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Leonardo
On the Failure or Success of Experimental AestheticsAuthor(s): Laurence GaneSource: Leonardo, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring, 1976), pp. 173-174Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1573172 .
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himself (Reggini's Ref. 31) had earlier found inverse corre- lations both with intelligence and with training in drawing, artists reporting the least constancy. Wartofsky's suspicion of indoctrination of artists notwithstanding, I believe that constancy testing might yield more understanding where subjects have, over several years, given close attention to their visual experience. They need not be artists. Note, for instance, Helmholtz and Arnheim, who are among the very few experimenters and theorists who appear to have themselves looked carefully at their world. Regarding size constancy, for nearly everyone I know who has carefully examined the proportions of the appearance of the natural world, the image of an object indeed doubles in size when the distance from the observer is halved, or very nearly so, for a degree of Thouless' 'perceptual compromise' appeared in all of his test results, even those using artists as subjects.
2. What Reggini's formula provides is a 'family of perspectives' that reflects the appearance of a cube from a variety of viewing distances. In Fig. 6(a), i=0 corres- ponds to a viewing distance of around one object-diameter; i=0.5 corresponds to a more common and comfortable viewing distance of 10 or 15 diameters; i=l can be ex- perienced from a viewing distance of perhaps 100 dia- meters, one that produces the essentially parallel visual rays of a telescopic view, as do 6(b) : i= 1 and 6(c) : i= 1.
Fig. 6(b) : i=0, on the other hand, does not depict the appearance of a cube at all. It expresses our experience either of a very long trapezoidal tunnel or of a truncated trapezoidal pyramid. There is no possible visual experience of a cube that would permit vertical edges to converge sharply while the horizon (containing the central vanishing point) appears within the object, centered on its vertical axis. The sharply converging skyscraper that Reggini cites is an entirely different situation, where vanishing points exist on a horizon far below the visual field. Fig. 6(c) : i =0 is a less extreme example of the same situation and the same contradiction is inherent even in 6(b) : i=0.5 and 6(c) : i=0.5.
Both in Figs. 6(b) and 6(c) and in Fig. 7 Reggini's computer program has presented convergences and fore- shortening which in experience must depict actually con- verging planes and edges. They are charming and provoca- tive diagrams, but any artist will find that these oblique views fail to convey the parallel planes of cubes, as will anyone else, I believe, who acquaints himself intimately with his vision. Perception formulas must stand the test of subjective introspection as well as the test of internal logic.
As for curvature (see my article, Reggini's Ref. 36), straight lines perpendicular to the line of sight may appear curved where they occupy peripheral vision, but it is both irrational to conceive and impossible to experience curva- ture in the orthogonals that approach the central vanishing point, as in Figs. 6(b) : i=0-5 and 6(c) : i=0-5. The computer has again produced a charming phantom.
References
1. H. Leibowitz, I. Waskow, N. Loeffler and F. Glaser, Intelligence Level as a Variable in the Perception of Shape, Quarterly J. Exper. Psychology 11, 108 (1959).
2. M. W. Wartofsky, Pictures, Representation and the Understanding, in Logic and Art, R. Rudner, ed. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972).
Robert Hansen Dept. of Art
Occidental College Los Angeles, CA. 90041, U.S.A.
ON THE FAILURE OR SUCCESS OF EXPERIMENTAL AESTHETICS
It is disappointing, to say the least, that the Notes by
himself (Reggini's Ref. 31) had earlier found inverse corre- lations both with intelligence and with training in drawing, artists reporting the least constancy. Wartofsky's suspicion of indoctrination of artists notwithstanding, I believe that constancy testing might yield more understanding where subjects have, over several years, given close attention to their visual experience. They need not be artists. Note, for instance, Helmholtz and Arnheim, who are among the very few experimenters and theorists who appear to have themselves looked carefully at their world. Regarding size constancy, for nearly everyone I know who has carefully examined the proportions of the appearance of the natural world, the image of an object indeed doubles in size when the distance from the observer is halved, or very nearly so, for a degree of Thouless' 'perceptual compromise' appeared in all of his test results, even those using artists as subjects.
2. What Reggini's formula provides is a 'family of perspectives' that reflects the appearance of a cube from a variety of viewing distances. In Fig. 6(a), i=0 corres- ponds to a viewing distance of around one object-diameter; i=0.5 corresponds to a more common and comfortable viewing distance of 10 or 15 diameters; i=l can be ex- perienced from a viewing distance of perhaps 100 dia- meters, one that produces the essentially parallel visual rays of a telescopic view, as do 6(b) : i= 1 and 6(c) : i= 1.
Fig. 6(b) : i=0, on the other hand, does not depict the appearance of a cube at all. It expresses our experience either of a very long trapezoidal tunnel or of a truncated trapezoidal pyramid. There is no possible visual experience of a cube that would permit vertical edges to converge sharply while the horizon (containing the central vanishing point) appears within the object, centered on its vertical axis. The sharply converging skyscraper that Reggini cites is an entirely different situation, where vanishing points exist on a horizon far below the visual field. Fig. 6(c) : i =0 is a less extreme example of the same situation and the same contradiction is inherent even in 6(b) : i=0.5 and 6(c) : i=0.5.
