ORAL HISTORY MEMOIR

BAYLOR UNIVERSITY PROGRAM FOR ORAL HISTORY

Interviewee: Leon Jaworski

Date: November 10, 1978

Place: Baylor University School of Law Room 107 Waco, Texas

Interviewers: Thomas L. Charlton

W. Frank Newton

JAWORSKI INTERVIEW NO. 5

THOMAS L. CHARLTON: This is Thomas L. Charlton. Today is

November 10, 1978. W. Frank Newton, professor of law at

the Baylor School of Law, and I are interviewing for the

fifth time the Honorable Leon Jaworski of Houston, Texas.

This interview is a part of a series of interviews with

Mr. Jaworski concerning his career in the field of law, his

life in Waco and Houston, and a number of events that he has

been fortunate to participate in at the national level. The

interview is taking place in the rare books room of the law

school library in room 107 in Morrison Constitution Hall.

Mr. Jaworski, we're—we're very pleased to—to be able

to continue our series with you today; and today, we want to

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concentrate on a number of periods of service that you ren-

dered during the decade of the sixties. And to begin very

directly, we'd like to talk first of all about your work

following the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in

1963 in Dallas. We know that you served as special counsel

to the Texas attorney general following that event, and we'd

like for you to try to go back in your meraory to that time

and—and tell us where you were at that tirae and how you

became involved in the investigation following that tragic

event in Dallas.

LEON JAWORSKI: I had been in the East and I was traveling

to Dallas to join several attorneys in a conference that

related to litigation that was pending in Texas at the time,

involving sorae insurance companies. When I was nearing

Dallas on this particular flight, the pilot announced that

we would be delayed a few minutes in landing because

President Kennedy's plane was coraing down ahead of us. He

was to speak in Dallas, and our plane would be held in pat-

tern until such tirae as his plane had landed and the presi-

dent and all of those accompanying him had deplaned. It

wasn't very long. There were some people meeting me; and we

went to a club in one of the buildings in Dallas, downtown

Dallas. We were having luncheon there to discuss these raat-

ters iraraediately following luncheon.

As we were having our first course, as I recall it, a

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w a i t e r came running in and said t h a t P r e s i d e n t Kennedy had been

s h o t , r i d i n g in the motorcade and a l s o sa id t h a t Lyndon Johnson

had been s h o t . Of cour se , t h a t l e f t us aghas t a t the thought of

both these men having been—been sho t—the p r e s i d e n t and the vice

p r e s i d e n t . We asked for raore informat ion , t ry ing to determine

whether they were j u s t wounded or whether they were k i l l e d and

were unable to ge t much informat ion. But i t was not too long

a f t e r t h a t — t h e w a i t e r s were l i s t e n i n g over radios—we began to

turn r a d i o s on; b u t we learned t h a t i t was John Connally and not

Lyndon Johnson, the second man who was sho t . We s t i l l were not

sure of the e x t e n t of the in ju ry or the wound. Then, a f t e r a

s h o r t while though, l e t ' s say wi th in t h i r t y rainutes from the

tirae, perhaps f o r t y - f i v e rainutes of the tirae we f i r s t learned of

i t , we were, then , to ld t h a t P r e s i d e n t Kennedy was dead. And we

learned t h a t John Connally was r a t h e r seve re ly wounded but was

doing f a i r l y wel l a t the h o s p i t a l . Then—I d o n ' t r e c a l l exac t l y

how long I s tayed in D a l l a s . We did f i n i sh our conference , and

I'ra beginning to think t h a t maybe we were there for a longer

per iod of time than j u s t a day. But I b e l i e v e t h a t ' s a—tha t

f i r s t r e c o l l e c t i o n i s i n c o r r e c t . We probably depar ted t h a t

a f t e rnoon , and I came back to Dal las a f t e r a few days . And the

reason I was not c e r t a i n i s because I r e c a l l t h a t Waggoner Carr

and I went by to see John Connal ly , then , a t the h o s p i t a l ; so

t h i s must have been s eve ra l days l a t e r , obv ious ly . No one was

see ing hira except h i s wife and h i s faraily for the f i r s t few days

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because he was really badly hurt.

W. FRANK NEWTON: Then you did not contact, nor did anyone

contact you iraraediately on the day of the assassination in

Dallas?

JAWORSKI: No. No. I returned to Houston, and Thanksgiving

came along. We—and by we I meant—I mean ray wife and I and

raaybe sorae of the children, even, went along to our place at

Wimberly, to our ranch there. We were going to watch the

Texas A&M-University of Texas game in the afternoon; and

Waggoner Carr called from Austin and said it was very impor-

tant for hira to raeet rae, talk with rae. And I said, "Well,

can't it wait until toraorrow morning; and I'll corae into

Austin and talk to you?" This was on a Thursday afternoon,

of course. And he said, "No, this is pressing. I need to

see you, and I'll be driving out, soraebody will bring me to

your place." So I told hira that I would meet hira at a cer-

tain place so that he would have no trouble finding—into

the ranch—and, also, frora there on to the main house which

is some distance away from the gate. So I got in ray jeep,

and I drove over and waited for hira to corae along the road,

and I met Waggoner Carr there together with someone who was

driving for him. We went to the main house of the ranch and

went to the porch, and he and I sat there and talked in the

afternoon. I did not get to see any of the game, I well

remember that.

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What he said to me was that it would become necessary

for Texas to hold a court of inquiry.

NEWTON: For purposes of clarity let's just remind everyone

that Waggoner Carr was serving as attorney general of Texas

at that time.

JAWORSKI: That's right. That's right. And he felt that it

was his obligation to call this court of inquiry. He told

me that he had already announced his plans to do so; that he

had been in Washington; that he had conferred with Lyndon

Johnson, who was then president; and that the conclusion was

that such a court should be held. It was announced nation-

wide over—over television.

NEWTON: Do you reraeraber what he told you, Mr. Jaworski,

about the genesis of the idea that the State of Texas, as an

entity, would hold such an inquiry?

JAWORSKI: Because it happened in Dallas, he thought that it

was appropriate for the state to do it. And he felt that it

was incurabent to get started as soon as possible; and he was

approaching me, asking me to serve as the special assistant

attorney general in charge of the court of inquiry.

NEWTON: So far as you know, was this apparently Waggoner

Carr's own idea? that is, the idea that the State of Texas,

since this assassination had occurred in the state of Texas,

that the State of Texas ought to be responsible for conduct-

ing an inquiry?

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JAWORSKI: He had d i scussed i t with P r e s i d e n t Lyndon Johnson.

With who e l s e he may have d i scussed i t , I siraply d o n ' t know.

NEWTON: Okay.

JAWORSKI: He may have even mentioned t h a t to rae because he did

say to rae t h a t the re were s eve ra l who had a l l agreed t h a t I

should serve in t h i s c a p a c i t y .

NEWTON: There a r e , I suppose, sorae who would be i n t e r e s t e d and

who would th ink about how in our f ede ra l systera—which i s one of

the models, r e a l l y , for t h i s kind of governmental systera in the

wor ld—(chuckles) how i t was t h a t someone decided t h a t t h i s

should be handled, a t l e a s t in p a r t , by the S t a t e as well as the

f ede ra l government ins tead of simply d e f e r r i n g to a federa l

i nqu i ry which must have, from the o u t s e t , have been obviously a

pending i n q u i r y .

