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A University of Sussex PhD thesis
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URBANGOVERNANCE,LANDCONFLICTSANDSEGREGATIONINHARGEISA,SOMALILAND:HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVESANDCONTEMPORARYDYNAMICS
ABDIFATAHITAHIR
ThisthesisissubmittedtotheDepartmentofGeography,SchoolofGlobalStudies,UniversityofSussex,inpartialfulfilmentoftherequirementsfor
thedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophy(PhD)
OCTOBER1,2016
DEPARTMENTOFGEOGRAPHYSCHOOLOFGLOBALSTUDIES
UNIVERSITYOFSUSSEX
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ORIGINALITYSTATEMENT
Iherebydeclarethatthisthesishasnotbeenandwillnotbesubmittedinwholeorinpartto
anotherUniversityfortheawardofanyotherdegree.
Signature
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I. ABSTRACT
ThisthesisoffersanexplanationforwhyurbansettlementinSomaliland’scapitalcityofHargeisa
issegregatedalongclanlines.Thetopicofurbansegregationhasbeenneglectedinbothclassic
Somali studies, and recent studies of post-war state-building and governance in Somaliland.
Suchnegligenceofurbangovernanceindebatesoverstate-makingstemsfromapredominant
focusonnationalandregionallevels,whichoverlookstheinstitutionsgoverningcities.Yeturban
governancecanprovidekeyinsightsintothenatureandqualityofinteractionbetweenpeople
andthelocalstate,andtheprocessesofmakingandunmakingofSomaliurbanspaces.Given
therapidurbangrowthintheSomalipopulatedterritories,Iproposeashiftinfocustoexplore
city spaces, as a means of deepening understanding of Somali social, political and spatial
organisation. In advancing this proposed shift, the thesis scrutinises the nexus between
governanceandsegregation inHargeisa,drawingonurbanethnographicmethods, interview
and archival sources. I argue that segregation in the city can be understood as the spatial
manifestationofgovernancepracticesacrosscolonialandpostcolonialperiods,inintersection
withbottomupprocesses,particularlythequestforsecurityandpeacebuildinginwhatislargely
characterisedasahybridorder.Theconceptofhybridgovernance–whilecapturingimportant
aspectsofcontrolovercityspace-isofteninsufficientlyhistoricisedandpoliticisedtoconvey
the complex intersection of state institutions, clan and sub-clan allegiance and traditional
authorities.Myanalysisthussituatesrecenturbangovernanceandconflictsoverlandinalonger
history of municipal governance, urban land administration and conflict adjudication. This
historical perspective is important for the understanding of how segregation has been
reproduced over time, and adds a new dimension to the understandings of the drivers and
dynamicsofHargeisa’sspatialcharacter.
KEYWORDS:Urban,Segregation,State-building,Governance,Hybrid(ity),Customary,andClan
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II. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Firstandforemost,Iwouldliketothankmysupervisor,ProfJoAnnMcGregor,withoutwhose
tremendousandcontinuoussupportthisresearchwouldnothavebeenpossibletocomplete.
ProfMcGregor’sselflesstimeandattentionaswellasherhelpfulcommentsandconstructive
critiqueshavesharpenedmythoughtsandpushedmetocriticalboundariesthatallowedmeto
lookatissuesfromdiverseperspectives.ImustsaythatIcouldnothavepossiblyaskedfora
bettersupervisor.Iwouldalsoliketothankmysecondarysupervisor,DrCeriOeppen,forher
supportandvaluableadviceandcommentsinmeetingsandondrafts.
Similarly,mythanksgototheObservatoryofConflictandViolencePreventioninHargeisawhich
notonlyfundedthisstudypartiallybutalsoprovidedmewithconnectionsandlogisticalsupport.
I am particularly indebted to its Director, Abdullahi Odowa, the Head of the Research
Department,AhmedMuse,theHeadoftheLogisticsandHumanResourcesDepartment,Safia
Ali,andthedrivers,MohamedandSaad.IndispensablealsowassupportfromtheDepartment
forInternationalDevelopment(DFID),andIparticularlywishtothankMrIvanParkswhowas
inspirational and helpful at all times. Equally, I am indebted to thank the academic and
administrativecommunityoftheUniversityofSussexDoctoralSchoolforco-fundingthestudy
andSchoolofGlobalStudiesfortheirdistinctiveengagementandsupportindiscussions,deeds
anddealings.
Mythanksalsogotoallthepeoplewhoeitherfacilitatedaccesstoinformationorprovidedme
withdatainbothoralandwrittenforms.Becauseofthelimitationsinspace,Icannotmention
themallbutafew,includingMohamedAbdi,MohamedDiriye,AbdifatahIbrahim,Mohamed
Hussein,MohamedFarah,HusseinSamatar,IbrahimIdle,andJamalQawdan.Ialsowouldlike
tothankalltheotherindividualsorinstitutionsthathelpedmeinsomeformorshapeinthe
processofconductingthisresearch,whomIhavenotimplicitlyorexplicitlyacknowledged.Last
but not least, I wish to thankmy familymemberswhose names I cannot, for practical and
politicalreasons(entirelydomesticinnature),listhere.
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III. LISTOFFIGURES
Figure1:MapofHargeisa..........................................................................................................13
Figure2:SomalilandAdministrativeMap..................................................................................14
Figure3:TheannualDistributionofCaseshandledbytheLandCommissions,2009-13........141
Figure4:TheSpatialDistributionofLandDisputesHandledbytheLandCommissions,2009-13
..................................................................................................................................................142
Figure5:ActiveConflictonaPlotofLandinMasalaha,aneighbourhoodinSouthernHargeisa
..................................................................................................................................................157
Figure6:Weaponsusedintheattack,asclaimedbysecurityofficials...................................200
Figure7:Governmentofficialsspeakingtothemediaintheaftermathoftheincident.........201
IV. LISTOFTABLES
Table1:Urbanandruralpopulation,urbanproportionandaverageannualrateofchange....10
Table2:Therangeofkeyinformantandgeneralinterviews.....................................................53
Table3:Thelistoffocusgroups.................................................................................................54
Table4:NumberofflightsinHargeisaEgalInternationalAirport...........................................165
Table5:TheVolume(Kg)ofcargoHandledatHargeisaAirport..............................................166
Table6:TheNumberofPassengersHandledatHargeisaAirport...........................................166
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V. LISTOFABBREVIATIONS
APD AcademyforPeaceandDevelopmentCACAS CivilAviationCaretakerAuthorityforSomaliaDC DistrictCommissionerDRC DanishRefugeeCouncilDDF DistrictDevelopmentFrameworkDFID DepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentICAO InternationalCivilAviationOrganisationIFC InternationalFinanceCorporationINGO InternationalNon-GovernmentalOrganisationsJPLG JointProgramforLocalGovernanceLUMI LandUrbanManagementInstituteMA MinistryofAgricultureMCAAT MinistryofCivilAviationandAirTransportMD MinistryofDefenceMFA MinistryofForeignAffairsMH MinistryofHealthMI MinistryofInformationMJ MinistryofJusticeML MinistryofLivestockMMR MinistryofMineralResourcesMNPD MinistryofNationalPlanningandDevelopmentMOI MinistryofInteriorMOP MinistryoftheOfficeofthePresidencyMPT MinistryofPostsandTelecommunicationsMPWHT MinistryofPublicWorks,HousingandTransportationMRDE MinistryofRuralDevelopmentandEnvironmentNUPI NationalUrbanPlanningBoardNGO Non-GovernmentalOrganisationOCVP ObservatoryofConflictandViolencePreventionPC ProvincialCommissionerRDP ReconstructionandDevelopmentProgramRRA RahanweynResistanceArmySNL SomaliNationalLeagueSM SpokesmanMovementSNM SomaliNationalMovementSORADI SocialResearchandDevelopmentInstituteSPR StandardsandRecommendedPracticesSSP StateSafetyProgramsSYL SomaliYouthLeagueUCID UrurkaCadaaladaiyoDaryeelkaUDUB UrurkaDimuqraadigaUmmaddaBahawdayUN UnitedNationsUN-Habitat UnitedNationsHabitatProgramUNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramWB WorldBank
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TABLEOFCONTENTS
CHAPTER1 INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................9
1.1 WhyHargeisa?................................................................................................................11
1.2 ResearchAimsandQuestions........................................................................................14
1.3 StructureoftheThesis...................................................................................................15
CHAPTER2 DEBATINGHYBRIDGOVERNANCEANDSEGREGATION.............................20
2.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................20
2.2 HybridGovernanceandSomaliState(Re–)Formation.................................................20
2.2.1 ConceptualisingHybridPoliticalOrders.................................................................22
2.2.2 RecentSomaliState-BuildingandHybridity...........................................................24
2.2.3 RoleofCustomaryInstitutionsinHybridity............................................................30
2.3 BeyondHybridity:Legitimacy,TrustandSegregation...................................................34
2.3.1 UnderstandingLegitimacyandTrust......................................................................35
2.3.2 ConceptualisingUrbanSegregation.......................................................................40
2.3.3 CausesandImpactofSegregation.........................................................................42
2.3.4 HargeisaasaSegregatedSpace.............................................................................45
2.4 Conclusion......................................................................................................................50
CHAPTER3 NEGOTIATINGDATACOLLECTIONINASEGREGATEDCITY........................51
3.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................51
3.2 BriefOverviewofDataSources......................................................................................51
3.3 InstitutionalAffiliationandAccessibilityofInformants.................................................57
3.4 NegotiatingResearchinStateandNon-StateSpheres..................................................59
3.5 The‛ConflictinSitting’Parlours?SomaliTeashops.......................................................64
3.6 ‛OverHere’:Ex-PublicOfficialsandArchivalMaterials..................................................65
3.7 EthicalConsiderationsandLimitationoftheResearch..................................................66
3.8 Conclusion......................................................................................................................68
CHAPTER4 HISTORICISINGURBANGOVERNANCEINHARGEISA.................................70
4.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................70
4.2 LocalGovernmentinaLateColonialContext:PolicyandResistance............................71
4.3 BoggedDownintheColony?CivilianRule.....................................................................79
4.4 BreakingwiththePast?MilitaryRule............................................................................83
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4.5 Re-establishingLocalGovernance:Post-Conflict...........................................................87
4.6 Conclusion......................................................................................................................96
CHAPTER5 HISTORIESOFTOPDOWNURBANLANDMANAGEMENT..........................97
5.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................97
5.2 EmergenceandContinuityofTopDownLandManagement........................................98
5.3 Development(s)ofPost-ConflictLandAdministrationandLandConflicts..................111
5.4 AccesstoLandandtheAlienationofthePoor............................................................119
5.5 Conclusion....................................................................................................................123
CHAPTER6 PLURALADJUDICATIONOFURBANLANDCONFLICTS.............................124
6.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................124
6.2 PluralJustice:HarmonisationandReforms..................................................................124
6.3 JudicialChallengesandtheirEffectonStateLegitimacy..............................................129
6.4 TowardsSpecialisedIntervention:LandCommission..................................................139
6.5 LandCommission:AdjudicationofaSelectedCase.....................................................145
6.6 WeakState?DynamicsandDilemmasofEnforcement...............................................153
6.7 Conclusion....................................................................................................................158
CHAPTER7 LEGITIMATIONFUNCTIONOFURBANLANDCONFLICTS.........................160
7.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................160
7.2 PushingtheBoundary:ThePastAirportExpansions...................................................161
7.3 TerritorialControlandSignificanceoftheAirport.......................................................164
7.4 AirportasaSiteforStateLegitimation........................................................................168
7.5 ExpropriationRationaleandResistance.......................................................................171
7.6 Mediation,ValuationandCompensation....................................................................179
7.7 Conclusion....................................................................................................................191
CHAPTER8 SECURITYIMPACTOFVIOLENTURBANLANDCONFLICTS.......................193
8.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................193
8.2 UrbanSecurityinaSomaliSetting:TheStatusQuo.....................................................193
8.3 UpsettingtheStatusquo:TheEarlyMorningWarCall................................................196
8.4 CourtMartialandPostViolenceCustomaryMediation...............................................199
8.5 Conclusion....................................................................................................................206
CHAPTER9 CONCLUSION.............................................................................................208
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BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................................................216
APPENDIXES.....................................................................................................................235
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CHAPTER1 INTRODUCTION
Somalilandhasattractedasignificantresearchinterestinthelasttwoandhalfdecades,focused
onpost-conflictpeace-buildingandthe‘hybridity’ofstateinstitutions.Thishasshedimportant
lightontheroleofclaneldersinnegotiatingaplacewithinthestate,andhasgivenbirthtoa
widerdebateabouthybridityinAfricanstateinstitutions.Itis,however,importanttopointout
thatthedebatesonpost-conflictstateformationinSomalilandoveremphasisehybridityasa
departure from the past, notwithstanding the fact that the trajectory of state building in
Somalilandshowsevidenceofcyclicalreproductionofstatutoryinstitutionsandtheirpractices
(Hoehne,2009).Inadditiontothisover-elaborationofthenoveltyofclanauthoritywithinthe
state,thecurrentdebatesoverhybrid-statebuildingarelimitedinseveralways.Firstly,these
studiesareaimedatthenationalorsemi-nationallevel,largelyoverlookingurbanauthorityand
citygovernance[exceptionsincludeGandrup(2014)andHagmann(2015)];secondly,theyfocus
on the intersection between the central state and peace-building, paying scant attention to
everydayinstitutionalpracticesinthemoremundanerolesofregulatinganddeliveringservices;
andthirdly,theyneglectthenexusbetweenclan-basedurbansegregationandgovernance.
Thisthesis,whichisfocusedonthegovernanceofSomaliland’scapitalcityofHargeisa,begins
toredresstheselimitations,byaddressingthedearthofknowledgeaboutpost-conflicturban
authority and spatial form. The shift in focus from the national to the urban level is
fundamentallyimportantbecausethelocalandmorespecificallytheurbanisthesitewherethe
vastmajority of people “come into contactwith ‘the state’ and this iswheremany of their
images of the state are forged”(Gupta, 1995, p. 376).Moreover, almost 40% of the Somali
populationnowliveincities,1withanestimatedannualgrowthof4.6%between2010-2015(The
WorldFactbook,2015b).The trend isexpected to rise further sharplyas currentprojections
predicturbanpopulationgrowthof270%by2050–Seetable1below(UN,2014).Relatedto
this, focussing on the city can enable us to examine the everyday practices and quality of
interactionbetweenthepeopleandthelocalstatemorecloselyandhencegaincomprehensive
analytical understanding of the politics and practices of governance in the post-conflict
Somalilandcontextwhereinstitutionsareinaformativeorreformativestate.
1UrbanpopulationsinSomaliahavealsorisenby125%between1990to2014withanannualrateofchangeof1.2.See(UN,2014).
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Table1:Urbanandruralpopulation,urbanproportionandaverageannualrateofchange
SOMALIA:URBANANDRURALPOPULATION,PERCENTILEPROPORTIONOFURBANPOPULATION,ANDAVERAGEANNUALRATEOFCHANGE
Urban RuralProportionofUrban
(percent)
Averageannualrateofchange
(percent)Year 1990 2014 2050 1990 2014 2050 1990 2014 2050
(inthousands) 1875 4223 15664 4447 6583 11412 30 39 58 1.2
Source:(UN,2014)
Inthisthesis,Itakeahistoricalapproachtoanalysethehithertounexploredlinkbetweenurban
governanceandsegregation,focusingspecificallyonmunicipalgovernance,landadministration,
andconflictadjudication.Thishistoricalapproachisimportantbecauseitcanshedlightonthe
rootsofcurrenturbansegregationandcanexplainhowgovernancepracticesnotonlyshaped
butalsoreinforcedpeople’son-goingsuspicionofthestate,whichinturncontributedtothe
perpetuationofsegregationofcitiesinSomaliland.
Thethesisprovidesthefirstin-depthanalysisofHargeisacityspace.Iexaminetherelationship
betweenurbansegregationandgovernance,arguingthaturbansegregationispartlyaspatial
manifestationoftherelationshipbetweenthestateinstitutionswithauthorityovercityspace
andthepublic.Equally, IarguethatthepresentsegregatedurbanforminHargeisahasbeen
cyclicallyconfiguredandreconfiguredovertime,throughgovernancepracticesmanyofwhich
createacontinuumbetweenepisodesofcolonialandpostcolonialcivilianandmilitaryrule.The
presentdiscussionsoverhybridgovernanceignorethesecontinuities,astheirmajorfocusisto
point out the relative difference in peace and stability between Somaliland and the rest of
Somalia. In theprocess, Somaliland’s state institutionsare representedasan idealmodelof
governanceforSomalis.Thiscelebratoryapproach(over)emphasisesthekeymediatingrolesof
‘traditional’authorities,suchastheclanelders,Akils,andSultans2,instate-buildingandservice
provision,andimplicitlyrepresentstheirinvolvementasanewphenomenon.Butthisisbyno
meansneworunique.Infact,customaryinstitutionshadoftenplayedakeyroleinbothcolonial
and postcolonial administrations. For this reason, it is also important to go beyond existing
2 Akils and Sultans are traditional authorities mainly found in Somaliland. The Sultans are higher inhierarchyasheistheleaderofalargerclanconglomerate.TheAkilsarechiefswhoareofteninvolvedinthedaytodaygovernanceandmediationofclanpolitics.
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debatesover 'hybridity' tounderstandurban institutionsand their role in theemergenceof
Hargeisa’s spatial character. The specific conflicts examined in this thesis do not point to
integrated/fusedlocalstateinstitutions,butrathertoplurality,coexistenceandcontradiction.
1.1 WhyHargeisa?
This study focuses on Hargeisa, Somaliland (See map of the city on page 13)3, which is a
particularlyinterestingsiteforastudyofurbanformandspatialdynamics,giventhepaucityof
existingscholarship,andthepotential forresearchontheneglectedmunicipalauthoritiesto
contribute tobroaderdebatesabout statehybridityand institutionalpluralism,aswellas to
debates overAfrican cities and segregation. The studywashosted and co-sponsoredby the
Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP), which is a non-profit institution in
Hargeisaestablishedin2009toconductresearchonpeacebuilding.Thisstudycomplementsand
extendstheOCVP’sexistingresearchonpost-conflictgovernance,conflict,security,andjustice.
AsaformerHargeisaresidentandemployeeofOCVP,theresearchhasbenefitedfromthefact
thatmyprofessional,socialandpersonalnetworksareconcentratedinthiscity.Animportant
elementofmydecisiontofocusonHargeisaalsorelatestothefactthatitisSomaliland’sbiggest
city inboth geographical andpopulation terms (though,due to theabsenceof censusdata,
populationsizeestimationsrelyongoodguessesbasedontriangulationsofsecondarydatafrom
varioussources).TheInternationalNon-GovernmentalOrganisations(INGOs),UnitedNations’
agencies,localandcentralgovernmentsuseworkingfiguresrangingfrom400000to1200000
(TheWorldFactbook,2015a,HM,2010,Demographia,2016,WPR,2016).
Forthesereasons,themakingandun-makingofurbansegregationinHargeisaisofparticular
significance.Thecity’sdistinctivesegregatedclan-basedspatialformdatesbacktothecolonial
period, when the administrative functions of the state were not in Hargeisa, but were
concentratedinandlargelylimitedtothecoastaltownsofZeila,BulaharandBerberawiththe
latterservingastheseatofgovernmentandremainingtobesofornearly57outof85yearsin
whichSomalilandwaspartoftheBritishEmpire.ThecapitalwasmovedtoHargeisain1942and
itbecametheseatoftheprotectorate’sgovernment.Thecolonialperiodwascharacterisedby
an authoritarian governance of the city mediated by clan authorities. The importance of
Hargeisabothinadministrativeandeconomictermsdeclinedduringthepostcolonialciviland
military period, when it was significantly overshadowed by Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital.
3SeealsothemapofSomalilandonpage14.
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Administratively, the colonial-era authoritarian governance of the city mediated by clan
authoritiescontinuedtoshapethesegregationofurbanspaceinHargeisa.Ininstanceswhere
theauthoritariangovernmentwasabletocreateanenvironmentinwhichcosmopolitanspaces
emerged, these were then subsequently undone by the reintroduction of clan-based state
politics,whichbyimplicationmadeclan-protectionessential.Hargeisaregaineditsimportance
intheregionwhenSomalilandreinstateditsindependenceunilaterallyfromtherestofSomalia
in 1991, reclaiming its statehood on the basis of the colonial administrative boundaries
developedoveraperiodof85yearsunderBritishcolonialrule.Duringthisperiodsegregation
inthecitycontinuedalongthesameclan-basedlinesprimarilybecauseofthestate’sinabilityto
guarantee the security of urban citizens. All of this makes it ideal to extend or question
(celebratory) debates of hybrid peace-building by focusing on neglected city space and
authority,where subjects/citizens encounter the local state on a daily basis, andwhere the
manifestationoflackoftrusthasrepeatedlyfosteredatrendtowardsspatialsegregation.
Itisimportantheretonotethatclanidentityshapesnotonlytherelationshipbetweenthestate
and the public but it also plays a crucial role in the social and economic life of residents in
Hargeisa. For instance, employment opportunities are to a significant degree influenced by
kinship. Justifications for this include that there are social expectationswhich bind business
owners,shareholdersandorseniorofficialstotakepartintheirclan’seconomicempowerment
inorder tobenefit from itsprotection.Otherspointout thatbusinesses requireprospective
employeestohavesomesortofaguarantorwhocouldbeheldresponsibleincaseofatheft
andotherformsofmisappropriation.Thismakestheemploymentofpeoplefromone’skinship
networksmucheasiertotraceandsettlecases.Nonetheless,thefocusofthisresearchisthe
intersection between urban governance and the formation and perpetuation of clan based
segregationinthecity.
HargeisaisdividedintofiveadministrativedistrictsnamelyAhmedDhagax4,MohamoudHaybe,
Ga’an Libax, 26 June, and Ibrahim Koodbuur. Arab andAyub clans5 predominantly populate
4SomalispellingisusedinsomecasesassomeoftheplacenamesappearonmapsinSomali. Insuchcases,itisimportanttonotethatthelettersofXandChavedifferentpronunciationsinSomali.XcanbereadasHwhileCcanbereadasA.
5Irefertovarioussub-clansi.e.Isaaqasclansbecausetheyspeakofthemselvesmostlyasclansratherthan sub-clans. For this reason, I used the language commonly spokenandunderstood in the streetsratherthanthetextswhichreferIsaaqasoneclan.MyreferenceshouldnothoweverbetakenasthoughIamsuggestingIsaaqsub-clansareunrelatedandareindependentfromeachotherasclanunits.
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AhmedDhagah.Theformerstraddlesovervarioussub-districtssuchasMohamedAli,18thMay
and FarahNurwhile the latter ismainly found in aneighbourhoodpopularly knownas Isha
Borama as well as other sub-districts in the North andWestern parts of the city. Garhajis
(Eidagale and Habar Yonis) populates Mohamoud Haybe District, consisting of various sub-
districts such as Burco Durey, Sheikh Shukri, Qudhac-Dheer, JameecoWayn, andMohamed
MoogeaswellaspartsofGa’anLibahDistrictsuchastheNewHargeisasub-district.AwalClans
(Sa’adMuse,IsseMuseandAfgabMuse)predominantlypopulateIbrahimKoodbuurconsisting
ofGuul-Alle,Jig-JigaYar,HeroAwr,andLihle,aswellas26thJunedistrictconsistingofGol-Jano
Ayngal,Durya,Almis.Additionally,theyalsoresideinpartsofGacanLibaxsuchasSheikhMadar,
WaraabaSalaan,SheekhYusuf,SheikhNuur,andAwAdan.TheGaboyeclanisfoundintheDami
neighbourhoodofGa’anLibah.
Figure1:MapofHargeisa
Source:(UN-Habitat,2013)
The abovedescriptionof the clanbased settlementpattern inHargeisa ismeant toprovide
overall picture about how clans are predominantly distributed over space. It is however
importanttopointoutthatpopulationdistributionandspaceidentityinHargeisaiscontested
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andthereforetheaboveaccountmustnotbetakenforafirmrecognitionofspaceidentity.The
aimistoindicatethatsettlementinHargeisahasaclanundertonenotwithstandingthefactthat
manyresidentsdefytheclanlogicandarefoundinareaspredominantlyoccupiedbyclan(s)
other than their own. In other words, even in spaces where strong evidence of clan
predominanceexists,itisdifficulttodelineateresidentialpatternsbetweenthedifferentclans
astheboundariesarefluidandporous.
Figure2:SomalilandAdministrativeMap
Source:(OCHA,2012)
1.2 ResearchAimsandQuestions
Thisstudy’sfocusonHargeisa’sgovernanceandspatialformaimstohighlighttheimportance
ofunderstandingcitydynamics,andtocontributetoagreaterunderstandingofpeace-making,
institutions and governance in a post-conflict context. We can gain a more insightful
understandingofpost-conflictstate-buildingprocessesamidrapidurbanisationthroughgreater
knowledgeofurbangovernanceinstitutionsandtherelationsofpowerthataremanifestinthe
city’sspatialorganisation.ThestudycanalsocontributetobroaderdebatesoverAfricancities,
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governanceandsegregation.Governanceisnottheonlyexplanatoryfactorthatcanaccountfor
theemergenceandperpetuationofsegregationinHargeisa,butisoneofthekeyfactorsthat
shapesthemakingandunmakingofurbanspacesinSomaliland.Myargumentemphasisesthe
intersection between governance and popular responses to insecurity andmistrust of state
institutions to explain the reproductionof segregationover time. The studyhas a particular
focus on urban land administration and conflict adjudication and their interfacewith urban
developmentasameanstoshedlightonthespatialoutcomeofclan-basedpoliticsinthecity.
Thekeyoverarchingquestioninthisthesisis:whatarethekeyhistoricalprocessesandrecent
socio-political dynamics underpinning Hargeisa’s spatial character as clan-based segregated
urbanspace;howdopeoplenavigatetheterrainofurbaninstitutions;andhowdoesthisshape
themakingandremakingofurbanspaceinHargeisa?Asthethesisexaminesparticularaspects
of urban governance and institutions responsible for urban land administration and conflict
adjudication,themainresearchquestioncanbebrokendownintothefollowingsub-questions:
• Howdothehistoricallyrootedhybridmunicipalpoliticsandthetopdownurban
landadministrationexplaintheconfigurationandreconfigurationofHargeisa’s
spatialcharacter?
• Whatarethekeydriversanddynamicsofurbanlandaccessibility,conflictsand
adjudicationandhowdotheyrelatetotrust/mistrustofthestateandthecity’s
patternofsegregation?
• Howdo people navigate the terrain of urban institutions and howdoes this
shapethemakingandremakingofurbanspacesinHargeisa?
• Whatarethesecurityimplicationsofunresolvedurbanlandconflictsinthecity
and how do they influence state legitimacy and affect the city’s spatial
character?
1.3 StructureoftheThesis
Toanswerthesequestions,theremainingpartsofthethesisisorganisedintoninechapters:In
thenextchapter(two), Iexploredebates inthe literatureoverurbansegregationandhybrid
governanceintheAfricancontextandSomalilandspecifically.Idiscussthehistoricalandrecent
dynamicsunderpinningtheabsenceoftrustandthenegativeperceptionstowardsthestate,
situatingsuchdynamicsascrucialexplanatoryfactorsfortheemergenceandperpetuationof
urban segregation in both colonial and postcolonial times. I elaborate debates over hybrid
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governance,statelegitimacyandtrust,andtheirinterfacewiththeproductionandreproduction
ofurbansegregationtodevelopnewwaysofunderstandingthespatialcharacterofcities in
Somali/land. I argue that negative public perceptions of the state and lack of trust in its
institutionscantoasignificantdegreeexplaintheclan-basedurbansegregation.Theabsence
ofacceptablemeansofregulatingpublicservicesandconflictshaveerodedtrustinthestate.
Thespatialcharacterofthecitycanbeseenasaresponsetothesedynamics.Thechapteralso
revealstheshortcomingsofpredominantdebatesaboutSomalilandthatfocusonthenational
levelandneglecttheurbanlevel.Theproblemhereisthatsuchnegligenceoverlooksthefact
thatclansegregationcreatesbothurbangovernancechallengesandopportunities.Ontheone
hand,itcementsclancitizenshipandencouragesfragmentedurbangovernancepoliticswhich
makesitdifficultforthestatetoimplementdevelopmentpolicies.Ontheotherhand,itnotonly
enablesresidentsresistmoresuccessfullygovernmentpoliciesandpracticeswhichoverlooks
publicacceptancebutitalsomakesiteasierfornewcomerssuchasmigrantsnegotiatespace
inthecitythroughtheirexistingclannetworks.
IthereforearguethatthecurrentliteratureonSomalilandanditsfocusonthehybridpolitical
orderaremainlyaimedatexaminingstatelegitimacy,whichisimportantgiventhelongcolonial
andpostcolonialhistoryoflocalunacceptabilitybuttheyneglecttheurbanasacrucialsitefor
deepening understanding into the legitimacy crises the Somali state suffered for a long and
hence fail to informpublicpolicyandurbangovernancepractices thatareadequate toalter
publicchoicesofresidentialplaces,whicharecurrentlyperpetuatingsegregation.
In the third chapter, I discuss themethodological approach for this study, emphasising the
importance of urban ethnographic methods and historical sources to complement formal
interviewswith key informants and residents. After reviewing themain empirical sources, I
outlinethechallengesofcollectingdatafromstatedomains,anddiscusshowIusedteashopsin
Hargeisaasimportantsitesforgatheringinformationandlocatingkeyinformants,includingin
thediaspora.
Inthefourthchapter,IanalyseurbansegregationinHargeisainrelationtothetrajectoryoflocal
governance, drawing on oral narratives, archives and ethnographic field research, with the
purposeofmappingthecontinuitiesandchangesinurbangovernanceandtheirrelationshipto
themakingandremakingofsegregationinthecity.Thishistoricalapproachtourbaninstitutions
isimportantpartlybecauseparticularepisodesareoftenusedasapointofreferencepositively
ornegativelyforthelegitimationofpowerandauthority.Forinstance,memoriesofhowthings
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weredoneinthepastserveasexamplesofhowastateshouldbehaveinthepresentorthe
future. The chapter begins by exploring the introduction of local andmunicipal governance
duringthecolonialperiodandthepopularresistancethisprovoked.Itthenturnstotheearly
postcolonialgovernment’sfailuretoshiftawayfromthecolonialrulesandregulationsgoverning
urbanspaces,andthemilitary’ssubsequentattemptstobreakawaywiththepast.Inthefinal
section, I discuss the post-conflict state’s attempt to re-establish local and municipal
governance. I argue that spatial segregation has been a salient feature of the city from the
outset,andexplorethepowerrelationsandturbulenthistorythroughwhichsegregationalong
clanlinesandpopulardistrustofstateinstitutionshavebeenreproducedovertime.Myfocusis
ontheimportantmediatingroleofAkils(Chiefs)6,andtheeffectsofepisodesofinsecuritythat
reinforceurbanresidents’desiretoliveinspatialproximityoffellowclanmembers.
Thefifthchapterturnstourbanlandmanagementinstitutionsandpractices,whichalsohavea
history of operating from top-down, and I explore and how these shape public perception
towardsthestate.Thechapterbeginsbyexploringthecolonialsubversionandalterationofthe
indigenousapproachtolandmanagement.Ishowthatthecolonialadministration’sapproach
to landmanagement contravened local customson resourcemanagementbasedonmutual
understandinginformedbyasetofunwrittenrules.Itintroducedatop-downlandmanagement
with little or no consultation, which undermined the prior voluntary compliance with rules
governingnaturalresourcesincludingland.AsHargeisabecameacriticalsitewherenewurban
land regulations were enforced most visibly during the colonial period, I argue that the
expropriationoflandinHargeisaaffectedresidentsintwoimportantways.Firstly,thosewhose
landwasexpropriatedhadnoalternativebut tonegotiatespace inareaspopulatedby their
clan. Secondly, thosewhoqualified for compensationwere required tobring their elders as
guarantorsforthesepay-outs,forcingthemtobeclosetowheretheycouldgetaccesstothe
traditionalleaders.Ialsoarguethatthecolonialtopdownapproachtolandmanagement,which
wasunderstoodasalteringlandownershipfromthedomainofGodtothedomainofhumans
undermined theacceptabilityof thenewurban landmanagement regime.Thechapter then
discusses postcolonial attempts to bring about change in the land management regime,
primarily as a tool for boosting economicdevelopment. I argue that thepostcolonial state’s
attempt to bring about changewas unsuccessful, and that the continuation of the previous
6AkilsandSultansaretraditionalauthorities.InSomaliland,theSultanishigherinhierarchythantheAkilasheistheleaderofalargerclanconglomerate.TheAkilisequivalenttoachiefandheisofteninvolvedinthedaytodaygovernanceandmediationofclanpolitics.
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colonialrulesunderminedpublictrustinthestate.Furthermore,thecontinuedalienationofthe
poorfurtherentrenchedlackofpublictrust.Inthefinalpartofthechapter,Idiscussthepost-
conflictdynamicsofre-establishingurbanlandmanagementandconflictadjudicationregimes.
I argue that post-conflict attempts aimed at improving the legal framework for urban land
administration have not been successful, as the newly enacted laws are characterised by
ambiguity, further undermining public trust. This top-down land management was further
exacerbatedby thestate’s inability to regulate land,enforce itsdecisionsandguarantee the
securityofurbanresidents.Iarguethatthetopdownnatureofurbanlandregulatoryregimes
inthecitysignificantlycontributestotheperpetuationofsegregation.
Inthesixthchapter,Idiscussurbanlandconflictsandadjudicationmechanismsastheywere
operating at the time of the research, supposedly regulated initially through ad hoc local
government committees and the statutory judicial systembut later through theUrban Land
Commission(aspecialtribunalforurbanland).TheCommissionwassetupin2009tomediate
and adjudicate urban land conflicts, but which was shaped in practice by a plurality of
institutions.Thechapterbeginsbydiscussingkeyissuesinaccessibilitytourbanlandandthe
alienationof thepoor. I argue that the currentmechanismof access to land inurban areas
marginalisesthepoor,astheexistinglandmanagementregimeimposesrestrictionswithwhich
thelow-incomepeopleinthecitycannotcomply.Inthesecondsection,Ishowthatinstitutional
weaknesses,rapidurbanisation, increasing landprices,andgreatercompetitionforaccessto
landinurbanareascan,toa largedegree,accountfortherise inurbanlandconflicts.These
conflicts are exacerbated by the inability of the plural justice system to deal with them
adequately.Inthethirdandfourthsections,Idiscussurbanlandconflictadjudication,shaped
bythepluraljusticesystem.Iarguethatattemptstoimprovethedisputemediationmechanism
have shown institutional gaps in how the state deals with land issues. While the Land
Commissiondealswithconflictsamongcityresidents,itrarelyaddressesdisputesbetweenthe
people and the state.One of the key challenges emanating from this gap is the fact that it
reinforcesthepluralityofinstitutionsinvolvedbydrivingrecoursetoclan,andalsoundermines
trustinthestate.Iarguethaturbansegregationistheproductofsuchstrugglesandcompetition
betweencustomaryandstatutoryinstitutions.
In the seventh chapter, I discuss a high-profile land conflict between the government of
SomalilandandresidentsintheSouthofthecity.Thegovernmentdecidedtoexpandtheairport,
butthe landconcernedwasheldbyresidentswhowereunwillingtohanditover. Ibeginby
discussingthehistoryofairportexpansion,andscrutinisethesignificanceoftheairportforstate
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territorialcontrol.Iarguethatthestate’sexpansionattemptsarepremisedonanassumption
fortheneedforfullterritorialcontrolasameansofbothlocalandinternationallegitimation,
andthattheairportisseenasanimportantsiteforstatelegitimation.Thechapterthenmoves
ontodiscusstherationaleforthelandexpropriation,resistanceandthedynamicsofmediation,
valuation and compensation,muchofwhichpits the state evoking its rights todevelop and
managelandagainstresidents’claimsofbothformal legalentitlementsaswellastraditional
customaryrightstotheland.Suchstrugglesforlegitimacybetweenlandclaimants/ownersand
thestatemarginalisesthepoor,underminespublictrust,andformsthebasisonwhichviolent
resistancetothestateisjustified,andpublicchoiceofabodearemade.Iarguethatthenature
and means through which urban land conflicts are adjudicated play a key role in the
entrenchmentofthecity’ssegregatedspatialcharacter.
In the eighth chapter, I discuss the impact of urban land conflicts on security. The chapter
focusesonacasestudyinwhichthegovernmentwasinvolvedwithlandconflictatamilitary
base located in EasternHargeisa. Locals also claimed the land onwhich themilitary base is
located. The dispute flared up after the government decided to compensate a prominent
Ethiopianpolitician,fromwhomitconfiscatedland,bygivinghimrightstolandlocatedinthe
contestedarea.This led toviolent resistance inwhichsevenpeople lost their lives,and four
otherswereinjured.Thechapterconsistsofthreesections.Inthefirstsection,Iprovideabrief
overview of security in urban Somali settings. I show that the state is not the only actor in
securityprovisionsinthecountry.Iarguethatclanidentityisamajorfeatureofpublicsafety
andsecurity.Ialsoarguethatthemultiplicityofactorsinsecuritymayhavecontributedtothe
stabilityinSomalilandoverall,butitcanalsobeanobstacletoprogresstowardsaccountable
stateinstitutions.Myaccountofthisconflictseekstoshowthediresecurityimpactsthatcan
result fromthe lackofcrediblemediationandresolutionmechanisms forcases inwhich the
stateisoneofthedisputants. Iarguethattheabsenceofcrediblemechanismstoadjudicate
land conflicts in cases where the state is one of the disputing parties frequently produces
insecurityinurbancontexts,becauseofthewaythestatemanipulatesthejusticesystem.Iargue
that this erodes public trust, and hence plays a significant role in the production and
reproduction of clan-segregated spaces. The security implications of unresolved urban land
conflictsinthecitythusalsoplayasignificantinreinforcingthecity’sexistingspatialsegregation
alongclanlines.
Inthefinalchapter,conclusion,Iprovideoverviewofthechaptersandsummarisekeyfinding
andarguments.
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CHAPTER2 DEBATINGHYBRIDGOVERNANCEANDSEGREGATION
2.1 Introduction
This chapter elaborates debates in the literature over hybrid governance to show their
inadequacyforilluminatingurbanformandspatialcharacterofcitiesinSomali/land.Itseeksto
develop new perspectives on understanding the spatial character of cities in Somali/land
through alternative concepts such as state legitimacy and mistrust. These concepts are
appropriatebecausetheyaremoreconcernedwiththequalityoftheinteractionbetweenthe
rulerandtheruled.Thechapterconsistsoftwomainsections.Inthefirstsection,Ishowthat
recentstudiesonSomalilandfocusonthenationalorsubnationallevel.Iarguethatthecurrent
debatesneglecttheurbanlevelanditsrelevancetothestatebuilding,aswellastheinterface
betweengovernanceandurbanforminthebroaderSomalicontextandSomalilandinparticular.
In thesecondsection, Iarguethat therecentpost-conflicthybridstate-buildingprocesses in
Somaliland–whichwerebylargeaimedataddressinglegitimacyconcernsgiventherepeated
legitimacycrisesofSomalistate-buildingfromthecolonialperiodthroughtothepresenttime–
failedtodeliverasignificantshiftadequatetoalterpublicchoiceofresidence.Ithereforeargue
that it is important to go beyond existing debates over 'hybridity' to understand the social,
politicalandmorespecificallygovernancedynamicsunderpinningthespatialcharacterofcities
inSomaliland.Ithenmoveontodiscussurbansegregationandarguethatnegativeattitudes
towardsthestateandlowlevelsoftrustinitsinstitutionscantoasignificantdegreeexplainthe
perpetuationofurbansegregationonthebasisofclanidentity.Ialsoarguethattheabsenceof
crediblemechanismstomanageservicedeliveryleftpeoplewithnoalternativetousingidentity-
basedsocialarrangementstoregulatetheirrelationswiththestateandamongthemselves.This
preventedtheemergenceofcosmopolitanspacesandreinforcedtheresilienceofsegregation
by(sub)clans.
2.2 HybridGovernanceandSomaliState(Re–)Formation
Beforeembarkingonthediscussionaboutthepost-conflicthybridgovernanceandstate(re–)
formationinSomaliland,itisimportanttolookbrieflyatthehistoryoftheconflict.In1981,an
insurgentpolitical organisation, the SomaliNationalMovement (SNM),wasestablishedby a
groupofmainlyIsaaqpoliticians.TheirstatedobjectivewastoliberateSomaliafromthegripof
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Mohamed Siad Barre’s dictatorship. Soon after its launch7, SNM established itself along the
borderwithEthiopiaparticularlyNorthWesternandTogdheerregionsamidhostilitiesbetween
Ethiopia and Somalia. It startedwaging sporadic guerrilla attackson the Somali government
forcesbasedalongthebordersandfurtherinside.TheresponseoftheSomalistatewasheavy
handedasitoftenvisitedwrathonthecivilpopulation(mainlytheIsaaqclans)intheNorthwho
wereaccusedofproviding support for the insurgency.ThisgaveSNMthe tools itneeded to
enlistwidespreadsupportandrecruitmorepeopleinitsranks.Realisingthedangerapparentin
thepopulargrowthofSNM,Barreembarkedonadiplomaticeffortaimedatcuttingoffsupport
andsuppliesfromSNMbymendingrelationswithhisarchrival,DictatorMengistuHaileMariam,
thethenPresidentofEthiopiawhowasprovidingSomaliinsurgencies8withmilitaryandfinancial
support.
InApril1988,BarreandHaileMariamsignedadealmediatedbyDjibouti’sPresidentHassan
GouledAptidon.Keyamongtheagreedpointsweretherestorationofdiplomatictiesandending
ofhostilitiesparticularlytheprovisionofsupportforeachother’sinsurgencies.Thiswasamajor
blowtoSNM.Onthe27thofMay,merelytwomonthsaftertheagreementwassigned,SNM
forceswagedasurpriseattackontheSomaliArmy,whichwasatthetimeoneofthestrongest
intheregion.TheepicentreoftheattackswerethemajorcitiesofHargeisaandBurao.Both
citieswerealmostlevelledtothegroundbygovernmentforcesandnearly50000peoplelost
theirlives.Thewarlastedforthreeyearsandintheend,itnotonlydrainedthestateresources
butitalsoweakeneditsmilitarycapability.Italsousheredinthedeathofthemilitaryregimein
Somaliaastwomoreguerrillamovements,UnitedSomaliCongress(USC)andSomaliPatriotic
Movement (SPM) sprung up in the Southern regions of Somalia. Barrewas finally ousted in
January1991andthemajorcitiesintheNorthwerecapturedbySNMforces.However,SNM
wasunabletogovernpeacefullyasriftsbetweenitsleadershipemerged.Insomeinstances,this
ledtoafreshformofconflictswithintheSNMelitesandtheirclans.Clanauthoritiessuchas
elders,AkilsandSultanswhichwerevitalintheSNMstruggleagainsttheBarreregimebecame
essentialonceagainforfindingapoliticalsolutioninthepostBarreconflictoverresourcecontrol
andpowersharingbetweentheSNMelites.
7Someaccountssuggestthatsomeof theforcesthat laidthefoundationforthearmedwingofSNMdefectedfromtheSomaliArmedForcesasfarbackasin1978.
8PrimarilySomaliNationalMovement(SNM)andSomaliSalvationDemocraticFront(SSDF)whichwas2yearspriortoSNM
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The important role traditional authorities played in the post-conflict political dispensation
occurredatatimewhenthepoliticalsituationintheSouthwasdeteriorating.Forthisreason,
discussionsonhybriditydominatethepost-conflictpoliticalwritingaboutSomaliland.Explicitly
orimplicitly,thisbodyofliteraturepointstothefactthatthehybridpoliticalorderinthepost-
conflictcontextwaslargelyanattemptinwhichtheelitesweretryingtoaddressthedeficitin
statelegitimacyandpublictrust.Butthishasnotbroughtaboutsignificantchangesinthelevel
oftrustforthestateinanyqualitativelymeaningfulway.Forinstance,forthefirstthreeyears
(1991-1993)ofthepost-conflicthybridorderinSomaliland,tensionwasrunninghighbetween
the different factions in major cities as armed confrontations occurred in Berbera when
AbdirahmanAhmedAliwasincharge9(Drysdale,2001).Hissuccessor,MohamedIbrahimEgal,
alsoencounteredresistancefromsectionsofthemajorclansin1994-1997,asarmedconflict
brokeoutinboththecapital,Hargeisa,andsecondcapital,Burao.ForBalthasar(2013),these
wars formed as part of the state-building processes. More importantly, these wars can be
understoodasalegitimationstruggleinwhicheachsideoftheconflictwastryingtoaddressthe
legitimacycrisiswhichledtothedisintegrationoftheSomalistatebetween1988-1991.Before
arguingwhy it isnecessarytogobeyondhybridity forunderstandingthespatialcharacterof
citiesinSomaliland,itisimportanttodefinehybridityasaconcept.
2.2.1 ConceptualisingHybridPoliticalOrders
Hybridpoliticalorderscanbedefinedas“contradictoryanddialecticco-existenceofformsof
socio-politicalorganisationsthathavetheirrootsinbothnon-stateindigenoussocialstructures
and introduced state and societal structures” (Boege et al., 2009b, p. 17). More
comprehensively, Hagmann and Hoehne define hybrid political orders as the “sum of
institutionalised,yetdynamicpowerrelationsthatonecanempiricallygraspatagiventimeand
place, [involving] international legal arrangements aswell as everyday practices of ordinary
peopleandprocessesatthe local level,oftenacrossbutrarelywithoutreferencetonational
boundaries” (Hagmann and Hoehne, 2009, p. 44). The use of the words contradiction and
coexistence are important here, as they show that traditional institutions may act in
contradiction of state authority in some instances, but may also be complementary and
enmeshedinotherinstances.Examplescanreadilybefoundinincaseswherethestateisweak
9TheseincludetheperiodinwhichAliwasacaretakerSNMleader(JanuarytoMay1991)fortheNorthernRegions, and after he was elected as President of Somaliland on 18th May 1991-1993 when he wasreplacedbyMohamedIbrahimEgal.
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andseeksthesupportofnon-stateactorsto,forexample,upholdpeaceandstability.Butthere
may also be contradictions when the existence of traditional institutions works against the
desiresofthestatetodischargeitslocalandinternationalobligations.Thedynamicnatureof
hybrid political orderspartly reflects the fact that theboundariesbetween ‘traditional’ and
‘state’arenotdefinedabsolutely,ascustomaryleaders,businessmenandreligiousleadersmay
becomepoliticiansandtakeonstateroles,andviceversa(Boegeetal.,2009a).
AccordingtoBoegeetal.(2009a),hybridpoliticalordersdifferfromWesternconceptualitiesof
thestateinanumberofways.Firstly,inhybridorders,securityisundertakenbyvariousactors
unliketheWesternmodel,whichmakessecuritytheexclusivedomainofthestate.Secondly,
politicalleadershipisnotthesoleprerogativeofthestateastherearedifferentkindsofpolitical
leadershipsexistingalongthestate.Thirdly,thewelfareofthepeopleisnotinthehandsofthe
statemostlyaspeoplerelyonsocialsafetynetssuchaskinship,andinSomaliland,clan-based
socialnetworks.Richards(2015)arguesthathybriditygoesbeyondthetraditionalandformal
governancecombinationdiscussedintheliterature.Shearguesitisalsoaboutstrikingabalance
between “domestic needs and external demands”, supported and sustained locally but also
aimedatreachingsovereignty.AttheendoftheColdWarinearly1990s,manyAfricanstates
disintegratedandWesternpowers saw itnecessary to intervene inwhat theyconsideredas
failedstates,soastoenhancethenewinternationalorderofpeaceandsecurity.Somalialayat
theheartof thesetheoreticaldebatesoverhybrid-state-makingandbecamethefirst testing
groundforstaterevivalattemptsconceptualisedinrelationtothestatefailurethesis.
Proponentsofhybridpoliticalorderssuggestthatthecentralproblemwithinterventionsthat
stemmedfromtheassumptionofstatefailurerelatedtoconceptualisationofthelatteritself.