Both in Figs. 6(b) and 6(c) and in Fig. 7 Reggini's computer program has presented convergences and fore- shortening which in experience must depict actually con- verging planes and edges. They are charming and provoca- tive diagrams, but any artist will find that these oblique views fail to convey the parallel planes of cubes, as will anyone else, I believe, who acquaints himself intimately with his vision. Perception formulas must stand the test of subjective introspection as well as the test of internal logic.
As for curvature (see my article, Reggini's Ref. 36), straight lines perpendicular to the line of sight may appear curved where they occupy peripheral vision, but it is both irrational to conceive and impossible to experience curva- ture in the orthogonals that approach the central vanishing point, as in Figs. 6(b) : i=0-5 and 6(c) : i=0-5. The computer has again produced a charming phantom.
References
1. H. Leibowitz, I. Waskow, N. Loeffler and F. Glaser, Intelligence Level as a Variable in the Perception of Shape, Quarterly J. Exper. Psychology 11, 108 (1959).
2. M. W. Wartofsky, Pictures, Representation and the Understanding, in Logic and Art, R. Rudner, ed. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972).
Robert Hansen Dept. of Art
Occidental College Los Angeles, CA. 90041, U.S.A.
ON THE FAILURE OR SUCCESS OF EXPERIMENTAL AESTHETICS
It is disappointing, to say the least, that the Notes by
himself (Reggini's Ref. 31) had earlier found inverse corre- lations both with intelligence and with training in drawing, artists reporting the least constancy. Wartofsky's suspicion of indoctrination of artists notwithstanding, I believe that constancy testing might yield more understanding where subjects have, over several years, given close attention to their visual experience. They need not be artists. Note, for instance, Helmholtz and Arnheim, who are among the very few experimenters and theorists who appear to have themselves looked carefully at their world. Regarding size constancy, for nearly everyone I know who has carefully examined the proportions of the appearance of the natural world, the image of an object indeed doubles in size when the distance from the observer is halved, or very nearly so, for a degree of Thouless' 'perceptual compromise' appeared in all of his test results, even those using artists as subjects.
2. What Reggini's formula provides is a 'family of perspectives' that reflects the appearance of a cube from a variety of viewing distances. In Fig. 6(a), i=0 corres- ponds to a viewing distance of around one object-diameter; i=0.5 corresponds to a more common and comfortable viewing distance of 10 or 15 diameters; i=l can be ex- perienced from a viewing distance of perhaps 100 dia- meters, one that produces the essentially parallel visual rays of a telescopic view, as do 6(b) : i= 1 and 6(c) : i= 1.
Fig. 6(b) : i=0, on the other hand, does not depict the appearance of a cube at all. It expresses our experience either of a very long trapezoidal tunnel or of a truncated trapezoidal pyramid. There is no possible visual experience of a cube that would permit vertical edges to converge sharply while the horizon (containing the central vanishing point) appears within the object, centered on its vertical axis. The sharply converging skyscraper that Reggini cites is an entirely different situation, where vanishing points exist on a horizon far below the visual field. Fig. 6(c) : i =0 is a less extreme example of the same situation and the same contradiction is inherent even in 6(b) : i=0.5 and 6(c) : i=0.5.
Both in Figs. 6(b) and 6(c) and in Fig. 7 Reggini's computer program has presented convergences and fore- shortening which in experience must depict actually con- verging planes and edges. They are charming and provoca- tive diagrams, but any artist will find that these oblique views fail to convey the parallel planes of cubes, as will anyone else, I believe, who acquaints himself intimately with his vision. Perception formulas must stand the test of subjective introspection as well as the test of internal logic.
As for curvature (see my article, Reggini's Ref. 36), straight lines perpendicular to the line of sight may appear curved where they occupy peripheral vision, but it is both irrational to conceive and impossible to experience curva- ture in the orthogonals that approach the central vanishing point, as in Figs. 6(b) : i=0-5 and 6(c) : i=0-5. The computer has again produced a charming phantom.
References
1. H. Leibowitz, I. Waskow, N. Loeffler and F. Glaser, Intelligence Level as a Variable in the Perception of Shape, Quarterly J. Exper. Psychology 11, 108 (1959).
2. M. W. Wartofsky, Pictures, Representation and the Understanding, in Logic and Art, R. Rudner, ed. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972).
Robert Hansen Dept. of Art
Occidental College Los Angeles, CA. 90041, U.S.A.
ON THE FAILURE OR SUCCESS OF EXPERIMENTAL AESTHETICS
It is disappointing, to say the least, that the Notes by
himself (Reggini's Ref. 31) had earlier found inverse corre- lations both with intelligence and with training in drawing, artists reporting the least constancy. Wartofsky's suspicion of indoctrination of artists notwithstanding, I believe that constancy testing might yield more understanding where subjects have, over several years, given close attention to their visual experience. They need not be artists. Note, for instance, Helmholtz and Arnheim, who are among the very few experimenters and theorists who appear to have themselves looked carefully at their world. Regarding size constancy, for nearly everyone I know who has carefully examined the proportions of the appearance of the natural world, the image of an object indeed doubles in size when the distance from the observer is halved, or very nearly so, for a degree of Thouless' 'perceptual compromise' appeared in all of his test results, even those using artists as subjects.