JAWORSKI: I th ink I can c l a r i f y t h a t . The idea of a federa l

inqu i ry by a commission did not a r i s e u n t i l two or th ree days

l a t e r , and I can t e l l you what prompted i t . To ge t back to our

conversa t ion a t the t ime, I to ld Carr t h a t , of course , I wanted

to serve i f i t was a s e r v i c e to the s t a t e and to the n a t i o n . Now

I had many cases t h a t were then pending and I had o ther o b l i g a -

t i o n s , coraraitments of one kind or ano the r . And I asked him to

give me u n t i l the next morning, and I would l e t him know. And I

c a l l ed him the next morning and to ld him t h a t I would s e r v e .

The—I r e t u r n ed to Houston and I was in Houston for two or th ree

days . Waggoner Carr sa id to me, did I have any ob j ec t i on in h i s

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asking Col. Robert Storey, who was also known as Dean Storey

of the Southern Methodist University Law School, a former

president of the American Bar Association and a very close

friend of mine who had also participated in the war-crimes

trials in Europe—to—to join as special counsel also. And

I told Carr, by all means, I thought it was an appropriate

thing to do for him to ask Dean Storey, especially inasmuch

as I felt that we needed the help of local citizens, public

officials, and others in Dallas who had firsthand infor-

mation of the facts. So, we left it at that.

I had been back in Houston for a day or two—I went back

to Houston pretty promptly—and I well remember that I had

in mind going to work on this. In fact, I had already gone

into the matter of what the statutes provided and what

precedent there was and what cases may have touched on such

an inquiry and so on. And I reraeraber it was a Monday

evening, and the law firra was having its partners' raeeting

at the Ben Milam Hotel, and calls carae in from Abe Fortas

and frora Nick Katzenbach and from Archibald Cox in quick

succession. Archibald Cox was in Washington at the tirae

and, I think, was still solicitor general. Katzenbach was

deputy attorney general, and Abe Fortas had been an adviser

of Lyndon Johnson's and was practicing law in Washington.

They were calling and saying: You better get up here. The

president has concluded that the situation was such that he

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had to appoin t a commission to make t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The

r e p o r t s in some of the European c o u n t r i e s are t h a t Johnson

had Kennedy a s s a s s i n a t e d so t h a t he could ascend to the

p r e s i d e n c y , and the r e p o r t s are beginning to gain raoraentum.

And i t was concluded as a r e s u l t of t h a t , t h a t a

n a t i o n a l coraraission should be s e t up and t h a t i t would be

raisunderstood i f t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n were confined to Texas,

conducted by Texas people and under the a u t h o r i t y of Texas

law. I t would then be sa id t h a t Lyndon Johnson, being a

Texan, had arranged a l l of t h i s as a cover-up under tak ing .

I was fu r the r to ld t h a t t h i s coramission would be s e t up. I t

l e f t Waggoner Carr somewhat on the limb because Waggoner had

announced n a t i o n a l l y — w i t h Lyndon Johnson ' s approval and

b l e s s i n g , t h a t the cour t of inqu i ry would be he ld , and here

he was with the Warren Coraraission having been appointed by

the p r e s i d e n t . The p r e s i d e n t moved r a t h e r r a p i d l y

because—I th ink For tas in p a r t i c u l a r , but maybe Katzenbach

a l s o , were p r e s s ing the p r e s i d e n t to do soraething about i t .

And the reason they were c a l l i n g me somewhat anxiously i s

because Ear l Warren, who did not want th i s—he was then the

chief j u s t i c e of the Supreme Court of the United S t a t e s —

accepted i t because Lyndon Johnson j u s t ta lked hira i n to i t ,

as a mat te r of f a c t . Told him t h a t i t was j u s t h i s duty to

do i t and t h a t he , as p r e s i d e n t , was expect ing hira to do i t ;

t h a t the coraraission had to have p r e s t i g e and s t a t u r e t h a t

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only he as the chief justice could give it; and that it was

very important for those disbelievers and those who were

casting aspersions at the president should have a feeling of

confidence in the commission that was conducting the

interrogation.

CHARLTON: How did you respond to the telephone calls you

received?

JAWORSKI: I said: Well, I would come up there. They said:

You had better come immediately. And the reason they were

urging me to come is because Earl Warren had said that he

didn't want any part of Waggoner Carr or the Texas

investigation. And they said: You better come up here

because this is unthinkable. What we'd like to do is for

you folks to work with the chief justice, of course, and

particularly with the public not understanding, it having

been announced nationally that this would be done.

Moreover, we cannot have two investigations. We can't have

the Warren Commission investigate and you in Texas investi-

gating at the same time. We could get all of the witnesses

so readily; and they'd have trouble getting them, you see.

NEWTON: Absolutely! Did you—

JAWORSKI: And they figured that the witnesses would

cooperate with us more than they would with—with the Warren

Commission. So—

NEWTON: Do you know if Chief Justice Warren's concern was

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j u s t t h a t — t h a t i s , the problem of having two d i f f e r e n t

e n t i t i e s i n v e s t i g a t i n g the sarae, ah, a s s a s s i n a t i o n ? Or was

t h e r e some pe r sona l (chuckles) animosi ty involved?

JAWORSKI: No, the re was—there was another reason t h a t he

had, as rauch as anything e l s e . I can t e l l you about i t a t

t h i s p o i n t . I l ea rned about i t a f t e r I go t to Washington,

and I went up the re p r e t t y proraptly. And I was t a lk ing with

Archibald Cox sorae b i t , and I was t a lk ing with Nick

Katzenbach sorae b i t . Nick Katzenbach was t a lk ing to the

chief j u s t i c e , and t h i s went on for about th ree days , and

the chief was very u n r e l e n t i ng a t the beginning . What he

sa id was t h a t he did not want t h i s to have any s o r t of a

p o l i t i c a l t inge and t h a t he thought i t had a p o l i t i c a l t inge

with the a t t o r n e y genera l of Texas being in there in the

raiddle of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n . Now t h i s i s the o s t e n s i b l e

reason t h a t he a s s igned . Now what o ther reasons he may have

had t h a t were not d i s c l o s e d , I d o n ' t know.

CHARLTON: By p o l i t i c a l t inge do you think he meant an

e l ec t ed o f f i c i a l working on the—

JAWORSKI: T h a t ' s i t e x a c t l y .

CHARLTON: — i n v e s t i g a t i o n ?

JAWORSKI: He thought t h a t i t would be misunderstood, and he

thought t h a t p o l i t i c s might creep i n to t h i s . He was very

eager t h a t t he re not be any type of p o l i t i c a l involvement;

and here you had an o f f i c eho lde r tha t—perhaps the second

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highest or at least the second most important in our state—

conducting this investigation. I should digress by saying

that each time the messages were brought back to me by

Katzenbach and some by Archibald Cox, they always said that

the chief justice wanted to see me immediately, but he

wanted to see me alone. And I made it plain to them I could

not do that, that I couldn't ditch the attorney general of

Texas and be holding conferences when the attorney general

had every right to participate in these, a greater right

than I had, and—

NEWTON: Was Mr. Carr in Washington at this time?