(Boegeetal.,2009a).Bycastingstateorderas‘hybrid’,scholarsrejectedtherepresentationof
Africanstatesasbeing“pathologicallyweak’inneedofsavingthroughinterventions(Hagmann
andPéclard,2010).According toHagmannandHoehne (2009), thestate failure thesishasa
number of weaknesses. Firstly, it fails to recognise the differences between African states.
Secondly, thestate failurethesishasatendencytoassumethatthedisintegrationofcentral
institutionsmeansanarchy.Thirdly,thestatefailurethesisusestheWesternstateasthemodel
againstwhichotherstatesshouldbemeasured,oftenassumingthatWesternstatesarestrong
and others are weak. Fourthly, the abovementioned assumption inherently leads to the
conceptualisation of intervention mechanisms relying on set of indicators developed under
theseassumptionsinordertoanalyseandarriveatasolutionforthe“failingstates”.
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Giventherealitiesofstate-building,whicharecharacterisedbymultipleprocesses,therewere
manyemergingpoliticalordersthatdeviatedfromthemaintenetsofthestatefailurethesis
(Hagmann and Hoehne, 2009). For instance, Somali territories represent an example of an
emergenttrendofgovernancearrangementsnegotiatedatthelocallevel(Menkhaus,2006b,
Menkhaus, 2006a). The manner in which such orders develop differs from one context to
another, indeed, suchnegotiation“refers tothedynamicand,at leastpartly,undetermined
processesofstate(de-construction”(HagmannandPéclard,2010,p.544)whichtakesplaceat
both the localandnational levels (RendersandTerlinden,2010). Instateswherecentralised
formalinstitutionsarenon-existent,unableorunwillingtoreachallpartsoftheirterritory,such
inexistence or gaps in governance are filled through non state actors such as customary
institutionsandsubnationalorlocalpoliticalorganisations,negatingtheideathatthoseareas
arechaoticandanarchicBoegeetal.(2008).Forinstance,Bakonyi(2013)arguestheRahanweyn
ResistanceArmy(RRA)intheSouthernpartofSomaliawasapoliticalorganisationthatmanaged
to bring about three elements which are essential for governance; security managements,
judicialservicesandlocaltaxcollectionforthefirsttimesincethedisintegrationoftheSomali
centralstate.
2.2.2 RecentSomaliState-BuildingandHybridity
AsthecentralSomalistatewasnearingdisintegrationinthelate1980s,scholarlydebatesabout
whatwentwrongandhowanalternativeoption couldbemapped for Somali state-building
raged among academics. These debates often focussed on the national level. The object of
argumentwastheanalyticaluseoftheconceptofclan,which, in itsmostbasicdefinition, is
termedasa“dynamicsocialconstructthatcanbesubjecttodifferentinterpretationsandare
usedtodescribeandvalidatechangingsocialandpoliticalrelations”Bradbury(2008,p.13).Two
majorperspectivesemergedfromthesedebates.Thefirstsoughttotaketheclanasabasicunit
ofanalysisforthesocialandpoliticalorganisationoftheSomalis,whilethesecondpositedthat
clanisoneofmanywaysinwhichtheSomalisocietycouldbeanalysed.Bothdebatesplacethe
focus on political and cultural dimensions of the concept,while overlooking its socio-spatial
utilityand the factorsunderpinning suchutilities. Theuseof clanasanalytical framecanbe
traced to Lewis’s seminal works in the late 1950s on Somaliland (1958, 1961). For Lewis,
clannismwasandremainstobepervasiveamongtheSomalis,asclan identity isacquiredat
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birthandisusedtoformsocialandpoliticalalliances.10Hisbasiccontentionisthatifyouwant
tounderstandtheSomalis,youneedtounderstandthemechanicsofkinshipandclan.Thisview
remainedunchangedforLewisfromhisearlyworksthroughtohisrecentwritinginthe1990s
and2000s.Hemaintainedthatclanlineageisintrinsically‘inherentintheSomaliculture’,saying
thatthe“global levelmodernmasssocietyseems,by itsscaleandanonymity,toexpandthe
boundsofpatriotismbeyondacceptable,viablelimits.Thisappearstoevokealienationatthe
locallevel,soremotefromthecentreofrealpower,andpromotingrenaissancesofthelittle
traditionaloffamiliarcommunalidentity”(Lewis2010,p.141).
Luling(2006,p.473)observesthatgenealogy,whichisessentiallythearchitectureonwhichclan
mechanicsarebuilt,isa“webwhichholds[Somali]societytogetherandunderpinspoliticallife”.
She further points out that clan is a complex system, characterisedby shifting alliances and
allegiances,theunderstandingofwhichoftenslipthroughthefingersofobservers.Lewis(2004)
referstothis“intricacy”asinvisibility,whichpresumablymasksthedifferencesamongSomalis,
leadingtoover-elaborationoftheirhomogeneity.ForLewis,thekinshipconceptprovidedthe
tool for understanding thepolitical and social dynamics underpinning conflict.His argument
posited that clan lay at the heart of state-building and it is the clan through which its
disintegrationcouldbecomprehendedandresolved(LewisandMayall,1995,Lewis,1993).In
thisperspective,clanbecomesthemostimportantmeansthroughwhichtheSomalistatecould
berevived.Thisapproachcriticisestheanti-clansentimentsofficiallyadoptedbytheprevious
Somali administrations during both the democratic andmilitary rules as being far from the
Somali reality (Lewis, 2008a).Here, kinship is presented as anorganisingprinciplepervasive
enoughthateventheIslamists,whosewaronclanwasthusfarthetoughest,wereunableto
subdue as clan divisions between them come to the surface endangering the very anti-clan
ideologiestheypromotedorbreached.
Lewis(1998)pointsoutthatpoliticalviolenceshouldnotbeasurpriseamongtheSomalis.He
assertsthatanyobserverwhostudiedtheSomalisknowsthatviolenceisinherentinitsculture
and symmetric clan system. The Somali culture according to the author distinguished only
warranleh(warrior)andwadaad(religiousman).Thisviolentandsegmentaryclansystem,he
argues,gavethedictatorshipanopportunitywhichitcouldexploittoprolongitstimeinpower.
Hepointsoutthat“anyrealisticassessmentofpossiblefuturetrendshastoacknowledgethat
10Hefurtherarguesthatclancanbeunderstoodwithinthesameframeworkoftribeasablood-based“social,territorial,political,andtosomeextentreligiousunit”(Lewis,1955,p.585)
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Somalinationalismevidently retains its segmentarycharacterandhasnotbeen transformed
intoamodernorganicmode” (Lewis,1989,p.578).Heargues further that this is sodespite
rejection by “urbanised andWesternised Somalis [who]maintain that discrimination is 'old-
fashioned', that it is contrary to the injunctions of the Prophet” (Lewis, 1955, p. 584). Even
thoughtheconceptofclanliesinthecentreofLewis’view,heneglectsthespatialdimensions
ofclanasakeyfeatureofurbansettlementsinSomaliland.Equallyheoverlooksthefluidityof
theclanconceptandalignmentsinspiteofthefactthatheemphasisesitsimportanceasatool
ofunderstandingtheSomalis.Forinstance,criticspointoutthatclanidentityismorepoliticised
inthecurrentclimateinSomalilandandSomaliathanittraditionallywas(Bradbury,2008).
Theabovecritiquespointtothechangingfaceofclanasaconceptboth in itsdynamicsand
functionamongtheSomalis.AccordingtoLittle(2003),clanhasinthepastservedasameans
throughwhichcommunitiesseektosurviveinahostileecologicalandeconomicenvironment.
Thishoweverwas/isneitheruniformacrossgeographicalspacesnorstaticinsocialdomainsover
time.ForinstanceBjork(2007)observesthattherearedifferencesinthewaythatclanisused
inthedifferentgeographicalspacesinthecountry.Forinstance,inurbancontexts,clanidentity
isnotasstrongasintheruralcontexts.Theauthornotesthatmanypeopleinurbancentresdid
notknowtheirclanmembershipuntilthecivilwarbrokeout.Itwasalsocommonforurbanites
toliveincosmopolitanneighbourhoodswherepeoplehailedfromdifferentclanbackgrounds.
InspiteofthefactthatclanisusedassocialandeconomicnetworkamongtheSomalis,many
peoplestilldespiseclanidentity(Bjork,2007).Furthermore,Luling(2006)claimsthatclannism
wasideologicallyrejectedbySomalinationalistsduringtherunuptotheparliamentaryelections
of1960s.Buttheseattempts,sheargues,didnotlastlongasclannismplayedanimportantrole
inpost-independenceSomalipolitics.Shearguesthatclannismdidnotandprobablywillnot
disappearasadivideramongSomalisuntilsomethingelsereplacesitastotalunityisdifficultto
achieveinanysociety.Sheacknowledges,however,thepossibilityofurbanplacesassites in
which the influenceof clannismcould reduce, as these sitesproduced younggenerations in
whichclannismmeantnothing.
ThesecondmainperspectiveinthedebateaboutthemannerinwhichthecentralSomalistate
couldberevivedwasopposedtotheuseofclanasanoverarchinganalyticalconceptforthe
social, economic and political organisation of the Somalis (Samatar, 1989, Kapteijns, 2004,
Besteman,1998).Theseauthors likewise focussedonnationalpolitics,oftenoverlookingthe
urbanlevel.ThisperspectiveproposesthatclanisoneofmanyelementsthatunderpinSomali
culturalandpoliticalreality,butitisfarfrombeingtheanswerforcentralstaterevival.Theycite
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theexistenceofa commonculture, language, religionandappearanceas someof theother
morelegitimatetoolsofanalysisthatcouldbeusedtounderstandSomalisociety.Inopposing
thosewhopresent clanasameans to resolve thepolitical crisis inSomalia, thisperspective
placestheblameonbadleadershipandexclusionarypolitics(Samatar,1997).Thissuggeststhat
political conflict in the Somali territories cannot be understood as being the result of an
intrinsically violent culture but rather as the absence of a civil way to address political and
economicconcerns.Samatar(2006b)arguesthatthemobilisationofpeopleandresourcesfor
political or military action is often necessitated by the “absence of a viable civic political
associations”.Samatar(2009)submitsthatcommoncivicbelongingispossibleandtherehave
beenmanycasesdemonstratedinSomalipolitics.AcaseinpointisSomaliYouthLeague(SYL)
wheredespitebeingtheleastfavouritepoliticalmovementforcolonialists,itemergedasavictor
intheMogadishu’smunicipalelectionin1955.
Samatar(2006b)alsoarguesthatclanidentityisnottheonlymaindeterminantofsocialand
politicalorganisationamongtheSomalis.HepointsoutthattheSomalitraditionalandmoderate
practicesofIslamprovideanimportantplatformofcommoncitizenshipwheredifferentclans
canseethattheybelongtoacommunityaboveclansegmentation(Samatar,2006b).Equally,
clan identity is contextboundand canbeoverriddenby social andpolitical occurrences.He
furtherpointsoutthatrecenteventsinwhichtheIslamiccourtswereabletomobilisecrossclan
supportfortheireffortsshowsthatclanisnotthebigelephantinSomalipoliticsanditcanbe
overcome in many instances through nationalist or religious means. In other words, both
external and internal factors can bring about a situation in which Somalis can act
nationalistically.AnimportantexampleisthewaythattheIslamicCourtscametoprominence
inMogadishu,whichcanbeexplainedbyaconjunctionofseveralfactors.Firstly,oppressionby
warlords;secondly,thewayinwhichKenyaintervenedandmanipulatedthepeaceprocessin
Embagathi;thirdly,theendorsementoftheIslamicCourtsbytheinternationalcommunityand
fourthlythepopularperceptionthattheWestisagainstIslamicvalues(Samatar,2006b).The
suggestion inherent in this view is that clan ideals and identity are contextual and can be
configuredandreconfiguredbypolitical,economicandsocialeventsandoccurrences.
Similarly,Kapteijns (2004)criticises theabsenceof the ‘impactofcolonial rule’ inclan-based
analysesofSomalisociety,whichignorethechangesthatmayhaveoccurredtotheconceptof
clanduringthisperiod.Sheprovidesthreeexamplesofhowtheimpactofcolonialruleonclan-
basedSomalisocialandpoliticalorganisationcouldbeteasedout.Firstly,thedivisionofSomali
land is put forward as being a drastic measure cutting communities from each other and
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therefore altering their clan-based interdependence. Secondly, the role of the colonial
administration in using and abusing the clan-based political structures through a process of
formalisationinwhichthestateimposeditselfonitssubjectsisoverlooked.Shearguesthatthis
reinventionof traditional institutionsby thecolonialadministrationaltered the fundamental
tenetsofSomalipoliticalorganisationanddenteditsimage.Equally,Besteman(1998,p.110)
argues that even though the kinship skeleton remains, its content has changed due to the
pressuresimposedonitbyglobalprocessessuchas“colonialism,statebuildingandColdWar”,
andthesechangesneedtobeaccountedforwhenanalysingSomalisociety.Thisperspective
advancesSomalisasbeingoneethnicgroup,organisedthroughmembershipofakinshipsystem
of association, but warns of the danger apparent in the ‘deployment of this genealogical
difference’asthebasisforpolitics(Samatar,2006a).
ThisperspectivealsounderlineshowSomalipoliticalcriseshavebeenrootedinthepoliticisation
ofgenealogicaldifferencesamongtheSomalisandifthis isreinventeditwill leadtoanother
disaster as Somali cultural values and the political exploitation of clan identitieswill collide.
WhilethisperspectivehassuccessfullyprovidedalternativeunderstandingsofSomalisocialand
politicalorganisation,likethepreviousperspective,italsofailstoelaboratetheutilitiesofclan
in the spatial character of cities in the Somali territories and its role in urban governance.
Moreover,criticsofthisperspectivepointtotheusefulnessofclanasanorganisationalasset
andreadilypointtotheclan-basedsegregationapparent inalmostall aspectsoftheSomali
society (Luling, 2006). This accords well with the assumption inherent in the early Somali
scholarshipwhichcharacterisestheSomalisasculturallyfractiousandpronetoviolencebecause
ofthepowerofclan.Inriposte,advocatesoftheSamatarianperspectivepostulatethatafar
betterexplanationforthedestructionandanarchyinSomalipoliticscanbefoundintheobvious
hegemonicstrugglebetweenpowerfulpoliticalforceswhoseekrefugeinidentitypoliticsand
useitinstrumentallyasameanstorealisetheiraims(Samatar,1992,Samatar,1988,Samatar,
2009).
This argument against an essentialist view of clan is further reinforced when the practices
committedinthenameofclanareseparatedfromtheclanasamodeofsocialorganisation.For
instance Samatar (2006a, p. 57) distinguishes clanism “as the political mechanism for
manipulating community sentiment along sectarian lines” from clan as the “genealogical
differences[that]havebeenoneoftheelementsofSomalitradition,but…never inducedthe
kindofmayhemthatmar[theSomali]society”now.Samatar(1997)seekstovalidatethispoint
inhiscomparativestudyofBotswanaandSomaliawhereheargues that these twosocieties
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havetakentwodifferentpathsdespitehavingsimilarecologicalandculturalelements.Whereas
onecreatedasectarianandexclusivenorm,theotherenjoysacivilandinclusivesystem.Inthis
view,whenthecivicstateprevails,legitimacyisenforcedandnationalidentityisstrengthened
leadingtotheentrenchmentofademocraticcultureandenhancementofpeacefulcoexistence.
While the author does not focus on the urban level, the samepoint could bemade for the
formation of spatially segregated cities in Somaliland, which are, as will be argued in the
empiricalchapters,toa largeextenttheoutcomeof lowlevelsof legitimacyandtrust inthe
state.
Atthesubnationallevel,scholarlydebatesaboutrecentstate-buildinginSomalilandfocuson
thehybridpoliticalorderwhosehistorycanpartlybetracedtoSNM’smanifestoof1982.The
manifesto advocated a decentralised system of governance for the post Barre political
dispensation,aimedatincorporatingclan-basedpoliticsaswellasregionalidentities(Prunier,
1998,Gilkes,1999).Likethepreviousstrandsofargument,thesedebatesneglecttheurbanlevel
intheirdiscussionofthehybridstatebuildinginSomaliland.Theytooaccreditsuccesstothe
significantroleoftraditionalinstitutionsinmediatingpost-warclanandpoliticalconflicts.The
firstoftheseconflictstookplaceinBuraoinSeptember1991wherelocalclanmilitiascollided.
Thisunderminedtheoptimismthatfollowedthedeclarationofindependence,aspro-SNMclans
werethoughttobenefit fromthenewstatedisproportionatelyandattheexpenseofothers
(FarahandLewis,1997).ThesecondconflicttookplaceinBerberainMarch1992whentheSNM
administrationtriedtoimposecontrolovertheportofBerberaandthelocalclansrefusedto
abidebythatorder.Notlongthereafter,thethirdmajorpoliticalconflicttookplaceinHargeisa
andBuraoin1994(Bradbury,2008)assomeoftheclansfeltthattheywerenotgiventheirdue
shareingovernmentstructures.Theseconflictsoccurredagainstthebackdropofexcitement
aboutSomaliland’sstatehoodandmostpeoplefeltthatclanswhosupportedtheSNMtofight
Barrewouldnot fightamong themselves (FarahandLewis,1997).Amajordimensionof the
political conflicts in Somaliland which was not captured in the literature relates to an
observationmadebyMenkhaus(2003)inrelationtoSouthernSomalia.Hearguesthatwhen
conflicts devolve in a lower level of the genealogical chain, the scale and the impact of the
conflict reduces. This observationmay alsowell explain an important factor that expedited
peace in Somaliland, as clans had becomewar weary during the final years of the political
conflictandcouldnolongeraffordtosustainthewar.Thepoliticalclassinbothcampshadalso
realised that their days were numbered before the public turned their back on them. This
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createdfrictionbetweenpoliticianswithinthesamefactionsastheystartedaccusingeachother
ofbeingbeneficiariesofthewar(Balthasar,2013).
ThepeacebuildingprocessesinSomalilandbeganwithclan-basedmeetingslargelysanctioned
bytheSNMandweremotivatedbyadesiretoreconciletheclans inSomalilandratherthan
inflame theirdifferences. These clan-basedpeace initiativespaved theway forbiggerpeace
conferencestosettlepoliticaldifferencesbetweentheclans.Thefirstmajorpeaceconference
inSomalilandtookplaceinBuraoin1991(Bradbury,2008).Theconventionofthisconference
wasaimedatreconcilingtheclanssoastoenhancethelegitimacyoftheSNMadministrationin
theregion.TheconferenceaddressedthedifferencebetweentheclansintheNorthandlaid
thefoundationforthepresentdaySomalilandadministration.Itwasthisconferencethatsaw
the reinstatementof Somaliland’s statehoodagainst thewishof SNM top leadership (Walls,
2011).Inspiteofinitialpublicapproval,politicalconflictseruptedbetweentheclansmainlyover
hegemonyandresource-sharinginthenewlyfoundedstate.Thesecondmajorconferencein
SomalilandwasaresponsetotheseconflictsanditoccurredinSheikhinOctober1992.Several
keyissueswereagreedinthisconference,includingthedesignationofmajorportsandairports
asanationalasset.Bradbury(2008)suggeststhatthisconferencewasadefiningmomentfor
theGuurti(astate-widecouncilofelders)asitpavedthewayforitsformalisation.Walls(2009)
observesthatthereweretwooutcomesfromtheconference;aceasefireagreementbetween
thewarringclansandthefoundationforanotherpeaceconferencetobeheldinBorama.The
Boramaconferencewasfromthebeginning‘intendedtobeabigger’conferenceandaimedto
have a fundamental impact on the country’s political landscape. Even though the Borama
conference was more to do with state-building than peace-building, the existence of the
differentmilitiasloyaltotheirrespectiveclansandotherfreelancerswhowerebentonmaking
money for themselves caused concern for the participants, such that peace-related issues
remainedattheheartoftheconference.
2.2.3 RoleofCustomaryInstitutionsinHybridity
TheoveralldrivetowardshybridpoliticalorderinSomalilandcanbestbecharacterisedasan
attemptaimedatconstitutingor reconstitutingpublic trustandstate legitimacy in thepost-
conflictcontext.Keytothisattemptistheenmeshmentoftraditionalinstitutionsinthemodern
statebuildingprocesses.IntheSomalicontext,thisisnotanewphenomenon.Inboththerecent
anddistantpastofstateformationintheSomalipeninsula,‘modern’and‘traditional’formsof
governanceinmanycasescontradicted,coexistedandcomplementedeachother.Forinstance,
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colonialadministratorsoftencollaboratedwithclanelders.FarahandLewis(1997)describethe
processofdelegating responsibility to theeldersduring thecolonialerawhenAkils (Chiefs),
were paid to perform some state functions. In post-colonial times, traditional systemswere
againusedbythestateinordertobringaboutlawandorderamongthepopulace,particularly
inruralareas.WhatisuniqueaboutthecurrenthybridpoliticalorderinSomalilandis,perhaps,
the scale rather than the substance of the mixture. In other words, the extent to which
traditionalsystemsareformalisedandconstitutionallysanctionedisnew.Inthepast,however,
Akilsandpro-governmentelderswerealsokeyinstrumentsthroughwhichthestatemaintained
lawandorder in a politically chargedenvironmentwheremost of the ‘people regarded the
government as an enemy and declined to cooperate. Akilswere important for these efforts
becauseoftheirknowledgeaboutthemembersoftheirclansandthefactthattheycouldeasily
facilitatethecaptureofsuspectsandimpoundmentoflivestock.Forinstance,Rayne(1921,p.
21)wrotethat“awantedman’sAkilmaybeorderedtoproduce”asuspect“insteadofsending
a[messenger]tocall”him.Formanypeople,Akilswerepartoftheproblemsincetheywere
voluntarilyorinvoluntarilyworkingwithanillegitimatestatesecurityapparatus.
Butitisimportanttorememberthatthepoliticsofchieftaincywascharacterisedbydiversityas
it was underpinned by individual agency. Indeed, this diversitywas characteristic of African
contextsmore broadly, as some chiefswillingly supported the colonial powerswhile others
opposed.AccordingtovonTrotha(1996,p.80)“thisdiversitywastransformedandsubsumed
into a unifying administrative structure....organised on the basis of institutional innovations
followingthreeprinciples:thoseofdevolution,hierarchyandtheadministrative”(vonTrotha,
1996, p. 80). Firstly, the principal of devolved powers upheld the colonial state’s right of
‘appointmentand removalof chiefsas its soleprerogative (vonTrotha,1996); secondly, the
principal of hierarchy meant that the colonial government could invent and/or modify the
institution of chieftaincy to serve as auxiliary communicativemeans between itself and the
population;andthirdlytheprincipalofadministrationunderpinnedthecolonialgovernment’s
introductionof territorialityand jurisdictionaldistrictboundaries for localgovernance. Inthe
caseofSomaliland,theinstitutionofchieftaincyprecededtheBritishcolonialadministration.It
wasinheritedfromtheEgyptianswhoconstitutedchiefsamongtheSomalisduringtheirbrief
rulepriortothearrivaloftheBritish,tofacilitatebasicadministrativefunctionssuchasrecord
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keepingandpopulationcountsfortheirofficialsinthecoastaltowns.EachAkilwasresponsible
foradia-payinggroup11andwouldreportbacktohisEgyptiansuperiorsinBerberaandZeila.
Even though the customary institutions were not limited to only Akils, they became the
preferredcolonialmeansofgovernanceintheProtectorateduringBritishrule.Thehome-grown
Sultanatesystemofpublicauthority,whichhadbettersocialstandingandlegitimacyintheeyes
of the public,wasmarginalised to a significant degree. UnlikeAkils, the public authority of
Sultanswasnotacolonialinvention.ThisisnottosaythattheSultansweretotallyoutsidethe
statebutratherthelevelofAkils’engagementwaspronounced.OneofthereasonswhyAkils
were preferred as an administrative instrument was the fact that they could cover wider
geographical areas by their sheer far greater number than the Sultans who were few and
represented bigger clan groupings. According to Lewis (1955, p. 585), the institution of
chieftaincy (i.e. Akil) was highly revered or feared. He observes that “chief's glance [was]
referredtoas(ilkulul)'theburningeye'…hispersonissostronglyendowedwithpowerthat
amongsomecloselyrelatedtribesitisusualforavisitingchieftoavoidafacetofaceencounter
with his equivalent and to be greeted indirectly by a representative”. Consequent upon his
specialrelationwithGod,achiefcancalldownblessingormisfortuneuponhispeopleandtheir
stock”.Asevidenthere,thechiefsarerepresentedastheagentofGod,whichdeviatesfromthe
generalperceptionofchiefdomasapoliticalposition,whichwasandstillissubjecttochallenge
bythemainlyegalitariansociety inwhich itoperates.Theauthorhimselfpointsoutthatthe
chiefs’decisionsweremainlyvoluntaryastherewasnospecialpolicetoenforcetheirdecisions.
Functionally,theAkilsystemwasconstitutedintwoways.Thefirstwasbasedonpeoples’choice
and clans were given the opportunity to nominate an Akil and present their choice to the
government, while the second was based on government selection where the District
Commissioner(DC)appointedtheAkilwithoutnecessarilyconsultingtheclan.DeceasedAkils
wereinheritedinmanycasesbytheirnextofkin.Thecolonialadministratorsdidnotconsider
the Akil system they introduced as wholly traditional but they were hopeful that it would
transformintoanindigenousformofgovernancehavingfeaturesandpropertiesoftraditional
leadership.Theprimaryadministrativefunctionofthisinstitutionwasbasicallydeterminedby
the colonial administrators and most importantly the District Commissioner whose orders
11Dia isabloodmoneyandadiagroup iscomprisedofmembersofaclanwhocollectivelypaybloodmoney in cases where one of their members causes death within or outside the clan accidently ordeliberately.
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outlined the duties and responsibilities of the Akils. In otherwords, Akilswere government
agentsaswellastraditionalauthorities.EventhoughAkilswereseenascolonialstoogesthey
wereneverthelessneededby their subjects,as theywere themosteffectivemeans through
whichthepopulationcouldmakecontactwiththestate.TheneedforAkils’mediationwaseven
madegreaterinsituationswhereacollectivepunishmentinvolvingtheconfiscationofproperty
andseizureoflivestockwascarriedoutagainstclans(Millman,2013).Understandably,forthis
reason, among others, Akils’ intervention often necessitated that people of the same clan
backgroundconcentrate inareaswhere they couldeasily get access to theirAkils andother
supportsysteminherent intheclanstructure.DespitethesehistoricrolesofAkilsascolonial
stateagents,thereisnonethelessaconsensusintheliteratureaboutthekeyroleoftraditional
authoritiesinthemorerecenthybridstate-buildingprocesses.
Thereis,however,anemergenttrendintheliteratureonstate-makingthatprovidesacrucial
case for going beyond hybridity (Hoehne, 2013, Hoehne, 2011). Furthermore, the role of
customary institutions in thehybridordercanbecritiqued inanumberofways.The ideaof
hybridityevokesanimageinwhichstateinstitutionsaremadeoftwoformsofgovernancethat
arenicelyfittingandmerged–itiscastasamagicmedicinethatcouldrevivetheSomalistate
orotherAfricanstates.Put itdifferently, theroleof thecustomary institutions in thehybrid
order isover-emphasisedandrepresentedasthemissing linkthatcanexplainthedifference
betweensuccessfulgovernanceand failedattemptsof topdown international interventions.
This representation seems exaggerated andmight inmany cases jarwith the reality on the
ground. For instance, one could question the extent towhich institutions in Somaliland are
hybrid.ApartfromtheGuurti,thehouseofelders,thereisnonotablenationallevelinstitution
which could be characterised as being hybrid in Somaliland. This is in sharp contrast to the
assumptioninherentintheliteraturethatseeshybridityasagoldenthreadthatgoesthrough
thestatestructuresinSomaliland.
Additionally,somescholarsaccusethehybridordersofbeinginstrumentalised.Attheheartof
theseaccusationsisthefactthatthecustomaryinstitutionsareincreasinglybecomingco-opted
by the political elites in the executive branch of the government. For instance, traditional
authorities in Somaliland were accused of transforming into institutions that undermine
democraticprogressandhencefurtherexacerbatethealreadybleakimageofstatelegitimacy
(Hashi,2005).Otherscepticsofthe longtermapplicabilityofthehybridpoliticalorderargue
that hybrid state-building processes have outlived their usefulness and what remains now
“underminesdemocraticprogress…andlegitimateauthorityofthestateinstitutionsaswellas
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theleadingtraditionalauthoritiesintheregion”(Hoehne,2013,p.199).Theauthoralsooutlines
anumberofweaknessesinherentinthetraditionalsystems,whichgetstransferredtothestate
when the tradition and themodern are combined to formonepolitical order. For instance,
traditionalsystemsmaybeeffectiveat the local levelbut theymightbe lesseffectiveat the
nationallevelandleadtodivisionsbetweenclans,astheirauthorityislimitedtotheirparticular
clanofbelonging.Traditionalsystemsalsohaveatendencyofbeingbiasingagainstwomenand
youngpeople. If theycontinuetobeasignificantpartof thestatestructures, theycouldall
present a threat to the possibility of democratic and equitable participation in the political
processeswherewomenhave thesamerights in stateaffairsas theirmalecounterparts.As
evident here, the interaction between traditional and modern ways of governance are
“characterisedbycomplementarityandincompatibility”(Renders,2007,p.441)incontrastto
representationsthatcasttheirrelationshipasblendedandfunctioningwelltogether.
Amajorweaknessinthehybridstate-buildingargumentiswhatHoehne(2013)callsimbalanced
state-building, in which the modern structures of the state dominate the incorporated
traditionalstructure,suchasinthecaseoftheGuurti.Inspiteofitsformalinclusioninthestate
structure, the current political dispensation in Somaliland makes the Guurti functionally
marginal. This undermines the quest for state legitimacy, which was the main reason why
traditional institutionswere incorporated in the firstplace.TheGuurti’s standingamong the
public is vulnerable. They are not elected and they have onmany occasions prevented the
democraticprocessbyeitherextendingtheirterm,orthatoftheexecutive.Moreover,Guurtiis
traditionally a dynamic institution in which any male capable of commanding respect can
representtheclanandperformthefunctionsknownforGuurtii.e.mediationofdisputesand
conflict. This, coupledwith their institutionalisation aspartof the state,has cost them their
legitimacyamongthepopulace,andbyimplicationworsenedthatofthestate(Renders,2007).
2.3 BeyondHybridity:Legitimacy,TrustandSegregation
Fortheabove-mentionedreasonsaswellasthefactthathybridityfailstoilluminatethequality
of interaction between the state and the people and the spatial manifestation of such
interaction, it is crucial to go beyond existing debates over 'hybridity' to understand urban
spatialformandtheunbaninstitutionsthatshapesettlementpatterns.Theargumenthereis
thattheliteraturesonurbansegregation,statelegitimacyandtrustaremoreabletoprovide
newunderstandingsof thedynamics that shape the spatial character ofHargeisa andother
Somalicities.Whilehybriditygenerallyfocusesonthenatureofstate institutionsandcanbe
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descriptiveof the character of state-building, the concepts of legitimacy and trust aremore
concernedwiththequalityofinteractionbetweenthestateandthepeople.Assuch,theycan
provideabetterunderstandingofurbangovernanceandsegregationinHargeisa.
2.3.1 UnderstandingLegitimacyandTrust
Tyler(2006,p.1),defineslegitimacyasa“psychologicalpropertyofanauthority,institution,or
socialarrangementthatleadsthoseconnectedtoittobelievethatitisappropriate,proper,and
just”.ThisisreinforcedbytheOECD(2010,p.15)’spostulationthata“politicalorder,institution
or actor is legitimate to the extent that people regard it as satisfactory and believe that no
availablealternativewouldbevastly superior”. TheOECD (2010),differentiatesat least four
forms of state legitimacy. First is ‘process legitimacy’, which is about setting the rules of
engagementbetweencitizensandthestate.Secondis‘performancelegitimacy’,whichisabout
thestate’sperformanceagainstasetofmeasuresbelievedtoindicatelevelofperformancei.e.
service delivery. Third is legitimacy that emerges from shared beliefs and social practices
informed by values, ideology or religion. And finally, there is a legitimacy that derives from
recognitionofthestatebyexternalactorsascertainingitssovereignty,whichinturnimpactson
itsinternallegitimacy.
Discussionsover legitimacyareimportantforunderstandingstate-buildingprocesses.Lemay-
Hébert (2009) divides state-building debates into twomain camps. The first of these is the
‘institutionalapproach’,whichbuildsontheWeberianconceptualisationoftheterritorialand
organisationalcontrolofthestate,throughthemonopolyofviolence,whichiscaseasacrucial
elementforunderstandinglegitimacy.Inthisapproach,statelegitimacyisalsomeasuredbythe
state’sabilitytodeviseplansorpoliciesanditsabilitytoenforceregulationsandlawsthrough
accountable and transparent processes and instruments of power (Fukuyama, 2004a). The
second approach draws heavily on Durkheimian state-building perspectives and it places
emphasisnotonthephysicalstructuresandinstitutionsofthestate,butratherthepoliticaland
socialaspectsofthestatei.e.thepeoplewhoconstitutethepowersininstitutionalstructures
(Buzan, 2008). As evident here, these conceptions of the state also vary in their
conceptualisationoflegitimacy,andtheextenttowhichtheyemphasiseit.AccordingtoLemay-
Hébert(2009),theinstitutionalapproachplacesemphasisontherelationshipbetweenservice
deliveryandlegitimacyasafulfilmentofthesocialcontractbetweenrulerandruled(Rotberg,
2004 ),while in the legitimacy approach, the strength of the state and the extent towhich
democracyexistsareseenasfactorsenhancinglegitimacy(Fukuyama,2004b).
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The literature alsomakesotherdistinctions in how tounderstand the concept. For instance
Gilley (2006)makesadistinctionbetweenobjectiveand subjective legitimacy. The former is
basedonimpartialobservationofstatebehaviour,howpeopleviewthestateaswellastheir
levelof trust,whereasthe latter isbasedonsubjectiveexperienceand interpretationbythe
opiniongivers.Thepolicyimplicationsofthesedifferentanalyticalperspectivesonlegitimacy
taketwoforms,descriptiveandprescriptive,asmappedbyHoffmanandKirk(2013).Theformer
places the emphasis on understanding legitimacy by looking at the specifics of beliefs and
perceptionsandhowthisshapesthewaypeoplerelatetoandassessthestate(Andersen,2011).
Thelatterplacesemphasisonnormativeindicatorsbasedonuniversalguidelines(Bellinaetal.,
2009). This is mainly concerned with improving political legitimacy, and it is particularly
importantforcountriesgoingthroughdelicatedemocratictransitions,assumingthatthelevel
ofstatelegitimacyislikelytoincreasevoluntarycompliancewithrulesandregulations(Moehler,
2005).
Furtherdifferentiationoflegitimacyincludeinput,outputandthroughputlegitimacy(Schmidt,
2013).Theinputlegitimacyisconcernedwiththecitizen’sparticipationinthedecisionmaking
processeswhereasoutputisconcernedwiththeperformanceofthestateinstitutionsentrusted
withdischargingpublicservice.Thethroughputisconcernedmorewiththeprocessesthrough
which both the input and output as well as the practices and cultures which shape their
interactionareconstituted(Lieberherr).
State legitimacy is associatedwith effective institutional development. Positive attributes of
highstate legitimacy include increasedvoluntaryengagement ingovernance,aswellasnon-
coercive compliance with rules and regulations. In other words, legitimacy is believed to
enhance state capacity as it spares theneed to devote resources to coercion (OECD, 2010).
Consequently,statesareoftenkeentoincreasepositiveregardfromthepublic.Inacontinent
marredbyauthoritarianism,oneofthemostpopularmeansthroughwhichpoliticallegitimacy
ispursuediselections,whethergenuineornominal(Moehler,2005).Butthepitfallofpursuing
legitimacy through elections is that people’s perception is to a significant degree shapedby
whichpoliticalpartytheyidentifywith.TheauthorobservesthatinmanyAfricancountries,itis
likely that losers of elections may display negative perceptions towards state institutions
whereasthosewhovotedforthewinningpartyarelikelytoexhibitmoretrustinthestate.This
may be particularly pronounced in cases where state and party institutions aremerged, or
wherepartieshaveaconstituencythatisdefinedbyregional,ethnic(orintheSomalicase),clan
loyalties. Similarly, winners are less likely to defend civic rights than losers if such action is
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perceivedtobeagainstthegovernment(Moehler,2005).Animportantspatialmanifestationof
theweaknessesintheprimacyofelectionsasalegitimationprocessisthefactthatsuchefforts
produceasymmetricaldistributionsoflegitimacyacrossterritories,aspeoplelivingindifferent
partiesofacityorcountrymayhavesignificantlyvaryingperceptiontowardsthestateforsocial,
economicandpoliticalreasons.Eventhoughthisisoverlookedintheliterature,itisimportant
topointoutthatidentitypoliticsinsuchelectionscanoftenperpetuateurbansegregationalong
ethnicandclanlines.
According Etzioni (2011), legitimacy is, more often than not, underpinned or informed by
normativevaluesandsocialpractices,“subjecttomoraldialogues”butnotnecessarilyproduced
bythem.Inmanycases,suchmoraldialoguesinformtheunderstandingofwhatisconsidered
and what is not considered just. But Buckley (2013) problematises this, underscoring the
importance of distinguishing the related acts of justice and legitimacy. While just can be
understoodasmorallyinformedprinciplesthroughwhichdecisionsareappropriatedasbeing
correct, legitimacy denotes rules to which conformance is attained voluntarily without
necessarilybelievingthatsuchactsarejust.Hepointsoutthat“theconceptoflegitimacydiffers
from the concept of justice insofar as citizens accept “just” principles as both morally
appropriateandmorallycorrect,whereascitizensaccept“legitimate”usesofpublicpoweras
morally appropriate but not fully correct” [ibid, p 329]. Arguing along these lines, Samatar
(2009)invokestheconceptoffaith(bywhichhemeansdevotiontoparticularvaluesfoundin
boththeIslamicreligionandnomadicSomaliculture,i.e.egalitarian“beliefinself-relianceand
developmentofconfidenceinthecommunity’scommitmenttojustice”)asameansofrestoring
statelegitimacythatsufferedfromlongtermnegativeattitudes.
NegativepublicattitudestowardstheSomalistatedatebacktothecolonialtimeswhenmost
oftheSomalipopulationfeltthatthestateinstitutionsthroughwhichtheyweregoverneddid
notrepresenttheirvaluesandbeliefs.Thiswasmanifestedbythestiffresistancetothecolonial
powers from their arrival in 1884 to their departure in the 1960 (Irons, 2013, Hess, 1964,
Mohamed,2002a).Keytothisresistancewasawidespreadrejectionoftheexclusionarynature
ofcolonialrule,whichnotonlyimposedanalienstate(s)butalsosubdividedSomaliterritories
intovariousentities(Samatar,1982,Mohamed,1996).Beingawareofsuchdiscontent,colonial
authorities embarked on politicalmanoeuvres prior to independence such that some loyal
Somalis were incorporated into the formal governing system primarily to bring about state
legitimacy (Samatar, 2009, Mohamed, 2002b). These attempts did not, however, yield
significantimprovementsintherelationshipbetweenthecolonialstateandSomalis.Asaresult,
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politicalresistancegainedmomentum,leadingtoindependenceinthe1960(Mohamed,2004).
To thedismayofmanywhoexpecteda turnaround inhowgovernancewasconstitutedand
executed,thepostcolonialstatebecameasiteforfreshformsofstruggleforresourcesmainly
betweenelites.Similarly,thepostcolonialstateinheritedallinstrumentsofrepression,asthose
whoassumedthepowerdidnothaveimmediateintentionsofdismantlingthem.
Consequently, public perceptionof state legitimacymade little if anyprogress. This became
clear soon after independencewhen poets whowere strong supporters of the struggle for
independencefoundthemselvesatwaragainwithanewAfricanstatereplicatingoldcolonial
behaviours.Amongthefirsttocriticisethewayinwhichpower-sharingtookplaceandtheway
in which resources weremisappropriated by the ruling elites was Ali Sugule (Sugule, 1962,
Sugule,1966).Growingpopulardiscontentwiththeimmediatepostcolonialstatefacilitatedthe
coupin1969.Themilitaryofficerswhooverthrewtheciviliangovernmentwereawareofthe
legitimacydeficit fromwhichthecivilianSomalistatewassuffering.Asaresult, thefirst few
yearsofmilitaryrulewerecharacterisedbynation-buildinganddevelopmentnarrativesaimed
atrestoringpublicconfidenceinthestate.This,however,didnotlastlongasthemilitaryregime
becamemorerepressivethanthecivilianregimeitreplaced.AccordingtoBradbury(2003),in
the aftermath of Somalia's war with Ethiopia in 1997, public institutions were dilapidated
through scarcity of financial resources and dwindling aid and state legitimacy declined
significantlyasclansbecamean importantsourceof“patronageandprotection”.Thosewho
wereexcludedfrompowerandthebenefitsofthestatealsofurtherentrenchedgroupidentity
bymobilisingresourcesthroughclanstructures.Bytheearly1980s,increasedcompetitionfor
illicitandformaltradeledtoincreasingsegregationofthemilitaryandpoliticalelitesandthe
eventual collapse of the state in Somalia [ibid]. This insecurity and breakdown of state rule
underpinned people’s tendency for concentrating in particular geographical locations. The
manner inwhich the statewas governed had significantly undermined trust in formal state
institutions in the country. Trust in the state is particularly important in understanding the
perpetuationofurbansegregation.Thisisbecausetrustplaysanimportantroleinformingsocial
relationshipsbasedonchoiceandreciprocity.Inotherwords,thestate’smodeandpracticesof
governance shapes the levelof credibilityand legitimacy it can reciprocally receive fromthe
public.
Dunn(1992,p.74)definestrustasthe“confidentexpectationofbenignintentionsinanother
free agent”. But Luhmann (1992) makes a distinction between confidence and trust.While
confidencecanbeunderstoodasacertainlevelofexpectationsofapersonorinstitutions,trust
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can be understood as being based on previous encounters and confidential information
presupposing scenarios of risk. Similarly, Dasgupta (1992, p. 51) places emphasis on
expectationsbydefining trustasa“senseofcorrectexpectationsabout theactionsofother
people thathaveabearingonone’sownchoiceofaction”.Although this doesnotaddress
Luhmann(1992)’sconcernregardingassessmentsofriskasakeycomponentoftrust,Gambetta
(1992,p.217)’sproposaloftrustdoesseemtoaddressthisconcern,ashesuggeststhattrust
“or,symmetrically,distrust[canbeunderstoodas]aparticularlevelofthesubjectiveprobability
withwhichanagentassessesthatanotheragentorgroupofagentswillperformaparticular
action,bothbeforehecanmonitorsuchaction(orindependentlyofhiscapacityevertobeable
tomonitorit)andinacontextinwhichitaffectshisownaction”.
AccordingtoDasgupta(1992), trustcanbeunderstoodasacommoditygovernedbyspecific
marketrules.Forinstance,whentherearedeviationsfromnormalpractices,punishmentssuch
as social stigma or other forms of enforcement are applied. If trust in the enforcement
mechanism is low, the possibility of entering into agreements also becomes low. In the
Somalilandcase,trusttowardsthestateisunderminedbythelackofequitableaccesstojustice
andenforcementmechanismsfreefromcorruptionandnepotismandhencepeoplenolonger
seeitfittohonourasocialcontractwiththestateastheirexperiencewiththestateismainly
negative.Trustisthereforeinfluencedordeterminedthroughaprocessinwhichanagentacts
in a relationship on the basis of prior knowledge [ibid]. In other words, trust here can be
understoodasa commodityheldby thepublic and traded foraparticularoutcomeof state
governance. The price is determined by the extent to which reasonable arrangements
acceptabletobothsidesarenegotiated.InthecaseofSomaliland,thecurrentarrangements
arenotacceptabletothepublicandthiscanhelpexplainthespatialconcentrationofpeoplein
particulargeographicallocationspartlytoresistthestate.Thisconceptualisationoftrustseems
tobebasedonfamiliarity,whichmakesthelatterakeyattributeoftrust.ButLuhmann(1992,
p.95)pointsouttheneedfordistinguishingtrustandfamiliarity,suggestingthat“familiarityis
anunavoidablefactoflife;whereastrustisasolutionforspecificproblemsofrisk”.Herethe
“specificproblemsofrisk”arethegovernment’sactionswhicheitherenhanceorerodetrust.
Historically, colonial legacies and the manipulation of state instruments for the control of
subjects canbeconsideredasamajorexplanatory factor for the lossofpublic trust in state
institutions (Mamdani, 1996). Equally, postcolonial continuity of governance malpractices
further undermined public expectations of independent African states, as they failed to
constitute ruling arrangements different from those experienced during the colonial period
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(Samatar,1985).Theabsenceofsignificanttrustinstateinstitutionshasbeenworsenedinmany
African contexts by the emergence of military dictatorships that overthrew the colonially
inducedfragileAfricandemocraciespartlybecauseofpublicdiscontentoverhowthoseinpower
behavedorgoverned.Mostofthesemilitaryregimesdidnot,however,performanybetterthan
thosetheyreplaced.AccordingtoMenkhaus(2006b),distrusttowardstheSomalistateisrooted
intherepressivemannerthroughwhichpublicorderwasconstitutedandimplemented.This
had left a lasting scar in public confidence in state institutions, and many people remain
reluctanttoseethestateresumingoldpowers.Byimplicationthishasfacilitatedorentrenched
urbansegregation.
2.3.2 ConceptualisingUrbanSegregation
Thetermsofurbanfragmentationandsegregationareinterchangeablyusedintheliteratureto
describetheurbanformandrelatedsocialrealitiesthatresultfromtheresidentialseparation
ofsocialgroupsonthebasisofidentityi.e.tribe,ethnicity,race,religion,ideology,economicor
othersocialstatuses.While,Imostlysticktousingsegregation,Ioccasionallyalsousetheterm
fragmentation,bywhich Imeanthesameassegregation.Myaimbelow is first toprovidea
conceptual understanding of segregation. I then move onto discussing the causes and
consequencesof segregation. In the final subsection, Iprovideanoverviewof thehistoryof
urbansegregationinHargeisa.GiventhelackofliteratureonsegregationinSomalistudies,this
sectionreliesmainlyonwidergeographicalandsociologicalstudiesontheconcept,itscauses
anditsconsequenceinurbanplaces.
Urban segregation can be understood as a phenomenon where specifically defined groups
occupyparticularspacesinthecity,voluntarilyorinvoluntarilymaintainingadistancefromone
another for social,economicandpolitical reasons (KaplanandWoodhouse,2005,Battersby,
2004,Muhammadetal.,2015). It isaconceptwhich, fromasocialandpoliticalperspective,
reflectschangingurbansocio-spatialrealitiesaswellasthedynamicsofpowerrelationswithin
andbetweenpeopleandthestateandnon-stateactors.Fromaphysicalperspective,itseeksto
accountforthechanginggeographicalandterritorialstructuresofplacesandtheimpactthis
couldhaveonurbanliveability(Navez-Bouchanine,2002citedinDeffnerandHoerning,2011,
Dauskardt, 1993). According to Massey and Denton (1988), urban segregation can be
understoodastheoutcomeofsocialandeconomicprocesses,anditcanbemeasuredwithina
basic frameworkconsistingofat least fivemaincomponents.Thesearetheextenttowhich:
groupsaredispersedacrossspatialunits;groupmembersareexposedtoeachotherinurban
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spaces;groupmembersareoriented towardsaparticular central residence;particular social
groups are concentrated in a physical space; andminority groups are clustered in adjacent
places.
