ONLINE PLATFORM ECONOMY...2 Some online platforms, such as the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform, are specifically set up to provide such ‘microtasks’. In a recent study, the ILO

TACKLINGSOCIALDISRUPTIONINTHEONLINEPLATFORMECONOMY

Shiftingthenarrativetothebenefitsof(EU)regulation

SachaGarbenProfessorofEULaw,CollegeofEurope*

AbstractThis papermakes the case that there is a need to regulate theactivitiesofonlineplatformsatEUlevel,especiallywhenitcomesto the precarious position of their workers. It describes thevulnerable nature of (much) online platform work, it links thechallenges to those present for other types of atypicalemployment and surveys the current regulatory responses atnationallevel,whichhavenotyetresultedinsufficientprotectionforonlineplatformworkers.Thepaperconsiderswhat steps theEU is now taking,with a specific focuson the EuropeanPillarofSocialRights.Thepaperwill considerhowtheEU’sresponsecanbe further improved, toensure that thepositivepotentialof theonline platform economy is harnessed and embedded to yieldbenefitsforeveryone,especiallythosepeoplewhoareatthecoreofgenerating thesebenefits.Thismayentailaholisticupgradingof the current EU acquis of atypical work. The paper concludesthatitisimportanttoshiftthenarrativeawayfrom‘harmfulrules’that‘hamper’technological‘innovation’andinsteadtoargueforasocially sustainable technologically supported economy thatbenefitseveryoneinvolved.

*Thispaperhasbeenwritteninapersonalcapacity.

FEPSPolicyPaper

July2019

TacklingSocialDisruptionintheOnlinePlatformEconomy SachaGarben

FEPS|RueMontoyer40,B-1000Brussels|Tel+3222346900|Fax+3222800383|[email protected]

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TABLEOFCONTENTS

EXECUTIVESUMMARY............................................................................................................................3

1.INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................................................4

2.WHYTHEEUSHOULDREGULATEONLINEPLATFORMS.....................................................................4

2.a.Theprecariousnatureofonlineplatformwork...........................................................................5

2.b.Onlineplatformworkas‘standard’atypicalwork.......................................................................6

3.HOWTHEEUCANREGULATEONLINEPLATFORMWORK................................................................12

3.a.CurrentstepsatEUlevel............................................................................................................12

3.b.WhatwayforwardfortheEU’sapproachtoonlineplatformwork?........................................14

4.CONCLUSION.....................................................................................................................................16

REFERENCES..........................................................................................................................................17

ABOUTTHEAUTHOR............................................................................................................................18



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EXECUTIVESUMMARY

• In our increasingly digitalized world, a crucial role is played by online platforms. They affect theeconomy and our society in various ways and their regulation (or lack thereof) is increasingly thesubjectofpublicandpoliticaldebate.

• Akeyproblemisthepositionofthepeopleworkingintheonlineplatformeconomywhoaregenerallycontractedbytheonlineplatformsasformallyself-employedandarethereforeoftennotgivenaccessto the social, labour, health and safety protections that are in most countries connected to anemploymentcontract.Thisalsoimpliesalackofsocialsecuritycontributionsandtaxrevenues,whichpresentasocio-economicsustainabilityproblem.

• However,consideringthevulnerableprofileofmanypeopleworkinginthissectorinoftenprecariousconditions, these social, labour, health and safety protections are verymuch needed in the onlineplatformeconomy.Onlineplatformworkposesa rangeofbothpre-existingandnewhealth, safetyandwellbeingrisksforworkers,bothphysicalandpsycho-social.

• Moreover, toan importantextent, thevarious individualandsocietal risksassociatedwithplatformworkcoincidewiththosethatare found inothertypesofa-typicalemployment, forwhichdifferentformsofregulatoryframeworksalreadyexistatEUlevel(seetable1).Atthemoment,itisnotcleartowhat extent the rules covering fixed-termwork, temporarywork and part-timework also apply toplatformwork,butitisevidentthattheydonotconstituteasufficientlyencompassingframeworktoaddressthisphenomenon.

• Itappearsthattheonlineplatformeconomyisgrowing‘forthewrongreasons’,namelynottodelivernew,innovativeandbetter-qualityservicesforthebenefitofcustomersandwiththeside-benefitofcreating quality employment opportunities, but instead that it is used as ‘unfair competition’ toundercuttheexistingindustryoperators.Theprofitisgeneratedonthebackoftheindividualworker’swellbeingandthewelfarestate’ssustainability.Iftheseexternalitycostswereproperlyfactoredintothe calculationof theeconomiceffectsof theonlineplatformeconomy, it isdoubtful that itwouldgenerateanetbenefitforthemajorityoftheindividualsworkingwithinit,andforsocietyatlarge.

• Nonetheless,nationalregulatorshavefounditdifficulttocopewiththesedevelopments,astheonlineplatformeconomyisamovingtarget,asithasdeliberatelyavoidedrule-complianceand,importantly,duetoapersistentnarrativethatconsidersthese‘new’and‘innovative’developmentsassomethingthat regulation should either not apply to or should foster rather than ‘stifle’. Therefore, afundamentalshiftinnarrativeisinorder,whereinsteadofbuyingintotheideaof‘harmfulrules’that‘hamper’ technological ‘innovation’ the importance is underlined of a socially sustainabletechnologicallysupportedeconomythatbenefitseveryoneinvolved.

• Sofar,therehavebeendifferentresponsesatnationallevel,rangingfromapplyingexistingcategoriesof employee and self-employed to platform workers, which often depends on a case-by-baseassessment and leads to different results depending on the country; applying an intermediatecategoryof ‘independentworker’with limited formsofprotection,orby settingupnew regulatoryframeworksspecificallyforplatformworkers,eitherintheformoflegalrules,collectiveagreements,orself-regulation.Alloftheseapproacheshavedifferentstrengthsanddrawbacks,butnoneprovideaholisticapproachthatwouldsolvetheproblemsidentifiedearlier(seetable2foranoverview).

• While the problems raised are not unique to labour provided throughonline platforms but insteadcoincidewiththemoregeneralproblématiqueofincreasednon-standardandprecariouswork,onlineplatformwork is ‘special’ in termsof theextent towhich itplacesatypicalemploymentat theverycoreof itsapproachto labour.Nevertheless, itwouldseemthat themostappropriateandeffectiveregulatoryresponsewouldbetoaddresstheproblemoflow-qualityworkmoregenerally.TheSocialPillarcouldbeusedasthepathwaytolaunchaholisticprocessofthesocial(re-)regulationofworkatEUlevel,whichupgradesandcomplementsthecurrentmeasuresonatypicalworktoprovideatrulyeffective,andtrulysocial,minimumfloorofworkers’rights.



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1.INTRODUCTION

Inour increasinglydigitalizedworld, a crucial role isplayedbyonlineplatforms.1 Theseplatforms -dynamicwebsitesthatconstitutedigitalpublicsquaresormarketplaces-affecttheeconomyandoursocietyinvariouswaysandtheirregulation(orlackthereof)isincreasinglythesubjectofpublicandpoliticaldebate.Thewayinwhich Facebook deals with personal and public information, the influence of Airbnb on our habitat, Uber’seffectsonthetaxisector,theworkingconditionsofDeliveroocouriersortech-workersonAmazonMechanicalTurk:the‘disruptive’effectsoftheactivitiesoftheplatformsregularlymakeheadlines.