JAWORSKI: Yes. Yes, I asked him to come up, too, so that

we could both watch developments because we were at a very

crucial stage. The chief justice, on the second day, became

quite annoyed with Katzenbach. In fact, he no longer called

him Nick as he always did. Katzenbach told me that the

chief Justice spoke up in not only a firm voice but in a

critical voice and just said to him, (raises voice)

"General," which is a name that is used for the attorney

general and the deputy attorney general; and he would

address him that way instead of addressing him Nick—as

Nick. And I did not have to persuade Katzenbach—I did not

have to persuade Cox that it was just unthinkable for us to

withdraw our part of the investigation; if the two couldn't

be melded, couldn't be joined sorae way or merged, that there

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could just forego participating or conducting one on our

own. And I tried to reassure them about the attorney general

whom I knew very well. And I assured thera of cooperation and

every reassurance I could give. He told me that the chief

justice, whom I knew personally and with whora I had discussions

before and to whom I had argued cases, was very kindly disposed

to me and wanted me to become a part of it. And they said that

he had had high hopes that I would be a part of the investigation.

And parenthetically I should state that the chief told rae

later—although I'm getting a little bit ahead of the story,

but it fits into this part of it—the chief told me later that

they had had hopes before they selected Lee Rankin as the

general counsel of the commission that I might consider taking

it. And he said, of course, as soon as he heard that I had

becorae a special assistant to the attorney general, he had to

lay this aside. And I thanked him and told him that I appre-

ciated the honor implicit in what he had said, and then I—by

that tirae you can tell that I—he had asked that I talk with

hira alone, on the assurance, though, that he would later talk

with me and the attorney general together.

CHARLTON: What was Attorney General Carr saying to

Mr. Katzenbach and Mr. Cox and others while you were in

Washington trying to work out this very delicate matter?

JAWORSKI: He was somewhat disgusted with the chief justice

and disappointed in his attitude. Waggoner Carr felt that

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wanted to do was c o n t r i b u t e . He wasn ' t t r y ing to hog the

s p o t l i g h t . He did not want to raake a p o l i t i c a l f oo tba l l of

i t or have p o l i t i c s take a p lace in the m a t t e r , big or

s m a l l . And he f e l t t h a t the fea rs of the chief j u s t i c e were

no t j u s t i f i e d , and he expressed himself t h a t way p r e t t y

w e l l . What I was doing during those two or th ree days of

confe rences , p r i m a r i l y I was under taking to keep Waggoner

Carr calm and o b j e c t i v e about i t . At the same t ime, I saw

t h a t the chief j u s t i c e was beginning to y ie ld sorae ground.

At one tirae i t looked as i f he would y i e ld none. But he was

cont inuing to t a l k ; and a f t e r I ta lked with him, I f e l t

b e t t e r about the whole ma t t e r ; and we arranged a meet ing,

then , with Carr p r e s e n t and Katzenbach p r e sen t and Cox p r e s -

e n t , as I r e c a l l i t .

NEWTON: Had At torney General Carr been asked, or conferred

wi th , in terms of the arrangement which was made for you to

see the chief j u s t i c e alone and then to see the two of you

toge the r?

JAWORSKI: I would never have seen the chief j u s t i c e wi thout

Waggoner C a r r ' s agreeraent and—

NEWTON: So t h a t when you went to see the chief j u s t i c e

a lone , t h a t c a r r i e d the b l e s s i n g s of At torney General Carr—

JAWORSKI: T h a t ' s c o r r e c t .

NEWTON: —he knew about i t ahead of time and understood?

JAWORSKI: T h a t ' s c o r r e c t .

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CHARLTON: Tell us how you resolved the dilemma then.

JAWORSKI: Well, I talked to the chief justice and said, "Now,

Mr. Chief Justice, if you will just put yourself in ray position

and put yourself in Waggoner Carr's position, in good faith it

had been announced to the nation that he would participate in

these raatters. And you say to me that you would welcome ray help

because you feel that you will need help in Texas"—which it

turned out, he did need help in Texas. And I said, "You—you

feel that you need this help. You want it, but there is no way

that I can be of any help to you. There's no way that Bob Storey

can be of any help to you unless Waggoner Carr is in the matter.

And I think I know Waggoner Carr. You don't know him; but if we

have an understanding that this is going to be handled on an

objective and constructive basis without politics entering into

it, I can assure you that Waggoner Carr will abide by it. And as

far as I'ra concerned, I'll have nothing to do with it if politics

begins to rear its ugly head." So then I said, "Now the only way

that we can do this is: we're going to have to have a raeeting

with Waggoner Carr present, talking to you just like I'ra talking

to you, Mr. Chief Justice." Finally he said, "All right, I'll

agree to it."

It was embarrassing because he would direct all of the

questions to me. He would ignore Carr. Carr was sitting to the

right of rae, and he wouldn't pay any attention to him at all.

And he kept talking with me, and he kept directing his questions

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and raaking s t a t e m e n t s ; and he was asking for ray responses

and, " I s t h i s agreeab le to you?" and " I s t h i s the way you

would do i t ? Do you fee l t h a t t h i s i s a good way for us to

j o i n t l y do i t ? " and so on. And then I ' d say, "Mr. Carr , how

do you fee l about t h a t ? " And t h i s i s the way i t went on.

Most of the tirae I would turn to hira and l e t hira give the

r e sponse , bu t the chief continued to always d i r e c t the

ques t i ons to me. But, t h a t soon blew over .

And I d o n ' t know whether you want me to cont inue on to

say how the (both t a lk ing )

CHARLTON: What did you conclude then, Mr. Jaworski?

JAWORSKI: We concluded t h i s : t h a t we could work well

t o g e t h e r . Waggoner Carr was s a t i s f i e d ; the chief was

s a t i s f i e d . The p r e c i s e agreement was t h a t we would be

n o t i f i e d of any m a t e r i a l wi tness who appeared before the

coramission so t h a t e i t h e r Waggoner Carr or I or Bob Storey

would be p r e s e n t . Lee Rankin, the genera l counse l , was to

l e t us know in ample t ime. If more than one of us wanted to

be p r e s e n t , i f i t was a mat ter of a p a r t i c u l a r wi tness t h a t

both Waggoner and I , for i n s t a n c e , wanted to hea r , then, we

could be p r e s e n t . We would not p a r t i c i p a t e in the asking of

ques t ions d i r e c t . We would—

CHARLTON: Why do you suppose t h a t was a p a r t of the

arrangement?

JAWORSKI: I t d i d n ' t make t h a t much d i f f e r e n c e to u s .

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f r a n k l y . i wou ldn ' t have pressed the po in t a t a l l . The way

the coraraission ope ra t ed , i t s a t around a t ab l e and there

were seldora raore than th ree or four of thera p r e s e n t out of

the e n t i r e commission, sometimes only the chief and somebody

e l s e . He was always p r e s e n t , the chief was. He ca r r i ed on

the d u t i e s of the Supreme Court along with t h a t which I take

off my ha t to t h i s gentleman. He spent many e x t r a hours as

a r e s u l t of i t . He raet—at t i raes, as I say , there would be

only th ree or four p r e s e n t , soraetimes as many as s ix or

seven, soraetiraes only one, and sometimes the chief a lone .

