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Jessica Ward !!!Operation Eagle Claw: a Failure of Policy, a Failure of Desperation !!

It is April 24, 1980. For 170 days, nearly six months, Iranian students have held

Americans hostage in the American embassy in Tehran. There seems to be no diplomatic solution

to the problem in sight. For 170 days President Carter has been trying to free the hostages,

including severing all relations with Iran and calling on allies to do the same. In a frantic move,

he ordered the U.S. special forces to go into Iran and rescue the hostages. This mission failed to

even reach Tehran due to weather condtions. Two helicopters collided in the Iranian desert,

killing eight Americans. At 1 AM the next morning the White House announced the failure of the

mission. Later in the day, Carter, in a press conference, claimed full responsibility to the

American public.

Operation Eagle Claw was a desperate act from a desperate President Carter. With an

upcoming election, Carter needed to solve a problem that had become a thorn in his side,

damaging his political reputation, to which he had tried every possible solution. Trying to keep

Operation Eagle Claw secret, the President failed to inform congress, despite the fact that it had

been in planning since shortly after the beginning of this crisis (The Situation in Iran 3). The

mission, which aimed to get all 53 hostages out of Iran without being caught was serious risk

both the lives of the hostages and members of the Delta Force and the possibility of future

diplomatic relations with Iran .

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For Carter, 1980 was a turbulent time. Within one month of Operation Eagle Claw,

Iranian students took over the Iranian Embassy in London; the Yugoslavian president died,

resulting in his funeral being the largest diplomatic meeting until the funeral of Pope John Paul II

in 2005; a Liberian ship crashed into a bridge in Florida, killing 35; race riots occurred in Miami;

Mt. St. Helens would erupt in Washington, an unprecedented natural disaster in the continental

United States, killing 57 and causing $1.1 billion in damage. In addition, Carter was running for

re-election, first for the Democratic nomination against the formidable Edward Kennedy, and

then against the eventual winner Ronald Reagan. Carter did not gain the democratic nomination

until the Democratic National convention in August.

The Iranian hostage crisis had a huge impact on the American voters psyche. Every night

at the end of the daily news broadcast Walter Cronkite would end with the count of the number

of days the hostages had been held in Iran and the ABC television network aired a show every

night on the crisis called America Held Hostage, making the crisis an everyday issue, an issue

that would seep into the minds of Americans and effect the opinions of Americans towards the

competency of their current president (Goodman). With his approval ratings sinking below 40%

in 1980 Carter had the to solve the crisis in order to regain the support of the American public in

time for the rapidly approaching November election (Gallup).

Meanwhile, the Iranian government was unstable and was adamant that the issue would

only be addressed by the Majilis, which had not yet been fully formed, a date that kept slipping

further and further backward (The Situation in Iran 3). Other international methods for

mediation had been tried and failed to produce any result. On December 4, 1979, the United

Nations security council passed unanimously Resolution 457 which called for the release of the

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hostages, a peaceful settlement of U.S. - Iranian differences, and participation by the Secretary-

General to implement the resolution (The Iran Hostage Crisis 50). On the 15th of December the

International Court of Justice ruled in favor of the United States and ordered Iran to release the

hostages. A second resolution was soon passed by the United Nations Security Council,

Resolution 461, which enforced this ruling but recalled the previous Resolution 457

The Carter Administration had tried every possible avenue it saw for diplomatic

solutions:

We took economic and other actions- cutting off purchases of oil from them, freezing their assets, blocking the sale of military equipment and parts. We pressed the United Nations, in the International Court of Justice, anywhere we could find, for clear international expressions of condemnation that would underscore the isolation that Iran is warranted in feeling over this situation (Situation in Iran 2). !

On April 7, all diplomatic relations with Iran were cut and all Iranian diplomats and military

students were ordered out of the country by midnight (The Iran Hostage Crisis 148). Americas

allies wavered on following these harsh actions. The first major ally to ban all trade with Iran

was Portugal 10 days later on April 17 with Australia following on April 21 (The Iran Hostage

Crisis 158 and 162). Other allies, particularly Europe and Japan favored the U.S. actions but did

not go so far as to ban trade entirely.