Akeysocialproblemisthepositionofthepeopleworkingintheonlineplatformeconomyascleaners,drivers,engineersetc.Astheyaregenerallycontractedbytheonlineplatformsasformallyself-employed,thesepeopledo not (seem entitled to) benefit from the social, labour, health and safety protections that are in mostcountries connected to an employment contract, even if their precarious working conditions and socio-economicpositionverymuchrequiressuchprotection.Theensuinglackofsocialsecuritycontributionsandtaxrevenuespresentasustainabilityproblemforsocialsystemsmoregenerallyinthelongrun.Itshouldbenotedthatthesechallengesassuchdonotseemtobeuniquetotheonlineplatformeconomy(DeStefano,2016).Thepastfewdecadeshaveseenanincreaseintheuseofnon-standardformsofwork,suchascasualwork,on-call work, temporary agency work, informal work and dependent self-employment. Many of the workingarrangementssetupbytheonlineplatformscoincide,orcloselyresemble,theseformsofa-typicalworkoramixturethereof,sometimeswiththeonlydifferencethattheymakeuseofadigitaltool.However,someonlineplatformsseemtohavebuilttheirentirebusinessmodelandtechnologicalinfrastructurearoundthisprecarity,whichdoesseemtolifttheoverallproblématiquetoahigherlevel.

There is a necessity to better regulate the activities of online platforms, especially when it comes to thepositionoftheirworkers,andthispaperarguesthattheEUlevelshouldplayanimportantroleinthisregard(Section2).Thefirst,normative,reasonisthatplatformworkersareespeciallyvulnerable(Section2.a.below).Thesecondisthatplatformworkistoalargeextentcoterminouswitha-typicalformsofworkthatarealreadyregulatedatEUlevel(Section2.b.).Thirdly,thedifferentapproachesadoptedbytheMemberStateshavenotbeenable toachievesufficientprotection (Section2.c.).Thepaperwill consider theways inwhich theEU isalreadytakingupthisresponsibility,particularlyinthecontextoftheEuropeanPillarofSocialRights(Section3.a.below).Thispaperwillconsiderhowtheregulatoryresponsescanbefurtherimproved,toensurethatthepositivepotentialof theonlineplatformeconomybenefitseveryone,especially thosepeoplewhoareat thecoreofgeneratingthesebenefits.Itwillconcludethatitisimportanttoshiftthenarrativeawayfrom‘harmfulrules’ that ‘hamper’ technological ‘innovation’ and instead to argue for a socially sustainable technologicallysupportedeconomythatbenefitseveryoneinvolved(Section3.b.).

2.WHYTHEEUSHOULDREGULATEONLINEPLATFORMS

The regulatory challenges or questions raised by the online platform economy aremanifold and “span theentire map of the legal world, including work, tax, safety and health, quality and consumer protection,intellectualproperty,zoning,andanti-discrimination”(Lobel,2016).Thekeysocialandlegalquestionistowhatextent the various labour and employment regulations, that have usually been designed with a traditionalbilateral, standard,open-endedemployment relationship inmind,canandshouldbeapplied to theoftena-typicalworkingarrangementsusedintheonlineplatformeconomy.

The drivers, riders, cleaners, designers, translators, technicians and others working in the online platformeconomy are often formally contracted as independent, and their working arrangements tend to exhibitfeatures that are difficult to square with the traditional employment relationship, such as the use of ownmaterials (e.g. thedriver’scar),autonomyconcerningworkinghours (e.g.deciding toworkby logging intoasmartphone app), the short duration of the relationship (e.g. the translation of a single sentence, (Milland,2017))2,andthemultilateralcharacteroftherelationship(e.g.thedriver,theplatformandthepassenger).At

1ThispaperbuildsontheresearchpresentedinGarben,2017,Garben,2019.2Someonlineplatforms,suchastheAmazonMechanicalTurkplatform,arespecificallysetuptoprovidesuch‘microtasks’. In a recent study, the ILOdescribes thesemicrotask platforms as “a type ofweb-based labour



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the same time, the worker may well be economically dependent on the platform work, the contractualindependencecanbeconstructed inratherartificialways(e.g.adriverthatworksfulltimeforaplatformforseveral yearsbut is formally contractedper journey) and theplatformcanexert significant control over theworkandthepersonperformingit.Thiscomplexrealityhaschallengedjudgesinmanyjurisdictions,whohavehadtodecideonclaimsbroughtbyonlineplatformworkersagainsttheplatforms,arguingthattheyshouldbetreatednotasindependentcontractorsbutas“employeesorworkers”.

Theadditionalprotectionthatwouldusuallyresultfromsuch(re-)qualificationseemshoweververywelcomefromasocialsecurity,labourlawandoccupationalhealthandsafety(OSH)perspective,especiallyconsideringthevulnerableprofileofmanypeopleworkinginthissectorinoftenprecariousconditions(Section2.a).Suchprecarityconnectedtoatypicalworkingarrangementsmoregenerallyhasalreadybeenpartiallyaddressedbythe EU in the form of a number of Directives providing a minimum level of protection. Platform workers,however,riskbeingexcludedfromtheprotectionsofferedbycurrentEUlegislation(Section2.b.).AtMemberstate level, various regulatoryapproacheshavebeenpiloted,butnonehasbeenable toachievea sufficientlevelofprotectionforonlineplatformworkers(Section2.c.).

2.a.TheprecariousnatureofonlineplatformworkOnlineplatformworkposesarangeofbothpre-existingandnewhealth,safetyandwellbeingrisksforworkers,both physical and psychosocial. The fact that online platform workers share many similarities with bothtemporaryworkersandagencyworkers,meansthattheyareprobablyexposedtothesamerisks,withstudiesconsistentlyshowinghigherinjuryratesamongworkersonthesenon-standardarrangements(Howard,2017).Moreover, any physical health and safety risks could be anticipated to beworse because of the loss of theprotectiveeffectofworkinginapublicworkplace,asmostofthisworkistransactedinprivateautomobilesorhomes (Tran and Sokas, 2017, Rockefeller Foundation, 2013). Thismay alsomean that thework equipmentdoes not meet ergonomic criteria and that other environmental factors are not optimized for working. Inaddition,onlineplatformworkerstendtobeofyoungerage,whichisawell-knownindependentriskfactorforoccupational injury (Tran and Sokas, 2017). In addition, platform work, through competitive and ratingmechanisms,encouragesarapidpaceofworkwithoutbreaks,whichmayinduceaccidents(Huws,2015).Paynot being continuous but per-assignment adds such time pressure. The lack of appropriate training furtherincreases the risk of accidents, and this while several key activities typically carried out by online platformworkersareinoccupationsthatarenotoriouslydangerous,suchasconstructionandtransport(Huws,2015).

The fact that online platformworkers will usually be denied the right to paid sick leave leads to increasedillnessmorbidity.Workingwhilesickcanincreasetheriskofinjury(Howard,2017).Inseveralstudies,workerswithpaidsick leavebenefitswere28%less likelythanworkerswithoutaccesstopaidsick leavetosustainawork-relatedinjury(Asfawetal,2012).Studiessuggestthathealthproblemsmayinfactbeamainreasontoengage in digital online platformwork such as onmicrotask platforms (Berg, 2018). On the one hand, thismeansthatonlineplatformworkcanprovideanalternativewayforpeoplewithhealthimpairmentstocarryonworkandearnsomeincome,contributingtosocialandlabourmarketinclusion.Ontheotherhand,italsomeansthatmanyonlineplatformworkersarealreadyinavulnerablepositionfromanOSHperspective,whichtheonlineplatformworkmayaggravate.