But, he always provided us with a desk r i g h t c lose by so

t h a t we could hear anything we wanted t o , and there was no

reason why I c o u l d n ' t pass to Lee Rankin a note saying to

Lee, "Why c o u l d n ' t you ask t h i s ? " Usual ly before any very

important wi tness came up, a very m a t e r i a l w i t n e s s , Lee

Rankin and I would s i t down—and I'ra sure the same thing was

done with Bob Storey when he would be t h e r e — to d i scuss the

area of i nqu i ry and p r e c i s e l y what should be brought out by

t h i s wi tness so as to raake sure t h a t every th ing was fu l ly

covered. And a l l of the p r i n c i p a l wi tnesses I heard

p e r s o n a l l y : Marina Oswald, a l l of t hose , even tua l ly—

NEWTON: Mr. Jaworsk i , was the unders tanding t h a t you would—

t h a t the S t a t e of Texas, I should say—would not conduct a

s e p a r a t e , independent inqu i ry a t l e a s t i n i t i a l l y — t h a t i s ,

u n t i l you had l i s t e n e d to the wi tnes ses brought before the

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Warren Commission?

JAWORSKI: I'ra glad you asked that. The understanding was

that we would not do anything by way of an inquiry that

would conflict with the Warren Commission's conducting of

its full investigation. But once the Warren Commission had

completed its investigation and had told us that they were

through interrogating witnesses, we were then at liberty to

interrogate witnesses; and we were also at liberty to write

our own report if we were not satisfied with the report that

the Warren Coraraission had written.

NEWTON: Was there—was there a part of an agreeraent that you

worked out with the chief justice which had to do with your

facilitating in finding witnesses or assisting in collecting

lead information in the State of Texas?

JAWORSKI: As raatters turned out, it was very fortunate for

the chairman. Chief Justice Earl Warren, and the members of

the commission that we were in the picture.

At that time in Dallas, the chief justice was keenly

disliked. There were streamers and banners in many dif-

ferent parts of Dallas that said, "Impeach Earl Warren."

You must remember that the racial issue was at its height,

much strife. And to use a comraon expression in Dallas, he

was about as popular as an illegitimate child at a family

reunion. And the chief soon found out how lacking in popu-

larity he was in the city of Dallas. Worse than that, some

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of the witnesses—and I'm not pinpointing any in particular;

but let me just mention the category to you: the chief of

police, the chief of detectives, the sheriff, others of

importance in Dallas—they had no particular interest in

Earl Warren or in appearing before hira. The way the raatter

was finally resolved is that Bob Storey, who knew all of

these people in Dallas, arranged for the chief justice to

come to Dallas; and it was not known that he was coming. He

wanted to inspect the school depository building in which

Oswald was situated when the assassination took place and

from which he shot with his rifle. The—there was no—there

was no preannouncement at all regarding the visit of Earl

Warren. He came; he was ensconced in Bob Storey's apart-

ment, as I reraeraber it, in Dallas, and then was taken to the

school depository building so he could see for himself where

this happened. Then he was given an opportunity to talk to

some of the witnesses who were most material, who were

public officials in Dallas, and then some of them came to

Washington, also, and testified. It turned out very well;

but I think by the time that the investigation was reaching

the closing stages, that Earl Warren was extremely happy

over the arrangement that had been made. During the course

of the investigation, I had occasion to talk to him several

times. One afternoon about four o'clock, he told Lee

Rankin, general counsel—he said, "Lee, let this be the last

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t a l k with Leon a w h i l e . " And he s a i d , "Well and good," and

l a t e r we s t a r t e d t a lk ing around 4:15 or 4 :20 , and we were

s t i l l t he re a t e i g h t o ' c l o c k . I t was then t h a t I l earned

of the tremendous admira t ion t h a t Ear l Warren had for Hugo

Black. During the course of t h a t t a l k with the chief j u s t i c e ,

which went on way p a s t the d in ing hour, I am c e r t a i n t ha t

dur ing the course of t h a t t a l k the chief j u s t i c e must have

r e f e r r e d to Hugo B l a c k ' s views, quoted him a t l e a s t a dozen,

maybe as raany as f i f t e e n or e igh teen times—more so than any

o the r one—as a mat te r of f a c t , raore so by two or th ree fo ld

than any o ther j u s t i c e or any o ther i n d i v i d u a l . I th ink he

had a high regard for Hugo B lack ' s unders tanding of the Cons-

t i t u t i o n . And I th ink t h a t Ear l Warren, who had not served

as a judge before he came to the Supreme Court , leaned very

rauch on Hugo B l a c k ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the C o n s t i t u t i o n — n ot

n e c e s s a r i l y always the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n so much as h i s knowl-

edge of ma t t e r s t h a t r e l a t e d to the C o n s t i t u t i o n .

NEWTON: Did you sense , Mr. Jaworsk i , t h a t he adhered to or

shared Mr. J u s t i c e B l a c k ' s very , very broad view of the

C o n s t i t u t i o n ? — t h a t i s , an almost unbending d e s i r e to look

a t i t in whole c lo th ins tead of being pragmat ic .

JAWORSKI: I th ink t h a t ' s r i g h t . And I b e l i e v e — I have not

checked and d o n ' t r e c a l l any s t a t i s t i c s on the raatter a t a l l ;

bu t I had the f ee l ing t h a t the two of them probably were on

the same s ide of the cases t h a t involved C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s sues

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a l o n g .

CHARLTON: Let me ask a genera l ques t ion a t t h i s p o i n t , Mr.

J a w o r s k i . Why do you suppose the chief j u s t i c e wanted to

have t h i s informal chat with you?

JAWORSKI: By t h a t time he had go t t en to know rae even

b e t t e r ; and I had been a c t i v e in sorae ma t t e r s t ha t had come

to h i s a t t e n t i o n . And he—he j u s t undertook to—to v i s i t

wi th—I d o n ' t know why i t was t h a t he had considered me for

t h a t p o s t . I d o n ' t th ink t h i s o r i g i n a t e d with him. I d o n ' t

know—I d o n ' t know who ta lked with him about i t . He may

have—they raay have had a—a number of names. J u s t as I

learned the o the r day for the f i r s t t ime, i f I can

d i g r e s s — I d o n ' t know whether you've read Arthur

S c h l e s i n g e r ' s book. I did not know t h a t Kennedy was

th inking of me, along with some o t h e r s , for pos s ib l e

appointment to the Suprerae Court . I knew t h a t i t was in

Lyndon—it was in Lyndon Johnson ' s mind; bu t I ' d never heard

t h a t be fo re . Here was a man who had access to the—to the

inner c i r c l e s . So, you never know.

NEWTON: (both t a l k ing ) Don ' t you think—

JAWORSKI: I d o n ' t know what was in Ear l Warren 's mind.

