Operational Maneuverfrom the Sea

U.S. Marine Corps

PCN 145 000001 00

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYHeadquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20380-1775

4 January 1996

FORWARD

In the White Papers. . . From the Sea and Forward... Fromthe Sea, the Navy and Marine Corps presented a commonvision for a future in which skillfully handled naval forceswould enable the United States to exert its influence in thelittoral regions of the world. Building upon the foundationlaid by those papers, Operational Maneuver from the Seadeals explicitly with the full spectrum of challenges that wewill have to face, the dangers and opportunities created bynew technologies, and the very exciting prospect of adaptingthe -adition of maneuver warfare, not merely to amphibiousoperations, but to all aspects of warfare in, and around,coastal waters.

C.C. KRULAKGeneral, U.S. Marine Corps

Commandant of the Marine Corps

DISTRIBUTION: 145 000001 00

The contents of this Marine Corps Concept Paper havebeen previously published and distributed as OperationalManeuver from the Sea, by Concepts Division, MarineCorps Combat Development Command. The samecontents are now presented in this format.

OPERATIONAL MANEUVERFROM THE SEA

A CONCEPT FOR THE PROJECTION OF

NAVAL POWER ASHORE

In the white papers, " . From the Sea" and "Forward.From the Sea," the Secretary of the Navy, with the Chief ofNaval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps,began the development of a new approach to navaloperations. This approach places unprecedented emphasis onlittoral areas, requires more intimate cooperation betweenforces afloat and forces ashore, introduces the concept of thenaval expeditionary force, and provides the foundation forOperational Maneuver from the Sea.

Like its predecessor, the approach to amphibious warfaredeveloped at Quantico during the 1930s, OperationalManeuver from the Sea is a response to both danger andopportunity. The danger, summarized by the phrase "chaos inthe littorals," consists of a world characterized by the clash ofthe myriad forces of national aspiration, religious intolerance,and ethnic hatred. The opportunity comes from significantenhancements in information management, battlefieldmobility, and the lethality of conventional weapons.

These two changes to the operational environment, a newseries of threats and enhanced tactical capabilities, aresignificant ones. While they change neither the nature of warnor our fundamental doctrine of maneuver warfare, "chaos inthe littorals" and the military applications of newtechnologies will have a profound effect on where we fight,who we fight, and how we fight. This, in turn, will requireconsiderable alterations in the education of leaders, theorganization and equipment of units, and the selection andtraining of Marines.

The details of these alterations are, as yet, unknown.Refocusing the Marine Corps to meet the needs of the nextcentury will, like all successful military innovation, involve agreat deal of debate and experimentation. Many ideas will beput forward, discussed, and put to the test in war games, fieldtrials, exercises, and actual operations. And, if history is anyguide, the conclusions we draw from this process may wellbear little resemblance to the assumptions with which westarted.

The purpose of this concept paper is to begin this process ofproposal, debate, and experimentation. Building on thefoundation laid by " . . . From the Sea" and "Forward .From the Sea," it provides our vision of what OperationalManeuver from the Sea is and what naval forces of the nearfuture should be able to do. In doing this, it provides aframework for the actions of many people, Marines, Sailors,civilian employees, and contractors whose work will turn theconcept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea into thereality of forces capable of winning decisive victories inlittoral areas.

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"CHAOS IN THE LITTORALS"

Challenge and Opportunity

In the future, the United States is likely to face a number ofvery different threats to its security, interests, and way of life.Many of these will be associated with the littorals, those areascharacterized by great cities, well-populated coasts, and theintersection of trade routes where land and sea meet. Whilerepresenting a relatively small portion of the world's surface,littorals provide homes to over three-quarters of the world'spopulation, locations for over 80 percent of the world's capitalcities, and nearly all of the marketplaces for internationaltrade. Because of this, littorals are also the place where mostof the world's important conflicts are likely to occur.

