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MCFARLIN LLPTimothy G. McFarlin (State Bar No. 223378)Email: tim@mcfarlinlaw.com

3Jarrod Y. Nakano (State Bar No. 235548)Email: iarrod~cfarlinlaw.com

4Gary T. Dote (State Bar No. 259722)Email: garv@mcfarlinlaw.com

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4 Park Plaza, Suite 1025Irvine, California 92614Telephone: (949) 544-2640Fax: (949) 336-7612

Attorneys for PlaintiffsMCFARLIN LLP, TIMOTHY G. MCFARLIN, JARROD Y. NAKANO, and GARY T. DOTE

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - SANTA MONICA COURTHOUSE

MCFARLIN LLP, a Limited Liability Case No. SC124187Partnership; TIMOTHY G. MCFARLIN,an Individual; JARROD Y. NAKANO, an Judge: Hon. Gerald RosenbergIndividual; and GARY T. DOTE an Department: KIndividual,

Plaintiffs, PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TODEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR

v. SUMMARYJUDGMENT; MEMORANDUMOF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES;

ALADDIN DINAALI, an Individual; andDOES 1 through 10, inclusive, DECLARATIONS OF JARROD Y. NAKANO

AND TIMOTHY G. MCFARLIN FILED INDefendants. SUPPORT THEREOF.

[Filed concurrently with Plaint@ ' SeparateStatement of Disputed Facts]

Hearing:Date: May 16, 2017Time: 8:30 a.m.Dept.: KJudge: Hon. Gerald Rosenberg

Date Action Filed: May 18, 2015Trial Date: July 31, 2017

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OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD HEREIN:

Plaintiffs MCFARLIN LLP, TIMOTHY G. MCFARLIN, JARROD Y.` NAKANO, and

GARY T. DOTE (collectively, plaintiffs) respectfully submits their Opposition to Defendant

ALADDIN DINAALI's ("Defendant") MOTION FOR SDY JUDGMENT

("Opposition").

This Opposition is based n the attached memorandum of points and authorities, the

declarations in sup pol all records, pleadings and files herein, oral permeate, and any other

evidence presented at the hearing.

DATED: May 2, 2017

By:

Timothy G. McFarlinAttorneys for PlainffsMCFARL LLPTOT G. MCFARLIN; andJAOD Y. NANO; andGY T. DOTE

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OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMT

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1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

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I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Plaintiffs MCFARLIN LLP, TIMOTHY G. MCFARLIN, JARROD Y. NAKANO, and

GARY T. DOTE (collectively, "Plaintiffs")_ bring this action to stop the fraudulent and libelous

internet websites created by Defendant ALADDIN DINAALI ("DINAALI" or "Defendant").

DINAALI has filed his motion for summary judgement (the � Motion"), based on DINAALI's

position that complaint does not contain sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against him

and that the Court does not have jurisdiction over the subject websites.

Plaintiffs have properly pied facts demonstrating each of their causes of action in the

complaint as DINAALI has willfully and maliciously created false and defamatory websites

targeting Plaintiffs in retaliation for opposing DINAALI's illegal shakedown tactics.

Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Coult deny DINAALI'S motion for summary

judgment in its entirety.

IL STATEMENT OF PERTINENT FACTS

As contained in the First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), Plaintiffs represented Michele

and Mark Barlow (the "Bat'lows") in a frivolous lawsuit filed by DINAALI against the Barlows

(the "Underlying Suit"). F AC |1 15].

In retaliation for representing the Barlows and filing a motion to change venue in the

Underlying Suit, DINAALI proceeded to create the following fraudulent and defamatory websites

targeting Plaintiffs: garydote.corn, mcfarlinlaw.info, jan`odnakano.com, timothygmcfarlin.corn,

and www.statebar.info (the "subject websites"). As alleged in the Complaint, DINAALI created

the websites to cause harm and embarrassment to Plaintiffs. F AC $, 23~-30].

III. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

A. The Standard of Summary Judgment.

For summary judgment actions, the moving party bears the burden of proving that there

are no t liable issues of material fact. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. k 437c; `A-uiglar v. Atlantic Richjleld

"the action has no merit." CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. h 437c(a). The action has no merit when "[o]ne

or more of the elements of the cause of action cannot be separately established." CAL. CODE CIV.

