Office of Internal Oversight - Las Vegas Metropolitan Police … · 2017-05-02 · Prepared by the Office of Internal Oversight / FACT Team Page 11 of 39 Comparing the total number

Revised: November 20, 2014

Office of Internal Oversight

Force Analysis Compliance Team (FACT)

Non‐deadly Use of Force Analysis

2009‐2013 Prepared by Toni Pond, OIO Analyst

Issued April 15, 2014

Douglas C. Gillespie, Sheriff

Prepared by the Office of Internal Oversight / FACT Team Page 2 of 39

ContentsPreface ............................................................................................................................................................................ 4

1. Officer Presence .............................................................................................................................................. 4

2. Verbal Communication ................................................................................................................................... 4

3. Empty Hand Tactics (Takedowns, Takedown with Injury, Strikes, Kicks) ....................................................... 4

4. Handcuffs/Other LVMPD Approved Restraint Devices ................................................................................... 4

5. Baton/Impact Weapons (As Escort Tool, Jabs, Strikes) .................................................................................. 4

6. OC Spray .......................................................................................................................................................... 4

7. ECD .................................................................................................................................................................. 4

8. LVNR® .............................................................................................................................................................. 4

9. Canine ............................................................................................................................................................. 4

10. Pinching ....................................................................................................................................................... 4

11. Blocking ....................................................................................................................................................... 4

12. Low Lethality Shotgun (five yards or greater) ............................................................................................ 4

13. P.I.T. (Speeds 40mph or below) .................................................................................................................. 4

Overview ......................................................................................................................................................................... 5

Person‐Oriented Officer‐Involved Shootings .................................................................................................................. 6

Factors Effecting Use of Force ........................................................................................................................................ 7

Manpower ...................................................................................................................................................................... 8

Calls for Police Service .................................................................................................................................................... 9

Use of Force by Area of Assignment ............................................................................................................................. 12

Shift ............................................................................................................................................................................... 14

Type of Force Used ....................................................................................................................................................... 16

Breakdown by Quarter ................................................................................................................................................. 19

Patrol – Specific Tool by Area Command ...................................................................................................................... 20

Electronic Control Device (ECD) ................................................................................................................................ 20

Empty Hand and Handcuffing ................................................................................................................................... 21

Impact Tool ............................................................................................................................................................... 22

LVNR .......................................................................................................................................................................... 23

Pepper Spray and Other ........................................................................................................................................... 24

Tenure of Involved Officers .......................................................................................................................................... 25

Ethnicity ........................................................................................................................................................................ 28

Informal Assessment of Subject ................................................................................................................................... 29


Officer Injuries .............................................................................................................................................................. 31

Suspect Injuries ............................................................................................................................................................. 33

Injuries by Force Used .................................................................................................................................................. 35

Suspect Injuries and Those Requiring Hospitalization .................................................................................................. 36

Informal Observation of Suspect .................................................................................................................................. 37

Suspect Actions ............................................................................................................................................................. 37

Suspect Weapon ........................................................................................................................................................... 38

Statement of Complaint – Use of Force ....................................................................................................................... 39

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................................................... 39


Preface

The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) has committed to being open and transparent to

the community we are sworn to serve and protect, especially as it relates to incidents involving police use

of force. As an agency we place the highest value on human life. We place minimum reliance on the use

of force to gain compliance. We are committed to analyzing the non‐deadly use of force incidents while

providing a high level of accountability and transparency to our community.

Statistical analysis of instances in which an officer has used force helps assess how officers are

responding, engaging, and selecting their force tools. The purpose of the collection is to timely identify

trends and patterns and allow the department to address issues through training and other corrective

actions.

The LVMPD defines non‐deadly use of force as the force required to compel compliance, which is not

intended to, and is not known to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm.

Non‐deadly use of force options include:

1. Officer Presence 2. Verbal Communication 3. Empty Hand Tactics (Takedowns, Takedown with Injury, Strikes, Kicks) 4. Handcuffs/Other LVMPD Approved Restraint Devices 5. Baton/Impact Weapons (As Escort Tool, Jabs, Strikes) 6. OC Spray 7. ECD 8. LVNR® 9. Canine 10. Pinching 11. Blocking 12. Low Lethality Shotgun (five yards or greater) 13. P.I.T. (Speeds 40mph or below)

The following report is an analysis of LVMPD’s non‐deadly use of force that are documented in the

Department’s web‐based Blue Team application, stored in IAPro. Blue Team is LVMPD’s system for

collecting use of force statistics and evaluating an individual officer’s performance related to their use of

force.

