Office of Internal Oversight - LVMPD Home · Prepared by the Office of Internal Oversight / FACT Team Page 4 of 22 Executive Summary In 2014, we observed an increase of 94 non‐deadly

Office of Internal Oversight

Force Analysis Compliance Team (FACT)

Non‐deadly Use of Force Analysis

2010‐2014 Prepared by Toni Pond, OIO Analyst

Issued April 1, 2015

Joseph Lombardo, Sheriff

Prepared by the Office of Internal Oversight / FACT Team Page 2 of 22

ContentsExecutive Summary ........................................................................................................................................................ 4

Preface ............................................................................................................................................................................ 6

1. Officer Presence ............................................................................................................................................. 6

2. Verbal Communication ................................................................................................................................... 6

3. Empty Hand Tactics (Takedowns, Takedown with Injury, Strikes, Kicks) ....................................................... 6

4. Handcuffing/Other LVMPD Approved Restraint Devices ............................................................................... 6

5. Baton/Impact Weapons (As Escort Tool, Jabs, Strikes) .................................................................................. 6

6. OC Spray ......................................................................................................................................................... 6

7. ECD ................................................................................................................................................................. 6

8. LVNR® ............................................................................................................................................................. 6

9. Canine ............................................................................................................................................................. 6

10. Pinching .......................................................................................................................................................... 6

11. Blocking .......................................................................................................................................................... 6

12. Low Lethality Shotgun (five yards or greater) ................................................................................................ 6

13. P.I.T. (Speeds 40 mph or below) .................................................................................................................... 6

Overview ......................................................................................................................................................................... 7

Factors Effecting Use of Force ........................................................................................................................................ 7

Man Power ..................................................................................................................................................................... 9

Calls for Police Service .................................................................................................................................................... 9

Arrests ........................................................................................................................................................................... 11

Service Type .................................................................................................................................................................. 11

Use of Force by Area of Assignment ............................................................................................................................. 12

Shift ............................................................................................................................................................................... 14

Type of Force Used ....................................................................................................................................................... 15

Officer Injuries .............................................................................................................................................................. 17

Suspect Injuries ............................................................................................................................................................. 18

Department Demographics .......................................................................................................................................... 18

Suspect Demographics ................................................................................................................................................. 19

Tenure of Involved Officers .......................................................................................................................................... 19

Informal Assessment of Subject ................................................................................................................................... 19

Suspect Resistance Level .............................................................................................................................................. 20

Suspect Actions ............................................................................................................................................................. 20


Suspect Weapon ........................................................................................................................................................... 21

Allegations of Excessive Force ...................................................................................................................................... 21

Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................................... 22


Executive Summary

In 2014, we observed an increase of 94 non‐deadly use of force incidents (11%) over 2013. There

was a total decrease of 97 incidents over the past five years (‐10%).

The ratio of non‐deadly force incidents per officer increased slightly in 2014, to 0.27 uses of force

per officer (an increase of 0.02). The five year high was reached in 2011, with 0.32 uses of force

per officer. This ratio decreased in both 2012 and 2013.

Clark County’s population at the end of 2014 was 1,497,944. This equates to 5.954 non‐deadly use

of force incidents per 10,000 citizens of Clark County.

Analysis indicates officers applied force in less than one percent of all 2014 police calls for service.

The rate of non‐deadly use of force per 10,000 CFS that a citizen had contact with police during

2014 was 8.426.

Even though the number of officers has declined, the number of citizen‐initiated calls for service

has continued to rise, increasing the number of citizen initiated calls for service per officer in 2014.

The reduced number of officers available to handle citizen‐initiated calls has reduced the time

available for officer‐initiated activity.

Consistent with the previous four years, “Calls‐for‐Service” account for the majority of our police related non‐deadly use of force incidents, followed by “Pedestrian Stops” and “Vehicle Stops.”

At DSD, “Module Operations” and “Disturbance” were the most common incident evolving into a non‐deadly use of force, followed by “Booking.”

