The 2011 Welsh Referendum

Richard Wyn Jones (Cardiff University)Roger Scully (Aberystwyth University)

Paper presented to Annual Conference of the Political Studies AssociationLondon, April 2011

Outline of Paper1. Introduction2. Background to the Referendum3. The Campaign4. The Result5. Turnout6. Yes .v. No7. Conclusions & Implications

But first, a word from our sponsors…

• The 2011 Welsh Referendum Study (ESRC Grant RES-000-22-4496)– Survey-based study of voting in the referendum– Conducted via Internet with YouGov– Two-Wave panel study, with first wave conducted as ‘rolling’

study through period of the campaign– N of panel study = 2569

• Further support from the McDougall Trust for interview-based study of local and national campaigning (ongoing)

Wales 2011: the Background, 1• Previous devolution referendums: 1979, 1997• 1998 GOWA: Flawed Devolution Model– ‘Secondary’ legislative powers: responsibility

without power?– ‘Body Corporate’ and other problematic aspects

• 2004: Richard Commission Report• 2006 GOWA:– LCOs– Provision for Referendum on full transfer of primary

legislative powers

Wales 2011: the Background, 2• 2007: One Wales coalition agreement

• 2008-09: All Wales Convention

• BUT continuing caution…– ‘Shadow of 1979’: unwillingness to believe the survey

evidence!– Labour parliamentary opposition

• Final agreement on referendum: March 3rd 2011

The Campaign: General Context

• Greatly constrained by referendum not being on a ‘fundamental constitutional issue’

• Difficult for campaigns to craft appealing messages to voters

• Difficult to frame intelligible and legally accurate referendum question (Lord’s Prayer!)

• Problems with PPERA:– No official campaigns– Constraints on spending (2011<1997!)

The Yes Campaign• Support from all four party leaderships in NAW• Also widespread support from civil society• The ‘Establishment’ campaign• Paradox of Yes position: Main strength also main

weakness – constrained precisely because it was so all-inclusive– Had to ‘wait for Labour’– Limited in what it could campaign against (not LCOs,

not UK govt)– Main stake-holders had other priorities (particularly

2011 election)

The Yes Campaign

The No campaign• Little mainstream support, meaning…– Little ability to raise resources: spending <£5k?– No prominent politicians active. Resulting

inexperience obvious in:• Breakdown in message discipline by end (increasingly

arguing for abolition)• Seem to have believed own propaganda (own polls)• Failure to produce promised campaign material

• Local campaigns very weak– ‘Grassroots campaign’ largely without roots

• Some of the spokesmen very weak – Welsh-speaking voices just plain embarrassing

The No Campaign

Referendum Voting Intention 2007-11

Series1

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Yes No DK/Not Voting

Why was the No side so weak?• Polls as self-fulfilling prophecy?• Party cues very strong. Labour (eventually) more

united on devolution than ever• Habermas and Hain– Force of better argument.

• Status quo so obviously flawed (cf. ‘scrutiny’)• Slippery slope-ism busted flush

– Hain (2005) was right: flaws would lead to irresistible pressure for further devolution

• Wales has changed – Death of ‘Assimilationist Unionism’ and growth of

‘Devolutionist Unionism’

Wales 2011: the Result, 1

Yes: 517,132 (63.5%)

No: 297,380 (36.5%)

Turnout = 35.6%

Wales, 2011: the Result, 2

Perhaps least important aspect of result is that it vindicated work of the Institute of Welsh Politics!

Key arguments post-1999:– Devolution increasingly ‘settled will’ in Wales too– Support evened out over country– Appetite for more very apparent

But overshadowed by focus on close 1997 result and legacy of the ‘shadow of 1979’

Turnout, 135.6% hardly good. Low by most historic UK and

international standards. But readily explicable:• No fundamental constitutional question at stake• Lack of official campaigns, and only one campaign

functioning at local level• Lack of interest in UK media• Timing (winter + forthcoming election)• General reduction in turnout in UK and elsewhere– 3 UK GEs before 1997 av. turnout = 74.8%– 3 UK GEs before 2011 av. turnout = 62%

Turnout, 2 (aggregate data)• 17 % difference between highest and lowest

figures across Wales• Turnout closely correlated with turnout in 1997

referendum and substantially so with 2010 GE– turnout strongly related to those factors that

shape turnout in general and in particular devolution referendums

• At aggregate level, turnout correlates with:– % Welsh-speakers in area– Rurality– % employed in professional/managerial roles

Turnout, 3 (individual-level data)• Turnout only moderately predicted by most social

characteristics: HH income, social class, national identity

• Slightly stronger correlation with welsh language; very strong with age

• Strong association with some political characteristics: Interest in politics, perceived duty to vote, perceived importance of referendum

• But weak relationship with constitutional preference, or perceived performance of devolved institutions

Yes .v. No: Homogenisation• Yes side won in 21 of 22 Welsh local authorities• Overall ‘swing’ from 1997 for Yes: 13.2%– Av. swing in 1997 No areas = 16.8%– Av. Swing in 1997 Yes areas = 10.4%– 8 highest ‘swings’ to Yes all in areas that voted No

in 1997

• 4 largest Yes ‘swings’ all in North Wales• Gap between highest and lowest Yes % =

26.6%, compared to 34.5% in 1997

Yes .v. No (aggregate data)• Yes % closely correlated (r = .90) with % Yes

in 1997 – but differences all greater homogeneity

• % Welsh identity and Welsh language in LA strongly related to % Yes vote; so also % Plaid vote

• % middle class and % Conservative vote 2010 negatively related to % LA Yes vote

Yes .v. No (individual-level data)• Yes vote lower amongst oldest age cohorts,

middle-class voters• Correlation between Yes vote and both Welsh

language and Welsh national identity• Yes vote uncorrelated with Interest in politics or

perceived duty to vote• Very strong relationship between Yes voting and

perceived importance of referendum, constitutional preference, and perceived performance of devolved institutions

Conclusions, 1What we can learn from Wales:

Don’t hold constitutionally frivolous referendums under flawed Referendum legislation in the middle of winter…

Further work to be done on modelling vote:• Impact of Party Cues• National Identities & Sentiments• Performance Politics

Conclusions, 2: Implications• Deeply-flawed referendum, but likely to have substantial

consequences…– Demonstrates ‘settled will’, therefore legitimacy not provided

by 1997 result now bestowed– Substantial pressure developing for devolution of further

areas, changes to financial settlement, possible Welsh jurisdiction etc.

– Coupled to reduction of MPs ensures that NAW will be main forum for Welsh democratic debate

– Welsh relationship with UK state from now inter-governmental in character

– Welsh MPs from now on very marginal figures in Wales and Westminster

And to find out more…

Richard Wyn Jones and Roger Scully, Wales Says Yes: the 2011 Welsh Referendum (University of Wales Press, 2012)