2. What Reggini's formula provides is a 'family of perspectives' that reflects the appearance of a cube from a variety of viewing distances. In Fig. 6(a), i=0 corres- ponds to a viewing distance of around one object-diameter; i=0.5 corresponds to a more common and comfortable viewing distance of 10 or 15 diameters; i=l can be ex- perienced from a viewing distance of perhaps 100 dia- meters, one that produces the essentially parallel visual rays of a telescopic view, as do 6(b) : i= 1 and 6(c) : i= 1.
Fig. 6(b) : i=0, on the other hand, does not depict the appearance of a cube at all. It expresses our experience either of a very long trapezoidal tunnel or of a truncated trapezoidal pyramid. There is no possible visual experience of a cube that would permit vertical edges to converge sharply while the horizon (containing the central vanishing point) appears within the object, centered on its vertical axis. The sharply converging skyscraper that Reggini cites is an entirely different situation, where vanishing points exist on a horizon far below the visual field. Fig. 6(c) : i =0 is a less extreme example of the same situation and the same contradiction is inherent even in 6(b) : i=0.5 and 6(c) : i=0.5.
Both in Figs. 6(b) and 6(c) and in Fig. 7 Reggini's computer program has presented convergences and fore- shortening which in experience must depict actually con- verging planes and edges. They are charming and provoca- tive diagrams, but any artist will find that these oblique views fail to convey the parallel planes of cubes, as will anyone else, I believe, who acquaints himself intimately with his vision. Perception formulas must stand the test of subjective introspection as well as the test of internal logic.
As for curvature (see my article, Reggini's Ref. 36), straight lines perpendicular to the line of sight may appear curved where they occupy peripheral vision, but it is both irrational to conceive and impossible to experience curva- ture in the orthogonals that approach the central vanishing point, as in Figs. 6(b) : i=0-5 and 6(c) : i=0-5. The computer has again produced a charming phantom.
References
1. H. Leibowitz, I. Waskow, N. Loeffler and F. Glaser, Intelligence Level as a Variable in the Perception of Shape, Quarterly J. Exper. Psychology 11, 108 (1959).
2. M. W. Wartofsky, Pictures, Representation and the Understanding, in Logic and Art, R. Rudner, ed. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972).
Robert Hansen Dept. of Art
Occidental College Los Angeles, CA. 90041, U.S.A.
ON THE FAILURE OR SUCCESS OF EXPERIMENTAL AESTHETICS
It is disappointing, to say the least, that the Notes by
So James Gips and George Stiny have admitted in their letter above [Leonardo 9, 172 (1976)] that the class of mathe- matical entities that they have defined is a formal frame- work applicable to non-aesthetic matters. In my opinion, it can more easily be applied to non-aesthetic matters.
My motivation is that of a computer artist looking around hopefully for usable scraps falling from a theoreti- cian's table. The system of algorithms, connected by input- output relations, that constitutes the aesthetics of Gips and Stiny is difficult to implement. As generators, they imply a direction of 'from few to many', although as an artist I do not want many, and then to give me the first few of the many is no solution either. If I want something very par- ticular, then I let the generator run until I (or the 'reference decision algorithm') note something of value or get tired or until the wastepaper bin is full. Suppose that I do not know what I want. Using quite a different terminology, Frieder Nake, in a paper Generative Aesthetics-Two Picture-Generating Programs, presented at Brunel Uni- versity Conference on Computer Graphics in 1970, said: 'The problem of picture generating is that of selecting them.' The problem has not 'gotten off the ground' and I think that the difficulty resides in the direction of the algorithms.
The throughput of two algorithms, linked in series, forces users of the Gips and Stiny aesthetics to impose a strong directional emphasis on their thinking. One is compelled to follow the series of input to output, with this output becoming the input to the next stage. The stages are (1) rules for construction; (2) description of (art) objects and (3) evocations-associations, emotions, con- tent. The effect of this is, firstly, to drive the syntax and the semantics apart, whereas they are inseparable to an artist. Secondly, they treat syntax as the source of art, whereas for me external evocations, such as meaning and emotion, provide a livelier source.
Michael Thompson 1 Remez Rd.
Kadimah, Israel.
HARRIES' PROPOSED NOTATION FOR VISUAL ART (cont.)
My article [Leonardo 8, 295 (1975)] provides information about a concept and method of work that could be found useful by others who are, in the nature of things, those actually engaged in the field of the visual arts. The method was, of course, developed in the first place for myself; to speak of it as 'intended for' anyone else would be inappro- priate sales talk in Leonardo. Neither my opinions nor those of R. Maconie [Letters, Leonardo 9, 86 (1976)] will add to or detract from its possible productiveness in the hands of anyone with a practical interest in the idea.
It would be tedious to restate here matters about which I have already written. To the extent that Maconie raises factual issues relevant to the subject, I refer him to the article, where I believe, they are dealt with in adequately clear language.
John G. Harries 5 Beth-Lechem St.
Holon, Israel.
PERSPECTIVE USING CURVED PROJECTION RAYS AND ITS COMPUTER APPLICATION
Regarding Horacio C. Reggini's article [Leonardo 8, 307 (1975)], two comments may be in order, from the point of view of experience rather than mathematics.