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

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PROC. k 437c(o)(I). In that case, summary judgment should be granted "if all the papers

submitted show that there is no t liable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law." CAL. CODE Cly. PROC. 9 437c(c).

Once the defendant has made this p limo fade showing that there is no triable issue of

material fact as to one or more elements of the plaintiff s claim, the burden shifts and the plaintiff

"is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prims facie showing of the

existence of a triable issue of material fact." Auig/ar v. Atlantic Rz.chjield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th

826, 850. The law is clear that in meeting this shifted burden, the plaintiff cannot rely upon the

allegations of its pleadings, but must set faith specific facts. Id. at 849.

"From this premise, it follows that the moving party's simply point to' the absence of

evidence supporting plaintiff s position is not itself enough to obtain summary judgment in its

favor. There must be some "affirmative showing" by the moving defendant that plaintiff could

not obtain such evidence, before summary judgment would be proper." Krantz v. Bt Visual

Images, (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 164, 173'174.

In reviewing the evidence, the Court must view the evidence "most favorably to the party

opposing the motion, liberally construe its evidence, and strictly construe the movant's."

StathouLis v. City of Montebellow, (2008) -164 Cal.App.4th 559, 565.

B. Plaintiffs' Claims for Libel Per Se and Prelinlinary and Permanent

Injunction are Properly Pied.

In his Motion, DINAALI argues that Plaintiffs cannot prove any of their allegations. See

Motion pg. 4, line 11. Defendant's arguments are unintelligible and merely cite unrelated case

law and offer little to no argument to support his Motion. However, as outlined in the four

corners of the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs have properly alleged their claims for libel per

Se and preliminary and permanent injunction. '

Libel is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, effigy, or other fixed

representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or disgrace, or

which causes a person to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure a person in his

or her occupation. CAL. CIV. CODE h 45. In addition, a Plaintiff must also plead and prove t,he

i\IEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIFS

URI [

requisite degree of fault. See Philadelphia Neivspapers v. Hepps (1986) 475 U.S. 767, 778.

1. Defendant's Defamatory Websites Contain Numerous False and_

' Unplivileged Statements rewarding Plaintiffs. . .

A publication must contain a false statement of fact to give rise to liability for defamation.

CAL CIV. COD 45; Gregoty v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 596, 600. The

dispositive question is whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the published

statements implies a false factual allegation. A court examines the communication in light of the

context in which it is published, the occasion of the utterance, the persons addressed, the purpose

to be solved, and all of the circumstances surrounding the publication. Jensen v. Hewlett-Packard

Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 958, 971. In this case, DINAALI'S websites are riddled with false

statements.

On DINAALI's websites, DINAALI falsely states that McFarlin LLP, Timothy G.

McFarlin, Jarrod Y. Nakano, and Gary T. Dote are all white collar criminals, who aid and abet

criminals and engage in criminal activities. F AC 25-30], See Declaration of Jaod Nakano

(De cl. Nakano") 14-18. As stated in Piatiffs' Complaint, all of these statements are patently

false and are completely fabricated by DAALI. [PAC 29-3O][Decl. Nakano 18-191

addition, DLI states that there are pending criminal and state bar proceedings

initiated against McFarlin LLP, Timothy G. M.cFarlin, Jarrod Y. Nakano, and Gary T. Dote.

F AC 25-30][Dcl. Nakano | 14-18]. S`lady, as specified in Plaintiffs' first Amened

Complaint, these statements made by DAALI do not contain a scintilla of troth. [PAC | 29-

30} De cl. Nakano 18-19].

Plaintiffs have alleged in their Complaint that DAALI specifically created the

defamatory websites in retaliation against plaintiffs for defending the Bax'lows in the underlying

lawsuit filed by DAALL [PAC 24, 301[Decl. Nakano 12-13]. DAALI treatened to

take action against Gary Dote for filing a motion to change venue and DAALI created

numerous websites against the related parties and their counsel in the underlying action. F AC

24]. DAALI created these websites to ha those that opposed his illegal and unauthorized

actions. F AC 25, 30-31].