Furthermore,workers in the online platform economy are exposed to a range of psycho-social risks. Thesefollow fromthe lackofa commonworkplace,asmostof the taskswillbeperformed individually, separatedfrom—andoften competitionwith—fellowworkers,which can lead to isolationbydenyingworkers face-to-face contact with their colleagues, which forms the basis of both social support and discussion of workconcerns (Tran and Sokas, 2017, Smith 2015, Valenduc and Vendramin, 2016). This lack of a monitoredworkplacemayalsomeanthataworkercandevelopanti-socialand/orhealth-threateninghabitsasameansofplatformthatprovidebusinessesandotherclientswithaccesstoalarge,flexibleworkforce(a“crowd”)forthecompletion of small, mostly clerical tasks, that can be completed remotely using a computer and Internetconnection. These tasks are diverse, including image identification, transcription and annotation; contentmoderation; data collection and processing; audio and video transcription; and translation. Clients use theplatforms topostbulk tasks thatneedcompletion;workers select the tasksandarepaid foreach individualtaskorpieceofworkcompleted.Theplatformspaytheworkersthepriceindicatedbytheclientminustheirfee.”Bergetal,2018.



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copingwith stress (such as dependence on alcohol or drugs)whichwould be spotted by the employer in anormalworkingsituationbutcanescalaterapidly ifnobody isawareofthem(Huws,2015).Continuousreal-timeevaluationandratingofworkerperformancecanbecomeanimportantsourceofstress:workershavetobe friendly, efficient and serviceable at allmoments, akin to a “constantmonitoring system” (Aloisi, 2016).Stresscanresultwhere“thefacilitytouseplatformscombinedwiththeavailabilityofalargepoolofworkersmakes the timing of this type of outsourcing extremely compressed” (Maselli et al, 2016). In addition, theworker must always be on stand-by to accept any potential upcoming jobs, which also blurs work-lifeboundaries(Huws,2015,Degryse,2016,ValenducandVendramin,2017,HarrisandA.Krueger,2015).Inotherwords:“[t]hefriendlyandflexible ‘anytimeandanyplace’workingmodelcaneasilyturn intoan“alwaysandeverywhere”trapforsomeworkers–withnegativeeffectsonpsychologicalhealth”(Eurofound,2016).

Finally, jobinsecurity,apartfromanimportantsocialconcernin itself, isknowntocontributetopooroverallhealth among contingent workers and is salient among online platform workers (Tran and Sokas, 2017,CummingsandKreiss,2008,BenachandMuntaner,2007).Theirworkingrelationshipwiththeonlineplatformcanusually beendedwithoutnoticeor any formofdismissal protection, andevenwhen the relationship isactive, there is no guarantee of minimum pay since this is dependent on performing an assignment.Precariousness thereforedefines this typework; formanyworkers it is “unclear fromoneday,or evenonehour,tothenext,whethertheywillhavework,andifso,whatthatwillconsistof,orwhen,oreveniftheywillbepaid(insomecasesnopaymentmaybereceivedatallbecausethework isdeemedunacceptablebytheclient)”(Huws,2015).Intermsofpsychologicalimpact,asTranandSokaspointout,theroleofchoiceislikelytobeimportant:astudyofa largesampleofwomenwithtemporaryjobsshowedpsychologicaldistressandsomatic complaintswerehigher among thosewhowere involuntarilyperforming temporary jobs, comparedwith those workers who preferred temporary work (Tran and Sokas, 2017). Research has shown thatinsufficientworkisaprincipalconcernofonlineplatformworkers,themajorityofwhomexpressedadesireformore hours, either in crowdwork or non-crowdwork activities (Berg, 2006, Berg et al, 2018). Suchunderemploymentand intermittencyofwork requiredailyorevenhourly jobsearch,3with theaddedstressandexcessworkingtimethatensues.

Last but not least, on a societal level, the fact that online platform workers are generally treated asindependent/self-employedinsteadofworkers/employees,meansagravelossofsocialsecuritycontributionsandtaxrevenue.Thismay,inthelongterm,underminethepositionofnotjusttheonlineplatformworkersbutthesustainabilityofthewelfarestateandtheeconomymoregenerally.

2.b.Onlineplatformworkas‘standard’atypicalworkIn light of the digital/technological element necessarily involved in online platforms, the activities of theseplatformcompanieshavebeenpresentedas‘new’and‘unprecedented’,asnovelfeaturesemergingfromrapidtechnological changeandanewtypeofeconomy, to support theargument that theyshouldnotbe treatedsimilarly to anyexistingeconomic activities. For regulators, it hasprovendifficult to sort ‘theold’ from ‘thenew’.Thisiscompoundedbythefactthattheemergenceoftheonlineplatformeconomycoincideswithmanyrelated, yet different trends and concepts, which are often conflated and confused, such as, inter alia, the“digitaleconomy”,“sharingeconomy”,“collaborativeeconomy”,“gig-economy”,“crowd-work”,“piece-work”,and “gig-work” (Codagnone and Martens, 2016). This has also allowed hard-core economic activities (withsometimesexploitative features) tocloak themselves in the ‘fluffy’positive languageofpeer-to-peersharingandcitizens’initiatives.Thesharingorcollaborativeeconomyisoftenunderstoodastocomprisenot-for-profitactivitiesofgenuinesharingbetweencitizens,whichhoweverrunscountertothecommonunderstandingof‘economic’transactions,thusproducingacontradictiointerminis(oxymoron).

Regulatorsmayfearnegativepoliticalconsequencesinappearingunwelcomingofthese‘new’developments,whicharepresented toholdgreateconomicpromisesespecially for a youngergeneration thathasbeenhithardbythelabour-marketconsequencesofthe2008economiccrisis,andwhichisparticularlyreceptivetothecommunitarian idea of a ‘sharing society’. However, this results from the incorrect way in which onlineplatformworkisgenerallyconceptualized. Itwouldseemfarmoreappropriate,anduseful,tostressthatthe3TheILOhasrevealedthatonaverage,workersonmicrotaskplatformsspent20minutesonunpaidactivitiesfor every hour of paid work, searching for tasks, taking unpaid qualification tests, researching clients tomitigatefraudandwritingreviews.SeeBergetal,2018.



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precariousandexploitativefeaturesofsomeonlineplatformworkarenotsonewanddifferent.Instead,whatalso emerges fromthediscussion inSection2.a., toan importantextent, thevarious individualandsocietalrisks and costs associated with online platform work coincide with those in the context of a-typicalemploymentandincreasingprecarityonthelabourmarketmoregenerally.