Close association with the littorals is one of the few thingsthat conflicts of the near future are likely to have in common.In all other respects—goals, organizations, armament, andtactics—the warfare of the next 20 years will be distinguishedby its great variety. For that reason, it is imperative that theMarine Corps resist the temptation to prepare for only onetype of conflict. To focus on one threat greatly increases thedanger that we will be surprised, and perhaps defeated, byanother.

To influence events overseas, America requires a credible,forwardly deployable, power projection capability. In theabsence of an adjacent land base, a sustainable forcible entry

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capability that is independent of forward staging bases,friendly borders, overflight rights, and other politicallydependent support can come only from the sea. The chaos ofthe future requires that we maintain the capability to projectpower ashore against all forces of resistance, ranging fromovercoming devastated infrastructure to assisting a friendlypeople in need of disaster relief to countering the entirespectrum of armed threats.

The Breakdown of Order

The most obvious challenge faced by the United States and itsMarine Corps is the worldwide breakdown of order. Fromthe former Soviet Union to the former Yugoslavia, from theAtlas Mountains of North Africa to the Andes of SouthAmerica, and from the streets of Washington, D.C. to thestreets of Algiers, governments are losing their monopoly onorganized violence. The result, as Marines have seen inSomalia, Lebanon, and Los Angeles, will be chaoticsituations in which ethnic groups, street gangs, clans, andother non-state actors wage the war of "all against all."

In many parts of the world, this trend towards the breakdownof order is likely to continue. Loyalty will shift, as it has forsome time, from states to more intimate groupings, and fromorganizations that can keep the peace to entities that do a farbetter job at providing people with a sense of purpose andcommunity. The long-term implications of this realignmentof allegiances is hard to gauge. In the immediate future,however, we can be sure of more of the same sort of

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chaos—famine, terrorism, crime—that we see in ournewspapers every day.

One particularly frightening possibility is the use of weaponsof mass destruction by non-state actors. States that fail tocommand the loyalty of significant portions of theirpopulation will have difficulty controlling their stockpiles ofnuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

A World of "Fighters"

Though there is much war in the news, there is verylittle mention of "soldiers," those who belong to theregularly constituted armed forces of establishedstates. Instead, most of the fighting is done by peoplein the much broader category of "fighters." At a timewhen most states are reluctant to risk casualties amongtheir well organized and well paid regular forces, thereseems to be no shortage of men who are willing topick up a weapon and, defend the cause of their ethnicgroup, religion, clan, or tribe usually as an unpaidvolunteer.

Non-state actors that cannot access traditional means of massdestruction may contemplate such equally destructiveexpedients as the blowing up of dams and the poisoning ofwater supplies. Even without weapons of mass destruction,non-state actors wield considerable destructive power. Theycan disrupt economies to the point of famine and societies tothe point of lawlessness.

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Regional Powers

The breakdown of order is not a universal phenomenon.Many areas of the world will continue to be dominated bystates whose armed forces, while not always armed with themost advanced weaponry, are still formidable opponents.Regional powers that acquire, as many are likely to, nuclearweapons and other weapons of mass destruction will becomeeven more powerful.

Regional powers are not necessarily hostile. Indeed, much ofAmerica's foreign policy is based upon alliances with regionalpowers. Nonetheless, a change of regime, a shift in theinternational balance of power, or even the perception ofopportunity can turn a neutral or even friendly regionalpower into a hostile one. As a result, the Armed Forces ingeneral, and the naval services in particular, must be able todeal not only with those regional powers that are currently atodds with the United States, but also with regional powersthat alone or in combination might pose a threat in the future.

The Next Superpower

At present, the United States is the only superpower in theworld. If history is any guide, this enviable position isunlikely to be permanent. At some time in the future, anothersuperpower—whether an existing state, a new state, or analliance of states—could rise up.

