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IDEAS & ISSUES (CONCEPTS)

On 17 January 1991, the Unit-ed States military launched Operation DESERT STORM. After six weeks of an aerial

bombing campaign, coalition forces be-gan the ground offensive. One hundred hours later, the Iraqi government capitu-lated and the war was over. Prior to the Persian Gulf War, Iraq had the world’s fourth largest army, including a modern integrated air defense network.1 Despite numerous points of inter-Service fric-tion, Operation DESERT STORM proved to be one of the most dominating tacti-

cal victories in the history of warfare. While the American public—along with western allies—patted their mili-tary on the back, the results horrified many of the U.S.’ potential rivals. The Soviet Union, China, and a host of other countries studied the Persian Gulf War

in detail. In their assessments, the So-viets and Chinese determined that the most serious mistake Saddam had made was allowing the U.S. military forces to establish themselves in the region and subsequently build up a robust inva-sion force completely unmolested.2 Had Saddam contested the initial landings by the 82nd Airborne or the offload of U.S. forces and equipment off naval shipping, he may have inflicted much heavier casualties on U.S. military per-sonnel which was his ultimate opera-tional aim.

Operational Maneuver

from the AirLeveraging the hybrid ultra-large aircraft

to become a true counter antiaccess force

by Capt John Schenck

>Capt Schenck wrote this article

when he was a student at the Expe-

ditionary Warfare School.

A hybrid airship. (Photo courtesy of Lockheed-Martin.)

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Denying adversaries the ability to establish combat power in a specific region has driven the development of technology and doctrine known as an-tiaccess/area denial (A2/AD). To deal with the growing proliferation of A2/AD technologies and threats, the De-partment of Defense published the Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) in January 2012 (Washington, DC: Joint Staff). The JOAC discusses, in broad terms, how the DOD may potentially counter the growing A2/AD threat.

Intended partially as a response to the JOAC, the USMC published Ex-peditionary Force 21 (EF 21) in March 2014 (Washington, DC: HQMC). EF 21 highlights many of the USMC-specific challenges to countering the A2/AD threat; however, many of its proposed solutions are flawed. Specifi-cally, EF 21 proposes that the Marine Corps needs to compensate for the in-adequately low number of L-Class ships by relying more on forward deployed, landbased units,3 and a more robust role for the maritime prepositioning force (MPF).4 The geopolitical challenges of positioning a landbased force in a sov-ereign foreign country and the realistic timelines involved in offloading MPF shipping without host-nation infrastruc-ture call into question the viability of these proposed solutions. The Marine Corps must look beyond its nostalgia for its naval roots without becoming less operationally agile and invest in hybrid ultra-large aircraft (HULA) technology in order to be capable of countering A2/AD networks and remain the Service most capable of forcible entry. HULAs are essentially 21st century blimps with a few significant differences from the early 20th century airships. First, HULAs use helium5 rather than

the highly flammable gas, hydrogen, which the Hindenburg used. Helium is not only a non-flammable gas, but it also acts as a fire suppressant. Next, HULAs have non-rigid hulls in which the envelope is made of fabric. Earlier 20th century blimps had rigid hulls made of expensive aluminum. HULAs can provide the Marine Corps the capability to embark a middleweight-sized MAGTF and its equipment from its home base; trans-port them across the globe in less than

a week; and land them in an austere environment with no receiving area infrastructure requirement—all at a procurement cost that is most favor-able when compared with purchasing L-Class amphibious ships. Experts estimate that fully loaded HULAs capable of carrying 500 tons of equipment only require an 8,000 foot circular or rectangular concrete take off area,6 which could easily be made available on any Marine Corps base. Experts further estimate that 500-ton HULAs could travel at an average speed of between 80 to 110 knots7 depending on weather. The landing area would only require an estimated 1,500 feet and would not require any infrastructure.8 The capability to embark a unit’s organ-ic personnel equipment at its home base and to then deploy them into theater without any host or receiving country infrastructure requirements, ready to fight, is a capability commonly known as “from the fort to the fight.”9