Northeast (NEAC) has had the highest increase from 2013 (67) to 2014 (86), an increase of 18

(28%). Northeast’s increase appears to be largely due to multiple officers being involved in a single

incident, nine in 2013 compared to 17 in 2014. Three of the incidents in 2014 involved three

officers. The second quarter 2014 had nearly ten more non‐deadly use of force incidents over the

other three quarters. After the ambush of Igor Soldo and Alyn Beck in June 2014, officers were

doubled up and supplemented by officers from across the valley.

The most significant increase (28) was in the Central Booking Bureau (CBB). Followed by the

increase (18) in the South Tower Bureau (STB).

The most significant increase was in “Empty Hand/Takedown” non‐deadly use of force. It is

evident, based on a significantly higher reported use of “Empty Hand” and “Handcuffing,” officers

are using low level force. Effective in January 2014, LVMPD began further breaking down “Empty

Hand” to depict a clearer picture of this option of force.

The number of officer injuries in Patrol decreased 18%, from 2013 (186) to 2014 (153). However,

the number of officers seeking treatment at a hospital for an injury resulting from a non‐deadly

use of force incident, increased 17%, from 34 in 2013 to 40 in 2014.

The number of suspects injured by officers in non‐deadly use of force incidents increased 14% in

2014 (661) compared to 2013 (579). Suspects claimed to have been injured in 74% of non‐deadly

force incidents in 2014, compared to 73% in 2013.


White officers comprise 70% of our commissioned workforce and accounted for 73% of our non‐

deadly use of force. Hispanic officers comprise 12% of our work force and accounted for 11% of

our use of force. Black officers comprise 10% of our work force and accounted for 9% of our use

of force.

White citizens comprise 46% of the Clark County population, and white suspects accounted for

35% of non‐deadly use of force incidents. Hispanic citizens comprise 29% of the Clark County

population, and hispanic suspects accounted for 24% of non‐deadly use of force incidents. Black

citizens comprise 11% of the Clark County population, and black suspects accounted for 37% of

the non‐deadly use of force incidents in 2014.

In 2014, two of the most frequently reported suspect actions “Fighting” and “Assault on Officer”

were reported during a non‐deadly use of force incident, placing the suspect in the aggressive

category.

In 2014, the presence of an “Edged Weapon” was the most frequently reported suspect weapon.

This was followed by the presence of a “Firearm.”

The LVMPD Internal Affairs received 182 force related allegations in 2014, compared to 201 in

2013 (a decrease of 19, or 9%). Fifteen percent of 2014 allegations have not yet been adjudicated.

In 2013, LVMPD sustained 4% of the use of force allegations. LVMPD has already sustained 5% of

the allegations from 2014, not accounting for the 28 open cases.

Patrol received 131 use of force related allegations in 2014, compared to 128 in 2013 (a 2%

increase). Eighteen percent of the 2014 allegations are not yet adjudicated. In 2013, 2% of the

cases were sustained, compared to 4% in 2014, not accounting for the 23 open cases.


Preface

The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) has committed to being open and transparent

to the community we are sworn to protect and serve, especially as it relates to incidents involving police

use of force. As an agency we place the highest value on human life, and minimal reliance on the use of

force to gain compliance. We are committed to analyzing non‐deadly use of force incidents to provide a

high level of accountability and transparency to our community.

Statistical analysis of instances in which an officer has used force helps assess how officers are

responding, engaging, and selecting their force options. The purpose of the analysis is to identify trends

and patterns in a timely manner, and allow the Department to address adverse issues through training

and other corrective actions.

The LVMPD defines non‐deadly use of force as the force required to compel compliance, which is not

intended to, nor known to create a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm.

Non‐deadly use of force options include:

1. Officer Presence 2. Verbal Communication 3. Empty Hand Tactics (Takedowns, Takedown with Injury, Strikes, Kicks) 4. Handcuffing/Other LVMPD Approved Restraint Devices 5. Baton/Impact Weapons (As Escort Tool, Jabs, Strikes) 6. OC Spray 7. ECD 8. LVNR® 9. Canine 10. Pinching 11. Blocking 12. Low Lethality Shotgun (five yards or greater) 13. P.I.T. (Speeds 40 mph or below)

The following report is an analysis of LVMPD’s non‐deadly use of force incidents as they are documented

in the Department’s web‐based IAPro application. IAPro is LVMPD’s case management system for

collecting use of force data to enable us to calculate statistics and evaluate an individual officer’s

performance related to their use of force.