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The Rapid Rise of Dominant Powers

In 1480, Spain was a collection of little kingdoms, aseager to fight each other as to defend their commoninterests. Twenty years later, Spain held title to halfthe globe. In 1850, Germany was little more than ageographical expression, a no-man's land between theterritory of the great powers. By 1871, Germany wasthe dominant force in Europe. In 1935, with no armedforces to speak of and an economy in decline, theUnited States wanted nothing more than for the worldto leave it alone. Within ten years, flush with victory,economically prosperous, and in sole possession ofthe atomic bomb, the United States became the singlemost powerful nation on earth

It is unlikely that this new superpower will be a mirror imageof the United States. Nonetheless, the advantages so evidentin our recent conflicts with regional powers—superiornumbers, logistics, wealth, and technology—are likely to bematched by similar advantages in the hands of our rival. It iseven possible that the new superpower will possess more ofthe basic building blocks of military power than we will. Insuch a situation, the outcome will depend, to a degreeunprecedented in recent history, upon the skill with which wefight.

Whether our enemy is a superpower as large and as rich as weare, or a regional power armed with second-hand weapons, ora political entity that has neither a capital city nor coinage,

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the wars of the near future share a number of importantcharacteristics. Many of these derive from the wideavailability of a variety of weapons that are far more lethalthan the weapons used for most of the 20th century. Theseweapons include existing precision-guided munitions;non-line of sight gunner-in-the-loop weapons such as thefiber-optic guided missile; and improved level-of-effortmunitions rockets/missiles, artillery, and mortars.

In war against non-state actors, where the proximity ofinnocents is often the enemy's greatest advantage, and inoperations other than war, more precise weapons will allow asignificantly greater degree of discrimination. A guidedmissile sent through a window, an armed robot turning acorner, and a directed energy weapon covering an exit willoften be useful in situations where the delivery of tons of highexplosive would be counter-productive.

In a war against regional powers, more precise weapons,whether precision-guided or level-of-effort, will allow greatereffect on the target for far fewer rounds. This translates intoadditional shipping space available for landing forcerequirements, reductions in overland transport, and reductionsin on-shore storage. The reduced logistics footprint oflanding forces armed with more precise weapons will alsotranslate into a significant reduction in the time needed forship-to-objective and shore-to-ship maneuver.

In a war against a new superpower, new technologies willallow us to compete on equal terms. The infrastructure of

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20th century combat power—large dumps of fuel andammunition, ships waiting for days to unload their cargoes,and crowded assembly areas—will make lucrative targets forthe weapons of the 21st century. At the same time, landingforces armed with the C2, tactical mobility, and fire supportcapabilities of the present will be hard pressed to decisivelyengage an enemy who is likely to combine the destructivecapability of a conventional force with the elusiveness of aguerrilla.

New technologies, whether organic or in support, will givesmall units unprecedented combat power. Since small unitsare easier to move than large ones, these new technologieswill permit high tempo operations in and between a widevariety of environments. At the same time, new weapons,which will inevitably be wielded by at least some of ourenemies, require that our units be hard to detect, far-ranging,and fast-moving.

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RESPONDING- To the Challenge

There is no single answer to the many challenges that willpresent themselves in the future, naval forces will have toadapt as they have done throughout history to changingcircumstances. For that reason, it is important that navalforces avoid a narrow definition of their capabilities. At thesame time, the fact that the future is uncertain is no excuse forfailing to make adequate preparations.

The centerpiece of our preparations for the future is anapproach to expeditionary, littoral, and amphibious warfareknown as Operational Maneuver from the Sea. WhileOperational Maneuver from the Sea will not define allNavy/Marine operations, the attitudes, skills, techniques andequipment associated with it will provide naval forces with asolid foundation for future improvisation.

The heart of Operational Maneuver from the Sea is themaneuver of naval forces at the operational level, a bold bidfor victory that aims at exploiting a significant enemyweakness in order to deal a decisive blow. Mere movement,which may lead to indecisive results or even becounterproductive, does not qualify as operational maneuver.That is to say, operational maneuver should be directedagainst an enemy center of gravity—something that isessential to the enemy's ability to effectively continue thestruggle.