Our current doctrine fails to achieve the same degree of deployability as the “from the fort to the fight” concept. The Marine Corps relies on L-Class and MPF shipping to rapidly respond to crises and the subsequent buildup and sustainment of follow-on forces if

required. Units embarked on L-Class shipping operate using organic equip-ment; however, opportunities to train with and maintain the larger major end items are limited while underway. Units deployed to theater not previ-ously embarked on L-Class shipping fall in on equipment once they arrive. The equipment they fall in on typically will come from the MPF. The goal of any MPF operation is to be “fully op-erational within 10 days following the initial offload.”10 The 10-day timeline would be in addition to the time it takes for the maritime prepositioning squad-ron (MPS) to transit to the theater, the time of the offload itself, and the time incurred by unforeseen problems ready-ing the equipment. During the MPF offload prior to the Persian Gulf War, the state of some of the equipment to come off the MPS was disappointing. Many vehicles had the wrong type of oil or none at all.11 Additionally, batteries were so depleted that Marines had to search the local markets to replenish them.12 Much of the trouble with the MPF equipment in the Persian Gulf War was not repeated during Opera-tion IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). However, one thing that will never change in an MPF operation is that an arrival and assembly phase will always be required to make the stored equipment opera-tional. If everything goes right in the assembly phase, it should not take lon-ger than 10 days. However, if unfore-seen problems occur as they did in the Persian Gulf War, more than 10 days will be required. Additionally, prior to assembly, an MPF operation that relied exclusively on the mobile landing plat-forms (MLP) to keep the seabase out of range of A2/AD weapons would incur a significant amount of additional time for the offload. Simply put, a “from the fort to the fight” operation would have Marines and their equipment fighting in days and weeks, while compositing a MEB on L-Class ships and a follow-on MPF operation would take months. In addition to being timelier, “from the fort to the fight” operations are also more cost effective. Looking at the pro-curement costs of the separate fleets, L-Class ships and HULAs is probably the simplest way of comparing costs. An

Experts estimate that fully loaded HULAs capable of

carrying 500 tons of equipment only require an 8,000

foot circular or rectangular concrete take off area,

which could easily be made available on any Marine

Corps base.

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IDEAS & ISSUES (CONCEPTS)

industry study examining the deploy-ment of a U.S. Army Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) from the conti-nental United States to Korea estimat-ed that thirty 500-ton HULAs could accomplish the movement in a single lift.13 Additionally, the study estimated the time for deployment at 96 hours,14 which is competitive with the time it would take for a MEB to composite in theater on L-Class ships. Because there is no known study conducted on lift-ing a MEB using HULAs, this article will compare the cost of lifting two SBCTs via HULAs against lifting two MEBs with L-Class shipping, while ac-knowledging the tables of organization and equipment between the two types of brigades are different. The Marine Corps L-Class shipping requirement is a total of 38 ships15 consisting of 11 LHAs/LHDs, 14 LSDs, and 13 LPDs.16 At $3.8 billion per LHA/LHD, $1.7 billion per LPD, and $1.5 billion per LSD,17 the 38-ship fleet costs roughly $84.9 billion in terms of procurement costs. A fleet of sixty 500-ton HULAs would cost an estimated $12 billion.18

These savings alone justify a more de-tailed investigation of adopting a “from the fort to the fight” model. Other cost comparisons between personnel, fuel, operational maintenance, basing op-

tions, and acquisitions costs would pro-vide a truly accurate picture of how cost effective the HULA platform would be. The largest counterargument usu-ally raised over employing HULAs is their survivability. However, HULAs are unexpectedly more survivable than one may believe. HULAs do not face a threat from sea mines or antiship ballis-tic missiles that have become far cheaper

and more prevalent in recent years. The threat of most surface-to-air weapons systems is mitigated be the sheer size of the HULA’s envelope. According to two Air Force colonels studying HULA employment, “Even if a MANPAD were to detonate against the envelope … it would still take hours, not minutes, to bring the airship down. And it would land, not crash.”19 As hostile aircraft represent the largest threat to HULAs, the one unavoidable prerequisite to em-ploying HULAs is local air superiority. To mitigate the air-to-air threat during

a forcible entry-type HULA operation, the intelligence preparation of the bat-tlefield would optimally find strategic and operational avenues of approach with little or no enemy presence, ide-ally devoid of any human civilization. The world’s shipping lanes bottleneck at several strategically significant re-gions. Countering an A2/AD leveraged force entrenched at one of these strate-gic bottlenecks represents a significant challenge to the Navy and the Marine Corps. Because HULAs maneuver from the air, predicating avenues of approach will be a significant challenge for the enemy. Regardless of how effective the operational security of a HULA opera-tion could be, escorts would be needed. It is unlikely that the USMC would be able to organically escort a HULA-based force. Some level of escort would undoubtedly need to come from the Air Force. Joint doctrine between the Air Force and the HULA-based force would need to be developed and subsequent joint training conducted. If an adequate amount of operational security exists and an appropriate escort is apportioned then a HULA-based force could be con-fident that they would marshal, move, and arrive in theater unmolested. To understand the need for addition-al maneuverability and deployability in

The hybrid airship would land, not crash, if hit by a MANPAD. (Photo courtesy of Lockheed-Martin.)