In the past, LVMPD has prepared an annual statistical report to meet CALEA Standard 1.3.13, to

“determine patterns or trends in the use of force while identifying potential requirements for equipment

upgrades, officer training deficiencies and/or needed policy modifications.” Following an assessment by

Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) and in compliance

with their recommendations, LVMPD began completing an internal analysis on a quarterly basis.


Overview

LVMPD’s non‐deadly use of force incidents have

been in decline over the past five years, with the

exception of 1,090 in 2011. There was a total

decrease of 97 non‐deadly use of force incidents

over the past five years (‐10%). In 2014, we

observed an increase of 94 incidents (11%) over

2013. LVMPD’s all‐time high was reached in 2002,

when 1,674 use of force reports were completed.

In 2014, 24.0% of reported non‐deadly use of force incidents were documented as “Complaint of Injury

Only. ” DSD reported 33.8% “Complaint of Injury Only” incidents. Patrol reported 23.3% “Complaint of

Injury only” incidents. Other bureaus reported 9.6% “Complaint of Injury Only” incidents.

Factors Effecting Use of Force

Internal Factors

LVMPD established the Critical Incident Review Team (CIRT) in July 2010, to conduct administrative

investigations of all officer‐involved shootings and other critical incidents.

The Organizational Development Bureau (ODB) was created in January 2011. ODB combined all LVMPD

training units and CIRT into one bureau, to effectively investigate critical incidents and to funnel the

lessons learned to the appropriate training section.

In 2011, the Department implemented Reality Based Training (RBT) for all Patrol Division police officers

and sergeants. This training was expanded in 2013 to include all bureaus throughout the Department. In

2014, RBT began requiring the attendance of all commissioned officers through the rank of lieutenant.

Each year, this training is developed to address trends identified by CIRT and ODB, and incorporates de‐

escalation tactics when appropriate.

In January 2012, under growing community concern and scrutiny of the Department’s deadly use of

force practices, LVMPD agreed to take part in a “Collaborative Reform Process,” sponsored by the U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office). This process

included an in‐depth assessment of our use of force policies and practices. It identified national

standards and best practices as they relate to: 1) policy and procedures; 2) training and tactics; 3)

investigation and documentation; and 4) external review of officer involved shootings.

The Office of Internal Oversight (OIO) was established in 2012, to work as a liasion between the

989 1,090840 798

892

0

500

1,000

1,500

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Use of Force


Department and the COPS office, and to manage the implementation of the recommendations resulting

from their assessment. The mission of OIO is to significantly reduce the number of use of deadly force

incidents. Once established, CIRT moved from ODB to OIO.

Also in 2012, major revisions were made to the LVMPD use of force policy, driven by two main factors:

the Ninth Circuit Court that governs our state laws and the Department’s extensive internal review

process, which indicated changes were needed. Recommendations made by CNA and the ACLU were

also considered by LVMPD in drafting the new policy. Although, it was not a new concept for our

officers, the sanctity of human life statement was incorporated into the use of force policy. Upon

finalization of the new policy, the LVMPD sucessfully instructed all commissioned officers in a five‐week

period. The revised use of force policy recognized that officers do have the ability to impact the outcome

of many situations based on decision‐making and chosen tactics.

The LVMPD’s Use of Force Policy Review Committee recently implemented a bi‐annual schedule to review

and revise the use of force policy to ensure it is up to date, based on law and Department standards.

In 2014, LVMPD developed our Fair and Impartial Policing – Procedural Justice class. All full‐time

Department employees have been mandated to complete this class, and it will be incorporated into

curriculum for future employees. The class trains students in understanding bias, its effects, and provides

an understanding of fair, impartial and effective policing.

External Factors

2014 was a challenging year for law enforcement across the country, as a general disdain for law

enforcement garnered national attention. Pictures of heavily armed officers in tanks permeated the

media. Police officers themselves became victims of violence. Fifteen officers were shot and killed in 2014

in ambush‐style assaults. These assailants had criminal histories and mental instability and harbored so

much resentment toward police, they lashed out at officers in uniform.