LVMPD has utilized this data to report the Department’s non‐deadly use of force annually. To meet the

CNA recommendation (7.4), this information is now being monitored and analyzed on a more frequent

basis. In doing so, LVMPD will also meet CALEA Standard 1.3.13, which requires an annual report

summarizing the Department’s use of force to … “determine patterns or trends in the use of force while

identifying potential requirements for equipment upgrades, officer training deficiencies and/or needed

policy modifications.”


In 2013, it took an average of 32 days for a use of force report to complete the entry and approval

process. The completion process consists of the report being entered by the officer who used force,

approval by the officer’s chain of command and ultimately the transfer from Blue Team into IAPro. The

time required to complete a use of force report hinders timely analysis.

Overview

There has been a decline over the past five years in LVMPD’s non‐deadly use of force incidents, with an

increase anomaly in 2011. We have observed a decrease of 44 incidents over the past two years (‐5%).

There was a total decrease of 431 non‐deadly use of force incidents over the past five years (‐35%).

LVMPD’s all‐time high was reached in 2002, when 1,674 use of force reports were completed.

1,230

989 1,090

843799

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Non‐deadly Force ‐ 5 Yr Comparison


Person‐Oriented Officer‐Involved Shootings

(Although covered in a separate report, “Deadly Force Statistical Analysis” it helps put non‐deadly uses of

force into perspective.)

Over the past five years, with the exception of 2011, there has been an overall downward trend in use of

deadly force. There were 19 Officer‐Involved Shootings (OISs) involving persons in 2009 and 13 in 2013,

resulting in a decrease of 6 (‐31.6%). There was a five year high of 25 OISs in 2010, with a decrease in

non‐deadly use of force incidents for the same time frame.

In 2009, 1.5% of our reportable uses of force resulted in an OIS, with 2.5% in 2010, 1.7% in 2011, and

1.3% in 2012. There was a slight upward trend in 2013, with 1.6% of reportable uses of force incidents

resulting in an OIS.

19

25

18

11 13

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Person‐Oriented Officer‐Involved Shootings


Factors Effecting Use of Force

In July 2010, the Critical Incident Review Team (CIRT) began officially conducting administrative

investigations of all officer‐involved shootings and other critical incidents.

The Organizational Development Bureau (ODB) was created in January 2011. ODB combined all LVMPD

training units and CIRT into one bureau, to effectively investigate critical incidents and to funnel the

lessons learned to the appropriate training section.

The Department implemented Reality Based Training (RBT) for all police officers and their sergeants

assigned to the Patrol Division, in 2011. This training was expanded in 2013 to include all bureaus

throughout the Department. In 2014, RBT began requiring the attendance of all commissioned officers

through the rank of lieutenant. This training is developed to address trends identified by CIRT and the

ODB, and incorporates de‐escalation tactics when appropriate.

Under growing community concern and scrutiny of the Department’s deadly use of force practices, in

January 2012, LVMPD agreed to take part in a “Collaborative Reform Process,” sponsored by the U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office). This process

included an in‐depth assessment of our use of force policies and practices. It also identified national

standards and best practices as they relate to officer‐involved shootings (OISs). The assessment focused

on four main areas: 1) policy and procedures; 2) training and tactics; 3) investigation and documentation;

and 4) external review.

The Office of Internal Oversight (OIO) was established in 2012. The mission of OIO was to significantly

reduce the number of use of deadly force indients. Once established, CIRT moved from ODB to OIO.

Major revisions were made to the LVMPD use of force policy, driven by two main factors: the Ninth

Circuit Court that governs our state laws and the Department’s extensive internal review process, which

clearly indicated changes were needed. Recommendations made by CNA and the ACLU were also

considered by LVMPD in drafting the new policy. Although, it was not a new concept for our officers, the

sanctity of human life statement was incorporated into the use of force policy. Upon finalization of the

new policy, the LVMPD sucessfully instructed all commissioned officers in a five‐week period. The revised

use of force policy recognized that officers do have the ability to impact the outcome of many situations

based on decision‐making and chosen tactics.

The LVMPD recently implemented a schedule for the review of the use of force policy to ensure it’s up to

date, based on law and departmental standards. The use of force policy review committee meets

quarterly to review and revise the policy.