... HULAs are unexpect-edly more survivable than one may believe.

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our current operating environment, our recent experience in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM serves as a worthy example. The original war plans for IRAQI FREE-DOM called for a division-sized attack from Turkey. Planners thought that a northern front would divert the Iraqi Army’s attention from the south, rap-

idly secure northern oilfields at risk of being scuttled, and establish a presence to mitigate potential ethnic violence between the Arabs and Kurds.20 After months of negotiations, planning, and coordination, the Turks pulled out of the agreement.21 War planners at the time were then faced with a near-crisis of not being able to open a northern front as planned. The attack from the north that never was is a typical example of the geopoliti-cal challenges war planners face. Tradi-tionally, the Navy and Marine Corps have limited the amount of influence a nonbelligerent, but sovereign, foreign government can have on U.S. military operations by using the world’s oceans as maneuver space. The majority of the world’s ocean areas are not under the legal authority of any nation; therefore, permission neither needs to be asked nor granted for its use. Similarly, the world’s airspace is equally maneuver-able with regard to legal considerations. The most significant difference between maneuvering from the sea and the air is that avenues of approach in the air are not bottlenecked at strategically vulnerable areas like the world’s ship-ping lanes are. Had the Iraqi Freedom planners had the appropriate amount of HULA-based lift in the planning of the operation, the Turkish reneging would not have resulted in the canceling of a major part of the operation. The planners could have simply attempted to negotiate overfly approval of another

adjacent country’s airspace, since there would not be any infrastructure require-ment. If no adjacent nation granted overfly, the HULA-based force could have crossed the Iraqi coast and navi-gated along strategically void portions of the Iraqi desert to an appropriate drop zone, landing in a matter of hours af-

ter entering enemy airspace. Again, no host-nation infrastructure requirements need to be considered. The growing pervasiveness of A2/AD threats and the inability of the Navy and Marine Corps to counter those threats on the water should drive the Marines to develop HULAs as an alternative platform to get “from the fort to the fight.” If the Marine Corps loses its expeditionary edge on the other sister Services, it loses its right to exist.

Notes

1. Michael R. Gordon and Gen Bernard E. Trainor, The General’s War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf, (New York: Hatchette Book Group, 1995), 102.

2. Sam J. Tangredi, Anti Access Warfare: Coun-tering A2/AD Strategies, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013), 28–29.

3. Department of the Navy, Headquarters Ma-rine Corps, Expeditionary Force 21: Forward and Ready: Now and in the Future (Washington, DC: 2014), 18.

4. Ibid., 42–43.

5. Col Walter O. Gordon, USAFR and Col Chuck Holland, USAF(Ret), “Back to the Fu-ture: Airships and the Coming Revolution in Strategic Airlift,” Air Force Journal of Logistics, (September 2005), 49–50.

6. Ibid., 55.

7. Ibid., 53.

8. Ibid., 55.

9. NAVAIR, “Hybrid Aircraft Envisioned Military Relevance: Report to EUCOM S&T Conference,” (Stuttgart, Germany: 20 June 2007), Slide 37.

10. Department of the Navy, Headquarters Marine Corps, MCWP 3-32/NTTP 3-02.3M, Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations, (Washington, DC: 2011), 1-4 to 1-5.

11. Gordon and Trainor, 61.

12. Ibid.

13. Gordon and Holland, 57.

14. Ibid.

15. Expeditionary Force 21, 18.

16. Ronald O’Rourke, Congressional Research Service, “Naval LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Pro-curement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress,” (Washington, DC: 2009), 8.

17. LtCol James W. Hammond III, USMC(Ret), “The ACE That Ate the Marine Corps: Restore Balance to the MAGTF,” Marine Corps Gazette, (Quantico, VA: January 2014), 7.

18. Gordon and Holland, 57.

19. Ibid.

20. Michael R. Gordon and Gen Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Inva-sion and Occupation of Iraq, (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), 127–128.

21. Ibid., 384–385.

The most significant difference between maneuvering

from the sea and the air is that avenues of approach

in the air are not bottlenecked at strategically vulner-

able areas like the world’s shipping lanes are.

Visit http://bit.ly/20QzO7H to watch a video of the hy-brid ultra-large aircraft.

LINK

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