MEMORA/DUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

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There is no doubt that DINAALI has made false representations on his websites regarding

Plaintiffs. DINAALI admits that he was destroying website data by indicating that "all virtual

data" in regards to the subject cites were "reset." {peel. Nakano 231. Moreover, DINAALI

admits to creating several other related sites to harm Plaintiffs De cl. Nakano 25, 28, 33, 35].

2. Dinaali's Websites are Publications Made to the General Public_

Concerning Plaintiffs.

The publication must be by writing, printing, pictme, effigy, or other fixed representation.

CAL. CIV. CODE 45. Generally, publication is the dissemination of the wtten.,defamatory

material to someone other than the subject mutt of the defamation. Live OakPubl 'g Co. v.

Cohagan (1991) 234 Cal.3d 1277. The statement at issue must specifically refer to the plaintiff,

although it may do so by inference rather than by name. Blot v. New York Times Co. (1986) 42

Cal.3d 1033, 1042-43. DAALI'S statements contained in his websites are specific as to each

of the named Plaintiffs.

DLI specifically created misleading and defamatory websites for each Plaintiff.

addition, each website is species to the false statements for Tothy G. McFarlin, Jaod Y.

Nakano and Gary T. Dote. F AC 25-30] De cl. Nakano 14-18]. While the fake state bar

website and McFarlin LLP websites contain false statements regarding all of the Plainti. F AC

30][Decl. Nakano 18]. DAALI then states his intention to email Plaintifs business

complex neihors with his libelous websites. [Peel. Nakano 35]. DINAALI then does email

Plaintiffs' business complex neihors and masks his identity behind:

lparKplaza@sanbemardinocounty.info, 2parKplaza@sanbemardinocountY.info,

4parkplazasanbemardinocount.info and 5parkplaza@sanbemardocounty.info. See

Declaration of Timothy G. McFarlin (De cl. McFarlin") 5.

Clearly, DAALI'S Defamatory Websites are clear publications made to the public and

concerning Plaintiffs. . _ _

3.

The defamatory statement must expose the plaintiffs hatred, contempt, ridicule, or

diocese, or cause the plaintiff to be Shued or avoided, or tend to injure the plaintiff in his or her

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MEMORAND%I OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

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occupation. CAL. Cly. CODE 45. In determining whether a statement is libelous, courts look to

what is explicitly states as well as what insinuation an,d implication can be reasonably drawn from

the communication. Fol'sher v. Bugliosi (1980) 26 Cal.3d 792, 803.

The statements contained on DINAALI'S websites are defamatory on their face and have

caused great embarrassment and harm to Plaintiffs. As alleged in Plaintiffs' First Amended

Complaint, DLI'S Defamatory Websites have caused Plaintiffs to suffer om a loss of its

reputation, shame, modification, and lost business OppOlunities all to its general damage. F AC

461 De cl. Nako 37]. DAALI'S Defamatot Websites have caused Plaintiffs ha and

extreme embarassment.

C. PlaWtiff Has Established Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendant.

In his Motion, DAALI appears to be arguing and alleging that since the subject

websites are located in PeSylvania and are owned by an out of state third-pa residing in

Massachusetts, no. personal jurisdiction exits. DAALI aries "The websites in question are of

a passive the which basically means they are not interactive and comercial in nature." Motion,

pg. 7, lines 3-4. In an attempt to follow DAALI's logic and one sentence garment, Plaintiffs

address personal jurisdiction over Internet activities.

ether personal jurisdiction over a nonresident can be based solely on internet activities

depends on the nature and qualify of the acts involved. Sn'own v. Harrah 's Entertaz.ning, Inc.

(2005) 35 C4th 1054, 1063. Posting information on a passive internet site accessible to forum

residents is not an act "directed at the folm state," and thus not enough for the exercise of local

personal jurisdiction. Pavlovzc` h v. Sup. Ct. (DVD Copy Control Ass 'n, Inc.) (2002) 29 C4th 262,

277. If the website is interactive, the existence of jurisdiction must be determined "by examining

the level of interactivity and commercial notre of the exchange of information that occurs on the

web site." Jewish Defense Organization Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (Rambam) (1999) 72 CA4th 1045, 1060.

First, DAALI's Motion to Quash Setice for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction was -heard

on August 17, 2015, by the Honorable Nancy Newman, who denied DAALIs motion with

prejudice. De cl. McFarlin 5].

