ORANGE WATER AND SEWER AUTHORITY - owasa.org · ORANGE WATER AND SEWER AUTHORITY ... Chatham County ... activation of the Orange County Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

ORANGE WATER AND SEWER AUTHORITY

A public, non-profit agency providing water, sewer and reclaimed water services

to the Carrboro-Chapel Hill community.

400 Jones Ferry Road Carrboro, NC 27510-2001

Equal Opportunity Employer Printed on Recycled Paper

Voice (919) 968-4421 www.owasa.org

Final Report

February 2017 Water Emergency

June 2, 2017

(Amended August 4, 2017)

Purpose

Provide a summary of the events and actions for improvements regarding the Orange Water and

Sewer Authority (OWASA) February 2017 Water Emergency.

Executive Summary

The water emergency in February 2017 resulted from the combination of: 1) an accidental

overfeed of fluoride which was contained at the Jones Ferry Road Water Treatment Plant (WTP),

but made it necessary to shut down the plant and obtain drinking water from the City of Durham;

and 2) a major water main break which occurred about 19 hours after the WTP had been shut

down. The major water main break caused the storage of drinking water for the Carrboro-Chapel

Hill community to drop to very low levels which resulted in a “Do Not Use, Do Not Drink”

directive by the Orange County Health Department for OWASA customers for about 25 hours.

Water with elevated levels of fluoride was fully contained within the WTP and OWASA’s

drinking water remained in full compliance with all quality standards throughout the event.

OWASA customers reduced water use by about 37% during the “Do Not Use, Do Not Drink”

directive. The supply of water was not exhausted and was available for fire protection.

The Board of Directors approved three Action Plans for improvements related to the emergency:

• Improvements related to the water main break at Foxcroft Drive (approved on March

23rd);

• Improvements for the reliability and safety of the fluoride feed system at the WTP

(approved on April 13th); and

• Improvements for strategic communications in OWASA-related emergencies (approved

on April 27th).

Fluoridation of drinking water is expected to resume this fall upon completion of fluoride feed

system improvements at the WTP.

OWASA deeply appreciates the cooperation and understanding of our customers, who

experienced disruption and hardship. We sincerely thank the City of Durham, Chatham County

and Town of Hillsborough for their water supply support. We are very grateful to Orange

County, the Towns of Chapel Hill and Carrboro, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

and other agencies for partnering with us to inform and otherwise serve the community during

the emergency.

Final Report on the February 2017 Water Emergency

June 2, 2017 (Amended August 4, 2017)

Page 2

1. Summary of Events – Thursday, February 2, 2017

At 3:22 p.m. on Thursday, February 2nd, the WTP was shut down due to an accidental overfeed

of fluoride in the treated drinking water. Testing confirmed that water with elevated levels of

fluoride was contained in the 1.5 million gallon (MG) clearwell located at the WTP and did not

enter the public drinking water distribution system.

The decision to shut down the WTP was made by OWASA’s Water Supply and Treatment

Manager to avoid pumping drinking water to OWASA customers that wasn’t in full compliance

with all applicable drinking water standards. In making this decision, it was understood that

OWASA would follow standard protocol by immediately initiating actions to bring drinking

water into OWASA’s distribution system through emergency interconnection(s) with the City of

Durham (and Chatham County and/or Town of Hillsborough, if necessary). In doing so, the

expectation at the time was that a sufficient amount of water would be available from the City of

Durham (Durham) to maintain an adequate supply of drinking water for the estimated 48 hours

needed to return the WTP to service. It was also understood at the time that depending solely

upon the water made available through the interconnects increased the risk of a drinking water

shortage. A drinking water shortage could occur if there was an unanticipated increase in water

demand (such as a large water main break or major fire) and/or an unexpected loss of sufficient

supply through the emergency interconnection(s). Staff decided to accept that risk in order not to

send any overfluoridated water into the distribution system.

At 5:09 p.m., the primary emergency interconnection with Durham was activated at a rate of

approximately 6 million gallons per day (MGD) by running a booster station to pump the water

from Durham into OWASA’s water distribution system.

OWASA issued a news release at 6:00 p.m. to inform the public of the accidental overfeed of

fluoride that was contained within the WTP. The release noted that OWASA expected to



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continue to receive drinking water from Durham for a few days and requested that customers use

water wisely.

At 9:10 p.m., OWASA staff began pumping the water with elevated fluoride out of the WTP’s

clearwell into OWASA’s wastewater collection and treatment system. The treatment process at

OWASA’s Mason Farm Wastewater Treatment Plant (WWTP) does not remove fluoride so the

rate of pumping was controlled to avoid a water quality violation in the WWTP’s treated water.

