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Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty ComplianceBureau of Industry and Security
Nonproliferation & Export Control Update Briefing
Steven ClagettDirector
Missile and Nuclear Technology Control Divisions
Nonproliferation & Export Control Update Briefing
Steven ClagettDirector
Missile and Nuclear Technology Control Divisions
Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty ComplianceBureau of Industry and Security
Trends in Export Control and Nonproliferation Policy after 9/11
• The Multilateral Nonproliferation Regimes remain
focused on the fundamental goal of preventing the spread of technologies that may contribute to the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
• The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Australia Group (AG) recognize the increased need for effective multilateral export controls.
• Regime members continue to update and modify the lists of controlled commodities and implement “catch all” controls.
Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty ComplianceBureau of Industry and Security
U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Export Controls
• Proposals to modify the Multilateral Export Control Regime Guidelines & Annexes (Control Lists)
• NSG proposal to notify Partners of approvals for controlled nuclear items to non-partners
• Support for multilateral initiatives, such as the International Code of Conduct (ICOC) against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
• Ensure effective implementation of “catch all controls” for all commodities to end users (countries, companies, or individuals) of concern
• Provide multilateral notifications of U.S. denials to utilize the “no undercut” policies
Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty ComplianceBureau of Industry and Security
U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Export Controls
• Sanctions
• Consultations with foreign governments and commercial entities
• Outreach efforts with U.S. industry to stress the importance of export control compliance
• Strong enforcement of the law against violators
• International outreach programs to assist other nations implement a effective export controls
Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty ComplianceBureau of Industry and Security
MTCR Update
• Plenary: September 2002 Warsaw, Poland
• Technical Experts Meeting (TEM) to discuss changes to Annex controls
• Update on the new International Code of Conduct (ICOC) Against Missile proliferation
• Focus on regional nonproliferation issues.
• MTCR Plenary has added an Enforcement Experts component.
Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty ComplianceBureau of Industry and Security
• Plenary convened May 2002 in Prague, Czech Rep.
• Enforcement experts meeting held in conjunction with the Plenary.
• Member States continued discussions on sharing NSG license approval data and proposed notification requirements.
• Regional nonproliferation issues.
NSG Update
Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty ComplianceBureau of Industry and Security
Missile Technology Applications Processed (2001)
Received: 949
Value: $154.3 million
Received: 1036
Value: $2.2 billion
Nuclear Technology Applications Processed (2001)
Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty ComplianceBureau of Industry and Security
UK4%
PRC4%
Germany3%
Israel3%
Netherlands5%
France5%
Japan6%
India46%
Other22%Italy
3%
Distribution of Missile Technology Licenses by Country (2001)
Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty ComplianceBureau of Industry and Security
Other 15%
Taiwan9%
Russia5%
Thailand4%
Mexico5%
Singapore8%
PRC9%
Israel10%
India35%
Distribution of Nuclear Technology Licenses by Country (2001)
Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty ComplianceBureau of Industry and Security
EPCI “Catch All” Controls
The Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) is designed to:
• Strengthen multilateral non-proliferation efforts;
• Prevent the export of technology that could contribute to missile, chemical, biological, and nuclear-weapons proliferation; and
• Minimize the impact on legitimate commerce.
EPCI places export controls on end use and end users rather than a particular item.
Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty ComplianceBureau of Industry and Security
EPCI
• License may be denied if destined for missile, nuclear, or CBW activities or facilities.
• License must be obtained if the exporter knows the commodities will be used in CBW or missile activities or facilities.
• BIS may inform exporters at anytime that a license is required for a specific end-user if there is a possibility of nuclear, CBW, or missile activities.
• Any U.S. participation in nuclear, CBW, or missile activities or facilities requires a license.
Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty ComplianceBureau of Industry and Security
Evaluation Factors
• Country
• Commodity
• End-Use
• Significance for Missile/Nuclear Development
• Non-Proliferation Credentials
• Assurances and Guarantees
• Risk of diversion
• Sanctions
Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty ComplianceBureau of Industry and Security
• Listed in Supplement #1 in Part 740 of the EAR• Programs in Countries:
– China -- M-series, CSS-2– India -- Prithvi, Agni, SLV-3, Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle
(ASLV), Polar Satellite LV (PSLV), Geostationary Satellite LV (GSLV)– Iran -- Surface-to-surface, Scud– No. Korea -- No Dong, Scud– Pakistan -- Hatf-series missiles
• Other Countries: (Mostly Middle East)– Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen
Missile Technology Projects and Countries of Concern
Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty ComplianceBureau of Industry and Security
Entities List
• The Entities List notifies exporters of a requirement for exports/reexports to specified end users.
• See Supplement Number 4 to part 744 of the EAR.
Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty ComplianceBureau of Industry and Security
India/Pakistan Sanctions
• On September 22, 2001, President Bush lifted missile sanctions placed on India and Pakistan.
• On October 1, BIS reinstated a case-by-case license review policy for exports of MT and NP commodities to India and Pakistan and removed a significant number of entities from the Entity List.
• Entities affiliated with Indian and Pakistani missile development and their nuclear programs remain listed entities.
• The United States does not support Indian unsafeguarded nuclear power industry or the satellite launch vehicle development programs.
Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty ComplianceBureau of Industry and Security
PRC Issues
• Ongoing missile and nuclear proliferation concerns with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
• All commodities controlled for missile proliferation concerns - except inertial navigation systems for commercial aircraft - require presidential certification prior to export.
• The U.S. continues to conduct missile talks with the PRC in an effort to decrease Chinese proliferation activities.
• Success of these talks could affect U.S. export licensing in the future.
Office of Nonproliferation Controls and Treaty ComplianceBureau of Industry and Security
Questions?
Steve ClagettDirector, Missile and Nuclear Technology Divisions
www.bis.doc.gov