Manpower

The downturn of the economy consequently affected the revenue available to the Department, resulting

in a decrease in the number of police officers policing our jurisdiction. As officers left the Department,

the LVMPD did not hire replacements. We have 11.6% fewer officers assigned in 2013, compared to

2009, a decrease of 321. In 2013, we were down 76 (‐3%) commissioned officers, since year‐end 2012.

The ratio of non‐deadly force incidents per officer in 2011 was 0.41. This ratio decreased by ‐0.08 per

officer, or ‐19.5% from 2011 to 2012. The ratio of 0.33 remained the same from 2012 to 2013. The

reduction in the total number of officers does not appear to have directly influenced the application of

non‐deadly force per officer, as the ratio remained constant.

2,7742,726

2,645

2,5292,453

2200

2300

2400

2500

2600

2700

2800

2900

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Officers

0.44

0.36

0.41

0.33 0.33

0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

0.50

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Use of Non‐deadly Force per Officer


Calls for Police Service

The demands for police services can be an indicator of the number incidents that may result in an officer

having to use force. The total calls for service were on a steady incline from 2009 to 2012, increasing by

253,876 calls (17.0%). However, from 2012 to 2013, calls for service decreased by 135,609 (‐7.8%).

Analysis shows, officers applied force in less than one percent of all 2013 calls for service.

1,490,617

1,652,957 1,679,612

1,744,493

1,608,884

1,350,000

1,400,000

1,450,000

1,500,000

1,550,000

1,600,000

1,650,000

1,700,000

1,750,000

1,800,000

YE 2009 YE 2010 YE 2011 YE 2012 YE 2013

Total Calls For Service


The LVMPD uses a series of “400” codes to categorize the assignment of service calls for our officers.

Citizen initiated calls for service are captured with 401‐447 codes. Officer initiated contacts are captured

with 461‐469 codes.

The number of officer‐initiated stops has continued to decrease over the past three years. From 2012 to

2013, officer‐initiated calls (400 codes 467‐469) decreased by 85,607 calls (‐15.2%). This could be due to

the deduction in the number of officers available in Patrol, as well as the time available to them between

citizen‐initiated calls for service.


Comparing the total number of calls for service per officer, there has been an overall upward trend from

2009‐2012, with an increase of 153 (28.5%). In 2013, there was a decrease of 34 (‐4.9%) from 2012. Even

though the numbers of officers declined, the calls for service also declined, reducing the number of calls

for service per officer in 2013. The limited number of officers available to handle citizen‐initiated calls has

reduced the time available for officer initiated activity. There does not appear to be a causal relationship

between the average number of calls an officer handles and the number of non‐deadly force applications

per year.

537

606 635

690656

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Total Calls for Service per Officer


Use of Force by Area of Assignment

Analysis of non‐deadly use of force by bureau of assignment depicts the Patrol Division has a significantly

higher number of non‐deadly use of force incidents. This is primarily due to the number of citizen

contacts associated with the Patrol Division in comparison to the Investigative Division.

Focusing on the Patrol Division’s non‐deadly use of force, all of the area commands are displaying a

downward trend in the number of use of force incidents. The decrease in some areas was greater than

that in others. NWAC has had the highest decrease from its high of 113 in 2009, to the low of 31 in 2013,

a decrease of ‐72.6%. DTAC has had the lowest decrease over five years, from a high of 108 incidents in

2011, to 76 in 2013, a decrease of 29.6%.

97 102 100 104

142

11399

157

47

116

146

108

89

126

9178

63

42

63 76

36

69

31

5248

6

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

BAC CCAC DTAC EAC NEAC NWAC SCAC SEAC OPSUP

Patrol Division

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013


Overall, use of non‐deadly force has been on a downward trend within the Investigative Division. Crimes

Against Youth and Family (CAYF) increased from 2009‐2012; however, this increase was insignificant

showing one use of force incident a year. Emergency Operations Bureau (EOB) decreased ten in 2012, but

increased by nine in 2013. Financial Crimes Bureau (F/PROP) showed an increasing trend involving low

numbers of incidents. Fluctuations in the Investigative Division could possibly be due to reorganization

within the Department.

From 2012 to 2013, Detention Services Division (DSD) experienced a decrease in use of force incidents,

with the exception of the North Tower Bureau (D/NTB). However, D/NTB’s incidents increased a total of

three compared to the previous year.

