Ombudsman Law

8/11/2019 Ombudsman Law

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Prosecutor #endell Barreras-!ulit. 0heir petitions challen1ed the constitutionalit of !ection 2%)& ofRepublic Act %RA& No. 344*.)

n the challen1ed Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionalit of !ection 2%)& of RA No. 344* andruled that the President has disciplinar 5urisdiction over a Deput "'buds'an and a !pecialProsecutor. 0he Court, hoever, reversed the "P rulin1 that6 %i& found on/ales 1uilt of rossNe1lect of Dut and rave Misconduct constitutin1 betraal of public trust7 and %ii& i'posed on hi'

the penalt of dis'issal.

!ulit, ho had not then been dis'issed and ho si'pl sou1ht to restrain the disciplinar proceedin1sa1ainst her, solel 8uestioned the 5urisdiction of the "P to sub5ect her to disciplinar proceedin1s. 0heCourt affir'ed the continuation of the proceedin1s a1ainst her after upholdin1 the constitutionalit of!ection 2%)& of RA No. 344*.

0he fallo of our assailed Decision reads6

#9ERE:"RE, in .R. No. +;3)<+, the decision of the "ffice of the President in "P Case No. + "-=-(3* is RE>ER!ED and !E0 A!DE. Petitioner E'ilio A. on/ales is ordered REN!0A0ED ithpa'ent of bac?a1es correspondin1 to the period of suspension effective i''ediatel, even as the"ffice of the "'buds'an is directed to proceed ith the investi1ation in connection ith the above

case a1ainst petitioner. n .R. No. +;3)<), #e A::RM the continuation of "P-DC Case No. ll-B-**< a1ainst !pecial Prosecutor #endell Barreras-!ulit for alle1ed acts and o'issions tanta'ount toculpable violation of the Constitution and a betraal of public trust, in accordance ith !ection 2%)& ofthe "'buds'an Act of +;2;.<

n vie of the Court@s rulin1, the "P filed the present 'otion for reconsideration throu1h the "ffice ofthe !olicitor eneral %"!&.

#e briefl narrate the facts that preceded the filin1 of the petitions and the present 'otion forreconsideration.

. AN0ECEDEN0!

A. on/ales@ petition %.R. No. +;3)<+&

a. Factual antecedents

"n Ma )3, )**2, Christian ala filed separate char1es ith the Philippine NationalPolice nternal Affairs !ervice %PNP-A!& and ith the Manila Cit Prosecutor@s "fficea1ainst Manila Police District !enior nspector Rolando Mendo/a and four others%Mendo/a, et al.& for robber, 1rave threat, robber extortion and phsical in5ur.(

"n Ma );, )**2, Police !enior !uperintendent Att. Clarence uinto filed anad'inistrative char1e for 1rave 'isconduct ith the National Police Co''ission

%NAP"C"M& PNP-NCRP" a1ainst Mendo/a, et al. based on the sa'e alle1ations 'adeb ala before the PNP-A!.

"n =ul ), )**2, on/ales, Deput "'buds'an for Militar and "ther a Enforce'ent"fficers %M"E"&, directed the NAP"C"M to turn over the records of Mendo/a@s caseto his office. 0he "ffice of the Re1ional Director of the NAP"C"M dul co'plied on=ul )(, )**2.3 Mendo/a, et al. filed their position papers ith on/ales, in co'plianceith his "rder.4

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Pendin1 on/ales@ action on Mendo/a, et al.@s case %on Au1ust )3, )**2&, the "ffice of theCit Prosecutor of Manila Cit dis'issed ala@s co'plaint a1ainst Mendo/a, et al. for hisfailure to substantiate his alle1ations.2 !i'ilarl, on "ctober +4, )**2, the PNP-A!reco''ended the dis'issal ithout pre5udice of the ad'inistrative case a1ainst Mendo/a,et al. for ala@s failure to prosecute.;

"n :ebruar +3, )**;, after preparin1 a draft decision on Mendo/a, et al.@s case, on/alesforarded the entire records to the "ffice of then "'buds'an Merceditas utierre/ for herrevie.+* n his draft decision, on/ales found Mendo/a, et al. 1uilt of 1rave 'isconductand i'posed on the' the penalt of dis'issal fro' the service.++

Mendo/a, et al. received a cop of the "'buds'an@s decision that approved on/ales@reco''endation on "ctober <*, )**;. Mendo/a, et al. filed a 'otion for reconsideration+)on Nove'ber , )**;, folloed b a !upple'ent to the Motion for Reconsideration.+<

"n Dece'ber +*, )**;, the M"E"-Records !ection forarded Mendo/a, et al.@s caserecords to the Cri'inal nvesti1ation, Prosecution and Ad'inistrative Bureau-M"E". "n

Dece'ber +(, )**;, the case as assi1ned to raft nvesti1ation and Prosecution "fficer%P"& Dennis arcia for revie and reco''endation.+(

P" arcia released a draft order+ to his i''ediate superior, Director Eulo1io !.Cecilio, for appropriate action on April , )*+*. Dir. Cecilio si1ned and forarded the draftorder to on/ales@ office on April )4, )*+*. on/ales revieed the draft and endorsed theorder, to1ether ith the case records, on Ma 3, )*+* for the final approval b the"'buds'an.+3

"n Au1ust )<, )*+*, pendin1 final action b the "'buds'an on Mendo/a, et al.@s case,Mendo/a hi5ac?ed a tourist bus and held the )+ forei1n tourists and the four :ilipino tour

assistants on board as hosta1es. #hile the 1overn'ent exerted earnest atte'pts topeacefull resolve the hosta1e-ta?in1, it ended tra1icall, resultin1 in the deaths ofMendo/a and several others on board the hi5ac?ed bus.

n the after'ath, President Beni1no C. A8uino directed the Depart'ent of =ustice andthe Depart'ent of nterior and ocal overn'ent to conduct a 5oint thorou1h investi1ationof the incident. 0he to depart'ents issued =oint Depart'ent "rder No. *+-)*+*, creatin1an ncident nvesti1ation and Revie Co''ittee %RC&.

n its !epte'ber +3, )*+* :irst Report, the RC found the "'buds'an and on/alesaccountable for their 1ross ne1li1ence and 1rave 'isconduct in handlin1 the case a1ainstMendo/a.+4 0he RC stated that the "'buds'an and on/ales@ failure to pro'ptlresolve Mendo/a@s 'otion for reconsideration, ithout 5ustification and despite repeatedpleas xxx precipitated the desperate resort to hosta1e-ta?in1.+2 0he RC reco''endedthe referral of its findin1s to the "P for further deter'ination of possible ad'inistrativeoffenses and for the initiation of the proper ad'inistrative proceedin1s.+;

Accordin1l, on "ctober +, )*+*, on/ales as for'all char1ed before the "P for rossNe1lect of Dut andor nefficienc in the Perfor'ance of "fficial Dut and forMisconduct in "ffice.)*





























b. The OP ruling

"n March <+, )*++, the "P found on/ales 1uilt as char1ed and dis'issed hi' fro' theservice.)+ Accordin1 to the "P, the inordinate and un5ustified dela in the resolution ofFMendo/a@sG Motion for Reconsideration FHthat spanned for nine %;& lon1 'onths@G xxxa'ounted to 1ross ne1lect of dut and constituted a fla1rant disre1ard of the "ffice of the

"'buds'an@s on Rules of Procedure.))

c. 0he Petition

on/ales posited in his petition that the "P has no ad'inistrative disciplinar 5urisdictionover a Deput "'buds'an. Inder !ection )+ of RA No. 344*, it is the "'buds'an hoexercises ad'inistrative disciplinar 5urisdiction over the Deput "'buds'an.