NEWTON: — t h a t the Kennedy c o n s i d e r a t i on must have come out

of the M i s s i s s i p p i a c t i v i t i e s , Mr. Jaworski? Or do you—or

do you have any fee l for how you might have come to h i s

a t t e n t i o n ?

308

JAWORSKI: No, because t h a t happened before t h a t t ime. I t hap-

pened before the M i s s i s s i p p i a c t i v i t i e s because Byron White was

deputy a t t o r n e y genera l—

NEWTON: T h a t ' s r i g h t .

JAWORSKI: —and was put on the cour t a t the time t h a t I was

under c o n s i d e r a t i o n , according to Arthur S c h l e s i n g e r . And Byron

White was not the deputy a t t o r n e y genera l a t the tirae of the

M i s s i s s i p p i raatter. He had a l ready been s i t t i n g on the Supreme

Court and—

NEWTON: T h a t ' s c o r r e c t .

JAWORSKI: —and Nick Katzenbach was the deputy a t t o r n e y genera l

a t the t ime, so i t wasn ' t t h a t . My guess i s t ha t Kennedy knew

about ray l i t i g a t i o n for Lyndon Johnson and for him in Texas. You

must remember t h a t the t h i rd of the cases r e l a t e d — t h a t I handled

for Johnson t h a t year—the t h i rd one r e l a t e d to Johnson and

Kennedy both because i t involved the mat ter of a recount with the

Republicans having f i l e d s u i t to force a recount in Texas and

undertook to withhold the c e r t i f i c a t i o n of the e l e c t o r a l - c o l l e g e

v o t e s . Had they been success fu l and been success fu l in I l l i n o i s ,

they would have turned the e l e c t i o n around; and t ha t was t h e i r

game. And Kennedy knew t h a t I had handled these m a t t e r s ,

a p p a r e n t l y , from Johnson. And i t may have been t ha t Johnson even

threw my name in the ha t a t the t ime. I j u s t d o n ' t know.

CHARLTON: You raentioned in an e a r l i e r i n t e rv i ew , Mr. Jaworsk i ,

t h a t — t h a t P r e s i d e n t Kennedy had p e r s o n a l l y thanked you for—

309

JAWORSKI: Yes.

CHARLTON: —handl ing—handl ing t h a t raatter for him.

JAWORSKI: Yes. He to ld me to s t ay in good shape because he

never knew when he might need rae (chuckl ing) aga in .

CHARLTON: Going back to the—to the Warren Commission

h e a r i n g s , how s a t i s f i e d were you with the way the var ious

w i tnes se s were i n t e r r o g a t e d , were quest ioned by the chief

j u s t i c e and by o the r members of the coraraission? You were

s i t t i n g on the s i d e l i n e , l i s t e n i n g , pass ing n o t e s . How did

you fee l about i t while i t was going on?

JAWORSKI: I thought t h a t Lee Rankin, the genera l counse l ,

did a very able j o b . He l a t e r became c i t y a t t o rn ey of New

York which i s — I th ink t h a t ' s the t i t l e o f — t h a t , a h — i t ' s a

very r e s p o n s i b l e p o s i t i o n in New York. Ah—or do they c a l l

hira l e g a l counsel o f — i t has a narae o ther than c i t y a t t o r -

ney, bu t i t araounts to the same t h i n g .

I thought the chief j u s t i c e was on top of the b a l l very ,

very rauch. In f a c t , I had a—ray whole opinion of hira grew

in admirat ion as—as I watched hira. The sad thing was t h a t

there were a number of them who came and went. I t was a

c a t c h - a s - c a t c h - c a n thing with them. Gerald Ford was a

member of t h a t commission and was the re a good p a r t of the

t ime. The—another a t t e n d e r the re more than most of them

was—the sena to r from, ah, and h i s name has escaped me.

He's Of Counsel to a l a r g e firm in Washington now. The

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name may come back to me, and I will fill it in if it does.

But some were not there very much. Senator Russell was not

there very much; and McCloy, who had a wonderful history as

a very, very outstanding lawyer, and practicing in New

York—he came and went; but when he was there a good part of

the time, he had so raany irons—other irons in the fire that

he'd go to the telephone and be out and come back. When it

would be an unusual witness like Marina Oswald, for

instance, then you would find that there was a right good

attendance or Oswald's mother.

I was satisfied with what the coramission had done. And

I have been critical of the waste of money that's been in-

volved in going back into the Kennedy assassination matter.

I did not feel that anything substantial would be dug up.

To rae, the whole raatter was so clear. I could not see any

possible conspiracy. There were too raany reasons contra-

dicting a conspiracy theory. The clear revelations, about

which there was no doubt, all pointed to his having done

this as a loner. This is what his wife thought; this is

what his brother thought and everybody else who knew him

well.

CHARLTON: How many trips to Washington did you make in con-

nection with the commission?

JAWORSKI: Very raany. Very raany. I took many trips to

Washington. I spent a lot of time there.

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CHARLTON: You were present then at most of the hearings?

JAWORSKI: I definitely was; and at every single hearing

that had any very material witness, I would be present.

Sometimes it'd be on—the rarest of occasion when I wouldn't

be present. I don't recall any at the moment.

CHARLTON: How would you describe your relationship with Mr.

Rankin during the hearings?

JAWORSKI: Very good. We formed a fast friendship. He

believed in me and would discuss some of his probleras with

rae. As a matter of fact, there were tiraes when he would

talk with rae; and he didn't want anybody else around, just

to get ray feel of what some of his problems were. They had

a distinguished staff. Several of the lawyers on that staff

are good friends of raine. Some of them were outstanding

trial lawyers. But some of thera didn't apply theraselves

too assiduously, but I thought the investigation was

completed very well. (coughs)

CHARLTON: As you know, Mr. Jaworski, in recent years,

(Jaworski coughs) there have been criticisms of the Warren

Coraraission report, criticisras that say that a number of

small bits of evidence were overlooked at the time of the

Warren Commission hearings. Did you have the feeling during

the hearings that—that much evidence was being overlooked?

JAWORSKI: No. As a matter of fact, we knew what sorae of

that evidence was. What happened, there were—there are

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phases of i t t h a t became so completely immaterial because i t was

so abundant ly c l e a r what the t rue f ac t s were t h a t you j u s t d i d n ' t

go i n t o t h i s minu t i ae , i t wouldn ' t have helped any a t a l l . The

Cuban angle of i t was a b s o l u t e l y absurd. This raan, Oswald, had

mental a b e r r a t i o n s . There wasn ' t the s l i g h t e s t ques t ion about

i t . He wanted to do soraething where he would be recognized . He

go t i n t o a f i g h t with some Cubans over the d i s t r i b u t i o n of some

c i r c u l a r s t h a t he had prepared hiraself, d i d n ' t even have enough

raoney to pay for the p r e p a r a t i on of them. And frora t h a t , there

was t h i s long s t r i d e taken t h a t had him connected with Castro or

with Cuba in some way. On top of i t , he had t h i s t e r r i b l e

exper ience in Russ ia . He thought he was going over there as a

he ro , and he was t r e a t e d j u s t as an o rd ina ry fel low, g e t t i n g a

very small pens ion . He was despondent; he t r i e d to commit

s u i c i d e and a l l of t he—wel l , you know the whole s t o r y . I th ink

we raay have ta lked about i t be fo re .