As the situation continued, Carters approval ratings continued to drop to levels that were

the among lowest ever recorded, only a few percentage points away from post-Watergate Nixon

approval ratings (Gallup). As the election came ever closer the options for reconciliation

diminished. Carter was described as driven to the end of his patience by a situation he could

not win (Beckwith and Knox 258). Diplomatic actions like economic sanctions will take time to

have an effect on Iran (The Situation in Iran 3). There was considerable concern for how long

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the hostages could stand being held, as Warren Christopher explained to congress following the

failed rescue mission time is hard on the hostages, for as time goes by, the psychological and

physical strain on the hostages grows (The Situation in Iran 3). Throughout the official reports

to Congress, six hostages are reported to be missing in the few and far between accounts from

inside the embassy, typically by members of the clergy performing holiday services for the

hostages. It was later reports state that the Iranians singled out [them] as spies, and may even

have moved them from the embassy compound (The Iran Hostage Crisis 70). As time

continued to pass it seemed as though the only option left was a military intervention.

Despite the warning that students at the embassy said the hostages would be killed if

the United States attempted any military action against Iran Operation Eagle Claw was ordered

(The Iran Hostage Crisis 151). In November, after the beginning of the crisis, when Delta Force

Special Forces began preparations for a rescue mission in Iran, ground commander Con. Charlie

Beckwith reports being asked about the chances of success, and replying zero (Beckwith and

Knox 199). This mission was one of the first to be performed by the Delta Force, and it presented

not only a difficult problem, but an unprecedented one as well. While the Delta Force was

designed as a counterterrorist unit, the situation of state-sanctioned terrorism was one that they

had not thought to prepare for, it had always been assumed, in establishing a counterterrorist

unit, that when Delta was needed overseas, the country in which it would operate would be

friendly or at least neutral (Beckwith and Knox 200).

The problem of how to get special forces into Tehran, take the embassy, and get out of

Iran was a difficult one. The city of Tehran is inland from the Persian Gulf. In order reach it vast

distances, nearly 1,000 miles of Iranian wasteland... had to be crossed and the embassy itself

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was a heavily guarded building complex stuck in the middle of a city of 4,000,000 hostile folks

(Beckwith and Knox 188). In order to get to Tehran from the Persian Gulf, Delta Forces would

have to cross either a vast desert or a mountain range with enough men and equipment to free the

hostages. In addition to these geographic barriers, the Delta forces were aware of their eventual

downfall: the weather. Because of certain weather conditions the mission was to happen very

soon after it was ordered because of a number of seasonal weather conditions... these include

wind, temperature and hours of darkness (The Situation in Iran 3).

The final plan involved Delta Force, with 132 men going to Wadi Kena, Egypt, and then

fly from the small island of Masirah in the Gulf of Oman to Desert One in the middle of the

Iranian desert, the last stop before Tehran (Bowden). At Desert One, they would be met by

helicopters flown in from the Gulf of Oman on the USS Nimitz. Along the way, the helicopters

encountered a haboob, a dust cloud, in the desert. causing the helicopters and plans to land in the

middle of the desert, where, honoring an absolute law of military operations: the inevitability of

the unexpected, they encountered a bus with forty Iranians traveling from Yazd to Taba as well

as two trucks, one of which was shot by an anti-tank weapon and the other fled (Bowden). In the

process of going through the haboob, Operation Eagle Claw had been reduced from eight to five

helicopters, one was too damaged and two had not shown up. The planned minimum to make

continuing to Tehran possible was six. Colonel Beckwith made the difficult decision to turn back

and abort the mission, to which Carter reportedly responded Damn. Damn. (Bowden). In the

process of this failed mission two of the helicopters collided, resulting in the deaths of eight

Americans and one Iranian.

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One of the primary reasons for the failure of Operation Eagle Claw was an intentional

lack of information for security purposes. Very few people within the government were aware of

the Operation, including no one in Congress. There was no firm contingency plan on when to

inform members of Congress on the operation only that it was the Presidents intention to call a

group of people to the White House so late that the compromise of secrecy would not have been

so great (The Situation in Iran 4). Without the leaders of the nation, particularly those guiding

the nations foreign relations, informed of a crucial intrusion into enemy territory, there was

much more room for hasty decision making and human error. Through these rushed and secret

policy decisions, which were primarily conducted with higher-ups in the Cater administration

and military officials with high motivation to take the mission forward and little or no knowledge

of foreign policy, moments were not taken to explore the possible diplomatic fallout of the

mission (such as the meeting described in Beckwith and Knox 4-10).

This lack of information is also extended to the duration of Operation Eagle Claw itself,

which remained secret to the members of Delta Force until after their arrival in Egypt, I told the

troops on Thursday that we were moving forward to Egypt, but not that the mission was a

go, (Beckwith and Knox 259). The problems encountered in Iran, particularly the loss of the

helicopters, were amplified by the desire to keep the mission as secret as possible. The planes

forced to land in the desert were aware of the presence of the haboobs, but radio communication

was not possible because it was only allowed through secure lines for fear of being overheard by

Iranians. If communication had been made possible during the operation it may have been

possible to avoid the collision of the two helicopters, save the lives of Americans, and continue

on to Tehran to rescue the hostages.