The challenges presented by a-typical employment/working relationships do not seem to be unique to theonlineplatformeconomy,oreventhedigitaleconomy,inaconceptualsense.Partiallyduetotheevolutionoflabourmarketsandsociety,partiallyduetotheeconomiccrisis(andlabourmarketpolicyresponsesthereto),andfacilitatedbythedigitalizationofsocietyandtheeconomy,thepastfewdecadeshaveseenanincreaseintheuseofnon-standardformsofemploymentandwork,suchascasualwork,on-callwork,temporaryagencywork, informalworkanddependentself-employment(Eurofound,2015).Manyoftheworkingarrangementssetupbytheonlineplatformscoincide,orcloselyresemble,theseformsofa-typicalworkoramixturethereof,sometimeswiththeonlydifferencethattheymakeuseofadigitaltool.Gig-work(workingnotonacontinuousbasisbutintheformofone-offassignments)could,forinstance,beseenasaformofcasualoron-callwork.Itcancompriseworkperformedondemandthroughanonlineplatformbutalsoother typesof freelance-typeactivities,digitallyfacilitatedornot.

Indeed, the online platform working arrangements can at times resemble very old working arrangements,presentedinanewdigital‘jacket’,suchaspiece-work(atypeofemploymentinwhichaworkerispaidafixedpiecerateforeachunitproducedoractionperformedregardlessoftime)whichwasverycommonundertheGuildSystembeforethe18thcenturyaswellasintheIndustrialera,andputting-outwork/home-work,aformofsubcontractingwidelyusedinearlytimesofindustrializationwhereworkiscontractedbyacentralagenttosubcontractorswhocompletework inoff-sitefacilitieseither intheirownhomesor inworkshops(RisakandWarter,2015).Thisputting-out/homeworkcloselyresemblescertainaspectsofcrowd-work,whichisregularlyattheheartof‘typical’onlineplatformwork.4 Crowd-workisnotonlysimilartohome-work,butalsosharesmany similaritieswithother formsofnon-standardemployment suchas temporarywork,part-timeworkortemporaryagencywork(Berg,2006).

Whiletherefore,asstated,alltheseformsofa-typicalworkarenotuniquetolabourprovidedthroughonlineplatforms,itshouldberecognizedthatthefeaturesofonlineplatformwork(i)areparticularlysuitedtovariousformsofa-typicalworkandthusoperateasacatalystforit,and(ii)oftenresultinamixtureofvarioustypesofa-typicalemployment (triangularityresemblingtemporaryagencywork,digitalization leadingtoautonomy inwork place and time and as such to potentially dependent self-employment, crowd-sourcing leading to acasual,on-callnatureoftheworkingarrangement,etc).Moreover,(iii)manyonlineplatformshavetakentheseatypical features to the extreme and place them at the centre of their business model and seem to beorganizingthemselvestogeneratetheirprofitsnotonthebasisofqualityservicesandproductsbutratheronthebackoftheseexploitativeworkingarrangementsthatallowsthemtoundercutpricesofthemoresociallysustainablealternativeservicesofferedby‘traditional’competitors.

Thus, on balance, it seems fair to say that “it is important not to overstate, and at the same time not tounderestimate,themagnitudeoftheproblem.The[onlineplatform]economymayberevolutionary insomerespects […],but in thecurrent context thechallenges it createsarenotunlike thosewehavealreadybeenstrugglingwithformanyyears[…].Thesechallengescertainlyrequirediscussion,andjustifydebatesaboutthebestway to address the newproblems, but there is no reason to see themas paradigm-shifting” (Davidov,2017). This double-edged finding is very important, because on the one hand it neutralizes the regulation-delayingand-avoidingnarrativesthatthese‘new’developmentsrequireeithernoorverydifferentlevelsandtypes of regulation to thrive, while on the other hand it underlines the need for firm regulatory action tocounterthesignificantnegativeeffects.

AtEUlevel,animportantchapterofthesocialacquisconsistsofmeasuresconcerningatypicalformsofwork,namely fixed-term work, part-time work and temporary agency work. These non-standard workingarrangements are often part of an irregular career pattern and carry a high risk of unemployment (SchulzeBuschoffandProtsch,20018).TheEUdirectivesseektoaddressthisprecariousnesstoacertaindegree,and

4Crowd-workcanbedefinedas“theorganizingofoutsourcingoftaskstoalargepoolofworkers”,potentiallyprovidedtoalargepoolofcustomers/employers,oftenthroughonlineplatforms(PrasslandRisak,2016).



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consider the open-ended, direct and full-time employment relationship to be most preferable form ofemployment,evenifalsoreflectingthe‘flexicurity’approachthatpromotesatypicalworkingarrangementsasdesirableinspecificcircumstances.Ascanbeseeninthetablebelow,theyofferdifferentkindsofprotection.Whetheranonlineplatformworkercanalsobenefit fromtheprotectionoffered inthedirectivedependsonthesituation.Inanyevent,theprotectivemodelfollowedinthesedirectivesisthatatypicalworkersneedtobetreatedonequaltermsasstandardworkersinthecompanyor,intheabsenceofacomparableworker,inthesector.However, in the caseofmanyonlineplatforms,everyone is in the same (precarious)position,whichmeansthatamereprincipleofequaltreatmentwillnotresolvetheissues.

Table1-EUlawsonatypicalwork

EUMeasure Scope MainElementsofWorkerProtection

PositionofOnlinePlatformWorkers

TheFixed-TermWorkDirective1999/70/EC

Applies “to fixed-termworkers who have anemployment contract orrelationship as defined inlaw, collective agreementsorpracticeineachMemberState”.

A fixed term worker is “aperson having anemployment contract orrelationship entered intodirectly between anemployer and a workerwhere the end of theemployment contract orrelationship is determinedby objective conditionssuch as reaching a specificdate, completing a specifictask,ortheoccurrenceofaspecificevent”.

Lays down the principle ofequal treatment: fixed-term workers should notget less favourableemployment conditionsthan permanent workers,unlessobjectivelyjustified.

Obliges MS to adoptmeasures topreventabuseof successive fixed-termemployment and gives thechoice between (i)requiring objective reasonsfor the renewal of suchemployment, (ii), providingan overall limit of durationof such employment, and(iii) providing a maximumnumber of renewals ofsuccessive fixed-termemployment.

Unclear; possibility for an onlineplatform worker with a fixed-termposition to rely on the rights in theDirective depends largely on theiremployment status under nationallaw.

TheTemporaryAgencyWorkDirective2008/104/EC

Applies to “any personwho, in the member stateconcerned, is protected asa worker under nationalemploymentlaw”.

But the CJEU held inRuhrlandklinik that thiscannot mean that the EUlegislaturewaivesitspowerto determine the scope oftheDirectiveitself. Instead,the Directive applies tothose “who for a certainperiod of time performremunerated services forand under the direction ofanother person to the

Provides the principle ofequal treatment fortemporary agencyworkers,entitling them to the sameconditions of employment,including pay, as directlyhiredworkers.

Depends on whether the onlineplatformworkercanbeconsideredaworker in thedefinitionof theCJEU,andwhethertheonlineplatformcanbeconsidereda“legalpersonwho,incompliance with national law,concludes contracts of employmentor employment relationships withtemporary agency workers in orderto assign them to user undertakingsto work there temporarily undertheirsupervisionanddirection”.



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exclusion of marginal andancillaryactivities”.

ThePart-TimeWorkDirective97/81/EC

Applies to part-timeworkers who have anemployment contract orrelationship as defined bythe law, collectiveagreement or practice ineachMemberState.

'Part-timeworker`referstoanemployeewhosenormalhours of work, calculatedon a weekly basis or onaverage over a period ofemployment of up to oneyear,are lessthanthoseofasimilarfull-timeworker.