1. Perceptual constancy, as Reggini points out, is not completely understood. The misunderstanding is aggra- vated, it seems to me, by test results with subjects who are for
So James Gips and George Stiny have admitted in their letter above [Leonardo 9, 172 (1976)] that the class of mathe- matical entities that they have defined is a formal frame- work applicable to non-aesthetic matters. In my opinion, it can more easily be applied to non-aesthetic matters.
My motivation is that of a computer artist looking around hopefully for usable scraps falling from a theoreti- cian's table. The system of algorithms, connected by input- output relations, that constitutes the aesthetics of Gips and Stiny is difficult to implement. As generators, they imply a direction of 'from few to many', although as an artist I do not want many, and then to give me the first few of the many is no solution either. If I want something very par- ticular, then I let the generator run until I (or the 'reference decision algorithm') note something of value or get tired or until the wastepaper bin is full. Suppose that I do not know what I want. Using quite a different terminology, Frieder Nake, in a paper Generative Aesthetics-Two Picture-Generating Programs, presented at Brunel Uni- versity Conference on Computer Graphics in 1970, said: 'The problem of picture generating is that of selecting them.' The problem has not 'gotten off the ground' and I think that the difficulty resides in the direction of the algorithms.
The throughput of two algorithms, linked in series, forces users of the Gips and Stiny aesthetics to impose a strong directional emphasis on their thinking. One is compelled to follow the series of input to output, with this output becoming the input to the next stage. The stages are (1) rules for construction; (2) description of (art) objects and (3) evocations-associations, emotions, con- tent. The effect of this is, firstly, to drive the syntax and the semantics apart, whereas they are inseparable to an artist. Secondly, they treat syntax as the source of art, whereas for me external evocations, such as meaning and emotion, provide a livelier source.
Michael Thompson 1 Remez Rd.
Kadimah, Israel.
HARRIES' PROPOSED NOTATION FOR VISUAL ART (cont.)
My article [Leonardo 8, 295 (1975)] provides information about a concept and method of work that could be found useful by others who are, in the nature of things, those actually engaged in the field of the visual arts. The method was, of course, developed in the first place for myself; to speak of it as 'intended for' anyone else would be inappro- priate sales talk in Leonardo. Neither my opinions nor those of R. Maconie [Letters, Leonardo 9, 86 (1976)] will add to or detract from its possible productiveness in the hands of anyone with a practical interest in the idea.
It would be tedious to restate here matters about which I have already written. To the extent that Maconie raises factual issues relevant to the subject, I refer him to the article, where I believe, they are dealt with in adequately clear language.
John G. Harries 5 Beth-Lechem St.
Holon, Israel.
PERSPECTIVE USING CURVED PROJECTION RAYS AND ITS COMPUTER APPLICATION
Regarding Horacio C. Reggini's article [Leonardo 8, 307 (1975)], two comments may be in order, from the point of view of experience rather than mathematics.
1. Perceptual constancy, as Reggini points out, is not completely understood. The misunderstanding is aggra- vated, it seems to me, by test results with subjects who are for
So James Gips and George Stiny have admitted in their letter above [Leonardo 9, 172 (1976)] that the class of mathe- matical entities that they have defined is a formal frame- work applicable to non-aesthetic matters. In my opinion, it can more easily be applied to non-aesthetic matters.
My motivation is that of a computer artist looking around hopefully for usable scraps falling from a theoreti- cian's table. The system of algorithms, connected by input- output relations, that constitutes the aesthetics of Gips and Stiny is difficult to implement. As generators, they imply a direction of 'from few to many', although as an artist I do not want many, and then to give me the first few of the many is no solution either. If I want something very par- ticular, then I let the generator run until I (or the 'reference decision algorithm') note something of value or get tired or until the wastepaper bin is full. Suppose that I do not know what I want. Using quite a different terminology, Frieder Nake, in a paper Generative Aesthetics-Two Picture-Generating Programs, presented at Brunel Uni- versity Conference on Computer Graphics in 1970, said: 'The problem of picture generating is that of selecting them.' The problem has not 'gotten off the ground' and I think that the difficulty resides in the direction of the algorithms.
The throughput of two algorithms, linked in series, forces users of the Gips and Stiny aesthetics to impose a strong directional emphasis on their thinking. One is compelled to follow the series of input to output, with this output becoming the input to the next stage. The stages are (1) rules for construction; (2) description of (art) objects and (3) evocations-associations, emotions, con- tent. The effect of this is, firstly, to drive the syntax and the semantics apart, whereas they are inseparable to an artist. Secondly, they treat syntax as the source of art, whereas for me external evocations, such as meaning and emotion, provide a livelier source.
Michael Thompson 1 Remez Rd.
Kadimah, Israel.
HARRIES' PROPOSED NOTATION FOR VISUAL ART (cont.)
My article [Leonardo 8, 295 (1975)] provides information about a concept and method of work that could be found useful by others who are, in the nature of things, those actually engaged in the field of the visual arts. The method was, of course, developed in the first place for myself; to speak of it as 'intended for' anyone else would be inappro- priate sales talk in Leonardo. Neither my opinions nor those of R. Maconie [Letters, Leonardo 9, 86 (1976)] will add to or detract from its possible productiveness in the hands of anyone with a practical interest in the idea.
It would be tedious to restate here matters about which I have already written. To the extent that Maconie raises factual issues relevant to the subject, I refer him to the article, where I believe, they are dealt with in adequately clear language.