62 1 3

19

29

5044

1

2015

313

517

2

12

65

25

126 12

5 1 5

22 2012

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Investigative Division

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

71

59

4

27

83

55

7

4045

52

6

27

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

D/CBB D/NTB D/SOB D/STB

Detention Services Division

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013


Shift

Historically, the majority of our interactions involving use of non‐deadly force have occurred on swing

shift. This distribution has remained constant even as the overall number of use of force incidents

decreased. In 2009, 53.9% of our non‐deadly use of force incidents occurred on swing shift compared to

43.3% in 2013. From 2009 to 2011, there was an increase in the number of use of force incidents

occurring on both day and graveyard shifts, this trend reversed itself in 2012 and 2013.

The analysis for the Investigative Division, reflects swing shift has accounted for more than double the

number of use of force incidents than on other shifts. In 2013, use of force incidents were more evenly

distributed across the three shifts, with 33.7% on both day and swing shifts and 32.6% on graveyard.

Changes made to the use of force policy reference the deployment of canine reporting guidelines may be

partially responsible for this decrease (11 incidents). Also, with the depletion of our ECD inventory, the

number of ECDs assigned to the Investigative Division were reduced to those with heavy citizen contact.

274257

296

216

151174 172 181

146

89

523

358341

249183

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Patrol Division

GRAVE

DAY

SWING

28 21 28 23 27

41

30 3137 39

7886

109

85

46

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


GRAVE

DAY

SWING


The analysis of DSD depicts the number of use of force incidents has been the highest during day shift,

followed by graveyard with only a very few during swing shift. In 2012, 56.3% of DSD’s use of force

incidents occurred during day shift and 51.5% in 2013. Graveyard had 43.7% use of force incidents in

2012 and 48.5% in 2013.

7570

83

62 63

86 83

100

80

67

0 1 2 0 00

20

40

60

80

100

120

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


GRAVE

DAY

SWING


Type of Force Used

The United States Supreme Court decisions and interpretations of the Fourth Amendment of the United

States Constitution indicate a police officer may only use that force which is “objectively reasonable.”

When use of force is needed, officers must assess each incident to determine, based on policy, training

and experience, which use of force option could possibly control the situation and bring it under control

in a safe and prudent manner. Reasonable and sound judgement will dictate the force option to be

employed.

The Department had fewer non‐deadly use of force incidents in 2013 than in 2012, with a decrease of

5.2%. It is evident, based on a significantly higher reported use of “Empty Hand” and “Handcuffing,”

officers are using the lowest level of force. There was a slight increase for most non‐deadly use of force

tools in 2011. This increase corrected itself in 2012 and continued downward in 2013, with the exception

of the “Impact Tool” which increased by three incidents Department wide.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Department Wide Tool Used

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013


Patrol reported a decrease in use of non‐deadly force incidents associated with all use of force tools with

the exception of PIT. While the use of force associated with “PIT” increased 200%, it was only an increase

of four incidents.

The Investigative Division had an increase in reported useage of the “ECD” from 2009 to 2011; however,

in 2012 and 2013, there was a decrease of 46.2%. Due to a depletion of our ECD inventory in 2011, the

number of ECDs assigned to the Investigative Division was reduced to those with heavy citizen contact.

The decrease in incidents involving canine is partially due to the elimination of two officer positions and

four dogs.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Patrol Division ‐ Tool Used

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

0

20

40

60

80

100

Investigative Division ‐ Tool Used

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013


While DSD reported an increase in “Pepper Spray” (nine incidents), “ECD” (two incidents), and “Other”

(two incidents) from 2012 to 2013, overall they had a decrease of 22.0% over a five year period.

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Detention Services Division ‐ Tool Used

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013


Breakdown by Quarter

A quarterly analysis from 2012‐2013 shows an increase in the use of “Empty Hand” and “Handcuffing.”

This increase corresponds to the revised use of force policy and de‐escalation training officers received.

All other force tools reflect a decrease in their application, with the exception of “LVNR.” The application

of the “LVNR” was on an upward trend in 2013.

020406080

100120140

Type of Force Used ‐ Patrol

2012‐Q4

2013‐Q1

2013‐Q2

2013‐Q3

2013‐Q4


Patrol – Specific Tool by Area Command

The reporting mechanism used for use of force requires officers report all tools used during an incident.

It does not allow officer documentation of which tool brought the suspect into compliance, except in the

narrative portion of the report.

Electronic Control Device (ECD)

SCAC had a spike in “ECD” usage in the first quarter of 2013 (an increase of nine) and again in the third

quarter (an increase of seven). Analysis of SCAC incidents in the first quarter of 2013, “ECD” usage

appeared to be reasonable under the circumstances. In three of eight incidents (37.5%) the “ECD” was

reportedly ineffective. Further analysis identified that the ECD was ineffective in two incidents due to the

spread of the prongs. In the third incident, the prongs missed the suspect when the officer deployed the

“ECD.”