Asalientfeatureofthedebatesoversegregation isthebinaryforminwhichdistinctionsare
madebetweenthewealthyandpoorneighbourhoodsofthecity,oftenrootedinthehistorical
developmenttrajectoriesofoldandnew,or‘traditional’andmoderncities(Muhammadetal.,
2015).Furthermore,segregationcanbejudgedtobe‘good’or‘bad’.Theformerisassociated
withpeople’sabilitytoincreasetheirchanceofnegotiatingabetterlifeinurbanplacesthrough
socialnetworkswithneighbours. The latter isassociatedwithnegativefeaturessuchasthe
exclusionofthepoorfromopportunitiesavailableinthecity(Peach,1996).VanKempen(1994)
points to someof themainweaknesses in thesedualistic framings, chiefamong thembeing
whether segregation should be considered at the city or conurbation level, and whether it
shouldbeconsideredasstaticordynamic.Equally,segregationstudiesarecharacterisedbyan
epistemologicalbias,asthefocustendstobeplacedonareaspopulatedbythepoor,whichby
defaultmakeswealthyareasescapescrutinyofacademicandpolicydebatesoverhowspaces
shouldbeorganisedandinhabited.KaplanandWoodhouse(2005)criticisestheliteraturefor
overlookingsegregationwithinthesamegroupsalongclasslines.Visser(2013)arguesthatthis
can influence the outcome of efforts aimed at bringing about integrated spaces, as lack of
understandingoftherelativelywealthyareascan leadtomisdiagnosisand ineffectivenessof
city-widepolicyefforts.
Several distinct strands of academic writing can be distinguished on segregation. The first
investigatessegregationasaspatialphenomenonwherethecityconsistsofdifferentsegments
occupied by various sections of the urban population (Balbo and Navez-Bouchanine, 1995,
Navez-Bouchanine, 2003,Navez-Bouchanine, 2002 cited inMichelutti, undated). The second
looks at urban segregation from a social perspective where service provision is analysed in
relationtoinfrastructuraldevelopmentanditsimpactondisintegrationorintegration(Coutard,
2008,GrahamandMarvin,2001).Thethirdconsiderssegregationfromaneconomicperspective
lookingatthepolarisationofurbaneconomicspacesandthedifferentialaccesstoopportunities
and services (Sassen, 2002, Van Kempen, 1994), while the fourth strand looks at political
segregation where exclusion and inclusion are perpetuated through power relations and
administrativeinstrumentsusedtodoorundopolicybasedornon-policybasedinstitutional
practices(Navez-Bouchanine,2002,Pieterse,2006,Watson,2009,Parnell,1991).Thisbringsus
to the final thread of the debate, looking at urban segregation from social and cultural
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perspectiveswhereconflictingidentitiescoexistandinteractwithinthesameterritoryshaping
urbanresidentialpatternsaccordingtoculturalandethnicidentities(Harrisonetal.,2003).Itis
importanttopointoutthattheabove-mentionedthemesaresituatedwithinbroaderattempts
toidentifysegregationdynamics,itscausesasaphenomenonanditsimpactonurbanliveability
as well as the possible means through which its negative consequences can be mitigated
(Michelutti,undated).
2.3.3 CausesandImpactofSegregation
Segregation is generally cast as the result of two main processes: “social prejudice” and
economicmalfunctioning’ (K’AkumuandOlima, 2007). Social segregation inAfrican cities is
largelyattributedtothecolonialmanipulationofspace(Macoloo,1998).Mbembe(2004,p.384)
arguesthaturbansegregationwasa“biologicalprotectionoftheso-calledwhiterace…[where]
variouspoliciesandregulatoryframeworksaimedatprotectingthewhite[s]fromtherestofthe
population[wereintroduced,making]the…artsofcitybuildingandofinhabiting…synonymous
withthecreationofanillusoryharmonyandpuritybasedonthefictionofracialdistance”.In
addition tosuchrationalisationsofprotection, segregation inmanycitiesduring thecolonial
period was justified on the basis of health risks such as malaria (Muhammad et al., 2015,
Murunga,2012).Indigenouspeopleinthecontinentweredisplacedfromtheirhomesonthe
basisofthispoliticallymotivatedviewonhygiene12(Parnell,1991).Policyinstrumentssuchas
urbanplanninganddesignpracticeswereusedtobringaboutdomiciliaryseparationbetween
socialgroupsforthebenefitofonegroupoveranother(Spinks,2001,Myers,2003).
An example of this is South Africa (Dauskardt (1993), where residential segregation was
implementedthroughlegislationincludingtheGroupAreasAct,whichresultedintheremoval
ofmanyinnercitycommunitiestourbanfringes.Similarly,inNairobi,localcommunitieswere
alsoremovedfromstrategicpartsofthecitytoremoteperipheriesinthe1910s(Turton,1972).
Postcolonialcitiesoftenretainedthissegregatedurbanformastheyfailedtobreakawayfrom
colonialmechanismsofmakingurbanpoliciesandplaces(Myers,2010).Asaresult,“segregation
and segmentation in colonial” urban form translated into a high level of inequality among
12Regardlessofhowsegregation is justified, insomecases,suchcolonially inducedsegregationfoundcurrencyinthelocalcultures.Forinstance,insomeMuslimcities,theindigenouscommunitiesdidnotmind segregation primarily because they wanted to protect their values from colonial influence(Muhammad,etal,2015).
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Africanpopulationsaselitesinheritedtheexclusivewhiteareaswhilethepoorwereleftout.As
thegapbetweentherichandpoorincreased,classbecameinimportantfactorinfluencingurban
segregationinAfrica,andalsoledtoprocessesofself-segregation.
Lewinson (2007) provides an example in which segregation came about as a result of class
differenceinanEastAfricancontext,whereofficeworkerssociallysegregatedthemselvesfrom
those inthecommunitytheyconsideredasbackward.Asidefromclass,community interests
can influence the emergence of voluntarily segregated residential patterns on the basis of
‟strong taste for sharing a church or temple, preserving customs, trading with each other,
borrowing from or lending to each other, speaking their language and teaching it to their
children,orenjoyingeachother’scompanyinday-to-dayaffairs”(Anas,2006,p.542).Spatial
segregationmay also occur, either deliberately or inadvertently, on thebasis of landuseor
following infrastructural developments. An example of this is cities where primary and
secondary use of land exhibits differentiation in the location of residential and commercial
spaces(K’AkumuandOlima,2007).
Elaborating the concept of ‘splintered urbanism’, Graham and Marvin (2001) posit that
investment in infrastructural networks underpinned by differentiation in land use leads to
segregation inurbanspaces,andcannegativelyaffect theprovisionofservicesacrosscities.
Their argument rests on four key points. Firstly, urban development tends to be advanced
through the provision ofmodern infrastructural networks across national economic spaces.
Secondly the emergence of new information technologies has challenged the assumed
inevitabilityofconnectionsthroughphysicalinfrastructure,asthesenewtechnologieshaveto
some extent ‛unbundled’ infrastructural development, leading networks to be segmented.
Thirdly, infrastructuraldevelopment strategies led to theemergenceofpremiumnetworked
spaceswherewealthypeople live inclosedoff sectionsof thecitymostoftenreferredtoas
gatedcommunities.Fourthly,thisproducesresistanceintheformofsocialmovementsopposed
totheinequalitiesofpremiumspacesandcommoditisednetworks.
However, the idea of splintered urbanism was heavily criticised for beingWest-centric and
ignoringexperiencesfromNon-Westernsettingswhichinmostcasesdeviatefromtheaforesaid
theorisationofurbansegregation(Coutard,2008).Splinteredurbanismwasalsocriticisedfor
theimplicationthatsegregationisanewphenomenon,whichresultedfromrecentchangesin
global economic interaction and governance practices. Kooy and Bakker (2008) refute this
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suggestionandpointoutthatcitiesinmanydevelopingcountrieshavelongbeendividedalong
ethnicandsocio-economiclinespriortotherapidglobalisationofeconomicandculturalflows.
One of themost fundamental questions underpinning segregation discussions is thatwhich
relatestoitsimpact.Thisisimportantbecausesegregationisnotonlyproducedbyparticular
social, economic and political realities but it also produces particular social, economic and
politicalimpactswhichshapeexperiencesofurbanliveability.Theseincludebothnegativeand
perhapstoalesserextentpositiveimpacts.Amongthenegativeimpactsofsegregationinclude
the political marginalisation of certain groups that can flow from their concentration in
particularareas.Segregationcaninthesecasesleadtocollectiveviolencewhen‟discrimination,
spatialmismatch,anddemographicchangecombine”(KaplanandDouzet,2011).Similarly,Abu-
LugholdandRace(2007)arguethatracialandethnicconflictcanarisefromrivalryoverspace
andaccesstoresources.Theauthorobservesthatconflictarisinginsuchsituationsoftenleads
totwotendencies;eitherindividualsmovetoareasperceivedtobesaferforthemortheyget
trappedwithinaclosecircleoftheirfamiliesorcommunities,oftencuttingthemselvesofffrom
thesocialfabric,aconditionofself-isolationwherechildrenandadultsinthefamiliesspendless
time in the streets. As we shall see, the former has particularly relevance for the case of
Hargeisa.
Moreover,segregationcanalsoentrenchundesirableeconomicconditions,aspoorpeoplewho
liveinlowincomeareasarelikelytohavelesssocialandeconomicmobilitythanpoorpeople
living in non-poor locations. This is due to the fact that the “particular form of the spatial
configurationthatarisesinacityshapesthehorizonsofpossibility.Ifthehorizonisextremely
limited,spatialconfigurationcontinuestoproducesegregationandexclusion.Alternatively,if
thehorizonsaremoreopen,wearemoreinclinedtousetherichmultiplicityofspatialpractices
to unleash new ways of interaction and engagement” (Pieterse, 2005, p. 3). In urban
managementterms,segregationplacesaburdenonlocalauthorities’questforequitableservice
delivery,wheresucheffortexists.Forexample,servicesprovidedinlowincomelocationsmight
belowerthanotherareasasmunicipalauthoritiespaylessattentiontoareaswithlowerlevels
ofrevenuegeneration.
Segregationmayalsohavepositiveimpacts.KaplanandDouzet(2011)observethatsegregation
may have contributed to political empowerment in some instances, as spatial separation
formedthebasisonwhichparticulargroupsfightingforgreaterrightsareincubatedinareas
predominantlyoccupiedbytheirownsocialgroups.Whilesomepositive impactsmayfollow
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fromvoluntarysegregation,Anas(2006,p.13)pointsoutthatitscrucialtoidentifythelevelat
which this occurs. The author distinguishes between optimal and non-optimal level of
segregation.Theformercanbeunderstoodastheconditioninwhich‟addingonemoreperson
toa[segregatedarea]createssocialmarginalbenefitsandcoststhatareequal”.Thelatteris
whentheadditionofoneormorememberstothesegregatedareadonotadd“socialmarginal
benefits”.Althoughsuchoptimalseparationmaymitigatesomeofthenegativeexternalitiesof
segregation,itisimportanttopointoutthatsocialintegrationbasedonstronggroupidentity
such as clan or regional affiliations can play an important role in possible instability. This is
becauseitcreatesanenvironmentwheredistancingothersistheprinciple/goalthroughwhich
advancementofsocial,economicandpoliticalinterestsrotate,hencelayingthefoundationor
exacerbatingexistingdivisions.InthecaseofHargeisa,thespatialconcertationofpeoplealong
clan linesenabledpeopletoresist thestatebothpoliticallyandviolentlywhentheir interest
are/perceivedtobeendangered.
2.3.4 HargeisaasaSegregatedSpace
InanattempttohistoricisehowsegregationdevelopedovertimeinHargeisa,Ibrieflydiscuss
theemergenceofurbansegregationduringthecolonialperiod.Iarguethaturbansegregation
was not necessarily inevitable as some of the Somali settlements prior to the arrival of the
colonialadministrationhadsignsoftraversingclanandlineageboundaries.Ialsoarguethatthe
postcolonial, including the post-conflict, development trajectory reinforced the existing
segregatednatureofurbansettlementinHargeisa.Forthemostpartduringthecolonialera,
Hargeisawasnotasadministrativelyandeconomicallyimportantforthecolonialadministration
asweretheEasternandcoastaltown.Asaresult,theseatofgovernmentforthreeandhalf
decadeswasinBerberaandoccasionallySheikh.Thisinitialconcentrationofstatestructuresin
Berberawasattributabletoarangeoffactors.FirstlyBerberawastheonlyall-weatherharbour
inSomaliland(WarOfficeGeneralStaff,1907)andsecondly,itwasthebiggesturbancentrein
thecountryandthirdly,littlewasknownatthetimeaboutthesettlementsintheinteriorparts
ofthecountry(SeeSwayne,1996).Moreimportantly,thecoastaltownswereperceivedtobe
morecivilisedandcosmopolitanthantheinteriorpartsofthecountry,asaresultofIndianand
Islamicinfluences.13
13Capt.MalcolmMcNeilofSomalilandFieldForcewrotein1902aboutcoastaltownsthat“Indianwaysandcustoms(andwiththemAdenprices)cameintovogueintheSomalicountrywhere….thecoinageis
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Thecolonialgovernment’sviewsoncosmopolitanismwerecharacterisedbybinaryoppositions
whereontheonehanditconsideredcosmopolitanspacesaslesssusceptibletoharbouringlocal
resistance,14 but on the other it encouraged clan segregation due to the ease with which
administrationfunctionswereoperablethroughprecolonialinstitutions,particularlytheAkils.
Priortothearrivalofcolonialpowers,Hargeisawasaruralsettlementpopulatedbynomadic
clanswhoseasonallymigratedinandoutofthearea.PermanentsettlementinHargeisabegan
withthearrivalofIslamicclericsinthemid-19thcentury,whoseauthoritywascastastakinga
cosmopolitan non clannish form (War Office General Staff, 1907, p. 51). Hargeisa’s urban
nucleusisattributabletoIslamicclericswhooftenhailedfromdifferentclansandcommanded
highlevelsofrespectamongthenomadsallowingthemto“settledownandformpermanent
villages”inanyspaceoftheirchoosingregardlessoftheirclanbackgrounds(Irons,2013,p.20).
InadditiontotherespectforthereligionembodiedbytheseagentsofGod,tolerancetowards
Islamicclericswasfosteredbytheirprovisionofeducationalandhealthservices,inmanycases
freeofcharge(Briggs,2012).Suchservicesattractedpeopleofdifferentbackgroundsseeking
Islamic knowledge and treatment, making cleric-dominated urban places cosmopolitan.
ThroughouttheearlyyearsofBritishrule,urbandevelopmentinHargeisaremainedmodestand
segregatedalongracial,ethnicandclanlines.GovernmentquarterswerelocatedintheWest
andservedastheareawherethewhitesandtheirIndiansubordinatesresided,whiletheSomali
populationwasmainlyconfinedtotheEastandtheNorthofthetown.MajRayne,whovisited
Hargeisa,describeditasa“townofsticks/andnativemats[and]afewsun-driedbrickhouses”
andagovernmentquarters(1921).Thegovernmentquartersconsistedof“districtheadquarters
[with]Europeanaccommodationforofficialsandgovernmentofficesandotherinstallations”.15
TheestimatedpopulationofHargeisawas1000in1907(Swayne,1996)butinlittlemorethan
adecadethisnumbergrewto2000makingthesettlementthebiggestofahalfadozencleric
dominatedvillagesintheinteriorpartsofthecountry16(FOHS,1919).
in rupees,andHindustanibeenspokenbyverymanySomalis ispractically theofficial languageof thecountry”(Fergusson,2013).
14ThisissobecausethefirstresistancetocolonialrulewasinstigatedinBerberabythemanlaterlabelledasthe‘madmullah’,buthefailedtowintheheartsandthemindsofthetown’seliteswhoconsistedofpeoplefromdifferentethnicandracialgroups.
15TNACO535/141/7Theseatofgovernment.
16Theestimatedpopulationoftheprotectorateatthetimewasabout300,000.
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The urban significance of Hargeisa was boosted in 1942/3 when it became the seat of the
protectorate’sadministration following thedestructionof thegovernmentoffices inBerbera
duringthewarwiththeItalians(Millman,2013).Themovementofthecapitalwasattributable
toanumberoffactorsthatinclude:firstlythefactthatHargeisawasincloseproximitytomajor
traderoutessuchasEthiopiaandDjibouti; secondly,militaryattentionshifted fromtheeast
followingthedefeatoftheMullahbecauseoftheItalianpresenceinEthiopia;thirdlyHargeisa’s
weatherconditionswerefriendlierthanBerberawhichgetsextremelyhotduringthesummer;
fourthly,theWesternpartofthecountryhadahigherpopulationdensitythantheEast;and
lastlyHargeisawasbynowthelargestinteriorsettlementinthecountry.17Beingthenewseat
of government, Hargeisa received greater infrastructural development in the run up to
independence(BritishSomalilandProtectorate,1945).Thesenewprojectsfurtherentrenched
the spatial character of the town as they followed the previous settlement patterns.
Governmentoffices,stores,camps,andhousingforexpatriates(manyofwhomcamefromthe
otherBritishdependenciesinAsia),werebuiltintheWesternsideofthecity(BritishSomaliland
Protectorate,1954,BritishSomalilandProtectorate,1958)whiletheSomalisectionsremained
underdevelopedandneglected.
The spatial segregation of the city was manifest not only in physical but also social terms.
AccordingtoLaurenceandThomas(2010)therewasaclearsocialdemarcationbetweenthe
EuropeanquartersofthecityandtheSomalisection.Forinstance,itwasatabooforaEuropean
womantovisittheSomalipopulatedpartofthetownunaccompaniedoronfoot.Moreover,the
European population of the town was itself also divided along ethnic lines socially and
economically.WhileEuropeansofBritishdescentmainlyoccupiedprestigiousgovernmentjobs,
Italians(manyofwhomwerefromItalianSomalia)wereoftenengagedinnon-officebasedjobs
such as mechanics and low-profile engineering occupations. The internal segregation of
Europeanswas not limited to economic differences but also social disparities. Little cultural
interactionexistedbetweentheItaliansandtheBritish.Equally,theSomalipopulationinthe
citywasdividedalongclanlines.TheGarhajis.Arab,Awal,andAyubbelongtotheIsaaqbranch
oftheSomaliclanswhereasGaboyebelongstotheminorityclansoftheSomalia.
PostcolonialHargeisaretainedthesamespatialcharacterdevelopedundercolonialrule.Itwas
dividedintoquarters;thegovernmentquarterandthecivilianquarters.Theformerhousedthe
17TNACO535/141/7Theseatofgovernment.
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civilservantsandothergovernmentofficialsandunliketherestofthetown,thissectionwas
wellbuiltbythestandardsofthetimeandithadsteadywatersuppliesandelectricityaswellas
somepavedroads.TheEasterncivilianquarterconsistedoftwomajorneighbourhoodsdivided
bytheriverbed,withtheNorthbeingalittlemorebuiltupthantheSouth.Thedeteriorating
economicsituation inSomalilandafter independencehasalso furtherentrenchedthespatial
segregationofthecity.Fourdaysafterindependence,SomalilandunitedwithSomaliaandthis
dawnedaneweraforHargeisaasmeagrestateresourceswerechannelledtodevelopingthe
capital, Mogadishu, making it the prime city and central focus of action for all sorts of
opportunities.Asaresult,thehandfulofBritish-trainedskilledmenandtolesserextentwomen
fromSomaliland left for thenewseatofgovernment.Equally,businessmenfromSomaliland
increasinglyshiftedtheirfocustotheSouth,leavingHargeisaforthoseunableorunwillingto
relocate forwhatever reason.Soonafter independence, theurbanelites fromtheNorth felt
side-lined notwithstanding the fact that they believed that they weremore qualified than
Southerners(Gulaid,undated).
ThisdiscontentresonatedwiththebroaderpopulationintheNorthwhowerealsoincreasingly
realisingthattheunionwaslessfruitfulthananticipated.ThemarginalisationoftheNortherners
wasmorevisibleinHargeisathaninanyothertownsinthecountryduetothefactthatHargeisa
in the latter years of the British colonial powerwas progressively becoming a capital in the
making for a future Somaliland state. In the two decades after independence, however,
unprecedented numbers of development projectswere implemented in the South. The first
major resistance to thismarginalisation came in1962whenmilitaryofficers from theNorth
staged a coup in Hargeisa.18 Although this failed, therewas a backlash in the form of state
repression of theNorthern population. In otherwords, the after effect of this coup further
entrenchedthemarginalisationofHargeisa.CivilservantsfromtheNorthwerereplacedwith
Southerners.Thisfuelledtensioninthecityaspeoplecouldnolongeridentifywiththestate,
andfeltswampedbyalargerandmorepopulousSouthernbrother.Itisimportanttonotethat
the social support system that the clan structure provides became an effective response
mechanism for theharsheconomic reality inwhichNortherners found themselves after the
Union.AslimitedurbanemploymentopportunitiesmadeitdifficultformanySomalistosurvive
18Capitalisingonthediscontentamongthepeopleinthenorth,ColHassonKeydAbdilleWalanwalwhoreturned from SandhurstMilitary College in theUK led 25 junior officers to take overmajormilitarybarracksandtheradioinHargeisa.
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inHargeisa,socialnetworkingandclancontactsbecamethebasisonwhichnewcomerssurvived
theharsheconomic realityof the town. Inotherwords, itwasmore likely for somebody to
surviveinaneighbourhoodpopulatedbyhisorherkinsmen/womenthanareaswherethatis
notthecase.
Inthe1980s,acivilwarbrokeoutintheNorthernregionsofSomalia(asstatedelsewherein
Chapter2).Thewarbeganasaresultofa long-termmarginalisationofnotonlythepolitical
classbutalsotheordinarypeoplefromtheNorth.Employmentopportunitiesbecamerelatively
scarce in the northern cities and the meagre service delivery inherited from the colonial
authoritiesdeterioratedsignificantly.TheNortherndiscomforthoweversubsidedintheearly
yearsofthemilitarycoupwhichinthebeginninggainedasignificantpublicsupportacrossthe
country.Asthebrutalityofthemilitaryregimeincreased,thepublicsupportstartedtodwindle
inthemid1970sandNortherndiscomfortresurfacedagain.Theregime’swarwithEthiopiain
1977alsoprecipitatedtheemergenceofmajorcrackswithinthemilitaryrankspartlybecause
of clanpoliticsanddivision in the system.SNM,whichcapitalised significantlyondefections
fromtheregime,strengtheneditsmilitarycapabilityasaguerrillamovementbetween1981and
1988when it launchedasurpriseattackongovernmentbases inmajorurbancentres in the
North.
Hargeisa became the epicentre of the war Hargeisa and it was heavily bombarded by the
government forces using both heavy artillery and air power (Gilkes, 1989). Almost all the
residents in thecity fledtotheneighbouringcountries,aswellas toAsia,EuropeandNorth
America(Bradbury,2008,Hammond,2014).WhenMohamedSayyadBarrewasremovedfrom
powerin1991,thedisplacedresidentsreturned,reconstructingwhatwasleftoftheirhomes.
The precarious security situation in the aftermath of Barre’s removal from power made it
difficultforpeopleofdifferentclanbackgroundstoresideinthesameneighbourhoodasmany
fearedfallingvictimtorevengeattacksagainst theirclan forearlieroffences.Thisreinforced
clan-baseddivisionofthecityontheonehandbutontheotherhanditcontributedsignificantly
totheresilienceofthecityatatimewhenitwasemergingfromaconflict.For instance,the
clan-basedspatialcharacterofthecityfirstlymadeiteasierforpeopletoliveinareaswhere
theycouldaccessstateservicesthroughavailablesocialnetworks.Secondly,itenabledthecity
tocopewiththehighlevelof inter-urbanmigrationaswellasrural-urbanmigrationbecause
newcomers negotiated space and survival in areas populated by their clan. And thirdly, it
contributed to theconstructionof thecityby thediasporawhoremit substantialamountof
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moneyandtendtotargetneighbourhoodspopulatedbytheirownclanprimarilybecauseof
perceivedlowerrisks.
2.4 Conclusion
Inthischapter,Ihavereviewedtheliteratureonhybridstatebuilding,statelegitimacy,public
trust,andurbansegregation, inanattempt tounderstandhow identity-basedoccupationof
particularurbanspacescantosomedegreebeexplainedbygovernancepractices.Ihaveargued
that there is aneed togobeyondhybridity ifweare tounderstand the spatial characterof
Hargeisa and the drivers and dynamics underpinning its segregation along clan lines.While
state-practicesare important in thedevelopmentof segregation, I alsoargued thatnegative
perceptionsofstatelegitimacyandtheerosionofpublictrustinformalinstitutionscanbecome
acatalystwhichdrivespeopletoresideinareaspredominantlyoccupiedbypeoplewithwhom
theyshare identityandrelationsbasedonkinship. Inmuchofthe literatureonAfricancities
(outsideSouthAfrica),andparticularlyinunderstandingofSomalicities,authorshavepaidlittle
attention to identity-based segregation. This gap in scholarship is replicated in policy and
practice. In contexts where efforts have beenmade to dismantle geographical segregation,
bridgingthegapinspatialinequalityoftenbecameamonumentaltaskwithfewtangibleresults.
The problem partly lies in misplaced priorities, as there has been a blatant failure of the
interveningauthoritiestotransformtheconditionsthat initiallyerodedpublictrust informal
institutions. I have argued that policy efforts in the Somali context aimed at bringing about
greater social cohesion above the clan identity, during both postcolonial and post-conflict
periods, failed because of the manner in which the state behaved. For instance, the state
breached water but drank wine during the postcolonial period, as it failed to live by the
principlesitrhetoricallyadvocatedi.e.equitableaccesstoresourcesandservicesregardlessof
one’sidentity.Similarly,thepost-conflicthybridorderhasbecomeboggeddowningovernance
malpractices (nepotism, corruption and cronyism) that undermined trust. The spatial
manifestationof this isa segregatedsettlementpatternbasedonclan identity. Toseehow
thesetheoreticalargumentsexplainingthedevelopmentofurbansegregation,ariseoutof/are
rootedinempiricaldynamicsofurbangovernanceinHargeisainrecentyears,itisfirstnecessary
tospellouttheresearchmethodsofthethesis.
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CHAPTER3 NEGOTIATINGDATACOLLECTIONINASEGREGATEDCITY
3.1 Introduction
Thischapteroutlinestheurbanethnographicmethodsthroughwhichthedataforthisthesis
wascollected.UrbanethnographytracesitsroottotheChicagoSchool(CobbandHoang,2015),
anditsfoundationislargelycreditedtoRobertParkandErnestBurgesswhomadesignificant
contributiontothestudiesofurbanpovertyinthelate1920s,19atatimewhensocialscience
scholarship was shifting its focus to the dynamics of the rapid urban transformation and
populationgrowthincities,particularlyintheUSA(Gubrium,2007).Initsmostbasicdefinition,
urbanethnographycanbeunderstoodasaqualitativeresearchtechniqueaimedatcapturing
the“waysinwhichcitydwellersexperiencetheurbanenvironment—howtheyperceive,cope,
act,orfailtoact”(AuyeroandJensen,2015,p.361).Inthisstudy,however,myfocuswasnot
solely on urban dwellers’ experience, but also to explore urban institutional dynamics and
investigate the history of city governance, which is important in shaping urban residents’
perceptionsandactions.Thedataforthisstudywasgatheredoveraperiodofninemonths.
The duration of the fieldwork was influenced by the accessibility and availability of data,
institutionalarrangementsandmyownfamiliaritywiththefield.Thechapterisorganisedinto
fivesections.Inthefirstsection,Iprovideabriefoverviewofthedatasources–ethnographic,
oralhistoricalandarchival.Inthesecondsection,Idiscussmyexperienceofgatheringdatafrom
state and non-state actors inHargeisa. In the third and fourth sections, I discussmy use of
teashopsinthecityaskeysitesofdatagathering,aswellasmyendeavoursoftracingformer
public officials in the diaspora. In the final section, I explore the limitations and ethical
considerationsoftheresearch.
3.2 BriefOverviewofDataSources
Primarily, this study relieson threemain setsofdata.The first set consistsoforalhistories,
observations, interviews, informal conversations, and focus group discussions, which are
conventionaltourbanethnographicstudies.Thesecondsetconsistsofnewspapers,blogs,and
websites.Thefinalsetconsistsoflocalgovernmentrecords,courtrecords,NGOreports,colonial
archives and other documentary materials. Using snowball sampling from initial contacts, I
conductedatotalof91interviews(notallofwhichareciteddirectly),namelykeyinformantand
19See(Parketal,1925).
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personalinterviews.Thekeyinformantinterviewswereconductedwithpeopledeemedtohave
specialist knowledge and insight into urban land and conflictmanagement as well as other
relevanturbangovernanceelementssuchasdevelopmentplanningandmanagement.
Iselectedtheintervieweesfromthepredominantclansinthecity,namelyHabarAwal(which
includesSa’adMuseandIsseMuse),Garhajis(whichincludesHabarYonisandEidagale),Arab,
AyubandGaboye20.Clanrepresentationforthisstudywasparticularlyimportantinanumber
ofways.Firstly,identityplaysacrucialroleinhowpeoplenavigatethroughserviceprovisionin
thecity, largelybecauseofgovernancemalpractices,whichreinforcesclan identityaswillbe
seenintheempiricalchapters.Secondly,clanbalanceiscrucialforrepresentingdivergentviews
andtoconstructanoverallnarrativeofcitydynamics.Thirdlyandmoreimportantly,Ifeltthat
myattemptsforclanbalancecouldshieldmefrombeingaccusedofbiastowardsaparticular
clan,moreso since Ihail froma local clan,HabarYonis.However, Idonot seeclanoreven
Somali-ness, for thatmatter,asa significant shaperofmy identity;norwould Iwant tocast
myselfasessentiallyWesternisedorurbanite(incontrasttoLewis’s(1961)characterisationof
thosewhodonot identifywithclannismasWesternisedorLulling’s (2006)depictionofsuch
groupsasurbanites).
WhileIcanneitherclaimnorrefusetobeurbaniteorrural,WesternisedorNon-Westernised,
whatIcanassertandinsististhatmylifeexperiencemorethananythingelseconstitutesmy
identity.However,theproblemwithmylifeexperienceisthatitkeepsonchangingandbreaking
all the rulesof fixed identity, takingmeacrossmanyboundaries i.e.my trajectoryhasbeen
transurban,transrural,transnational,andtranscivilisation.Inanutshell,mylifeexperienceand
senseofbelongingtraversesthedominantformsofbelongingsuchasclan,tribe,nation,and
nationality. Likemanyothers on themove, I alternately acquire and shedoff aspects ofmy
identityasmylifechanges–young-old,rural-urban,citizen,refugee-citizen–orasisrequired
byaparticularcontextataparticularpointintime.Keytriggersofthesechangesincludeboth
socialandeconomicinfluences.Forinstance,livingindifferentcountriesequippedmewiththe
ability of acquiring a set of social and economic skills as well as experiences that were not
essential for negotiating space in the host societies but which were also important for
broadeningmyscopeofworldviews.
20ClangroupingsinSomalilandaremainlyDir,DaaroodandGabooye.DirincludesIsaaq,Gedabuursi,Issa,andAkishawhereasDaaroodincludesDhulbahanteandWarsengeli.
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MypositiononclanisimportanthereatatimewhentheSomaliidentityrecentlytookthecentre
stageinaheateddebateaboutknowledgeproductioninSomalistudies:controversyhingedon
whetherornotitwaspossibleforSomaliresearcherstoriseabovetheirownclan,objectively
analysepoliticalrealitiesintheirowncountry(s)andproduceunbiasedknowledge(Aidid,2015,
Hoehne,2015,Mirre,2015,Mohamud,2015,Serunkuma,2015).
Besidesclanbackground, Ialsoselected interviewees fromparticularly relevantoccupational
categories.TheyincludedMinisters,Parliamentarians,civilservants,judges,traditionalleaders,
religiousleaders,NGOworkers,andformerpublicofficials,includingsomebasedinthediaspora
(Seetable2).Theagegroupsoftheparticipantsrangedfrom18sto70s(theseagesarebased
onmyownestimations).Thepersonalinterviewswereconductedwithpeoplewhohaddirect
experienceof issues related tourban landmanagementandurban landconflicts.This setof
interviewees include landowners or claimants aswell as relatives of those affectedby land
conflictsorrelatedviolence.WhileIgenerallytriedtointerviewasdiversearangeofpeopleas
possible to gain different perspectives on urban matters, the voice of women is not well
representedinthisresearchduetoinaccessibilitychallenges.Onlythreekeyinformantsanda
focus group discussion consisting of five women were interviewed for this research. To
compensate for this underrepresentation, most court cases I selected for analysis involved
women.
The interviews and other research material were used variedly in the research. Some case
studiesexploredingreaterdepthreliedonanarrowerselectionofinterviewswhileothershad
a larger rangeof interviews andother secondarymaterials. For instance, the case study of
conflict around the airport relied on a less diverse range of informants because it pitted
membersofpredominantlyoneclan(theEidgaleclan)andagainstthestate.Asaresult,most
ofmyinformantsinthisregardwerefromthisclan.
Table2:Therangeofkeyinformantandgeneralinterviews
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
KEY INFORMANTS PERSONAL INFORMANTS
Politician (2) Land Owner - Taxi driver
Policeman Land Owner - Farmer (2)
Police Station Commander Land Owner – Agro-pastoralist (2)
Hargeisa Local Government Councillor Hargeisa Resident - involved in land dispute (2)
Opposition Member of Parliament Relatives of one of the attackers (3)
Member of Parliament Relatives of one of the attackers (2)
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Official - Ministry of Public Works Relatives of one of the attackers
Official - Ministry of Aviation and Air Transport Land Broker (2)
Ministry of Public Works Official (2) Farmer
Ministry of Aviation – Official Famous Playwright
Military Official Unemployed
District Officer Student
District Court Judge (2) SNM Fighter
Director of Civil Unit - Legal Aid Clinic Lawyer - Farmer's Son (2)
Director General of the Ministry of Public Works Lawyer - Farmer's Son
Director General - Ministry of Aviation and Air
Transport
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS
Director UNDP – JPLG Somali Official
Civil Servant UNHABITAT – International Staff
Chairman of Land Commission NGO Worker
Former Minister of Interior. Activist for displaced people (2)
Former Mayor of Hargeisa (2) Activist and Social Researcher.
Solicitor General of Somaliland IT Specialist in an NGO
Prosecutor Religious Leader
Criminal Lawyer TRADITIONAL LEADERS
Legal Advisor for Electoral Commission Sultan (2)
Lawyer (2) Elder (2)
Oral Historian, Artist and Radio Presenter. Clan Elder
Local Resident Involved in Land Dispute Son of a Chief Akil and Lecturer at the University of Hargeisa
Academic INFORMANTS IN THE DIASPORA
Retired Agricultural Economist Former Governor of North Western Province.
Former District Commissioner of Hargeisa
Former Chairman of Somaliland Atrocities Commission.
Seaman21 from Hargeisa
The above-mentioned interviewswere complementedby four focus groupdiscussions. Each
focusgroupconsistedofatleastof6individualsfromadiverserangeofbackgrounds,selected
fortheirsharedexperienceandinterestinaparticulartheme(TraceyandBurgess,2001).Like
the interviews, I selected the focus group
participants fromvarying social and interest
groups such as the youth, business people,
women’s groups, members of the religious
community, and predominant clans in the
city,namelyHabarAwal,Garhajis,Araband
Ayub.Mostofmyinterviewsandfocusgroups
21Therewereonly
LIST OF FOCUS GROUPS
Traditional Leaders Focus Group (8 Participants)
Religious Leaders Focus Group (5 Participants)
Women’s Focus Group Discussion (5 Participants)
Preliminary Focus Group on Land Conflict (7 Participants)
Table3:Thelistoffocusgroups
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discussionsweredrawnfromtheIsaaqclansnotwithstandingthefactthat Ialso interviewed
fewpeoplefromotherclans.ThisissobecauseHargeisaispredominantlypopulatedbyIsaaq.
Moreover,Hargeisa’sidentityisincreasinglybecomingexclusionarypartlybecauseofthefact
thatthecity’spre-conflicthistoryisunderemphasised.Forinstance,therearefewmonuments
inthecitysuchasthejetfighterinfrontoftheformerCommercialBankofSomalia,atankona
roundabout in from of Bar Hargeisa and a hand holding themap of Somaliland in Kaalinta
Sideedaad:allofwhichsignifyconflictandorimmediatepost-conflictIsaaqcentredhistorical
references. Thismakes the city identity Isaaq centred and it has to some extent influenced
availabilityandaccesstoinformation.
Among the social groups included in the studywere also returnees from the diaspora. The
intention was to be inclusive. As focus groups tend to either become consensual where
participantsmostlyagreeonthediscussedissuesordissentientwheretheydisagreesignificantly
(TraceyandBurgess,2001), Iemployedcarefulmoderation soas toensure that issueswere
debatedbytheirmerit.Thefirstfocusgrouptookplaceintheearlystageofmyfieldwork,with
theaimofgettingageneralpictureofkeyissuesandthecurrentandhistoricaltrendsofurban
governance in the city. The second and third focus groups examined the interface between
urbaninstitutionaldynamicsandurbanland,asitemergedthatcontrolsoverurbanlandwere
verysignificantsourceofconflict.Theselatterfocusgroupswereparticularlydedicatedtothe
rolesoftraditionalandIslamicinstitutionsinrelationtolandaccessibility,landadministration,
andconflictmanagement.The last focusgroupsexaminedhowwomenareaffectedby land
conflictandtheirresolutionmechanisms.Inputfromthefocusgroupsarecitedasgroupsrather
thanindividuals.
OneofthemajorchallengesIfacedwiththeinterviewsandfocusgroupsrelatedtotheprocess
of interviewingwomen.On the onehand, I feared thatwhen interviewingwomenwith the
consentof theirhousehold leaders, itmightdiminish thequalityof the informationbecause
femaleparticipantsmaygivemeversionsof thestorywithwhichtheythinktheirhousehold
leaderswouldbehappy.Ontheotherhand,ifwomenwereinterviewedintheabsenceoftheir
householdleadersthatmayposeagreaterriskofadisputewheretherelationshipofthefamily
mightbeatarisk.Thisconcernwasaddressedthroughpriorconsiderationandassessmentof
particularinterviewees’circumstancesandbyaskingviewsoftheirfamilyabouttheinterviews.
Given the unequal power relations between men and women in Somali settings, careful
selectionofvenueswascrucialforwomeninterviewees.Itriednottomakeassumptionsand
sought tomitigate thesepower relationsby attempting tohold interviews in awoman-only
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sessioninthelocationoftheirchoice.IaskedthemtosuggestavenuebuttheyinsistedIshould
alsoproposesomelocationsforthemtochoosefrom.AmongthesitesIrecommendedincluded
theUniversityofHargeisa’sLawDepartment,theOCVPoffice,restaurantswithprivatemeeting
rooms, and a notary firm in the city centre. They unanimously chose the latter for its
convenience for public transport and proximity to shops where many of them wanted to
proceed,andthefirm’smeetingroomswithwhichatleastoneoftheparticipantswasfamiliar.
Whileconductingthediscussions,Iobservedthatwomenfounditdifficulttotalkabouttheir
experienceinfrontofotherwomenforfearofpeerlabellingandpressure.Socialstatussuchas
employment, age and household positions also influenced the interviewswithwomen. For
instance,IfoundthatdiscussionsweremoreopenandfrankwhereIconductedinterviewswith
high-rankingfemaleofficialsinNGOandGovernment,aswellaswiththeolderwomen.Another
challengeIfacedwithinterviewsandfocusgroupsrelatedtofinance.Inanenvironmentwhere
NGOs conduct assessment exercises regularly, itwas often difficult to get intervieweeswho
werewillingtoshareinformationwithoutbeingpaid.Insomecases,Iwasabletoovercomethis
byinformingtheparticipantsaboutmystatusasastudent,emphasisingthatIwastheretolearn
andshareknowledgeabout“ourpeople”inacademicfora.Butinmanyinstances,Ihadtopay
transportationandrefreshmentexpensesforintervieweesandfocusgroupdiscussants,using
theOCVP financial infrastructure to issue receipts toensure transparencyandaccountability
(andIthenreimbursedtheOCVP).
In addition to the focus groups and interviews,media sources also proved to be important
platforms for gathering information about the city. I monitored issues relating to land
administrationandconflictinthepopularSomaliwebsitesandblogs,aswellasrelatedYouTube
channels,whichare increasinglybecomingapopularmethodofdisseminating informationin
theSomalicontext.Thismadememoreawareofawidearrayofsocialandpoliticalissuesnot
necessarily directly connected but relevant to my study. Among the websites I monitored
included salaanmedia.com, qarrannews.com, hadhwnaagnews.com, somaliland.org,
somalilandpress.com, and others. I often stored videos and articles from these sources in a
thematicallyorganisedplaylisttobeabletoaccesslater.Thedataobtainedfromthesesources
wasparticularlyimportantforgaininginsightintothedynamicsofthelandconflictattheairport
andthemilitarybaseintheeastofthecity.
In addition, I monitored the social, political and economic climate in the city through
participating in discussions in teashops, which are important public places where people
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socialiseanddiscussvariousissuesrangingfrompoliticstosports.Thepoliticalaspectsofsuch
discussionareoften termed, in theSomali language, fadhikudirir.This loosely translates to
engaging in conflict while sitting. In other words, it is a form of public discourse in which
participantsintimately(orseeminglyso)debateabouttopicsrangingfromsocialandreligious
issues to economic and political issues. Such debates provided particularly a significant
opportunityforgainingurbanethnographicdata.
Theabove-mentionedinterviews,focusgroups,teashopdiscussions,andmediasourceswere
supplementedwith reportsandother recentpost-conflictarchivalmaterials collected locally
from NGOs and independent consultants. I also draw on important historical materials,
collectedfromtheNationalArchivesandtheBritishLibrary.Thesecolonialreportsandarchives
wereimportantforhistoricisingurbangovernanceinHargeisa.Historicaldocumentsarehardto
comeby,asthecitywasalmostentirelylevelledtothegroundinthelate1980swhenwarbroke
outbetweenSNMandthemilitaryregimeofMohamedSiyadBarre.Ofcourse,thesecolonial
documentsandarchiveswerewrittenfromparticularpoliticalandadministrativeorientations
thatrequirecarefulscrutiny.OneofthewaysinwhichItriedtoovercometheselimitationswas
touseoralhistoricalnarrativesasacounter-balancetocolonialsources.Inthenextsection,I
will outline the key dynamics and contours of assembling data from the above-mentioned
sources.
3.3 InstitutionalAffiliationandAccessibilityofInformants
Myfieldworkbeganin lateFebruary2014,whenIarrivedinHargeisafromLondon. Itwasa
familiarenvironmentbothatthepersonalandprofessionallevel.Atthepersonallevel,Igrew
upinthiscity,havingasaresultbothfamilyandfriendnetworks,whileattheprofessionallevel,
I worked with the Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention (OCVP). The PhDwas a
collaborativedoctoral studyco-sponsoredby theOCVPand theUniversityofSussex.On the
OCVP side, the funding was a small part of £1.8 million grant from the United Kingdom’s
Department of International Development (DFID) for research into conflict, governance and
justiceinSomalia.MyaffiliationwiththeObservatoryservedasanasset.Itprovidedmewith
statusandavisibleandknownbase,astheorganisationhasahistoryofresearchinthecity.It
alsopermittedmetohaveaccesstovariousnetworksingovernmentalandnon-governmental
agenciesaswellasresearchfacilitiesandlogisticalsupport.
InthefirstweekofmystayinHargeisa,IarrangedameetingwiththeDirector,AbdullahiOdowa,
oftheOCVPtoupdatehimaboutmystudyanddiscusstheroleIcouldplayintheorganisation’s
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researchactivities,whilenotlosingfocusonthedatacollectionforthePhD,aswellashowthe
organisation could supportme inmy study.My secondmeetingwaswith the Logistical and
HumanResourcesmanager,SafiaAhmed.WediscussedwaysinwhichIcouldshareaccessto
theorganisational facilitiesandnetworks.Thecentral focusof themeetingwasofficespace,
meetingvenuesandtransportation.Atthetimeofmyarrival,theOCVPhadseveralvacantdesk
spacesandtwomeetingrooms.Inlightofthis,accesstomeetingvenuesandallocationofdesk
spacewererelativelystraightforward,butthesamewasnotthecasefortransportationasthere
wereonlytwovehicles,aminibusandafour-wheel-drive,sharedbyallmembersofthestafffor
theirday-to-dayduties.Asaresult,themanagerrightlyaskedmetoprovideherwithadvance
noticeofmyresearchactivities,soastoprioritiseaccesstotransportation.
One problem I encountered in fulfilling this requirement was the fact that in many cases
appointmentsweremadeonadhocbasisoftenrequiringmetobeflexibleandmeetinformants
atatimeandplaceoftheirchoice,mostlywithveryshortnotice.Thiswasmadeallthemore
difficult by the fact thatmeetings were constantly cancelled or delayed by the informants,
particularly key informantsworking for thegovernment. Furthermore, theabsenceofpublic
transportthatcouldcomplementmyaccesstotheOCVPtransportationwasalsoahindrance.
Inordertoovercometheseproblems,thereweretwochoices.Rentorbuyacar.Ioptedforthe
latter and bought a second hand car at the cost of $2100, payable in instalments. Thiswas
moderately cheaper than renting car at a cost of $600 per month. Being from the local
community, it is important to mention that my experience with logistical issues and their
interface with safety and security was relatively cheaper than that of foreign researchers
negotiating data collection in Somaliland. The latter are required to hire armed escort from
special police units established to protect foreigners with two 4x4 vehicles outside the
immediatebordersofthecity22(Gandrup,2014).
Inthesecondweekofmystayinthefield,Iturnedmyattentiontomappingouttheinstitutions,
placesandpeoplethatcouldshedlightonurbangovernancedynamicsandtheirinterfacewith
segregation.TheinstitutionsandpeopleIidentifiedincludedbothstateandnon-stateactors.
Chief among the state actors were officials in local government, the statutory courts, the
Ministries of Public Works, Interior, Aviation, and Planning. The non-state actors included
traditionalleaders,suchasAkilsandSultans,aswellasreligiousleaders,suchastheclericsand
22Thislimitsforeignresearchers’abilitytomeetrelevantinformantsinthenearbyvillagessurroundingthecity.
59|P a g e
informal Islamiccourts.Theyalso includednon-governmentalorganisationsbothat the local
and international level. At the international level, I was interested in the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP), particularly the Joint Program on Local Government (JPLG),
whichsupportsinitiativesaimedatimprovinglocalgovernance;andtheUnitedNationsHabitat
Program,whichsupportedsomedevelopmentplanningexercisesinHargeisa.Atthelocallevel,
Iwas interestedingettingconnectionswiththeAcademyforPeaceandDevelopment(APD),
whichhas in thepastdone significant researchon land conflicts; and the Social Research&
DevelopmentInstitute(SORADI),whichalsohasahistoryinresearchonlocalgovernanceand
advocacy forhuman rights; and the LegalAidClinic,whichprovides legal assistance topoor
peoplewhocannotaffordlegalrepresentation.
3.4 NegotiatingResearchinStateandNon-StateSpheres
IbeganmyinquirywithselectedpublicofficialsinlocalgovernmentandtheMinistryofPlanning.
Iassumedthatelitemembersofsocietywouldbedifficulttoaccess(HertzandImber,1993),
asresearchersinAfricancontextshavepointedtothedifficultyinobtaininginformationfrom
publicofficialsbecausetheyareeitherunusedorunwillingtogivedata(Gokah,2006).Inthe
secondweekofmyfieldwork,IformallyapproachedthelocalgovernmentExecutiveSecretary,
whoisthesecondmostpowerfulfigureintheMunicipality.Afterbriefinghimaboutmyresearch
overthephone,hegavemeanappointmenttomeethimat10o'clockonthe4thofMarch2014.
However,whenIreportedtohisoffices,hewasnotavailable.Itriedtocallandinformhimabout
mypresencebuthedidnotpickupthephone.Ispentthedayinandaroundtheofficesoflocal
governmentinHargeisa,hopingtocheckhimagaininhisoffice.Theproblemoflocatingpublic
officialsduringtheformalhoursismadeallthemoredifficultbythefactthattheworkinghours
inSomalilandareonly08:00amuntil12pm.Astherewasnosignofhimcomingtotheoffice,I
wentbacktomystationat1:00pm.Thefollowingday,IcalledtheExecutiveOfficerandpolitely
toldhimaboutthefactthatIhadwaitedinhisoffice.Hetoldmethathewouldbeabletomeet
methefollowingday.ButthesamehappenedonthenextdayandIhadtoreturntotheOCVP
empty-handed.
