness. In turn, when validity

concerns are salient, people tend to rely on thorough information search and consider various

alternative appraisals to explain conflict events as well as entertain new solutions how to end

it (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).10

Another way to trigger unfreezing is related to the emotional system. From an

affective perspective, extensive studies have shown that emotions may play an important role

in guiding information processing. This assumption relies on the well established relations

between emotions and human motivation for information processing (Frijda., Kuipers & ter-

Schure, 1989). Rogers (1983) in his protection motivation theory suggested in line with the

expectancy value analysis that fear appeals are effective to the extent that they convince the

audience that the consequences are severe and very likely to occur if the recommendation

will not take place. In this line, the meta analysis of fear studies found that use of fear is

associated with increased persuasion (Boster & Mongeau, 1984). Similarly, according to the

“affective intelligence theory” (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993), medium levels of emotions like

fear and anxiety, which are part of the “surveillance system,” will move people from their

basic perceptions, cause them to reassess their attitudes and ask for additional, new

information about the situation (Marcus, 2000 see also Janis, 1967, who also points out to the

9 Empirical studies on the individual level (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Tetlock, 1983) found that

individuals that experienced such motivational guidance showed less of a primacy effect in impression

formation, less tendency to use ethnic stereotypes in their evaluations of essay quality, and less anchoring when

making probability judgments.

10 It should be noted that other scholars in different fields of research have pointed to some other

factors that may induce unfreezing. For example, Block and Williams (2002) have found that elaboration about

health issues “unfreezes” information processing and leads to persuasion and greater change appraisal.

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effectiveness of the medium level of fear in persuasion). Within the context of conflict

studies, recently, Rosler (2006) found that fear was a pivotal factor in all alternative peace

plans within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Paez (2006), who examined the impact of

different emotions on peace negotiation in the Basque country, showed that in some cases

fear can move people's opinions towards supporting negotiation with terrorists. Hence, it

seems that a monitored and moderated use of fear might be the trigger for unfreezing in the

context of conflicts.

Mediating Beliefs for Unfreezing

We suggest that the process of societal unfreezing on a large scale in situations of

severe conflicts usually begins within a unique context that triggers motivating beliefs which

then instigate openness. Despite our recognition of the importance of the context, in the

current chapter we focus mainly on the contents of beliefs and not on the context. Yet, before

elaborating about the specific beliefs, we will now briefly point out some changes in the

context that may instigate reevaluation of the held repertoire. We call the new context as a

facilitating one that enables the appearance of the new mediating beliefs.

Firstly the context may change as a result of accumulation of conflict experience like

fatigue, vast human and property losses, continuous stalemate and lack of effective

governance. Secondly as a result of major events like the outbreak of a war, dramatic peace

gesture or extreme violent events. Thirdly this may happen as a result of conciliatory and

trust-building actions by the rival, which lead to perceived change regarding the opponents'

character, intentions and goals. Fourthly change may take place because of internal events or

processes unrelated to conflict (recession, hunger, appearance of a new enemy) that indirectly

create the motivation to reassess the centrality and importance of the conflict. Fifthly, a third

powerful party may change the context by an intervention. That intervention can take various

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forms such as mediation, bombing, sending troops or even economic boycott. Fifthly, coming

to power of new leaders, who develop new approaches to the conflict may create new

context. In addition, arriving of a new generation which has a different look at the conflict

and its implications may create a new context. Finally, a need to reevaluate the situation may

be the result of more global geopolitical processes and events that are not directly related to

the conflict (collapse of a superpower, international climate), but may eventually affect the

parties.

Each of the abovementioned conditions may contribute to unfreezing. The ultimate

goal is adoption (seizing) of alternative repertoire that eventually may lead to the acceptance

and internalization of new ethos of peace. This ethos must act as the opposite equivalent of

the repertoire of conflict, in terms of content and structure, in a way that will successfully

fulfill the same needs and aspirations of the in-group members. But, in the absence of actual

peace and reconciliation the attempt to provide a new socio-psychological repertoire that will

fulfill those needs and aspirations is a great challenge. Fulfilling those needs in the two clear-

cut situations - intractable violent conflict or viable peace – looks much easier than doing so

in the "transformational" period of time between violent conflict and peace, full of

uncertainty and often with continuing violence and active opposition groups.