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

BAC CCAC DTAC EAC NEAC NWAC SCAC SEAC

ECD ‐ Patrol

2012‐Q4

2013‐Q1

2013‐Q2

2013‐Q3

2013‐Q4


Empty Hand and Handcuffing

Overall, “Empty Hand” and “Handcuffing” are most frequently used to gain control of a suspect, and are

only considered reportable when a subject is injured or complains of injury. DTAC, who is responsible for

the law enforcement activity within the Las Vegas Downtown area, had the most reportable uses of force

incidents involving “Empty Hand” and “Handcuffing.” The only exception was CCAC in third quarter 2013,

with 31, whose responsibilities include the Las Vegas Strip area.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35


Empty Hand ‐ Patrol

2012‐Q4

2013‐Q1

2013‐Q2

2013‐Q3

2013‐Q4

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14


Handcuffing ‐ Patrol

2012‐Q4

2013‐Q1

2013‐Q2

2013‐Q3

2013‐Q4


Impact Tool

Due to the rare use of the “Impact Tool,” its use may depict large spikes on the graph below. In comparing

BAC from first quarter to fourth quarter 2013, the change is only five uses over a six month period, and

for DTAC a decrease of two incidents from third quarter to fourth quarter 2013.

Further analysis of the incidents in BAC determined four officers were involved in the same use of force

incident involving a suspect depicting signs of excited delerium. The suspect reportedly ran from officers,

accessing the balcony of an unrelated citizen. During the incident, the suspect armed himself with a

metal broom and began jabbing at the officers. Additional force tools were considered but due to the

suspect’s clothing and his distance from the officers, they were believed to be ineffective. The supect

further utilized a screen door as a shield and attempted to gain access to the residence. The consecutive

deployment of the officer’s impact tools was determined to be reasonable, as officers were not striking

the suspect simaltaniously, but were rather fending off the suspect as he attempted to attack each officer

individually.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7


Impact Tool ‐ Patrol

2012‐Q4

2013‐Q1

2013‐Q2

2013‐Q3

2013‐Q4


LVNR

The Lateral Vascular Neck Restraint (LVNR®) is a specific method of applying pressure to the side of a

subject’s neck to overcome resistance and allow safe control. The “LVNR” was used in five incidents at

CCAC in the fourth quarter 2013. As previously mentioned, caution is advised when interpreting the

fluctuations in the graph below, the change of two incidents over a three month period is not as extreme

as it appears. In each use of force incident, the suspects were non‐compliant and the application of

“LVNR” appeared objectively reasonable.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6


LVNR ‐ Patrol

2012‐Q4

2013‐Q1

2013‐Q2

2013‐Q3

2013‐Q4


Pepper Spray and Other

The analysis of “Pepper Spray” as a use of force tool resulted in a difference of one incident. Officers

utilized the category “Other” when articulating the use of knee strikes or when something not specifically

related to use of force tools caused injury. Further analysis revealed that in some incidents, suspects

intentionally caused injury to themselves not realted to an officer’s use of force tool.

The use of both “Pepper Spray” and “Other” appears to be equally distributed between all area

commands.

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5


Pepper Spray ‐ Patrol

2012‐Q4

2013‐Q1

2013‐Q2

2013‐Q3

2013‐Q4

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9


Other Tool Used ‐ Patrol

2012‐Q4

2013‐Q1

2013‐Q2

2013‐Q3

2013‐Q4


Tenure of Involved Officers

Patrol officers are the most active and have the highest frequency of citizen contact. The tenure in Patrol

began to increase as officers left the Department and positions were not filled. During the past five years,

more than half of the officers involved in a use of force incident had a tenure of 1‐3 years. This reflects

the reality that newer officers made up a large portion of the officers assigned to patrol.

Patrol Division

Yrs of Employment 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

< 1 YR 59 6.08% 17 2.16% 4 0.49% 0 0.00% 1 0.24%

1‐3 YR 527 54.27% 404 51.33% 383 46.82% 191 31.26% 48 11.35%

4‐5 YRS 120 12.36% 144 18.30% 220 26.89% 230 37.64% 186 43.97%

6‐10 YRS 152 15.65% 122 15.50% 117 14.30% 110 18.00% 118 27.90%

11‐20 YRS 98 10.09% 86 10.93% 77 9.41% 71 11.62% 70 16.55%

>21 YRS 15 1.54% 14 1.78% 17 2.08% 9 1.47% 0 0.00%

971 787 818 611 423

In 2013, patrol officers with less than five

years of service had a higher rate of non‐

deadly use of force (55.56%) than officers

with more than five years of service

(34.61%).