Thefollowingweek, IwenttotheMinistryofPlanningandspoketothereceptionaboutmy
research.Aftercarefullylookingatthelistoftheofficebearersonthenoticeboard,Iaskedfor
thenamesandcontactdetailsof those I thought tobepotentialkey informants.However, I
wentthroughthesameexperience,asIwasunabletolocatethem,excepttheMinisterwhomI
foundtobenotonlypunctualbutalsoengaging.ThesehiccupsconvincedmethatIneededto
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change tactics. I imagined that social networking andmore informal ethnographicmethods
wouldbemoreeffectiveinlocatingkeypublicofficialsthanformallyapproachingthemintheir
offices. In the thirdweek ofmy research, I reorientedmy strategies and contacted the key
peoplethatIneededthroughinformalsocialnetworks.Thechangeinstrategyworkedforme
inaverysignificantway.WhenIlocatedindividualsinformallythroughsocialnetworks,Iwas
abletosavetimeandresourcesasmyappointmentswereveryrarelycancelled.Thisapproach
alsoenabledmetobypasstheredtapebureaucracyofformalappointments.SoIconcentrated
myeffortsongettingkeypublicofficialsinlocalgovernmentinthismanner.Localgovernment
in itself was important to understand in order to gain insight to how recent urban politics,
governanceandplanninginHargeisaworks,anditsimpactonurban-dwellers’lives.Inaddition,
local government offices were important as they housed the Land Tribunal – or Land
Commission as it is popularly known -which dealswith land issues in the city, andwhich I
regardedasakeysourceofinformation.
Throughinformalsocialnetworks,Imanagedtogetholdofthreecouncillors,oneofwhomwas
responsibleforurbanlandmanagementandconflicts.Asidefromprovidingmewithinformation
and grantingme an interview, hewas also crucial in facilitating further contactswithin the
municipal council. Having secured key contacts and interviews from themunicipal council, I
turnedmyattentiontotheLandCommission.Iapproachedalegalpractitionerinmycontacts
tohelpmelocatesomeofthekeyjudgesandCommissionersintheLandCommission.Hewas
abletoputmeincontactwiththechairmanoftheCommissionwhowastrainedasalawyerat
theUniversityofHargeisaandwhoalsoworkedwith theMinistryofPublicWorks.Our first
meeting occurred in a city centre restaurant, Hadhwanaag, where we had informal
conversations aboutmy research aswell as the general political climate in the country.My
familiaritywithlocalpoliticsallowedmetoengagewithhiminformally,whichinturnfacilitated
mylaterrelationshipwiththeCommission.Hesetmeanappointmentwithinacoupleofdays
attheLandCommissionofficesinthelocalgovernmentpremises.Ihadaformalinterviewwith
himandwithanothertwojudgesofthesameCommissioninthenextweek.Ialsoaskedthe
chairmanwhetherhecouldallowmetositinsomeofthehearingstowhichheagreed.Ishowed
upthedayofthehearing.
Unfortunately,however,thisdidnotgoaccordingtoplan,asoneofthejudgesthrewmeoutof
thecourtalongwithsomejournalistswhowantedtocoverthecase.Iwaitedforthehearingto
endandthenapproachedthechairmanoftheCommissiontointroducemetotherestofthe
judgesincludingtheonewhothrewmeout.AfterformalintroductiontothoseIhadnotyetmet
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before,Iwasgrantedpermissiontolistentoanothercaseinthesameweek.Asaresult,Iwas
abletoattendthesubsequenttrialandobservehowtheCommissionoperatesanddischarges
itsdutieswhendecidingcases.Thejudgesalsograntedmeaccesstosomeofthecourtrecords.
Theyinstructedthesecretarytogivemeelectroniccopiesofsomecasesandalsophotocopied
theregisterforme.WhileIwasthusabletogetformalwrittenjudgementsofabout100cases,
thesecretarywastoobusytocopythefullregister,butsheallowedmetodosomyself.This
registerofcasesfrom2009to2013wasaparticularlyimportantsourceforme,asitenabledme
toseethegeographicaldistributionoflandconflictsinthecity.Italsoenabledmetohavean
ideaaboutthelandconflicttrendssolvedthroughtheformalcourtsinthe5yearsfrom2009.
Followingthesuccessfulattainmentofkeycontactsinstatedomains,Iturnedmyattentionto
non-stateactors.IbeganthisendeavourwithinternationalandlocalNGOs.Whilemypersonal
networksandOCVPlinkswereuseful inaccessinglocalNGOs,thesamewasnotthecasefor
internationalNGOs.Thiswasbecausekeyofficialsintheseorganisationswereinternationalstaff
whocouldnotbeaccessedthroughmyexistingpoolofsocialnetworks,whichmainlyconsisted
ofSomalis.Whereaccesswaspossible, the internationalorganisationswere less informative
andweremuchstricteroninformationsharing.Forinstance,Irequestedaccesstoshapefiles
heldbytheUnitedNationsHabitatPrograminordertomakesomemapsofurbansegregation
inHargeisabutwasunabletoobtainthemastheUNHabitatProgramkeepsatightlidonsuch
data.Thismightbepartlyattributabletothefactthattheywereunwillingtosharesensitive(or
evennon-sensitive)datawhichcouldaffect their relationshipwith thegovernment.Another
reasonwhyaccesstointernationalNGOsmighthavebeendifficultisthefactthattherewasa
senseof competitionbetween researchers coming fromoutsideand the internationalNGOs
who conduct their own research tailored to obtaining funding from donors, which can be
contradictedbyfundingfrombynon-NGOcirclessuchasacademia.
AccesstoIslamicinstitutionswasalsodifficult,primarilybecauseofwidespreadfeelingamong
thereligiouscommunitythattheWest(andbyextensionthoseeducatedintheWest)isoften
biasedagainstthem.Forinstance,myvisittotheIslamiccourtandinteractionswithkeypeople
therewasmoreuptightandformalthantheotherjudicialactorsImet.Thiswassodespitethe
fact that I was introduced to the scholars operating the Islamic court by individuals they
respected and knew. I tried to compensate for this up-tightness through contacts who had
insightintohowIslamiccourtsoperateandinteractwithpeopleinvolvedinlandconflicts.As
evidenthere, individualswhocome fromWesterncountries, regardlessofwhether theyare
Somalisornot,areoftenviewedwithsuspiciouseyes.Moreseriousworries includedthatof
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espionage.InspiteofthefactthatIwasnotdirectlyconfrontedwithaccusationsofthisnature,
I was made aware that social science research in Somali settings is negatively affected by
conspiracytheoriesusedbydifferentsocialforcestodiscreditresearchers.Thefoundationof
such suspicions is not only related to recent world politics but is also rooted historically in
footprints left behind by explorers who disguised themselves as Muslims in order to gain
information about Somali territories. For instance, Richard Burton, a British explorer, who
arrived in the Somali shores in 1854 at a timewhen Somali nomads in the interior parts of
SomalilandhadlittleifanyinteractionwithpeopleofEuropeandecentdisguisedhimselfasan
ArabmerchantwellversedwiththeIslamicknowledgeinordertogaintrustamongthelocals.
SomalisrealisedhewasneitherArabnoramanofreligiousbackground,asclaimed,whenhe
hadalreadyleftthecountry.
Ontheotherhand,accesstotraditionalleaderswasrelativelyeasy.Thiswaspartlybecausethe
OCVPhadavastpoolofcontactsinthecustomarydomain.However,oneproblemIfacedwas
thatmostofthesecontactswereextensivelyexposedtoresearchactivitiesattheOCVP.(The
OCVPconductscontinuousassessmentofsecurity,justiceandgovernanceanditoftencontacts
traditional leaders to provide information). In order to avoid bias primarily inducedby their
familiaritywith the lineofwork theOCVP is involved in, I soughtaccess toother traditional
leaders who had no previous contact with the OCVP in the recent past through my own
independentsocialnetworks.
Havingobtainedcrucialdataonurbanlandmanagementandconflict,Iturnedmyattentionto
thosewhoareinvolvedinoraffectedbyurbanlandmanagementandconflictatthecommunity
andneighbourhoodlevel.Inthebeginning,locatingpeopleinvolvedinurbanlandconflictswas
difficultduetothefactthattheLandCommissiondidnotkeepcontactsofthepeoplewhose
cases it handles. Key to my endeavours for accessing particular communities was the
establishment of trust (Tonkin, 1984). ForHyndman (2001) creating trust could involve the
ethnographerimmersinghim/herselfintherealitys/heisstudying.Theresearcherinthissense
becomespartoftherealityandhencegetsmoreinsight,helpandcooperationintheprocessof
conducting the research. This immersion however still requires overcoming people’s
unwillingnesstocooperateorshareinformation.Lindley(2009)underscorestheimportanceof
existingpersonalandsocialnetworksasameanstostartbuildingtrust.
Theuseofsocialnetworksandvolunteeringtobuildtrustwereparticularlyappropriateforthis
studygiventhatIwasalreadyfamiliarwiththepolitical,socialandeconomiclifeofthepeople
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inthecity.23IapproachedtheInstituteofPeaceandConflictStudiesattheUniversityofHargeisa
aboutthepossibilityofvolunteeringtohelpteachoneoftheircourses.ThethenDirectorofthe
Institute,whowasrecentlyappointedforChief Justice, informedmeaboutanopening fora
part-timepositionforteachingresearchmethodstopostgraduatestudents.Itaughtthiscourse
alongwithanothercolleaguefromUniversityofAddisAbaba,spendingabout6hoursaweek
over a period of one month. Most of those enrolled in the course were working with the
government, non-governmental organisations and themedia. The coursewas taught in two
classes,withatotalnumberof120studentsfromvariouspartsofthecity,whocamewitha
significantdegreeofprofessionalexpertiseandtheirownsocialnetworks. Iwasalsoable to
volunteerforanotheracademicinstitution,theUniversityofBederinHargeisa,inordertowiden
my ability to gather data from different geographical areas. The process of making new
colleagues and everyday working relations paved the way for insightful chatting, informal
probingandlistening,whichaccumulatesalotmoreusefulinformationthanformalinterviews.
Hyndman(2001)providesanexampleinwhichshevolunteeredforanorganisationandwasable
toestablishfriendshipaspeoplegotusedtoher.Inthisway,shewasabletogaininformation
thatwouldhavebeenimpossibleforhertogethadshenotvolunteeredandtriedtowinpeople
overbyshowingherimpartialitytotheofficeandorganisationalpolitics. Impartialityiseven
more important inpost-conflictcontextswherethedegreetowhichone isseenas impartial
playsasignificantroleintheprocessofestablishingtrust(vanderHaaretal.,2013).
Myassociationwiththeaboveuniversitiesandtheirstudentsenabledmetoaccessapoolof
peopleanddataonurban landadministrationandconflictmanagement, indeed,thevarious
issues that surfacedbecame toowide formy focusonunderstanding the interfacebetween
urban governance and segregation. As a result, I concentrated my attention on particular
landmarkcaseswherethestatewasengagedinconflictswithcivilians.Isingledouttwomajor
cases.Thefirstcasewasanactiveon-goingconflictintheairportarealocatedintheSouthern
partofthecitywherethegovernmentwantedtoexpandtheairportboundarybutthelandear-
markedforsuchexpansionwascontestedandclaimedbylocallandowners.Thisledtoaconflict
inwhichthestateandlandownersnearlyclashedonseveraloccasions.Amemberofthestaff
attheOCVP,whoisadriverandrecentgraduateoflawattheUniversityofHargeisaandwhose
23 Nonetheless, the author notes that familiaritywith context is not a guarantee for easier access toinformation.Evenifoneisfamiliarwiththeresearchsite,thereisaneedtore-establishcontactsassomepeoplemayhavechangedtheircontactdetailssorlefttheregion/county.See(Gokah,2006).
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familywasinvolvedintheconflict,MohamedSaeed,wasusefulinmyinitialcontactwiththe
landowners.
ThesecondcasewasaconflictbetweenthemilitaryandciviliansintheEasternpartofHargeisa.
Thegovernmentgave the land inquestion toa localbusinessmanas compensation for land
confiscatedbythemilitaryneartheirheadquartersinHargeisa.Butthecivilianswhooccupied
andclaimedownershipofthelandclaimedithadbeenconfiscatedfromthemforpublicuse
duringthemilitaryregimeandthuscouldnotbegiventothebusinessman,whowasacivilian
justlikethem.Astheconflictdeteriorated,sevenpeoplelosttheirlivesandanotherfivewere
injuredfollowingclashesbetweenthetwosides.AmemberofthestaffintheOCVPputmeinto
contactwithpeoplewhowereinsidersinthisconflict.KeyamongthesewastheSultanofthe
areawhowascrucialinmediatingtheconflictbetweenthestateandcivilians.AlthoughIwas
unabletogetholdofthosewhowereinjuredinthefightbetweenthetwosides,Imanagedto
locatetheir relatives.Thesetwo landmarkcaseswere important formystudytounderstand
howgovernancepracticesfosterurbansegregationinthecity.
3.5 The‛ConflictinSitting’Parlours?SomaliTeashops
Teashopdiscussionswereparticularlyimportantinmyethnographicapproachtounderstanding
popular attitudes and identifying emerging trends and issues related to urban land
administration,landmarketsandconflict.AlthoughIwasalreadyawareoftheimportanceof
teashopdiscussions,theirimportanceassitesofresearchenquirywasbroughttomyattention
byMohamedSeid,aclosefriendwhoisasocialresearcherandatrainedlawyer.Bearingthisin
mind, I experimentedwith these sites, andmy first teashopdiscussionwaswith a groupof
friendsand theirassociateswhom Ihad interviewed in thepast. I agreewithSeid that such
discussionsweremoreopenandengagingthantheformalinterviews.Thisisnottosuggestthat
teashopdiscussionsshouldreplaceformalinterviewsbutrathertoshowthatdiscrepanciesexist
betweenthelevelofengagementandopennessinthetwotechniques.
Theteashopdiscussionsoftentakeplacebetween4to6o'clock,butcanalsolastlonger.This
temporalframeisprimarily influencedbythehightemperatureinthecitywhichkeepsmost
peoplehomeandmostbusinessesclosedbetween1to3:30pm.Oneofmyfavouritespotswas
apopularteashopinthecitycentre.Thisteashopattractedsignificantcrowdsforthreemain
reasons.Firstly,itwaslocatedinastrategicpositionintheheartofthecity,withalmostequal
distance to the various neighbourhoods. Secondly, itwas cheaper thanmost of the formal
teashops–itwaslocatedinpublicopenspaceinfrontofaformercommercialbankandsothe
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ownersdonotorpaylittlerent.Andthirdly,thechanceofonefindingsomeonetheyknowin
this teashop without necessarily having a prior appointment was higher, indeed it has the
reputationofattractingpeoplefromallwalksoflife.OtherteashopsIfrequentedwerelocated
inCalaamadahaneighbourhoodintheSouth,inthecourts’areaintheShacabkaneighbourhood
intheWest,andinnewHargeisaintheEast.Mostoftheseteashopswereoperatedinformally
by small-scale tradersanddidnothavenames. I alsoheldappointmentsanddiscussions in
hotelsandrestaurantssuchastheShiraaqle,Star,MaansoorandAmbassador.
More often than not, people who knew my contacts also joined us and provided crucial
informationand insight into theproblemofurban landmarkets,managementandconflicts.
Discussionsofthisnaturetookmoretimethannormalinterviews.ButthelongerIsatinatea
shopwithpeopleIknew,themorelikelythatotherpeopleIdonotknowjoinedusandprovided
key insights intothetopicunderdiscussion.Forexample, inone instancewewere joinedby
someonewhotookoffenceatourdiscussionsonlandgrabbing,takingissuewithcriticismofa
particularpoliticianwhohadcriticisedapublicofficialwhohailsfromtheirclan.Asaresult,the
visitorjoiningusfeltobligedtoshedlightonanumberoflandallocationstheyknewinvolving
officialsfromotherclans.Amajordrawbackofthistechnique,however,wasthefactthatsome
people steered the discussion into a direction which was not of interest to the research.
However,Iwasflexibleandtolerantinsuchscenarios,soastogaintrustandfriendshipwithmy
contacts.Anotherdownsideoftheteashopdiscussionswasthefactthatasignificantnumberof
thepointsslippedawayfrommemorywhenneithernotesnorrecordingsweremade.24Ioften
wrotedownwhatIcouldsalvagefrommemorywhenIgothome,oftenafter8:00pm.
3.6 ‛OverHere’:Ex-PublicOfficialsandArchivalMaterials
Some of the key individuals who were useful for shedding light on the history of urban
governance in the city were based at the time of the data collection in England and the
Netherlands.Itwasadauntingtasktotrytolocatethemastheyleadalowprofilelife.Istarted
thejourneyof locatingthembyvisitingWoolwichArsenalwherethereisasignificantSomali
community.Imetacloserelative25ofBilleRafle,theformergovernorofHargeisaintheearly
andmid-1970s.Iaskedhimtocallhisuncleandenquireaboutthepossibilityofaninterview.A
24 Research in Somali setting ismoreproductivewhen tape recording is not involved. See (Balthasar,2012).
25Whohimselfwasaformerpoliceofficialinthefinalyearsofthemilitaryregime.
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fewdayslater,closerelativesinformedmethathewaswillingtospeaktome.Asafollowupto
thispermission,Icalledthepublicofficialtoconfirmhisconsentaswellasaskinghimwhether
hewouldprefertomeetinpersonorhaveatelephoneinterview.Heoptedforthelatter.The
otherpublicofficial,OmarBoss,whowasaDistrictCommissionerinHargeisain1967,wasalso
basedinWoolwich.Iapproachedhimwhilesittinginacafeteriaandaskedhimwhetherhecould
talktomeabouthistimeinHargeisatowhichheagreed.Wehadalengthychatinacoffeeshop
wherewe discussed urban governance during his time, particularly urban land and security
management.
Aside fromspeakingto formerpost independencepublicofficials, theBritishLibraryandthe
NationalArchivesalsoheldhistoricaldocumentsonurbangovernanceinHargeisa.Ifirstbecame
familiarwiththeBritishLibraryduringtheearlystageofmystudyandhavesincenichedmyself
aspaceinthisreveredinstitutionforaccessibilityandconvenience(sinceIlivedinLondon)and
becauseithasthesecondlargestcollectionofresearchmaterialsintheworld.WhiletheBritish
Library wasmy primary base for reading andwriting, I also spent twoweeks in the British
National Archives, selecting and scanning relevant materials. The acquaintance with these
institutionswasparticularly importantbecausehistoricalmaterialsonurbangovernanceare
hardtocomebyinSomalilandowingtothefactthatthecountrywentthroughacivilwarwhich
destroyedmuchofthearchivalrecord.
ExceptforthreeinterviewswithinternationalstaffinSomaliland,alltheinterviewsandfocus
group discussionswere conducted in the Somali language. In both the interviews and focus
groupdiscussions,I informedtheparticipantsabouttheirrighttowithdrawatanypoint.The
datawastranscribedinthesourcelanguageandthentranslatedintoEnglish.
3.7 EthicalConsiderationsandLimitationoftheResearch
Ethical consideration for this research was drawn from the six principles stipulated in the
economicandsocialscienceresearchcouncil (ESRC,2010).Theseprinciplesare integrityand
quality,informingresearchparticipants,confidentialityandanonymity,voluntaryparticipation
freefromcoercion,avoidanceofharm,andindependenceandimpartialityoftheresearcher.In
this study, the integrity and quality of the research were safeguarded throughout the data
collectionandanalyticalprocesses.Imadeanexpliciteffortincollectingandanalysingdatato
capturedifferentperspectives.
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Onewayinwhichintegrityissueswarrantedspecialattentioninthisresearchrelatestowhat
Hyndman(2001)callstribalismintheresearchprocess.26Thisreferstotheuseofsocialnetworks
andnational andethnic affiliation as away toobtain information,which couldhaveproved
difficult toobtainotherwise.As I havealreadyelaborated, social networkswereparticularly
important in this study and I exhausted bothmy professional and other social networks to
identifyandlocateinterviewees.
Theresearchparticipantswerefullyinformedabouttheresearch.Eachparticipantwasgivenan
opportunitytoaskquestions,andIansweredthesetothebestofmyability.Whileformalsigned
informedconsenthasbeendeemedobtainableinSomaliland,MohamedandLoewenthal(2009)
pointtotheneedforconsideringhistoricalbackgroundwhenconductingresearchonSomalis.
TheypointoutthatSomalisarenotusedtobeinginterviewedwithasignedconsent.However,
it is important to note that this has changed significantly over the last few decades where
Somaliland was relatively stable and free from widespread repression. Nonetheless, I used
verbalconsentinmystudyprimarilybecauseitmadeinformantstalkmoreopenly.Iwasalsoat
mosttimesinpossessionofaninformationsheetdevelopedforsharingwithpublicofficialsif
requested.Whenusingdiscussionsatteashops,ItriedtoensurethateveryoneknewthatIwas
aresearcher,andknewwhatIwasresearching.Isubjectedthematerialcollectedinthiswayto
closeethicalscrutinybeforeusingit,oftenapproachingindividualsagaintoasktheirpermission
toattributeviews,ormorecommonly,makingsurethatinformationwasanonymised.
Participationinthisresearchwasvoluntaryandfreefromcoercion.Ipaidparticularattention
tohowIwasusingmysocialnetworks.Wherepossible,Iusedhighlyinfluentialpeopleaskey
informantsbutItriedtoavoidusingthemasameansofaccesstoothergeneralinterviewees.I
wantedtoavoidpeoplefeelingobligedtogivemeinterviewsbecauseofthepowerrelations
involved.Wheretheserviceofsuchpeoplebecametheonlywaythroughwhichaccesstothe
soughtindividualswaspossible,Imadeeveryefforttoremovetheimpressionofinfluenceby
theintermediaryperson.
Confidentialityandanonymitywereupheld inthestrictestmannerpossible.Balthasar(2012)
notesthatanonymityisimportantaswhatisbeingsaidmayhaveasignificantimpactonnot
26Hyndman2001showshowidentitybecomesimportantwhenconductingresearch.Shenarratesthatinher fieldwork, the colleagues at theUNofficewhere shewas volunteering suggested introduction toCanadiancolleaguesattheUN.Sheseesthereasonforwhichthisintroductionwasmadewasessentiallyto enable her get access to better facilitation and help for her research through her nationalitybackground.
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onlythepresentbutalsofuturecareersofpeople.Irecordedthenoteswithanelectronicpen
anduploadedthemontoencryptedcloudstoragesoastoavoidtheriskofthenotesgettinglost
with traces of participants. Thiswas particularly important because the study encompassed
interviews fromgovernment employeeswho could lose their jobs for having the courageof
speakingcandidlyabouttheissuesIinvestigated.
Inapost-conflictcitywherediscussiononland-relatedissuesmayevokememoriesofatrocities
committedduringacivilwarthatdisplacedmostoftheresidentsinthecity(Walls,2011),itis
importanttounderstandthatsomepeoplewereunableorunwillingtoshareinformation.Asa
researcher, Iwas fullyawareof thisandrespectedpeople’schoice,assilencecanserveasa
copingstrategyinpost-conflictcontext(Goodhand,2000).
Asindependenceandimpartialityarecrucialforanycrediblestudy,Imadeanuttermosteffort
to remain impartial.Nonetheless, it is important topointout that regardlessofmyeffort in
ensuringimpartiality,IamawarethatImaybeaccusedofpartiality.ThisisbecauseHargeisais
acontestedurbanspacewhereclanpoliticsprevail.Hassan(2015)pointsoutthatonerarely
conducts research insettingswhere the informant isalso insiderwithoutmakingabalanced
compromisebetweenresponsibilityand trust. In suchasettingonemightbeseenasbiased
towardshisclanandhencethismaynegativelyaffectone’simageincertainquarters.Having
this risk in mind, I maintained my independence from local political dynamics, assuring
participantsthatIwasimpartialthroughouttheresearchprocess.
Someofthelimitationsoftheresearchrelatedtothelackofshapefileswhichcouldhavehelped
memapandvisualisethesettlementpatternofthecity. Iwastoldthatsomeshapefilesare
availabletoUNHabitatbutIcouldnotobtainthemfromtheirofficesinHargeisa,asIwastold
that these are unavailable for public consumption. As other researchers in Hargeisa have
experienced (SeeOmar andOsman, 2016), further problemson visualisation also related to
photos. Inotherwords, takingphotos inHargeisa isnotwelcome,asmanypeopleprefer to
remainanonymousbothintextandimage.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, Iprovidedanoverviewofdata sourcesand institutionalaffiliationaswellas
accessibilityofInformants.Ihaveshownthatthedatawascollectedthroughurbanethnography
involvingbothkeyinformantparticipantsandthegeneralpublicwhohadpersonalexperience
oftheissuesrelatedtourbanlandadminstrationandconflictmanagement.Ihavealsooutlined
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theusefulnessoftheteashopsaskeysitesfordatacollectionandrecountedmyendeavoursto
trace key public officials in the diaspora. Finally, the chapter discussed ethical issues and
considerations for the study.Having familiarised the readerwith themethodology, thenext
chaptersdeploymyempiricaldatatoshowhowurbangovernanceshapesHargeisaspatialform.
Thefollowingchapterbeginsbydiscussingfindingsongovernanceatthemunicipal leveland
subsequent chapters zoom into narrower aspects such as land administration, conflict and
adjudication.
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CHAPTER4 HISTORICISINGURBANGOVERNANCEINHARGEISA
4.1 Introduction
Inthischapter,IanalysethetrajectoryofurbangovernanceinHargeisa,situatingitinalonger
history of urban institutions, drawing on oral narratives, archives and ethnographic field
research. This historical approach is important because history in Somaliland is a lived
experience where particular episodes are often used as a point of reference positively or
negativelyforthelegitimationofpowerandauthority.Forinstance,memoriesofhowthings
weredone inthepastserve inmanycasesasexamplesofhowastateshouldbehave inthe
present or the future. This chapter will explore continuities and changes in the interaction
between the state and the intermediary customary institutions through which
centralised urban governance – often under Governor, District Commissioner or a Military
Commander–wasmediated.Iarguethatthecentralisedauthoritarianhistoryofgovernance
andthemediatingroleofcustomaryinstitutionshaveshapedandreinforcedHargeisa’sspatial
characterasasegregatedcity,oftenalongclanlines. Asthe‘hybridity’focusedliteratureon
Somalilanddoesnotilluminatethecomplexdynamicsofurbangovernanceanditsintersection
withsegregation,Iarguethatitisimportanttogobeyondthisconcepttounderstandthespatial
character of cities in Somaliland. Specifically, I argue that a deeper historical perspective is
necessaryonthecontradictoryandcomplementaryrelationshipbetweenstateandnon-state
actorsthanisusualindiscussionsofhybridity,andIalsoexploreempiricallyhowlegitimacyand
trustcanprovidefruitfulinsighttothenexusbetweengovernanceandspatialform.
Thechapterbeginsbydiscussingthelatecolonialcontextandtheintroductionofurbancouncils,
whichunderminedthepowersofAkils. I showthatpopularresistancetothe introductionof
local governance contributed to the growing sense of nationalism and therefore had the
potential to reduce segregation. The chapter then turns to thepostcolonial context and the
civiliangovernment’scontinuedmisuseofpowerandrecoursetoAkils.Itisimportanttonote
thatduringthemilitaryperiod,asignificantbreakoccurred.Thisbreakwasrootedinthestate’s
denunciationofclanism.Butthiseffortwasunderminedinpracticebythestate’severyday’s
interactionwiththepublic.Forinstance,nepotismthrivedinpublicservicedeliveryandaccess
to employment and other economic opportunities did not emasculate the resort to clan in
practice. Furthermore, I argue that state led developments and re-planning of cities – i.e.
through self-help campaigns and evictions – re-segregated the city,while also resulting in a
cosmopolitan moment of cross-clan opposition to the government. I also discuss the post-
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conflictcontextofdemocraticlocalgovernmentandtheon-goingroleofAkilsandclaneldersin
municipalelections.Despitethebriefhistoricalrupture,itisthereforethecontinuitiesinurban
governance–shapedbyAkilsandclanmediation-thatareparticularlystrikingtoday.
4.2 LocalGovernmentinaLateColonialContext:PolicyandResistance
Inthissection,Idiscussthepoliticalandadministrativedynamicsoflocalgovernmentinalate
colonialcontext.Ishowthatthroughoutthecolonialperiod,customaryinstitutionssuchasAkils
werekeyintermediaryinstitutionsofpower.IncontrasttoMillman’s(2013)argumentthatthe
Protectorate’s survival on meagre resources was largely attributable to colonial officers’
effectiveness,IarguealargepartofsuchsurvivalcanbeattributedtotheroleAkilsplayedin
the administration of the population. But, as independence approached, the colonial
governmentmadeconcertedeffortsaimedatreorganisingpowerasitspoliciesshiftedtowards
the creation of what can essentially be understood as responsible governance as part of
preparationforindependence.Intheory,thesepoliciesweremeanttoformalisepowerofthe
Akilsbysettingupurbancouncils,designedtofosterconditionsconduciveforatransitionto
civic rule based on citizenship rather than subjecthood. I argue that opposition to local
governancecanbeinterpretedasanattemptbyHargeisaresidentstorejectthereorganisation
ofpoweroverspace,providingthemwithcommoncausetraversingclaninterestsaroundwhich
they could unite and temporarily reducing segregation.While colonial authorities were not
intentonpromotingnationalcitizenshipinplaceofsubjecthoodbeforeindependence,theyalso
wantedtobeginaprocessoftransitionawayfromAkils’priorpowers.Inshort,theintroduction
and resistance to local governance impactedonhowpeople related toeachother,with the
effectofmitigatingpriorurbanpoliticalsegregation.
Municipal governance in Somaliland dates back to the latter decades of colonial rule in the
protectorate.In1948,thecolonialgovernmenttookadecisionthatitwantedtointroducelocal
governanceinSomaliland,bringingnearlytenyearsofpreandpost-WorldWarTwomilitaryrule
toanend.Thisintroductionoflocalgovernancewascharacterisedbyuncertainty,mainlyabout
the shape of the new structures and the role of customary institutions. This marked the
beginningofeffortsaimedatdevolvingpowerinalimitedsensetolocalgovernmentstructures
aspartofalargerpolicyofSomalisingtheadministrationforeventualindependence.Thekey
questionswere; could the Somali people practice aWesternmodel of democracy and elect
councilsonthebasisofuniversalsuffrageorwoulditbemorepracticalandcheapertousethe
existing political institutions to introduce municipal governance? Locally based colonial
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administratorswereinfavourofthelatterwhichallowedthemtocreateinstitutionsthathad
the shapeofWestern structuresand substanceofnativeorders. Furtherquestionshowever
arosefromissuesoflegitimacyastheAkilsystemonwhichtheadministrationhadsofarrelied
waspopularlyconsideredtobeacolonialinventionanddidnotenjoylegitimatesupportlocally.
Post-warcolonialrecordsshowtherewereattemptstofindapragmaticandamicableapproach
tosolvingthisdilemma,createdbypopulargrievancesagainsttheAkilswhowereincreasingly
becomingcorrupt(Rayne,1921).27Proposalswerethusmadeintheearly1950storeducethe
power of the Akils by drawing on other existing traditional public authorities for local
governance,suchasthejilibshir.Thejilibshirisaclanmeetingofupto200menwhogatherto
discussmattersconcerningtheclansuchasconflictandsocialwelfareaswellasfinanciallyand
politicallybindingdecisionsonmembersoftheclan.Whilethisdidnotby-passAkilscompletely,
astheyattendandevenpresidedinthemeetings insomecases,theydidnothaveexclusive
controloverwhatwastobediscussedandcouldonlyadvanceviewsthatwereagreedupon.
Vertically,above this levelofpublicauthoritywas theequally importantsubclanshirwhere
elders of the different groups congregate and deliberate on collectively binding decisions.
CorrespondencebetweenLondonandthecolonialadministratorsinHargeisashowthatthere
wasaconsensusabouttheabsenceofeffectivepublicauthoritiessuitableforlocalgovernance
introduction above this level of Somali traditional decision-making platforms, except when
greaterclangroupingswereneededforwarfareordefencepurposes.28
PriortotheSomaliparticipationinformalurbangovernanceintheformoftowncouncilsand
district committees, an Advisory Council was constituted in 1946 to give the Governor a
consultationforuminwhichhecouldseektheadviceofelitemembersoftheclansonmatters
affectingtheirlives(suchelitememberswereoftenpopularlyconsideredstooges).29Inspiteof
thisinstrumentalisationofcustomaryinstitutionsinlocalgovernance,until1950,therewasno
officialwrittengovernmentpolicyregardingtheassociationofSomaliswithurbangovernance.
Inotherwords,decisionsontheinvolvementofSomalisinurbangovernanceweremadeonad
hocbasisbythedifferentcolonialofficialsindifferentcapacities.Thiswas,however,changed
27TNACAA/23/6/01FutureorganisationoftowncouncilsinSomaliland.
28 This suggests that the Somali traditionalpublic authority andpolitical institutionsweregetting lesseffectiveasthehierarchygoesup;aweaknesspartlyattributabletothedisruptioncausedtothesystembythesuccessivecolonialpowers;firstly,theEgyptiansandlatertheBritish.Ibid.
29TNACO535/141/11Reorganisationofadministration:advisorycouncillegislation.
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whenthegovernmentdeclaredthatitaims“toevolveasimpleandeffectiveorganisationwhich
willbecapableofremainingagovernmentoperatedbythepeoplethat issufficientfortheir
needs.”30Theplanshowsthatthe‘localauthorities[wereproposed]tobeconstitutedbygroups
having affinities along geographical’ lines. In otherwords, the constituted authoritieswould
consist of tribal leaders paid by the government and assisted by councillors who would
voluntarilyworkforthelocalgovernment.
Thenextstepwasthe“settingupofdistrictcouncilscomposedofrepresentativesofallclasses,
including the local authorities, [and] theywould be advised at first butmight become local
government bodies later”.31 Though the planwas seen as progress by locally based colonial
administrators, London was concerned about the viability and sustainability of such local
governance structures in the long run. It worried about the introduction of complex and
unfamiliarsystemsofurbangovernance,whichriskedupsettingthestatusquoandundermining
existingsystemsofdecision-makingandpublicauthority.ForLondon,itwaspreferabletofind
traditionalleadersandtoincreasetheirpowersonconditionthattheyagreedtorepresenttheir
peopleinlocalgovernancestructures.OfficialsalsosuggestedthatAkilsshouldbegivengreater
financialautonomyandallowancesfortheirlocalexpensesastheywouldotherwiseinevitably
bereluctanttoserveaslocalgovernmentstructures.32Whilepessimismcharacterisedtheviews
ofLondon, localcolonialadministratorsweremoreoptimisticaboutthe introductionof local
governance in Somaliland. Their optimism drew inspiration from ‘the existence of tribal
conferences’andthe‘increasingdesireforprogressandadvancement’aswellasstereotypical
characterisationsofSomalisaspeoplewitha‘highlevelofintelligence’.33
Thelocalgovernmentordinancewasfinallyenactedin1950andtheGovernorwasempowered
toselectthosewhowouldbecomemembersofthenewcouncil.TheaimwasthattheGovernor
shouldretaintheabilityofappointingindividualsseenasfriendlytocolonialauthoritiesfrom
boththetraditionalleaderssuchasAkilsandeldersandothernotablesinthetownsuchasloyal
businessmenandclerics.TheprimaryfunctionofthenewTownCouncilwasmainlytomaintain
30TNACO535/152/3Thereorganisationofnativeadministration:Somalirepresentationandintroductionoflocalgovernment.(Theexactdateofthisstatementisnotstated,butitrelatestothe1940s).
31Ibid.
32Ibid.
33TNACAA/23/6/01FutureorganisationoftowncouncilsinSomaliland.
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peace and the rule of law as most of the provisions in the Town Council Ordinance were
inherentlyconcernedwithurbansecurity.Forinstance,section5statesthat“thedutyofevery
localauthoritywastomaintainorder inthetribeoramongtheSomalisresiding inthearea”
(BritishSomalilandProtectorate,1951).Thecolonialgovernmentwasunsureaboutthesocial
and political consequences that could emerge from the constitution of local councils and
thereforeitproposedthattheintroductionoflocalgovernanceshouldbepilotedinmajorurban
settingsbeforerollingitouttotherestofthecountry.Thiswasbecauseitwasassumedthat
townshadsomecosmopolitanareas,andthat‘tribalpolitics’wouldbelesspronouncedthanin
ruralareas.34
Being the biggest towns in the protectorate, Hargeisa and Berbera hosted the first Town
Councils,establishedin1953.35InthecaseofHargeisa,thenominatedmembersoftheCouncil
formedthemajorityoftheassemblyandtheyhadlimited‘legalandfinancialautonomy’.36The
District Commissioner was the ultimate authority in the council and was empowered to
manipulate rules leaving no room for deviation from the established norm of colonial
administrationintheProtectorate.Anotheropportunityforavoidinganysignificantdevolution
of power was presented by the scarcity of skilled staff, whichmade the staffing of council
dependent on the central state.37 In other words, civil servants working for the central
governmentweretransferredtolocalgovernmentsoastohelptheseexperimentalstructures
performtheirduties.
While the colonial government saw the introduction of local governance as a positive step
towardstheSomalisationof theadministration, the localpopulationwasscepticalaboutthe
aims and objectives of the exercise. The locally-based colonial administrators related this
scepticismtotemporalandaptitudefactorsnotingthat:
thispromptstheenquirywhethertheSomalisaresufficientlydevelopedto
assume the greater responsibilities proposed at so early date as 1953 [or
34Thiswassoduetothefactthatitwasassumedthat‘tribalpoliticsaffectedlessadverselytheTownCounciladministration’inthemorecosmopolitanareasIbid.Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.Ibid.
35Ibid.
36TownCouncilswereencouragedtocomeupwithhalfofthemoneyneededfordevelopmentprojectstobeundertaken.
37TNACAA/23/6/01FutureorganisationoftowncouncilsinSomaliland.
75|P a g e
whether] it may well be that given definitive powers with something
concrete,reluctancetoacceptresponsibilitywillgraduallydisappear.38
The introduction of local government in Somaliland took place at a time when nationalism
amongSomaliswasreachingitspeakandthishadanunexpectedeffectonurbanclan-based
segregationinthetown.Thiswasbecausetheexistingpoliticalcleavagesbetweenthedifferent
clanssignificantlydecreasedasaresultofthesharedoppositiontolocalgovernment,making
theprojectlesssuccessfulthanenvisionedbythecolonialgovernment.Eventually,TownCouncil
committeeswerefilledmainlywithilliteratecolonial-friendlyfiguressuchasformeragentsof
the native security apparatus, messengers, translators or small scale businessmen who
benefited from colonial rule, and it failed to bring about any tangible changes in urban
governance.Rather,itbecameajustificationfortheDistrictCommissionertocontinuehaving
completecontrolovertheaffairsofurbancentres,makingtheprocessnomorethananexercise
offormalisingandlegitimisingthestatusquo(BritishSomalilandProtectorate,1951)
Fortheprotagonistsoflocalgovernment,clannismand“nomadisminhibiteddistrictcouncils,
whiletribalincoherenceneuteredtribalcouncilsbeforetheyhadbeenformed”(Millman,2013,
p.207).Butforantagonists,askingpeopletopayallegiancetoaprocessinitiatedbyapolitythey
didnottrustwasnaïveat itsbest.Seenthisway,theTownCouncilwasneithersuccessful in
developmentplanningnormaintaininglawandorder,aspeopledidnotseelocalgovernment
councils as legitimatepublic authorities. For instance, inOctober 1953, attemptsmadeby a
memberofthecouncilcalledGulaidSamatartodisperseacrowdwhichwasformingatthetown
centrewasmetwithseverebeatingbyhisclansmen.Thecolonialgovernmenttookthisincident
seriouslyandarrestedsevenmenfortheassaultofthecouncillor.Twoofthesemenreceived
18-monthsentenceswhilefivereceived12months.Thesentencesweremainlyaimedatmaking
anexampleofthosewhoresistthegovernmentanddisrespect itsagents (BritishSomaliland
Protectorate,1951).
Thisincidentdidnot,however,deterorreduceoppositiontolocalgovernment.Accordingtoa
letterfromtheGovernorofSomalilandtotheSecretaryoftheStateforColonies,therewere
three categories of opposition to the government plan: nationalists who claimed to be the
legitimate voice of the people, individuals who lost government jobs because of the re-
38TNACO535/152/3Thereorganisationofnativeadministration:Somalirepresentationandintroductionoflocalgovernment.
76|P a g e
organisationoftheadministration,andIslamicclericswhohabituallyopposedeverythingthat
thegovernmentproposed.39Ofthethreegroups,oppositionfromthenationalistmovements
represented the most forceful threat because of the fact that their influence was growing
exponentially.Non-violentnationalistmovementsintheProtectorateweredrawinginspiration
from Farah Omar who had shown a remarkable peaceful resistance against colonial rule a
decadebeforetheintroductionoflocalgovernment.Thenationalistmovementclaimedtobe
the legitimaterepresentativeof thepeopleandrequestedthatanycommunicationbetween
thestateandthepopulationshouldcomethroughthem.Butthedistrictadministrationhadlong
refused todealdirectlywith their representatives: in a letterdated18 September1938, for
example,thedistrictofficerinHargeisawrotethathe
willnotrecogniseanypersonasaspokesmanforanyparticulargroup,party,
districtortribe[andthat]inallsuchmatters[he]willonlydealthroughthe
district officers, Akils, Jawabdars [interpreters] and recognised religious
leaders.40
Drawinginspirationfrominstancesofcivildisobedience,supportersofnationalistmovements
such as the Somali National League (SNL) and Somali Youth League (SYL)41 showed strong
resistancetotheintroductionoflocalgovernment.42Thetorchbearersofthisoppositionwere
mainlyurbaniteswhowereconsideredbythecolonialgovernmentas“detribalisedandsemi-
detribalised progressives [with] a disruptive influence” in Hargeisa.43 For these nationalist
leaders, the idea of national self-determination stemmed from cities, envisaged as
cosmopolitansettlementsnotbasedonclandivisionsandresultanturbansegregation.Intheir
thinking,theideaofthestatewasembodiedinurbanityandurbanisationaswellasarelated
39Ibid.
40Ibid.
41SYLwasinitiallysetuptocreatebrotherhoodamongtheSomalisandreducetheviolenceamongthembut later expanded into a nationalist organisation that sought self-rule for Somalis and eventuallyindependence.
42TNACO535/152/3Thereorganisationofnativeadministration:Somalirepresentationandintroductionoflocalgovernment.
43Ibid.
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shiftawayfromtheintermediarysystems.AccordingtoJama,anationalistactivistinthe1950s
whoispresentlyasocialresearcher,theanticolonialviewpointsoftheseyoungmenandwomen
wasthat:
ifyou'renotincities,itisdifficulttotalkabouttheformationofastate.This
isadesirewithoutafoundation.Itiseasytodresslikeanurbanisedperson
but it is difficult to become a son of the city. If you pose a question to
somebody pretending like an urbanised person and ask them about their
deeperfeelingonthestate,theywillprobablytellyouthatattheendofthe
dayitisnecessarytobecomebiasedtowardsyourclan.44
Thepointmadehereisthaturbanisationandurbanismwillshiftpeopleawayfromthecolonially
supportedparochialrelationshipsbasedonkinshiptowardsmorecosmopolitanrelations,and
tonationalcitizenshipasaformofbelonging.Itisallegedthatthenomadiclifestyleandmind
setinevitablyhinderstheformationofanyrelationshipsbasedonelementsotherthankinship.
AccordingtoJamaagain,clanaffiliation:
undermines the emergence of a united political vision based on
farsightednesswherepeoplehaveidentityotherthantheclan.Forinstance,
in urban contexts it was usual to hear that somebody is from Hargeisa,
Berbera or Mogadishu. The interaction between the two groups also
significantlydiffer.45
Inabidtocountertheoppositiontolocalgovernanceandcustomaryinstitutions,thecolonial
administrationsaw itnecessary tocreateamoreBritish friendlyenvironment inHargeisaby
reinvigoratingbroadcastingfacilities.46Colonialrecordsshowthatpartoftheintentionofthis
strategywas to ‘demystify’ the local governmentpolicies towhich the residentsofHargeisa
44Interviewee1November6,2014.ActivistandSocialResearcher.
45Ibid.
46Radiobroadcastwas firstaired inHargeisa in1941.Thebroadcastswereusedasanadministrativeinstrument, toannouncekeygovernmentdecisionsaffectingnomadsetc.Thiswasnot so far-fetchedfromthetraditionalmeansofdisseminatinginformation,asinformationaboutsecurity,lossofpropertyandevenforeignaffairswastraditionallybroadcastinthevillagesthroughgatheringsinthecentreofthevillage.WhenradiobroadcastswereestablishedinHargeisa,peopleusuallygatheredaroundabigradiopositionedinoneofthepopularareasofthecitycentre(WarOffice,1946).
78|P a g e
showedsignificantresistance.Theobjectiveoftheinformationdisseminationexercisewasto
inform people about the intention behind the introduction of local government as
‘developmentmachinerywherebythepeoplecancombinetoimprovetheirownconditionsby
theirowneffortswithgovernmentguidanceoneducationandhealthservicesaswellaswater
supplies’.47Assuch informationalonemayhavebeen insufficient toconvinceSomalisof the
purposeofthelocalgovernment,theadministratorssuggestedthat‘leadingSomalisshouldbe
takentosomesuitablepartsoftheSudantoseeforthemselveswhathasbeenachievedthere’.48
The radio broadcast was, however, a double-edged knife. On the one hand, it enabled the
colonialadministratorstoadvancesupportfortheintroductionoflocalgovernanceandsocial
development agendas, particularly education, to which the population was hostile in the
beginning.Butontheotherhand,thoseentrustedwithadvancingthese initiativeswerealso
furthering nationalist ideas through songs and poetrywhichwere full of idioms and riddles
makingamockeryof the system.49The colonial administrationwasnotnaiveabout thisbut
facedasituationwhereotherregionalpowerssuchasEgyptwereencouraginglocalnationalism
inSomaliland,byprovidingnationalistswithmeansthroughwhichtheycouldpropagatetheir
ideas.Thus,theytoleratednationalistfiguresandgroupsusingcolonialpropagandamachines
inalimitedway,providedthattheysupportedeffortstocreateaBritishfriendlyandeducated
rulingclass.
Frederiksen(2014,p.1287)arguesthat“colonialgovernmentalitywasfundamentallyaproject
ofmanagingcontradictionanddifferenceandthosetechniquesofpowerthatbestmanaged
and worked with this produced the greatest stability of rule”. As evident here, to borrow
Frederiksen’s framing, the colonial administration was caught between a need to maintain
politicalorderanddesiretobringaboutBritish-friendlysocialtransformation.Inotherwords,
local government was used as a way of bringing about reorganising power over space –
particularly in the cities - while advancement of education was used as way of facilitating
acceptanceforcolonialparadigms.Butoppositiontothisnewformofsubjectivityinthespatial
reorganisationofpowerhadgivenpeopleacommonreasontounitearoundandresistthestate.
47TNACO535/126/16FutureAdministrationofSomaliland.
48Ibid.
49In1954,MohamedAhmedpopularlyknownasKulucmadealivebroadcastofasongthatwascriticalofthegovernment.ThisresultedinthestationoperatorfleeingthecitytoevadearrestandthesingerwhowasongovernmentpayrollbeingsuspendedandexiledtohishomevillageofKhatumo.
79|P a g e
Inshort,theintroductionandresistancetolocalgovernanceimpactedonhowpeoplerelated
toeachother:althoughevidenceissketchy,Isuggestthatthislatecolonialcontextofnationalist
resistancehadtheeffectofmitigatingpriorurbansegregationalongclanlines.
4.3 BoggedDownintheColony?CivilianRule
Inthissection,IarguethatthepostcolonialSomalistatewasunableorunwillingtoshiftaway
fromthecolonialpracticesofurbangovernance,henceunderminingstatelegitimacyandpublic
trust in thestate. I showthatpower remainedcentralisedandconcentrated in thehandsof
publicofficialssuchasDCsandPCswhoactedandbehavedlikethecolonialmasters.Inother
words, thepoliticalauthorities failed tocreateagovernanceenvironmentbasedonnational
citizenshiprathertheclan-basedandhighlymediatedstatehoodwherecustomaryinstitutions
actedandwereusedasgatekeepersforaccesstoservices.