"n the 'erits, on/ales ar1ued that his office received the draft order fro' P" arciaon April )4, )*+*. "n Ma 3, )*+*, he co'pleted his revie of the draft, approved it, andtrans'itted it to the "ffice of the "'buds'an for final approval. !ince the draft order on

Mendo/a@s 'otion for reconsideration had to under1o different levels of preparation,revie and approval, the period it too? to resolve the 'otion could not be un5ustified, sincehe hi'self acted on the draft order onl ithin nine %;& calendars das fro' his receipt ofthe order.)<

B. !ulit@s petition %.R. No. +;3)<)&

n April )**, the "ffice of the "'buds'an char1ed Ma5or eneral Carlos :. arcia andseveral others, before the !andi1anbaan, ith plunder and 'one launderin1. "n Ma 4,)**4, arcia filed an Ir1ent Petition for Bail hich the prosecution opposed. 0he!andi1anbaan denied arcia$s ur1ent petition for bail on =anuar 4, )*+*, in vie of the

stren1th of the prosecution@s evidence a1ainst arcia.

"n :ebruar ), )*+*, the "ffice of the "'buds'an, throu1h !ulit and her prosecutorialstaff, entered into a plea bar1ainin1 a1ree'ent %A1ree'ent& ith arcia.)( arcia thereba1reed to6 %i& ithdra his plea of not 1uilt to the char1e of plunder and enter a plea of1uilt to the lesser offense of indirect briber7 and %ii& ithdra his plea of not 1uilt to thechar1e of 'one launderin1 and enter a 1uilt plea to the lesser offense of facilitatin1'one launderin1. n exchan1e, he ould conve to the 1overn'ent his onership, ri1htsand other interests over the real and personal properties enu'erated in the A1ree'ent andthe ban? deposits alle1ed in the infor'ation.)

0he !andi1anbaan approved the A1ree'ent on Ma (, )*+*)3 based on the parties@sub'itted =oint Motion for Approval.)4

0he apparent one-sidedness of the A1ree'ent dre public outra1e and pro'pted theCo''ittee on =ustice of the 9ouse of Representatives to conduct an investi1ation. Afterpublic hearin1s, the Co''ittee found that !ulit, her deputies and assistants co''ittedculpable violations of the Constitution and betraal of public trust J 1rounds for re'ovalunder !ection 2%)& of RA No. 344*.)2 0he Co''ittee reco''ended to the President thedis'issal fro' the service of !ulit and the filin1 of appropriate char1es a1ainst her deputies



















and assistants before the appropriate 1overn'ent office.

Accordin1l, the "P initiated an ad'inistrative disciplinar proceedin1 a1ainst !ulit.); "nMarch )(, )*++, !ulit filed her #ritten Explanation, 8uestionin1 the "P@s 5urisdiction. <*0he 8uestion of 5urisdiction notithstandin1, the "P set the case for preli'inarinvesti1ation on April +, )*++, pro'ptin1 !ulit to see? relief fro' this Court.

. C"IR0@! RIN

"n 'otion for reconsideration and further reflection, the Court votes to 1rant on/ales@petition and to declare !ection 2%)& of RA No. 344* unconstitutional ith respect to the"ffice of the "'buds'an. %As the full explanation of the Court@s vote describes belo, thisconclusion does not appl to !ulit as the 1rant of independence is solel ith respect to the"ffice of the "'buds'an hich does not include the "ffice of the !pecial Prosecutorunder the Constitution. 0he prevailin1 rulin1 on this latter point is e'bodied in theConcurrin1 and Dissentin1 "pinion of =. Marvic Mario >ictor eonen&.

A. Preli'inar considerations6

a. Absence of 'otion for reconsideration on the part of the petitioners

At the outset, the Court notes that on/ales and !ulit did not file a 'otion forreconsideration of the Court@s !epte'ber (, )*+) Decision7 onl the "P, throu1h the "!,'oved for the reconsideration of our rulin1 reinstatin1 on/ales.

0his o'ission, hoever, poses no obstacle for the Court@s revie of its rulin1 on the holecase since a serious constitutional 8uestion has been raised and is one of the underlin1bases for the validit or invalidit of the presidential action. f the President does not havean constitutional authorit to discipline a Deput "'buds'an andor a !pecial Prosecutor

in the first place, then an rulin1 on the le1al correctness of the "P@s decision on the 'eritsill be an e'pt one.

n other ords, since the validit of the "P@s decision on the 'erits of the dis'issal isinextricabl anchored on the final and correct rulin1 on the constitutional issue, the holecase J includin1 the constitutional issue J re'ains alive for the Court@s consideration on'otion for reconsideration.

b. 0he 5usticiabilit of the constitutional

issue raised in the petitions

#e clarif, too, that the issue of hether a Deput "'buds'an 'a be sub5ected to thead'inistrative disciplinar 5urisdiction of the President %concurrentl ith that of the"'buds'an& is a 5usticiable J not a political J 8uestion. A 5usticiable 8uestion is one hichis inherentl susceptible of bein1 decided on 1rounds reco1ni/ed b la,<+ as here thecourt finds that there are constitutionall-i'posed li'its on the exercise of the poersconferred on a political branch of the 1overn'ent.<)

n resolvin1 the petitions, e do not in8uire into the isdo' of the Con1ress@ choice to











1rant concurrent disciplinar authorit to the President. "ur in8uir is li'ited to hethersuch statutor 1rant violates the Constitution, particularl hether !ection 2%)& of RA No.344* violates the core constitutional principle of the independence of the "ffice of the"'buds'an as expressed in !ection , Art. K of the Constitution.

0o be sure, neither the Executive nor the e1islative can create the poer that !ection 2%)&

of RA No. 344* 1rants here the Constitution confers none. #hen exercised authorit isdran fro' a vacuu', 'ore so hen the authorit runs counter to a core constitutionalprinciple and constitutional intents, the Court is dut-bound to intervene under the poersand duties 1ranted and i'posed on it b Article > of the Constitution.