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Principles ofOperational Maneuver from the Sea

Operational Maneuver from the Sea focuses on anoperational objective.

Operational Maneuver from the Sea uses the sea asmaneuver space.

Operational Maneuver from the Sea generatesoverwhelming tempo and momentum.

Operational Maneuver from the Sea pits strengthagainst weakness.

Operational Maneuver from the Sea emphasizesintelligence, deceptions, and flexibility.

Operational Maneuver from the Sea integrates allorganic, joint, and combined assets.

The center of gravity may be a physical object (a militaryforce, a city, a region) or a source of supplies or money.More often than not, the center of gravity will be anintangible, essential element of the political and moral forcesthat keep our enemies in the fight against us. The purpose ofthe legitimate use of force, is to convince our enemies that itis unwise and, in the final analysis, wrong to make waragainst us.

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Decisive Action

Decisive action is that which leads directly to theimposition of our will upon the enemy. In situations wherea great deal is at stake, this will often require depriving theenemy of all means of effective resistance. Where less isat stake, depriving the enemy of a well-defmed portion ofhis armed forces, territory, revenue, alliance structure, orprestige may be sufficient. Thus, action that is decisive ina strictly limited conflict, such as the taking of theFalkiand Islands by British forces during the South AtlanticWar of 1982, might not be decisive in a war, such as theSecond World War, where the belligerents were fightingfor critical national interests

The search for decisive effect is common to all forms ofoperational maneuver, whether on land, at sea, or in thelittorals where land and sea meet. What distinguishesOperational Maneuver from the Sea from all other species ofoperational maneuver is the extensive use of the sea as ameans of gaining advantage, an avenue for friendlymovement that is simultaneously a barrier to the enemy and ameans of avoiding disadvantageous engagements. Thisaspect of Operational Maneuver from the Sea may make useof, but is not limited to, such techniques as sea-basedlogistics, sea-based fire support and the use of the sea as amedium for tactical and operational movement.

For most of the 20th century, the usefulness of sea-basedlogistics was limited by the voracious appetite of modernlanding forces for such items as fuel, large caliber

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ammunition, and aviation ordnance. As a result, the optionsavailable to landing forces were greatly reduced by the needto establish, protect, and make use of supply dumps.Concerted efforts were delayed and opportunities for decisiveaction missed while the necessary supplies accumulated onshore.

In the near future, improvements in the precision oflong-range weapons, greater reliance on sea-based firesupport, and, quite possibly, a decrease in the fuelrequirements of military land vehicles promise to eliminate,or at least greatly reduce, the need to establish supplyfacilities ashore. As a result, the logistics tail of landingforces will be smaller, ship-to-shore movement will take lesstime, and what were previously known as "subsequentoperations ashore" will be able to start without the traditional"build up phase." In other words, landing forces will movedirectly from their ships to their objectives, whether thoseobjectives are located on the shoreline or far inland.

The significant reduction of logistics infrastructure ashorewill also facilitate the rapid re-embarkation of the landingforce. This will enable the landing force to avoid combatoffered on unfavorable terms, to avoid obstacles that stand inthe way of decisive action, and to make use of the inevitablyperishable advantage of surprise. In effect, powerful landingforces will be able to do what had hitherto been the exclusiveprovince of lightly armed landing parties.

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When combined with a command and control system orientedtowards rapid decision-making at all levels of command, theadditional speed and flexibility offered by these newtechniques translates into a high tempo of operations.Vulnerabilities can be exploited before they are reduced,opportunities seized before the they vanish, and traps sprungbefore they are discovered. In short, we will be able to act soquickly that the enemy will not be able to react effectivelyuntil it is too late.

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OMFTS: A Classic from the Past

The capture of Seoul in 1950 was a classic example of anOperational Maneuver from the Sea. It was a completelyfocused operation, unified under a single commander, thatflowed coherently from San Diego, Sasebo, and Pusan,through an amphibious power projection at Inchon, to keyobjectives well inland.