Provides that part-timeworkers are not to betreated less favourably inrelation to employmentconditions than full-timeworkers (subject totheproratatemporisprinciple).

Provides that employersshould facilitate voluntarypart-timeemployment.

Provides that “a worker'srefusaltotransferfromfull-time to part-time work orvice-versa is not in itself avalidreasonforterminationofemployment”.

Unclear;whether an online platformworkerwhoworks less than fulltimecan benefit from the Directivedependslargelyontheiremploymentstatusundernationallaw.

2.c.Thefailuretoresolvetheregulatorychallengesofonlineplatformworkatnationallevel

Thedevelopmentsconcerningthedigitaleconomy,onlineplatformsandtheiractivities,especiallywheretheyimpactontheprovisionoflabour,havecaughtnationalregulatorsstuckbetweenarockandahardplace.

Firstly, theonlineplatformsector ishighlydynamic,withnewbusinessesbeingcreatedvirtuallyeverysingleday,andothersdisappearingorbeingquicklyintegratedinotherdigitalbusinesses.Thisispartiallyduetotherelativelylowentry-barriertothecreationofanewonlineplatformandthustherealizationofanewbusinessidea,whichisaseasyascreatingadynamicwebsite(orhavingitcreatedforyou),partiallya“combinationofanewindustrialrevolutionandgoldrush”(Degryse,2016),partiallybecauseofsocio-culturalfactorssuchastheinfluence of Generation Y (millennials) (Bluekens, 2017), and partially due to changed labour-market andeconomicconditionssince the2008economiccrisis.Theonlineplatformeconomy is thus, fromaregulatoryperspective,amovingtarget.

Secondly,theapproachofmostoftheonlineplatformcompanieshasbeento“growfirstandaskcompliance-related questions later” (Jain, 2015), which has been labelled a “fait accompli strategy” (Degryse, 2016).Instead of first ensuring the official permission to operate through following the existing administrativeprocedures, the online platform companies have often simply rolled out their activities and gainedmarket-share without asking, confronting regulators with a de facto situation that proves much more difficult tochange. In particular, this strategy (i) has prevented these companies from being subjected to existingregulations from the get-go,whichwould havemade it harder for them to argue later that they should beexempted from these regulations, (ii) ithasallowed thecompanies toacquirewealthand influence,helpingthemtoobtaindesiredpoliticalresults(whichistobeexemptedfromregulation),and(iii)ithasallowedthesecompaniestofirstgainusers(customers,clients,employers,workers,etc.)whohavebecomereliantonthemand who may now therefore act in political support of the online platform companies and their politicalagendas.

Thirdly, most of the online platform companies have taken deliberate steps to try and render existingregulations inapplicable, where possible. They argue that they are simple intermediaries, digital ‘bulletinboards’ thatmerelyserve tobringpeople together,andthat it is thosepeople that theybring together thatengage in the real economic activity inquestion–not theonlineplatforms themselves. This linepermeatestheir communications and HR strategies. They seek to have this mentioned explicitly in theagreements/contracts that they concludewith users, where it is often stated that there is no employmentrelationship between the platform and the user, that workers are independent contractors, and that theplatformasintermediarycanincurnoliabilityforanythingrelatedtothetransactionbetweentheusersithas



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connectedwitheachother.Thisassertiveapproachmakesitharderforregulatorstointerveneandre-qualifythe status and obligations of these companies. It is also highly dependent on intervention by the judiciary,whichhoweverisnotanoptionopentomanyonlineplatformworkersinpractice.

Fourthly, it shouldbe recognized that someof theonlineplatformcompanies’ activitiesdoobjectivelyposedifficulties in relation to the pre-established regulatory categories. For instance, because of the increasedvariety,complexityandscaleofthea-typicalworkingarrangementsitfacilitates,onlineplatformworkpresentsaparticularlydifficultsetofquestionsintermsoflabourlaw,aswillbediscussedfurtherbelow.Regulators(inabroadsense,includingcourts)maybegenuinelyunsureofwhethertheexistingrulesapply/oughttoapplyinsomeofthesecases,andinwhatway.Furthermore,thereisanenormousheterogeneityinthevariousonlineplatformsandtheiractivities,intermsofthewaytheyareorganized,thesectorstheyimpact/belongto,theirscaleandscope,thetypeofuserstheytarget,etc.Thismakes itdifficulttoapplyaone-size-fits-allapproachandseemstoargueforcase-by-caseassessmentandtreatment,implyingamuchhigherhurdleforregulators.Moreover, someonline platform companies’ activities are by their nature transnational, and therefore posecomplicated conflict of laws questions and may warrant transnational policy responses instead of, or inadditionto,nationalones.

Theabovenotwithstanding,itshouldbepointedoutthatinadditiontoregulatorychallenges,theonlinelabourplatform economymight also present some beneficial regulatory opportunities. In some sectors, the onlinelabourplatformeconomy“transferstransactionsthatwereprobablyconductedintheshadoweconomytotheformal sector” (Maselli et al, 2016 ; Dagino, 2016). Indeed, it would seem that online platform companiesincrease the visibility and institutionalization of many odd-jobs and informal transactions that before in alllikelihoodtookplace‘intheblack’andcantherebyfacilitateatleastthedeclarationoftheseactivitiestothecompetentauthorities–evenifthequestionaboutwhichregulationstoapplyandtowhom,remainsopen.

Despite thechallenges, to tryandmeet thevariousconcerns raisedbyonlineplatformwork, commentatorsand regulators have proposed and adopted different approaches. Indeed, although some consider thattraditionallabourprotectionsarenotsuitableforthe“new”and“innovative”aspectsofonlineplatformworkandthattheapplicationoftheseprotectionswouldinhibittheirdynamicdevelopment,manyothersarguethatemploymentrulesshouldatleastinsomeformapply(interalia:Tolodi-Signes,2017;Rogers,2016,Davidov,2017;J.PrasslandM.Risak,2018;DaviesandFreedland,2006;Ratti,2017).

Afirstoptionisto‘simply’applyexistingregulationstoonlineplatformwork.Often,thiswouldentailacase-by-case determinationwhether the online platformworker is an employee, or self-employed, or – in somecountries,suchas theUnitedKingdom– falls ina thirdcategory inbetween.Dependingonthe (flexibilityofthe)testapplicabletodeterminelabourstatus,thismayalreadyincludemanyonlineplatformworkersinthecategoryofemployee,orinanintermediatecategory,meaningthat(most)employmentandOSHruleswouldapply–atleastinlegalterms.Activeenforcementbythecompetentauthoritiesandeffectiveaccesstojusticeforworkersarenecessaryforthisapproachtobeeffective,especiallyconsideringthesystematicrule-avoidingbehavior of many online platforms. Countries that seem to largely follow this approach a present are theUnitedKingdom,Ireland,SwedenandtheNetherlands.Incontrast,inDenmarkandBelgium,theapproachofapplying the current legal provisions will usually lead to online platform workers being classified as “self-employed”,leavingmostemploymentlawinapplicable(Garben,2017,Garben,2019).