B. 0he Deput "'buds'an6 Constitutional ssue

a. 0he Philippine "'buds'an

Prior to the +;4< Constitution, past presidents established several "'buds'an-li?ea1encies to serve as the people$s 'ediu' for airin1 1rievances and for direct redress a1ainst

abuses and 'isconduct in the 1overn'ent. Ilti'atel, hoever, these a1encies failed tofull reali/e their ob5ective for lac? of the political independence necessar for the effectiveperfor'ance of their function as 1overn'ent critic.<<

t as under the +;4< Constitution that the "ffice of the "'buds'an beca'e aconstitutionall-'andated office to 1ive it political independence and ade8uate poers toenforce its 'andate. Pursuant to the +;4< Constitution, President :erdinand Marcosenacted Presidential Decree %PD& No. +(24, as a'ended b PD No. +3*4 and PD No. +3<*,creatin1 the "ffice of the "'buds'an to be ?non as 0anodbaan. t as tas?edprincipall to investi1ate, on co'plaint or 'otu proprio, an ad'inistrative act of anad'inistrative a1enc, includin1 an 1overn'ent-oned or controlled corporation. #hen

the "ffice of the 0anodbaan as reor1ani/ed in +;4;, the poers previousl vested in the!pecial Prosecutor ere transferred to the 0anodbaan hi'self. 9e as 1iven the exclusiveauthorit to conduct preli'inar investi1ation of all cases co1ni/able b the!andi1anbaan, file the correspondin1 infor'ation, and control the prosecution of thesecases.<(

#ith the advent of the +;24 Constitution, a ne "ffice of the "'buds'an as created bconstitutional fiat. Inli?e in the +;4< Constitution, its independence as expressl andconstitutionall 1uaranteed. ts ob5ectives are to enforce the state polic in !ection )4,Article < and the standard of accountabilit in public service under !ection +, Article Kof the +;24 Constitution. 0hese provisions read6

!ection )4. 0he !tate shall 'aintain honest and inte1rit in the public service and ta?epositive and effective 'easures a1ainst 1raft and corruption.

!ection +. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and e'ploees 'ust, at all ti'es,be accountable to the people, serve the' ith ut'ost responsibilit, inte1rit, loalt, andefficienc7 act ith patriotis' and 5ustice, and lead 'odest lives.

Inder !ection +), Article K of the +;24 Constitution, the "ffice of the "'buds'an is









envisioned to be the protector of the people a1ainst the inept, abusive, and corrupt in theovern'ent, to function essentiall as a co'plaints and action bureau.<3 0hisconstitutional vision of a Philippine "'buds'an practicall intends to 'a?e the"'buds'an an authorit to directl chec? and 1uard a1ainst the ills, abuses and excessesof the bureaucrac. Pursuant to !ection +<%2&, Article K of the +;24 Constitution, Con1ressenacted RA No. 344* to enable it to further reali/e the vision of the Constitution. !ection

)+ of RA No. 344* provides6

!ection )+. "fficial !ub5ect to Disciplinar Authorit7 Exceptions. L 0he "ffice of the"'buds'an shall have disciplinar authorit over all elective and appointive officials ofthe overn'ent and its subdivisions, instru'entalities and a1encies, includin1 Me'bers ofthe Cabinet, local 1overn'ent, 1overn'ent-oned or controlled corporations and theirsubsidiaries, except over officials ho 'a be re'oved onl b i'peach'ent or overMe'bers of Con1ress, and the =udiciar. Fe'phasis ours, italics suppliedG

As the "'buds'an is expected to be an activist atch'an,<4 the Court has upheld itsactions, althou1h not s8uarel fallin1 under the broad poers 1ranted it b the Constitution

and b RA No. 344*, if these actions are reasonabl in line ith its official function andconsistent ith the la and the Constitution.<2

0he "'buds'an@s broad investi1ative and disciplinar poers include all acts of'alfeasance, 'isfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, includin1 Me'bers ofthe Cabinet and ?e Executive officers, durin1 their tenure. 0o support these broad poers,the Constitution sa it fit to insulate the "ffice of the "'buds'an fro' the pressures andinfluence of officialdo' and partisan politics and fro' fear of external reprisal b 'a?in1 itan independent office. !ection ,

Article K of the Constitution expressed this intent, as follos6

!ection . 0here is hereb created the independent "ffice of the "'buds'an, co'posed ofthe "'buds'an to be ?non as 0anodbaan, one overall Deput and at least one Deputeach for u/on, >isaas, and Mindanao. A separate Deput for the 'ilitar establish'ent'a li?eise be appointed. Fe'phasis oursG

iven the scope of its disciplinar authorit, the "ffice of the "'buds'an is a verpoerful 1overn'ent constitutional a1enc that is considered a notch above other1rievance-handlin1 investi1ative bodies.<; t has poers, both constitutional and statutor,that are co''ensurate ith its dauntin1 tas? of enforcin1 accountabilit of publicofficers.(*

b. ndependence of constitutional bodies vis-a-vis the "'buds'an@s independence

Inder the Constitution, several constitutional bodies have been expressl labeled asindependent.(+ 0he extent of the independence en5oed b these constitutional bodieshoever varies and is to be interpreted ith to si1nificant considerations in 'ind6 first,the functions perfor'ed or the poers involved in a 1iven case7 and second, consistenc ofan alloable interference to these poers and functions, ith the principle of chec?s andbalances.


















Notabl, the independence en5oed b the "ffice of the "'buds'an and b theConstitutional Co''issions shares certain characteristics J the do not oe their existenceto an act of Con1ress, but are created b the Constitution itself7 additionall, the all en5ofiscal autono'. n 1eneral ter's, the fra'ers of the Constitution intended that theseindependent bodies be insulated fro' political pressure to the extent that the absence ofindependence ould result in the i'pair'ent of their core functions.

n Ben1/on v. Drilon,() involvin1 the fiscal autono' of the =udiciar, e ruled a1ainstthe interference that the President 'a brin1 and 'aintained that the independence and theflexibilit of the =udiciar, the Constitutional Co''issions and the "ffice of the"'buds'an are crucial to our le1al sste'.

0he =udiciar, the Constitutional Co''issions, and the "'buds'an 'ust have theindependence and flexibilit needed in the dischar1e of their constitutional duties. 0hei'position of restrictions and constraints on the 'anner the independent constitutionaloffices allocate and utili/e the funds appropriated for their operations is anathe'a to fiscalautono' and violative not onl the express 'andate of the Constitution but especiall as

re1ards the !upre'e Court, of the independence and separation of poers upon hich theentire fabric of our constitutional sste' is based.