L('IThe Seoul operation was focused on a critical North Koreanvulnerability, the lines of support (and withdrawal) throughthe Han River Valley at Seoul. It maintained that focus andwith it an unmatched tempo of aggressive action. As a result,it was crushingly successful, leading to the destruction of theNorth Korean Army and the liberation of South Korea.

If the operation had lost its focus, however, and been plannedand executed as merely an amphibious lodgment at Inchon, itwould have generated only an operationally insignificanttactical "victory".

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OMFTS: A Path to the Future

The sea offers, strategic, operational, and tactical mobility tothose who control it. For most of the 20th century, however,the options created by control of the sea have been severelyconstrained by the requirements to transition to war on land.In 1944, for example, Anglo-American control of the seaswas sufficient to permit landings anywhere along theextensive Atlantic coast of France. However, therequirements to ferry a massive, relatively immobile forceashore, and then provide the support necessary to createmaneuverability within that force, restricted the choice oflanding areas to those large beaches and open drop zones thatcould easily be supported from Great Britain. Thus, thelandings could only take place on selected portions of thenorthwest coast of France.

In the future, a naval expeditionary force will be able to makefull use of the options provided by control of the sea. A navalexpeditionary force attacking from Spain, for example,would have the ability to .fight a campaign on the western sideof the Atlantic without having to establish a base at someintermediate point. The ability to operate at long distance,would give a force trained and equipped for futureOperational Maneuver from the Sea the freedom to landpowerful forces through nearly any point along the east coastof the North American continent.

The forces in this example have been given the option ofchoosing any one of three Littoral Penetration Areas (LPA).

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In this case, intelligence pulls the operation toward LPARichmond, this allows LPA Charleston or LPA Jersey to beused for deception operations if the commander chooses. Theenemy is forced to attempt to be strong everywhere until themoment when he is sure that our main landing force haslanded.

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As the attack on Richmond (NEF Objective A) relentlesslycontinues, advance operations and real-time reconnaissanceidentify highly exploitable Littoral Penetration Points (LPP)through which the attacking forces swarm by air and surfacemeans to overwhelm enemy defenses. The attack progressesfrom ship to objective with no large or lengthy buildup on theinitial beaches. (In many cases, the assaulting Marines willsimply pass through the penetration points, leaving noresidual forces at all.) An MPF landing reinforces this attack,while other Marines are the seaward flank for an overlandsouthern advance of combined Army, Air Force, and alliedforces.

Maneuver Warfare to...

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.— I

LPARICHMOND

Maneuver Welfare

Though their definitive task is always to prepare for and fightthe nation's wars, deployed naval forces are often called uponto do such things as evacuate noncombatants, assist disastervictims, and protect the delivery of relief supplies. Liketoday's Navy-Marine team, naval expeditionary forces of thefuture will not be designed specifically for such tasks.Nonetheless, future naval expeditionary forces will, thanks tothe equipment and training associated with OperationalManeuver from the Sea, have a significantly enhanced abilityto conduct operations other than war.

Seabasing will free Marines from the need to set up facilitiesashore prior to devoting their full energies to relief efforts.Improvements in ship-to-objective mobility will allow help tobe delivered directly to areas where it is needed most,iucluding places far from ports and airfields. The highlyaccurate and rapidly responsive weapons on board the shipsof the naval expeditionary force—weapons that can bequickly employed to support Marines on the ground—willallow a landing party to present a less-threatening appearancewhile not depriving it of a powerful means of protection.

The value of these capabilities can be seen by comparingwhat happened in the 1992 relief effort in Somalia withwhat could have been done by a naval expeditionaryforce trained and equipped for future Operational Maneuverfrom the Sea. During the 1992 relief effort, the MAGTFcould for future Operational Maneuver from the Sea. During

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the 1992 relief effort, the MAGTF could not proceed inlandto its objective until it had established a lodgment to supportand sustain the advance of convoys and limited rangehelicopters.