Hence, we suggest that in the interim period a society should develop temporary

substitutive mediating beliefs that would trigger evaluation of alternative solutions and bridge

the psychological gap between the repertoires of conflict and peace. Those mediating beliefs

will also play an important role in establishing the rationalization for change and moderating

the cognitive dissonance, embedded in such a demanding process. Therefore, the content of

these beliefs should rely on a solid ground of arguments like: "the change is inevitable", "it

serves the national interest" or even "it is important for national security" (Bar-Siman-Tov,

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1996). In order to accurately serve its goals, the mediating beliefs should introduce new,

innovative issues into the public agenda and develop into consensual views. Those issues

change the focus of public discourse and bring in new questions into the conflict-peace

equation. In a way, these innovative questions or issues correspond to the basic principles of

the unfreezing process. They motivate people to engage in deeper and more open thinking by

highlighting the current and future threats and costs of the conflict while developing the idea

that the conflict can be resolved peacefully (see also Janis & Mann, 1977).

The basic principles and inner logic that guide the construction of the mediating

beliefs are similar for both the stronger and the weaker parties of the conflict (see Kriesberg,

2007, pp. 38-43 for an elaborate discussion on inequality between parties in conflict), because

both usually have to compromise or withdraw from their ultimate aspirations, goals and

dreams. However, considering the asymmetry, it would be only natural to assume, that the

specific contents of mediating beliefs that motivate unfreezing differ between the groups.11

.

We will try to point out to few understandings on what are the more useful mediating beliefs

for the unfreezing process, assuming that they are not mutual exclusive.

Mediating Beliefs about Losses

The basic proposition of the present chapter is that the most efficient mediating

beliefs that can lead to unfreezing focus on losses.12

This proposition is based on insights

from the Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) that were adjusted to the context of

conflicts (for more elaborate examples of such implementations of the theory, see: Levy,

11 The lion share of our discussion will focus on the beliefs of the powerful side. This is mainly due to

the fact that in most cases, the radical reevaluations of alternatives, as well as most compromises, are required

from the side that holds most of the tangible and non tangible resources.

12 We would like to note that we realize that society members may raise different mediating

beliefs that refer also to benefits of the peace process and other contents.

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1997; Geva & Mintz, 1997; Boettcher, 2004).13

According to the prospect theory people are

more reluctant to lose what they have than to gain what they do not have (Tversky &

Kahneman, 1986). This asymmetry is expressed by the fact that the value function is steeper

on the loss side than on the gain side. Through the years prospect theory's claim about the

superiority of the influence of losses vis-à-vis gains, was reinforced by other psychological

theories and research. One notable example is the Conservation of Resources Theory

(Hobfoll, 1989), according to which loss of resources as a result of a traumatic event would

be a more important contributor to the evolvement of psychological distress, when compared

to equivalent lack of gain of resources (Hobfoll., Canetti-Nisim & Johnson, 2006). Similar

pattern of negativity bias is frequently displayed within the wide literature of persuasion,

which generally claims that negative events and information tend to be more closely attended

and better remembered and that they strongly impact evaluation, judgment and action

tendencies (see reviews by Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990). The

premise about the unwillingness to lose what a party has is well anchored in our experience

that no party in conflict yields willingly its already possessed, advantages, goods and

commodities such as territory, resources, wealth, status, power, prestige, control etc.

One of the most important methods to emphasize potential losses due to the

continuation of the conflict and reduce the loss perceived in a peaceful settlement is to

reframe the Reference Point. Prospect theory stipulates that people react more strongly to

changes in assets than to net asset levels, which means that they react to gains and losses

13 It is worth noting that the motivation to reevaluate attitudes and behavior within the context of a

conflict does not always stem from gain-loss considerations. We would like to point out that there is a part in

every society, who judges the situation from moral perspective. Yet, according to the moral development theory

of Kohlberg (1984), most people are not situated in the high stages of moral development, and hence, the

abovementioned group is in most cases a negligible minority.