0he constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Co''issions@ need forindependence. n the deliberations of the +;4< Constitution, the dele1ates a'ended the+;< Constitution b providin1 for a constitutionall-created Civil !ervice Co''ission,instead of one created b la, on the pre'ise that the effectivit of this bod is dependenton its freedo' fro' the tentacles of politics.(< n a si'ilar 'anner, the deliberations of the+;24 Constitution on the Co''ission on Audit hi1hli1hted the develop'ents in the pastConstitutions 1eared toards insulatin1 the Co''ission on Audit fro' politicalpressure.((

Notabl, the Constitution also created an independent Co''ission on 9u'an Ri1hts,althou1h it en5os a lesser de1ree of independence since it is not 1ranted fiscal autono' inthe 'anner fiscal autono' is 1ranted to the constitutional co''issions. 0he lac? of fiscalautono' notithstandin1, the fra'ers of the +;24 Constitution clearl expressed theirdesire to ?eep the Co''ission independent fro' the executive branch and other politicalleaders6

MR. M"N!"D. #e see the 'erits of the ar1u'ents of Co''issioner Rodri1o. f eexplain to hi' our concept, he can advise us on ho to reconcile his position ith ours.0he position of the co''ittee is that e need a bod that ould be able to or? andcooperate ith the executive because the Co''issioner is ri1ht. Man of the servicesneeded b this co''ission ould need not onl the cooperation of the executive branch ofthe 1overn'ent but also of the 5udicial branch of 1overn'ent. 0his is 1oin1 to be aper'anent constitutional co''ission over ti'e. #e also ant a co''ission to functioneven under the orst circu'stance hen the executive 'a not be ver cooperative.9oever, the 8uestion in our 'ind is6 Can it still function durin1 that ti'e 9ence, e areillin1 to accept su11estions fro' Co''issioner Rodri1o on ho to reconcile this. #ereali/e the need for coordination and cooperation. #e also ould li?e to build in so'esafe1uards that it ill not be rendered useless b an uncooperative executive.










x x x x

MR. ARCA. xxx >er often, hen international co''issions or or1ani/ations on hu'anri1hts 1o to a countr, the 'ost credible or1ani/ations are independent hu'an ri1hts bodies.>er often these are private or1ani/ations, 'an of hich are prosecuted, such as those efind in 'an countries in atin A'erica. n fact, hat e are proposin1 is an independent

bod on hu'an ri1hts, hich ould provide 1overn'ents ith credibilit precisel becauseit is independent of the present ad'inistration. #hatever it sas on the hu'an ri1htssituation ill be credible because it is not sub5ect to pressure or control fro' the presentpolitical leadership.

!econdl, e all ?no ho political fortunes co'e and 1o. 0hose ho are in poeresterda are in opposition toda and those ho are in poer toda 'a be in theopposition to'orro. 0herefore, if e have a Co''ission on 9u'an Ri1hts that ouldinvesti1ate and 'a?e sure that the ri1hts of each one is protected, then e shall have a bodthat could stand up to an poer, to defend the ri1hts of individuals a1ainst arrest, unfairtrial, and so on.(

0hese deliberative considerations abundantl sho that the independent constitutionalco''issions have been consistentl intended b the fra'ers to be independent fro'executive control or supervision or an for' of political influence. At least insofar as thesebodies are concerned, 5urisprudence is not scarce on ho the independence 1ranted tothese bodies prevents presidential interference.

n Brillantes, =r. v. orac,(3 e e'phasi/ed that the Constitutional Co''issions, hichhave been characteri/ed under the Constitution as independent, are not under the controlof the President, even if the dischar1e functions that are executive in nature. 0he Courtdeclared as unconstitutional the President@s act of te'poraril appointin1 the respondent inthat case as Actin1 Chair'an of the Co'elec hoever ell-'eanin1(4 it 'i1ht havebeen.

n Bautista v. !enator !alon1a,(2 the Court cate1oricall stated that the tenure of theco''issioners of the independent Co''ission on 9u'an Ri1hts could not be placedunder the discretionar poer of the President6

ndeed, the Court finds it extre'el difficult to conceptuali/e ho an office conceived andcreated b the Constitution to be independent J as the Co''ission on 9u'an Ri1hts J andvested ith the delicate and vital functions of investi1atin1 violations of hu'an ri1hts,pinpointin1 responsibilit and reco''endin1 sanctions as ell as re'edial 'easurestherefor, can trul function ith independence and effectiveness, hen the tenure in officeof its Chair'an and Me'bers is 'ade dependent on the pleasure of the President.Executive "rder No. +3<-A, bein1 antithetical to the constitutional 'andate ofindependence for the Co''ission on 9u'an Ri1hts has to be declared unconstitutional.

A1ain, in Att. Macalintal v. Co'elec,(; the Court considered even the 'ere revie of therules of the Co''ission on Elections b Con1ress a tra'plin1 of the constitutional'andate of independence of this bod. "bviousl, the 'ere revie of rules placesconsiderabl less pressure on a constitutional bod than the Executive@s poer to discipline














and re'ove ?e officials of the "ffice of the "'buds'an, et the Court struc? don thela as unconstitutional.

0he ?ind of independence en5oed b the "ffice of the "'buds'an certainl cannot beinferior J but is si'ilar in de1ree and ?ind J to the independence si'ilarl 1uaranteed bthe Constitution to the Constitutional Co''issions since all these offices fill the political

interstices of a republican de'ocrac that are crucial to its existence and properfunctionin1.*

c. Section 8(2) of RA No. 6!"esting disci#linar$ authorit$in the President o"er the %e#ut$ O&buds&an "iolatesthe inde#endence of the Officeof the O&buds&an and is thusunconstitutional

"ur discussions, particularl the Court@s expressed caution a1ainst presidential interferenceith the constitutional co''issions, on one hand, and those expressed b the fra'ers ofthe +;24 Constitution, on the other, in protectin1 the independence of the ConstitutionalCo''issions, spea? for the'selves as overhel'in1 reasons to invalidate !ection 2%)& ofRA No. 344* for violatin1 the independence of the "ffice of the "'buds'an.

n 'ore concrete ter's, e rule that sub5ectin1 the Deput "'buds'an to discipline andre'oval b the President, hose on alter e1os and officials in the Executive Depart'entare sub5ect to the "'buds'an@s disciplinar authorit, cannot but seriousl place at ris? theindependence of the "ffice of the "'buds'an itself. 0he "ffice of the "'buds'an, bexpress constitutional 'andate, includes its ?e officials, all of the' tas?ed to support the"'buds'an in carrin1 out her 'andate. Infortunatel, intrusion upon theconstitutionall-1ranted independence is hat !ection 2%)& of RA No. 344* exactl did. Bso doin1, the la directl collided not onl ith the independence that the Constitution1uarantees to the "ffice of the "'buds'an, but inevitabl ith the principle of chec?s andbalances that the creation of an "'buds'an office see?s to revitali/e.

#hat is true for the "'buds'an 'ust be e8uall and necessaril true for her Deputies hoact as a1ents of the "'buds'an in the perfor'ance of their duties. 0he "'buds'an canhardl be expected to place her co'plete trust in her subordinate officials ho are not asindependent as she is, if onl because the are sub5ect to pressures and controls external toher "ffice. 0his need for co'plete trust is true in an ideal settin1 and truer still in a oun1de'ocrac li?e the Philippines here 1raft and corruption is still a 'a5or proble' for the1overn'ent. :or these reasons, !ection 2%)& of RA No. 344* %providin1 that the President'a re'ove a Deput "'buds'an& should be declared void.