Postcolonialurbangovernance in theSomali republicwas characterisedby continuity rather
thanchangeofcolonialadministrativepractices.Notwithstandingthefactthatthemantraof
resistance to the colonial power had revolved around liberation and transformation, little
changedregardinghowthestaterelatedtoitspeople.Therewerealsocontinuitiesinthesocial
andspatialorganisationofthecity.Pesek(2011)attributesthistowhathecallsthe‘dilemmas’
ofthepostcolonialAfricanstate,whichinheritedthestructuresaswellasgovernancetacticsof
colonialpowersbutdidnothavetheeconomicmeansandpoliticalpowerthroughwhichitcould
behavelikethecolonialpowerswithoutbeingsignificantlyandmilitarilychallenged.
Furthermore,thepostcolonialstate’slackofcommitmenttodecentralisingpowerreducedlocal
governancetonomorethananominalstructure.Municipalgovernment’srolewasdrastically
limited to themanagementof theZaribas (a localurbanmarket),maintenanceof roadsand
garbagecollection.Assuch,itfailedtoattracteithercapablepoliticiansorskilledlabourforce
asmost of those qualified enough for running a city had taken up vacancies at the central
government level. The District Commissioners and Regional Governors in collaborationwith
intermediaryinstitutionsrantheshow.AccordingtoRay(1996)oneofthereasonsthatchiefs
were formidable intermediary institutionswas the fact that they constitutedparallel power,
perceivedmainlyasillegitimate,becausetheyhadbeenusedbycolonialauthorities,butthey
werealsoaccessibletothepostcolonialstateastheyderivedtheirauthorityfromprecolonial
sourcesoflegitimacy.Thiscreatedasituationofinstitutionalpluralism,inwhichbothstateand
traditional authorities coexist in the postcolonial context. This coexistence was however
characterisedby tensions. In the caseof theSomaliRepublic, these tensionsweremanaged
80|P a g e
differently by the civilian and military postcolonial regimes. During the civilian government
(1960 to 1969), Akils50 assumed greater role in the mediation of the state and the people
particularlyduringtheelectiontime. It is importanttonotethatAkilsplayedacrucialrole in
electoralprocessesastheymobilisedpeopleforcompetingpoliticalpartiesandcandidates.Akils
organisedpeoplenotonlybecausetheywereagentsofpoliticalpartiesbuttheyalsohadvested
interestsinmaintainingtheirinfluenceandpoweraswellensuringaccesstostateresourcesand
servicesforthemselvesandfortheirclanmembers.
Thespatialmanifestationof theroleofAkils inpolitics is important forunderstandingurban
segregation in a number ofways. Their role becomes particularly clearwhen one examines
Somalielections.51Firstly,politicalelitesmayseeitaselectorallystrategicandbeneficialifthey
concentratetheirsupportinaparticularurbanspace,soastoincreasetheirchanceinpolitical
participation.Secondly,itiseasiertomobilisefinancialresourceswhentheclanisconcentrated
inaparticulararea.Thirdly, it is logisticallymoreefficienttoreachsupporterswithmessages
andupdateclanmembersaboutthepoliticaldynamicsforone’sadvantage.
ThestatewasoftentolerantwiththeinstitutionsofAkils,asitneitherhadthecapacitynorthe
politicalwilltoreplacethem.Whiletheywereattimesseenasactorswithdisruptiveinfluence
for bureaucratic development, they were on the other hand seen as an effective way of
controlling thevastunmanned territoriesof thisyoungnation.As sovereigntyand territorial
controlthatcomeswithitdependontheavailabilityofcertainlevelsofresources(Pesek,2011),
the postcolonial Somali state lacked the capacity necessary for maintaining territorial and
politicalcontroloveritsnomadicandpovertystrickenruralandurbanpopulations.Thestate’s
inabilitytomonopolisetheinstrumentsofviolencehadamajorimpactonthespatialcharacter
ofHargeisa.Forinstance,thefrequentoccurrenceofviolenceinthehinterlandsofHargeisahad
oftencausedmanypeopletofearfortheirlivesbecauseofthepossibilityofrevengeattacksby
relativesofthevictims.Mediationaimedatbringingclanskirmishestoanendhadoftendrained
amajorpartofthegovernment’seffortsinthemaintenanceoflawandorder.Hargeisa’s1967
50 Akils’ relationship with the state was determined initially through their roles in the struggle forindependence.Thoseindividualswhowereonthesideofthecolonialrulerswereside-linedbythenewstate while those who were involved in the struggles enjoyed better status and access to the stateresources and power. This, however, was not sustained for a long as criticism against the stateovershadowedcriticismagainstthosewhoworkedwiththecolonialofficials. Interviewee7August20,2014OralHistorian,ArtistandRadioPresenter..
51Thesearebasedonmyownobservationinthe2012elections
81|P a g e
DistrictCommissionerrecallsseveralincidentsofconflictwithinashortspanoftimeandstates
thatthesecurityproblemswereoneofthemajorchallengesthegovernmentfacedatthetime.
The DC says that when he was transferred to Hargeisa, there were 51 cases of unresolved
murder in thecourtsandanother50cases forwhichsentenceswere issuedbut judgements
wereyettobeenforced.52
Themurdersresultedfromaconflict,whichlastedfornearly7years,betweenSa’adMuseand
ArabclansofHargeisa.TheDCclaimsthatthereasonswhythisconflictwasprolongedrelated
torevengeattackswhichallbeganwiththekillingofareputablereligiousmanintheoutskirts
ofthecity.Thisledtoachainofretaliatoryrevengeattackswhere46peoplefromthetwoclans
losttheirlives.Inordertoresolvethisconflict,theDCappointedamediationteamofsevenmen
fromeachside.TheAkilsfrombothsidesagreedtothisarrangement.Thesupportofagroupof
religiousmenwhowereactivelyengagedinresolvingcivilaffairsandissuestodowithpeace
werealsoenlistedtohelpresolvetheissue.Thelastdisputeinvolvedthedisappearanceof5
menwhosefatewasnotknown.Bothsidesdeniedknowledgeofwhathappenedtothesemen.
TheDCinformedthemeetingthat:
unlessthetruthistoldaboutwhathappenedtothesemen,noonewillleave
themeeting.Thenarespectableoldmanstoodupcryingandconfessedthat
his clanwas responsible for the death of the fivemen in retaliation for a
religiousmankilledbytheotherclan.Anotheryoungmanfromtheotherclan
alsostoodupandsaidthatthereligiousmanwaskilledbyhisclanandthat
they will give compensation for him and 20 additional camels for wrong
doing.53
Whilethemediationwascontinuing,theDCissuedaconfiscationordertoparamilitarytroops
fortheroundingupoflivestockfrombothclans.AccordingtotheDC,thousandsofsheep,goats,
cattle,andcamelwereroundedup,andanumberofbirkas(smallmobilereservoirsconstructed
withcement)wereseized.Theprimaryaimoftheconfiscationwastoforceclanstoreachan
amicablesolutiontothesecurityprobleminthecity.Moreover,theconfiscatedlivestockwould
alsoformpartofthecompensationfortheoffenceseachsidehadcommittedagainsttheother.
52Interviewee3Nomember05,2014.FormerDistrictCommissionerofHargeisa.
53Ibid.
82|P a g e
Followingtheagreement,thecamelsthathadalreadybeenconfiscatedweredesignatedtoform
partofthecompensation.Althoughtheamountneededforcompensationexceededthatwhich
was in government hands, the DC proposed that the livestock in his possession should be
subdividedascompensation.54Thispropositionwassaidtohavebeenreadilyacceptedbymost
eldersasitsparedthemfromatediousprocessofcompensationcollectionanditalsorelieved
thestateofworryingaboutfurtherrevengeemanatingfromimpatiencewiththelongevityof
collectiontime.
AsimilarcasealsooccurredintheSouthofthecitywheretwosub-clans,ReerGuuleedandReer
GobdoonoftheEidagalesub-clans,clashedin1968.Fivepeoplewerekilledintheclash,two
fromeachsideplusawadad(cleric),whowastryingtomediate.TheDCrequestedaunitof
paramilitarytroopsandavehicletoconfiscatethelivestockofthewarringclans,aswellasthe
birka.Theconfiscationincludedsheep,cattleandcamel.AccordingtotheDC:
thereasonwhytheconfiscationwasnotlimitedonlytocamelwasthefact
thattheconsequencesoftheconfiscationwillnotbefeltatthehousehold
levelifsheepandgoatsarenotincluded.Butiftheyareconfiscatedthenthe
painwillbefeltattheverylocallevelaschildrenwillhavenoaccesstomilk.55
Asinthepreviouscase,thesupportofareligiousgroupwasagainenlistedandinformationon
thebackgroundandclandynamicsoftheconflictwereobtained.Claneldersweretakentoa
remotevillageintheSouthofthecityneartheborder.TheDistrictCommissioneridentified7
menfromeachgrouptomediatethisproblem.Themediatinggroupweretoldthattheyarenot
goinganywhereuntiltheissueswereresolved.Thereligiousgroupbroughtsomeinformation
totheDCwithregardstothenumberofpeoplekilledandonwhatsideseachcamefrom.The
compensationforthedeadmenwasagreedinthelimitedtimethattheDChadgiven:24hours.
Theabovecasesdemonstratethatthememoriesofpastcolonialwaysofgovernanceshaped
the manner and mechanism through which urban governance and particularly conflict-
resolutionwaspracticedinthepostcolonialcontext.Contrarytothegeneralrhetoricagainstthe
stateduringthecolonialtimesandearlynationalistagendas,thepostcolonialstatewasunable
54 The clans agreed to this arrangement except for one sub clan which refused to accept thecompensation,allegingthattheirmanwaskilledwithoutreason.TheAkilsofthatclanthentoldtheDCtokeepthecamelsforthempendingsidetalkswithhisclan.
55Interviewee3Nomember05,2014.FormerDistrictCommissionerofHargeisa.
83|P a g e
tobreakawayfromtheuseofcustomaryinstitutionsasintermediariesbetweenthestateand
thepeople.Bycontrast,thestatecontinuedtousetheintermediarysystemofAkilsforalmost
thesamereasonsandinthesamewaysthattheywereusedduringcolonialtimes.
The clan conflicts and insecurity seem likely to have undone some of the prior impetus to
cosmopolitanchoiceof residence inurbancontexts,promotinga recourse tosegregation. In
otherwords,securityconcernsandfearofrevengeattacksbyotherclansaswellasthefactthat
the state was unable to guarantee safety in Hargeisa made it difficult for people to trust
neighbourhoodsunpopulatedbytheirclans,perpetuatingsegregationalongclanlines.
4.4 BreakingwiththePast?MilitaryRule
The civilian era thus did not usher in change regarding the importance of clan and the first
notablebreakwiththepastcamein1969whenthemilitarytookover.Ofparticularimportance
intermsofbreakingwiththepastwasasetofpoliciesaimedatpromotingnationalcitizenship
and intended as a departure from the highly clanised belonging prevalent under the civil
leadership. Intheseexercises, themilitaryregimeembarkedonpoliciesofclandenunciation
andmilitariseddevelopmentcampaigns.
Whenthemilitarytookovertheadministrationofthecountry,municipalgovernanceinHargeisa
was further weakened. Councillors were dismissed and the role of municipality in city
management remained limited. Urban governance was militarised and most of the civilian
DistrictCommissionerswere replacedbyMilitaryOfficers.Neighbourhoodmanagementwas
alsocloselytiedtorulingpartystructures.Each50houseswereputunderthemanagementof
aloyalsocialistsupportercalledtabeele(signholder).56Orientationcentreswerealsoerected
in most of the neighbourhoods where people were called in on weekly basis to hear long
sermons about how the state was different from that which existed before it and how
nationalismcanbenurturedthroughcollaborationwiththestate.Subjugationandsuppression
ofopinionbecameamarkerforthenewgovernmentanddissentingvoiceswerepunishedin
themostseveremannerpossible.
Therewasaspecificrhetoricandpolicyofdenouncingclan,asthegovernmentissueddirectives
criminalising clan identity. In 1971, the statedeclared clannism, “whichwas associatedwith
nepotism and corruption, officially banned and ritually buried” (Lewis, 1989, p. 573) in
56Interviewee7August20,2014OralHistorian,ArtistandRadioPresenter.
84|P a g e
cemeteries across the country. People remember in particular, the government’s symbolic
‘burial’oftribalisminanorchestratedpublicgatheringinHargeisa,whichwassupposedtobea
signofaparadigmshiftfromclannism.Thisrhetoricwashowevernotaccompaniedbyconcrete
actionasthestaterevivedclanismandnepotisminitseverydaygovernancepractices.57
Loyalty to the socialist party was maintained through a guulwade (guulwadeyaal in plural)
system.GuulwadeinSomaliisawordwhichlooselytranslatesasvictorious.AccordingtoGulaid
(undated,p.134)guulwadeweredesignatedasrevolutionaryguardiansandwere“giventhe
powertojudgeanyindividualtheyencountered,onadailybasis,whiletheywereadministering
theirrolesasguardiansoftheRevolution….nootherauthorityhadthepowertoreversetheir
judgmentoncetheyhadformulatedtheirperceptionof thosewhocrossedtheir roads”.The
practicesof theguulwadehasgiven rise to theemergenceofaconcept,guulwadeyn,which
capturesthecultureofobediencecreatedunderrepressiveconditionswherepeopleplaytothe
tuneoftheoppressorforpersonalandpoliticalsurvival.
Beingthesecondbiggesttownintherepublic,Hargeisawasanimportantcentreofactivitiesfor
therevolution.Itwasalsoherewhereresistancetothestatewasmostactive.Forthisreason,
Hargeisa was given unparalleled attention by the security forces and most importantly by
guulwadeyaal.As repression and forced compliancewith governmentdirectivesbecame the
normratherthanexception inHargeisa,everyonestartedfearingfortheir lives includingthe
‘hardheadednomads’incolonialterms.Thisunprecedentedleveloffearledtoareductionin
violent conflict among the clans as they feared the dire repercussion that could result from
gettinginvolvedinconflict.58Forthefirsttimeinmanyyears,violenceinthehinterlandsand
subsequentrevengeattackscarriedoutinmajorcitieswentdown.Thisreducedlevelofviolent
conflictledtotheemergenceofcosmopolitanspacesaspeoplecouldtrustresidinginspaces
dominatedbyclansotherthantheirown.Thesecosmopolitanmixedclanneighbourhoodswere
comprisedofrelativelywelltodofamilies–residentswereoftenmiddle-classpeoplemainly
consisting of senior government officials, businessmen andwealthy people from the Somali
Diaspora–suchastheRedSeaneighbourhoodformedintheWestofthetown.59Asevident
here, the urban desegregation seen under military rule did not result from intentional anti
57ParticipantinAgipTeashopDiscussionApril11,2014.HargeisaResident.
58ParticipantMay13,2014.HargeisaResident.FocusGroupDiscussion.
59ParticipantinStarAreaTeashopDiscussionMay17,2014.HargeisaResident.
85|P a g e
segregationpolicybutratherasareductionofinsecurityunderrepressiveconditions.Moreover,
thereisnoevidencethatthisdesegregationoccurredinlessaffluentpartsofthetown.
Despitethedenunciationandcriminalisationofclanismintheearlyyearsofthemilitaryrule
andthecreationofhighlystructuredpartypowers,themilitarygovernmentdidnotbreakaway
fromtheuseoftheintermediarycustomaryinstitutionsbutitchangedtheparameterswithin
which this system worked. Bank and Southall (1996) see the manipulation of chieftaincy
institutionsasattemptsmadeatchangingthelegitimacyandautonomyofchiefs.Inthecase
thatconcernsushere,structuralandsemioticchangesalteringthemechanicsandlanguageof
powerweremadetotheinstitutionofAkils.Thiswasdonebyrelabellingtheirtitlestoreflect
thefunctionsthatthestate identifiedforthemtoperform.For instance,thetitleofAkiland
ChiefAkil(ParamountChief)wererespectivelyrenamedNabadoonandSamadoon.Theformer
translatesastheSeekerofPeacewhereasthesecondtranslatesastheSeekerofGood.Inthe
urbancontextofHargeisa,thesenewrolesforAkilsweredelinkedfromclanandinsteadtiedto
a specific geographical area – a town neighbourhood for example (or a village in rural
contexts).60 The new arrangements thus spatialised and territorialised the operation of the
institutioninsuchawaythattheauthorityoftheAkilwasnolongernecessarilyconfinedtothe
clanhecomesfrom.
Iargue that thismovecanbeseenessentiallyasawayofunderminingAkils’ legitimacyand
jurisdiction,asthestatewasfarfromditchingtheinstitutionasitoftenhadacauseforwhichit
couldbeused.Forinstance,inadditiontotheirroleinthemaintenanceofpeaceandsecurity,
the Akils in urban areaswere at the centre ofmilitary campaigns. One of these campaigns
focusedonbuildingamajordamforHargeisa.Theresourcesandmanpowerfortheconstruction
ofthiswaterfacilitywereraisedthroughacombinationofgovernmentfundsandpublicsupport
intheformofequipmentandmanpower,muchofwhichmobilisedbyrebrandedcustomary
institutionssuchasNabadoonandSamadoon(AkilsandChiefAkils).Essentially,thiscampaign
canbeseenasanattemptaimedat legitimisingandmobilisingtotalsupportforthesocialist
regime’s self-help approach to development particularly the improvement of education,
agricultureand infrastructure.Pesek(2011,p.54)conceptualisescampaignsasa“temporary
and concentratedattempt to changewithina short spanof timeparticular aspectsof social
configurations of a given society”. As in other newly independent African states, Barre’s
60ParticipantinCommercialBankTeashopDiscussionJune13,2014.HargeisaResident.
86|P a g e
campaignssupposedlyaimedtobreakwiththepastthroughself-sufficiencyrhetoricthrough
whichthepopulationwasmobilisedforundertakinggranddevelopmentprojectswithresources
locallyavailable.
Akilswerealsoinstrumentalinthecampaignforgrandiosestateleddevelopmentandnation-
buildingprojectsmentionedabove.InHargeisa,theseprojectsincludedtheconstructionofthe
majorsocialistpartybuildingandorientationcentres,schools,nationalmuseumandlibrary–all
ofwhichdatedfromthisperiod.Asidefromthemeagreresourcesavailabletothestate,the
manpowerandequipmentnecessaryforconstructingtheseprojectswerenotinthehandsof
thegovernment.Akilshelpedthegovernmentpullupalltheregionallyavailableresourcesfrom
privateindividualsvoluntarilyorinvoluntarily:theywerethusonceagainintheir(colonial)role
of state agents, as tax collectors and mobilisers of labour for the state. According to the
Governor, the reason for which the revolutionary government was interested in the urban
development inHargeisawastoupliftthestatusofHargeisasoastobring itatparwiththe
imageexpectedofa2ndcapitalcity.TheGovernorrecalled:
thegovernmenthadlong-termprogrammeforthecityandallmyprograms
are interconnected;wells, library,museumandtheairportaswell.WhenI
cametoHargeisa.Theairportdidnothaveaplacewherepassengerscould
sit,theyusedtostand-upbutIaddedaVIPssection.Theideawasthatwhen
dignitariesarrive,theywillbewelcomedtherethantheyshouldbetakento
themuseum,thelibrarythenfinallyentertainedattheNationalTheatre.61
Thisurbandevelopmentnarrativeis,however,challengedbymanypeople62inHargeisawho
claim that far from promoting Hargeisa to a second capital city, the government had an
unwrittenruleofblockingdevelopment,asevidencedbythebanninginvestmentofbuildingsof
morethanthreestoriesinthecity.Theyallegethatthegovernmentwaslessinterestedinthe
urbandevelopmentofHargeisaforpoliticalreasons.
Ontheotherurban landtenuresecurityhad improvedundermilitary rule.Peopleno longer
fearedowninglandinareaspopulatedbyotherclans.Whilethisfacilitatedtheintegrationof
theclanswhotraditionallyhailedfromHargeisa,italsoincreasedtheriftbetweenthosewho
61Interviewee10October29,2014.FormerGovernorofNorthWesternProvince.
62ParticipantinCommercialBankTeashopDiscussionJuly01,2014.HargeisaResident.
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wereassociatedwiththegovernmentandthosewhowereopposedtoit.Inotherwords,non-
Isaaq clans such as Daaroodwere viewedwith suspicion due to their support, or perceived
support,fortheregime.Thisledtonewconcentrationofpeopleofparticularclanorientation
i.e.Southernersinaparticularspace.Ontheotherhand,thiswasoftenusedbyantagoniststo
showthattheircityisatriskforbeingovertakenbyforeignersduetotheformationofnewclan
spaces.
Thissectionhasshownthatthefocusofurbangovernanceduringtheperiodsofcivilianand
military rule was on security and development. Urban segregation during civilian rule was
exacerbatedby increasingmarginalisationofHargeisaand lackofemploymentopportunities
whichforcedmanypeopletostayareasclosertowheretheycouldgetaccesstokinshipbased
communalsupport.Similarly,insecurityemanatingfromclanskirmishescausedmanypeopleto
watchtheirbackforpossiblerevengeattacks.Customaryinstitutionsmitigatedtheseproblems
byhelpingthestatemaintainlawandorderandfacilitateaccesstoservicefortheirsubjects.It
is important tonotethatwhilesignsofdiversityemerged in thespatialcharacterof thecity
duringthemilitaryregimemainlyduetotheimprovedsecurity,thestatewasunabletobreak
awaywith thepastdespite repeatedeffortsorat least rhetoric to thisend.Thecontoursof
governanceinthecountryandthefactthatcitiesweremanagedinamilitarisedwayforagood
partofthepostcolonialperiodledtogreatcontinuitiesinthespatialcharacterofthecity.
Thisepisodeofurbandevelopmentendedabruptlywiththenearcompletephysicaldestruction
andemptyingofthecityduringthewarwithmasspopulationflight.Theconflictdestroyedits
physical and institutional structures, claimed the lives of more than 50 000 residents and
displacednearlyitsentirepopulationinthelate1980s(Bradbury,2008).Thenextsectionturns
tothenextphaseinthecity’shistoryandthetrajectoryofpostconflictrecovery.
4.5 Re-establishingLocalGovernance:Post-Conflict
Below,IarguethatinsecurityintheimmediateaftermathoftheBarre’sousterinmostcities
reinforced theutilityof clanasan importantelement inchoosingwhere tostayandwho to
relateto.Furthermore,Iarguetheroletheclancontinuestoplayinthedemocratisationprocess
andthewaypoliticalpartiesuseitorabuseitreinforcestheutilityofclanasaunitofidentity.
This, combined with the key roles the customary institutions continue to play inmediating
access to services in the post-conflict context, strengthens clannism and hence perpetuates
segregation.
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Forthreeyearsfollowingthewarin1988,thecityremainedalmostvacantasitwasflattenedto
thegroundandresidentsfledtotheneighbouringcountryofEthiopiaandelsewhere.Whenthe
militaryregimewasoustedfinallyin1991,peoplestartedcomingbackfromtherefugeecamps.
Duetothefragilityofthestateintheearlyyearsofthepost-conflictcontext,clanbecamemore
important than ever before for security purposes in urban areas, causingmany peoplewho
ownedlandinareaspopulatedbyotherclanstomovetostrongholdsoftheirclans(APD,2010).
In other words, the conflict seems to have removed whatever solidarity may have existed
betweentheclansinHargeisaandreconstitutedsegregation.
RefugeesandotherruralmigrantsaimingtotakeadvantageofthepostBarrefreedomhave
graduallyrefilledtheemptyandruinedspacesofthecity.Reconstructionbeganmostlythrough
remittancesfromthediasporaandemanatedmainlyfromtheMiddleEast,WesternEuropeand
NorthAmerica.Thisusheredanewwaveofurbandevelopmentorredevelopmentandrapid
growth,whichmadeHargeisamorethantwiceasbigasbefore,bothintermsofitsgeographical
areasandpopulationsize.Thisrapidpost-wargrowth63gaverisetovariousurbangovernance
challengesatatimewhenSomalilandwasstrugglingwithpost-conflictinstitutionalweaknesses
andlackofcapacitytodeliverservices.
From1991to1993,theweaknessofthestateanditsinabilitytomonopolisepowerinthepost-
conflictcontexthadamajor impactonthereestablishmentof localgovernment institutions.
Attemptsatestablishinglocaladministrativestructureswereovershadowedbyeffortsaimed
at ensuring safety and security in the city as lawandorderbrokedown in theaftermathof
Barre’sremovalfrompowerin1991.64Thiswasattributabletopoliticalandpersonaldifferences
amongtheSNMleadersfuelledbythefactthattheclanswerearmedandmilitarycommand
hadlittleornoinfluenceovertheaffairsoftheclanmilitias.65
Politiciansinthepost-conflictcontextarticulatedtwomajorviewsontheroleofclanandAkils
instatestructures,whichhadimplicationsforHargeisalocalgovernment;institutionalismand
63Thisrapidgrowthcanberelatedtothreemainreasons.Firstly,Hargeisahadbeenandcontinuestobeamajoradministrativecentre.SecondlyHargeisaistheepicentreoftheinter-urbanmigrationaswellasrural-urbanmigrationwhere thosemoving fromotherurbanor ruralareas in thecountry stretch theboundariesofthecity.AndthirdlyHargeisahadinthepastfourdecadesproducedasignificantdiasporawhocontributesignificantlytoitsrapideconomicandspatialgrowth.
64Interviewee2November8,2014FormerChairmanofSomalilandAtrocitiesCommission.
65Ibid.
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deferralism66. Thesepositionshad theirhistory in thecontextof theSNMsmilitary struggle
againsttheregime.Thoseintheformercampwereconcernedabouttheincreasinginfluence
andauthorityoftheclaneldersintheorganisationandtheyproposedtoprofessionaliseand
detribalisethearmedwingoftheorganisation.Theideaherewasinsteadoftheclansproviding
rationsandlogisticstothesoldiers,theyshouldsupportacentralisedauthoritysoastomake
sure that the forces fighting for theorganisation are accountable to its command. If people
wanted to provide supplies for the cause SNMwas fighting for, then they shouldmake all
contributions through a central fund managed by the central command. The other group
believedthatthepriorityofSNMwastoremovethemilitaryregimefrompoweratanycostand
throughanyavailablemeans;theassumptionwasthattheremovalofBarrewouldleadtoan
environmentinwhichtheorganisationwouldbeabletoreorganiseitselfandputaneffective
administration inplace.ThedifferencesbetweentheSNMleadershipwasmainlysuppressed
duringthestruggle.AccordingtoaformerSNMofficialduringthewarwithBarre:
tosaythingsshouldbedoneinapropermannerwasakintotreason.The
confidentialdiscussionswehadinthecentralcommitteemeetingwereoften
leakedtothecivilians.Propagandawouldspreadagainstanyonecomingup
withadifferentnarrative.Peoplewouldsaytodayisnotthedaytotalkabout
these issues and those who voice their concern would be branded as
traitors.67
These pre-incursion differences between the SNM officials created a hostile political
environmentinthepostBarreadministrativeandpoliticaldispensations.Inotherwords,Post
SiyadBarrelocalgovernancewasmarredbyinternalpowerstrugglesandinsecurityproblems.
Thisparticularlynegativelyimpactedthereestablishmentofaneffectivelocalgovernanceinthe
immediateaftermathofBarre’sfall.Thespatialconsequencesofthiswasthatmembersofclans
whoresidedinanareawheretheirclanisnotpredominantmovedtootherareaswheretheir
clanhadsignificantpresenceasthatwouldreducetheriskofbeingvictimisedbymarauding
militiasofotherclans.Forinstance,manyfamilieswhowerefromtheAwalclansmovedoutof
66Ibid.
67Ibid.
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areapopulatedbytheGarhajisandviceversa.68Thesecurityutilityoftheclanseemshereto
haveunderminednationalbelongingandcitizenship.Ray(1996),andSkalník(1996)arguethat
thereisatensionbetweentheconceptofcitizenship,whichgrantsthebearerindividualised
rightssuchthatonecouldtheoreticallyliveinanyplaceofhis/herchoosingwithinthepolity;
and the subjectivity inherent in the traditional public authorities where the individual is
expectedtopledgetheirallegiancetothecustomaryinstitutionofchieftaincy.
Such division in allegiance became a recipe for the widespread post Barre deterioration in
securityinHargeisa.Asurbansafetydeclinedbetween1991to1993,nonSNMpoliticiansused
thisasanopportunity topresent themselvesasanalternative to the failedSNM leadership,
culminatingintheelectionofMohamedIbrahimEgal,aformerPrimeMinisterofSomalia.The
newPresidentcametopoweratatimeofinsecurity.Hespentasignificantpartofhispolitical
energyonunderminingtribalinfluenceonthearmedforcesasheembarkedonademobilisation
process, which was largely successful (though at times there were problems, e.g. the
governmentoverlookedthefactthatthearmedyoungmenhadlongmadealivingoutofthe
checkpointsandanyhandoverneededtofurnishthemwithanewsourceofincome).69Thenew
PresidentappointedMohamedHashiElmifromAwalclaninNorthernandWesternHargeisaas
aMayorin1993.HashiwasatrainedengineerandakeyfigureintheSNMpoliticalstructure.
ThePresidentmadetheappointmentatatimewhenarmedoppositionagainsthimwasactive
inthecity.Thiswasthefirstmajorattemptatre-establishinglocalgovernmentinHargeisa.The
new[PostSNMappointed]mayorprioritisedlawandorderandestablished22policestations
andsubstationsinacorrespondingnumberofnewlyrestructureddistrictsandsubdistricts.70
Theincreaseinsecurityinstallationswereseenasimportant71bythePostSNMgovernmentfor
notonlymaintenanceoflawandorderbutalsoasapreludefortheestablishmentofarevenue
base in a hostile political environment where people were armed and could challenge tax
68Interviewee62May12,2014.LandBroker.
69Interviewee2November8,2014FormerChairmanofSomalilandAtrocitiesCommission.
70Interviewee9August16,2014.FormerMayorofHargeisa.
71ParticipantinKaahRestaurant/TeaDiscussionAugust07,2014.HargeisaResident.
91|P a g e
collection attempts.72 The new mayor’s rearrangement of administrative structures was,
however, heavily criticised as this came at a timewhen the governmentwas facing armed
resistancefromdisgruntledGarhajisclansintheEastandSouthofthecity.Hewasaccusedof
takingadvantageofthisanddestroyingpropertieslocatedinthecitycentrebelongingtothe
clanswhofoughtwiththegovernmentbetween1994and1997withoutdueprocess.73
As detailed in chapter two, traditional authorities played a significant role in the re-
establishmentof lawandorder in Somalilandafter thewar, helping the state todisarm the
militiaandfacilitatingdialoguebetweenwarringclans.Asaresult,theyareoftenrepresented
asanimportantinstitution,andinvokedasanexplanationtoaccountforthedifferencesinstate
building processes between Somalia and Somaliland(Walls, 2009). Advancing this
representation are state officialswho for political reasons seek to legitimate their cause for
independenceonthebasisofidentitypoliticswherereferenceismadetohowSomalilandisa
culturednationwithtraditionalauthoritiesthatsaveditfrompoliticalcatastropheasopposed
totheSouthwhichlacksthis.74
Despite this romanticised representation, I argue that tensions characterise the relationship
betweenthestateandtraditionalauthoritiesinSomaliland,andspecificallyinHargeisa.These
tensionsareattributedtotheinabilityofthestateandthecustomaryinstitutionstomanagethe
complex post-conflict political, cultural and social dynamics. While the statutory system is
accusedofbeing ineffective in resourceandconflictmanagement, the traditional system(as
representedbyAkils)isaccusedoflackofinnovationtokeeppacewiththechangingrealityof
modernlivesandbeinganobstacletotheformationofstatebureaucracies.Forinstance,the
FormerMinisterofInteriorbelievesthatAkilshaveoutlivedtheirusefulnessas.
the harm they cause is more than the good they do for governance and
maintenanceof lawandorder.Theproblemnowisthefactthatthereare
72Revenue collection startedwithamodest levies small shopsandhawking standsbut this graduallyincreasedandthelocalgovernmentfinallymanagedtohaveasourceoffundingindependentfromthepresidency.
73ParticipantinStarAreaTeashopDiscussionMay17,2014.HargeisaResident.
74Interviewee28August12,2014.Politician.
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toomanyofthemandwhenconflictsariseeachsidewhetherrightorwrong
willhaveanAkilontheirside.75
In2001,areferendumwasheldforanewconstitution.WhiletheconstitutionofSomaliland
(RepublicofSomaliland,2001)incorporatestraditionalauthorityatthepoliticallevel,thiswas
notthecaseattheadministrativeurbanlevel.Forinstance,apartfrombeingregisteredwiththe
MinistryofInterior,theAkils’roleinlocalgovernanceisnotclear.Thisisdespitethefactthat
they are considered crucial actors in peace-making and a formidable force in electioneering
wheretheymobilisesupportforthedifferentpoliticalparties.
Inadditiontotheelections,servicesprovidedthroughclientalismandpatronagenecessitates
clanstostrivetoputoneoftheirowningovernmentpositions.Inotherwords,oncetheclan’s
candidateisinpositioninaservicedepartmentforalocalauthority,membersoftheclanexpect
thattheywillhaveprivilegeinaccessingserviceslegallyorillegally.76MediatedoftenbyAkils,
this kind of political environment increases the need for clan solidarity towards political
participationandrepresentationandthisinturnreinforcesurbansegregation.
Thenewconstitutionalprovisionforlocalgovernmentelectionsin2001markedanimportant
breakwiththepast,astherewasfromthen,asystemof localgovernmentthatpromisedto
quitedramaticallyalterlocalgovernanceinstitutionswithahistoryofauthoritarianpracticeand
lackofaccountability.WhileAkilsretainedtheirroleinthecentralgovernment,theywerenot
formallyincorporatedintothelocalgovernancestructures.AccordingtotheformerMinisterof
interior,1200Akilsarenowonthegovernmentpayrollacrossthecountrywhile400moreare
onawaitinglistforapproval.77Themajorfunctionoftheirpayistoensurethatthestatecan
enrol their services on issues related to peace and security. The process throughwhich the
appointment or recognition of Akils’ statehood is achieved is not well defined. The Interior
MinistryofficialspointoutthatAkilcandidatescomewithahandfulofmembersfromtheirclan
whodemandrecognitionofthecandidateoftheirchoice.Thestateseesthispracticeasbeing
informalandforthepurposeofcontrollingthemitisbetterforthegovernmenttoreducethe
75Interviewee8August19,2014.FormerMinisterofInterior.
76ParticipantinStarAreaTeashopDiscussionMay17,2014.HargeisaResident.
77Interviewee8August19,2014.FormerMinisterofInterior.
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number of Akils.78 While officials thus tried to control and reduce Akils’ power, politicians
nonethelessdependedheavilyonthem.Inthelocalcouncilelectionsof2002,politiciansactively
engagedAkilstobroadentheirpoliticalbaseandlegitimacy.
MayorJi’ir,cametopowerthroughthisfirstsetofmunicipalelectionsin2002,bringinganend
tomorethanadecadeofexecutiveappointmentofmayors.Morethanadozenpoliticalparties
contestedforseatsinthemunicipalelectionsbutonly3politicalpartiesemergedasnational
parties; UDUB, Kulmiye and UCID.79 Eleven councillors were elected on UDUB tickets and
another6councillorsjoinedthemfromthepartieswhichdidnotmakeittothefinal3national
parties.Thismadethenumberoftherulingpartycouncillors17,trailedbyKulmiyewhichhad4
andUCIDwith3. TheMayor and thedeputymayor served as executive and the rest of the
councillorsweredividedinto4committeeswithchairs,deputiesandsecretaries.Thecitywas
divided into5districtsandonecouncillorwasput inchargeofeachdistrict. Inotherwords,
everycouncilloralsohadanotherexecutiveor ‘semiexecutive’position.Thekeycommittees
were the finance and the land committees but equally important were the social welfare
committee which was responsible for the sanitation and social affairs and the security
committeeresponsibleforissuestodowithsecurityattheneighbourhoodlevel.
Forthefirstfewyears,themayoralseatofHargeisawaspoliticallyunstableascouncillorsoften
madeattemptstoremovethesittingmayorforpersonalorpoliticaldifferences.Removalwas
often attempted through a vote of no confidence, which required the support of only 8
councillors.Interestingly,thispoliticsdidnotmapstraightforwardlyontoclanpolitics.According
toaformermayor,impeachmentwasoftenattemptedforpoliticalgainsas:
everybodywanted tobecomeamayor.Mayorsmayhave tobedislodged
constantlyfortheopportunitytocomeup.Atthetimetheissuewaslessto
dowithclanpoliticsassomecouncillorsfrommyownclanusedtooppose
me. Itwasmoretodowithotherassociations likefriendshipandpersonal
interests.80
78Ibid.
79UrurkaCadaaladaiyoDaryeelka(WelfareandJusticeParty).
80Interviewee9August16,2014.FormerMayorofHargeisa.
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Thefocusofthenewelectedcouncilfrom2002wasonstrengtheningthetaxregimes.Previously
local government tax collectionhadbeendone through informalpracticesheavily relianton
individualcollector’saptitudeinusingtheirsocialnetworkasapotentialsourceofidentifying
keytaxpayersinahighlysegregatedcity.Urbansegregationservedthenewtowncouncilwell
astheywereabletoidentifypotentialtaxpayersthroughtheclanandkinshipbasednetworks.
Inotherwords,sincetherewere/arenoaddressesandpersonaldocumentsforidentification,
clanmembershipwhichassignseveryonewithalineagebasedidentitylabelbecameauseful
toolthroughwhichtaxcollectorslocatepotentialtaxpayers.81Theaimwastoincreasethetax
baseoflocalgovernmentbutbyimplicationitreinforcedserviceprovisionalongclanlines.Local
government staff were often sent to neighbourhoods populated by their clan not only for
securityreasonsbutalsoforeaseofaccessandidentificationpurposes.BorsdorfandHidalgo
(2009)arguethatsegregationofurbanspaceissometimesbridgedbytheexistenceofsocial
networksbetweenactorswhotrytomitigatethenegativeconsequencesofsegregation.Inthe
case of Hargeisa, even after the local elections, tax collectors used kinship based social
networkingtoidentifypotentialtaxpayers.Onemajorflipsideofthismechanismwashowever
thefactthatitrecordedaverylowrateoftaxcollectionunderstandablebecauseofnepotism
andcorruption.
Astaxpaymentisakeycomponentforaccountablegovernance,itisalsoanimportantelement
throughwhichstatelegitimacycanbemeasured.InsituationslikeHargeisa,wherethestateis
believedtomisappropriaterevenuesgeneratedfromtaxpayers,suchtaxationisusedasmeans
todiscreditthestate,andtoreinforcearationaleofelectingsomeonefromone’sownclan.In
the2012localgovernmentelections,aninformerinateashoppointedoutthat:
Thereweretwocandidatesfromhisclanwhereasonewasamanofintegrity
andtheotherwasnot.Weelectedthecandidatewith less integrityastax
collectedfromuswas/isanywaymisappropriated…solethim(withtheguy
withlessintegrity)eatwiththem.Hadweelectedtheotherguyhewoulddo
thatandhenceourmoneywouldallbeeatenbypeopleotherclans.82
81ItisimportanttopointoutherethatAkilsarenotusedtocollectrevenuesfrommembersoftheirclan.
82ParticipantinCommercialBankTeashopDiscussionJuly01,2014.HargeisaResident.
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Theconcernhereisthatifaclanelectsamanofintegritybuthiscolleaguesfromotherclans
are not, he/she will not be involved in irregular or corrupt practices or sharing of
misappropriatedtaxesorresourceslootedfromthestatewithhisclansmen/womenwhereas
othersaredoingwhatherefrainedfromtothedisadvantageofhisclan.
Thenewsystemoftaxcollectionintroducedbytheelectednewmayor,Ji’ir,tooktheformofan
incentive,throughwhichtaxcollectorswhorecordedthelargestnumberofpayerswouldbe
rewarded.However,thisonceagainhadanegativeeffectonthetaxcollectionregimeinthe
town. The tax collectors placed their focus on the individuals that paymost taxes so as to
maximise their tax collection strategy. As the previous incentive-based strategy for tax base
expansionfailedtobringaboutanytangibleincreaseinthenumberoftaxpayersinthecity,the
newmayorapproachedtheUnitedNationsHabitatprogrammetohelpwiththecreationofa
GIS which would enable the local government to record the cadastral boundaries of the
propertiesandthebuiltenvironmentingeneralforrevenuecollectionandplanningpurposes.
UNhabitatacceptedtheproposalandimplementedtheGISprojectin3phases.Thefirstpart
wascompletedin2005andthe2ndin2008when25,000propertieswererecorded.Thedata
wasusedforthreereasons;taxcollection,landmanagementandtownplanning.Attheendof
theproject,90%ofthebusinessesinthecitywererecorded.Therecordingofthepropertiesin
the town has increased the revenue of the local authority by a significant margin, 300%.83
Thoughimportantintermsoflocalgovernmentcapacity,thisdidnothelpmuchwiththeland
conflictproblemsinthecity(asweshallseeinchapter6).
This section has shown that the focus of urban governance in the post-war periodwas the
reestablishmentofurbangovernancestructuresandtransition todemocracy,andredefining
theroleofthecustomaryinstitutionssuchastheAkilsinthepoliticalandsecuritydynamicsof
the city. I have shown that the existing rifts between the SNM factions complicated the
reestablishmentof local governance in the immediateaftermathofBarre’souster asefforts
aimedatendingthearmedconflictovershadowedtheneedforestablishinglocalgovernance
structures.Iarguedthatpost-conflicturbangovernancedidnotshiftfromtheuseofcustomary
institutionsasameansofdeliveringservices.Ihaveshownthattheyplayedakeyroleinthe
political and security stabilisation of the town. They also continue to play a key role in the
municipalpoliticsparticularlytheelectionandre-electionofcandidates.
83Interviewee9August16,2014.FormerMayorofHargeisa.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I provided a historical narrative of segregation and its interface with local
governanceinHargeisa.IarguedthatsegregationinHargeisacouldbeunderstoodasaresponse
topolitical,economicandsecurityissuesthatpersistedduetothestate’sinabilitytobringabout
changeandshiftawayfromthepast.Forinstance,Hargeisa’ssegregatedspatialcharacterwas
entrenchedduringthepostcolonialperiodbythestate’sinabilitytodealwiththedireeconomic
andsecurityproblemsinthecity,whichmadeitnecessaryforpeoplerelyontheclanasarisk
mitigationmechanism.Themostsignificantsignofchangeinurbansegregationcameduringthe
socialist regimewhenmilitarised and repressive approaches to urban governance improved
securityintheearlyyearsoftherevolutionandcosmopolitanspacesemergedincertainareas
ofthecity.Butthisdidnotlastlongasthestatemetamorphosedagaintoitsfamiliarpatrimonial
andclientalistformfurtherexacerbatedbypredatoryanddictatorialgovernancepracticesthat
underminedwhatwasleftofthepublictrust inthestate.UrbansegregationinHargeisawas
finallytakentoanewheightbythediresecuritysituationintheimmediateaftermathofBarre’s
removalfrompowerandthesuccessivefragiletransitiontodemocracy.Thishistoricaltrajectory
ofurbangovernancecanelucidatethefactorsthathaveentrenchedthespatialsegregationof
Hargeisaamidrapidurbangrowth.Whilethischapterfocusedonmunicipalpolitics/governance,
thenext chapter further zooms inon landadministration to revealhowspecific governance
practicesshapeHargeisaspatialcharacter.
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CHAPTER5 HISTORIESOFTOPDOWNURBANLANDMANAGEMENT
5.1 Introduction
This chapter focusesonurban land administration, past andpresent. It provides ahistorical
overview of the colonial land management practices and their impact on shaping people’s
attitude towards the state aswell as the dynamics of post-conflict urban landmanagement
practices.Iarguethattheweakstatecapacityandlackofresourcesandskillstoputinplacean
effectiveregulatoryframeworkcanexplainthecontinuedlargenumberoflandconflictsinthe
city.Ialsoarguethatthe“modern”landadministration,whichischaracterisedbyaweakstate
andpluraljusticesystem,hasunderminedpublictrustinthestate.Thechapterbuildsonthe
previouschapter’saccountofhistoriesoflocalgovernmentthatdetailedtheroleofAkilsand
urban councils to focus on urban land administration. I provide a further layer of empirical
evidencetosupportmyargumentforhowurbanlocalgovernanceinstitutionshaveshapedthe
cityinspatialtermsandparticularlyhowtheyhavereinforcedthespatialsegregationofthecity
alongclanlines.Throughoutthenarrative,IattempttoshowthaturbansegregationinHargeisa
alongclan linescanbeviewedasageographicalmanifestationofpeople’sresponsetostate
policiesandpractices.AsIhaveargued,thepresenthybridityfocusedliteratureonSomaliland
failstoprovideadequateexplanationoftherelationshipbetweengovernanceandspatialform
at the urban level. I argue that it is important to go beyond the brief references of urban
governanceashybridtoexplorethespecificmodesoflandadministrationovertime.Ialsoseek
toexploretheideaofsegregationasaconcept,whichismoreusefulintermsofexplainingthe
spatialcharacterofcitiesinSomaliland.
Thechapterisorganisedintothreesections.Inthefirstsection,Ilookattheearlyhistoryofland
administrationand its legacies, particularly theassociationbetween landadministrationand
appropriation,andthelate-colonialattempttoregisterindividualurbanlandholdingforelites
and itseffects. Inthesecondsection, Ipresentevidenceforpostcolonial legalcontinuities in
landadministration.Inthispostcolonialperiod,Iarguethaturbanlandwasnotapriority,partly
duetoalackofcapacity,buttheresultwasaproliferationoflandconflicts,whichreinforced
the importanceofclanandsegregatedurbanspaces.Finally, Idiscuss the importanceof the
2001legalandpolicyframeworksforurbanlandinterventionandaseriesofstate/NGOefforts
toregulateurbanland.
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5.2 EmergenceandContinuityofTopDownLandManagement
Understandingthedynamicsofthecurrentstateofurbanlandmanagementinthepost-conflict
contextbegsforarevisitingofthepast.Thiswillenableustoseehowurbanlandgovernance
approaches during the colonial and postcolonial periods shape the present day urban land
managementpractices.Asshowninthepreviouschapterandisalsorelevanthere,historyisa
livedexperienceinthecontextofSomalilandasitisusedorabusedtojustifycurrentthinking,
processesandpractices.Inmyexaminationofthepast,Iarguethaturbanlandmanagement
duringthecolonialperiodwashighlycentralised:authoritiesdidnotconsulttheSomalisabout
waystomanagetheircities,presumablybecauseofanassumptionthattheSomaliswerenot
educatedorknowledgeableenoughtopassjudgementonideasaboutlandmanagement.Ialso
arguethatthisauthoritarianformofgovernancelaidthefoundationforthemistrustbetween
thestateandthepublichenceunderminingstatelegitimacy.Ialsoarguethatthepostcolonial
statedidnotshiftawayfromthispractice,furtherentrenchingthelackoftrustinthestateand
byimplicationthelowlevelofstatelegitimacy.Theresponsetothelackoftrustandlegitimacy
ismanifest in the formof spatial segregationasmembersof thesameclanconglomerate in
specificchunksofthecitytoincreasetheirchanceofsurvivalinthecity.
IbeginthisexaminationwithcoloniallandmanagementinSomaliland,whichcanbetracedback
to the early years of the protectorate’s formation when the government introduced the
registration of documents ordinance in 1912. This legislation provided the colonial
administrationwithatoolthroughwhichtheycouldrecordandmanageindividualownership
oflandandimmovableproperties.TheregisterwaslostduringthewarwiththeItalians.This
ledtopost-WorldWarTwolandconflictsaspeoplemadeclaimstovacantgovernmentlands.
Landclaimswereatthetimemostlysubmittedbyeliteswhowantedtooccupyimportantparts
ofthecityorfurthercommercialgains.84Controlswereinitiallylimitedtothecoastaltownsbut
asurbancentresgrewinlandthe landadministrationframeworkwasalsoexpanded intothe
interiorpartsofthecountry.Colonialofficialsintroducedthetownship’sordinancein1924ata
timewhen theProtectoratewas emerging fromaprotracted conflict following theMullah’s
uprising.Thisactwasminimalist initsfirstversionmainlyfocusingonpoliticalcontrol,butin
1927thegovernmentamendedtheordinancetoprovidecolonialofficialswithsweepingpowers
of reorderingsettlementpatterns in townships. It isparticularly relevant to the focusof this
84TNACO535/149/4LandTenure.