LVMPD began to feel the anti‐law enforcement sentiment locally in April, when the Bundy ranch standoff

drew armed supporters from across the nation. Some of these supporters claimed to be sovereign

citizens, who gathered to show their support against the government. This sentiment abruptly presented

itself again in June, when LVMPD officers Igor Soldo and Alyn Beck were ambushed and murdered. The

July chokehold death of Eric Garner in Staten Island, New York and the August shooting of Michael Brown

in Ferguson, Missouri prompted many anti‐law enforcement riots and continued to cultivate disdain

toward cops.

By necessity police officers, both nationally and locally, had to become more vigilant to ensure their own

safety and to preserve the safety of their fellow officers.


Man Power

The downturn of the local economy in 2008

affected the revenue available to the Department,

resulting in a decrease in the number of police

officers policing our jurisdiction. As officers left

the Department, the LVMPD did not hire

replacements. In 2014, we hired 243 recruits (PO

and CO), however with attrition we received a net

gain of 69 officers (2%). As of the end of 2014, we

have 221 (6%) fewer officers than we had in 2010.

The ratio of non‐deadly use of force incidents

per officer reached a five year high in 2011,

with 0.32 uses of force per officer. This ratio

decreased in both 2012 and 2013. This ratio

increase slightly in 2014, to 0.27 uses of force

per officer (an increase of 0.02). The total

number of non‐deadly use of force incidents

increased by 94, and the total number of

officers increased by 69, which influenced this

ratio.

Clark County’s population at the end of 2014 was 1,497,944. This equates to 5.954 non‐deadly use of

force incidents per 10,000 citizens of Clark County.

Calls for Police Service

The demands for police services can be an

indicator of the number incidents that may result

in an officer having to use force. The LVMPD uses

a series of “400” codes to categorize the

assignment of service calls for our officers.

Citizen initiated calls for service are captured

with 401‐447 codes. Officer initiated contacts

are captured with 461‐469 codes.

The citizen initiated calls for service (CFS), where a citizen calls the Department prompting an officer

response (401‐447 call codes) have been on a steady increase since 2010 (with the exception of 2013),

increasing by 182,985 events (20%).

2,693 2,610 2,493 2,423 2,489

774 764 764 754 757

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

PO/CO Officers

PO CO

0.290.32

0.26 0.250.27

0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Use of Non‐Deadly Force per PO/CO

875,529

972,266

1,042,279

1,008,856

1,058,514

0

500,000

1,000,000

1,500,000

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Calls for Service


However, our officer initiated CFS (467‐469 call

codes) have been on a steady decline over the

past five years (with the exception of 2012).

From 2010 to 2014, we have had a decrease of

241,879 (‐40%) officer initiated CFS. There is a

direct correlation between the number of officers

available to repond to citizen calls and the

unassigned time available to the patrol officers to

make proactive contacts.

Analysis indicates officers applied force in less than one percent of all 2014 police calls for service. The

rate of non‐deadly use of force per 10,000 CFS that a citizen had contact with police during 2014 was

8.426.

Comparing the citizen initiated calls for service per

officer, there has been an overall upward trend from

2010‐2014, with an increase of 100 (31%). In 2014

alone, there was an increase of 9 (2%) from 2013.

Even though the number of officers has declined, the

number of citizen initiated calls for service has

continued to incline, increasing the number of citizen

initiated calls for service per officer in 2014.

The reduced number of officers available to

handle citizen‐initiated calls has reduced the

time available for officer initiated activity. It

appears there may be a causal relationship

between the average number of calls, whether

citizen initiated or officer initiated, and the

number of non‐deadly use of force applications

per year.

611,575

562,445

563,688

482,306

369,696

0

200,000

400,000

600,000

800,000

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Officer Intiated CFS

325373

418 416 425

0

200

400

600

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Citizen Initiated CFS per Officer

227 215 226199

149

0

50

100

150

200

250

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Officer Initiated CFS per Officer


Arrests

The Clark County Detention Center (CDCC) is the

housing facility for felony and misdemeanor

criminals arrested by all law enforcement

agencies in Clark County. Clark County arrests

have been on a steady decline over the past

three years, as have LVMPD’s Bookings. All CCDC

Bookings are down in 2014 by 4,507 (‐7%), while

LVMPD Bookings are down 4,621 (‐9%). This may

partially be due to overcrowding and the long

overdue remodel of CCDC.