John G. Harries 5 Beth-Lechem St.
Holon, Israel.
PERSPECTIVE USING CURVED PROJECTION RAYS AND ITS COMPUTER APPLICATION
Regarding Horacio C. Reggini's article [Leonardo 8, 307 (1975)], two comments may be in order, from the point of view of experience rather than mathematics.
1. Perceptual constancy, as Reggini points out, is not completely understood. The misunderstanding is aggra- vated, it seems to me, by test results with subjects who are for
So James Gips and George Stiny have admitted in their letter above [Leonardo 9, 172 (1976)] that the class of mathe- matical entities that they have defined is a formal frame- work applicable to non-aesthetic matters. In my opinion, it can more easily be applied to non-aesthetic matters.
My motivation is that of a computer artist looking around hopefully for usable scraps falling from a theoreti- cian's table. The system of algorithms, connected by input- output relations, that constitutes the aesthetics of Gips and Stiny is difficult to implement. As generators, they imply a direction of 'from few to many', although as an artist I do not want many, and then to give me the first few of the many is no solution either. If I want something very par- ticular, then I let the generator run until I (or the 'reference decision algorithm') note something of value or get tired or until the wastepaper bin is full. Suppose that I do not know what I want. Using quite a different terminology, Frieder Nake, in a paper Generative Aesthetics-Two Picture-Generating Programs, presented at Brunel Uni- versity Conference on Computer Graphics in 1970, said: 'The problem of picture generating is that of selecting them.' The problem has not 'gotten off the ground' and I think that the difficulty resides in the direction of the algorithms.
The throughput of two algorithms, linked in series, forces users of the Gips and Stiny aesthetics to impose a strong directional emphasis on their thinking. One is compelled to follow the series of input to output, with this output becoming the input to the next stage. The stages are (1) rules for construction; (2) description of (art) objects and (3) evocations-associations, emotions, con- tent. The effect of this is, firstly, to drive the syntax and the semantics apart, whereas they are inseparable to an artist. Secondly, they treat syntax as the source of art, whereas for me external evocations, such as meaning and emotion, provide a livelier source.
Michael Thompson 1 Remez Rd.
Kadimah, Israel.
HARRIES' PROPOSED NOTATION FOR VISUAL ART (cont.)
My article [Leonardo 8, 295 (1975)] provides information about a concept and method of work that could be found useful by others who are, in the nature of things, those actually engaged in the field of the visual arts. The method was, of course, developed in the first place for myself; to speak of it as 'intended for' anyone else would be inappro- priate sales talk in Leonardo. Neither my opinions nor those of R. Maconie [Letters, Leonardo 9, 86 (1976)] will add to or detract from its possible productiveness in the hands of anyone with a practical interest in the idea.
It would be tedious to restate here matters about which I have already written. To the extent that Maconie raises factual issues relevant to the subject, I refer him to the article, where I believe, they are dealt with in adequately clear language.
John G. Harries 5 Beth-Lechem St.
Holon, Israel.
PERSPECTIVE USING CURVED PROJECTION RAYS AND ITS COMPUTER APPLICATION
Regarding Horacio C. Reggini's article [Leonardo 8, 307 (1975)], two comments may be in order, from the point of view of experience rather than mathematics.
1. Perceptual constancy, as Reggini points out, is not completely understood. The misunderstanding is aggra- vated, it seems to me, by test results with subjects who are for the most part visually naive. Leibowitz et al. [1] found that shape constancy is reported most by mental defectives and slow learners (and even more by Rhesus monkeys, according to Wartofsky [2]) and least by 'Ford Fellows'. Thouless
the most part visually naive. Leibowitz et al. [1] found that shape constancy is reported most by mental defectives and slow learners (and even more by Rhesus monkeys, according to Wartofsky [2]) and least by 'Ford Fellows'. Thouless
the most part visually naive. Leibowitz et al. [1] found that shape constancy is reported most by mental defectives and slow learners (and even more by Rhesus monkeys, according to Wartofsky [2]) and least by 'Ford Fellows'. Thouless
the most part visually naive. Leibowitz et al. [1] found that shape constancy is reported most by mental defectives and slow learners (and even more by Rhesus monkeys, according to Wartofsky [2]) and least by 'Ford Fellows'. Thouless
James J. Gibson [Leonardo 8, 319 (1975)] and by R. W. Pickford [Leonardo 9, 56 (1976)] provide such limited agreement on the nature and scope of experimental aesthetics.
James J. Gibson [Leonardo 8, 319 (1975)] and by R. W. Pickford [Leonardo 9, 56 (1976)] provide such limited agreement on the nature and scope of experimental aesthetics.
James J. Gibson [Leonardo 8, 319 (1975)] and by R. W. Pickford [Leonardo 9, 56 (1976)] provide such limited agreement on the nature and scope of experimental aesthetics.
James J. Gibson [Leonardo 8, 319 (1975)] and by R. W. Pickford [Leonardo 9, 56 (1976)] provide such limited agreement on the nature and scope of experimental aesthetics.
Letters Letters Letters Letters 173 173 173 173
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Pickford agrees with Gibson's view that 'no one believes any more that the aesthetic value of a painting is merely the sum of the values of the colours and form that compose it', and offers no serious objection against Gibson's account of painting as 'a display of information about the world'. The most damaging comment he can manage is that he finds Gibson's hypothesis 'difficult to grasp'. (Describing it as 'philosophical mysticism' may or may not be intended as criticism, depending on what this labelling means to Pickford.)