99|P a g e
chapteronlandadministrationbecauseitpermittedtheGovernortoconfiscatelandrequired
for‘publicpurpose’.85Thepublicpurposeforwhichtheamendmentwasjustifiedincludedthe
constructionofnewroadsandbridgesaswellas therealignmentofexistingstreetsandthe
constructionofpublicoffices,buildingsandanyotherpurposedeemedfitbytheGovernor.
Compensation,whereitexisted,wasoftendeterminedthroughgovernmentledassessments.
Landownerswhodidnothavetitledeedsqualifiedonlyforthepaymentofpresentvalueof
their buildingswithout regard to the value of the sitewhereas thosewhoheld government
issued freeor leaseholdqualified forpaymentof the landvaluetogetherwithanybuildings,
trees,cultivationetceteraonit.86Theintroductionanduseoversubsequentdecadesofthese
expropriationruleswereunfathomabletothevastmajorityofpeopleintheProtectorate,and
have a place in popular historical memory. This apprehension and memories of land
expropriationthatcontinuetoberetoldcanbeexemplifiedbyaclanelders’storyinwhicha:
seniorSomaliofficialnamedInaIgare,workingforthecolonialgovernment
issuedanorderfortheexpropriationofland.Anoldladywhowasamongthe
evicteeswastoldthefactthatMuseIgareactingontheinstructionsissued
bytheGovernorwantshertovacatethelandtowhichshereplied‘hewho
speaksnonsenseisInaIgare.87
Myargumenthereisthatthissimpleutterancebecameanidiomofresistanceusedtodismiss
stateactionslackingcrediblerationalisation.Theenduranceofthissimpleutteranceacrosstime
andspaceshedslightonhowunsophisticatedmundanelanguagewasusedtodefythestate.It
also shows that Somalis at the time could not imagine andmake sense ofwhy the colonial
governmentwouldwanttomovepeoplearoundwhenthereisaplentyofvacantspacewith
which it could do whatever it wanted. It highlights the importance of land administrative
regulationsbothtocolonialpowerandtopopularresistanceandperceptionsofitsillegitimacy.
Thisincomprehensiondoesnotsuggestthatlandusemanagementwasaforeignconcepttothe
Somalipeople in the interiorpartsof thecountry.Venemaetal. (2009)observe thatSomali
peoplehadahistoryoflandusemanagement,thoughthiswasupheldorally,variedoverspace
85Ibid.
86Failuretocomplywiththisstipulationoftenwarrantedafineof500shillings.
87Interviewee24August15,2014.ClanElder.
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andwasnotformallycodified.Forinstance,pastoralistsoftenplannedwhichareaofthecountry
might be suitable for migration during the dry seasons basing their assessment on the
environmentalfootprintsoftheprecedingseason(i.e.rainfall)whilefarmersusedtoenclose
certainpartsoftheirlandforuseinthedryseasonswhensuppliesmightbelessabundant.An
intellectual represented traditional land management in the following positive terms,
emphasisingmutualconsentandnegotiation,disruptedbycolonialinterventions:
whenpeoplecomewateringplacessuchaswells,theyusedtoenquireabout
whoseturnisitorwhoseclanissupposedtowatertheiranimalinaparticular
dayoftheweek.Theotherclansusedtostepbackandletthatparticularclan
quench their animals. So, it was a system based on mutual respect and
agreementbetweentheclans.Theproblem is that thetraditionalsystems
was disrupted by foreign influences which increased the competition for
resources.88
The point here is that local people’s approach to land use management was based on
consultation and voluntary adherence as opposed to colonial actions. Colonial interventions
wereoftenconstitutedthroughatopdownprocessrequiringinvoluntaryenforcementmainly
shaped by disregard for local knowledge that cast doubt on people’s ability to govern their
relationshipwiththeenvironmentinamutuallybeneficialway.Inrelationtourbanspace,the
techniques through which colonial urban land use management operated differed
fundamentallyfromthatwhichwasunderstandabletotheSomaliswhoselandusemanagement
wasbasedonseasonalcalendarswherecertaingrazingactivitieswerenotallowedincertain
timesbutevictionandexpropriationoflandwasunnecessary.
Hargeisa,likeothermajortownships,wassignificantlyaffectedbytheintroductionofthenew
landmanagementordinance.Accordingtocorrespondencebetweenthesecretaryofthestate
LieutenantColAmeryand theGovernorof SomalilandKittermaster,expropriationof land in
Hargeisabecamenecessarybecauseofthecity’sexpansioninonedirection.Primelandalong
theonlymainstreetinthetownshipwasidentifiedforoneofthemajorexpropriationexercises
inlinewiththenewrules.Thelandinquestionwasgrantedtotheownersin1922andtemporary
traditionalstructureswerethereaftererected.Theviewoftheadministrationwashoweverthat
88Interviewee14September03,2014.Academic.
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thelandwasgrantedonatemporarybasisandthisallocationdidnotentailguaranteeoftenure
security.Moreover, theyargued that theoccupationof this land felloutside thecategoryof
privateownershipasstructureswerenotpermanentandownersheldneithertitledeedsnor
paid taxeshenceproviding governmentwith sufficient grounds to removeandpay theman
amountofmoneyequivalenttothesimplestructuresonthelandandnotthelandvalue.89
However, the colonial office in London believed that private ownership of land should be
respectedandthosewhocurrentlyoccupythelandshouldbeconsideredasprivatelandowners
astheiroccupationalrightshouldremainduringthelifetimeoftheguarantee.90Intheend,the
localadministratorsproposedtocompensateownersinamannerthatdidnottakeintoaccount
thesitevalue.91Theproposedcompensationthereforeentailedonlythelabourandthematerial
cost of temporary structures. In a letter dated on the 23 ofDecember 1937, theGovernor
announced that land along themain streetwould be expropriated to pave theway for the
constructionofnewblocksofpermanentbuildings.Noticestothiseffecthadbeenservedwith
the occupiers, giving them seven days to make the necessary arrangements for the
expropriation. Sixteen dwellings were affected by this expropriation and a committee from
variousagenciesincludingtheTreasurer,andChiefofCustoms,DirectorofPublicWorksanda
‘leadingSomaliresident’wereputtogethertoevaluatethecostofthedwellings.Theevaluators
came back with an estimated compensation of Rs.2350. Occupiers were notified that the
compensationwillbepaidtothemnextyear.92
Theexpropriationoflandaffectedthespatialcharacterofthecityintwoimportantways.Firstly,
thosewhowereevictedfromthelandhadnochannelthroughwhichtheycouldcomplainabout
thegovernment’spositionotherthanthetraditionalinstitutionssuchastheAkils.AsIarguedin
thepreviouschapter,thislackofotherleverageagainstthestateinherentlymadepeoplestick
to the parts of the town in proximity to particular Akils, where they could easily get social
supportandsolidarityparticularlyiftheyexperiencednegativeencounterswiththestate.
89TNACO535/80/1Townshipamendmentordinance.Expropriationoflandordinance.
90Ibid.
91Ibid.
92TNACO535/126/20CompensationfortheremovalofwattleanddaubstructuresinHargeisatown.
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Thisrenewedeffortinstatelandmanagementpracticesofficiallyintroducedanewparadigm
for conceptualising land ownership. Conceptually, land management mechanisms in Somali
culturewererenderedwithinaresourcesharingframeworkrestingownershipof land inthe
domainofGod.Inthisapproach,peoplewereseenasmerecaretakerswithusufructrightsto
land.Twoformsofownershipwererecognisedbythissystemnamely1)communalownership
ofpastorallandwhereclansareidentifiedwithaparticularturfbutdonotmonopoliseitsuse
exclusively and2) privateownershipwhere individualsmay carveout a pieceof land in the
villageorurbanareaforcultivationorpermanentsettlement.Thisbottom-uptraditionalland
managementapproachwasalteredincrementallyoveraperiodof85yearsinwhichSomaliland
was part of the British Empire mainly through a top-down process. The most significant
alteration came in the late1930swhen local colonialofficialsembarkedonefforts aimedat
relievingLondonfromthefinancialburdenoftheProtectorate93byexploringthepossibilityof
discoveringmineraldepositsthatcouldsupporttheadministrationinthelongrun.Asaresult,
in1939thegovernmentintroducedanewlandtenureordinancedesignedtorespondtothese
possibilities.Whilethecolonialgovernmentconsultedthetraditionalleadersonlocalpolitical
issuessuchaspeaceandsecurity,thesamecouldnotbesaidforlandmanagement.Thislackof
consultationmighthavebeen justifiedon thebasis that therewas lackof knowledgeabout
urban land issues in Somaliland as therewere very limited number of towns in the country
notwithstanding the typical colonial mentality of underestimating local knowledge and the
intellectual capacity of natives. In the late 1930s, London becamemuch more reluctant to
providesufficientfundsfordevelopmentatatimewhenanumberofsignificanttownshipswere
emergingintheprotectorate(Millman,2013)
Accordingtocolonialrecords,theapproachtolandownershipbythestatewasinitiallyjustified
on the basis of treaties signed with the clans in Somaliland. But the legal officer in the
Protectorateraisedhisconcernaboutthis,sayingtheymakenomentiontoanyacceptanceof
thestate’sownershiprightsoverland.Onthecontrary,anarticleinthetreatystatesthatthe
tribeswill“nevercede,sell,mortgageorotherwise[disposeof]…anyportionoftheterritory
presentlyinhabitedbythemorbeingundertheircontrol”.Accordingtothelegalofficer,thisdid
notprovidethegovernmentwithalegalframeworkthroughwhichtransferthestateownership
oflandcouldbejustified.94Thelegalofficer,however,advisedhissuperiorsinLondonthatan
93Theprotectoratewasheavilyreliantonfundingfromthecolonialoffice
94TNACO535/149/4LandTenure.
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articleinthePrincipalOrderinCouncilof1929(whichreplacedtheOrderof1889)95contains
provisionsthatcouldallowthestatetotakeownershipofland.Accordingtoalettersignedby
MalcolmMacdonaldonthe19thofAugust1939,landownershipinthisorderwasdivisibleinto
threecategoriesnamelycrownland,publiclandandtriballand.
Crownlandwasdefinedas“allpubliclandsintheProtectoratewhicharesubjecttothecontrol
of his Majesty by virtue of any treaty, convention or agreement, or of his Majesty’s
Protectorate”; public land was defined as “all lands which shall have been required by his
Majestyforthepurposeofpublicserviceorotherwisehowsoever”,andprivatelandwasdefined
asalandthesurfaceofwhichisvestedinanindividualorcorporationwhetherbyvirtueofgrant
fromtheCrownorotherwise”butbeneathofwhich,i.e.mineralreserves,rightsarevestedin
the Crown.96 He argued that “the only crown land is that which has been acquired for the
purposeofpublicserviceor ‘otherwisehowsoever”.Hecontendedthat the“meaningof the
words‘otherwisehowsoever’[wasnotclearbutcouldbetakenasreferencetothe]acquisition
byaformaltransferfromthetribestotheGovernororbyalegislativeacteitherdeclaringland
tobecrownland,[or]tobeconvertedintocrown…givingtheGovernorpowerstodisposeof
orexercisecontroloverit’”.97
Thelegislation,introducingdifferentformsofstate,privateandcommunaltenurechallenged
howlandownershipwasconceptualisedamongSomalisandthetransferofownershipfromthe
domainofGodtothedomainofgovernmentdelegitimisedthelandmanagementprocessin
the eyes of the public, who continued to perceive it as a colonial project designed for the
subjugation and confiscation of their property without equitable compensation.98 The
unpopularityofhistoriesof landadministration inbothurbanandruralcontexts,particularly
through their role in expropriations, thus contributed directly to nationalist resistance. The
relevanceofthishistorytothenarrativethatfollows,isthatasweshallsee,therearedirect
continuitieswithmodesoflandmanagementinHargeisaovertimeandintothepresent.
95Wheretribessignedanagreementwiththegovernment.
96TNACO535/149/4LandTenure.
97Ibid.
98ParticipantMay13,2014.HargeisaResident.FocusGroupDiscussion.
104|P a g e
As evident above, colonial administration was a top-down process characterised by lack of
consultation with the public and local authorities. This authoritarian state culture had a
significantimpactonthefutureofurbanlandmanagementinthecountryasmostofthecolonial
land policies and lawswere retained in the postcolonial period. The continuities aremore
striking than the changes. Attempts aimed at change often failed. For instance, in 1960 the
governmentappointedaParliamentaryCommissiontodealwithlandreform,butaftersixyears
ofworktheycameupwithadraftwhichfailedtopassinparliament(Besteman,1990).From
the beginning this reform initiative had the hallmark of a failure as it was laden with elite
interestsandalsowasgeographicallyskewedinfavourofthefertilecommercialfarmlandsin
theSouthastheideabehindtheinitiativewastoredressthecolonialacquisitionofsignificant
cultivablelandalongtheriversinJubaandShebelle.Detailsofthehowtheywantedtodothis
(i.e.nationalisationsorrestitution)couldnotbeobtained.ADistrictCommissionerinHargeisa
duringthistimeattributesthefailureofthisattempttotheabsenceofnationalcoverageand
consultationwithlocalofficialsatdistrictlevel.99HestatedthattheCommissionneithervisited
norconsultedwithhimorthepeopleinHargeisa:
ThelegislationwascookedupinMogadishuandatnotime,whileIwasin
thedistrict,wasIconsultedoraskedtoorganisepeoplewhocouldcontribute
noteworthy ideas to the proposed legislation on land. At the time, we in
Hargeisaalsohadsignificant landmanagementproblemsasconflictoften
usedtoarisefromlandownershipdisputesinthecity…wecouldhaveadded
asubstantialcontributionfromthispartofthecountry.100
ThecontinuationofmanyofthelawsinheritedfromthecolonialadministrationandtheSomali
government’s failure to formulate new land management regulations permitted District
Commissioners to exercise colonial style powers in Hargeisa, which alienated people and
fosteredhostilityandmistrusttowardsthestate.AccordingtoalegalpractitionerinHargeisa,
landdecisionswerebasedonthewishesandwhimsofofficersratherthanlawsandpolicies.101
99Letalonethepublic.
100Interviewee3Nomember05,2014.FormerDistrictCommissionerofHargeisa.
101Interviewee34August30,2015.Lawyer.
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ThisviewofarbitrarydecisionstoresolveconflictsissupportedbytheformerDCofHargeisa’s
memoryoflanddisputesinthisperiod.In1967,herecalledfindingitdifficulttomanageland
and as a result took sternmeasures including banning issuing land titles to applicants who
wantedtoeitherlegalisetheirexistinglandownershiporapplyforregistrationofanewplotfor
twoyears.102Thisdidnotincreaseconfidenceinstateauthority.Iarguethatthewayinwhich
thestatemanagedurbanlandinHargeisaledmanypeopletolosefaithinthesystemandrely
onothermeansofdealingwiththeirproblems.Thislackoffaithinstateinstitutionsshapedthe
wayinwhichpeoplethinkaboutandchooseresidentialandbusinesssettlementsinthecity.In
otherwords,theylocatedthemselvesinareaspredominantlypopulatedbytheirclans,tobuild
propertyandworryaboutlegalisationlater.Whenthemilitaryregimecametopowerin1969,
thelackofconsultationonlandmanagementpoliciesandlegislationhadnotchanged.
Themostsignificantlandusechangeundermilitaryrulecamein1972whenBilleRafle,former
Governor of North Western Region of which Hargeisa was the capital, removed informal
settlementsnearthecitycentreinordertoimprovethecity’simage.Evicteeswereresettledin
peri urbanareas Southof the citywith limitedaccess towater andother essential services,
leading to a mixed reaction, discussed below. It is important to understand how particular
episodesof landmanagementpractices such as this shapedpublic perceptionsof the state.
Whilethismovepleasedsome,suchasthosewhomthegovernmentprovidedwithurbanland
andwhogainedadegreeoftenuresecurity,103manyothersweredisgruntledbecausetheywere
movedawayfromareasinwhichopportunitiesandaccesstoserviceswerehigher.Indeed,many
oftheresidentsIspoketowerenotissuedwithpapersatthetime,whichalsocontributedto
laterlandconflictsintheperiodofrebuildingafterstatecollapse.
The most prominent such scheme of eviction and resettlement was the movement of the
Dunbuluq neighbourhood to the outskirts of the city. Dunbuluq at the time was a
neighbourhoodconsistingmainlyofGarhajisandArabclans.Criticspointoutthattheremoval
of people and expropriation of land was done in a manner not dissimilar to the urban
governance practices of the past where people were often left with no choice other than
acceptingthegovernmentproposals,conveyedasorders.104Theycomplainthatpeoplewere
102Interviewee3Nomember05,2014.FormerDistrictCommissionerofHargeisa.
103ParticipantApril07,2014.HargeisaResident.FocusGroupDiscussion.
104ParticipantinAgipTeashopDiscussionApril11,2014.HargeisaResident.
106|P a g e
settledinareasfarremovedfromthecitycentreandmostoftheemploymentopportunities.105
The government version, however, brushed such criticism aside. According to the former
Governor, under military rule, eviction was necessitated by the fact that the area was
inaccessibletotheauthorities,asthestructureswerebuiltveryclosetoeachotherandposed
adangertoitsinhabitantsduetothepossibilitiesofdiseasetransmission,aswellascreatinga
publichealthhazardfortherestofthecity.106Thegovernmentplanningforthere-locationof
peoplefromthecitycentretotheoutskirtsdidnot,however,reconfiguretheclan-basedspatial
characterofthecity.Thisisbecausetheareaofthecitythattheevicteesweremovedtoabutted
theneighbourhoodof thecity inwhich ruralpopulationsof thesameclanbackgroundwere
living.Stateddifferently,theseevictionshavefurtherreinforcedHargeisa’sclan-basedspatial
character.
AccordingtoDauskardt(1993)evictionscanhaveprofoundsocio-economicandculturalimpacts
oncommunities.ButTröger(2009)pointsoutthateviction isnotonlyaboutexclusionbut it
couldaswellbeamodeofachievinginclusion.Inotherwords,peopleareinitiallyexcludedfrom
a particular space but included in another. He seeks to problematise the representation of
exclusionandinclusionastwoseparateandirreconcilableprocessesandpointsouttheinherent
interwoven-nessbetweenthetwo.Theauthorshowsthatconditionsofevicteesfromtheinner
cityofAddisAbabaimprovedinanewperipherallocation,whichhadbetteraccesstowaterand
road networks. In opposition to representations of peripheral neighbourhoods as entirely
excludedfromthesocialfabricofthecity,thestudyfoundthatvariousformsofcommunication
andnetworkshaveenabledevicteesgetaccesstoopportunitiesandservicesforthoselivingin
peripheral areas. In relation to theHargeisaevictions fromDunbuluq, theGovernor insisted
(contratopopularopinionandmemoriesoftheshiftasforceddisplacement)that:
therewerealotofpraisesfortheprojectandpeopleintheendwerequite
happywithwhatwehavedone.Eachfamilywaslocatedaplotofabout20
m²,bearinginmindthatfamiliesusedtoleavein3or4mintheirprevious
locations.Oncethenecessaryplanningwasundertaken,representativesof
thepeopleweretakentothenewsitesoastoseetheplaceforthemselves
beforetheyaremoved.Webroughtthepeoplevehiclestomovethem.Each
105Ibid.
106Interviewee10October29,2014.FormerGovernorofNorthWesternProvince.
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plotandfamilyweregivenanumber.Oncewemovedthemwithourvehicle,
Iinstructedthegovernmentofficerstohelpthemwiththeunloadingoftheir
stufffromthetrucks.Oncewehavecompletedtheprocess,peoplewerequite
happywithitandtheystartedcelebratingthemoment.107
TheresettlementofevicteesintheSouthofthecityreinforcedtheclanbasedspatialcharacter
of the city given the shift toareaspredominantlypopulatedby their respective clans.Many
peoplebelievethatthegovernmenthadanopportunitytoalterthecity’ssettlementpatternas
these exercises could have been used to promote spatial integration and to break up
concentrationsofparticularclans.108Itisimportanttomentionthattheseevictionstookplace
at a time when the government announced a new state policy on eradicating and burying
clanism in public life. Yet the land management practices of the state were in practice in
contravention with this policy, as the state failed to promote its rhetoric through existing
governmentinterventionssuchasthemovementofpeopletoareaspopulatedbyotherclans.
Equally,thestatealsofailedtobringaboutmeaningfullandreformsdespiteseveralhalf-hearted
attempts.
Itisimportanttopointoutthatlandmanagementpoliciesandlawshadaruralfocusthroughout
thepostcolonialperiod.ButsuchpoliciesarenonethelessrelevantfortheHargeisacontextas
theboundarybetweenruralandurbanisblurredinHargeisa(Moolla,2009).Asidefromthefact
thatasignificantnumberof‘urban’peopleleadasemi-rurallifewheretheykeepanimalssuch
aschickensandgoatsformilking,amajorseasonalriverflankedbyfarmsrunsthroughthecity.
Inotherwords,thelandreformpoliciesdesignedforruralbasedsectorssuchasagricultureand
livestockalsohadasignificantbearingonurbanlife.LandtenurereformsinSomaliadateback
totheimmediatepostcolonialperiodwhenthecivilianSomaligovernmentmadeanattemptin
whichitsoughttocodifyaspectsofthecustomarylawonlandaspartofagreaterattemptto
consolidatethedifferentlawsinthecountry(Contini,1967).Subsequentattemptsfollowedin
1975whenthemilitaryregimeissuedadecreeputtinglandownershipinthehandsofthestate
inabidtoincreaseagriculturalproduction(Bruyas,2006).Thiswaspremisedontheclassical
postcolonial assumption that sees land rights as key economic drivers able to reverse the
economicandsocialproblemsinAfrica(DFID,2007).Liketherestofitspostcolonialbrethren,
107Ibid.
108ParticipantinStarAreaTeashopDiscussionMay17,2014.HargeisaResident.
108|P a g e
theSomalistate’sattempttoreformlandownershipwaslargelyunsuccessfulandthestate’s
intentionofunlockinglandasaneconomicresourcewasnotrealised.
Eventhoughtheepicentreofpostcolonial landreforms inSomaliaushered inbythemilitary
administrationwasthefertileregionsintheSouth,thearidlandsoftheNorthwerenotspared.
Thereformsweremainlyundertakenintwodistricts,ErigavointheEastandGabileyintheWest.
InGabiley,thegovernmentestablishedalargescalestate-ownedfarmasanexperimentaimed
at increasingtheagriculturalproductioncapacityoftheregion,butthis miserablyfailedand
pastoralistsonceagaininformallyregainedcontroloftheirlostland(NortonandFlyktningeråd,
2008). Similarly, in Erigavo, grazing reserveswere established by the livestock development
agency for the formation of cooperative societies aimed at empowering pastoralists. The
cooperativesweredesignedtoconsistof45householdseachcontributing10sheepand1cow.
However,theprogrammewascounterproductiveasitwasexploitedbyeliteswhoboughtoff
the shares of those unable to contribute the 10 sheep and 1 cow required for cooperative
membership(NortonandFlyktningeråd,2008).Inbothcases,thelandtenurereformswereseen
asgovernmentencroachmentonpastoralists’traditionalrightsofpastureandwatering.
It is important to point out that urban landmanagementwas neglected during themilitary
regimeinSomalia,asidefromtheevictionsdiscussedabove.RoblehandHussen(1977)citedin
Besteman and Roth (1988), observe that the government passed 22 pieces of legislation
governingtheagriculturalsector,yetonlyonelaw(theUrbanLandDistributionLawof1973)
dealingwithurbanlandmanagement,whichwasnotwidelypromulgated,andwasamended
later in1980 (DemocraticRepublicofSomalia,1980,DemocraticRepublicofSomalia,1973).
This lackofurban focuswasattributable to the fact that thestatewas trying tobringabout
changeinoverdependenceonpastorallivelihoods,perceivedtobehighlyvulnerabletoseasonal
variations.Agriculturewasseenasamorestablemodeoflivelihoodeventhoughthecountry
hadonlylimitedfertilelandalongtheriversintheSouth.Amongthekeylegislationandpolicies
introducedweretheagriculturallandlawof1975,whichaccordingtoBesteman(1990)wasby
far themostextensivepieceof legislationdealingwith landmanagement inthepostcolonial
period.109Oneofthecornerstonesofthenewlegislation,whichalsohadimplicationsforurban
contexts,was the fact that it notonlyenhanced theauthoritarian colonial approach to land
109Thislegislationpavedthewayfortheestablishmentofdevelopmentcooperativesandalsoenhancedthe existing agricultural crash programmes through which land was allocated land to governmentemployeesandgraduatesofagriculturalcolleges.
109|P a g e
managementbut italsofurtheredthenotionofstateownershipover land.Besteman(1990)
pointsoutthatthe1975lawnullifiedtherecognitionoftraditionalauthorityoflandownership
asitvestedalllandinthehandsofthestate,reducingcommunalandprivateownershiptomere
tenancy.Therenewedstateinterestinvigorouslandmanagementcanbeseenasanattemptat
strengtheningitsgriponpowerandimplementingitssocialistideologies.Thislandmanagement
focuscouldalsobeseenasaprimeopportunityfordemonstratingtheshiftfromacapitalistfree
markettoasocialisteconomywherecooperativesratherthancompaniesplayacentralrolein
theeconomy(Roth,1989).
Another key corner stone of this law was the imposition of compulsory registration for
landownership.Again,therewereramificationsofthispolicyinurbanaswellasinruralcontexts.
Whilethislawwasjustifiedthroughthelenseofpovertyalleviation,italienatedthepoorand
empoweredtheelitesinthecountryatleastintwoways.Firstly, itenabledthemtogettitle
deeds for unclaimed land110 at a timewhen the countrywas going through steep economic
declineworsenedbyinsurgenciesintheNorth.Secondly,itenabledthemtosalvagesomeof
theirsavingsatatimewhenthecountrywasfacinghighrateofinflation.Roth(1989)notesthat
“high price inflation discourages investors from holding financial assets, and increases the
incentiveforholdinglandorcommodities(e.g.,goldorlivestock).Pricelevels,asmeasuredby
theGDPdeflator,roseatanaverageannualrateof10percentovertheperiod1965-80,andin
excessof45percentannuallybetween1980-5.Basedona14percentnominalrateofinterest
onbankdeposits in 1985, 10 financial assets in real termswouldhave yieldeda31percent
negativeannualreturn”(Besteman,1990).
Overall,theintroductionofcompulsoryregistrationwascounter-productive.Forinstance,the
prohibitionofsalesortransferof landnegativelyaffectedinvestmentasownerswerelegally
unabletosellortransfertheirproprietorshiptoothers.Moreover,itincreasedcompetitionover
landownershipandspeculationaswellascommercialisationofruralfarmlandsattheexpense
of the poor. It also led to the breakdown of existing traditional ways of managing and
adjudicatinglandconflictswithoutcreatingcrediblealternatives.AccordingtoBesteman(1990),
amoreappropriatelandmanagementschemecouldhavebeenfoundintheenhancementof
communalownershipoflandinsteadoftheindividualisedownershipapproachpromotedinthe
1975 legislation.Thiswouldhaveenabledmembersof thecommunity tocontinueusing the
110InmostcasestheeliteswhoacquiredregistrationforunclaimedlandinSomaliahavehadnoimmediateintentionorabilitytoinvestintheland.
110|P a g e
traditional systems while also getting access to government documentation guaranteeing
security of tenure (Besteman, 1990). Besteman (1990) defines tenure security in the Somali
context“asthe[landowners]perceptionthats/hewillbeabletosustainrightstousetheland
and obtain continuing benefits from investment in the land”. The introduction of land
registration in Somalia posed a challenge to this perception as it changed land rights from
communaltoindividual.Theideaherewastoalterthewaylandownersseetheirownershipto
thelandandhenceincreasetenuresecurity.
Whileinsomecontextslegaltitlingmayincreasetenuresecurity,thiswasnotthecaseinSomalia
followingthemilitaryregimesregistrationpolicy.AccordingtoBesteman,in“situationsofhigh
population pressure, rising land values, land speculation, unequal access to land under
customarytenure,orencroachingcontroloverlandbyadominantgroup,legaltitleconferred
bythestatemayincreasetenuresecurity”(Besteman,1990).But,underthemilitaryreforms,
thiswas not the case and themeasures contained in the agricultural land lawweremainly
counter-productive.Oneofthereasonswhycustomarytenurecontinuedtobeseenasmore
able to confer security was the fact that rural populations were dispersed and the level of
urbanisationwassignificantlylow.Butmoreimportantly,ownershipwasgovernedbyasetof
principlesthatareknowntovillagersandthegovernmentalike(BestemanandRoth,1988).For
instance,customarytenurerecognisedlandownershiponthebasisofinvestmentinvacantland
through either labour or other ventures such as capital, inheritance or gift(Norton and
Flyktningeråd,2008).Eventhoughtheintroductionofthe1975agricultural lawrenderedthe
existingcustomarytenurenullandvoidinlegalterms,inpracticeitprevailedinmostpartsof
thecountry,includinginsomeurbanareas.Thechallengetotheintroductionoftheregistration
processwasthereforethefactthatthepublicdidnotuniversallyacceptit.BestemanandRoth
(1988)arguethata“highlevelsoftenuresecuritycanexistwithoutstaterecognisedtitle.For
example, customary land tenure can, under certain circumstances, provide individuals with
tenure security having grazing and cultivation rights, without any state recognition of title”
(Besteman,1991).Theformalisationoflandregistrationinthecountrydidlittletoprovethat
customarytenurewasanimpedimenttoeconomicdevelopment.
InHargeisa,therewasrushtoregisterurbanlandbyelitesasaresultofthesemeasures.The
impositionofcompulsoryregistrationforlandinthecountrywasinterpretedintheNorthasa
measure through which the government wants to impose further punishment for their
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resistancetothestate.111Asaresult,manyeliteswhoownedagriculturalland,particularlyurban
farmsalongtheriverrunningthroughthecentreofHargeisa,rushedtoregistertheirlandsoas
to deny the government the chance of making this process a pretext for accusing them of
disobedience.112Anotherimportantfactorwhichcompelledlandownerstoregistertheirland
duringthisperiodwasthefactthatHargeisaattractedsignificantinvestmentintheconstruction
industryasmembersofitsdiasporacommunitiesincreaseddemandforlandsoastoconstruct
residentialhousesmainlyasaresultofincreasedoutflowofmigrationtotheMiddleEastwhere
employment opportunities were higher. However, the heightened opportunities for land
transactions in the city led to a rise in land conflicts complicated by the absence of proper
measurementofthefarmlandboundaries.Aspeoplehadnofaithwhatsoever inthemilitary
regime,traditionalinstitutionsoftendealtwiththeproblemthroughthebackdoorofthestate.
Theseprocesseswerebroughttoahaltthroughthewaranddestructionofthecity.Theydid,
however,haveimportantlegaciesfortheperiodofpost-conflictreconstruction,asweshallsee
inthenextsection.
5.3 Development(s)ofPost-ConflictLandAdministrationandLandConflicts
Inthissection,Idiscussthedevelopmentofpost-conflictlandadministrationanditsrelationship
tolandconflicts.Idosobyexaminingurbanlandmanagementlaw,whichhasbeencriticised
forbeingcomplexandambiguous(Bruyas,2006)andIshowthatthislawfailedtostrengthen
theurbanregulatoryframeworkwhichwasandcontinuestobeweak.Ialsoshowthattheurban
landregulatorysysteminplacecreatesmoreconfusionthanitsolvesandplaysakeyroleinthe
rampantlandconflictsinHargeisa.Asaresult,Iarguethatthisunderminespublictrustinthe
regulatory system and hence fosters the continued reliance on the clan network and hence
segregation.
Priorto2004,eachdistrict inHargeisahad itsownlandcommitteedealingwith landrelated
issues.Procedureswereweakleadingtomultipleissuanceoftitlesforthesamepieceofland.
Bruyas(2006,p.19)notesthattheregistrationprocedureswere inheritedfromtheprevious
regimeandthelegalregulatoryframeworkwithinwhichtheyoperatedwereeither“inefficient
ordisconnectedfromtherealityontheground”.Theconflictitselfreconfiguredandreinforced
111Interviewee7August20,2014OralHistorian,ArtistandRadioPresenter.
112Ibid.
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thecity’sclan-basedsettlement,butthepost-conflictlandmanagementexacerbatedinsecurity
anddistrustofthestate,andhencereproducedtheimportanceofaclan-basedsettlementlogic.
In1999,thegovernmentintroducedanagriculturallandlawwhichwasequallyimportantfor
urbanlandinHargeisaasthecitywas(andstillis)increasinglyexpandingintoagriculturaland
pastorallandwithinitsimmediatevicinity.Thelandmanagementregimeinplacecouldseldom
copewith the demand and pressure placed on it by such rapid growth. Attempts aimed at
bringing about reforms were mainly unsuccessful. This was partly attributable to the non-
existence of previous land records andmunicipal bylaws. Land reforms in Somalilandwere,
therefore,startedfromscratchasaparliamentary-led legislativeprocessaimedatproducing
comprehensive laws governing landboth at the central and the local governments’ level. In
2001,thepopulationofSomalilandvotedforareferendumonaconstitutionwhichplacedland
managementinthehandsofthestatebutguaranteedrespectforprivateownership(Republic
ofSomaliland,2001).
In2002, thegovernment introducedthe first landmanagement law(RepublicofSomaliland,
2002a)exclusivelydealingwithurbanlandwhichwaslateramendedin2008asthelawattracted
substantialcriticismforitssuperficiality(RepublicofSomaliland,2002amendedin2008).Such
criticismwascarriedovertotheamendedversion,whichwasequallyaccusedofbeingoverly
concernedwithplanmanagement rather than creation.Nonetheless, itwasby far themost
significantattemptatdelineatingtheinstitutionalboundariesbetweenthelocalandthecentral
statewithregardtolandmanagement.Whileregulatoryandpolicy-makingresponsibilitywere
giventocentralauthorities,themicromanagementoflandwasentrustedtolocalauthorities.
Accordingtothis law,themunicipaldepartmentsdirectly involved in local landmanagement
arethedepartmentsofland,physicalassets,andlandrecordstransfer(Bruyas,2006).Atthe
central state level, the ministries of agriculture, pastoral development and environment,
interior,health,communication,mineralresourcesandwater,theMinistryofpublicworks,and
the parliamentary subcommittee on natural resources and environment are all institutions
concernedwithurbanlandmanagement(Farah,undated).
Asidefromthelargenumberofministriesanddepartmentsinvolved,theprovisionsofthenew
wide-rangingurbanlandlawarenumerousanddetailed. This in itselfdidnotmakeforeasy
implementation.Norwasthelawwidelyunderstood.Inaddition,McAuslan(2006)criticises
thisurban landmanagement lawfor its tendencytopresumetheexistenceofamasterplan
[whichatthetimeofdatacollectiondidnotexist]anditscentralconcernwithrevisingplans
rather thanputting inplaceguidelinesonwhich plans couldbemadeand land registration
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problemscouldbeaddressed. In2004, themunicipalityofHargeisa incollaborationwithUN
Habitatstartedaregistrationofpropertiesexercisewhereinformationwasgatheredthrough
GISusingsatellitedigitalimagesandGPSdevices(Turkstra,2008).Theideawastostrengthen
the local state’sability tomanageurban landbydevelopinga reliablecadastral system.113A
majorproblemwiththesystem,however,wasthatitdidnotrecordthedimensionsoftheplots
asthiswasperceivedasinformationthatwouldincreaseboundaryconflicts.Thislimitedtheuse
of the system to a mere revenue collection mechanism (as shown in previous chapter).114
Moreover,thetechnicalexpertisenecessaryforthemaintenanceofsuchasystemisnotwidely
availableinthecityandthosewhoaretrainedtomanagethesystemtakeupmorelucrative
jobsinthenon-governmentalorganisationssector(APD,2010).Atpresent,only3000properties
outof60,000eligibleforregistrationinHargeisaareactuallylisted.Thisatteststothemagnitude
ofthelandregistrationprobleminHargeisa.(BarryandBruyas,2009)suggesttheintroduction
ofacomprehensivecadastralsystemasawayofreformingthelandregistrationprocessesin
thecountry.Theydefinecadastralsysteminthiscontextas“asystemincorporatingevidentiary
documents, unrecorded community knowledge, land registration, boundary definition and
cadastral survey”. They advance this cadastral system not only as a way of enhancing land
registrationprocessesbutalsoasawayofimprovingaccesstoland.
ThelandtitlingsystemisoneofthemajorcontributorstolandconflictsinHargeisa.Owingto
the lack of transparent, accountable and stringent land registration mechanisms, irregular
issuance of titles is not uncommon.While in general this negatively affects landowners by
creating a condition in which they have to bribe public officials to obtain the necessary
documentation,marginalisedsocialgroupsarebyallaccountsmorevulnerable.115Thelackofa
functioningregulatorysystemthatisaccessibletoallaswellasthelackofcapacitytoregister
continuallyandre-registerlandownershipcreatesmassiveinequalities.Theproblemisfurther
complicatedbythelackofunifiedcoherentsystem.Littleifanycoordinationexistsbetweenthe
localandcentralstateinstitutionsonurbanlandmanagement(FarahandAli,undated).
113Cadastralsystemhererefersto“asystemincorporatingevidentiarydocuments,unrecordedcommunityknowledge, land registration,boundarydefinitionsandcadastral survey. See (Barry,M.andBruyas,F.2009).
114Usingthecadastralsystem,taxesareleviedfromtheoccupantsofthebuildingratherthantheownersofthebuilding.
115Interviewee36August20,2014.DirectorofCivilUnit-LegalAidClinic.
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Themost important institution for urban landmanagement at the central state level is the
MinistryofPublicWorks,whichhoststheLandandUrbanManagementInstitute(LUMI).LUMI
wassetupinaccordancewithurbanlandlawtoworkcloselywiththeNationalUrbanPlanning
Boardtoformthebasisonwhichcentralgovernmentpoliciesaretranslatedintotechnicalsets
ofrulesandregulationsconcernedwithurbanlandmanagement(RepublicofSomaliland,2002
amended in 2008). The Institute was proposed to have various sections, including a land
administrationdivisionresponsiblefortheprovisionoftechnicalexpertiseonlandpolicyand
regulationaswellasaphysicaldesignsection,whichdealswiththepreparationofmasterplans
andmapping.Themasterplansoughttocoveraradiusofnomorethan5kmbeyondthefringes
ofthecityandtheyareusedforzoningpurposes–i.e.residential,industrial,commercialand
public–aswellasthemappingofutilityservicessuchaselectricity,waterandcommunication
linesinthecity(RepublicofSomaliland,undated).ThisInstitute,however,existsonlyinname
asithasneitherthetechnicalcapacitynorfinancialabilitytodischargeitsduties.
Atthelocallevel,thenewurbanlandmanagementlawof2002(particularlyarticle2)madethe
administration and the allocation of urban land (including land within the immediate
surrounding of the city) the prerogative of local government particularly the executive
committeeofthecouncils.Landlocatedonthefringesofthecity,accordingtothislaw,remains
in the hands of those who hold titles, but if the owner decides to convert it into a built
environment such residential or business buildings, 30% of the land will be taken by the
municipality.Themountainousareassurroundingthecitywherecultivationisimpossiblecannot
be recognizedas farmlandand theiroccupation is illegalandsubject toconfiscationwithout
compensation. This creates friction between the adjacent local authorities of Hargeisa and
Salaxleyaseachclaimstohavelegaljurisdictionoverthelandonthefringesofthecity(Republic
ofSomaliland,2002amendedin2008).Sometimesthesejurisdictionaldisputesresultinviolent
deathsashappenedin2013whenfirewasopenedbyrespectivearmedguardsaccompanying
theofficialsfromthetwosides,leadingtothedeathofonesecurityofficer.Localgovernments
arerequiredunderthislawtoregisterpropertieswithinthecitybasedonexistingownership
papersandinconjunctionwiththerecordsheldattheMinistryofPublicWorksaswellasthe
municipality(RepublicofSomaliland,2002amendedin2008),butthisleadstomultipleissuance
ofownershippapersbytherespectivemunicipalities.
While theurban land lawmakesa significantattemptatdelineating thevertical relationship
betweeninstitutionsdealingwithurbanlandadministration,i.e.centralandlocalauthorities,it
fails to cater for the horizontal relationship and interface between the local authorities
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themselves.116Thefailuretoseparatepoliticalfromadministrative issuesfurthercomplicates
the fragile regulatory system in the country. This is because the lower structures of the
governmentdonotfunctionwellanddonotprovidethebadlyneededservicesdueconstant
meddlingandinterferencefromthecentre.Inmanyinstances,thisblurstheboundarybetween
thepoliticalandadministrativefunctionsofthestate,asspeltoutbytheSolicitorGeneral:
if the localgovernment isnothappywith thedirectivesof theMinisterof
InteriorandMinistryofpublicworks,thelegalavenuethroughwhichthisis
supposedtobesolvedistotakethemattertotheHighCourt.Whathowever
happensisthattheselegaljurisdictionalissuesareoftensolvedinapolitical
way bymobilising various actors that include the traditional leaders and
other influential bodies. But what we do not realise is that this kind of
arrangementaretemporaryanddon’tlastlongandthisleadstorecurrence
oftheproblemmorefrequentlythancouldbethecaseiftheproblemwas
solvedthroughlegalmeans.117
Thispoorregulatoryframeworkandlackofharmonisationoflandlawsarepartlyresponsible
fortheinstitutionalweaknessesinthecountry(FarahandAli,undated).Attemptstoconsolidate
andstrengthentheinstitutionalcapacityoftheagenciesdealingwithurbanlandinthecountry
remainproblematic.AccordingtoadevelopmentworkerforalocalNGO,lackofpoliticalwill,
onthepartofthegovernmentandpoliticalparties,hamperseffortsaimedatstrengtheningthe
regulatory framework forurban landmanagement.Thisproducesboth lackofaccountability
amongofficialsandlackoftrustfromthepublic.
Thislackofpoliticalwillisrootedinthewaypeoplecometopowerinthefirst
place. People are not voted in becauseof their political agenda. Theyare
voted in because of their affiliation with clans. So instead of politicians
developingprogramsforthepublictobeabletodecide,votesaresolicited
on the basis of clan membership. This led to lack of accountability. For
instance,iftodayweareworkinghereandthereisnooneaskingmeabout
116Despitethis,clashesoverthe jurisdictionsof landmanagementbetweenthevariousgovernmentalagenciesarealsocommon. i.e.MinistryofAgricultureversusMinistryofPublicWorks,andMunicipalCouncilversusMinistryofPublicWorks.
117Interviewee23August14,2014.SolicitorGeneralofSomaliland.
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myworkandthereisnoonetowhomIamaccountable,itismostlikelythat
Iwillearnmysalarywithoutdoinganything.Thesameisthesittingmembers
ofthecouncilandparliamentwhoknowthattheyarenotaccountabletothe
publicand therefore theydon't care.The senior civil servantsalsoare the
same….they do things as they wish…..because after all they will be
nominated to their positions due to clanmembership or affiliation in the
nameofrepresentation.118
Twomajorthemesoftenrecurredinmydiscussionswithintervieweesastowhytheregulatory
systemforlandmanagementissoineffective.Firstly,governmentagenciesaresusceptibleto
clanpressures,makingtheapplicationofrulesandregulationsdifficult.Forinstance:
if government officials attempt to implement policies, their effort is
underminedbypeoplegoingtotheirseniorsandsayingofficialXandofficial
Yareuptonogoodandtheywanttomakethepublicgoagainstyou.119
Secondly, the weak regulatory system is attributed to government’s susceptibility to
international pressure as officials do not like to appear to be against the international
community,hencetheydeveloppoliciesthatarenotbasedonlocaldesiresandcircumstances.
InapoliticalenvironmentwhereinternationalNon-GovernmentalOrganisations(INGOs)havea
significantfinancial,developmentandplanningcloutoverthestate,externallyfundedpolicies
donotinmanycasesarisefromlocalneedsastheyareconceivedandproducedthroughoutside
interests,puttingaquestionmarkontheirapplicabilityandacceptabilityinthelocalcontext.As
apoliticianexplainedtome:
Donorshaveideologicalandeconomicinterestsandtheyoftenwantthese
intereststobereflectedinthemakingoftheregulations.Insomecases,they
maybecomeanobstacletothemakingofregulationsasparticularclauses
maynotbeservingtheirparticularideologicalinterests.Theywantthefinal
producttobeinlinewithparticularvisionstheyhaveinmind.Thismakesit
118Interviewee29August16,2014.NGOWorker.
119Interviewee23August14,2014.SolicitorGeneralofSomaliland.
117|P a g e
difficult for the Somaliland state to bring about regulations that are
acceptabletothepeople.120
Fortheirpart,thelaw-makingbodiesclaimthattheydonothavethenecessaryfinancialand
technicalexpertisetodraftorscrutinisebillssubmittedbythegovernmentministriestoensure
thatlawsarenotbasedonnarrowagendas.TheMPsandmembersofthelocalcouncilclaim
that:
they can’t serve their constituencies because of lack of resources as they
don'tgettravelallowanceforgoingbacktotheirconstituenciesandasthey
alsodon’thaveofficesintheirconstituencies.121
InHargeisa,lackoflegalcertaintyemanatingfromthepoorregulatorysystemhascontributed
tolowcompliancelevelswithlandmanagementrulesamongpropertyowners.Unnecessaryred
tapebureaucracyhampersthestrengtheningofthelandregulatorysysteminthecountryand
thisnegativelyimpactsonthecity’seconomicdevelopment.
According toa reporton thebusinesssector inHargeisa jointlypreparedby theWorldBank
(WB)andtheInternationalFinanceCorporation(2012),Hargeisaisrankedas86of183whenit
comestothebureaucraticdifficultiesofsettingupabusiness.Theprocedureforsettingupa
businessinHargeisagoesthrough15stepsoveraperiodof56days.ThismeansHargeisaismore
bureaucraticthanmanyAfricancitieswhenitcomestotheestablishmentofbusinesses.Italso
makesitmoreexpensive.Forinstance,the“costofdealingwithconstructionpermitsinHargeisa
is1,038.8%ofincomepercapita.ThisplacesHargeisaamongthetop20mostcostlyeconomies
globally. Only 16 economies are more expensive i.e. Afghanistan, Burundi, Chad, Djibouti,
TanzaniaandZimbabwe”(WBandIBRD,2012).Itisimportanttomentionthat90%ofthecost
incurredduringtheprocessofgettingtheconstructionstartedisspentonutilityconnections
andonly10%ofthecostisleviedbythegovernment.Inotherwords,thelocalauthoritiesdo
not significantly benefit from the red tape bureaucracy in place. According to the Solicitor
General,oneofthemainissueswiththeredtapebureaucracyisthat:
120Interviewee28August12,2014.Politician.
121Interviewee79August12,2014.MemberofParliament.
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itfacilitatescorruption.Theinfluenceoftheclanandinterferenceofthedue
processispartofthecorruption.Corruptionisnotonlyaboutgivingmoney
tosomeoneinordertoachieveaparticularaim.Corruptioncouldaswellbe
interference with due process. There are two kinds of corruptions; active
corruption and passive corruption. The passive corruption is if somebody
turnsawayfromanactionhewassupposedtocarryoutinordertobenefita
particulargroupofpeopleorperson.Theactivecorruptionontheotherhand
isthatwhichtheindividualactivelyparticipatesinacorruptionprocess.122
In addition to these obstructive rules and corruption, the regulatory system faces serious
challengesfromthelongtraditionoftopdownprocesses,whichunderminesitslegitimacyand
makesenforcementofgovernmentaldecisionsmostlyinvoluntary.Verylittleattempthasbeen
madetochangethistopdowncultureexceptforafewinstanceswhendonoragencieshelpto
formulate plans incorporating some level of consultation. Thus far the only plan involving
participatory planning is the recent constitution of District Development Framework (DDF)
documents aimed at identifying the social and economic as well as physical development
deficienciesinthecityandprioritiesforintervention.TheDDFidentifiedseveralpriorityareas
for immediate attention such as theneed for improvement in physical infrastructure,water
suppliesanddilapidatedpipelinesandaccesstohealthcare(HM,2010).