Service Type

In January 2014, LVMPD chose to

separate the categories used to capture

the service function an officer was

engaged in at the time force was used.

These new categories specify service

type for the police function, and those

appropriate for the corrections function.

As with the previous four years, “Calls‐

for‐Service” account for the majority of

our police related non‐deadly use of

force incidents, followed by “Pedestrian

Stops” and “Vehicle Stops.”

At DSD, “Module Operations” and

“Disturbance” were the most

common service type evolving into a

non‐deadly use of force, followed by

“Booking.” It is difficult to do a one‐

on‐one comparison to the incident

types from previous years, due to

category changes; however,

“Booking,” “Pre‐arrest,” and “Module

Operations” were also high in 2013.

343

10861 50 8 14 24 2 54

050

100150200250300350400

Police Service Type

36

2

44

8 10

1 47

18

43

1

11 63

18

0

10

20

30

40

50

DSD Service Type

56,770

65,296

60,751

53,402

48,781

68,883

77,936

72,482

64,341

59,834

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Arrests

Metro Bookings CCDC Total Bookings


Use of Force by Area of Assignment

Analysis of non‐deadly use of force by bureau of assignment depicts that Patrol area commands have a

significant portion (56%) of our non‐deadly use of force incidents. This is primarily due to the number of

citizen contacts associated with the area commands in comparison to the other police bureaus (22%).

Focusing on area command non‐deadly use of force, three of the area commands are displaying a

downward trend in the number of use of force incidents. These decreases ranging from two in

Convention Center Area Command (CCAC) (2%) and Northwest Area Command (NWAC) (5%), to eight in

South Central Area Command (SCAC) (11%). Northeast (NEAC) has had the highest increase from 2013

(67) to 2014 (86), an increase of 19 (28%).

Northeast’s increase appears to be largely due to multiple officers being involved in a single incident,

nine in 2013 compared to 17 in 2014. Three of the incidents in 2014 involved three officers. The second

quarter 2014 had nearly ten more non‐deadly use of force incidents over the other three quarters. This

could be due to the ambush of Soldo and Beck, officers were doubled up and supplemented by officers

from across the valley.

Southeast Area Command had the second highest increase, with 60 in 2013 to 67 in 2014, an increase of

seven (12%). In the third quarter of 2014, SEAC had more non‐deadly uses of force incidents than the

three other quarters. Enterprise Area Command (EAC) with an increase of 10%, from 60 in 2013 to 67 in

2014. EAC also had more non‐deadly use of force incidents in the third quarter of 2014 than the other

three quarters. Both the Bolden Area Command (BAC) and Downtown Area Command (DTAC) had an

increase of one from 2013 to 2014.

87 90

76

88

132

66 68

85

107

141

102

79

114

78

74

6265

85

105

56

79

69

63

5262

83

94

46

67

44

71

6063

81

95

52

86

42

63 67

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

BAC CCAC DTAC EAC NEAC NWAC SCAC SEAC

Area Commands

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014


Overall, non‐deadly use of force has been on a downward trend within non‐Patrol police bureaus. The

most significant change was in the Traffic Bureau with a decrease from 27 in 2013 to 15 in 2014.

Followed by the Support Operations Bureau (SOB), which included Air Support/Search and Rescue and

the Laughlin Area Command (and Canine in 2013), with a decrease of eight. Canine was moved to

Emergency Operations Bureau (EOB) in July 2014. After July 2014, EOB consisted of Canine, SWAT and

ARMOR. EOB had a significant increase (33) in 2014. Canine increased by 22 incidents from 2013 to

2014, and can be partially attributed to increased accountability of the handlers and increased utilization

of canine by other details (ie. The Criminal Apprehension Team and SWAT). In January 2014, LVMPD

implemented a change in canine policy from “Bark and Hold” to “Bite and Hold.” Approximately 65% of

the bites occurred while the dog was off leash and 35 % occurred on leash. SWAT increased by 10

incidents from 2013 to 2014.