0he deliberations of the Constitutional Co''ission on the independence of the"'buds'an full support this position. Co''issioner :loren/ Re1alado of theConstitutional Co''ission expressed his apprehension that an for' of presidentialcontrol over the "ffice of the "'buds'an ould di'inish its independence.+ 0hefolloin1 exchan1es beteen Co''issioners Blas "ple and Christian Monsod furtherreveal the constitutional intent to ?eep the "ffice of the "'buds'an independent fro' the







President6

MR. "PE. xxx

Ma direct a 8uestion to the Co''ittee xxx F#Gill the Co''ittee consider later ana'end'ent xxx, b a of desi1natin1 the office of the "'buds'an as a constitutional

ar' for 1ood 1overn'ent, efficienc of the public service and the inte1rit of the Presidentof the Philippines, instead of creatin1 another a1enc in a ?ind of ad'inistrative li'bohich ould be accountable to no one on the pretext that it is a constitutional bod

MR. M"N!"D. 0he Co''ittee discussed that durin1 our co''ittee deliberations andhen e prepared the report, it as the opinion of the Co''ittee L and believe it still is L that it 'a not contribute to the effectiveness of this office of the "'buds'an preciselbecause 'an of the culprits in inefficienc, in5ustice and i'propriet are in the executivedepart'ent. 0herefore, as e sa the ron1 i'ple'entation of the 0anodbaan hich asunder the tre'endous influence of the President, it as an ineffectual bod and asreduced to the function of a special fiscal. 0he hole purpose of our proposal is precisel to

separate those functions and to produce a vehicle that ill 1ive true 'eanin1 to the conceptof "'buds'an. 0herefore, e re1ret that e cannot accept the proposition.)

0he state'ents 'ade b Co''issioner Monsod e'phasi/ed a ver lo1ical principle6 theExecutive poer to re'ove and discipline ?e officials of the "ffice of the "'buds'an, orto exercise an poer over the', ould result in an absurd situation herein the "ffice ofthe "'buds'an is 1iven the dut to ad5udicate on the inte1rit and co'petence of the verpersons ho can re'ove or suspend its 'e'bers. E8uall relevant is the i'pression thatould be 1iven to the public if the rule ere otherise. A co'plainant ith a 1rievancea1ainst a hi1h-ran?in1 official of the Executive, ho appears to en5o the President@s favor,ould be discoura1ed fro' approachin1 the "'buds'an ith his co'plaint7 theco'plainant@s i'pression %even if 'isplaced&, that the "'buds'an ould be susceptible topolitical pressure, cannot be avoided. 0o be sure, such an i'pression ould erode theconstitutional intent of creatin1 an "ffice of the "'buds'an as cha'pion of the peoplea1ainst corruption and bureaucrac.

d. The &utual'#rotection argu&ent forcrafting Section 8(2)of RA No. 6!

n craftin1 !ection 2%)& of RA No. 344*, Con1ress apparentl addressed the concern that alac? of an external chec? a1ainst the Deput "'buds'an ould result in 'utual protectionbeteen the "'buds'an and her Deputies.

#hile the precedin1 discussion alread suffices to address this concern, it should be addedthat this concern stands on sha? 1rounds since it i1nores the existin1 chec?s and balancesalread in place. "n the one hand, the "'buds'an@s Deputies cannot protect the"'buds'an because she is sub5ect to the i'peach'ent poer of Con1ress. "n the otherhand, the "'buds'an@s atte'pt to cover up the 'isdeeds of her Deputies can be8uestioned before the Court on appeal or certiorari. 0he sa'e atte'pt can li?eise sub5ecther to i'peach'ent.





0he 5udicial recourse available is onl consistent ith the nature of the !upre'e Court as anon-political independent bod 'andated b the Constitution to settle 5udicial and 8uasi- 5udicial disputes, hose 5ud1es and e'ploees are not sub5ect to the disciplinar authoritof the "'buds'an and hose neutralit ould be less 8uestionable. 0he Me'bers of theCourt the'selves 'a be sub5ected to the i'peach'ent poer of Con1ress.

n these li1hts, the appeal, if an, of the 'utual protection ar1u'ent beco'es distinctli'plausible. At the sa'e ti'e, the Court re'ains consistent ith its established rulin1s -that the independence 1ranted to the Constitutional Co''issions bars an undueinterference fro' either the Executive or Con1ress J and is in full accord ithconstitutional intent.

e. ongress #o*er deter&ines the&anner and causes for the re&o"alof non'i&#eachable officers is not acarte blanch authorit$

Inder !ection ), Article K of the +;24 Constitution,< Con1ress is e'poered todeter'ine the 'odes of re'oval fro' office of all public officers and e'ploees except thePresident, the >ice-President, the Me'bers of the !upre'e Court, the Me'bers of theConstitutional Co''issions, and the "'buds'an, ho are all i'peachable officials.

0he intent of the fra'ers of the Constitution in providin1 that FaGll other public officersand e'ploees 'a be re'oved fro' office as provided b la, but not b i'peach'entin the second sentence of !ection ), Article K is to prevent Con1ress fro' extendin1 the'ore strin1ent rule of re'oval onl b i'peach'ent to favored public officers.(Inderstandabl so, i'peach'ent is the 'ost difficult and cu'berso'e 'ode of re'ovin1 apublic officer fro' office. t is, b its nature, a sui 1eneris politico-le1al process thatsi1nals the need for a 5udicious and careful handlin1 as shon b the process re8uired toinitiate the proceedin173 the one-ear li'itation or bar for its initiation74 the li'ited1rounds for i'peach'ent72 the defined instru'entalit 1iven the poer to tri'peach'ent cases7; and the nu'ber of votes re8uired for a findin1 of 1uilt.3* All thesear1ue a1ainst the extension of this re'oval 'echanis' beond those 'entioned in theConstitution.

"n the practical side, our nation has itnessed the co'plications and proble's ani'peach'ent proceedin1 entails, thus 5ustifin1 its li'ited application onl to the officialsoccupin1 the hi1hest echelons of responsibilit in our 1overn'ent. 0o na'e a fe, so'eof the ne1ative practical effects of i'peach'ent are6 it stalls le1islative or?7 it is anexpensive process in ter's of the cost of prosecution alone7 and, 'ore i'portantl, it isinherentl divisive of the nation.3+ 0hus, in a cost-benefit analsis of adoptin1i'peach'ent as a 'echanis', li'itin1 Con1ress@ poer to otherise le1islate on the'atter is far 'ore advanta1eous to the countr.

t is in these li1hts that the second sentence in !ection ), Article K of the +;24 Constitutionshould be read. Contrar to the i'plied vie of the 'inorit, in no a can this provisionbe re1arded as blan?et authorit for Con1ress to provide for an 1round of re'oval itdee's fit. #hile the 'anner and cause of re'oval are left to con1ressional deter'ination,this 'ust still be consistent ith constitutional 1uarantees and principles, na'el6 the ri1ht

























to procedural and substantive due process7 the constitutional 1uarantee of securit oftenure7 the principle of separation of poers7 and the principle of chec?s and balances.3)

n short, the authorit 1ranted b the Constitution to Con1ress to provide for the 'annerand cause of re'oval of all other public officers and e'ploees does not 'ean thatCon1ress can i1nore the basic principles and precepts established b the Constitution.

n the sa'e 'anner, the con1ressional deter'ination of the identit of the disciplinarauthorit is not a blan?et authorit for Con1ress to repose it on ho'soever Con1resschooses ithout runnin1 afoul of the independence en5oed b the "ffice of the"'buds'an and ithout disruptin1 the delicate chec? and balance 'echanis' under theConstitution. Properl vieed fro' this perspective, the core constitutional principle ofindependence is observed and an possible absurdit resultin1 fro' a contrarinterpretation is avoided. n other ords, hile the Constitution itself vested Con1ress iththe poer to deter'ine the 'anner and cause of re'oval of all non-i'peachable officials,this poer 'ust be interpreted consistent ith the core constitutional principle ofindependence of the "ffice of the "'buds'an. "ur observation in Macalintal v.