But, in any even t , there i s no doubt in ray raind about i t . He

i s a man who j u s t a few weeks before t r i e d to a s s a s s i n a t e General

Walker. And the re was no d i spu t e about t h a t . If the man had any

i n d i c a t i o n s along the l i n e s of wanting to ge t somebody with ce r -

t a i n p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n s , then why did he shoot a t Walker one

n igh t and then shoot a t Kennedy three weeks l a t e r ? So i t was a l l

absurd. But, in any event—

NEWTON: Was the re any d i s c u s s i o n , Mr. Jaworsk i , of—of the

p r o p r i e t y — n o t w i t h s t a n d i ng what was apparent to members of

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the coraraittee—the p r o p r i e t y of doing an exhaus t ive a n a l y s i s

s i n ce what had prompted the Warren Coraraission, as you

po in ted o u t , i n i t i a l l y was the concern of P re s iden t Johnson

and some of h i s a d v i s e r s t h a t any specu l a t i on s which might

come up be l a i d to r e s t and t h a t , t h e r e f o r e , there could

have been t h i s a n t i c i p a t i o n t h a t , r e a l l y , one of the major

funct ions of the Warren Coramission was to chase those r a b -

b i t s and to lay them to r e s t , to expose thera as being not

raeaningful or not t rue?

JAWORSKI: Yes. Now, I can t e l l you t h a t there were sorae

th ings known, and i t was considered by the Warren Coraraission

but the re was no p a r t i c u l a r purpose in coraraenting on thera

because they r e a l l y proved j u s t exac t ly noth ing. Let me

give you an i l l u s t r a t i o n . J u s t think of how rauch was made

over the FBI having f a i l ed to d i s c l o s e c e r t a i n m a t t e r s . Now

what happened i s t h a t there were some embarrassing fea tu res

to the FBI e x p e r i e n c e . They had a man named Hosty or some-

thing s i m i l a r to t h a t or—who was the FBI agent in D a l l a s .

They had a c t u a l l y been keeping s u r v e i l l a n c e on Osv/ald; and

the reason they had i s because he had t h i s Russian back-

ground, had come from Russia and a l l of t h a t . And they keep

s u r v e i l l a n c e on raany fe l lows who are j u s t l i t t l e minor func-

t i o n a r i e s and sorae of them no f u n c t i o n a r i e s a t a l l but

they 've got something sordid in what they 've been doing.

And the sad thing i s t h a t d e s p i t e t h e i r having kept a c t u a l

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park ing t h e i r car a couple a blocks away and watching him to

see what he was doing around the house and so on, the day

t h a t P r e s i d e n t Kennedy v i s i t s t h e r e , they d o n ' t conduct any

s u r v e i l l a n c e . They fo rge t about t h i s fe l low, pay no a t t e n -

t i on to hira and d o n ' t even look hira up. Now, t h a t ' s embarrass-

ing . This FBI agent—he was l a t e r t r a n s f e r r e d proraptly frora

Dal las to another place—made some comment about : Oh, w e l l ,

we'd known about t h i s fellow a long t ime, when they heard

about Oswald having been the man. And, of course , t h i s was

very s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i n g . He d i d n ' t think so a t the t ime.

Now, m a t t e r s of t h a t kind they , of course , t r i e d to hush up.

They were not m a t e r i a l to the i s sue of who shot Kennedy but

they were embarrassing to the FBI. I t would have been much

b e t t e r i f they h a d n ' t done i t . But t h i s was more or l e s s

J . Edgar Hoover 's way of p rese rv ing the good name of h i s

o r g a n i z a t i o n . I knew hira, had been around him severa l tiraes—

and from t h a t and what I l ea rned from o t h e r s , t h i s was raore

or l e s s h i s way of ope ra t ing because he wanted the FBI to have

an a b s o l u t e l y un ta rn i shed image. And he would do almost any-

thing he reasonably could j u s t to p rese rve t ha t iraage. I t

becarae a treraendous f e t i s h with hira. Now, as far as—

CHARLTON: Now, as s p e c i a l a s s i s t a n t , s p e c i a l counse l , to

Mr. Carr in Texas, you were supposed to decide whether there

were indeed f a c t s t h a t might need to be reopened a f t e r the

Warren Commission h e a r i n g s . Mat ters such as the FBI no t doing

315

on t h a t p a r t i c u l a r day did not impress you enough, though,

t o make t h a t recomraendation?

JAWORSKI: What we sa id—no, i t d i d n ' t — i t r e a l l y d i d n ' t .

And, very f r ank ly , I th ink i t ' s been blown up out of a l l

p ropo r t i on because i t j u s t had no r e a l re levancy to the

mat te r of the a s s a s s i n a t i o n . I mean by t h a t , the ques t ion

was: Who did the a s s a s s i n a t i o n ? Was i t done by Oswald? Was

i t done by a group? Did anybody e l s e p a r t i c i p a t e ? Was Jack

Ruby connected with i t ? and so on. This was r e a l l y the

q u e s t i o n .

CHARLTON: My purpose in—

JAWORSKI: Now whether the FBI had been g u i l t y of sorae

l a c k a d a i s i c a l conduct i s soraething e l s e aga in . That wasn ' t

the s u b j e c t of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n .

CHARLTON: My only purpose in asking t h a t ques t ion was to

ask t h i s one: Were the re any—were there any d e t a i l s , were

the re any raatters—untended—left open, l e f t hanging t h a t

you wanted to i n v e s t i g a t e a f t e r the Warren Coraraission r e p o r t

was w r i t t e n ?

JAWORSKI: What we d id , we f i l ed a suppleraental r e p o r t ,

Waggoner Carr and Bob StorV and I , and, ah—ah, we, in

e f f e c t , sa id t h a t as to the u l t i raa te i s s u e s , as to the u l t i -

mate m a t t e r s under i n v e s t i g a t i o n we found nothing to add.

And Waggoner was, of cour se , not very happy over one or two

t h i n g s . He thought t h a t one or two wi tnes ses had been

316

c a l l e d wi thou t our being given s u f f i c i e n t time to ge t t h e r e .