From 2013 to 2014,

Detention Services Division

(DSD) experienced an

increase of 41 non‐deadly

use of force incidents. The

North Tower Bureau (NTB) is

the only bureau in DSD with

a decrease from 2013 (57) to

2014 (49). The most

significant increase (28) was

in the Central Booking

Bureau (CBB). Followed by

the increase (18) in the South

Tower Bureau (STB).

12

3 15 5

12

1 1 28

1

50

23

1316

53

45

8 11

1

7 915

1511

010203040506070

Other Bureaus ‐ Excluding Area Commands

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

56

51

8

24

82

51

5

39

55

42

11

21

54 57

8

37

82

49

11

55

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

CBB NTB SOB STB

Detention Services Division

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014


The first and fourth quarters of 2014, for both CBB and STB, had significantly higher non‐deadly use of

force incidents than the other two quarters.

Shift

Historically, the majority of our

Patrol interactions involving use

of non‐deadly force have

occurred on swing shift. This

distribution has remained

constant even as the overall

number of use of force incidents

decreased. In 2010, 43% of our

non‐deadly use of force

incidents occurred on swing shift

compared to 40% in 2014. In

2010, 26% of our non‐deadly use

of force occurred on grave shift

compared to 33% in 2014. Gradually from 2012 to 2014 the distribution of non‐deadly use of force

incidents across all shifts began to equalize.

The analysis for the non‐Patrol

police bureaus, reflects day and

swing shifts have accounted for

the majority of the non‐deadly

use of force incidents.

Gradually over the past five

years, the number of non‐

deadly use of force incidents on

both of these shifts have

decreased. However, in 2014

the number of incidents

occurring on the swing shift

drastically jumped from 48 in

2013 to 98 in 2014.

The majority of this increase on swing shift occurred in the SWAT and Canine units.

163 206

167

162 197

192

206

156

157

157

271 303

251

225

226

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Area Command by Shift

Grave Day Swing

27 31

14 20

18

110

106

61

52

37

96

90

66

48

98

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Other Bureaus By Shift

Grave Day Swing


Shift analysis of non‐deadly use

of force incidents at DSD

depicts the majority of the

incidents have occurred on day

shift. However, in 2014, for the

first time in the past five years,

more non‐deadly use of force

incidents occurred on the grave

shift, a total of 51%.

The NTB had an increase of 12 on the grave shift, with a corresponding decrease of 12 on the day shift.

CCB had an increase of 18 on the grave shift, as well as an increase of 12 on the day shift. STB had an

increase of 15 on the grave shift and 21 on the day shift.

Type of Force Used

The United States Supreme

Court decisions and

interpretations of the Fourth

Amendment of the United States

Constitution indicate a police

officer may only use that force

which is “objectively

reasonable.” When use of force

is needed, officers must assess

each incident to determine,

based on policy, training and

experience, which use of force

option would best bring the

incident under control in a safe

and prudent manner. Officers

will use reasonable and sound

judgement when force is to be

deployed.

5268

56 65

110

7791

6985

105

0

50

100

150

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Detention Services Division by Shift

Grave Day


The Department had 94 more non‐deadly use of force incidents in 2014 than in 2013, an increase of

12%. The use of “Canine” as a use of non‐deadly force option doubled in 2014. This increase can be

partially attributed to increased accountability of the handlers and increased utilization of canine by

other details (ie. The Criminal Apprehension Team and SWAT). A policy change was also implemented in

January 2014 from “Bark and Hold” to Bite and Hold.” Reports reflect officer’s use of the ECD has

progressively decreased over the past five years. In 2014, reports indicate the ECD was effective in 56%

of its use, compared to 66% in 2013. The ECD had “Limited” effectiveness in 16% of its use in 2014,

compared to 13% in 2013. (For example, the ECD can be deemed ineffective when the probes miss the

suspect, when the suspect is wearing heavy clothing, when the ECD was not properly charged, or when

the ECD had little effect on the suspect.)

The most significant increase was in “Empty

Hand/Takedown” non‐deadly use of force.

It is evident, based on a significantly higher

reported use of “Empty Hand” and

“Handcuffing,” officers are using low level

force. Effective in January 2014, LVMPD

began further breaking down “Empty Hand”

to depict a clearer picture of this option of

force. Further analysis revealed over the

past five years, “Empty Hand/ Takedown”

has been approximately 85% effective.