Co'elec3< is apt6

0he a'bit of le1islative poer under Article > of the Constitution is circu'scribed bother constitutional provisions. "ne such provision is !ection + of Article K-A of the +;24Constitution ordainin1 that constitutional co''issions such as the C"MEEC shall beindependent.

#hile one 'a ar1ue that the 1rounds for i'peach'ent under !ection 2%)& of RA No. 344*is intended as a 'easure of protection for the Deput "'buds'an and !pecial Prosecutor J since these 1rounds are not intended to cover all ?inds of official ron1doin1 and plainerrors of 5ud1'ent - this ar1u'ent seriousl overloo?s the erosion of the independence ofthe "ffice of the "'buds'an that it creates. 0he 'ere fact that a statutoril-created sordof Da'ocles han1s over the Deput "'buds'an@s head, b itself, opens up all the channelsfor external pressures and influence of officialdo' and partisan politics. 0he fear ofexternal reprisal fro' the ver office he is to chec? for excesses and abuses defeats the verpurpose of 1rantin1 independence to the "ffice of the "'buds'an.

0hat a 5udicial re'ed is available %to set aside dis'issals that do not confor' to the hi1hstandard re8uired in deter'inin1 hether a Deput "'buds'an co''itted an i'peachableoffense& and that the President@s poer of re'oval is li'ited to specified 1rounds aredis'all inade8uate hen balanced ith the constitutional principle of independence. 0he'ere filin1 of an ad'inistrative case a1ainst the Deput "'buds'an and the !pecialProsecutor before the "P can alread result in their suspension and can interrupt theperfor'ance of their functions, in violation of !ection +), Article K of the Constitution.#ith onl one ter' alloed under !ection ++, a Deput "'buds'an or !pecial Prosecutor,if re'ovable b the President, can be reduced to the ver sa'e ineffective "ffice of the"'buds'an that the fra'ers had foreseen and carefull tried to avoid b 'a?in1 theseoffices independent constitutional bodies.

At an rate, even assu'in1 that the "P has disciplinar authorit over the Deput"'buds'an, its decision findin1 on/ales 1uilt of ross Ne1lect of Dut and raveMisconduct constitutin1 betraal of public trust is patentl erroneous. 0he "P@s decision







perfectl illustrates h the re8uire'ent of i'peach'ent-1rounds in !ection 2%)& of RANo. 344* cannot be considered, even at a 'ini'u', a 'easure of protection of theindependence of the "ffice of the "'buds'an.

C. 0he Deput "'buds'an6 0he Dis'issal ssue

a. The Office of the Presidentsfinding of gross negligencehas no legal and factual leg tostand on

0he "P@s decision found on/ales 1uilt of ross Ne1lect of Dut and of raveMisconduct. 0he assailed Decision of the "P reads6

Ipon consideration of the :irst Report, the evidence and alle1ations of respondent Deput"'buds'an hi'self, and other docu'entar evidence 1athered, this "ffice finds that theinordinate and un5ustified dela in the resolution of Captain Mendo/a@s Motion for

Reconsideration ti'el filed on Nove'ber )**; xxx a'ounted to 1ross ne1lect of dutandor inefficienc in the perfor'ance of official dut.3(

b. No gross neglect of dut$ or inefficienc$

et us a1ain briefl recall the facts.

+. Nove'ber , )**; - Mendo/a filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of the"'buds'an,3 hich as folloed b a !upple'ent to the Motion for Reconsideration733

). Dece'ber +(, )**;34 - P" arcia, ho as assi1ned to revie these 'otions and

'a?e his reco''endation for the appropriate action, received the records of the case7

<. April , )*+* J P" arcia released a draft order to be revieed b his i''ediatesuperior, Dir. Cecilio732

(. April )4, )*+* J Dir. Cecilio si1ned and forarded to on/ales this draft order73;

. Ma 3, )*+* %or nine das after the records ere forarded to on/ales& J on/alesendorsed the draft order for the final approval of the "'buds'an.4*

Clearl, hen Mendo/a hi5ac?ed the tourist bus on Au1ust )<, )*+*, the records of the case

ere alread pendin1 before "'buds'an utierre/.

ross ne1li1ence refers to ne1li1ence characteri/ed b the ant of even the sli1htest care,actin1 or o'ittin1 to act in a situation here there is a dut to act, not inadvertentl butillfull and intentionall, ith a conscious indifference to conse8uences insofar as otherpersons 'a be affected. n the case of public officials, there is 1ross ne1li1ence hen abreach of dut is fla1rant and palpable.4+

on/ales cannot be 1uilt of 1ross ne1lect of dut andor inefficienc since he acted on the



















case forarded to hi' ithin nine das. n findin1 on/ales 1uilt, the "P4) relied on!ection 2, Rule of Ad'inistrative "rder No. 4 %or the Rules of Procedure of the "fficeof the "'buds'an, series of +;;*, as a'ended& in rulin1 that on/ales should have actedon Mendo/a@s Motion for Reconsideration ithin five das6

!ection 2. Motion for reconsideration or reinvesti1ation6 rounds J #henever alloable, a

'otion for reconsideration or reinvesti1ation 'a onl be entertained if filed ithin ten%+*& das fro' receipt of the decision or order b the part on the basis of an of thefolloin1 1rounds6

a& Ne evidence had been discovered hich 'ateriall affects the order, directive ordecision7

b& rave errors of facts or las or serious irre1ularities have been co''itted pre5udicial tothe interest of the 'ovant.

"nl one 'otion for reconsideration or reinvesti1ation shall be alloed, and the 9earin1

"fficer shall resolve the sa'e ithin five %& das fro' the date of sub'ission forresolution. Fe'phasis and underscore oursG

Even if e consider this provision to be 'andator, the period it re8uires cannot appl toon/ales since he is a Deput "'buds'an hose obli1ation is to revie the case7 he is notsi'pl a 9earin1 "fficer tas?ed ith the initial resolution of the 'otion. n !ection 3 ofAd'inistrative "rder No. 4 on the resolution of the case and sub'ission of the proposeddecision, the period for resolvin1 the case does not cover the period ithin hich it shouldbe revieed6

!ection 3. Rendition of decision. J Not later than thirt %<*& das after the case is declared

sub'itted for resolution, the 9earin1 "fficer shall sub'it a proposed decision containin1his findin1s and reco''endation for the approval of the "'buds'an. !aid proposeddecision shall be revieed b the Directors, Assistant "'buds'en and Deput"'buds'en concerned. #ith respect to lo ran?in1 public officials, the Deput"'buds'an concerned shall be the approvin1 authorit. Ipon approval, copies thereofshall be served upon the parties and the head of the office or a1enc of hich therespondent is an official or e'ploee for his infor'ation and co'pliance ith theappropriate directive contained therein. Fitalics and e'phases suppliedG

0hus, the "P@s rulin1 that on/ales had been 1rossl ne1li1ent for ta?in1 nine das, insteadof five das, to revie a case as totall baseless.

c. No actionable failure to su#er"ise subordinates

0he "P@s clai's that on/ales could have supervised his subordinates to pro'ptl act onMendo/a@s 'otion and apprised the 0anodbaan of the ur1enc of resolvin1 the sa'e aresi'ilarl 1roundless.