OWASA issued a second news release at 11:00 p.m. to renew the request for conservation.

By the end of the day on Thursday, February 2nd, drinking water storage in OWASA’s system

(solid blue in graphic below) had dropped to about 2.8 MG, which was significantly below

normal minimum storage of 5.0 MG (yellow line below), but still above the emergency storage

minimum of 2.0 MG (red line below).



Page 4

Summary of Events – Friday, February 3, 2017

Through the early morning hours of Friday, February

3rd, the quantity of drinking water stored in OWASA’s

system increased as expected to about 3.4 MG, but

was still well below the normal minimum storage

level. At the time, staff expected that the continued

use of the primary Durham interconnection would

keep water storage sufficiently above the 2.0 MG

emergency storage minimum for another 36 hours or

so until the WTP was projected to return to service.

At 8:00 a.m., OWASA issued a news release

requesting continued conservation.

At 10:13 a.m., water storage levels suddenly began

dropping at a very high rate. As a result, OWASA

field staff were notified of a suspected water main

break(s).

At 10:36 a.m., a customer called to report the location of the water main break was Foxcroft

Drive in Chapel Hill. OWASA crews were dispatched to that location to isolate the leak and

stop the loss of water.

At 11:00 a.m., OWASA staff requested immediate

activation of the Orange County Emergency Operations

Center (EOC) because water storage was expected to

drop below the 2.0 MG emergency storage level.

OWASA issued a news release at 11:30 a.m. declaring a

Water Emergency to include a “Do Not Use Water”

directive until further notice because the water supply

was running out. Water storage dropped to 1.8 MG,

well below the emergency minimum supply level.

Water main break at Foxcroft Drive



Page 5

At 11:30 a.m., OWASA crews isolated the 12-inch water main break at Foxcroft Drive which

resulted in loss of water service to about 250 people in the Foxcroft Drive area. About 1.3 MG

of water was lost from storage as a result of the water main break. The water main break

damaged Foxcroft Drive and flooded some residences at The Apartments at Midtown 501.

Working closely with partners at the EOC, at 2:00 p.m. the Orange County Health Department

issued a “Do Not Use, Do Not Drink” directive because drinking water storage had dropped to

1.8 MG. At that very low storage level, the community had very limited buffer should another

water main break occur and/or a major fire take place which could have resulted in a total loss of

water supply for the Carrboro-Chapel Hill community. Had OWASA’s water storage been

totally depleted, the time to refill, sample and test the water storage and distribution system to

ensure its safety would have taken at least two to three days, or perhaps more depending on the

circumstances.

The EOC held a media briefing at 4:00 p.m.

Summary of Events – Saturday, February 4, 2017

The pumping of water with elevated fluoride from the WTP clearwell to the wastewater system

continued as planned. OWASA staff began restarting the WTP at 7:30 a.m. on Saturday,

February 4th.

During the previous 20 hours, the water stored in OWASA’s system had increased to about 3.8

MG.



Page 6

At 12:34 p.m., bacterial testing of 10 sites in the OWASA service area confirmed that the water

was safe. When distribution system pressures drop below 20 pounds per square inch, the risk of

bacterial contamination increases. A backsiphonage event can occur when water from outside

the pipe seeps into the pipe through cracks, breaks, or joints in the water system. Such a system

failure carries with it the potential for bacterial contamination. Samples had been taken to ensure

that no bacteriological contamination had occurred.

At 2:30 p.m., working closely with partners at the EOC, the Orange County Health Department

rescinded the “Do Not Use, Do Not Drink” directive because water supply had returned to a near

normal minimum storage level and bacterial testing in the distribution system indicated that the

water was safe to drink. It was also clear at this time that the WTP was on schedule to be back in

service within the next four to six hours.

The EOC held a media briefing at 3:00 p.m.

At 3:30 p.m., the contractor working for OWASA completed repairs to the broken water main

and service was restored for about 250 people in the Foxcroft Drive area. However, those

affected in this area were issued a “Boil Water Advisory” until testing confirmed that the water

was safe to drink.

The WTP was returned to service at 6:37 p.m.

By 9:04 p.m., OWASA stopped receiving drinking water from Durham.



Page 7

Summary of Events – Sunday, February 5, 2017

At 7:00 a.m. on Sunday, February 5th, the “Boil Water Advisory” was lifted for the Foxcroft

Drive area after testing indicated that the water was safe to drink.