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from a reference point rather than to absolute values of gain or loss (Kahneman & Tversky,

1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). In most cases the

reference point is the status quo, but in some situations it can take the form of other predicted

scenarios like the "aspiration level" (Payne, Laughhunn & Crum, 1981) or even the

achievement of the desired goals (Heath, Larrick & Wu, 1999). Very often, members of

societies that are involved in conflicts are socialized to believe, on the one hand, in the

feasibility of future gains or even victory of their own group and, on the other hand, in the

availability of resources to continue the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007a). These two societal beliefs

are of great importance in maintaining the conflict. The alternative option of paying high

prices or even a possible defeat is most frequently ignored. Naturally, when the compromises

often required by the peaceful settlement of the conflict are compared to the ultimate

aspirations, goals or even the status-quo (mostly for the strong side), they are perceived as a

huge loss.

Hence, the process of unfreezing should aspire to situate the loss in the conflict, or

loss of various present important gains in the future, or possible future deterioration of the

conflict situation as another alternative, that is as a possible reference point. Within this

perspective, the potential losses must be presented in a concrete way, as relevant to

individuals and the collective well being, as harming central basic needs and as occurring

with high probalablity. When compared to that point, the losses attached to peace and

compromise might seem of less value and a motivation for considering alternative solutions

may rise. We will now outline few of the possible contents that refer to different types of

losses.

Possible future losses.

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One type of losses refers to costs that can incur due to the continuation of the conflict.

As indicated on the basis of the prospect theory this focus is more effective in unfreezing than

emphasizing the benefits of peace. Society members have difficulty to imagine peace after

living through years in a conflict where the reality is well understood and predicted and the

patterns of behavior became well established and practiced. When they do, the vision is full

of ambiguity, uncertainty and perceived as risky (Mitzen, 2006). As a result, instead of

highlighting the advantages of peace, there is need to arouse fear by pointing out that

the losses from the continuation of the conflict situation are higher than the losses from

the possible settlement of the conflict, which requires compromises. Although this

approach may work for both the weak and the strong sides in a conflict, it is especially

effective for the strong side that already has many of the benefits and is required to give some

of them up at in the peaceful conflict resolution.

Moreover, in many cases, for both sides of the conflict, the basic assumption that

perpetuates the continuation of the conflict is that time is "on our side" and eventually "we

either will win the conflicts or at least will improve our gains in its settlement". Thus of

crucial importance is an appearance of a new belief which states that “time is not on our

side” which means that the future may bring higher costs in comparison to benefits. For

the strong side, a comparison between the expected losses in case of peace and the ones in

case of defeat may bring about beliefs such as "we do not have resources to continue with the

conflict" or "we may pay a heavy price if the present situation continues ". The presented

beliefs are liable to suggest alternative (and not very popular) future scenarios based upon a

new reference point that should be compared to the one of compromise and peace. This new

comparison may motivate people to a much deeper evaluation of all alternatives.

Furthermore, when using that new comparative perspective, the costs that are required by the

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peace process, may be seen as less threatening in comparison to costs of continuing the

conflict.

Three notable examples for changes that were driven, at least to some extent, by the

described processes can be taken from the peacemaking process in Northern Ireland, South

Africa and the Middle-East. In Northern Ireland, Mac Ginty and Darby (2002) have recently

argued that back in the early 90th

, the understanding that future change is inevitable and that

such change might consist of fundamental losses to the unionist side in the conflict, was one

of the most central motivations to reconsider their position and finally to join the negotiations

in order to gain influence over possible agreement. The writers quote a statement by a senior

Orangeman which according to them reflected a common view shared by the unionists:

"Every time something comes along it is worse than what came before" (Mac Ginty & Darby,

2002, p. 23).

Within the context of the South-African conflict, Mufson (1991) have pointed to

similar view of the unfreezing process when suggesting that since de Klerk and his people

realized that "White South Africans' bargaining position would only grow weaker with time"

(p. 124), they opened negotiations and made every effort to move as quickly as they could

towards a viable agreement.