Yrs of Employment

% COMM OFFICERS

% USING FORCE

DIFF

< 1YR 0.17% 0.24% 0.07%

1‐3 YRS 3.68% 11.35% 7.67%

4‐5 YRS 30.76% 43.97% 13.21%

6‐10 YRS 41.22% 27.90% ‐13.32%

11‐20 YRS 21.59% 16.54% ‐5.04%

>21 YRS 2.57% 0.00% ‐2.57%

Total 100.00% 100.00%


Due to minimal interdepartment transfers, in 2013 the tenure of the officers assigned to the Investigative

Division increased.



< 1 YR 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%

1‐3 YR 12 8.16% 4 2.92% 13 7.74% 3 2.07% 0 0.00%

4‐5 YRS 16 10.88% 22 16.06% 65 38.69% 14 9.66% 4 4.82%

6‐10 YRS 63 42.86% 33 24.09% 83 49.40% 36 24.83% 29 34.94%

11‐20 YRS 49 33.33% 65 47.45% 7 4.17% 82 56.55% 40 48.19%

>21 YRS 7 4.76% 13 9.49% 0 0.00% 10 6.90% 10 12.05%

147 137 168 145 83

Officers within the Investigative Division with 6‐

10 years of service reportedly used non‐deadly

force at a higher frequency than officers with 11

or more years of service.

Yrs of Employment

% COMM OFFICERS

% USING FORCE

DIFF

< 1YR 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%

1‐3 YRS 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%

4‐5 YRS 2.70% 4.82% 2.12%

6‐10 YRS 22.61% 34.94% 12.33%

11‐20 YRS 58.49% 48.19% ‐10.30%

>21 YRS 16.20% 12.05% ‐4.15%

Total 100.00% 100.00%




< 1YR 2 1.24% 7 4.55% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 0.77%

1‐3 YRS 28 17.39% 17 11.04% 23 12.43% 3 2.11% 0 0.00%

4‐5 YRS 25 1.24% 16 10.39% 25 13.51% 26 18.31% 13 10.00%

6‐10 YRS 71 44.10% 81 52.60% 90 48.65% 64 45.07% 59 45.38%

11‐20 YRS 31 1.24% 31 20.13% 46 24.86% 46 32.39% 57 43.85%

>21 YRS 4 2.48% 2 1.30% 1 0.54% 3 2.11% 0 0.00%

Total 161 154 185 142 130

The tenure for officers at DSD also increased. Officers with 4‐5 years of service reported a decrease in use of force incidents 2013, while those with 6‐20 years reported an increase.

Officers at DSD with 0‐3 years or 11 or more

years of service used non‐deadly force at a

higher frequency than officers with 4‐10

years of service.

Yrs of Employment

% COMM OFFICERS

% USING FORCE

DIFF

< 1YR 2.40% 0.77% ‐1.47%

1‐3 YRS 5.66% 0.00% ‐5.66%

4‐5 YRS 9.54% 10.00% 0.46%

6‐10 YRS 35.62% 45.38% 9.76%

11‐20 YRS 44.11% 43.85% ‐0.26%

>21 YRS 2.83% 0.00% ‐2.83%

Total 100.16% 100.00%


Ethnicity

The graph below correlates the ethnicity and gender of officers with suspect information. The ethnicity

and gender of the officers who used force are then compared to the population share of our

commissioned work force. The percentage of white male officers who have applied force (73.5%) is the

only category with a larger percentage than that of our commissioned workforce (64.4%), which depicts

more white officers are using force. Black males comprised the highest percentage of suspects having

force used on them (30.3%).


Informal Assessment of Subject

The informal assessment (captured in Blue Team) is the officer’s initial observation of the suspect’s

mental state, based on their belief of mental illness, drugs or alcohol, or any other unknown factor.

The assessment made by both Patrol and the Investigative Division is very similar. In over half of the

incidents, the informal assessment stated the suspect was under the influence of “Drugs/Alcohol.” In

nearly a third, the informal assessment is stated as “Unknown” and 15% involved a “Mentally Ill” suspect.