OWASA staff issued a news release at 9:00 a.m. lifting the request for conservation for all

customers.

2. Remediation of the WTP

The treated water with elevated levels of fluoride was contained at the WTP in the 1.5 MG

clearwell and associated piping and channels. The primary task to return the WTP to service was

to pump the water containing elevated fluoride out of the clearwell into OWASA’s wastewater

collection and treatment system at a rate which wouldn’t result in a water quality violation for

the treated water leaving the WWTP. The WWTP does not remove fluoride, so the rate of

pumping had to be controlled to ensure adequate dilution with the wastewater being collected

and treated. Additionally, pumping from the clearwell had to be carefully monitored and

controlled so the capacity of the wastewater collection system wasn’t exceeded (or a sewer

overflow would have occurred). Ultimately, three diesel powered pumps were used to pump the

water from the clearwell to the WWTP beginning on Thursday, February 2nd at 9:10 p.m. and

ending on Saturday, February 4th at 6:30 p.m.

OWASA staff began the process of restarting the WTP at 7:30 a.m. on February 4th by beginning

to treat a small amount of raw water and returning the water filters to service one by one in a safe



Page 8

and orderly manner. This process was completed and the WTP was returned to service at 6:37

p.m. on Saturday, February 4th.

During the shutdown, remediation and restarting of the WTP, OWASA staff remained in close

communication with NC Department of Environmental Quality staff in the Public Water Supply

Section.

3. Decision to shut down the WTP

The decision to shut down the WTP was made by OWASA’s Water Supply and Treatment

Manager to avoid pumping drinking water to OWASA customers that wasn’t in full compliance

with all applicable drinking water standards. In making this decision, it was understood that

OWASA would follow standard protocol by immediately initiating actions to bring drinking

water into OWASA’s distribution system through emergency interconnections with Durham (and

Chatham County and/or Town of Hillsborough, if necessary). In doing so, the expectation at the

time was that a sufficient amount of water would be available from Durham to maintain an

adequate supply of drinking water for the estimated 48 hours needed to return the WTP to

service.

It was also understood at the time that shutting down the WTP increased the risk of a drinking

water shortage should there be an unanticipated increase in water demand (such as a large water

main break or major fire) and/or an unexpected loss of sufficient supply from the emergency

interconnection(s) to meet demand. At the time, OWASA staff decided that the avoidance of a

violation of the drinking water quality standard for fluoride was the best course of action for the

community when weighed against what was believed to be a low risk of a large water main break

or loss of supply from Durham. Since September 2010, when staff began recording volume of

water lost from main breaks, there had been no main breaks which resulted in the loss of 1 MG

or more of water (1.3 MG was lost on February 3rd). Additionally, the Durham interconnection

booster pumping station is in excellent condition (only 10 years old) and is routinely tested to

ensure its readiness.

Alternatively, to reduce the risk of a water shortage, OWASA staff could have decided to keep

the WTP in service knowing that a water quality violation would occur. However, taking action

to knowingly violate drinking water standards could have resulted in civil and/or criminal

penalties. Such action could also have resulted in a review by the State Certification Board of

the license(s) of certified operator(s) who knowingly violated a drinking water standard. It is

important to note that there is no known regulatory guidance that supports intentionally

distributing water to the community that does not meet drinking water standards, to reduce the

risk of a water supply shortage. Furthermore, OWASA staff did not and still does not have

detailed information about possible short and long-term health risks of drinking water containing

elevated levels of fluoride. Had this “pump anyway” option been selected, staff would likely

have issued a “Do Not Drink” directive at the same time.



Page 9

4. The “Do Not Use, Do Not Drink” Directive

The “Do Not Use, Do Not Drink” directive was issued in consultation with EOC partners

because storage of drinking water in OWASA’s system had dropped to 1.8 MG, which was

below the emergency storage level of 2.0 MG. At that very low storage level, the community

had a very limited buffer should another water main break occur and/or a major fire take place,

either of which could have resulted in a total loss of water supply for the Carrboro-Chapel Hill

community. Had OWASA’s water storage been totally depleted, the time to refill, sample and

test the water storage and distribution system to ensure its safety would have taken at least two to

three days, or perhaps more depending on the circumstances.

When the decision was made, no options other than the “Do Not Use, Do Not Drink” directive

were seriously considered.

Had the supply of drinking water continued to drop below 1.8 MG, an option to keep the system

from running out of water would have been to quickly restart the WTP and pump water with

elevated levels of fluoride into OWASA’s storage and water distribution system. Had this been

done, the EOC would have developed the appropriate messages for the community to ensure

their safety. Keeping the water supply from running out completely is critically important for

fire protection and high-priority sanitation needs.