What he fails to observe is the logical confusion of Gibson's argument. Consider the following two state- ments by Gibson: (1) 'Perception is based on information' and (2) 'information is extracted from a flowing array of stimulation'. What is clear, then, is that 'perception' involves 'stimulation'.
But now one is told: 'Although sensations are triggered by stimuli, perceptions are not, they are obtained by an observer, not imposed on him.' What is Gibson saying- that perceptions do not involve stimuli? He cannot have it both ways.
I suspect that the argument rests on a fundamental ambiguity in the use of 'stimuli' and 'stimulation'. It is clear that these are not identical concepts for Gibson. Some clarification is surely required.
Additionally, it is also quite unclear why an account of the correspondence between physical stimuli and mental sensations should provide a solution to the mind/body problem. The central concern of that debate is whether any useful distinction can be made between the two concepts or alternatively whether one ultimately reduces to the other. Any hypothesis of mind/body interaction simply takes for granted those very terms that the mind/body debate finds so problematic.
Laurence Gane Dept. of General Studies
Royal College of Art Kensington Gore
Lontdon, S W7 2EU, England.
P. F. SMITH'S PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL FOR AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE
The article by Peter F. Smith [Leonardo 9, 25 (1976)] leads me to make the following comments in the light of my experience with certain aspects of the brain-behavior problem.
Smith makes a big issue of the 'three brains' of P. MacLean, but he bases it on secondhand information (he gives as reference 'from a medical paper cited by A. Koestler in his book The Ghost in the Machine'); shows a lack of biological understanding and does not realize that MacLean's triune-brain concept is a metaphor.
Smith's speculations bear a strong resemblance to a colony of amoebae, each hypothesis drifting across the data base, expanding where it can and contracting upon contact with another hypothesis, content to overlap one hypothesis here, another there. He does not appreciate that more is needed than contact and overlap between two hypotheses; for only when both of them are couched in a common language can a crucial experiment be described and performed [J. Platt, Strong Inference, Science 146, 347 (1964)].
When one puts quinine on one's tongue, the fleeting interaction results in the experience of a bitter taste-the bitterness is not a property of the quinine. The property is assignable to quinine only in terms of Aristotelian object-subject logic and this logic has proved to be operational only for purposes of human survival.
Analogously (but without justification), one projects and assigns the 'properties' and 'qualities' of aesthetic experience to stimulus configurations that give to a person the fleeting feeling of balance or harmony. These con-
Pickford agrees with Gibson's view that 'no one believes any more that the aesthetic value of a painting is merely the sum of the values of the colours and form that compose it', and offers no serious objection against Gibson's account of painting as 'a display of information about the world'. The most damaging comment he can manage is that he finds Gibson's hypothesis 'difficult to grasp'. (Describing it as 'philosophical mysticism' may or may not be intended as criticism, depending on what this labelling means to Pickford.)
What he fails to observe is the logical confusion of Gibson's argument. Consider the following two state- ments by Gibson: (1) 'Perception is based on information' and (2) 'information is extracted from a flowing array of stimulation'. What is clear, then, is that 'perception' involves 'stimulation'.
But now one is told: 'Although sensations are triggered by stimuli, perceptions are not, they are obtained by an observer, not imposed on him.' What is Gibson saying- that perceptions do not involve stimuli? He cannot have it both ways.
I suspect that the argument rests on a fundamental ambiguity in the use of 'stimuli' and 'stimulation'. It is clear that these are not identical concepts for Gibson. Some clarification is surely required.
Additionally, it is also quite unclear why an account of the correspondence between physical stimuli and mental sensations should provide a solution to the mind/body problem. The central concern of that debate is whether any useful distinction can be made between the two concepts or alternatively whether one ultimately reduces to the other. Any hypothesis of mind/body interaction simply takes for granted those very terms that the mind/body debate finds so problematic.
Laurence Gane Dept. of General Studies
Royal College of Art Kensington Gore
Lontdon, S W7 2EU, England.
P. F. SMITH'S PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL FOR AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE
The article by Peter F. Smith [Leonardo 9, 25 (1976)] leads me to make the following comments in the light of my experience with certain aspects of the brain-behavior problem.
Smith makes a big issue of the 'three brains' of P. MacLean, but he bases it on secondhand information (he gives as reference 'from a medical paper cited by A. Koestler in his book The Ghost in the Machine'); shows a lack of biological understanding and does not realize that MacLean's triune-brain concept is a metaphor.
Smith's speculations bear a strong resemblance to a colony of amoebae, each hypothesis drifting across the data base, expanding where it can and contracting upon contact with another hypothesis, content to overlap one hypothesis here, another there. He does not appreciate that more is needed than contact and overlap between two hypotheses; for only when both of them are couched in a common language can a crucial experiment be described and performed [J. Platt, Strong Inference, Science 146, 347 (1964)].
When one puts quinine on one's tongue, the fleeting interaction results in the experience of a bitter taste-the bitterness is not a property of the quinine. The property is assignable to quinine only in terms of Aristotelian object-subject logic and this logic has proved to be operational only for purposes of human survival.