And Waggoner was not completely happy with Earl Warren, even

a t the end; (chuckles) but as far as the—(chuckl ing) as the

i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s concerned, there wasn ' t much t h a t we could

add to i t and not much we could do. We d iscussed i t ; Bob

Storey wanted to w r i t e a paragraph or two in there about the

r u l e of law, how i t had been observed. And I ' v e fo rgo t t en ;

I wrote a p a r t of i t , and I d o n ' t even remember what p a r t of

i t I wro te . Waggoner went over i t to make sure t ha t i t was

in l i n e with h i s own thoughts . We then took i t to John

Connally and to ld Connally what we were doing; and Connally

thought—he was s t i l l governor—he thought t ha t i t was qu i t e

in o r d e r . He did r a i s e the same ques t ion a t t h a t time t ha t

he r a i s e d when he gave h i s testimony not long ago and t h a t

i s about which of the b u l l e t s pene t ra ted him. I th ink t h a t

he had some d i f f e r e n t concept ion; and t h i s , of course , i s

unde r s t andab l e . I t d i d n ' t change who was the a s sa s s in or

whether the re was raore than one a s s a s s i n , whether there were

o t h e r s shoot ing or whether he was the only one who was

s hoo t i ng . There was a l o t raade of t h i s c l i p , of shots being

f i r e d , ah, in r a t h e r f a s t success ion . All of t h a t had been

gone i n t o . And the re was a l o t of muddying of the water by

Oswald 's mother who became i n t e r e s t e d for the purpose of

making raoney. And her lawyer, Mark Lane who i s a very

u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , ah, "b ro the r " a t the ba r , i s the s o r t of an

317

i n d i v i d u a l who b r ings d i s g r a c e , in my concept ion , to the bar

because of h i s demeanor.

CHARLTON: What—

JAWORSKI: And—but—but o t h e r w i s e , we f i l e d a suppleraental

r e p o r t ; and t h a t was about i t .

NEWTON: Was the re very rauch of a concern on your p a r t or the

p a r t of the o the r raerabers of the Warren Coraraission about how the

r e p o r t would be perceived by members of the p u b l i c ? - - t h a t i s , was

the re a conscious a t tempt on your p a r t and the p a r t of o ther mera-

bers of the Warren Coramission to w r i t e a r e p o r t in such a way

t h a t i t would—that i t would have the des i red a f f e c t in terms of

causing the pub l i c to fee l conf ident about what had happened in

Dal las? The reason I ask t h a t — i t ' s one thing for you to hear

the wi tnesses and to see informat ion , much of which was not

a v a i l a b l e to members of the p u b l i c , and there must have been some

r e c o g n i t i o n on your p a r t of the d i f f i c u l t y , on the one hand, of

being convinced your se l f and r e p o r t i n g i t , on the o ther hand.

JAWORSKI: I do not r e c a l l any c r i t i c i s m of the r e p o r t a t the

t ime. Remember, now, t h a t t h i s was a very lengthy r e p o r t in many

volumes. I should mention, i n c i d e n t a l l y , t h a t Chief J u s t i c e Ear l

Warren, a t the beg inn ing , in w r i t i n g the i n t r o d u c t i o n paid t r i b -

u te to the work we did and the c o n t r i b u t i o n s t h a t we made to i t .

He mentioned a l l of us—the a t t o r n e y genera l and Storey and me—

as having helped hira. And—but I d o n ' t reraeraber much c r i t i c i s m .

As a raatter of f a c t , by the time the r e p o r t came out I th ink

318

everybody more or l e s s accepted i t . I t ' s the same old s t o r y

though, soraething i s done and then a nuraber of years l a t e r

the doubt ing Thoraases for one reason or another begin to

r a i s e a l l s o r t s of q u e s t i o n s , many of them j u s t in order to

w r i t e books theraselves and to ge t platforras frora which to

speak. And the d i s t o r t i o n s , some of them, t h a t came out

were j u s t u n b e l i e v a b l e . And Mark Lane and Oswald's mother

were—were s t i r r i n g the s tu f f up c o n s t a n t l y ; bu t they did i t

r e a l l y for t h e i r own purposes .

Now, I f a i l e d to t e l l you t h a t Lyndon Johnson was very

rauch i n t e r e s t e d in my coming up and working t h i s thing out

with Earl Warren. There aga in , u n w i t t i n g l y , Lyndon Johnson,

the p r e s i d e n t , had go t t en himself a l i t t l e b i t in the mire

on t h i s mat te r because he had told Waggoner to make the

n a t i o n a l announcement of the cour t of i nqu i ry ; and Waggoner

did i t as a r e s u l t of h i s d i s c u s s i o n s with the p r e s i d e n t .

And then the p r e s i d e n t r e a l i z e d t h a t he c o u l d n ' t leave i t

t h e r e . He had not known, of course , of—nor had he a n t i c i -

pated anything l i k e the amount of t a l k t h a t went on in

Europe and o ther p laces ques t ion ing whether he had not been

involved . But, a f t e r i t was over , and we got through with

the chief j u s t i c e l a t e in the evening, I c a l l ed Walter

Jenk ins and to ld him I wanted to corae over . He was Lyndon

Johnson ' s top a d m i n i s t r a t i v e man a t the t ime. And when

Waggoner and I g o t the re Walter s a i d , "Well , Leon, the

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president wants to see you, he left word, he's swimming over

in the pool, but he said the minute you got here to bring

you right on over." So I went on over there and the presi-

dent was swimming. He did have on his bathing trunks at the

tirae. And there were a few others in there. Jack Valenti,

and so I went to the edge of the pool and the president came

over and had some pictures with us shaking hands, and he had

the photographer there, you know, this—this preferred pho-

tographer of his (both talking)

NEWTON: The president (laughing) always had the photC^-

^rapher here, didn't he, Mr. Jaworski?

JAWORSKI: Oh, yeah, and I'll tell you, you have no idea how

many pictures were taken of the two of us together, over the

years. And he'd send thera to me. In any event, this was

quite an interesting picture. I'm sure that a few weeks

later he would never have had a picture taken of his being

in the swimming pool, you see, and shaking hands with

someone else. It was on that occasion that he said to me,

"Well, Leon, it's—you have done soraething for rae again."

He said, "It's my time to do something for you now"; and

that's when I said to him that there was nothing he could do

for me; there was nothing I wanted. And he looked at me

rather quizzically; and I said, "No, I mean that exactly.

There is nothing you can do for me." So he just looked

aside; and he said, "Well, I'll just send you a Christmas

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card then" ; and t h a t was i t . (Newton laughs)

Ah, Waggoner Carr heard a p a r t of t h i s conve r sa t i on . I

d o n ' t t h ink—I know—I'ra not sure t h a t he could piece i t

t o g e t h e r , he was off to the s i d e . He knew the p r e s i d e n t

want—had ind i ca t ed he wanted to say a few words to me so

Waggoner j u s t withdrew. I remember, a t t h a t time the pho-

tographer was saying to the p r e s i d e n t there wasn ' t enough

l i g h t in the re to take the p i c t u r e s . He s a i d , "Well, g e t

some l i g h t ! " (Newton chuckles) And with t h a t , why. Jack

Va len t i j u s t dashed out of t h a t swiraraing pool ; and he s a i d ,

" I know where the switches a r e ! " Right on up there and

turned thera on, he was dr ipp ing wet, turned the switches on

and got sorae more l i g h t .

NEWTON: Do you think P r e s i d e n t Johnson had in mind a pa r -

t i c u l a r kind of reward or r e c o g n i t i o n , Mr. Jaworsk i , when

he—when he sa id to you, "Now i t ' s time for me to do

something for you"?

JAWORSKI: You must reraeraber t h i s carae a f t e r the cases I ' d

handled for him and raatters of t h i s k ind . And then he was

r e a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e for ray coming up to Washington as quickly

as I d id to t r y to put out the f i r e s , you s e e , and to a l s o ,

ah, draw the p i eces t o g e t h e r . And, f o r t u n a t e l y , the chief

thought wel l of me; and I was able to do i t . If i t had been

someone t h a t the chief d i d n ' t th ink well of, he would have

j u s t s tonewal led i t ; and he wouldn ' t have go t t en anywhere.