For the next generation of naval power projection forces, the240 kilometers that separate Baidoa from Mogadishu and theshoreline would have been less of an obstacle. Indeed, thelanding of a force in Mogadishu (ship-to-coastal objective)and a detachment at Baidoa (ship-to-inland objective) couldbe carried out simultaneously, speeding relief to those in needand depriving potentially hostile forces of the ability toprepare and effectively react.

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(

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Setting The Course

- To Make It Happen

Operational Maneuver from the Sea requires that we focusour efforts on those areas which afford us the greatest return.Specifically, we must improve our operations, modernize ourcapabilities, and strengthen our intellectual underpinnings.

OMFTS requires significant changes in the way we areorganized, in the way we move between the sea and theobjective, and the way we deal with the wide variety ofmissions we will be called upon to support.

Operational Directions

•Enhance Naval Expeditionary Force Integration•Revolutionize Forcible Entry Operations4Expand Maritime Maneuver Across the Spectrum

of Conflict

Organization. OMFTS treats the littoral as a singleenvironment in which the cooperation of units on land, at sea,and in the air is based on a shared vision of what must be

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done, intimate knowledge of the capabilities and weaknessesof each type of unit, and an esprit de corps that transcendsservice identity or occupational specialty. This can only beachieved if the naval expeditionary force is organized andtrained as a highly cohesive team.

Movement Between Land and Sea. OMFTS requires rapidmovement, not merely from ship to shore, but from ship toobjectives that may be miles away from blue water and frominland positions back to offshore vessels. While someoperations may require the establishment of bases ashore, thepractice of separating ship-to-shore movement from thetactical and operational maneuver of units ashore will bereplaced by maneuvers in which units move, withoutinterruption, from ships at sea to their inland objectives.

The Spectrum of Conflict. In contrast to previous approachesto amphibious warfare, OMFTS is not limited to the high endof the spectrum of conflict. Indeed, in a world where war willbe made in many different ways, the very notion of"conventional" warfare is likely to fall out of use. For thatreason, the techniques of OMFTS must be of use in a widevariety of situations, ranging from humanitarian relief to ahigh-stakes struggle against a rising superpower.

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Operational Maneuver from the Sea will require us toovercome challenges in the areas of battlefield mobility,intelligence, command and control, fire support, aviation,mine countermeasures, and sustainment. In evolvingOMFTS, we will meet these challenges and find solutionsusing both technology and new approaches in doctrine,organization, tactics, and training.

Capability Improvements

•Mobility•Intelligence•Fires•Aviation•Mine Countermeasures•Command and Control•Combat Service Support

Mobility. To move units from ships lying over the horizon toobjectives lying far from the shore, we will require thecapability to cross great distances, reduce the limitationsimposed by terrain and weather, and, most importantly, toseamlessly transition from maneuvering at sea tomaneuvering ashore and vice-versa.

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Intelligence. The high tempo of operations essential tosuccessful OMFTS requires that intelligence be provided todecision makers with a minimum of delay. Technology thatpermits the rapid dissemination of intelligence products willplay an important role in this effort. However, the key toeffective intelligence support of OMFTS, lies in theorientation of intelligence specialists. In particular,intelligence specialists must be capable of rapidly makingeducated judgments about what the enemy is likely to do.

Command and Control. The command and control systembest suited to OMFTS will be very different from thosedeveloped to deal with previous approaches to amphibiouswarfare. Techniques previously employed to compensate forthe inability of fire support units to see the battlefield willgive way to techniques that exploit the fact that combatantunits will be better informed than ever before.Communications systems designed to provide a fewheadquarters with an overall view of the situation will have tobe replaced by those that provide units with control over theinformation they need. The equipment to make this transitionfrom communications nets to information networks hasalready been developed. Making this new technology workwill require fundamental changes to the skills and attitudespossessed by Marines involved with the command andcontrol system. The key to this capability lies more in therealm of education and doctrine than it does in the realm ofhardware.