Analogously (but without justification), one projects and assigns the 'properties' and 'qualities' of aesthetic experience to stimulus configurations that give to a person the fleeting feeling of balance or harmony. These con-
Pickford agrees with Gibson's view that 'no one believes any more that the aesthetic value of a painting is merely the sum of the values of the colours and form that compose it', and offers no serious objection against Gibson's account of painting as 'a display of information about the world'. The most damaging comment he can manage is that he finds Gibson's hypothesis 'difficult to grasp'. (Describing it as 'philosophical mysticism' may or may not be intended as criticism, depending on what this labelling means to Pickford.)
What he fails to observe is the logical confusion of Gibson's argument. Consider the following two state- ments by Gibson: (1) 'Perception is based on information' and (2) 'information is extracted from a flowing array of stimulation'. What is clear, then, is that 'perception' involves 'stimulation'.
But now one is told: 'Although sensations are triggered by stimuli, perceptions are not, they are obtained by an observer, not imposed on him.' What is Gibson saying- that perceptions do not involve stimuli? He cannot have it both ways.
I suspect that the argument rests on a fundamental ambiguity in the use of 'stimuli' and 'stimulation'. It is clear that these are not identical concepts for Gibson. Some clarification is surely required.
Additionally, it is also quite unclear why an account of the correspondence between physical stimuli and mental sensations should provide a solution to the mind/body problem. The central concern of that debate is whether any useful distinction can be made between the two concepts or alternatively whether one ultimately reduces to the other. Any hypothesis of mind/body interaction simply takes for granted those very terms that the mind/body debate finds so problematic.
Laurence Gane Dept. of General Studies
Royal College of Art Kensington Gore
Lontdon, S W7 2EU, England.
P. F. SMITH'S PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL FOR AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE
The article by Peter F. Smith [Leonardo 9, 25 (1976)] leads me to make the following comments in the light of my experience with certain aspects of the brain-behavior problem.
Smith makes a big issue of the 'three brains' of P. MacLean, but he bases it on secondhand information (he gives as reference 'from a medical paper cited by A. Koestler in his book The Ghost in the Machine'); shows a lack of biological understanding and does not realize that MacLean's triune-brain concept is a metaphor.
Smith's speculations bear a strong resemblance to a colony of amoebae, each hypothesis drifting across the data base, expanding where it can and contracting upon contact with another hypothesis, content to overlap one hypothesis here, another there. He does not appreciate that more is needed than contact and overlap between two hypotheses; for only when both of them are couched in a common language can a crucial experiment be described and performed [J. Platt, Strong Inference, Science 146, 347 (1964)].
When one puts quinine on one's tongue, the fleeting interaction results in the experience of a bitter taste-the bitterness is not a property of the quinine. The property is assignable to quinine only in terms of Aristotelian object-subject logic and this logic has proved to be operational only for purposes of human survival.
Analogously (but without justification), one projects and assigns the 'properties' and 'qualities' of aesthetic experience to stimulus configurations that give to a person the fleeting feeling of balance or harmony. These con- figurations are as 'beautiful' as quinine is 'bitter'. Thus, Smith is correct when he states that 'beauty is not intrinsic figurations are as 'beautiful' as quinine is 'bitter'. Thus, Smith is correct when he states that 'beauty is not intrinsic figurations are as 'beautiful' as quinine is 'bitter'. Thus, Smith is correct when he states that 'beauty is not intrinsic
to objects . . . ' but '... is an interpretation imposed upon them by the mind'. However, when he implies that there is a clear-cut division of labor between the hemispheres of the brain, he is untenably simplistic.
Roland Fischer Maryland Psychiatric Research Center
Box 3235 Baltimore, MD 21228, U.S.A.
ENVIRONMENTAL SCULPTURE IN THE U.S.A.
Howard Conant [Leonardo 9, 33 (1976)] makes a plausible plea for a return to the concept of sculpture as 'high art'. He deplores its use as the symbolism of status, though this is not a new phenomenon, as many a Renaissance pope would have admitted in the safety of the confessional.
The crux of Conant's argument is that much contem- porary urban sculpture is trivial and little more than an offshoot of Pop art. He concludes: 'Sculpture is inappro- priate in most urban environmental settings, unless, as is rarely the case, sculptors and architects are willing and able to work together in designing aesthetically enhanced environments.'
There are several comments I should like to make. First, a lot of urban sculpture is commissioned as an after- thought to enliven an environment that looked fine at a scale of 1 : 500, but is very dull at full size. Sculptors like Dubuffet are reacting against the austerity of the com- mercial approach to architecture and attempt to revive it with frivolity. The indicting finger should point to many contemporary architects rather than to sculptors who protest at the monotony of many large cities.
Secondly, sculptors are best at maximizing chance. It is not true that sculptors are unable to react appropriately to existing settings. The element of chance that generates the artistic process is an existing built milieu. Could there be a finer sculpture/architecture dialectic than Henry Moore's bronze at Westminster, London (Fig. 1)? There
to objects . . . ' but '... is an interpretation imposed upon them by the mind'. However, when he implies that there is a clear-cut division of labor between the hemispheres of the brain, he is untenably simplistic.
Roland Fischer Maryland Psychiatric Research Center
Box 3235 Baltimore, MD 21228, U.S.A.