A second possibility is to take specific action to narrow the group of persons that will be considered self-employed. This could most notably be achieved through the addition of an intermediate ‘(independent)worker’ category. In the United States particularly, there has been a call for the introduction of a new‘independentworker’ status (HarrisandKrueger,2015).Advocatesof thatmidwayapproach tend tocall forlegislative intervention to regulate relationships that do not easily fit into the employed – self-employeddichotomy (Ratti, 2017). These independent workers “would occupy amiddle ground between the existingcategoriesofemployeeand independentcontractor; the latter typicallyareworkerswhoprovidegoodsandservices tomultiple businesseswithout the expectation of a lastingwork relationship” (Harris and Krueger,2015).Theideawouldbethatbasedonasetofgoverningprinciplestoguidetheassignmentofbenefitsandprotections to independent workers, businesses would provide certain benefits and protections thatemployeescurrentlyreceivewithoutfullyassumingthelegalcostsandrisksofbecominganemployer.Severaljurisdictions,suchastheUnitedKingdom,alreadyhavesuchathirdcategory,andthisapproachwouldentail



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the expansion thereof. In particular, it has been argued that such expansion is necessary because in mostcountries the lawrequiressomedegreeofsubordinationeven for this intermediategroup (orat least this ishowlegislationhasbeeninterpreted).Thismeansthattheintermediategroupismuchsmallerthanitshouldbe,withmanydependentworkersstillleftoutsidethescopeof(evenpartial)protection.Inanyevent,workersin the intermediate groupusually receiveonly veryminimal protections, especially related to social securityandsometimestheabilitytobargaincollectively.Infact,largepartsoflabourlawshouldapplywhenaworkerisdependentononeclient(whoshouldbeconsideredanemployerforsuchpurposes)(Davidov,2014).

Anotherway to limit the group of self-employed is through a rebuttable presumption of employment. ThisexistsalreadytosomeextentincountriessuchastheNetherlandsandBelgium.Thelegalcasesconcerningthestatusofonlineplatformworkers in these countries, aswell as in theUnitedKingdomwith its intermediatecategory,howevershowthatthesemechanismsdonotnecessarilyresolvethecategorizationdifficulties,andthat in the end, a case-by-case assessment (by courts) is likely to still remain necessary, with the legaluncertainty that this entails (Garben, 2017). It should be noted that this approach could also be adoptedorganically,most notably by courts, as they can adapt the tests of (self-)employment that they have oftenthemselvesdevelopedtothespecificfeaturesofonlineplatformwork,forinstancebyplacinglessemphasisonownershipofkeyassetsofthebusiness(suchascarsinthecontextofpassengertransport)andmoreemphasisondefactocontrolmechanisms(suchasratingandpricingsystemsoperatedbytheplatforms).

Athirdpossibilityistoprovidespecificprotectionforonlineplatformworkers,regardlessoftheiremploymentstatus.Thiscanbethroughstateregulation,suchasinFrance,whichhasadoptedtheActof8August2016onwork,modernizationofsocialdialogueandsecuringofcareerpathsthatprovides:(i)thatindependentworkersin an economically and technically dependent relationship with an online platform can benefit from aninsurance for accidents atworkwhich is the responsibility of theonlineplatform inquestion; (ii) that theseworkersequallyhavearighttocontinuingprofessionaltraining, forwhichtheonlineplatformisresponsible,andshouldattheirrequestbeprovidedwithavalidationoftheirworkingexperiencewiththeplatform,bytheonlineplatform,(iii)thattheseworkershavetherighttoconstituteatradeunion,tobeamemberofaunionand to have a union represent their interests, and (iv) that they have the right to take collective action indefenseoftheirinterests.

Suchregulationcanalsobedonebythestakeholdersthemselves.InDenmark,acollectiveagreementhasbeensigned between the Danish cleaning services digital platform Hilfr and the United Federation of DanishWorkers, guaranteeing the same conditions as elsewhere on the Danish labour market. The 1-year “trial”agreement, in force from1August2018, coverspensionsand sicknessbenefits, holidaypayand collectivelyagreed wages. After 12 months, a revision will be carried out and training, education, and OSH may beincluded. The framework for the agreement was created by the Danish Government, aiming to ensure faircompetitionbycreatingthesamerulesforall(forexampleinrelationtotaxation).AnagreementwasreachedintheDanishParliamentonautomaticsharingofinformationbyplatformstotaxauthorities.

Finally,a“weaker” formofself-regulationhastakenplace inGermany,where in2017,eightGermany-basedplatformshavesignedaCodeofConductinwhichtheyagreetoconcludelocalwagestandardsasafactorinsettingpricesontheirplatforms.



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Table2-nationalresponsestoplatformwork

RESPONSE COUNTRIES ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES

Applicationofcurrentlegalframework

-MostEUcountries,suchastheUK,theNetherlands,Belgium,SwedenandIreland

-Precisecase-by-caseanalysisbyjudiciary

-Legallybinding

-Unpredictable(legaluncertainty)

-Differentlevelsofprotection,dependingonthenationalrules

Applicationofnewlegislation

-France -Targetedandlegallybinding

-Doesnotresolvethecoreissueoflabourstatus

Collectiveagreements -Denmark -Agreedbybothworkersandemployers

-Sector-specific

-OSHnotincludedupuntilnow

Self-regulation -Germany(CodeofConduct)

-Bottom-up -Notlegallybinding

-Limitedscope

3.HOWTHEEUCANREGULATEONLINEPLATFORMWORK

TheEUsharescompetencewiththeEUMemberStatesonarangeofemploymentissues,inaccordancewiththeprovisionsoftheSocialPolicyTitleintheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEU.WhilethiscompetenceisinprinciplelimitedtosettingminimumstandardsandshouldnotprejudicetheMemberStates’responsibilityforthe fundamental organization of their social security systems, the EU’s social acquis should not beunderestimated,consistinginarichbodyoflawonissuessuchasnon-standardemployment,workingtimeandoccupationalhealthandsafety.

3.a.CurrentstepsatEUlevelIn its Communication on a European agenda for the collaborative economy of 2 June 2016, the EuropeanCommissionhassetouttheconditionsunderwhichitconsidersthatanemploymentrelationshipexistsforthepurposesofapplying theseEUsocial lawprovisions. It considers that theCourtof Justiceof theEU’s (CJEU)definitionof‘worker’asappliedinthecontextofthefreemovementofworkersalsoguidestheapplicationofEUlabourlaw,entailingthat“theessentialfeatureofanemploymentrelationshipisthatforacertainperiodoftimeapersonperformsservicesforandunderthedirectionofanotherpersoninreturnforwhichhereceivesremuneration”.Whetheranemploymentrelationshipexistsornothastobeestablishedonthebasisofacase-by-case assessment, considering the reality of the relationship, looking cumulatively at the existence of asubordinationlink,thenatureofworkandthepresenceofaremuneration.

TheCommissionhasfurthermoreproposedtwomeasuresinthecontextoftheEuropeanPillarofSocialRightsthatmayimpactonlineplatformworkers’socialandemploymentrights.Firstly,ithasproposedtherevisionoftheWritten StatementDirective 91/533/EEC. Theproposal aims to reinforce the rights already contained inthatDirectiveabouttheinformationtheworkerisentitledtoreceiveintheiremploymentcontractbyapplyingthem to allworkers irrespective of their employment status. In addition, the revisedDirective (thatwill beentitled the Transparent andPredictableWorkingConditionsDirective) defines core labour standards for allworkers,particularlyfortheprotectionofatypical,casualformsofemployment.TheproposalwasadoptedbytheCouncilon24May2019andwillhavetobeimplementedinthreeyearsafteritsentryintoforce.