5. Conservation by OWASA Customers

OWASA customers were directed not to use OWASA drinking water from 11:30 a.m. on Friday,

February 3rd, to 2:30 p.m. on Saturday, February 4th. During that time, it is estimated that

OWASA customers reduced demand by 3.1 MG (a 37% decrease).



Page 10

During the “Do Not Use, Do Not Drink” period, all OWASA customers except about 250 people

in the Foxcroft Drive area (where water was shut off to isolate the water main break) had water

service available for their use.

Also of note, OWASA didn’t observe any reduction in demand in response to OWASA’s initial

requests on Thursday, February 2nd, and Friday, February 3rd, to use water for essential purposes

only.

6. Public Communications

With activation of the EOC including representatives of the Towns of Chapel Hill and Carrboro,

Orange County including the Health Department, UNC and UNC Health Care, the American

Red Cross, and others, OWASA participated in the Joint Information Center to coordinate public

communications including news conferences, news releases, text messages and web information.

Orange County also set up a phone bank at the EOC to respond to the numerous inquiries and

developed Spanish translations for distribution through its contact network.

OWASA staff used the following communication platforms and methods during the water

emergency:

• Constant Contact: distribution of news releases to more than 13,800 e-mail addresses,

primarily from the Customer Service database.

• OC Alerts: distribution of notices by telephone, e-mail and text to more than 22,000

people and including additional e-mail addresses which may be used under State law for

health and safety reasons.

• Website: Information posted and updated on the homepage and the Updates on Water

Event page created on February 7th.

• Twitter: the number of Twitter followers grew from about 300 before the emergency to

about 1,100. We sent 14 tweets during the emergency.

• Responding to individual inquiries received by e-mail and telephone. On Friday,

February 3rd, we set up an informal phone bank due to the large number of calls. E-mails

sent to [email protected] were recorded and tracked in our software to maintain a list of

pending requests and log when they were resolved. Our Spanish line was maintained by

bilingual Customer Service staff.

• News media coverage: We provided information as noted above and responded to

interview and information requests from print and broadcast media. There was extensive

news coverage including a national news item on CBS.

7. Investigating the fluoride overfeed and water main break

On Monday, February 6, 2017, OWASA staff contracted with CH2M Hill North Carolina, Inc.

(CH2M) to conduct an independent evaluation of the cause of fluoride overfeed. CH2M was

selected for this work because of their expertise in water treatment and problem solving and their

prior lack of involvement in the design and operation of the WTP. For the water main break,

http://www.owasa.org/2017-water-emergency

http://www.owasa.org/2017-water-emergency

mailto:[email protected]



Page 11

OWASA staff contracted with AECOM Technical Services of North Carolina, Inc. (AECOM)

because of their familiarity with OWASA’s water distribution system. Each consultant was

requested to provide their findings to OWASA staff by noon, February 10, 2017.

OWASA staff issued a news release at 12:17 p.m. on Friday, February 10, 2017, notifying the

public that the consultant reports below had been posted to the OWASA website:

• Onsite Fluoride overfeed at Jones Ferry Road Water Treatment Plant on February 2, 2017

(Report by CH2M)

• Water main break in Northeast Chapel Hill (Report by AECOM)

o Letter from AECOM Summarizing the Report on Water Main Break

CH2M determined that the primary cause of the accidental fluoride overfeed was an

unintentional operator keystroke that increased the pump feed rate to higher than the desired

level. Twelve seconds later, the operator entered the corrected command that should have

resulted in the correct pump feed rate. However, according to the control system and logs, the

pump acknowledged the command but failed to respond appropriately. The pump has been sent

to the manufacturer for examination to determine why it failed to respond appropriately. The

secondary cause was that during subsequent routine WTP inspection, the operator failed to take

timely corrective action.

AECOM determined that the water main located on Foxcroft Drive failed due to improper

installation in 1972.

8. Opportunities for Improvement

In addition to the independent consultants’ reports, OWASA staff conducted After Action

Reviews (AARs) on various elements of the water emergency. The purposes of the AARs were

to determine what went well in response to the Water Emergency (that should be repeated in the

future) and to determine opportunities for improvement. The information from the AARs, the

consultant reports, feedback from the public and guidance by the OWASA Board of Directors

resulted in staff preparing Action Plans for improvement regarding: 1) Foxcroft Drive Water

Main Break; 2) the Fluoride Feed System; and 3) Strategic Communications During OWASA-

Related Emergencies. These Action Plans were shared with the public and the Board of

Directors invited public feedback at Board meetings prior to approving the plans.