III

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

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Second, Plaintiffs have 'alleged in their First Amended Complaint that DINAALI- has

created the websites and bas defamed Plaintiffs. DINAALI does not dispute that the Court lacks

personal jurisdiction over him.

Lastly, DINAALPs argument that the subject websites are passive, fails. The subject

websites are aimed as California residents as they concern California attorneys licensed under the

State Bar of California and that complaints are/will be filed with the local District Attorney De cl.

Nakano %ll 14-18]. Further, D!NAALI threatened to defame Plaintiffs by informing local

residents and business within the counties of Los Angeles and San Bernardino of false terrorist

activity. De cl. Nakano , 35] De cl. McFarlin cU5].

As such, DINALLI's argument regarding personal jurisdiction should fail.

D. Defendant has Failed to Meet its Burden.

In DINAALI's Motion, he fails to provide any admissible evidence to make a prima facie

showing that there is no t liable issue of material fact as to any of the elements of Plaintiffs'

claims for Libel Per Se and Preliminary and Permanent Injunction. Therefore, the burden does

not shift to Plaintiff.

Defendant has the burden to establish a p limo facie showing that there is no triable issue

of material fact as to one or more elements of the plaintiff s claim, before the burden shifts and

the plaintiff is to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.

Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 826, 850. It is not enough for Defendant to

point to an absence of evidence, supporting Plaintiff s position, but must make an affirmative

showing that Plaintiffs cannot obtain such evidence. Krantz v. Bt Visual Images, (2001) 89

Cal.App.4th 164, 173-174.

Here, aside from copy and pasting statutes and case law, Defendant only makes the

following statements:

.". . .Plaintiffs cannot prove any of their allegations." Motion, pg. 4, line 11;

.". . .Plaintiffs have accused Dinaali of defamation and extortion without providing any proof

either claim." Motion, pg. 4, lines 19-20;

"�. . .Plaintiffs are hoping that through unwarranted discovery and harassment they would find

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something that would Ii the sites to Dinaali." Motion, pg. 5, lines 3-4;

plaintiffs also falsely claim that Dinaali published the sites in order to extort money from

Plaintiffs without providing any proof." Motion, `pg. 5, lines 5-6.

DINAALI is doing nothing more than point to an absence of evidence and has not made

an affirmative showing that Plaintiffs cannot obtain such evidence. As such, DINAALI has failed

to meet his burden. '

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs MCFARLIN LLP, TIMOT}IY G. MCFARLIN,

JARROD Y. NANO, and GARY T. DOTE respectfully request that this Court deny

Defendant ALADDIN DTNAALI'S Motion for Summmgement with prejudice.

DATED: May 2, 2017 MCFAIN ]

By: _____

Timothy G. McFarlinAttorneys for PlaintiffsMCFARLIN LLP, TIMOTIIY G.MCFARLIN, JARROD Y. NANO, and

, GARY T. I OTB

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MEMORANDnl OF FOINTS AND AUTHORITS

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DECLAI;tATION OF PROOF OF SERVICEMcFarlin, LLP, et al. v. Aladdin Dinactli

Los Angeles County Superior Coutt - Santa Monica CourthouseCase No. SC124187

I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action. I am employed byMCFARLIN LLP, whose business address is: 4 Park Plaza, Suite 1025, IIvine, CA 92614.

On May 2, 2017, I served the foregoing documents) described as: PLAINTIFF'SOPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF JARROD Y.NAKANO IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTIONFOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DECLARATION OF TIMOTHY G. MCFARLIN INSUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FORSUMMARY JUDGMENT; PLAINTIFFS' STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS INSUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S SUMMARYJUDGMENT MOTION. on the interested patties as follows:

Aladdin Dinaali Defendant in Pro Per6000 Canterbury Drive, D204Culver City, CA 90230

X BY MAIL: as follows:

X BY OVERNIGHT COURIER SERVICE as follows: I caused such envelope to be deliveredby overnight courier service to the offices of the addressee. The envelope was deposited in orwith a facility regularly maintained by the overnight courier service with delivery fees paid orprovided for.

X STATE: I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Californiathat the above is true and correct.

Executed on May 2, 2017, at Irvine, California.

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PROOF OF SERVICE