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In its aftermath, Operation Eagle Claw proved to be as much of a policy failure as it was

a technical failure while being carried out. Close and important allies, such as Japan condemned

the military intervention into Iran and asked the United States to refrain from military action in

the future (The Iran Hostage Crisis 167). So did Saudi Arabia, one of the most important allies

in the region, who view the operation with the greatest concern and much regret (The Iran

Hostage Crisis 168). Secretary of State Cyrus Vance resigned out of disagreement with the act,

originally submitting his letter of resignation on the 21st of April, but waiting until after the

operation to make his resignation official, adding unneeded turmoil to the already frenzied State

Department. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, disapproving of not being involved,

launched an investigation into whether the operation was legal because the president had not

consulted with Congress as required by law. Because of the resignation of Secretary Vance,

Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher was called to testify at the hearing as the representative of

the administration and the State Department.

The attempted military rescue mission did not help the diplomatic negotiation process

with Iran. It severely endangered the lives of the hostages in the hands of the students, who had

threatened to kill them should the United States attempt a military rescue. It also further

deteriorated the image of the United States in the rhetoric of the revolutionaries in Iran, who

called the mission everything from an act of war to all lies and connected to unrest at the

universities (The Iran Hostage Crisis 168). This profound insult to Iran and its sovereignty was

likely one of the causes of the extension of the crisis for its full 444 days. Whether this was the

reason for Ayatollah Khomeinis seeming unwillingness to work with the Carter administration

to find and end to the hostage crisis is uncertain, but it could have been a factor in his waiting

until minutes after Ronald Reagan was sworn in as president to release the hostages.

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In his press conference the following day, concerning Operation Eagle Claw, Jimmy

Carter said:

It was my decision to attempt the rescue operation. It was my decision to cancel it when problems developed in the placement of our rescue team for a future rescue operation. The responsibility is fully my own. (Carter) !

By emphasizing the amount of personal blame on himself, Carter demonstrates how much

Operation Eagle Claw was his own decision and own mistake. In his desperation to solve the

crisis, Carter ignored the many other stakeholders and walked the line of legality, specifically

section 3 of the War Powers Resolution by not consulting congress on the matter.

As the crisis unfolded, so did many other events around the United States and throughout

the world. Not only was Carter desperate to solve the crisis by the nature of it being a crisis,

every day the hostages stayed in Tehran was another day the American public saw him as a

failure, and every day put the future of his own political career in jeopardy. Having exhausted all

foreseeable diplomatic channels and having cut relations with Iran off completely, an action that

still defines U.S. relations with Iran today, Carter saw few solutions.

Without fully consulting the experts outside of the military field, Operation Eagle Claw

failed not only as a mission but as a policy. The mentality of secrecy created an environment

where even members of congress could not be trusted with state secrets. This same mentality led

to the deaths of eight Americans. Because of the failure of the mission, and its undermining of

the sovereignty of Iran, the U.S. action was condemned by the international community when it

had previously been fully favored in the situation.

Operation Eagle Claw serves as an example of how not to carry out foreign policy in an

international crisis. By learning from the failure of Operation Eagle Claw, the United States can

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avoid such action in the future. This mission highlights the importance of consultation of

multiple agencies, experts, and officials, instead of placing such a decision in the hands of one

man, who may have motivations outside of solely solving the crisis. Even the president of the

United States is not fully capable of making a policy decision that could affect the future of

relations indefinitely if he has not been advised to the fullest extent possible. From Operation

Eagle Claw, the United States has learned that decisions made in desperation lead to desperate

and not fully thought out actions.

!Works Cited !Beckwith, Charlie A, and Donald Knox. Delta Force. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,

1983.

!Bowden, Mark, The Desert One Debacle. Atlantic Magazine. May 2006

!Carter, Jimmy. Statement on the Iran Rescue Mission. April, 25, 1980

!Gallup Polls, Presidential Approval Ratings -- Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends, http://

www.gallup.com/poll/116677/presidential-approval-ratings-gallup-historical-statistics-trends.aspx#1. Accessed 1 December 2010.

Goodman, Ellen. And Thats the Way It Is-- Or Is It? Washington Post. July 17, 1980.

!The Iran Hostage Crisis : a Chronology of Daily Developments : Report Prepared for the

Committee On Foreign Affairs, U.s. House of Representatives / by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1981.

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The Situation In Iran : Hearing Before the Committee On Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-sixth Congress, Second Session, May 8, 1980. Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 1980-1981