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Fires. Successful execution of OMFTS will drive changes infire support. To improve our mobility ashore, we willincreasingly take advantage of sea-based fires and seekshore-based fire support- systems with improved tacticalmobility. To support rapidly maneuvering forces, we muststreamline our fire support coordination procedures toimprove responsiveness. To provide effective fires, forcesafloat and ashore require the ability to deliver fires withincreased range and improved accuracy and lethality. Finally,we will use fires to exploit maneuver just as we use maneuverto exploit the effects of fires.

Aviation. Our combat aircraft must be capable of operatingfrom a variety of ships and austere bases ashore, perfoim avariety of missions, and land on a wide variety of surfaces.Our aviation units must be organized, trained, and employedas integral parts of a naval expeditionary force.

Mine Countermeasures. Because of their relative low costand pervasiveness, mines have become a cheap means oflimiting the mobility of ships and landing craft in thecontested littoral regions. For that reason, we must developand enhance our counter-mine/obstacle reconnaissance, minemarking and clearing capabilities, precision navigation, andin-stride breaching to support maneuver at sea, ashore, andduring the transition from sea to land.

Combat Service Support (CSS). The requirement to sustainfast-moving, powerful, combined arms forces conductingship-to-objective maneuver will strain the best logistics

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system. Speed and mobility comparable to the assault forces'will be necessary for CSS elements responding to thedynamic demands of OMFTS. CSS flow must be efficient,secure, and timely, with the option to remain sea-based or tobuildup support areas ashore. Delivery means and materialhandling demands are great, as is the need for a command andcontrol system capable of rapidly communicatingrequirements and flexibly managing "right time, right place"support.

•Doctrine•Training and Education

Doctrine. The doctrine of maneuver warfare is fullycompatible with the concept of Operational Maneuver fromthe Sea. On the other hand, many of the techniques andprocedures currently used by Fleet and Fleet Marine Forceunits must be replaced by techniques that are more in accordwith OMFTS. This is particularly true in the areas of firesupport, logistics, command and control, andship-to-objective maneuver.

Training and Education. The effective employment ofOMFTS will necessitate changes in Marine Corps trainingand education programs. The operational environment for

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Intellectual Foundations

OMFTS is characterized by a dynamic, fluid situation. Insuch a chaotic situation, we require leaders and staffs who cantolerate ambiguity and uncertainty and make rapid decisionsunder stress. Producing leaders, from the small unit level tothe MAGTF commander, who have the experience to judgewhat needs to be done and know how to do it can beaccomplished only with an extensive amount of training andexposure to operational problems. We must have leaders whocan operate effectively in spite of risks and uncertainty; wecan develop these leaders by improving their capacity toidentify patterns, seek and select critical information, andmake decisions quickly on an intuitive basis. Thisintuitive-based decisionmaking cycle will be enhanced byextensive investments in education, wargaming and combatsimulation activities, and battlefield visualization techniques.These investments will produce leaders who can makeinformed judgments, take decisive action, and thus ensurethat OMFTS can be successfully executed.

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CONCLUSIONThe Future of Naval Warfare

Just as a littoral is formed by the meeting of land and sea,Operational Maneuver from the Sea is a marriage betweenmaneuver warfare and naval warfare. From maneuverwarfare comes an understanding of the dynamic nature ofconflict, the imperative of decisive objectives, and therequirement for skillful operations executed at a high tempo.From naval warfare are derived a deep appreciation for thestrategic level of war, the advantages inherent in sea-bornemovement, and the flexibility provided by sea-based logistics.Operational Maneuver from the Sea will couple doctrine withtechnological advances in speed, mobility, fire support,communications, and navigation to seamlessly and rapidlyidentify and exploit enemy weaknesses across the entirespectrum of conflict. When properly united, these elementsof Operational Maneuver from the Sea provide the UnitedStates with a naval expeditionary force that, while deployedunobtrusively in international waters, is instantly ready tohelp any friend, defeat any foe, and convince potentialenemies of the wisdom of keeping the peace.

28 * Li. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1997-424-96,I7O195