While suchparticipatoryplanningcan facilitatechange in the topdownmentalityofmaking
regulations,itisimportanttopointouttheanomaliesinsuchexercises.Onemajorchallengeis
thefactthatpeoplerarelycometoconsultationsessionsunlesstheyarepaidadailysubsistence
allowance.123 This demand for money developed from a culture in which the INGOs pay
participants forconsultationsoastomaketheirprograms lookconsultative. Inreality, those
who report for such forumsare a groupofpeoplewhomakeahabit of earning from these
practices,underminingthevalueofconsultation.
In short, weaknesses in the regulatory system have undermined public trust in the
administrativeframeworkofurbanlandinthecityandthisnegativelyaffectsserviceprovision.
Thestate’sinabilitytomobilisethenecessaryresourcesforimprovingaccesstoservicescoupled
122Interviewee23August14,2014.SolicitorGeneralofSomaliland.
123Interviewee4August16,2014.Lawyer.
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with lackofpoliticalwilltobringaboutchangearebelievedtoexacerbatethesituation.This
discreditsthestatefurtherandundermineswhatisleftofitsreputationtomanagepubliclife.
Inotherwords,publicconfidenceinthesystemisheavilyeroded,inherentlypromotingpeople’s
relianceonothermeansofresolvinglanddisputesandstickingtoareasinthecitywherethey
canaccessclansupportnetworknecessaryforaccesstoservices.Whilethiserosionofpublic
confidencecutsacrossthesocialandeconomicspectrumofthepeopleinthecity,thepoorand
underprivilegedsuchasminoritiesandwomenareaffectedmostseverelyasthecurrentland
governance practices inhibits access to landwhich is one of threemajor obstacles to urban
developmentinSomaliland,accordingtopaneldiscussionfacilitatedbytheWorldBank(WB,
2014). While, on the one hand, clan-based segregation may give an impression of social
integration transcending class, it is important to point out that this can also be viewed as
inconvenientcohabitationwheretherichoftenexploitthepoorfinanciallyandpolitically.
5.4 AccesstoLandandtheAlienationofthePoor
AccesstolandinSomalilandischaracterisedbysevereinequalitybetweenpoorandtherich.In
thissection,Iarguethatsuchinequalityisnotonlyduetoadisparityofwealthbutalsostructural
exclusionary state land management practices. For instance, the legal framework leads to
differential treatment of the poor and the rich. This is because the law imposes greater
restrictionsonthepoorthantheirwealthiercounterparts.Anexampleofthiscanbefoundin
article15oftheurbanlandlawwhichstipulatesthatplotsshouldbeallocatedinajustmanner
onthebasisofcitizenship(RepublicofSomaliland,2002amendedin2008).Whilethiswould
appearegalitarian,fameandprivilegecreepinbecauseofthedifficultyformanytoprovetheir
citizenship.Inotherwords,whilethosewhoarewellknownarenotusuallyrequiredtoprove
their citizenship, poor people and women have to enlist the help of an Akil or prominent
memberoftheirclantovouchfortheircitizenship.Moreover,whilethelawpermitstheabsence
ofaplanningprocessfortheconstructionofnon-permanentstructures,124thisimpermanence
alsoformsthebasisonwhichsuchbuildingsareoftenremoved.
Thepooralsofacefurtherchallengeswhengivenlandinaprimearea,becausesecurityoftenure
islinkedtobuildingandinvestmentintheland.Thelawstipulatesthatifsomebodyisgivenland
124Plotscanbecategorisedintopermanentresidencyplotsconsistingofmaterialssuchasbricks,cementet ceteraand temporary residencies consistingof Somali traditionalmatsandhousesmadeof ceilingboards.Temporarystructureswillnotrequiretohaveplanswhereasthepermanentstructuresshouldhavebuildingplans(RepublicofSomaliland,2002amendedin2008).
120|P a g e
in prime area facing amajor road and he/she is unable to build on it, themunicipality can
reinstate theallocationof such landand theoccupantwill begiven land inanother locality.
Wealthierpeopledonotfacethesechallengesastheycanoftenconformtotheconditionsof
thelawregardingnewlandallocations.Article19stipulatesthatanybodywhoisgivenapiece
oflandbythestateandwhoinvestedinthatpieceoflandandbuiltastructureofapermanent
naturewillberecognisedforowningthatlandforever.125Similarlytransferandsaleoflandis
subjecttotheabilityofthepersonacquiringlandforpermanentresidencyasstipulatedinarticle
25whichstatesthatanybodywhois/wasgivenlandforpermanentresidencycansell,transfer,
givethelandasagiftordispensethelandinanyformhe/shefindsitfitinaccordancewiththe
law.126
Further challenges face the poor living in peri-urban locations by the agricultural land law
introduced in1999.Article6of this law–whichalsoapplies tourbancontextsas thecity is
increasinglyexpandingtoagriculturalandpastorallandinperi-urbanareas–limitsallocation
of land to one plot of eight hectares which cannot be sold for three years (Republic of
Somaliland,1999).Formanypoorpeoplewaitingforthreeyearstoselltheirlandisaluxury
theycannotafford.Whilewealthierpeople in thecityaccessperi-urban land in thenameof
investmentanddevelopment,poorpeopledonothave theability toorganise the resources
necessary for acquiring land in the name of development. According to article 12 of the
SomalilandInvestmentpolicy,landgivenfordevelopmentshouldbebuiltupwithinoneyear.127
Butbusinessmenrarelyconformtothisrequirementyetarenotsubjectedtoevictionwhereas
the poor often face the risk of expropriation. On the other hand, land given for temporary
residencemusthavethenecessarystructureserectedwithinthreemonthsfromthetimeitis
granted(MTI,2014).Inmanycases,poorpeoplemaynothavethefinancialabilitytofulfilthis
requirement.Thelawstatesthatiflandisgrantedfordevelopmentsuchasindustryorother
businesses,itcannotbeusedforresidentialpurposes,128(RepublicofSomaliland,2002amended
125AccordingtotheconstitutionofSomalilandforeignerswhoaregivenlandinthecountryhavethesameprivilegeasthelocalswhenitcomestolandownershipandtransfer.Landownershiptitlecanbegiventotheowneroncethebuildingisabovetheventilation.
126Theaboverightsdonotextendtothepeoplewhomakehabitoftradingland.
127Ifthepersonfailstobuildthelandwithinthistime,ayearlytaxisleviedfromhimorher.
128 Allocation of plots for residential reasons will have to be advertised in noticeboards and the
newspaperssoastoallowthosewhowantadisputetheownershiptimetoraisetheirconcerns.
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in2008)butwealthypeople inthecitydefythisas landallocatedforbusiness is turned into
grandresidentialhouses.
Asevidentfromtheabove,thelandregulatorysysteminthecountrycreatesdifferentialaccess
tolandandoftenexcludesunderprivilegedpeople.Thesepracticeswidenthegapbetweenthe
havesandthehavenots inacountrywherepoverty istheorderofthedayforthemajority.
Somalilandranks4thintheleagueoflowestGDPpercapitaincomecountries.129Thereisalso
inequalityinhowmenandwomenaccessjobopportunitiesinthecountry,withanemployment
to population ratio of 28% for males and 17% for females. Urban poverty in Somaliland is
estimatedtobeintheregionof29%.Thefuturedoesnotlookbright,asonly50%ofthe6-13
agegroupgotoschool.ThisisinsharpcontrasttotheneighbouringcountryofEthiopiawhere
87%ofthesameagegroupsareschoolgoers(WB,2015).Moreover,oneinfourhouseholdsare
unable to meet their daily basic needs (WB, 2014). According to King et al. (2003), poor
households inHargeisasurviveon roughly2$aday.A recent reportby theWorldBankalso
indicatesthatpovertyinSomalilandiswidespread,aconditionwhichiscompoundedbylackof
recognitionandabsenceofeconomicopportunities.Accesstoservicesisalsounequalforthe
poorandthewealthyinthecountry(WB,2014).
Due to the fact that the legal mechanisms through which land in the country is managed
presentsafargreatchallengeforaccessinglandtothepoorthantherich,thepooroftenresist
theencroachingstatethroughclanmobilisation.Insomecases,thismobilisationenablesthem
toaccessandretainlandillegally.
AccordingtotheWorldBank(2014),accesstolandisoneofthemostimportantobstaclesto
business in Somaliland. Poor and weak regulatory and enforcement systems are partly
responsibleforthischallenge.AccordingtotheAcademyforPeaceandDevelopment(2010),
the state in many cases is unable to evict people from government buildings despite the
existenceofalegalmechanismallowingthestatetoevictandconfiscatepropertyfromthese
people130(RepublicofSomaliland,2002amendedin2008).Thestate’sinabilitytoenforceits
129Surprisingly,withaGDPpercapitaestimatedat$347,SomalilandisaheadofdiplomaticallyrecognizedcountriessuchasMalawi,theDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoandBurundi.
130Forexample,theurbanlandlawstatesthatthemunicipalityhastherighttoremoveillegalsettlementsinaccordancewiththemasterplan(article21).Suchevictioncouldbesubjectedtobothpermanentortemporarystructures.Buttheevicteeshavetoberesettledinappropriateplacesandthecostofremovingthemwillhavetobeshoulderedbythemunicipality.Equally,theMayorofthecityinconsultationwiththeNational Urban Planning Board has the right to issue orders of confiscating properties for public
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landregulations is inmanycasesattributabletocorruption.Thesemalpracticesarenowhere
moreevidentthaninthemultipleallocationandissuanceoftitledeedsforthesamepiecesof
lands.Thisleadstolackoffaithinthelandmanagementsystemwhichinturnleadmanypeople
tobuildonlandandworryabouttheconsequenceslater(APD,2007).Astudyconductedjointly
bytheWorldBankandtheInternationalFinanceCorporation(2012)pointsoutthatthehigh
cost of acquiring a construction permit forces many small companies and people to build
withoutapermitandthenseektolegalisetheirownershipafterwards.Asaccesstolandinthe
post-conflictcontext is increasinglybecomingdifficult for individualsfrompoorbackgrounds,
evasionofauthoritieshasbecomeinevitableformanypoorpeopletoputaroofovertheirhead.
Thestateisparticularlysusceptibletobeingunderminedinareaswhereindividualscanhave
access to greater support frommembers of their clan. This cements further the clan-based
characterofthecityasdemonstratedbyakeyinformantintervieweewhosaidthat:
Oneofthereasonswhythisirregularaccesstolandhappensincludesthefact
thatpeoplethemselvesfindaspacetosettleinareaspopulatedbytheirclan
beforelegalisingit.Ifthegovernmenthadthepowerofgivingthelandtothe
applicants first before it legalises, this would have probably altered the
spatial distribution of clans in the city. This is so due to the fact that the
governmentwouldthenhavetheopportunitytointegratedifferentclansinto
particularspaces.131
Beingwithincloseproximitytoareasdominatedbyone’sclanisimportantpartlybecauseofthe
factthatthestateisunabletoregulatelandinaneffectivewaythatsafeguardslandownership
andprovidestenuresecurityforthepoor. Inothertimes,rulesareimplementedinanillegal
way alienating the vast majority of urban residents through corruption. Affiliation to and
membership of particular clans and remaining within vicinity dominated by one’s clan is
thereforeanessentialmechanismtoresistunfavourablegovernmentpoliciesanddecisions.In
short,abjectpovertycoupledwiththefailureofthestatetoregulateaccesstolandandconflict
in amanner that is favourable to thepoor and theunderprivilegedhas reproduced clanned
spacesasameansofdodgingtheoddsagainstpovertyandstateaction.Amidtheconcentration
interest.LandconfiscatedbecauseofpublicinterestwillonlybeusedforpublicpurposeandnotanyotheruseIllegalsettlementswillhavenocompensationinthisregard.
131Interviewee28August12,2014.Politician.
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ofbusinesses,governmentservicesandaidprogramsinthecapital,spontaneouslanddisputes
occurfrequentlyandattimesspiralintomajorconflictsinvolvingnotonlythedisputingparties
butalsotheirrespectiveclansoftenoccurinHargeisa.
5.5 Conclusion
Inthischapter,IarguedthaturbanlandmanagementpracticesinHargeisa–fromearlyonwhen
Somalilandwasformedasaprotectoratetillthepresenttime–haveconsistentlybeenbased
on top down processes. For instance, during the colonial period, the introduction of land
managementlawsinvolvednoconsultationwitheitherthepublicorthetraditionalleaders.132
Thistopdownculturewascarriedforwardthroughindependenceasthestateoftenreliedon
lawsmadeduringthecolonialperiod.Neitherthelandreformsattemptedduringtheimmediate
postcolonial civilian government nor the subsequent socialist land management regime
introducedduringthemilitaryadministrationinvolvedpublicconsultation.Similarly,duringthe
post-conflictperiod, landmanagementpracticesremainedtopdowninsharpcontrasttothe
bottom up peacebuilding process.133 Very little has changed in the post-conflict context as
institutionsremainedcentralisedwithpolicies“hangingupinthecloudswithnosignsofcoming
down”;134apracticewhichledtothedevelopmentoflandmanagementinstrumentswhichare
divorcedfromtherealityontheground.Thishascontributedtothedevelopmentofincreasingly
negative public attitudes towards the state, reproducing the endearment of people to
customaryinstitutionsandlineageidentityandbyimplicationsettlementspatternsalongclan
lines.
Having discussed urban land administration in Somaliland, the next chapter discusses the
dynamicsofadjudicationmechanismsforurbanlandconflicttodemonstratehowresourceand
conflict management as well as service delivery shape the spatial character of cities in
Somaliland.
132Note,asmentionedelsewhere,colonialauthoritiesconsultedAkilsandfriendlyelderson issuesonissuestodowithlawandorder.
133ThroughthebottomupapproachforwhichSomalilandisnotablypraised.
134Interviewee34August30,2015.Lawyer.
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CHAPTER6 PLURALADJUDICATIONOFURBANLANDCONFLICTS
6.1 Introduction
LandconflictsaresomeofthemajorproblemsfacingurbanplacesinSomaliland.Thecapital
city,Hargeisa isparticularlyreelingwithsuchproblemsbecause it is increasinglybecominga
magnet for rural-urbanmigrations, relocationsand investment from thediaspora,aswell as
returnmovementsfromrefugeecampsaroundthecountry.Thecityalsohostsrefugeesfrom
theSouthandinternallydisplacedpeople.Theproblemisexacerbatedbythelackofcoherent
means throughwhich such conflicts canbe speedily and justly resolved. This is because the
justice landscape in Somaliland is characterised by the coexistence of plural (at times)
competing,contradictoryandoccasionallycomplementarysetsoflawsi.e.statutory,Islamicand
customary laws. In this chapter, I argue that themanner inwhich conflicts are adjudicated
reinforcesthecity’sclan-basedspatialcharacter.Thisistosaythatthefailureofthestatutory
system to manage conflict or enforce judicial decisions has eroded and undermined public
confidenceinthestate.Ialsoshowthatthisineffectivejusticelandscapemarginalisedthepoor.
Consequently, thepoorandotherswho lost trust inthesystemrelyonadjudicationbynon-
state institutions, increasingtheattachmentofurbanresidentsto localspacesdominatedby
theirclanwhereservicesandsupportaremoreaccessible.Onceagain,theconceptof‘hybridity’
asithasbeenelaboratedintherecentstate-buildingliteratureisablunttool,asIhaveargued
inchapter2,andmyfocushereisonapluralityofdiscrete,yetoverlappinginstitutions.
Thechapterisorganisedintothreesections.Inthefirstsection,Idiscussthepluraljusticesystem
in the country. In the second section, I turn to the challenges facing the judicial system, its
developmenttrajectory,thefailuretoaddressurbanlandconflictsaswellastheimpactsuch
failurehasonstatelegitimacy.Inthefinaltwosections,Idiscusstheestablishmentoftheurban
LandCommissionandthemannerinwhichitoperates,arguingthatredtapebureaucracy,low
levelofcapacityandinterferencefromthestatemakesitunabletobringaboutanysignificant
changesinthequestforresolvingproliferatinglanddisputes.
6.2 PluralJustice:HarmonisationandReforms
LandconflictadjudicationinSomalilandisunderpinnedbyaplurallegalsystemthatconsistsof
customary law, Islamicshariaandstatutory laws.AccordingtoUN(2006,p.35),“traditional,
religious,andsecular(modern)systems,functioninginparallel,regulateawiderangeofaffairs,
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from the resolution of constitutional disputes in regional political administrations to the
enforcementofbusinesscontractsandthesettlementoffamilydisputes”.Thispluralitydates
backtotheprecolonialSomalijudicialpracticeswhenIslamicshariainfluencedcustomarylaw
andinmanycasesinformedtherulings.Theintroductionofcoloniallawscreatedfurthernew
institutionsandenhancedthepluralityofthejusticesystemsasbothshariaandcustomarylaws
wereallowedformallytocoexistandservedifferentcolonialagendas,andwereincorporated
variously intostate legislativeframeworks(aswehaveseenwiththeAkils inchapter4). It is
importanttonotethatpriortothearrivalofthecolonialpowers,Somalisusedcustomarylaws
knownas(Xeer)whichreedsinEnglishasheer.Heerareagreementsbetweenclansabouttheir
interactionwitheachother:theyarenotlimitedonlytoconflictandjusticebutincludesocial
interactions,marriage,economicandculturalcooperation.
Abdile(2012,p.87)examineshowheerworksandidentifiesthreelayersinwhichthesystem
operatesnamelynegotiation,mediationandarbitration.Hearguesthatheerisan“alternative
disputeresolutionsystemthatfacilitatesreconciliationandpromotesrestorativejustice”.The
useofthetermalternativesuggeststhatheerisasubstituteforsomethingmoreimportantthan
itself.Itreinforcesthepositioningofstatutorylawastheprimarysystemoflawsinthecountry
towhichallotherformsoflawshouldconform.Abdille’spropositionofheerasanalternative
restorativejusticesystemisopposedbySchlee(2013)whoarguesthatnegotiationsinheertake
place between often unequal opponents and this compromises justice. He criticises the
idealisationoftheSomalistatelessness.Hearguesthatthestrengthofheerliesinitsabilityto
maintainpeace,butitdoesnothelpintheachievementofjustice.AccordingtoSchlee(2013,p.
261)“mediationandcompensationdonotre-establishamoralorderorenforce‘law’,andthey
arenotmeanttopleasehigherauthorities likeGod,theStateortoconformtolofty ideasof
Justice”.However,thisstatementoverlooksthefactthatcustomarylawsareinformedbysharia
andcouldpartlybeaimedatpleasingGod.ThisisevidentintheSomalisaying,“illahoweexna
hanagagategin,garashanahanagucadaabin.Looselytranslated,thismeans“ohgoddonot
forgiveusifwesidewitheitheroftheprotagonists,butforgiveusifourjudgementsarebased
ontheextentofourintellect”.
Owing to its popular familiarity, heer remains strong, and has outlasted the collapse of the
country,playinganimportantroleintherestorationofpeaceandstabilityinthenation.Thorne
(2011)pointsout that the informal justicemechanism inSomaliahas taken theplaceof the
statutory system or complements it where both exist. The author rightly criticises the
assumptioninherentinmanystudiesofajusticevacuumcreatedbythecollapseofthestate,
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butfallsintothesametrapofseeingheerasaninformalfall-backandinferioralternative,by
saying“peoplewillalwaysneedwaysofsettlingtheirdisputes,andifthereisnomoreformal
wayofdoingso,theyresorttoothermeans”(Thorne,2011,p.3).Thissuppositionisfurther
reinforcedbyNottenandMacCallum(2005)whoalsoarguethatSomalishavereturnedtotheir
customary law to fill the gap left by the statutory state laws. This problematic assumption
inflatesthevalueoftheso-calledformalbyassumingthatpeopleweremoreinclinedtousethe
statutory justice system than the customary one and that the absence of the statutory led
peopletofillthegapbyapplyingcustomarylaws.Iarguethattheoppositeaccordsbetterwith
Somalihistory,asacriticalmassofpeoplehaveatnotimepreferredthestatutorylawsoverthe
customary.
LeSage(2011) questionstheextenttowhichheercouldbeharmonisedamongtheSomalis
sinceit isoftenbasedonclanarrangementswhichmaydifferfromoneclantoanother.This
concernis,however,underminedbythefactthatinmanycasesthegeneralprinciplesofthe
heerarethesameregardlessoftheclansbetweenwhichagreementstakeplace.Theresilience
ofheerdespiteacenturylonginfluencebyboththecolonialandpostcolonialstatesisnotable
andcanbepartlyattributabletotheuniversalnatureofheeramongSomalis.ButAbdile(2012)
argues that universality alonemay fall short of explaining the survival of heer amidst state
collapse.HeemphasisesrathertheconservativenessofSomalisocietyandresistancetoforeign
influence;thesuspicionandmistrusttheydirectatthestatutorylaws;andtherespecttheyhave
for their own customary laws, which they regard as superior to the codified statutory laws
introduced by the colonial powers. Thorne observes that the limitations of customary laws
includetheirfailuretokeeppacewithchangingurbancontextswhere“defininglinesbetween
clansbecomeblurred”(2011).Thisis,however,contradictedbytheevidenceemergingfromthe
settlement patterns in Hargeisa that I present here. Yet there are drawbacks, because
enforcement of rulings is voluntary and there is no ‘central authority’ to resort to, while
customarylawalsoplacesgreatemphasisoncommunityrelationsattheexpenseofindividual
rights.Forinstancerapedwomenmightbeforcedtomarrytheirtormentorsinabid“toprotect
thewoman’shonour[andensure]fullpaymentofherdowrybytheattacker’sclantothevictim’s
clan”(Wojkowsk,2006,p.21).
There have, however, been attempts aimed at bringing heer into international standards.
AccordingtoNamibiaandUbink(2011),eldersinBuraoapproachedtheDanishRefugeeCouncil
(DRC) in 2003 with an idea of reforming customary law so as to bring it in line with the
international standards. The conference in Burao agreed on the elimination of communal
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responsibility,andenshrinedprotectionsforvulnerablegroups,andtheprotectionoftherights
ofwidowsinparticular.Anassessmentoftheimpactofthesechangesestimatedthattheresult
wasa90percentreductioninmurdercases.However,suchassessmentisproblematicandcould
have been related to other social changes given the fact that “awareness of the National
Declarationsamongthegeneralpopulationwasfoundtobeminimal”(NamibiaandUbink,2011,
p.15).Inotherwords,ifawarenessofthedeclarationwassolow,itisdifficulttoassumethat
these declarations had made changes in the public mind-set towards these issues. Unlike
customary law, the introduction of the statutory laws is a relatively new phenomenon in
Somaliland,datingfromthecolonialcontexts.Yetthestatutorylawsareofcourseimportant,
andaswehaveseenalreadyinrelationtochiefsandland,thepresentandimmediatepost-
colonialjudicialorganisationintheSomalilandsweremodelledonthecolonialsystem(Hersi,
2009).
The adoption of colonial justice structures and their post-independence application were
complicatedbytheinheritanceoftwocolonialsystems;ItalianintheSouthandBritishinthe
North.Inthetenyearsfollowingtheindependence,thejudicialsysteminthecountrycontinued
tofollowthesetwodifferentsystems,whichattimeswasineffective,andmeantthatcaseswere
dropped–famouslyinthecaseofanattemptedcoupbyBritish-trainedmilitaryofficers,who
couldnotbeconvictedduetoloopholescreatedbyadualsystem.135Seriousattemptshavenot
beenmade to rectify the limitsof theprevious judicial system in termsofbothcontentand
structureinthepost-conflictSomaliland.ThecurrentjudicialstructureinSomalilandconsistsof
mainlyurban-basedSupreme,Appellate,Regional,andDistrictCourts.TheRegionalCourthears
caseswith3years’punishmentwhileDistrictCourtsdealwithasentenceunderthreeyears.
TheAppellateCourtdealswithallcivilandcriminalappealsfromtheregionalcourts.136Itcould
bearguedthatthelimitationsofthestatutorylawscontinuetoexistpartlybecausetheydonot
enjoy the trust nor the resources required for its highly bureaucratic nature. Thisweakness
allows both the customary and the sharia laws to compete and at times outperform the
statutory laws. As evident here the existing plural forms of the judicial system have their
respectiveweaknessesandstrengthsandfuturejudicialreformsneedtostrikeacarefulbalance
135Interviewee2November8,2014FormerChairmanofSomalilandAtrocitiesCommission.
136Interviewee34August30,2015.Lawyer.
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betweenthemsoastobringoutthebestfeaturesofeach,ratherthanprioritisingonesetover
another.
Effortsaimedatreformingthejusticesystemarenotnew.Thepost-colonialSomaligovernment
hadtocontendwiththechallengesofintegratingpluraljusticesystemsconsistingofstatutory
lawsleftbehindbythecolonialpowersandtheshariaandcustomarylawswidelypracticednot
only in the rural areas but also in towns. The civilian Somali government established a
Consultative Committee for the Integration of the Legal System who put forward a set of
confusingrecommendationssuggestingtheuseoftheItalianpenalcodeforcivilcases,Indian
‘penalcodeforcriminalprocedures’,shariaforfamilyandminorcases,andheerfortheconflict
resolutionamongtheclans(LeSage,2011).Thismadethedispensationofjusticedifficultand
in practice Northern judges used their previous laws while Southerners continued with the
Italiansystem.Equallythemilitaryregimemadeanattempttoreformthesystemandin1973
changes placing responsibility for crimes on the perpetrator as opposed to the clan were
enacted,butthisfailedtotakeeffectasclansresistedimplementation.Thegovernmenthadto
retractin1974andallowthesimultaneoususeofbothheerandshariaforfamilymattersand
maintenanceofpeaceandsecurity(ibid).
As shown above, successive Somali governments failed to bring about meaningful judicial
reformsandintegrationbetweentheoverlappingandcompetingformsofIslamiclaw,statutory
andcustomarylaws.Ganzglass(1996)arguesthatthefailuretoestablishanintegratedjudicial
systeminSomaliawasnotjustafailureoftheSomalistate,butthattheUNalsodeservessome
oftheblame.HeoutlineshowtheUNfailedtolaythegroundworkforreformsasit‘missedthe
opportunity’ofputtinginplacepropermechanismstorevivetheSomalijudicialsystem.Atthe
heightoftheUNinterventionin1993,plansweredrawntoundertaketransitionaljustice,but
suchplanswere‘ambitious’anddiscussedjudicialstructuresalongthelineof“the1962Somali
three-tieredjudicialsystemconsistingof21DistrictCourts,RegionalCourtsinsevenregionsand
twoCourtsofAppeal,oneinHargeisaandtheotherinMogadishu”(Ganzglass,1996,p.125).
ThejudicialsystemenvisionedbytheUNwasnotcreativeenoughtotakeaccountofthedangers
of recycling thestateof justice thatexistedbefore thecollapseof thestate. Inotherwords,
theseefforts failedtodevisea formof legalempowermentdifferent fromthoseofthepast.
Namibia and Ubink (2011) point to the importance of legal empowerment in post-conflict
contexts,andtheneedtoaddresscharacteristicallyoverlappingandsometimescontradicting
plurallegalsystems.
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Reformingthepluraljudicialsystemhasbeencastaskeytomaintainingstability.Adam(1991)
arguesthatsharialawshouldbeintegratedformallyintoanyfutureSomalijusticesystem,and
thesameholdsforcustomarylaw.Suchamovewouldremovetheconcernsofmanywhohave
ahigherleveloftrustinthatwhichtheyknow,customaryandsharia,thanthatwhichtheydo
notknow,statutorylaw.PoliticalmovementsinSomalilandhavelongrecognisedthis,asalmost
all the major movements have a clause in their charters indicating that the customary or
statutorylawshouldbeusedonlywhennotincontradictionwiththesharialaw.Accordingto
LeSage(2011)historicalfootprintsabouttheapplicationofsharia,statutoryandcustomarylaws
intheSomalicontextprovideabasisonwhichharmonisationcouldbeimplemented.
6.3 JudicialChallengesandtheirEffectonStateLegitimacy
Copp(1999,pp.4-5)writesthat“whenweevaluateastateforitslegitimacy,ourconcernisto
assessitsmoralauthoritytogovern.Thelawsofastaterequireorprohibitustoactincertain
ways,andthestatetypicallyenforcesitslawbyattachingpunishmentsorpenaltiestofailures
to comply…The problem of legitimacy is, then, to explain how a state can have the moral
authority to do the kinds of thing involved in governing”. Like other key services, justice is
generallyregardedasacrucialcomponentofstate’smoralauthoritytogovern,moresoinpost-
conflictcontextswherethesocietyisintheprocessofhealingfromdevastatingconflictmuch
ofwhichwascausedbysubjectivelyperceivedorobjectivelyproveninjustice.Inthissection,I
arguethatthemannerinwhichthestatemanagestheplurallandscapeofthejusticesystem
underminesitslegitimacyandpeople’sconsentforitsmoralauthoritytohaveamonopolyover
violence.
ThechallengesofthejusticesysteminSomalilandaremany.Forinstance,thestatutorysystem
standsaccusedofincompetency,widespreadcorruption,andsubjecttothemeddlingofjustice
bypowerfulpoliticiansandclans,whiletheshariaandtheheerarecriticisedforbeingoutof
touch with the international conventions on equality and rights. Collective responsibility,
unequal representation,and immunitypresentproblems to the future integrationof judicial
systems in Somaliland. Thus far, attempts at improving justice have concentrated on
strengtheningthestatutorylawsinspiteofthefactthatveryfewpeopleeithertrustorhave
accesstothisformoflaw.Whiletheimportanceofthestatutorylawscannotbeoverlooked,it
isalsoimportanttoplacethecentralemphasisonwhatworksbestontheground.Customary
lawisparticularlycrucialbecauseitenjoysrelativelegitimacyandtrustamongthepopulaceas
itisbasedonsocial,culturalandpowerdynamicswithwhichlocalsarefamiliar.Forinstance,
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land in customary law is considered a symbol of power and communal property to which
everyoneisentitledtohaveashare,asopposedtoacommoditytowhichcertainindividuals
ownandreapthebenefit.Bruyas(2006)observesthatcustomarylawismoreadaptabletothe
contextinSomalilandthantheothertwoforms,especiallywhenitcomestotheadministration
ofcommonpropertiessuchasgrazing,waterandpasture.Theadvantagesofcustomarylaws
include that they are cheaper and less time demanding as customary decisions are reached
withinareasonabletimeframe(APD,2008).
The mediation process of customary laws focusses mainly on bringing about a solution to
problemsratherthandecidingonwhoisrightorwronginadispute.Critics,however,arguethat
mediation teamsarenotneutralas theyaredrawn fromthedisputingparties.137Moreover,
furthercriticismisdirectedatthefactthatcustomarylawscanbereactiveratherthanproactive.
Even though customary laws are highly effective when it comes to conflict resolution and
particularlylandconflicts,theyhavesomewell-documentedweaknesses(Hashi,2005,Hoehne,
2011).Forinstance,theprocesslacksuniformityinthesensethatdifferentterritoriesmayhave
differentprecedents.Thislackofuniformitymakesinterclanconflictslikely.Anotherweakness
isthefactthatthetraditionalmechanismprioritisesthewellbeingoftheclanovertherightof
theindividual.Despitetheseweaknesses,customarylawsremainthefavouritechoiceforland
conflictresolution(OCVP,2014)mainlyfortheirsimplicityandfamiliarity.Inaconflictmediated
bycustomarylaw,closefamilymembersoftheconflictingpartiesareinvolvedinthemediation
process,guaranteeingthevoluntaryimplementationofdecisions.Theprocessisalsorelatively
straightforward (Bruyas, 2006). Firstly, a committee comprising both sides is put together.
Secondly,thedefendantandtheplaintiffsaresummonedtoacceptdecisions,asaprerequisite
forthecasetocommence.Thirdly,thecommitteemembersswearthattheywillbeimpartial.
Fourthly,theplaintiffisrequestedtoproducewitnessesforhis/herclaim.Fifthly,thedefendant
is given an opportunity to accept or contest the legitimacy of the claims submitted by the
plaintiffandisaskedtopresentevidenceforhis/herobjection.Sixthly,thedefendantisasked
to swear in the name of God that the property belongs to him/her and that the plaintiff’s
submissionsareuntrue.Seventhly,thecommitteedecidesonownershipoftheparticularpiece
ofland.Thelastpartoftheprocessinvolvesaharmonisationprocesswherecertainstepsare
takentonormaliserelationshipi.e.gifts(APD,2008).
137Interviewee4August16,2014.Lawyer.
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Islamic law in relation to landdoesnot just sit alongside statutory and customary laws as a
separate corpus of rules, but138 is also a significant source for the twoother formsof laws
governingurbanlandmanagement(Bruyas,2006).Indeed,theconstitutionacknowledgesthe
roleofIslamintheformulationofstatutorylaw.Butwhenitcomestoapplication,Islamiclawis
oftenlimited,inrelationtoland,tothemediationofinheritancerelatedcases.Nonetheless,the
shariacourtsenjoyhigherlegitimacythantheotherformsofmediationpartlyduetothefact
thatIslamishighlyregardedasareligionamongSomalis.Accordingtoareligiousleader:
The Islamic lawenjoysoverwhelming support from thepublic. The reason
whytheyenjoythissupportisbecausepeoplerespectreligion.Somalisdonot
showthesamelevelofresistancetotheIslamiclawsastheformalstatutory
laws.Thosewhoareagainsttheimpositionofsevereshariapunishmentsdo
notnormallystatetheir intentionstraightforward.Theyoftensayshariais
applied without sufficient evidence. The reason for which this diplomatic
framingofthesituationisnecessaryisbecauseofthefactthatitisgenerally
unacceptable among the public to oppose Islamic sharia for religious
reasons.139
Like the customary institutions, the Islamic court places emphasis on harmonising the
relationshipbetweentheplaintiffandthedefendantandtheydosobyfirstlyremindingboth
sidesofthesanctityofthesharialaws.Adefiningfeatureoftheshariacourtisthefactthatthe
conflicting parties come to the court willingly and in most cases decisions are abided by
voluntarily.Unlikethecustomaryinstitutions,theshariacourtsfollowaprocedurewherethe
representativesoftheconflictingpartiesarenotpartofthepanelthatdecidesonthecases.The
processinsharialawisthatbothpartiesarelistenedtobyapanelofexpertclericswhoreview
thefactsandconsulttherelevantshariasourcestomakeajudgment.Ifthedefendantcontests
thevalidityofthefactspresentedbytheplaintiff,thecourtasksthedefendanttoproducea
138Thesharialawcategorizeslandintosevendiscreteareas:clearingavacantland,receivinglandasagrant, leasinga land fromthestate, charitable land, reserved land foradefinedpurpose,“unviolatedzonesoflandandtheofficeofpublicinspection”(APD,2008).
139Interviewee21August15,2014.ReligiousLeader.
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witness140orswearinthenameofGodthatthepropertybelongstohimorher.Theconflicting
parties in sharia courts are not often represented by lawyers. Religious leaders “who
participatedinFGDsexplainedthattheSulxi141mediationprocess[requires]eachpartyinthe
dispute[tobring]twomalewitnessesoriftwomalesareunavailableonemaleandtwofemale
witnesses”(OCVP,2014).Thelowerstatuswomenholdaswitnessessuggeststhe”possibilityof
biasagainstfemalesinthismediationprocess”(DS,2008).ThestudynotesthattheIslamicsharia
alsohasanumberofissueswhichdonotconformtointernationallysanctionedhumanrights
lawsparticularlyconcerningwomenasIslamicshariaisperceivedtohavedifferentialtreatments
formenandwomennotonlyintestimoniesbutmoreimportantlyinheritance.
Thestatutorylaws,ontheotherhand,arelessflexibleandmainlyrelyonpre-conflictlawsdating
frombeforethecivilwar(DS,2008).Inthestatutorysystem,thefocusisplacedonreachinga
decisionon thebasis of the legalmechanismavailable to the judges. In the context of land
disputes,moreoftenthannotdecisionsbecomeunsatisfactoryforoneofthepartiesandthis
jeopardises the process, leading in many cases to violence among the competing parties.
Moreover,thestatutorylawsaremainlyweakbecauseofthefactthattheinstitutionsthatwere
supposedtoproducelawsareeithermalfunctioningordonothavethecapacitytodoso(DS,
2008).Theyalsosufferfromalackoflegitimacyamongthepublicandtheyarealsoinaccessible.
In addition, the legal codes and complex terminology used in the statutory system are not
commonlyunderstoodbythepublic, resulting inapprehensionand lackofconfidence in the
judiciarysystem.Moreover,thestatutorycourtsareaccusedofbeingverycorruptinaddition
to being time-consuming, a luxury which the poor cannot afford as pointed out by a key
informantinterview:
Poorpeoplecan’taffordtocommuteandcomebacksomanytimestothe
courts.Theycan’teitheraffordtopayforthecaseadjudicationfeeletalone
lawyers.Thesituationisevenworseforinternallydisplacedpeoplewhoare
140 One of the distinctive features of the sharia law is the fact that testimonies ofmale and femalewitnessesdonotweighthesame.Whileonemalewitnessescantestifyforacase,thisisnotthecaseforfemalesastwofemalewitnessesweightthesameasonemaletestimony.
141Thisisareconciliatorymediationwherethefocusisplacedatbridgingthegapbetweenthesidesbyseekingvoluntarycompromises.
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forcedtoseekhelpfromthestatutorysystemasthecustomary lawmight
notbeveryusefultothem.142
In thecustomarysystem,conflictingpartiesare representedbypeople fromtheir respective
clans and the process has some degree of security built into it where mediators consider
repercussionsthatcouldresultfromneglectingtheinterestofoneoftheparties.Sinceinternally
displaced people do not belong to dominant clans with political clout in the city, they are
marginalisedbythecustomaryinstitutions.Thesameisthecasefortheminoritygroups.
Generally, judicial proceedings rely heavily on testimonies (aswill be seen in the court case
discussedindetail)anditisdifficultforthepoortobringwitnessestocourtaswitnessesusually
donotcometothecourtsunlesstheyarepaid.Similarly,itisdifficultforthepoortogatherthe
documentaryevidence required for filing casesas theyareunable tomobilise the resources
necessaryforundertakingthisexercise.Asmostpeopleinthecountryarenotfamiliarwithlaws
aswellasthecomplexcodesandterminologiesusedincourts,legalrepresentationisessential
forwinningcasesbutthisisbeyondthereachofthepoorinthecity.Thereisalsoverylittlehelp
availablefromNGOs.TheLegalAidClinic,whichisaprojectbasedintheFacultyofLawatthe
UniversityofHargeisaandfundedbytheUNDP, isoneofthefeworganisationsthatprovide
helpinaccesstoservicesforthepoor.Ithelpsthosewhocannotaffordlawyerswithbasiclegal
representation,butduetothelimitedresourcesavailable,thestringencyoftheirvettingmay
discouragemanypeoplefromseekingtheirhelp.143Theclinicliaiseswiththecourtsandinsome
instancesmayobtainawaiverforcourtfees.Oneofthe lawyersworkingwiththeclinicsaid
that:
in some cases, we ask the court to consider cases from these people
differentlyastheymaynotbeabletoaffordthefinancialrequirementsfor
142Interviewee21August15,2014.ReligiousLeader.
143Theneedofthepersontogetaccesstotheirservicesisthattheyaskthemtobringpeoplewhoknowthemandwhocanvouchforthem.Thecentreonlytakesthecaseofonesideandasktheothersidetoseek a different avenue for their representation. the legal aid clinic takes a small amount of casesdeterminedonassessmentfortheirneed.
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filingacase. Insomecasesthecourt'sacceptourpleaandallowthepoor
peoplefilecases.144
Difficultyinaccesstojusticeisalsogenderedasthewaymenandwomenaccesslegalservices
aredifferentinanumberofways.Forinstance,intervieweeswhoisaprosecutorpointedout
that:
menareoftenprepared topay corruptofficialsorat least seem toknow
exactlyhowtogoaboutitwhereaswomansufferbecausetheremightbea
perception among the officials that women either pay little or not at all
thereforetheymightbesubjectedtomorebureaucraciesthanthemen.145
Women’s ability to access justice services is also inhibited by the fact that the judicial
environmentisalsogenderedasmostofthestaffworkinginthejusticesystemaremenwho:
show very little empathy forwomen in courts.We are the first cohort of
womenpublicprosecutorsinthejusticesystem.So,theproblemiswoman
aremarginalisedinthejusticesystemandthisaffectsthewayinwhichjustice
isdelivered.Nowweareonlysixwomenprosecutorsandthereisnosingle
femalejudgeinthecity.146
Thesedifficultiesinaccesstojusticereinforcethehabitofbypassingthedueprocessaspeople
pursueothermeansofaccessingservicesi.e.socialnetworkingwhereonemayseekthehelpof
amemberofhis/herclan.Asidefromclanrelations,accesstoservices,arealsodeterminedby
whoyouknow.Forinstance,
144Interviewee36August20,2014.DirectorofCivilUnit-LegalAidClinic.
145Interviewee19September04,2014.Prosecutor.
146Ibid.
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ineveryMinistry,therearesomejuniorofficerswhoarepowerfulandhave
directaccesstothehigher-rankingofficials.Thispeoplecanmakeyoubypass
anyformalrequirementsandhaveyousortedout.147
The challenges in the judicial system can be situated in the dynamics of the state building
processesanditsinterfacewithlegitimacy.Somesuggestthatthejusticesystemgotweakeras
thestatebecamemorestable,gainingincreasingpowerandeconomicclout.148Inthebeginning
thestatewasunabletoinfluencethejusticesystembecauseitdidnothavefullfinancialcontrol
overtheaffairsofthejudiciaryasjudgesoperatedvoluntarilywithoutgettingpaidbythestate.
Evidencefortheindependenceofjudgesfromthestateissometimesarguedtoreflectthefact
that during the immediate post-war period, judicial decisionswere at timesmade amid the
presenceofarmedgroupsinthedoorstopofthejusticechambers.149Insomecases,judgeshad
tomakedecisionswhilemilitiassupportingtheplaintiffanddefendantsrespectivelythreatened
totakeactionifsentenceswereissuedagainsttheirperson.Yetthisdidnotmeanthatjudges
were independentof clans.Quite theopposite, as judgesmayhavebeendependenton the
politicalcloutoftheirrespectiveclanswhichimplicitlyorexplicitlyprovidedthemwithadegree
ofprotectionfortheirpersonalsafetyandsecurity.150
The anomalies in the justice system attract a substantial level of criticism from the public.
Variousstateledattemptstorespondtothiscriticismhavenotbornfruit.Insomeinstances,
internationalNGOshaveprovidedfundingforreforms,buttheyareseldomseenasapositive
influence,asspeltoutbyanintervieweeinHargeisa,sayingthat:
what's this NGOs are doing is sneaking Western influence and blocking
justice.Anexampleoftheseisthegovernment'sinabilitytocarryoutcapital
punishmentsentencesbecauseofinterferencefromtheinternationalNGOs.
Thisnegativelyaffectsthesecurityofthecity.Therewasacaseinwhicha
mankilledanothermanfromhisclanandacourtissuedadeathsentencefor
the perpetrator. However, the sentence has not been carried out due to
147Interviewee29August16,2014.NGOWorker.
148Interviewee23August14,2014.SolicitorGeneralofSomaliland.
149Ibid.
150Ibid.
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interferencefromtheinternationalNGOs.Thisledtoagreaterinstabilityfor
whichthegovernmentwasunabletocontrolasclansnearlyclashedoverthe
inabilityofthegovernmenttocarryoutthedeathsentence.151
Formostcritics,neitherinterventionfromNGOsnorthegovernmentdrivenattemptshaveso
farbroughtaboutasignificantchange in justicedelivery.This lackofchange isattributed to
either inabilityor lackofcommitment todealwith theproblemeffectively.One interviewee
sumsupthesituationsayingthatthe
lack of seriousness about the judicial reforms in the country can be
exemplifiedbythefactthatthegovernmentdidnotbuildasinglecourtroom
whilealmosteveryMinistryinthecountryhasnewbuildings.TheHighCourt
ishousedinadilapidatedcolonialbuilding.Thisshowsthelackofapolitical
commitment to improve the judiciary infrastructure and system in the
country. TheMinistry of Justice which is just an administrative executive
branchofthegovernmentishousedinadecentbuildingthatwasconstructed
recentlywhilethejudgesintheHighCourtandtheSupremeCourtdon'thave
properchamberstowork.ThereisonlyonevehiclefortheHighCourtinthe
country. The judge’smobility is limitedandmostof the courtsdon't have
transportoftheirown.152
Moreover, the judicial system is politicised and subject to interference from the executive.
Sensitivecasesareallocatedtojudgeswhomaysteerthecaseinthedirectionthestatewants.
Suchinterferencehappensinasystemicwaywherethechairmanofthejudgesiscalledbysenior
judges who order him to allocate certain cases to certain judges, often justifying their
interferenceonapretextthatthecaseistoocomplexforjudgeAorB’sabilityforadjudication.
Thisisalexiconforremovingcasesfromthedocketofreluctantjudges.Insuchinstances,what
happensisthatthe:
chairmanwillcallyouandaskyoutodosomethingaboutaparticularcase
ashereceivedacallfromtheuppercorridorofthejusticesystemhierarchy
151Interviewee33May30,2015.DivisionalManagerofaCoorporateCompany.
152Interviewee23August14,2014.SolicitorGeneralofSomaliland.
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requestingthatarulingshouldbemadeinaparticularway.Thiscausesfears
amongthesitting judgesandtheyhavetoabidebysuchrequestmadeto
themthroughtheirbosses.153
Accordingtokeyinformant interviewsandgroupdiscussions, inthecasewheresomejudges
refusetoabidebytheordersfromabove,theyareeithersubjecttoharassmentorremoved
fromoffice.Itisimportanttomentionthatthejudgesdonothaveentitlementsaftertheyleave
oraresuspendedfromtheirjob.Forthisreason,thejudgesmostlyconcentratetheirenergyand
effort in enriching themselves and protecting their jobs by not going against thewill of the
executive.Judgesalsoavoidbecomingjoblessinthestreetsforsecurityreasons,astheymay
have passed judgments with which many people may have not been happy, making them
vulnerabletoarevengeattackparticularlywhentheirprotectionisnolongerguaranteedbythe
state.Promotionsarealsomadeaccordingtothelevelofobediencedisplayedbysittingjudges.
Furthermore,judgesarenotappointedonthebasisoftheircompetenceforthejobbutthey
areratherselectedonthebasisofwhotheyknowandtoalesserdegreeclanrepresentation.
Whilehighcourt judgesaredirectlyappointedbythePresidentandtheprerogativeof firing
themremainswithhim,regionalanddistrictjudgesarehiredorfiredbythechiefjusticewhois
alsoapresidentialnomineeapprovedbyparliament.Thechiefjusticeheadsthedysfunctional
JusticeCommissionusedmainlyfordiscipliningdissentingjudges.TheCommissionconsistsof
10peoplemostofwhomholdkeynationalpositionsi.e.theChiefJustice,AttorneyGeneral,two
senior judges, Director General of the Ministry of Justice and the Director-General of the
Ministry of Labour. The other four are appointed by the upper and lower chambers of
Parliament. The role of the Justice Commission includes improving the justice system and
removing and transferring judges154 but a number of people from the legal community in
HargeisatoldmethattheCommissionisusedtomanipulatethejusticesystemas:
allthosewhoarerepresentedintheCommissionhavesomehowpowerover
the delivery of the justice services. For instance, if you clash with the
prosecutors, what happens is that you are summoned by the Justice
Commissionandyouwillbesuspendedfromthejob.Thisissoduetothefact
153Interviewee38August08,2014.DistrictCourtJudge.
154 The quorum is usually five and agenda is proposed by the chief justice. The chief justice is notindependentforhisjobasheisindirectlycontrolledbytheexecutivethroughtheParliament.
138|P a g e
thattheprosecutionisrepresentedintheJusticeCommissionandtheyhave
aninfluenceinwhogetshiredorsuspended.Thisinterfereswiththedelivery
ofjusticeinthecourtsanditmakesthejobofthejudgesdifficulttoperform.