When this tool is ineffective, officers must

rely on another force option.

274

16 68

158180

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Empty Hand / Takedown

24

250

604

326

53 58

27

229

661

366

61 71

29

147

560

286

59

49

21

101

579

190

60

52

143

125

516

190

59

24 180

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

Type of Force Used

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014


Officer Injuries

The number of officer injuries in Patrol

decreased 18%, from 2013 (186) to 2014

(153). However, the number of officers

seeking treatment at a hospital for an injury

resulting from a non‐deadly use of force

incident, increased 17%, from 34 in 2013 to 40

in 2014. Approximately 30% of those officers

injured required medical attention at a

hospital. A third of those officers requiring

hospital treatment had hand injuries. Another

45% sought treatment for human bites, head

injuries or concussions, and knee injuries.

Although officers are more frequently indicating in their use of force report that they sought medical

treatment at the hospital, per LVMPD Risk Management, this increase is not translating into higher

workman compensation costs. The majority of these injuries are treated (x‐rays, sutchers, etc.) and the

officer is released the same day.

Most officer injuries (101) result from incidents where “Empty Hand,” “Takedown/Escort,” or

“Handcuffing” techniques were employed. These techniques account for nearly three times that of other

tools used. Use of ECD declined, more frequently putting officers in physical contact with the suspect.

16 628 34 40

156

182

151

186

153

0

50

100

150

200

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Officer Injuries

Hospital Injured

19

9

1

5 5 3 2

8

4 1 3 3 1

42

22

6

27

11

1 3

36

15

3

9 8

3 3

3 1

4 2 10

10

20

30

40

50

Officer Injury ‐ by Tool

Head Torso Arm Leg Other


Suspect Injuries

The number of suspects injured by

officers in non‐deadly use of force

incidents increased 14% in 2014 (661)

compared to 2013 (579). Suspects

claimed to have been injured in 74% of

non‐deadly force incidents in 2014,

compared to 73% in 2013.

In comparing suspect injuries with those seeking hospital treatment, the number of suspects seeking

hospital treatment increased from 161 in 2013, to 203 in 2014 (a 26% increase). Of those incidents

where the suspect claimed an injury from an “Empty Hand ‐ Strike,” 13 requested hospital treatment.

However, as with all instances where the suspect requested hospital treatment, the cause was not

always due to the force used. Some were transported for Excited Delirium, Legal 2000’s, prior

unrealated accidents, and other miscellaneous medical issues, such as high blood pressure. The numbers

could be misleading without analyzing each individual report.

Department Demographics

Male officers constitute 88% of the LVMPD commissioned officers, with 12% being female. The graph

below correlates the ethnicity of officers with suspect information. The ethnicity of the officers who

applied force are then compared to the population share of our commissioned work force.

White officers comprise 70% of our

commissioned workforce and accounted

for 73% of our non‐deadly use of force.

Hispanic officers comprise 12% of our

work force and accounted for 11% of our

use of force. Black officers comprise 10%

of our work force and accounted for 9% of

our use of force.

(Source: LVMPD Diversity Section of IAB)

177 160 183 161 203

656 760587 579

661

0

500

1000

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Suspect Injuries

Hospital Injured

1% 1% 0% 4%9%

0%11%

73%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

Involved Officer Ethnicity


Suspect Demographics

White citizens comprise 46% of the Clark

County population, and white suspects

accounted for 35% of non‐deadly use of

force incidents. Hispanic citizens comprise

29% of the Clark County population, and

hispanic suspects accounted for 24% of

non‐deadly use of force incidents. Black

citizens comprise 11% of the Clark County

population and accounted for 37% of the

non‐deadly use of force incidents in 2014.

Tenure of Involved Officers

Patrol officers are the most active and have the highest frequency of citizen contact. Over the past five

years, more than half of the officers who used non‐deadly force had been on the Department between

one to five years. However, in 2014 Patrol officers who used non‐deadly force had been on the

Department for six to ten years (57%). As vacanted positions were left unfilled, both the tenure in

Patrol and officers using non‐deadly force increased.

At the jail, officers with 11 to 15 years on the Department were most likely to use force, followed by

officers with six to ten years.

Informal Assessment of Subject

When a police officer first arrives on a call, they make a quick observation of the suspect’s mental state.