0he "ffice of the "'buds'an is not a corner office in our bureaucrac. t handlesnu'erous cases that involve the potential loss of e'plo'ent of 'an other public






e'ploees. #e cannot conclusivel state, as the "P appears to su11est, that Mendo/a@scase should have been prioriti/ed over other si'ilar cases.

0he Court has alread ta?en 5udicial notice of the stead strea' of cases reachin1 the"ffice of the "'buds'an.4< 0his consideration certainl 'ilitates a1ainst the "!@sobservation that there as a 1rossl inordinate and inexcusable dela 4( on the part of

on/ales.

E8uall i'portant, the constitutional 1uarantee of speed disposition of cases before,a'on1 others, 8uasi-5udicial bodies,4 li?e the "ffice of the "'buds'an, is itself a relativeconcept.43 0hus, the dela, if an, 'ust be 'easured in this ob5ective constitutional sense.Infortunatel, because of the ver statutor 1rounds relied upon b the "P in dis'issin1on/ales, the political and, perhaps, practical considerations 1ot the better of hat isle1al and constitutional.

0he facts do not sho that on/ales@ subordinates had in an a been 1rossl ne1li1ent intheir or?. #hile P" arcia revieed the case and drafted the order for 'ore than three

'onths, it is noteorth that he had not drafted the initial decision and, therefore, had torevie the case for the first ti'e.44 Even the "'buds'an herself could not be faulted foractin1 on a case ithin four 'onths, 1iven the a'ount of cases that her office handles.

0he point is that these are not inordinatel lon1 periods for the or? involved6 exa'inationof the records, research on the pertinent las and 5urisprudence, and exercise of le1al 5ud1'ent and discretion. f this Court rules that these periods per se constitute 1ross ne1lectof dut, the "'buds'an@s constitutional 'andate to prosecute all the errin1 officials of thiscountr ould be sub5ected to an unreasonable and overhel'in1 constraint. !i'ilarl, ifthe Court rules that these periods per se constitute 1ross ne1lect of dut, then e 'ust beprepared to reconcile this ith the established concept of the ri1ht of speed disposition ofcases J so'ethin1 the Court 'a be hard put to 5ustif.

d. No undue interest

0he "P also found on/ales 1uilt of shoin1 undue interest in Mendo/a@s case b havin1the case endorsed to the "ffice of the "'buds'an and b resolvin1 it a1ainst Mendo/a onthe basis of the unverified co'plaint-affidavit of the alle1ed victi', ala.

0he fact that on/ales had Mendo/a@s case endorsed to his office lies ithin his 'andate,even if it ere based 'erel on the re8uest of the alle1ed victi'@s father. 0he Constitutione'poers the "'buds'an and her Deputies to act pro'ptl on co'plaints filed in anfor' or 'anner a1ainst an public official or e'ploee of the 1overn'ent.42 0hisprovision is echoed b !ection +< of RA No. 344*,4; and b !ection <, Rule ofAd'inistrative "rder No. 4, series of +;;*, as a'ended.2*

Moreover, on/ales and his subordinates did not resolve the co'plaint onl on the basis ofthe unverified affidavit of ala. Based on the prosecution officer@s reco''endations, thefindin1 of 1uilt on the part of Mendo/a, et al. as based on their ad'issions as ell.Mendo/a, et al. ad'itted that the had arrested ala based on to traffic violations andalloed hi' to sta the hole ni1ht until the folloin1 'ornin1 in the police precinct. 0he





















next 'ornin1, ala as alloed to leave the precinct despite his failure to sho a validlicense and based 'erel on his pro'ise to return ith the proper docu'ents.2+ 0hesead'issions led on/ales and his staff to conclude that Mendo/a, et al. irre1ularl acted inapprehendin1 ala, since the proper procedure for the apprehension of traffic violatorsould be to 1ive the' a tic?et and to file a case, hen appropriate.2)

astl, e cannot deduce undue interest si'pl because on/ales@ decision differs fro' thedecision of the PNP-A! %hich dis'issed the co'plaint a1ainst Mendo/a&. 0o be sure, ecannot tie the hands of an 5udicial or 8uasi-5udicial bod b rulin1 that it should alasconcur ith the decisions of other 5udicial or 8uasi-5udicial bodies hich 'a have alsota?en co1ni/ance of the case. 0o do so in the case of a Deput "'buds'an ould berepu1nant to the independence that our Constitution has specificall 1ranted to this officeand ould nullif the ver purpose for hich it as created.

e. Penalt$ of dis&issal totall$inco&&ensurate *ith established facts

iven the lac? of factual basis for the char1es a1ainst on/ales, the penalt of re'ovali'posed b the "P necessaril suffers 1rave infir'it. Basic strictures of fair pla dictatethat e can onl be held liable for our on 'isdeeds7 e can be 'ade to account onl forlapses in our responsibilities. t is notable that of all the officers, it as on/ales ho too?the least ti'e L nine das L folloed b Cecilio, ho too? )+ das7 arcia L the riterof the draft L too? less than four 'onths, and the "'buds'an, less than four 'onths untilthe ?idnappin1 incident rendered Mendo/a@s 'otion 'oot.

n these li1hts, the decision of the "P is clearl and patentl ron1. 0his conclusion,hoever, does not preclude the "'buds'an fro' loo?in1 into an other possiblead'inistrative liabilit of on/ales under existin1 Civil !ervice las, rules and re1ulations.

D. 0he !pecial Prosecutor6 0he Constitutional ssue

0he +;24 Constitution created a ne, independent "ffice of the "'buds'an. 0he existin10anodbaan at the ti'e2< beca'e the "ffice of the !pecial Prosecutor under the +;24Constitution. #hile the co'position of the independent "ffice of the "'buds'an underthe +;24 Constitution does not textuall include the !pecial Prosecutor, the ei1ht of thefore1oin1 discussions on the unconstitutionalit of !ection 2%)& of RA No. 344* shoulde8uall appl to the

!pecial Prosecutor on the basis of the le1islative histor of the "ffice of the "'buds'an asexpounded in 5urisprudence.