Within the Middle-Eastern context, recently the Prime Minister of Israel Ehud

Olmert, in an attempt to mobilize public support for his peace process, said "A day will come

in which the solution of two states will collapse and we will face a struggle in the South

African style for the right of equal vote. In the moment this will happen, the state of Israel

will be doomed" (Haaretz, November 29, 2007). And on another occasion, he said that:

"Israel needs to internalize that even its supportive friends on the international stage conceive

of the country's future on the basis of the 1967 borders and with Jerusalem divided … If

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Israel will have to deal with a reality of one state for two peoples it could bring about the end

of the existence of Israel as a Jewish state. That is a danger one cannot deny; it exists, and is

even realistic." (Jerusalem Post, January 1, 2008)

Similar but not identical beliefs about future losses may motivate reevaluation of

existing beliefs among the leaders and the public in general on the weak side. For this side,

unfreezing will be motivated, in most cases, by an immediate willingness to stop the losses

and suffering of the society members, and/or beliefs that in the current stage of the conflict,

the gains that they can get in present peaceful resolution of the conflict constitute the best

deal that can be achieved and continuation of the conflict will not bring more benefits. In

other words, the motivation of the weak side towards unfreezing, can be driven by the

understanding that compromises that current peaceful resolution of the conflict will require

(vis-à-vis the ultimate aspirations), are lower in comparison to possible losses embedded in

the future peace agreement.

Both these themes were emphasized in a speech that was given by the current

President of the Palestinian National Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, in the Annapolis

Conference held between Palestinians and Israelis in November 27th, 2007. Most

importantly, he stressed the fact that what Palestinians can get today, is the best they can get

in comparison to future potential alternatives: "The possibilities offered by today’s

conference must not be wasted. This window of opportunity might never open again … we

must not lose this opportunity that might never be repeated". In addition, he pointed to the

necessity of bringing peace in order to put an end to the Palestinians suffering: "This is how

we will end occupation and long years of suffering for our refugees" and he added: "to

Palestinian mothers who are awaiting the return of their jailed sons; to the children who are

dreaming of a new life and a prosperous and more peaceful future; to our brave prisoners and

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to all of my sons and daughters wherever you are: Have faith in tomorrow and the future

because an independent Palestine is coming"

Past and present losses.

Another direction of the mediating beliefs that focus on losses can refer to the past by

pointing out to the enormous price that the society involved in conflict paid through the years.

These mediating beliefs focus on the direct and indirect costs of the continuation of the

conflict, as accumulation of already incurred costs. Often they first of all point out to the

huge human losses which cannot be brought back to life and there is no compensation to the

families. They may draw attention to the destruction that was caused by conflict and the

continuous suffering of society members. In addition they may emphasize the great financial

investments that come on the expense of spending for various societal needs. This may lead

to public debates which illuminate alternative scenarios in which the conflict resources

(human, financial, societal and psychological) would have been invested differently. A

successful dissemination of these beliefs may create permanent mechanisms which evaluate

every failure through the prism of the huge investments in the conflict when at least some of

them may be also recognized as vain and waste. As previously suggested, these beliefs will

not necessarily convince people in the rightness of peace, but they will motivate them to

unfreeze and further invest in reevaluating the situation.

Apparently, the mediating beliefs about past and present losses were one of the most

important contributors to the change in the American public opinion and then the American

policy regarding the war in Vietnam (Burstein & Freudenburg, 1978). The main theme

underlie the operations of anti-war civil society groups, as well as of anti-war politicians,

focused on the huge costs of the war mainly in the aspects of human life and financial

resources (Small, 1987). Similar, though not identical trends can be identified within the U.S

20

political and societal sphere in reference to the current American war in Iraq. It might be too

soon to be decisive about the results of these trends, but to say the least, they seem to create

some significant movement within the American public opinion (Muller, 2005). Despite the

fact that the American involvement in Vietnam and Iraq does not meet most standards of

intractable conflicts, we use them as an example because they accurately illustrate how

mediating content about past costs destabilize war related public opinion.

New losses related to other potential threats

Another idea that may destabilize the rigidity of the repertoire of conflict is the

widening of the collective perspective, by suggesting that there are more important

threats or goals within the local, regional or global arena. These goals or threats are

exterior to the current conflict, and hence require a broader evaluation of the comprehensive

situation. That broader evaluation may lead to mediating beliefs that refer to potential very

high losses in the future if the conflict will not be resolved. In this case, the costs that are

bound within a viable peace process might seem negligible when compared to potential price

of inadequate coping with the other threats, goals or challenges. In addition identification of

new important internal goals that cannot be fulfilled because of the resources consumed by

the ongoing conflict may also raise the need to reevaluate the situation. Under the new

mediating beliefs, the need to solve the current conflict becomes much more urgent, concrete

and relevant and hence, society members are likely to become more open and receptive to

innovative solutions.