LVMPD first developed our Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) program in 2003 to handle incidents involving

persons in crisis with a response which is appropriate to the needs of the individual involved. The

desirable option is to divert certain persons away from the criminal justice system and toward treatment,

whenever available and appropriate.

To better equip our officers with the growing need to interact with the mentally ill, CIT re‐certification

training was designed and initiated in 2012.

Drugs Alcohol57%

Mentally Ill4%

Mentally Ill/Under Influence

10%

Unknown29%

Patrol ‐ Informal Assessment

Drugs Alcohol54%

Mentally Ill4%

Mentally Ill/Under Influence

11%

Unknown31%

Investigative Division‐Informal Assessment


The informal assessment of “Unknown”made by corrections officers at DSD plays a roll in the 80% of use

of force incidents and could be directly associated with the length of time a suspect has been incarcarated

in conjunction with the lack of access to drugs and alcohol. DSD reportedly assessed only 7% as

“Drugs/Alcohol.”

Those assessments of the “Mentally Ill” reflected

similar statistics between Patrol, the Investigative

Division and DSD, which totaled 13%.


Officer Injuries

The number of officer injuries in Patrol decreased from 158 in 2009 to 115 in 2013, a decrease of 43

(27.22%). Incidents involving injury increased from 16.27% in 2009 to 27.17% in 2013. Due to the number

of use of force incidents substantially decreasing for the same time frame, statistically more officers are

reportedly injured during use of force incidents. The percentage of officers going to the hospital for an

injury resulting from a non‐deadly use of force in 2012 and 2013 was substantially higher than in the

previous years.

Patrol Division

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Officer Injured INJURED HOSPITAL INJURED HOSPITAL INJURED HOSPITAL INJURED HOSPITAL INJURED HOSPITAL

No 813 960 651 770 676 812 495 586 308 403

Yes 158 11 136 17 142 6 116 25 115 20

971 787 818 611 423

% OF INCIDENTS 16.27% 1.13% 17.28% 2.16% 17.36% 0.73% 18.99% 4.09% 27.19% 4.73%

The number of officer injuries in the Investigative Division has decreased by eight from 2009 to 2013. Due

to the number of use of force incidents substantially decreasing for the same time frame (‐56),

statistically more officers are reportedly injured during use of force incidents. The number of officers

going to the hospital for an injury resulting from a non‐deadly use of force in the past five years has been

minimal.


2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


No 123 142 117 135 146 168 131 143 67 80

Yes 24 5 20 2 22 14 2 16 3

147 137 168 145 83

% OF INCIDENTS 16.33% 3.40% 14.60% 1.46% 13.10% 0.00% 9.66% 1.38% 19.28% 3.61%


In 2011 and 2012, the number of DSD officer injuries from non‐deadly use of force incidents was on an

upward trend. In 2013, both the number of officers and the use of non‐deadly force incidents decreased.


2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


No 146 159 138 154 158 184 118 140 110 127

Yes 15 2 16 27 1 24 2 20 3

161 154 185 142 130

% OF INCIDENTS 9.32% 1.24% 10.39% 0.00% 14.59% 0.54% 16.90% 1.41% 15.38% 2.31%


Suspect Injuries

The number of suspects injured by Patrol officers in non‐deadly use of force incidents in 2013 (307) was

less than half of the number injured in 2009 (621). As explained earlier, due to the total number of use of

force incidents decreasing, statistically the number of suspects with reported injuries has increased. This

also holds true with the number of suspects seeking treatment at hospitals.

Patrol Division

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Suspect Injured INJURED HOSPITAL INJURED HOSPITAL INJURED HOSPITAL INJURED HOSPITAL INJURED HOSPITAL

No 350 790 284 632 279 691 155 465 116 327

Yes 621 181 503 155 539 127 456 146 307 96

971 787 818 611 423

% OF INCIDENTS 63.95% 18.64% 63.91% 19.70% 65.89% 15.53% 74.63% 23.90% 72.58% 22.70%

The Investigative Division reported 62 (42.8%) fewer non‐deadly use of force incidents from 2012 to 2013.

The number of incidents resulting in suspect injuries decreased by 44 (‐39.6%). The number of suspects

requiring hospital attention for injuries from non‐deadly use of force incidents decreased by 17 (‐39.5%).