Inder the +;4< Constitution,2( the le1islature as 'andated to create the "ffice of the"'buds'an, ?non as the 0anodbaan, ith investi1ative and prosecutorial poers.Accordin1l, on =une ++, +;42, President :erdinand Marcos enacted PD No. +(24.2

Inder PD No. +(23,23 hoever, the Chief !pecial Prosecutor %C!P& as 1iven theexclusive authorit to conduct preli'inar investi1ation and to prosecute cases that areithin the 5urisdiction of the !andi1anbaan.24 PD No. +(23 expressl 1ave the !ecretar




















of =ustice the poer of control and supervision over the !pecial Prosecutor.22 Consistentith this 1rant of poer, the la also authori/ed the !ecretar of =ustice to appoint or detailto the "ffice of the C!P an officer or e'ploee of Depart'ent of =ustice or an Bureauor "ffice under the executive supervision thereof to assist the "ffice of the C!P.

n Dece'ber +;42, PD No. +3*42; practicall 1ave bac? to the 0anodbaan the poers

ta?en aa fro' it b the "ffice of the C!P. 0he la created in the "ffice of the0anodbaan an "ffice of the Chief !pecial Prosecutor under the 0anodbaan@s control, ;*ith the exclusive authorit to conduct preli'inar investi1ation and prosecute all casesco1ni/able b the !andi1anbaan. Inli?e the earlier decree, the la also e'poered the0anodbaan to appoint !pecial nvesti1ators and subordinate personnel andor to detail tothe "ffice of the C!P an public officer or e'ploees ho shall be under the supervisionand control of the Chief !pecial Prosecutor.;+ n +;4;, PD No. +3<* further a'ended theearlier decrees b transferrin1 the poers previousl vested in the !pecial Prosecutordirectl to the 0anodbaan hi'self.;)

0his as the state of the la at the ti'e the +;24 Constitution as ratified. Inder the +;24

Constitution, an independent "ffice of the "'buds'an is created.;< 0he existin10anodbaan is 'ade the "ffice of the !pecial Prosecutor, ho shall continue to functionand exercise its poers as no;( or hereafter 'a be provided b la.;

"ther than the "'buds'an@s Deputies, the "'buds'an shall appoint all other officials ande'ploees of the "ffice of the "'buds'an.;3 !ection +<%2&, Article K of the +;24Constitution provides that the "'buds'an 'a exercise such other poers or perfor'such functions or duties as 'a be provided b la. Pursuant to this constitutionalco''and, Con1ress enacted RA No. 344* to provide for the functional and structuralor1ani/ation of the "ffice of the "'buds'an and the extent of its disciplinar authorit.

n ter's of co'position, !ection < of RA No. 344* defines the co'position of the "ffice ofthe "'buds'an, includin1 in this "ffice not onl the offices of the several Deput"'buds'en but the "ffice of the !pecial Prosecutor as ell. n ter's of appoint'ent, thela 1ave the President the authorit to appoint the "'buds'an, his Deputies and the!pecial Prosecutor, fro' a list of no'inees prepared b the =udicial and Bar Council. ncase of vacanc in these positions, the la re8uires that the vacanc be filled ithin three%<& 'onths fro' occurrence.;4

0he la also i'poses on the !pecial Prosecutor the sa'e 8ualifications it i'poses on the"'buds'an hi'selfherself and hisher deputies.;2 0heir ter's of office,;; prohibitionsand 8ualifications,+** ran? and salar are li?eise the sa'e.+*+ 0he re8uire'ent ondisclosure+*) is i'posed on the "'buds'an, the Deputies and the !pecial Prosecutor asell. n case of vacanc in the "ffice of the "'buds'an, the "verall Deput cannotassu'e the role of Actin1 "'buds'an7 the President 'a desi1nate an of the Deputies orthe !pecial Prosecutor as Actin1 "'buds'an.+*< 0he poer of the "'buds'an and his orher deputies to re8uire other 1overn'ent a1encies to render assistance to the "ffice of the"'buds'an is li?eise en5oed b the !pecial Prosecutor.+*(

iven this le1islative histor, the present overall le1al structure of the "ffice of the"'buds'an, both under the +;24 Constitution and RA No. 344*, 'ilitates a1ainst aninterpretation that ould insulate the Deput "'buds'an fro' the disciplinar authorit











































of the "P and et expose the !pecial Prosecutor to the sa'e ills that a 1rant ofindependence to the "ffice of the "'buds'an as desi1ned for.

Con1ress reco1ni/ed the i'portance of the !pecial Prosecutor as a necessar ad5unct of the"'buds'an, aside fro' his or her deputies, b 'a?in1 the "ffice of the !pecial Prosecutoran or1anic co'ponent of the "ffice of the "'buds'an and b 1rantin1 the "'buds'an

control and supervision over that office.+* 0his poer of control and supervision includesvestin1 the "ffice of the "'buds'an ith the poer to assi1n duties to the !pecialProsecutor as heshe 'a dee' fit.+,*#hi+ 0hus, b constitutional desi1n, the !pecialProsecutor is b no 'eans an ordinar subordinate but one ho effectivel and directl aidsthe "'buds'an in the exercise of hisher duties, hich include investi1ation andprosecution of officials in the Executive Depart'ent.

Inder !ection ++%(& of RA No. 344*, the !pecial Prosecutor handles the prosecution ofcri'inal cases ithin the 5urisdiction of the !andi1anbaan and this prosecutorial authoritincludes hi1h-ran?in1 executive officials. :or e'phasis, sub5ectin1 the !pecial Prosecutorto disciplinar and re'oval poers of the President, hose on alter e1os and officials in

the Executive Depart'ent are sub5ect to the prosecutorial authorit of the !pecialProsecutor, ould seriousl place the independence of the "ffice of the "'buds'an itselfat ris?.

0hus, even if the "ffice of the !pecial Prosecutor is not expressl 'ade part of theco'position of the "ffice of the "'buds'an, the role it perfor's as an or1anic co'ponentof that "ffice 'ilitates a1ainst a differential treat'ent beteen the "'buds'an@s Deputies,on one hand, and the !pecial Prosecutor hi'self, on the other. #hat is true for the"'buds'an 'ust be e8uall true, not onl for her Deputies but, also for other lesserofficials of that "ffice ho act directl as a1ents of the "'buds'an herself in theperfor'ance of her duties.

n Acop v. "ffice of the "'buds'an,+*3 the Court as confronted ith an ar1u'ent that,at botto', the "ffice of the !pecial Prosecutor is not a subordinate a1enc of the "ffice ofthe "'buds'an and is, in fact, separate and distinct fro' the latter. n debun?in1 thatar1u'ent, the Court said6

:irstl, the petitioners 'isconstrue Co''issioner Ro'ulo$s state'ent as authorit toadvocate that the intent of the fra'ers of the +;24 Constitution as to place the "ffice ofthe !pecial Prosecutor under the "ffice of the President. Kxx

n the second place, !ection 4 of Article K expressl provides that the then existin10anodbaan, to be henceforth ?non as the "ffice of the !pecial Prosecutor, shallcontinue to function and exercise its poers as no or hereafter 'a be provided b la,except those conferred on the "ffice of the "'buds'an created under this Constitution.0he underscored phrase evidentl refers to the 0anodbaan$s poers under P.D. No. +3<*or subse8uent a'endator le1islation. t follos then that Con1ress 'a re'ove an of the0anodbaan$s!pecial Prosecutor$s poers under P.D. N*. +3<* or 1rant it other poers,except those poers conferred b the Constitution on the "ffice of the "'buds'an.

Pursuin1 the present line of reasonin1, hen one considers that b express 'andate of









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