An example for a new internal challenge, that enforced reevaluation about the status

quo of the conflict, can be tracked within the South-African conflict resolution process.

According to Sisk (1989), the rise of a new reactionary right-wing party in the late 80s

(Conservative Party) accelerated a peaceful process of transition because it forced whites, in

21

general, and voters of the governing party (National Party) in particular, to reassess their

political views about the conflict, and develop alternative perspective on the Apartheid

regime. The new political challenge made the National Party leadership realize that if they

will not act immediately, they might loose their long standing control of the government. This

new threat was one of the factors that lead to the process of unfreezing about the policy

towards blacks.

Within a more global perspective, Israeli then Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, had used

new emerging external threats, to convince Israeli citizens in the urgency of the need to solve

the local Israeli-Palestinian conflict, even if the Israelis will be required to make huge

compromises in order to achieve such peace. Barak has frequently stated that the ongoing

international terrorism, the growth of fundamentalist Islamism and the possible acquisition of

nuclear weapons by Islamic countries, outweigh any potential Israeli achievement in future

negotiation with the Palestinians, and, hence, Israel should make any effort to resolve the

conflict immediately (Sher, 2001, p.21). ,

Awareness of closed mindedness and losses.

Finally, in a relatively paradoxical way, for both sides of the conflict, an evolvement

of the understanding regarding the one-sided rigidity of the conflict socio-psychological

repertoire may set in motion the exact opposite dynamic. In some cases, once society

members (or at least some of them) come to recognize the closed mindedness of their own

society, they might push toward examining alternative themes. Frequently these

understandings develop as a consequence of an unnecessary war, or perceived missed

opportunity for peace. These are the prototypical cases in which society members are forced

to acknowledge the costs of the fact that they did not give proper thoughts to alternative

ideas. In other words, they become aware of the losses that took place because of the closed

22

mindedness. Furthermore, such occasions are a fertile ground for the development of even

more daring perceptions, like "the conflict is not right", "perhaps we also contribute to the

continuation of the conflict" or "the other side also has a case", that may further fuel a process

of change.

Seizing New Socio-Psychological Repertoire – Ethos of Peace

We suggest that the presented mediating beliefs about losses fulfill important role in

the unfreezing process on the way to the exposure and seizing of the new repertoire that is

conducive to the peace making. As Figure 1 pointed out, this new repertoire can evolve when

the context is supportive to the peace process. This means that the rival groups at least begin

peaceful conflict resolution process, accompanied by concrete steps to solidify the emerging

new societal beliefs, attitudes and emotions, such as reciprocal acts of good will, meetings

between the representatives of the rival groups, launching peace education and so on (see

Bar-Tal, in press: Kelman, 2004). It is beyond the scope of the present chapter to elaborate on

the process of seizing which in fact is a process of persuasion14

.

We argue that the evolved new societal beliefs and attitudes eventually have to

crystallize into a new ethos of peace that can serve as a foundation for peace culture. This

gradual and long process depends on the peaceful context that is a necessary condition for its

evolvement. The establishment of context of peace requires complete cessation of violence,

setting institutionalized mechanisms for resolving disagreements, constructing massive social

education for constructing culture of peace, building cooperative relations in every sphere of

14 Social psychology has developed a number of conceptions and an extensive bulk of empirical

studies through the years that deal with the problem of persuasion and attitude change which are reviewed

elsewhere (see the reviews by Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Hovland, Janis & Kelley, 1953; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981;

Petty & Wegener, 1998).

23

life, and active reciprocal acts of friendship that promote trust and sensitivity to the needs of

both sides.

We would like to end the chapter with a description of the peace repertoire. Bar-Tal

proposed that achievement of reconciliation requires changes in at least five themes of

societal beliefs that were formed during the conflict and forming of new beliefs that underlie

an ethos of peace (Bar-Tal, 2000b, Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004).