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And the chief would have been happy to throw i t back in

Lyndon Johnson ' s l ap and say: Well , I'm j u s t not going to

se rve under those c i r cums tances .

Johnson s e n t us back on a—on the p r e s i d e n t i a l p l a n e ,

not A i r fo rce One, but a p r e s i d e n t i a l p l a n e . And I suggested

to the p i l o t to drop Carr off in Aus t in , take rae then to

Houston. When we go t on the p l ane , both of us were very

t i r e d ; and they had asked whether we—before we l e f t the

White House—whether we had had anything to e a t ; and we

s a i d . No. So they s a i d : Well , w e ' l l have something on the

plane for you. I t ' s j u s t an o rd ina ry sandwich and f r u i t and

raaybe a l i t t l e sweet or something. But the steward asked

u s — m i l i t a r y man—asked us i f we wanted a d r i n k . And

Waggoner s a i d , "Gee, i f I ever needed one I need one now."

And so we had a Scotch and wa te r . And then Waggoner f e l l

a s l e e p . I d o n ' t remember whether I s l e p t or no t ; I may have

dozed some. But before we landed in Austin to drop Waggoner

off , the steward came a long; and he s a i d , "You owe me

$ 1 . 2 0 . " (Newton chuckles) And I s a i d , "All r i g h t . " And I

reached in to give hira $1 .20; and I s a i d , "May I j u s t ask

what t h i s i s for?" and he s a i d , " I t ' s for the d r i n k s . " And

I s a i d , "How about the food?" He s a i d , "Oh, no, i t ' s j u s t

for the d r i n k s . " Then I thought to rayself—and Waggoner and

I laughed about i t l a t e r on—here they s p e n t , I d o n ' t know,

$1,500 or $2,000 f ly ing us back—

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NEWTON: ( laughing) Flying an a i r p l a n e .

JAWORSKI: — s p e c i a l l y in t h a t plane but they c o l l e c t $1.20

( laughing) for the d r i n k s . Now you f igure t h a t ou t .

NEWTON: That raay not be so much of a j oke , Mr. Jaworsk i .

That may be w h a t ' s wrong with bu reauc rac i es in genera l to

s t a r t with ( l a u g h t e r ) .

JAWORSKI: I t may wel l be . ( laughing)

NEWTON: Well , what—what then—again , I d o n ' t want to p ress

you i f you d o n ' t fee l l i k e t h e r e ' s any way to t a l k about

i t — b u t do you th ink t h a t the p r e s i d e n t did have in mind the

idea t h a t you might assume some p o s i t i o n in the cab ine t or

t h a t he would be amenable to hear you t a lk ing about going on

the Supreme Court or t h a t s o r t of thing?

JAWORSKI: I t ' s hard to t e l l . That he was cons ider ing me—

and was wondering what my r e a c t i o n to i t would be—for

a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l , t h e r e ' s no ques t ion about i t . I'm not

saying t h a t he would have appointed me; t h a t i s not for me

to say . He was g iv ing cons ide ra t i o n to t h a t . He was giving

c o n s i d e r a t i on to p o s s i b l y an appointment to the Supreme

Court . I made i t c l e a r to him t h a t I wasn ' t i n t e r e s t e d in

anything t h a t took rae up there perraanently o r , I raean, for

even a per iod of s e v e r a l y e a r s . And I never did cease

raaking i t c l e a r , every oppo r tun i t y I was g iven , t h a t t h a t

was ray ab id ing f ee l i ng about the raatter. So he knew t h a t .

I t would have been a ma t t e r of h i s saying to rae: Well , Leon,

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I j u s t need you; and I want you to come." I f he 'd have said

t h a t , I would have, of cour se , gone. But I d i d n ' t want to

go . But what he did then—and I may have raentioned t h i s to

you be fo r e—hi s way of r e t a l i a t i n g was to put me on every

commission t h a t came a long, you s e e , because then, you s e e ,

he s t i l l had rae coraing to Washington; and he could ge t me in

anytime t h a t he wanted to to d i s c u s s with me whatever

q u e s t i o n s , whatever i s s u e s , whatever ma t t e r s t h a t he f e l t he

wanted to have my opinion about .

CHARLTON: T h a t ' s the next mat ter we'd l i k e to t a l k about

today, Mr. J aworsk i . Before we—before we do t h a t l e t

me ask ray f a v o r i t e ques t ion a t t h i s po in t which i s : what

did you l e a r n , and what did you add to your l e g a l career

as a r e s u l t of being on the in s ide and observing the

Warren Commission? What were some of the l e s sons t h a t

you picked up from tha t ?

JAWORSKI: I l earned a number of raatters, undoubtedly. I t ' s

a l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t to i d e n t i f y t hose . I t ' s — w h a t do you

l e a r n by reading a book, or what do you l ea rn by l i s t e n i n g

to c e r t a i n l e c t u r e s ? I t widens your i n t e l l e c t u a l hor i zon ,

i f you can use t h a t exp re s s ion . But—but to p inpo in t and

say e x a c t l y where i t was b e n e f i c i a l to you i s very , very

hard to do. That I en larged my c i r c l e of f r i endsh ip among

people who were worthwhile knowing was not to be ques t ioned .

I go t to know Ear l Warren b e t t e r . I had a chance to become

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acqua in ted even b e t t e r with Nick Katzenbach and Archie Cox,

wi th Lee Rankin, of course , and a few o ther merabers of the

coraraission. I v i s i t e d with Gerald Ford seve ra l times and

formed a good opinion of hira. So—and then aga in , i t was

j u s t going through another process of doing something t h a t

does add to your storeroom of knowledge; bu t to p inpo in t i t

or to i d e n t i f y i t i s a l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t to do.

CHARLTON: Sha l l we t a l k about the commissions t ha t you

subsequent ly served on now? You—you were a p a r t , as you

say , of j u s t about every major commission of the s i x t i e s .

Sha l l we s t a r t with the crime commission, the P r e s i d e n t ' s

Crime Commission which issued a r e p o r t in 1964? How did you

f i r s t l e a rn of t h a t work, and how did you becorae involved in

i t ?

JAWORSKI: I had a c a l l frora the White House, and I c a n ' t

t e l l you now who i t was t h a t c a l l e d . They told rae the

p r e s i d e n t wanted to put rae on t h a t commission. The fu l l

name of the commission was the P r e s i d e n t ' s Coraraission on Law

Enforcement and the Admin is t ra t ion of J u s t i c e . I t ' s sho r t

name was the P r e s i d e n t ' s Crirae Coramission.

I was somewhat (pause ) , I thought , compliraented by the

number of—by the i n d i v i d u a l s who were placed on t h a t

coraraission. The membership cons i s t ed of, among o t h e r s , the

p r e s i d e n t of Yale , Kingman Brewster ; t h e , ah, former a t t o r -

ney gene ra l and l a t e r s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e . B i l l Rogers .