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Table2–BreakdownofTransparentandPredictableWorkingConditionsDirective

Scope Informationrights Substantiverights

TheDirectivelaysdownminimumrightsthat“applytoeveryworkerin the Union who has anemployment contract orrelationshipasdefinedbythelaw,collective agreements or practicein force in each Member Statewithconsiderationtothecase-lawoftheCourtofJustice”.

If the criteria of a worker asdefinedintheCJEU’scaselawarefulfilled, platform workers “couldfall within the scope of thisDirective”.

Essential information in writtenform is tobegivento theworkerbetweenthefirstdayofworkandthe seventh calendar day thatfollows.

Theprobationaryperiodislimitedto a maximum of 6 months,longerperiodsareonlyallowedina case where this is in theinterests of the worker or isjustified by the nature of thework.

All workers workingmore than 3hours per week over four weeks(i.e.over12hourspermonth)aretobecoveredbythedirective.

Supplementary information is tobegivenwithin1month.

After sixmonths servicewith thesame employer, the worker canrequest an employment statuswithmorepredictableandsecureworkingconditions.

On objective grounds, certaingroups of workers may beexcluded from some of theprovisions of the directive (forinstance civil servants, armedforces, emergency services andlawenforcementservices).

Workers may take up a job inparallel with another employer(exclusivityclausesarebanned).

Workers with variable workingschedules (for instance on-demand work) should know inadvance when they will berequestedtowork.

Workers must receive trainingcost-free, when EU or nationallawrequiressuchtraining.

Member States that allow on-demand or similar employmentcontracts,must takemeasures topreventabuse,suchaslimitationsto the use and duration of on-demand or similar contracts or arebuttable presumption on theexistence of an employmentcontractwithaminimumamountof paid hours based on theaveragehoursworked.



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Secondly,theCommissionhasproposedaCouncilRecommendationonAccesstoSocialProtection,hopingtotackle the problem that up to half of people in non-standard work and self-employment are at risk of nothavingsufficientaccesstosocialprotectionand/oremploymentservicesacrosstheEU(EuropeanCommission,2017).TheRecommendationurgesMemberStatestoprovidesimilarsocialprotectionrightsforsimilarworkregardlessoflabourstatusandthetransferabilityofacquiredsocialprotectionrights.

Itshouldalsobementionedthatinanimportantjudgment,theEUCourtofJusticeexaminedthenatureoftheactivitiesoftheonlineplatformcompanyUber.ThecentralquestionwaswhetherUber’sactivitiesweretobeclassifiedas“informationsocietyservices”underEUlaw, inwhichcasemarketaccessshouldbegrantedandrestrictionsonitsoperationshouldhavebeennotifiedandcouldonlybeacceptedinlimitedcircumstances,orwhethertheyinsteadconstituted“transportservices”whichfalloutsidethescopeoftheEUrulesinquestionandcanthereforeinprinciplebefreelyregulatedbytheMemberStates.Initsjudgment,theCourtconsideredthat the intermediation serviceprovidedbyUber isbasedon the selectionofnon-professionaldriversusingtheirownvehicle,towhomthecompanyprovidesanapplicationwithoutwhich(i)thosedriverswouldnotbeled to provide transport services and (ii) persons who wish to make an urban journey would not use theservices provided by those drivers. In addition, Uber exercises decisive influence over the conditions underwhich that service is provided by those drivers. Uber determines at least themaximum fare, receives thatamountfromtheclientbeforepayingpartof it tothenon-professionaldriverofthevehicle,andexercisesacertain control over the quality of the vehicles, the drivers and their conduct, which can, in somecircumstances, result in their exclusion. Therefore, it was “inherently linked to a transport service and,accordingly,must be classified as “a service in the field of transport”which can be freely regulated by theMember States. While the judgment does not concern the labour status of the Uber drivers, the CJEU’sconsiderationsconcerningthemeasureofcontroloftheonlineplatformmayberelevantforfuturelabourlawcasesatnationalandEUlevelinthefuture.Itsuggeststhatonlineplatformworkersmaywellbeconsidered,inmanycases,“workers”inthesenseofEUlaw,meaningthattheprotectionofEUlabourdirectives,especiallythenewTransparentandPredictableWorkingConditionsDirective,willapplytothem.

3.b.WhatwayforwardfortheEU’sapproachtoonlineplatformwork?A key question to ask in considering why and how to regulate the various aspects of the social disruptioncausedbyonlineplatformworkiswhatactuallydrivesthegrowthoftheonlineplatformeconomy.ResearchconductedbytheEuropeanParliament(2017)foundthat

“Often,thekeyissuemotivatingcompaniestoadoptplatform-basedformsofworkorganisationwasseenastheavailabilityofsignificantcostsavingsasaresultofutilisinglabourprovidedbyaworkforcethatisnotdirectlyemployed.[…]IntheUK,forinstance,companiesmovingfromadirectemploymentmodelto a self-employment model typically reduced their labour costs by 13 per cent through avoidingemployers’contributionstowardsNationalInsurance(socialsecuritypayments),andbyafurther12percentthroughavoidingtherequirementtoprovidepaidholidaysunderEUWorkingTimeRegulations.[…]Overall, many of our interviewees thought that tax arrangements in particular Member States gavefinancial incentives to companies to move away from direct employment towards a platform-basedworkforce.Whilesomeemployerrepresentativesweinterviewedsawbenefitsforbusinessesinadoptingthis approach, others argued that the platform economy “should not be about reducing the costs ofemployment” (intermediary, Italy). Indeed, interviewees from employer organisations often reflectedtheir members’ complaints that such practices place more responsible employers at an unfairdisadvantage.Moreover, as interviewees also pointed out, this businessmodel also reduces financialcontributionstoimportantsocialprotectionschemes.”

This suggests that theonlineplatformeconomy is probably growing ‘for thewrong reasons’, namely not todelivernew, innovativeandbetter-quality services for thebenefitof customersandwith the side-benefitofcreatingqualityemploymentopportunities,butinsteadthatit isusedas‘unfaircompetition’toundercuttheexistingindustryoperators.Insomecasesitmayevenbethatonlineplatformsarenotjustusingnon-standardemploymentinordertodrivealow-costbusinessmodel,butthatthemodelofonlineplatformworkischosen



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simply in order to use non-standard employment (and to avoid tax and social security implications) to theextreme. The profit is generated on the back of the individual worker’s wellbeing and the welfare state’ssustainability.Iftheseexternalitycostswereproperlyfactoredintothecalculationoftheeconomiceffectsofthe online platform economy, it is doubtful that it would generate a net benefit for the majority of theindividualsworkingwithinit,andforsocietyatlarge.

Thissupportstheargumentemergingalsofromthediscussionintheprevioussections,thatinsteadoftreatingtheonlineplatformeconomyassomethingprecious,uniqueandtenderthatneedstobecradledandprotectedfromintrusiverule-making, it features(asaruleratherthantheexception)harmfultrendsandpracticesandthat need regulation. First and foremost, therefore, a fundamental shift in narrative is thus in order,whereinsteadof buying into the idea of ‘harmful rules’ that ‘hamper’ technological ‘innovation’ the importance isunderlinedofasociallysustainabletechnologicallysupportedeconomythatbenefitseveryoneinvolved.