Societal Beliefs about Group’s Goals: The basic goals and motivations of the society

in reference to the conflict must be drastically revised. In particular, societal beliefs regarding

the justness of the goals that underlay the outbreak and maintenance of the conflict must be

changed (Bloomfield, Barnes & Huyse, 2003; Lederach, 1997). The new beliefs must present

new goals for the society that allow compromise and therefore lead to peaceful conflict

resolution. Societal Beliefs about the Rival Group: Additional crucial objective of the peace

process is a change of the images of the adversary group (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005;

Kaufman, 2006; Kelman, 1999; Theidon, 2006). It is important to legitimize and personalize

its members. Societal Beliefs about the Relationship with the Past Opponent: The

development of a peace process needs to facilitate formation of new societal beliefs about the

relations between the two rival groups that emphasize the importance of cooperation and

friendly relationships (Gardner Feldman, 1999; Krepon & Sevak, 1995). In other words, the

well rooted "zero-sum" perception about the conflict must be replaced with a mixed-motives

approach, which enables recognition of win-win or loss-loss situations. Societal Beliefs about

the History of the Conflict: A successful peace process requires also a change of collective

memories that were dominating the engaged societies during the conflict. There is need to

revise these narratives that fueled the conflict into an outlook on the past that is synchronized

with that of the former rival (Barkan, 2000; Borer, 2006; Borneman, 2002; Conway, 2003;

24

Nets-Zehngut, 2006; Rotberg, 2006; Salomon, 2004). Societal Beliefs about Peace: A peace

process requires forming new societal beliefs that describe the multidimensional nature of

peace, specify the conditions and mechanisms for its achievement (for example, negotiation

with the rival and compromises), realistically outline the benefits and costs of achieving it,

connote the meaning of living in peace, and, and especially emphasize the conditions for its

maintenance.

A peace process also requires construction of general positive affects and specific

emotions about the peaceful relations with the past opponent. Positive affects should

accompany the described beliefs and indicate good feelings that the parties have towards each

other and towards the new relations. With regard to emotions, a peace process requires a

change in the collective emotional orientations of fear, anger and hatred, which often

dominate societies in intractable conflict. Instead, there is need to develop at least an

emotional orientation of hope, which reflects the desire for positive goals of maintaining

peaceful and cooperative relations with the other party. This emotional orientation indicates

positive outlook for the future, expectations of pleasant events, without violence and

hostilities (Averill, Catlin & Chon, 1990: Bar-Tal, Halperin & de Rivera, 2007; Kaufman,

2006; Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006; Snyder, 2000; Staub, Pearlman, Gubin & Hagengimana,

2005).

Finally, we would like to outline the needed qualities of the new repertoire. By and

large, in order to offer a viable substitute to the ethos of the conflict, the repertoire of peace

must equate with the ethos of conflicts' basic structural and essential characteristics. Most

importantly, it must fulfill the fundamental needs of society members, given the new

perceived reality of the conflict. It should especially address the basic needs for physical and

economic security, while providing the content-related foundation stones for new positive

25

social identity of the group, which is no longer based upon the conflict or hate for the out-

group. In addition, the new ethos should be constructed and presented as a new ideology,

offering more important, more moral and more relevant beliefs in comparison to the previous

ethos. The new beliefs should reaffirm the collective identity, as was so well done by the

ethos of conflict. They should also relate to each other and hold together in order to ensure

the stability of the new ethos. Similarly to the ethos of conflict, the stability of the alternative

ethos should be strengthened by continuous messages of threat focusing on the dangers

embedded in returning back to the previous situation of conflict.

To conclude, we note that we are dealing with very long, complex and challenging

process that requires much thought and effort to advance its understanding and then the

optimal intervention. This however is a well-spent effort as it may contribute to the well

being of the societies involved in intractable conflicts and to the international community at

large.

26

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Figure 1: Process of Overcoming the Psychological Barriers and Building the Culture of Peace

Context of Intractable

Conflict

Repertoire of Conflict

Facilitating Context

Mediating Beliefs

Supportive Context

New Beliefs, Attitudes

and Emotions

Peaceful Context

Culture of Peace

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