2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


No 43 120 41 116 58 136 34 101 16 57

Yes 104 27 96 21 110 32 111 43 67 26

147 137 168 145 83

% OF INCIDENTS 70.75% 18.37% 70.07% 15.33% 65.48% 19.05% 76.55% 29.66% 80.72% 31.33%


The number of suspects injured in use of force incidents at DSD was fairly consistent from 2012 to 2013

with an increase of only one. The total number of use of force incidents has increased, the percentage of

those resulting in injuries also increased. There was a spike in the number of suspects going to the

hospital in 2012, but this number decreased again in 2013.


2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


No 54 160 54 153 55 178 51 131 40 122

Yes 107 1 100 1 130 7 91 11 90 8

161 154 185 142 130

% OF TOTAL 66.46% 0.62% 64.94% 0.65% 70.27% 3.78% 64.08% 7.75% 69.23% 6.15%


Injuries by Force Used

Due to the officers’ reporting mechanism, when more than one tool is used, it is difficult to determine

which tool casued the injuries. Of the 83 Incidents where “Empty Hand” force was used, the suspect

complained of injury in 53 of them (64%). Officers were reportedly injured in 10 (19%) of the incidents.

The majority of injuries appear to be a result of the suspect continuing to resist when an officer is trying

to place them into handcuffs. Also, suspects reportedly received abrasions and cuts as they intentionally

injured themselves during incidents involving the police.

10

1

53

2 510

2

114 1

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Injuries By Force Used

Officer Injury

Suspect Injury


Suspect Injuries and Those Requiring Hospitalization

In analyzing suspect injuries with those requiring hospitalization, of the 53 incidents where the suspect

claimed an injury from “Empty Hand,” 13 (25%) requested to go to the hospital. However, as with all

instances where the suspect requested to go to the hospital, the cause was not always due to the force

used. Some were transported for Excited Delirium, Legal 2000’s, prior unrealated accidents , and other

miscellaneous medical issues, such as high blood pressure. There is no direct correlation with the type of

force used and hospitalization. The numbers could be misleading without a further analyzing the facts of

the report.

53

25

10

2

11

4 1

13

1 2 2 2 0 10

10

20

30

40

50

60

Suspect Injuries and Those Requiring Hospital

Suspect Injury

Suspect Hospital


Informal Observation of Suspect

The informal observation documents a suspect's behavior during a use of force incident. These have

fluctuated only mildly over the past five years. The only observation that has not been somewhat

constant is “Visibly Upset,” with a decrease in 2012 and an increase in 2013.

Suspect Actions

The number of officers reporting suspects classified as “Fighting” increased consistently from 2011‐2013.

In 2011, 5.12% were classified as “Fighting.” The increase was substantial from 5.12% to 39.94%.

The number of suspects characterized as “Attempting to Flee” decreased from 2012 to 2013.

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

% of To

tal U

oF Reports

Informal Observation

Suicidal

Visibly Upset

Erratic

Highly Agitated

Argumentative


Suspect Weapon

The classification of the suspect’s weapons in the initial observation has remained consistently low.

Edged weapon has fluctuated around 2.0‐3.0%. The classification of “Other” has fluctuated the greatest,

from 23.19% in 2010, to 15.81% in 2012. This reversed slightly in 2013, increasing to 17.14%.

0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

15.00%

20.00%

25.00%

30.00%

35.00%

40.00%

45.00%

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

% of To

tal U

oF Reports

Suspect Actions

Fighting

Threats

Attempt to Flee(Running/Flight)

Attempt to Escape

Attempt to Injure

Spitting/Body Fluids

Punching/Striking

Kicking

0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

15.00%

20.00%

25.00%

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

% of To

tal U

oF Reports

Suspect Weapon

Projectile

Impact Weapon

Edged Weapon

Animal

Vehicle Assault

Firearm

Other


Statement of Complaint – Use of Force

The LVMPD received 172 allegations of excessive force used in 2013, compared to 180 in 2012 (a

decrease of 8 or 4%). In 2012, these allegations were substantially higher in both June (24) and July (26);

however, in 2013, allegations of excessive use of force were more evenly distributed. In 2013, most

excessive use of force allegations occurred in January, with 20.

Conclusion

The LVMPD has analyzed the use of both deadly and non‐deadly force on an annual basis for a number of

years, however, the more frequent analysis is a new development. As we proceed through this new

process, these reports will continue to evolve and improve to become as useful and actionable as

possible.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC

Statement of Complaint ‐ Use of Force

2012

2013

Documents

Office of Internal Oversight - Las Vegas Metropolitan Police … · 2017-05-02 · Prepared by the Office of Internal Oversight / FACT Team Page 11 of 39 Comparing the total number