Ofcourse,thatconclusiondoesnotinitselfresolvethequestionofwhatthatregulationshouldlooklike.Wehave seen in Section 2.c that there aremany different possibilities, which each have their ownmerits anddrawbacks.

Perhapsthemostfundamentaldecisionthathastobemadeiswhethertotreatonlineplatformwork,andthechallenges related to it, separately from the broader problématique of non-standard, precarious workingconditions,orwhetheraholisticresponseisinorder.Althoughthispaperhasarguedthatonlineplatformworkis ‘special’ in termsof theextent towhich itplacesatypicalemploymentat theverycoreof itsapproach tolabour, itwouldseemthatthemostappropriateandeffectiveregulatoryresponsewouldbetoreinstatetheimportanceofthestandardemploymentrelationshipandtoallowallatypicalworkingarrangements,includingdependentcontractorstatus,onlyinhighlyexceptionalcircumstances,ifatall,andaccompaniedbyarangeofprotections andobligations thatwouldessentially allowand incentivize theuseof theseexceptions ‘for therightreasons’only.

Forthis,itisnotnecessaryto(re-)inventthewheel.ManyelementsarealreadypresentatEUlevel,thatcouldbeusedtobuild intoacoherentoverallregulatoryframeworktotacklethesocialdisruptionofnon-standardemploymentandprecarity.

TheEU’sapproachtootheratypicalworkforms,suchastemporaryagencyworkandfixed-termwork,hasbeentoensure theequal treatmentof theseworkerswith those in standard,directemployment in thecompany.This provides aminimum level of protection against exploitation for theworker concerned and reduces theincentive of companies to resort to such forms of employment simply to cut costs. It has furthermoreencouraged the transition to standardemployment, for instanceby limiting the successiveuseof fixed-termcontracts.TheTransparentandPredictableWorkingConditionsDirectiveproposes toobligeMemberStates,where they allow for the use of on-demand or similar employment contracts, to takemeasures to preventabusivepractices,suchaslimitationstotheuseanddurationofon-demandorsimilarcontractsorarebuttablepresumptionontheexistenceofanemploymentcontractwithaminimumamountofpaidhoursbasedontheaveragehoursworkedduringagivenperiod.Itfurthermoreprovidesminimuminformationrightsforworkersonanytypeofcontractandsomeminimumsubstantiverights,suchasamaximumprobationperiod.EUlawfurthermore features a wide definition of a ‘worker’ and thus already integrates a large part of the onlineplatformeconomy’sworkforceevenwheretheyareformallycontractedas‘independent’withinthescopeofprotectionofallthesemeasures.

Thisisagreatplacetostartfrom.

Inthisauthor’sopinion,itwouldbeuseful,oncetheTransparentandPredictableWorkingConditionsDirectiveissuccessfullyadopted,tolaunchaholisticrevisionprocessatEUlevelthat(withanemphasisonsecuritymorethan on flexibility) considers how to regulate in an integrated, coherent fashion all various forms of non-standardemployment - includingdependentself-employmentandgig-work– insuchawayastoensurefairanddecentworkingconditionsforeveryoneandtoguaranteeasustainabletaxbaseandsocialsecuritysystem.This shoulddraw together theexistingEUmeasures in the field andupgrade themandenlarge their scope,withthespecificaimtoprovideasolidminimumfloorofallworkers’rightsatEUlevel,whichMemberStatesmayalwayschoosetosurpassinaprocessofupwardconvergence.



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Indeed, the European Pillar of Social Rights provides a highly suitable pathway for the roll-out of such aninitiative.Itclearlysuitsthephilosophy,objectivesandworkingmethodofthePillarverywellandtestifiestothepoliticalmomentumpresenttosustainsuchanambitiousmove.Furthermore,ratherthanapproachesthatjust‘tinkerinthemargins’,afar-reachingpromisetotacklethedecreasingqualityofworkinallformswouldprovideapositivepost-crisisnarrativethatEuropeanandnationalpoliticsdesperatelyneed.

Anysuch initiativeshouldnot, in turn,beunderminedbycontradictorymeasures in thecontextofdecision-makingonother,economic, issues,suchas for instance in theEuropeanSemester.Fora longtime,country-specific recommendationshavepromoteda flexibilisationnarrative thatdiametrically opposes the approachsuggested in this paper. While the European Semester is arguably increasingly socialized (Zeitlin andVanhercke,2014)alsoinlightoftheEuropeanPillarofSocialRights,theprocessoverallstillneedsto“shiftthenarrative from austerity to social investment in social rights and standards, and finance adequate andsustainable welfare states through tax justice and progressive taxation” (European Anti Poverty Network,2017).

4.CONCLUSION

Wehaveseenthattherearestrongreasonstoprovideappropriateprotectionforpeopleworkingintheonlineplatform economy. Firstly, the working conditions tend to be precarious and the profile of many onlineplatform workers is vulnerable. In an EU that protects, these workers should be the focus of attention.Secondly,onlineplatformworkisconnectedtootheratypicalformsofwork,whichpresentsimilarindividualandsocietalchallenges,evenifnotalwaystothesameextent,andforwhichtheEUhasalreadyprovidedsomeminimumlevelofprotectioninitsEUlabourlawacquis.Thirdly,thedifferentresponsesatnationallevelshowthattheMemberStateshavenotbeenabletoprovideeffectiveresponsesandsufficientprotection,whiletheproblemisacommononeandaninterlinkedoneintheEU’sinternalmarket.

TheEU,withtheEuropeanPillarofSocialRightsandespecially theDirectiveonPredictableandTransparentWorking Conditions is taking steps to ensure that the positive potential of the online platform economy isharnessedandembeddedtoyieldbenefitseveryone,especiallythosepeoplewhoareatthecoreofgeneratingthese benefits. This paper has argued that further, more ambitious steps are warranted. This may entail aholisticupgradingofthecurrentEUacquisofatypicalwork. Inachievingthis, it isvery importanttoshiftthenarrativeawayfrom‘harmfulrules’that‘hamper’technological‘innovation’andinsteadtoargueforasociallysustainabletechnologicallysupportedeconomythatbenefitseveryone involved–andthat it is for theEUtosettheminimumstandardinthisregard.



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ABOUTTHEAUTHOR

SachaGarben,ProfessorofEULaw,CollegeofEurope

ProfessorDrSachaGARBENisPermanentProfessorofEUlawattheLegalStudiesDepartment of the College of Europe. She is on leave from the EuropeanCommission,whereshewasappointedasofficial in2013,andwheresheworkedasaLegalOfficeronEUlabourlawuntiljoiningtheCollegeofEuropein2015.Sheobtained her PhD at the European University Institute in 2010, winning theJacquelineSuterPrizefortheBestDoctoralThesis inEuropeanLaw2009–2011.ShehassincethenworkedattheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnionandattheLondonSchoolofEconomics.Shehaspublishedonawiderangeofconstitutionaland substantive issues in EU law, such as inter alia the division of competencesbetweentheEUandtheMemberStates,thebalancebetweensocialandeconomicrightsintheEUlegalorderandtheEuropeanPillarofSocialRights.

This paper is written in a personal capacity and does not represent the officialviewsoftheEuropeanCommission.

Documents

ONLINE PLATFORM ECONOMY...2 Some online platforms, such as the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform, are specifically set up to provide such ‘microtasks’. In a recent study, the ILO