Foxcroft Drive Water Main Break

This Action Plan was discussed and approved by the Board at the March 23, 2017

meeting. Key actions for improvement are:

• Additional staff training;

• Updates to Standard Operating Procedures; and

• Updates to the list of contractors available for emergency repair of infrastructure.

http://www.owasa.org/Data/Sites/1/media/2017wateremergency/final_primary-and-contributing-causes-of-loss-of-function-of-the-jones-ferry-wtp_10feb17.pdf

http://www.owasa.org/Data/Sites/1/media/2017wateremergency/water-main-break-tm.pdf

http://www.owasa.org/Data/Sites/1/media/2017wateremergency/water-main-break-evaluation_cover-letter.pdf

http://www.owasa.org/Data/Sites/1/media/about/agendas/2017/20170323_agenda_for_web.pdf#page=39



Page 12

Fluoride Feed System

This Action Plan was discussed by the Board at the March 23rd Board meeting and discussed

further and approved at the April 13, 2017 Board meeting. Key actions for improvement are:

• Replacement of feed pumps;

• Installation of new automated monitoring and control system with alarms and

safeguards;

• Additional staff training; and

• Updates to Standard Operating Procedures.

Strategic Communications During OWASA-Related Emergencies

This Action Plan was discussed and approved by the Board at the April 27, 2017

meeting. Key actions for improvement are:

• Continuing to work with local partners on public communications for emergency

preparedness and response;

• Active and responsive relationships with the media and other stakeholders;

• Improving internal procedures and resources;

• Communicating with public about emergency preparedness in homes and businesses; and

• Additional staff training.

Other Opportunities for Improvement

In addition to the specific improvements covered in the three Action Plans, OWASA staff will:

• Continue to participate with staff from Orange County, the Towns of Carrboro and

Chapel Hill, the University and other stakeholders in an AAR process being facilitated by

Orange County Emergency Services;

• Work closely with water utilities in the region to further explore opportunities to further

enhance the region’s water supply reliability and resiliency;

• Work with customers and other stakeholders on matters of insurance, preparedness and

communications during periods of service interruption; and

• Proactively share its “lessons learned” from the February 2017 Water Emergency with

utility peers and other stakeholders.

9. What worked well?

As noted in section 8, staff identified actions and activities in response to the water emergency

that worked well, as summarized below:

• OWASA drinking water in the distribution system remained in full compliance with all

quality standards (water with elevated fluoride was safely contained at the WTP and did

not enter the public drinking water system);

• The supply of safe drinking water was not exhausted;





Page 13

• The Orange County EOC, working cooperatively with the Towns of Chapel Hill and

Carrboro, the University, OWASA and other stakeholders, performed effectively to keep

the community safe and informed;

• There was extensive media coverage of the event;

• The interlocal mutual aid assistance of drinking water supplied by City of Durham,

Chatham County and (although not necessary) the Town of Hillsborough was excellent;

• OWASA customers and stakeholders were understanding and responded to the “Do Not

Use, Do Not Drink” directive by reducing water use by about 37%;

• Remediation of the WTP by OWASA staff went according to plan and without a

violation of any water quality standards for the wastewater collection and treatment

system;

• OWASA worked hard to be fully transparent and forthcoming with all communications

with the public and other stakeholders; and

• No OWASA accidents or injuries occurred.

10. OWASA’s Incurred Costs

As of April 30, 2017, the operating costs incurred by OWASA (not including staff time) in

response to the water emergency is about $126,000, as summarized below:

Item Cost

WTP fluoride overfeed $71,000

Water main break $55,000

The cost to upgrade the fluoride feed system at the WTP is estimated to be between $123,500

and $175,500. These improvements are expected to be completed by the fall of 2017.

11. Closing

OWASA deeply appreciates the cooperation and understanding of our customers, who

experienced disruption and hardship. We sincerely thank the City of Durham, Chatham County

and Town of Hillsborough for their water supply support. We are very grateful to Orange

County, the Towns of Chapel Hill and Carrboro, the University and other agencies for partnering

with us to inform and otherwise serve the community so well during the emergency.

The OWASA team will work hard to implement the many improvements noted in this report to

further improve the reliability and resiliency of our services.

Submitted by:

Ed Kerwin

Executive Director

Documents

ORANGE WATER AND SEWER AUTHORITY - owasa.org · ORANGE WATER AND SEWER AUTHORITY ... Chatham County ... activation of the Orange County Emergency Operations Center (EOC)