ENVIRONMENTAL SCULPTURE IN THE U.S.A.
Howard Conant [Leonardo 9, 33 (1976)] makes a plausible plea for a return to the concept of sculpture as 'high art'. He deplores its use as the symbolism of status, though this is not a new phenomenon, as many a Renaissance pope would have admitted in the safety of the confessional.
The crux of Conant's argument is that much contem- porary urban sculpture is trivial and little more than an offshoot of Pop art. He concludes: 'Sculpture is inappro- priate in most urban environmental settings, unless, as is rarely the case, sculptors and architects are willing and able to work together in designing aesthetically enhanced environments.'
There are several comments I should like to make. First, a lot of urban sculpture is commissioned as an after- thought to enliven an environment that looked fine at a scale of 1 : 500, but is very dull at full size. Sculptors like Dubuffet are reacting against the austerity of the com- mercial approach to architecture and attempt to revive it with frivolity. The indicting finger should point to many contemporary architects rather than to sculptors who protest at the monotony of many large cities.
Secondly, sculptors are best at maximizing chance. It is not true that sculptors are unable to react appropriately to existing settings. The element of chance that generates the artistic process is an existing built milieu. Could there be a finer sculpture/architecture dialectic than Henry Moore's bronze at Westminster, London (Fig. 1)? There
to objects . . . ' but '... is an interpretation imposed upon them by the mind'. However, when he implies that there is a clear-cut division of labor between the hemispheres of the brain, he is untenably simplistic.
Roland Fischer Maryland Psychiatric Research Center
Box 3235 Baltimore, MD 21228, U.S.A.
ENVIRONMENTAL SCULPTURE IN THE U.S.A.
Howard Conant [Leonardo 9, 33 (1976)] makes a plausible plea for a return to the concept of sculpture as 'high art'. He deplores its use as the symbolism of status, though this is not a new phenomenon, as many a Renaissance pope would have admitted in the safety of the confessional.
The crux of Conant's argument is that much contem- porary urban sculpture is trivial and little more than an offshoot of Pop art. He concludes: 'Sculpture is inappro- priate in most urban environmental settings, unless, as is rarely the case, sculptors and architects are willing and able to work together in designing aesthetically enhanced environments.'
There are several comments I should like to make. First, a lot of urban sculpture is commissioned as an after- thought to enliven an environment that looked fine at a scale of 1 : 500, but is very dull at full size. Sculptors like Dubuffet are reacting against the austerity of the com- mercial approach to architecture and attempt to revive it with frivolity. The indicting finger should point to many contemporary architects rather than to sculptors who protest at the monotony of many large cities.
Secondly, sculptors are best at maximizing chance. It is not true that sculptors are unable to react appropriately to existing settings. The element of chance that generates the artistic process is an existing built milieu. Could there be a finer sculpture/architecture dialectic than Henry Moore's bronze at Westminster, London (Fig. 1)? There
Fig. 1. Henry Moore. 'Knife Edge Two Piece', gun metal, plinth in marble, 8j x 13 x 5i ft, plinth 2.2 x 13 x 51 ft.
(Location: Abingdon Street Gardens, London.)
would hardly be a more daunting architectural background than Westminster Abbey and the Houses of Parliament, yet I find that this comparatively small piece has immeasur- ably heightened the aesthetic 'tone' of this little corner of the city.
On a quite different level there is the sculptor David Harding who works in Glenrothes, a new town in Scotland. He is employed by the town council and his influence on the appearance of the town has been remarkable. Some- times he is serious, at other times playful, as when he placed a herd of concrete hippopotamuses in and around a children's pool. An article devoted to his impact on this town would, I believe, constitute a potent antidote to Conant's despair.
Fig. 1. Henry Moore. 'Knife Edge Two Piece', gun metal, plinth in marble, 8j x 13 x 5i ft, plinth 2.2 x 13 x 51 ft.
(Location: Abingdon Street Gardens, London.)
would hardly be a more daunting architectural background than Westminster Abbey and the Houses of Parliament, yet I find that this comparatively small piece has immeasur- ably heightened the aesthetic 'tone' of this little corner of the city.
On a quite different level there is the sculptor David Harding who works in Glenrothes, a new town in Scotland. He is employed by the town council and his influence on the appearance of the town has been remarkable. Some- times he is serious, at other times playful, as when he placed a herd of concrete hippopotamuses in and around a children's pool. An article devoted to his impact on this town would, I believe, constitute a potent antidote to Conant's despair.
Fig. 1. Henry Moore. 'Knife Edge Two Piece', gun metal, plinth in marble, 8j x 13 x 5i ft, plinth 2.2 x 13 x 51 ft.
(Location: Abingdon Street Gardens, London.)
would hardly be a more daunting architectural background than Westminster Abbey and the Houses of Parliament, yet I find that this comparatively small piece has immeasur- ably heightened the aesthetic 'tone' of this little corner of the city.
On a quite different level there is the sculptor David Harding who works in Glenrothes, a new town in Scotland. He is employed by the town council and his influence on the appearance of the town has been remarkable. Some- times he is serious, at other times playful, as when he placed a herd of concrete hippopotamuses in and around a children's pool. An article devoted to his impact on this town would, I believe, constitute a potent antidote to Conant's despair.
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