The officer’s evaluation considers the suspects mental health, drugs or alcohol, or any other unknown

factor. In 26% of the incidents, the officer believed the suspect was under the influence of

“Drugs/Alcohol.” In 10% of the incidents, they believe the suspect was experiencing a mental crisis.

This assessment made by corrections officers at DSD reported only 6% of the suspects were under the

influence, due to the lack of access to drugs and alcohol, and 14% were reported as “Mentally Unstable.”

This assessment could be directly associated with the length of time the suspect has been incarcerated

and the correction officer’s prior encounters with the suspect.

LVMPD developed a Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) program in 2003 to handle incidents involving persons

in crisis, and to facilitate a response appropriate to the needs of the individual involved. The Department

and the community’s desire was to divert certain persons away from the criminal justice system and

toward treatment, whenever available and appropriate. To better equip our officers with the growing

need to interact with the mentally ill, CIT re‐certification training was designed and initiated in 2012.

1% 1%

37%

1%

24%

35%

1%0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

Suspect Ethnicity


Suspect Resistance Level

The “Informal Observation” are descriptors documenting the officer’s perception of a suspect's behavior

during a use of force incident. Eight of these nine descriptors reflect a suspect in an elevated level of

aggression toward the officer. In only four incidents the suspect was reported as “Calm.”

Suspect Actions

In 2014, the three most frequently reported suspect actions during a non‐deadly use of force incident

were“Fighting,” “Assault on Officer,” and “Attempt to Flee.” Both “Fighting” and “Assault on Officer”

place the suspect in the aggressive category. “Attempt to Flee” may also warrant an intermediate level

of force from the officer, if the severity of the crime and suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety

of officer(s) or others.

442

4

284

462

63

324351

45

352

050100150200250300350400450500

Informal Observation

60

227

126

236

44

278

116

181 177

15 46 69

154

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Suspect Actions


Suspect Weapon

The classification of the suspect’s

weapon in the “Initial Observation” has

historically been low. In 2014, the

presence of an “Edged Weapon” was the

most frequently reported suspect

weapon. This was followed by the

presence of a “Firearm.”

Officers used the less lethal shotgun

twelve times in 2014 to subdue armed

suspects, without resorting to deadly

force options.

Allegations of Excessive Force

The LVMPD Internal Affairs Bureau

received 182 force related allegations in

2014, compared to 201 in 2013 (a

decrease of 19, or 9%). Fifteen percent of

2014 allegations have not yet been

adjudicated. In 2013, LVMPD sustained

4% of the use of force allegations.

LVMPD has already sustained 5% of the

allegations from 2014, not accounting for

the 28 open cases.

30

2

15

97 50

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Suspect Weapon

206169 152 145 153

70 51 73 56 290

100

200

300

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Allegations of Excessive Force

PD DSD

3

12 13 15

14

23

13

22

14 16

8

3

13

12

17

17

12 13

16

6 7

9

1

14 17 17

10 11

9

12

8

10

8

0

16

25

14

12 13

10 12

12

8

6

16

28

10

7

10 12

17

15

13

3

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

ARPT BAC CCAC DTAC EAC NEAC NWAC SCAC SEAC SOB TRAFF

Area Command Allegations of Force

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014


Patrol received 131 use of force related allegations in 2014, compared to 128 in 2013 (a 2% increase).

Eighteen percent of the 2014 allegations are not yet adjudicated. In 2013, 2% of the cases were

sustained, compared to 4% in 2014, not accounting for the 23 open cases. (Source: Internal Affairs

Allegations data obtained from IAPro).

Conclusion

In October 2014, LVMPD began training every fulltime employee the Fair and Impartial Policing training

component. As of March 31, 2015 3,208 (70%) employees have completed this training. OIO has been

personally contacting those that have not yet completed the class. All remaining personnel are

anticipated to complete training by June 2015. At the conclusion of 2015, LVMPD will evaluate the impact

this training may have had on the Department’s non‐deadly use of force statistics.

Documents

Office of Internal Oversight - LVMPD Home · Prepared by the Office of Internal Oversight / FACT Team Page 4 of 22 Executive Summary In 2014, we observed an increase of 94 non‐deadly