Inadditiontothese,thereisnomechanismtocomplainagainsttheJustice
Commission and the head of the Justice Commission himself is subject to
politicalinterference.155
Theotherformofinterferenceisthatwhichcomesfromclans.Clanpressurecanbeinterpreted
asaresponsetothepoorperformanceof the judiciarysystem inthecountry. Insuchcases,
peopleexploretherelationalweboftheclanandtrytofindsomebodywhoisrelatedtothe
judge.Thepracticeisusuallythat:
youwould be visited privately and told about some sort of injustice been
committedagainstthepersonseekingthehelp.Inthatcasemembersofthe
clanwouldexpectyoutointerveneanddosomethingaboutitbelievingthat
thecaseoftheirmemberisjustone.Corruptjudgeshelptheirkinsmeninany
available way but those who resist the clan pressure face some sort of
labellingintheircommunity.156
Interference in the formal judicial systemcontributes to thenegativepopular conceptionof
stateinstitutionsnotleastbecausesuchinterferencedoesnotexistinthetraditionalmechanism
ofsolvinglandconflicts.Customaryinstitutionshaveproventobemoreeffectiveinresolving
issuesofthiskindbecausetheyarehighlyaccessibletothevastmajorityofthepublicandare
also cheaper.While customary institutions have provided peoplewith an alternativemeans
throughwhich they couldmanage land issues, it hason theotherhand significantly eroded
publicconfidenceinthestatutorylaws.Thisisnottosuggestthatclanmechanismsofresolving
landconflictsareafall-backduetotheabsenceofproperlyfunctioningstateinstitutionstodeal
withtheproblemsofland,butrathertoacknowledgetheoutperformanceofonesystemover
155Interviewee32August03,2014.MinistryofPublicWorksOfficial.
156Interviewee38August08,2014.DistrictCourtJudge.
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another in a customary legal environment characterised by multiplicity of institutions,
competitionandcoexistence.
Theabove challenges in the judicial systememasculates state legitimacy,whichwasalready
sufferingfromalonghistoryofstrainedrelations,mistrustandnegativeperceptionamongthe
populace.WhilethepluralnatureofthejusticesysteminSomalilandhelpsthestatedispense
servicesitdoesnotorcannotprovideformally,theflipsideofthisisthechallengepresentedby
thecoexistenceofthevariousjusticedispensations.Themannerinwhichthecomplementarity,
contradiction,competition,andcoexistenceof thisplural justice ismanagedtosomedegree
underminesthe legitimacyof thestate.Accordingto (Lund,1997,p.100), the“legitimacyof
stateinstitutionsimpliesarecognitionandthusanappreciationofthem,andthisisintimately
linkedtotheconceptsofjusticeandpropriety”.Neitherappreciationnorrecognitionofasense
ofjusticeexistsamongthepublicinHargeisa.157Suchoverrelianceonthecustomaryinstitutions
hasarguablyalsofurthersegmentedtheurbanpopulation,encouragingthemtoresideinareas
dominatedbytheclansfromwhichtheyhail.
6.4 TowardsSpecialisedIntervention:LandCommission
Priorto2005,landconflictsinthecityweredealtwithbyacommitteewithinthemunicipality
structureandappealswerehandledbytheformalcourtsinlinewiththeDistrictAdministration
Lawwhich empowered local authorities tomediate land conflicts as amatter of peace and
conciliation (Republic of Somaliland, 2002b). In 2005, however, this was changed and land
dispute adjudication was transferred to the formal courts (APD, 2008). In 2002, an
administrativeLandCommissionwasestablishedinaccordancewiththeurbanlandlaw,which
wasamendedin2008.TheCommissionconsistsofsevenmembersfromtheministriesofpublic
works, interior, agriculture, religion, pastoral development and environment, and the
municipalityofHargeisa.158Themembersarenominatedbytheirrespectiveinstitutionsandare
thenofficiallyappointedbytheMinisterofInterior.ThecommitteesitsinHargeisamunicipality
157ParticipantinHadhwanaagTeashopDiscussionSeptember19,2014.HargeisaResident,ParticipantinKaahRestaurant/TeaDiscussionAugust07,2014.HargeisaResident,ParticipantinMaansoorHotel/TeaDiscussionOctober21,2014.HargeisaResident.
158MembersoftheCommissionarelegallyfreefromtheministriesthatnominatedthemandcannotbeassignedwithotherdutiesotherthanthelandadjudicationworktheyareengaged.Equally,theministriescannot change a member and replace him with someone less the he is legally discharged from theCommission.
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premisesandtherepresentativeoftheMinistryofPublicWorkschairstheCommissionbecause
hisMinistryisthelineMinistryforurbanlandmanagementinthecountry.
WhiletheCommissionisempoweredtomediatelandconflictsinurbanplacesinavarietyof
contexts, there are limitations on their jurisdiction. For instance, the commission cannot
adjudicate land conflicts in which a court’s decision has already beenmade, where land is
locatedinanareabeyondtheurbanmasterplan,pastorallandinruralareas,publicland,and
landdisputeswhereacriminaloffence iscommittedand isundertrial inacourtof law. It is
importanttopointout,however,thatthedatacollectedfromtheCommissionforthisthesis,
showsthat inpracticetheCommissionadjudicatedlandoutsidetheir jurisdiction:nearlytwo
percentofthelandadjudicatedbytheCommissionfallsoutsidethecitywheretheCommission
isnotlegallyallowedtomediateandishometominoritygroupswhomighthavebeensubjected
tomorelanddisputesthananyotherareainthecity(Seefigure2).
Insomecases,theCommissionadjudicatesconflictswherethelocalgovernmentispartytothe
dispute–i.e.ifpeoplewhoownlandinperi-urbanareasrefusetogivethe30%oftheirland
requiredforpublicservicetothelocalgovernment.TheCommissionalsoadjudicatescasesin
whichlocalgovernmentsubmitsanapplicationforthereacquisitionoflandwhoseownersfailed
tobuildorpaytaxes.Insuchcases,ifconvicted,theCommissionorderslandownerstogivepart
oftheirlandequivalenttothetaxowedtothelocalcouncil.Moreover,whereverthereisacase
where both parties lay claim to vacant land where the Commission is not convinced that
ownership of the land is for neither parties, the Commission recognises such land as public
land159(RepublicofSomaliland,2013).Thiskindofrulingisrare,butwhenithappens,itoften
leadstogreatersecurityproblemsassuchdecisionsareviolentlycontested.
WhileitisdifficulttogaugetheeffectivenessoftheformationoftheCommissioninreducing
occurrenceoflandconflictsinthecountry,securityandadministrativeofficialsinHargeisaclaim
that land conflicts have been reduced over the last five years.160 Should this be the case, a
numberoffactorsmighthaveledtothisdecreasebesidestheestablishmentoftheCommission.
Oneofthesefactorsisthatlandtransactionsinvolvegreaterriskmitigationprocessessuchas
theverificationofownershipandassessmentofpotentialriskofdisputesarisingafterthesale.
159TheCommissiongivesacopyofthedecisiontotheexecutiveofficerofthelocalauthorityandtheywillalsogiveacopytotheMinisterofPublicWorksinordertoregisterthelandforgovernmentownership.
160Interviewee66August10,2014.PoliceStationCommander.
141|P a g e
Similarly, public land available in the urban periphery has decreased as the city is currently
expanding to farms previously owned by people who hold formal title deeds. Yet the
government proudly relates the decrease of land conflicts to the establishment of the Land
Commission.Whilethisclaimcannotberuledoutaltogether,itisimportanttopointoutthat
thelandconflictrecordsinthelandregistry(wherealllandrelatedcasesarerecorded)suggest
thatthecasesoflandconflictsubmittedtotheLandCommissionhavebeensteadilyontherise
forthelastfiveyears(SeeFigure1).
Figure3:TheannualDistributionofCaseshandledbytheLandCommissions,2009-13
Source:dataforthisfigureareobtainedfromthelandconflcitsregistryattheLandCommission’sofficesinHargeisa.
Between 2009 and 2013, the Commission handled 323 cases. Only 20 of these cases were
handledinthefirstyear,2009.Thisnumberalmostdoubledinthefollowingyear.Similarly,2011
and 2012 have also seen a sharp increase as the Commission handled 74 and 86 cases
respectively.In2013,thenumberofcaseshandledbytheCommissionreachedarecordof104.
Asapparentfromthisdata,thecasessubmittedtotheCommissionwererisingexponentially.
Thereasonwhytherewassubstantial increaseyearbyyearmightrelatetothefactthatthe
Commissionwasnotinthebeginningfamiliarorpopularamongthepublicbutaspeoplebecame
awareof itsexistence,morecasesweresubmittedforadjudication.Thecounterargumentto
thispositionis,however,thatcaseswerereferredfromthecourtstotheCommissionfromthe
142|P a g e
beginning and therefore awareness existed among those interested in getting their dispute
resolvedthroughatleastthestatutorysystem.161
Figure4:TheSpatialDistributionofLandDisputesHandledbytheLandCommissions,2009-13
Source:dataforthisfigureareobtainedfromthelandconflcitsregistryattheLandCommission’sofficesinHargeisa.
Thelandregistryalsoshowssomediscrepanciesinthespatialdistributionof landconflicts in
thecity(seefigure2).Accordingtothisdata,IbrahimKoodbuurandGa’anLibaaxhadthehighest
numberof landconflictsasthetwoneighbourhoodsaccountedfor29and27percentofthe
totalnumberofcasessubmittedtotheCommission.Anumberoffactorscouldhelpexplainwhy
thesetwoneighbourhoodshaveagreaternumberoflanddisputesthanotherareasinthecity.
Notwithstandingtheirpeculiarities,onecommonelementbetweenthesetwoneighbourhoods
isthatbothareasareperceivedtoberelativelymorestrategicandhavehigherlandvaluesthan
mostotherpartsofthecity.Forinstance,IbrahimKoodbuurhadtraditionallybetteraccessto
161ParticipantinCommercialBankTeashopDiscussionJuly01,2014.HargeisaResident.
143|P a g e
water162 and as a result land in this area remains expensive. Equally, it had significant state
properties and the elites of the previous government were mainly housed in this
neighbourhood. At present, a number of international NGOs have their bases in this
neighbourhood.Ontheotherhand,Ga’anLibaaxiswithinverycloseproximityofthecitycentre
and it is also increasingly expanding into peri-urban areas, which in the past were mainly
mountainouspubliclandinahighlystrategicdirectionofthecityi.e.theroadtotheimportant
nationalportofBerberawhichrunsthroughthisneighbourhood,makinglandinthisareamore
valuablethanmanyotherpartsofthecity.
Land disputes are some of the most pressing urban issues that the post-conflict state in
Somalilandfaces.Urbanauthoritiesacrossthecountryareconfrontedwithseriouslandissues
ranging from the inadequate land registry to encroachment of public space and illegal
appropriation of peri-urban land (King et al., 2003). The vastmajority of these conflicts are
resolved through customary laws as indicated by a survey conductedby theObservatory of
ConflictandViolencePrevention,whichfoundthat44%ofrespondentspreferresolvingtheir
landdisputesthroughcustomaryinstitutions(OCVP,2014).Butasignificantproportionofthe
conflictsarealsoadjudicatedbytheLandCommissionwhichemploysformalprocessesdetailed
ingovernmentpublishedguidelines.
TheCommissiondecideshowtohandlecasesbasedona judgementof theirmagnitudeand
complexity.Non-complexcasesarehandledinadifferentwayinvolvingfewproceduralsteps.
Inthesecases,theCommissionmakesquickrulingsmainlybasedonexpertopinion.Equally,
LandCommissionersrequestevidenceofownershipfromthemunicipalityinordertospeedup
rulings. Provision of evidence is governed by Islamic law and the other administrative laws
regarding land management. Acceptable evidence includes documentations issued by the
relevantauthorities,163testimoniesoflong-timeresidents,164oath,andvisibleinvestmentsuch
162Accesstowaterisoneofthekeyfactorsthatpeopleconsiderwhenbuyingland.
163Previousgovernmentissueddocumentshavesignificantweightiftheycannotbeproventohavebeengainedthroughcorruption.Equallydocumentswillhavesignificantweightifaprovableownershipdidnotprecedetheissuanceofsuchdocuments,orifthedocumentisnotissuedduringthetimeoftheconflict,thatthedocumentwasnot issuedillegally,andthattherehasnotbeenvisible investmentbyanotherpartyonthedisputedpieceoflandpriortotheconflict.
164 Testimonies are considered as crucial evidence in line with the Islamic law when proving on ordisprovingownershipofland.
144|P a g e
as building and erection of foundation or fences.165 The Commission makes the decisions
throughsimplemajorityvoteandalsogivestherulinginawrittenform.Thechairmanofthe
Commissioncommunicatesthedecisiontotheregionalcourt,whichhastheresponsibilityof
enforcingtheCommission’sdecisions,withinamonth.
Inmorecomplexcases,thechairmanappointsanadjudicationcommitteeconsistingofthree,
fiveorsevenmembers foreachcasesubmittedtotheCommission.166 Inthefirstsitting, the
committee sorts out procedural issues, i.e. both sides are represented in the hearing and
ensuring that lawyers of both sides have had the opportunity of speaking to the sides they
represent.This is followedbytheformationofacommitteeandavisit ispaidtothe land in
questionsoastoenablethecommitteetoassessthesituationontheground.Thecommitteeis
empoweredtoenlistexpertopinion.Intheinitialstages,thecommitteeoftenenquiresabout
thepossibilityofoutofcourtsettlementdrawingonanumberofoptionssuchasthatparties
resolve their issues by 1) agreeing within themselves through negotiation, 2) nominating a
mediation team consisting of their representatives and overseen by a member of the
Commission,and3)seekingthemediationofelders.
Shouldthepartiesagreetothisoutofcourtsettlementoption,theLandCommissionauthorises
thecommencementoftheproceduresandissuesadecisionsupportingtheresolutionofthe
case.Ifthemediationfails,anormalhearingofthecasecommences.Whilethetrialsgoon,itis
verycommonthattheCommissionissuesrestrictionsonongoingconstructionorregistrationof
property.Theimpositionofsuchrestrictionsisappliedforbyoneofthesides.IftheCommission
isconvincedtoapplytherestriction, itasks forthepersonwhosubmittedtheapplicationto
provideaguaranteeforthereimbursementofthecostincurredasaresultoftherestriction,in
casehe/shelosesthecase.167
Tounderstandnotonlytheproceduralbutalsothepracticaladjudicationofcases,itisimportant
toreviewoneofthecaseshandledbytheCommissionindetail.Thecasediscussedbelowhas
165Existenceofstructuressuchasfenceorfoundationcanbeconsideredasanevidenceifitcanbeprovedthattheywerenotconstitutedbyforce,grabbingorothercorruptedmeans.
166 The number of the Commissioners for mediation is determined by the nature of the case to bemediated.
167 There are two forms of restrictions, one imposed on one-party or another imposed on all partiesinvolvedinthedispute.TheCommissioncanimposerestrictiononanongoingconstruction,processingofownershippapers.
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beenchosenbecauseitshowsthedynamicsofthelegal,institutionalandskillgapsinresolving
landdisputesthroughthestatutorysystem.
6.5 LandCommission:AdjudicationofaSelectedCase
Thecasediscussed in this sectionpittedMahamed168 (hereafter referredasplaintiff) against
Marwo169(defendant).ThecasewasopenedforadjudicationonDecember12,2010intheLand
Commission.170 The hearing panel consisted of five out of the seven members of the
Commission.
Inhisopeningremarks,thedefendant’slawyercontendedthathisclientwassoldaplotofland
bythedefendantonDecember19,2003,asshowninanotarisedsaleagreement.Thelawyer
arguedthattwoweekspriortothedatethecasewasbroughttocourt,thedefendantdestroyed
concrete blocks, commonly erected as a sign of land ownership, on property owned by the
plaintiff.Whentheplaintiffaskedthedefendantswhytheydidso,thedefendantsaidthatthe
landwaspurchasedfromthembelowthemarketprice.Thelawyerarguedthatthedefendant
sold the land to theplaintiff,andher sonwasawitness in thenotary.The lawyer therefore
requestedthecourttorulethelandbelongedtohisclientandorderthedefendanttopaylegal
expenses.
Inhis counterargument, thedefendant’s lawyerdenied theseallegations.The lawyerargued
thathisclientdidnotsellthelandtotheplaintiffbuttherewasaverbalagreementbetweenhis
client and the plaintiff. The agreement was that the plaintiff should help the defendant’s
daughtermigratetoanoverseascountry.Theplaintiffwasalsosupposedtoregistertheland
for the defendant, and contribute financially to the upbringing of the defendant’s orphan
children.Inreturn,thedefendanttoldhimthatshewouldgivehimland,withoutspecifyingany
particularsizeofthisland.Theplaintiffdidnotfulfilthetermsoftheverbalagreement.Hedid
notalsoofferheranyfinancialhelpotherthan$100dollarsandanother$500sentthrougha
remittancecompany.Thelawyerarguedthatwhenhisclientwascollectingthemoney,shewas
168Pseudoname.
169Pseudoname.
170Thisispartofthetribunaldata,whichIhaveanonymised.
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madetosignapaperpresumablyasareceiptfortheremittance.Thesamepaperwaspresented
inthecourtasasaleagreement.Hearguedthatitisimpossibletosuggestthat200x150ofland
couldbesoldfor$600in2003.Healsodismissedthenotary,astheareawasnotevenatthe
timeplannedforresidentialpurposes.
TheHearing
Thecourtconvenedfoursittingsonthiscase.ThefirstwasheldonDecember25,2010.The
plaintiff’s lawyerarguedthatthereasonwhythelandwassoldcheaplytohisclientwasthat
therewasnohighdemandforlandatthetime.Healsoarguedthatthedefendantapproached
hisclient,whoisfromthesameclanashim,andbeggedhimtobuythelandfromherasshe
needed the money. Considering the kinship-based relations between the two families, the
plaintiffbought the land fromherunderonecondition: that shewillbringaguarantor.Asa
result,shebroughtherchildren’sgrandfatherwhohassincepassedaway.
Inanattempttopre-emptpossiblequestionsaboutwhythedefendantallowedtheconstruction
oftheconcreteblocksinthepropertyasademarcationforownership,thedefendant’slawyer
focusedhiscounterargumentonjustifyingthereasonwhyhisclientacceptedthedemarcation
inthefirstplace.Hearguedthatasanoldperson,hisclientwasfeebleandunabletoverifythe
factsof thematter. The lawyeralsopointedout that thedefendant’s son signed thenotary
thinkingthathismotherwassentmoneybysomeoneoverseas.Healsostatedthathersonat
thetimeofsigningtheletterwasunderageanddidnotknowwhatwasgoingon.Healsoargued
thatthesonwasilliterateandcouldnotknowthecontentofthelatter,ashesignedtheletter
withhisthumb.
ThesecondsittingwasconvenedonDecember26,2010. In thishearing, theCommissioners
weretakentothe land inquestion, located inG/Libah,WarabeSalan,AwAdan.The lawyers
showedtheCommissionersaroundtheproperty.TheCommissionersgaveinstructionforthe
land to be measured, which was recorded as 250x150m. They also identified the private
properties and public spaces surrounding the land. The plaintiff’s lawyer also showed the
Commissionersconcreteblockswithsomescribblingonthem,andanearthworkwhichhassince
been levelled. He argued that these concrete blocks belong to the plaintiff, and they are
damagedby the defendant and her family.While on the site, the Commissioners asked the
defendantsomequestionsinthepresenceofherlawyer.Theseincluded
Q:Wereyoutherewhentheconcreteblockswereerected?
A:Noitwasbuiltinthemiddleofthenight.
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Q:Didyoursonsworkintheconstructionandearthwork?
A:No.
Q:Whatisyourrelationshipwiththeplaintiff?
A:Nothing.
Q:Whoerectedtheconcreteblocks?
A:Theyaretheoneswhoconstructedandcamewithsoldierschasingourchildrenfromtheareas.
Q:Whoare‛they’?
A:Theplaintiffandhisfamily.
Q:Whobulldozedtheareaonthesecondtime?
A:Mychildrendidsowhenwedidnotseeanyonecomingforsixyears?
The last two sittingswerededicated tohearing thewitnesses.However, theydemonstrated
seriouslegalincompetencebyboththelawyersandthejudges.Thisisbecause,aswillbeseen
below,thewitnesseswereaskedverymildquestionwhichdidnotchallengethemenoughto
revealthetruth.Veryfewbackgroundchecks,ifany,werealsodonebythelawyerstoscrutinize
theintegrityandcredibilityofthewitnesses,aswouldbethecaseinanycrediblelegalprocedure
ofthisnature.ThethirdsittingoccurredonJanuary4,2011.Theplaintiff’slawyerproducedfour
witnessestosupporthiscase.Thefirstwitnesswasa34-year-oldconstructionworkerwhoisa
residentofHargeisa.He said thatheworkedon theconstruction siteon thedatewhen the
concreteblockswereerected,andtherewasnolanddisputeatthetime.Theplaintifflawyer
askedhim:
Q:Thereweresoldiersatthetime?
A:No.
Q:Didthechildrenworkintheconstruction?
A:Ihaveseenoneofherchildrenattheconstructionsite.
Thedefendant'slawyerdidnotcross-examinethewitness,buttheCommissionersaskedhim
onequestion:
Q:Whowassupervisingthematthetimeoftheconstruction?
A:Aforeman.
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The second witness was a 50-year-old builder. He said they were taken to the site by a
constructioncompanyunderthesupervisionofanengineerwhohasshownthemthesite.He
said,atthetimetherewasnoanysignoflanddispute.Theplaintifflawyeraskedhim:
Q:Thereweresoldiersinthesiteatthetimeoftheconstruction?
A:No.
Q:Werethedefendant’sfamilyworkingonthesite?
A:Someofthemwereworkinginthere,oneisincourtnow.
Thedefendant’slawyerdidnotcross-examinethewitnessagain.ACommissioneraskedhim:
Q:Howmanydaystherewereworkinginthere
A:Oneday.
Thethirdwitnesswasa60-year-oldresident inthearea.Shesaidshewasamakeshift food
seller,andwhileshewassellingherfoodontheconstructionsite,shedidnotseeanyproblem.
Theplaintiff’slawyeraskedherwhetherthe:
Q:familywhosoldthelandtotheplaintiffwerepresentatthetimeoftheconstruction?
A:Yes
Q:Doyouseeanyonewhowasthereinthisroom?
A:Yes,pointingatthedefendant’sson,hewasthinneratthetime.
TheCommissionalsoaskedthewitnesssomequestions:
Q:Wherewerethefamilywhosoldthelandatthetimeoftheconstruction?
A:Theywereresidentinanearbyplace.
Q:Didyouseethedefendantinthere?
A:Iwastheretwice,andIhaveseenher.
The fourthwitnesswas36-year-olddriverwhosaidtheywentthereat6 in themorning.He
testifiedthattherewasnolanddeputewhenhewentthereinthemorningoftheconstruction.
Theplaintiff’slawyeraskedhimwhether:
Q:Thereweresoldiersinthesiteonthedayoftheconstruction?
A:No.
TheCommissionersaskedhim
Q:Whatwereyoudoingonthesiteonthatday?
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A:Iwasdrivingtheplaintiffsisterstotheconstructionsite.
Q:Doyourecogniseanyonewhowasthereonthatday?
A:Hepointedtothedefendant’sson.
The fourth sitting was held on December 18, 2011. The defendant’s lawyer produced two
witnesses.Thefirstwitnesswasa55years-oldneighbourwhotestifiedthattheplaintiffandthe
defendantcametoherinateashop.Shesaidtohimthatshewantedtogivelandtothisman
whowasfromLondon.Theywenttothefarmtogether,andshepointedattheWesternpartof
thefarm,sayingshegaveittohim.Thelandgiventohimwasnotdemarcatedatthetime.The
plaintiffgaveher$200andsentheranother$400later.Thegrandfatherofherchildrenwasthe
guarantorwhosaidtheywouldberesponsibleforanyproblems.Thenotarywasthensigned.
Theplaintifferectedconcreteblocksonthesitetodemarcateownership.Awhile later,they
cametoknowthattheconcreteblocksweredestroyed.Theplaintiff’sfamilywenttothewitness
andgavehimsomemoneytohireabulldozer.Theytookthebulldozertheretodemarcatethe
landagain,but thedefendant’s sonsprevented them fromdoing so. They thenwent to the
guarantorandaskedhimtointervene,andhetoldthemtogowithpoliceofficers.Whenthey
wenttothesitewiththepolice,therewasnoonethere,andtheycontinuedtheirwork.Despite
allthis,thewitnesstestifiedthathedoesnotbelievethatthelandwassoldtotheplaintiff.He
insistedthatitwasagift.Theplaintiff’slawyercross-examinedthewitnessbriefly.Heasked
Q:Wasthecontentofthenotaryofwhichyouwereasignatoryreadtoyou?
A:IthoughttheywereGodfearingpeople.
Q:Whoaskedyoutobringthebulldozer?
A:Therelativesoftheplaintiff.
Thedefendantslawyercross-examinedthewitness.Heasked
Q:Wereyoutakingpartintheconstructionactivity?
A:Yes
Q:Didyouseethechildrenofthedefendant?
A:Myeyesdidnotcatchthem.
Q:Tellushowmuchlandwasdemarcatedfortheplaintiff?
A:Thelowerwesternpartsofthefarm.
Q:Whenyouusedthebulldozer,whatwasguidingyou?
A:Ifollowedpreviousdemarcations.
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Q:Didtheplaintiffbuylandfromyou?
A:Yes.
Q:Whatwasthesizeoftheland?
A:100x150.
Q:Howmuchdidhegiveyou?
A:$2500.
Q:Doyouhaveaproof?
A:Yes.
Q:Areyouoneofthesignatoriesinthenotary?
A:Yes,Iam,butitwasagift,notasale.
Q:Ifitwasnotsalewhydidtheguarantorsignit?
A:Ididnotknow,Isignedthenotarylater.
The second witness was a 35 years-old builder. He told the court that they started the
construction of the concrete blocks in the morning. At the time, there was no sign of the
presence of the defendant’s family. But two guys came to the site when the construction
workerswereleaving.Hesaidthatheoverheardthemsayingthattheywilldestroytheconcrete
blocksiftheirduesarenotgiven.TheCommissionersaskedhimfurtherquestions.
Q:Wereyouoneoftheconstructionworkers?
A:Yes.Didyouseethedefendant’sfamilyinthere?
Q:No.
Theplaintifflawyercross-examinedthewitness.Heaskedhim
Q:Whenyouweretakingpartinconstruction,didyouseesoldiers?
A:No.
Q:Wasthereadisputeinthesite?
A:No.
Q:Whowerethedefendant’stwochildren?
A:MohamedandAbdi.
TheCommissionersaskedthewitness:
Q:Whenyouwereconstructingtheconcreteblockswhichwassupervisingyou?
A:Anengineer.
Q:Wastheotherside,defendant,representedinthedemarcationprocess?
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A:No
TheCommissionaskedthetwosidestopresenttheirconcludingremarksonDecember23,2011.
Theplaintiff’slawyerpresentedhisconcludingremarks,butthedefendant’slawyerdidnot.
TheRuling
Followingthehearingofthewitnesses,theCommissionersdeliberatedtheirrulingonDecember
15,2012.Theystipulatedthattheybasedtheirrulingonarangeofstatutoryandsharialaws.
Theypointedout that, in linewithArticle79and80ofXHM,theCommissioncomparedthe
evidencepresentedbythetwosidesintheformofwitnessesanddocuments.Thisissodespite
the fact theonlywrittendocument submitted to thecourtwas thenotary sale’sagreement
disputedbythedefendants. Thismakesthewitnessestheonlysignificantevidenceforboth
sides of the land dispute. In the ruling, the Commissioners also claim that upon a close
examinationofthetestimonials,theyweresatisfiedwiththeaccountsprovidedbytheplaintiffs’
fourwitnesses.
In summary, theCommissionerspointedout in their ruling that the firstwitnesswhowas a
constructionworkertestifiedthatwhentheconstructionstartedtherewasnolanddisputeor
presenceofpolice.Thesecondwitnesstestifiedthatoneofthedefendant’ssonwasworkingin
theconstructionandthattherewasnodisputebetweenthesides.Similarly,thethirdwitness
whowasacookfortheconstructionworkersreinforcedthattherewerenodisputesbetween
the sides and the defendant’s children were on site at the time of the construction. The
Commissionwassatisfiedwiththesetestimonies.
The defendant’s witnesses were two. The first witness testified that he accompanied the
defendantandtheplaintifftothefarmatthetimeoftheexchange.Hetestifiedthathewasalso
awareofthepayment,andhewasasignatoryinthenotary.Theonlydifferencehepointedout
was that the land was a gift and not sale. His testimony therefore does not support the
defendant’s case in anyway. The secondwitnesswhowas constructionworkerdidnot also
testify inawaythatsupportsthedefendant.Heaffirmedthattherewerenodisputesatthe
timeoftheconstruction.TheCommissionwasthereforesatisfiedwiththetestimonygivenby
thewitnesses,whichdidnot inanycasesupportthedefendant.Takingthis intoaccountthe
Commissionacceptedthetestimoniesandthenotaryasevidencebytheplaintiff.
TheCommission’sbriefrulingonthiscasewasthusbasedonlaws,bothIslamicandstatutory,
whoserelevancetothecasewasnotexplainedatallintheruling.Inessence,therulingwasfour
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lineslongandwasladenwithreferencestoarticlesandsectionsoftherelevantlaws.Theruling
wasissuedintheSomalilanguage,anditstransliteratesasfollows:
TheCommission–inconsiderationoftheabovetestimoniesandinaccordancewitharticles82,
80,117,119oftheXHM;aswellasarticles92,193,and272section1ofXHM;readtogether
with723ofXMandarticle25section1ofLawNo:17/2001;andinconformancewiththeIslamic
ShariaLaw,particularly theQur’an,Chapter,1 (Baqara), verse275,282and283– issued the
followingruling:
1. TheCommissionruledthecaseagainsttheplaintiff.
2. Thesizeofthelandruledfortheplaintiffis200x150.
3. TheCommissionorderedthedefendanttopaythelegalexpenses
4. TherulingwasmadeonDecember15,2012.
5. ThechairpersonchairedthesittingsandattendedbyfourCommissioners
I have detailed this case at length because it shows the absence of proper documentation,
adequate legal training, sufficient financial resources, and investigative capacity. Taken
together,thisleadstoover-relianceonwitnesses.Italsopointstothegraveweaknessesinthe
landregistrationsystemofthecity.Furthermore,itexplainsthereasonwhytheadjudication
systemreliesonothermeansofprovingownershipsuchasthroughwitnesses.Bothsidesofthe
disputemobilisedwitnessestodefendtheircase.Neitherhadevidentialdocumentsotherthan
anotarysignedagreement,whichonesidepresentedasevidenceandtheotherdisputed.One
major problem with the reliance on witness accounts relates to their authenticity. Sources
knowledgeableaboutthelanddisputesinthecityinformedmeoftheexistenceofagroupof
peoplewhoarecommonlyknownasdheerbeenaalayaal,whichcanbe looselytranslatedas
false oath takers. The group benefits from the over-reliance on witness accounts as a key
mechanismofprovingordisprovinglandownership.TheytakeIslamicoathsonbehalfoftheir
clientswhoenlisttheirservice.
Moreover,thestatefailstocheckclaimsthroughalternativeformalmeans.For instance,the
Commissioners have overlooked the possibility of verifying disputant claims from the police
records. In otherwords, the police could have been requested to checkwhether they sent
officers to theconstructionsiteasclaimedbyoneof thedisputants.Suchpoorcoordination
betweenthevariousagenciesinvolvedinlandconflictsmakesadjudicationprocessesweakbut
alsocompromisesrevelationofthetruth.
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Themannerinwhichjudgmentsarepassedindicatesalackofsophisticationandshallowness
notonlyonthepartoftheLandCommissionbutalsootherstatutorycourts.Thejudgmentsare
justifiedonthebasisofarangeofstatutorylegalinstrumentsandsharialaw,butscantdetails
aregivenaboutthemeaningofthesearticlesandsectionoflawsandversesoftheQur’an,or
how they relate to the case. This ambiguity in the application of the law discouragesmany
peoplefromusingthestatutorysystemastheyareconfusedbythecomplexlegalorganisation
whosedetailsareburieddeepinbooksthatarebarelyaccessibleoravailabletothevastmajority
ofpeople in thecity.Theway thiscasewashandledechoes issues raised in focusgroups,171
which support my interpretation of the lack of trust in the Commission’s process and
judgements. Taken together, the above-mentioned weaknesses undermine the state’s
credibilityandlegitimacytogovern,encouragingpeopletorelyonothermeansandnetworks
tomediatetheirconflictanddefendthemagainstthestate.Thespatialmanifestationofsuch
mistrust,Iargueonceagain,issegregation,aspectsofwhichenablepeopletoresistthestate’s
attempttoenforcerulingsandotherregulatorydecisions.
6.6 WeakState?DynamicsandDilemmasofEnforcement
Theabovecasedemonstratesthatweakstatecapacityindeliveringjusticemayexacerbateland
disputesthatcanhaveserioussecurityimplicationsforthecity,asclaimantsmaycomearmed
to the teeth fighting on the disputed site. Inmost cases, armed violence happens after the
adjudication.172Thissuggeststhattheproblemarisesfromtheweaknessofthestatetoenforce
courtrulingsandothergovernmentdecisions.Thereasonwhythegovernmentcannotenforce
sentencesvariesdependingonthecaseandcontextbutonecommonelementthatrecursin
thediscussiononthejustificationforthepoorenforcementisthatitjeopardisesthesecurityof
thecityasclansmaymobilisethemselvesonalargescale.Thisunderminesthejudiciaryandthe
executivearmofgovernment,whichisentrustedwithenforcingjudicialdecisions.Oneformer
securityofficialtoldmewhathappenswhencourtsissuethemwithdecisionsforenforcement:
when a warrant reaches the station commander, he communicates the
divisionalcommanderandthenthedivisionalcommandercommunicatesthe
policeCommissionerand then thepoliceCommissioner communicates the
171FocusGroupDiscussionAugust31,2014.VariousParticipants.HargeisaResidents.
172ParticipantinKaahRestaurant/TeaDiscussionAugust07,2014.HargeisaResident.
154|P a g e
Minister and then the decision comes from the Minister saying that
enforcementofcourtsentencecouldcausegreaterpoliticalrepercussionand
thereforethereisnoneedtoenforceit.173
As evident here, the key challenge facing the Land Commission is a lack of enforcement.
Similarly, clan mobilisation makes it difficult politically for the state to take action against
individuals.Someofthereasonsthatmakeclansrendersupporttheirkinsmenisthatmanyof
thejudgmentsareperceivedtohavebeenissuedthroughcorruptionornepotism.Butitisalso
important that sometimes the clans side with people from their own ranks without any
justification.Aretiredagriculturaleconomistpointedout:
Whatpeoplewantisthattheygettheirrightsbutdenytherightofthestate.
Peoplegotogovernmentofficialsandiftheydon'tfindwhattheywantfrom
themtheybypassthesystemandgotosomeoneandabovethemthrough
socialnetworksandtrytoimposetheirordersfromabove.Thiskindofbypass
weakenstheruleoflawasofficialswillhaveatendencyofnotkeepingthe
lawastheirorderswillbecancelledbyhigherauthorities.174
Theotherproblemislackofcapacityonthepartofthestate.Thosewhoare
workingforthestatecanbecorruptedbecauseofthefactthattheydon'tget
enough benefits to take care of their families. There are also lack of
administrativeskillsforcivilservantstodischargetheirduties.Thistherefore
causesaproblemtotheenforcementprocess.Inmanycasesyouwillseea
smallplotoflandcausinghavocinaneighbourhoodaspeopledisputeand
sometimesuseviolencemainlybecauseoflackofenforcementondecisions
madethroughcourts.175
Aside from the fears of the destabilising repercussions resulting from
enforcement,securityforcesexerciseextremecautioninenforcementsdue
to the fact that if they harm somebody in the line of duty, they are held
173Interviewee23August14,2014.SolicitorGeneralofSomaliland.
174Interviewee35August16,2014.RetiredAgriculturalEconomist.
175Interviewee27August12,2014.Politician.
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responsiblepersonallyfortheseactsbytheclanfromwhichthevictimshail.
Recently,thegovernmentadoptedanewpolicyinwhichitpaysbloodmoney
totheclansonbehalfofitssecurityofficersbuttheamountofcompensation
is lesser than the standard clan-based arrangements and this leads to
unacceptabilityofgovernmentcompensation.176
Enforcement is also weakened by the mutual exploitation of government and traditional
institutions/Akils. Inotherwords, thegovernmentexploits the traditional system inorder to
enforce its rules and regulations and the traditional authorities exploit the government
structures by exerting political clan-based pressure on the government in order to achieve
particulargoalsandinterests.Anexampleofthiscouldbefoundinaninstancewhereasitting
judge’sauthoritywasdefiedincourtbyanAkilrepresentingamemberofhisclan.Thejudge
recalls:
Iinstructedthepoliceinthecourttotakehimoutofmychambersbutwhile
theyweretryingtodoso,hepulledapistolandfiredoneshotintheairand
thenfled.Iissuedanarrestwarrantforhimandpolicesiegedhishousebut
theleadofficerreceivedacallfromtheProvincialCommissioner(PC)saying
thatheshouldwithdrawhisforcesfromthearea.Theofficer informedhis
bossthathe isundercourt instructiontoarrest themanandbringhimto
courtbutwaschallengedthathewillberesponsibleforanyinsecuritythat
results fromthisattempt.The followingday,agroupofAkils cametome
requesting a mediation between me and the man who challenged my
authority.ItoldthemthisisnotanissueofAkils.Iinstructedthejudgesand
otherstaffinthecourttotakeleavesincethegovernmentisunabletoensure
theirsafety.
Followingthis,theprovincialprosecutorandthepolicedivisionalcommander
cametome,askingthatIshouldrecallthecourtstaffandjudgesoncondition
thattheywillbringtheAkilwhocausedtheproblemincourt.Itoldthemif
youcan'tbringthoseItellyoutobringtocourtthenIcannottakethoseyou
bringtocourtonyourown.Themanwasinhidingforfewdaysthenhecame
176Interviewee28August12,2014.Politician.
156|P a g e
outofthehidingafteraweekandheaccidentallymetthepolicedivisional
commanderinthelocalgovernmentoffices.Oneofthesoldiersrecognised
himandhewasarrestedonthespot.ClanelderstriedtointervenebutItold
themthatthemanchallengedtheruleoflawandauthorityofthestateand
forthisreasonheisunderarrestforthestate.Mypointwastoensurethat
thedueprocessisfollowed.Ofcourse,thatwaswhenthejudiciarywasmore
independentforatleastpettycasesbackinthelate1990s.177
Whileelitesandpublicofficialsrhetoricallydismissclanism,itisraretoseedirectconfrontation
overinstanceswhereclanshaveunderminedjudicialauthority,particularlyinissueswherethe
politicalstakesarenothigh.Thereasonswhyelitesandpublicofficialsavoidclasheswithclan
elders is not only about security, but also relates to social and political interests. Since the
introductionofmulti-partypoliticsinSomaliland,it iscommontoseeclansgatheringintheir
strongholdsandmakingpoliticaldeliberationsinsupportoroppositiontopolitical leaders. In
someinstances,clanshavebeeninstrumentalinthemakingofpower.Thecurrentgovernment
forinstance,cametoofficethroughfiercemobilisationofHabarJeloandsignificantproportion
ofAwalclans.Itcanbearguedthatthismobilisationofclansupportweakensthedevelopment
ofpoliticalparties’abilitytocompeteonthebasisof ideologicaldifferences.Thiscanleadto
security concerns as the different clan based political forums and gatherings can issue
inflammatorystatementsthatcanfuelconflictbetweentheclansandthestateorwithinthe
clansthemselves.
177Interviewee37March30,2014.DistrictCourtJudge.
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Figure5:ActiveConflictonaPlotofLandinMasalaha,aneighbourhoodinSouthernHargeisa178
Source:Phototakenbyauthor
WhiletheestablishmentoftheCommissionontheonehandmayhavehadasignificantimpact
ontheway landconflictsareresolvedthroughthestatutorysystembyspeedingupcases, it
facesseriouschallengesthatunderminepublicconfidenceinitsabilitytoresolvelandconflicts
inthecity.Manypeopleaccusethesystemofbeingascorruptasthecourtswhilealsosignificant
interferenceexistsfromdifferentsourcessuchasthegovernmentagenciesaswellastheclan
pressures.Butbyfarthemostimportantissuethatmakespeopledoubtthefunctionalityofthe
Commissionisthefactthatthereisaseriouslackofenforcementofdecisionsitmakes.179This
makespublicconfidenceswinginfavourofcustomaryandIslamicinstitutions,whichhavesome
sortofvoluntaryenforcementmechanismbuiltintothemasfamilymembersofbothsidestake
partinthemediationprocessandprovideguaranteesthattheverdictisacceptedbyall.
178IhavetakenthisphotoinMaywhenIcameacrossagroupofpeoplefightingoverapieceofland.Oneofthesidescametoconstructademarcationfoundationinacontestedplotofland.Thiswasstoppedbyanothergroupofmenwhoalsoclaimedtheownershipoftheplot.Thepoliceintervenedtheconflictandpreventedthetwogroupsfrombecomingviolenttowardseachother.
179ParticipantinHadhwanaagTeashopDiscussionSeptember19,2014.HargeisaResident.
158|P a g e
Ascanbeseenintheabovenarrative,theimportanceofclanmembershipthatisperpetuated
throughthepluralandoverlappingjudicialstructures,hasdevelopedasaproductofthestruggle
betweencustomaryandstatutoryinstitutions.Suchstrugglerestsonantagonisticpracticesof
legitimationanddelegitimationofauthority(aswillbedemonstratedinthenextchapter)where
landconflictmanagementisthefieldinwhichaspectsofthestruggletakeplace.Isuggestinthis
thesis, that theway the Land Commission and other legal institutions operates is thus also
implicated in theperpetuationof territorial segregation. This isbecause thewayurban land
conflictsaremanagedtoasignificantdegreecanchangeorreinforcethespatialcharacterofthe
city.Forinstance,iftheconstitutionofaspecialisedCommissionforlandconflictssucceededin
bringing about tenure security, such that land owners did not live in continual fear of
unnecessarydisputes,thiscouldhavecontributedtotheemergenceofnon-clanbasedattitudes
tochoiceofsettlement.Theopposite,however,seemstobethecase,asthestate’sfailureto
enforcejudicialdecisionsarguablyreinforcesthecurrentclanbasedspatialpatternofthecity
aspeopleseenoalternativetostayinginanareawheretheycanaccessothermeansofresolving
theirlandissues.
6.7 Conclusion
Given the fact that the statutory system has at no timemonopolised the local governance
landscapeinurbanplaces,customaryinstitutionshavesuccessfullypositionedthemselvesasa
betteralternativetoresolvelandconflicts.Thishappenedagainstabackdropofarelationship
characterisedby inconvenientcoexistenceandconstantstruggle forgoverningspaces.While
thestatutoryinstitutionshavetheupperhandinsuchstruggle,inthesensethatthestateoften
sanctionedthem,thecustomaryinstitutionsenjoyedmuchhigherlegitimacyandpopularity.In
mynarrativeabove,whichcutsacrosshistoricalandrecentlandmanagementpractices,Iargue
thattheclanbasedspatialsegregationofHargeisaispartlyageographicalmanifestationofthe
strugglebetweenthestatutoryandcustomaryinstitutions.Inotherwords,thegreaterthelevel
oflegitimacyandaccesstocustomaryinstitutions,themorelikelythatpeoplewillmaketheir
choicesofabodeinareaswheretheycouldgetaccesstosuchinformaljusticearrangements.
Itisimportanttonotethattheadjudicationmechanismdiscussedinthechapterneglectsland
conflictsinwhichthestateisparty.Whilethestatutorysystemisreelingwithproblemsresulting
frombothformalandinformalinterferencefromtheexecutive,thetraditionalinstitutionsare
alsosubjectedtoasignificantlevelofmanipulation.Suchmanipulationsaremultidimensional.
Someareformalsuchasthefactthatasignificantproportionofthetraditionalstructuresare
159|P a g e
onthegovernmentpayrollandhenceareseldomtrustedasindependentmediators.Othersare
informalinthesensethatthestateusesvariousmechanismstounderminetraditionalleaders
whodonotplaytotheirtune.Thisincludesthecreationofparalleltraditionalfigureswhohail
fromthesameclanasthatofthedissentingeldertobreakuptheirsupportbase.Thiscreates
mistrustnotonlybetweenthestateandcustomaryinstitutionsbutalsothestateandthepublic.
Inthelongrun,suchmistrustunderminesstatelegitimacy.Inthenextchapter,Iexaminefurther
howthisstruggleforlegitimacycontributestourbansegregationinHargeisa.
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CHAPTER7 LEGITIMATIONFUNCTIONOFURBANLANDCONFLICTS
7.1 Introduction
In 2012, the government of Somaliland embarked on efforts aimed at expanding Egal
International Airport in Hargeisa, following an infrastructural development grant from the
KingdomofKuwait.Theproposedexpansionincludedtheconstructionofarunwayaswellas
the demarcation of a boundary and security fence around the airport.180 One of themajor
challengesfacingthisprojectwashoweverthefactthatthelandsurroundingtheairportwasin
thehandsoflocallandowners/claimantswhoweremainlylow-incomepeoplefromtheEidagale
whichisoneofthemajorclansinthecity.Thisledtoalandconflict,pittingthestateagainst
landowners. Inseveral instances,thisconflictalmosttranslatedintoviolentconfrontationas
the state threatened land owners with eviction and land owners warned the state of dire
consequences.Evidently,thetwosideswereengagedinalegitimacystruggleinwhicheachside
soughttolegitimiseitsactionsanddelegitimisethoseoftheother.Inthischapter,Iarguethat
this legitimacy struggle marginalises the poor due to unequal power relations, undermines
publictrustinthestate,andformsthebasisonwhichviolentresistanceisjustified.Insecurity
and lack of trust contributes to the perpetuation of clan-based settlement patterns where
resistingindividualsorgroupsfavourtolocatethemselvesinareasdominatedbytheirclansso
astomobilisesupportandresourcesforchallengingauthorities.Thedisputedocumentedinthis
chapterthatpittedthelandowners,intheairportwhoallbutfewbelongedtotheEidagaleclan,
againstthestateworkedtoreinforcetheirclanidentityasaprimesourceofprotection,while
thecoverageofthisdisputeinthemediaalsoencouragedothersnottoneglecttheirinvestment
inclannetworksasasourceofsecurity.Thedisputealsoworkedtoincreasepopularsentiment
thatthestatecouldeasilybecometheenemy.
This chapter relies on key informal interviews, archivalmaterials, andmedia sources.While
discussionsontheconceptofhybriditymakereferencestothedynamicsofstatelegitimacyand
theessentialsinglenatureoflegitimationthroughthefusionofstateandcustomaryinstitutions,
the spatial manifestation is neglected. Simply casting institutions that shape the spatial
characterof the cities in Somaliland ashybrid, thusworks toobscure rather than illuminate
importantsocialandpoliticalprocesses.Thechapterisorganisedintofivesections.Inthefirst
180 Thenortherndirection is exempted from the expansiondue to the existenceof substantial urbandevelopmentconsistingofbothcommercialandresidentialareas.
161|P a g e
section,Idiscussthehistoryofairportexpansion.Inthesecondandthirdsections,Idiscussthe
significanceoftheairportandterritorialcontrolaswellastheimportanceoftheairportforstate
legitimationamidalonghistoryofnegativeperceptionstowardsSomalistatebuilding.Inthe
fourth and fifth sections, I discuss how the state rationalises and seeks to implement land
expropriationaswellashow landowners rationaliseandorganise their resistance.Equally, I
examinetheprocessesandpracticesofconflictmediationaswellthevaluationofproperties
andcompensation.
7.2 PushingtheBoundary:ThePastAirportExpansions
Legitimacyliesattheheartofmodernstate-buildingdiscussions.Despitethis,thelegitimacyof
publicauthoritiesattractsinadequateattentionintheliteratureonSomalistate-building.The
limited available literature on legitimacy places the focus on the national and regional
subnationallevelsoverlookingthelocalandmorespecificallytheurban(PeggandKolstø,2015,
Richards, 2015, Wiuff Moe, 2011). Hoffman and Kirk (2013) underline the importance of
localisinglegitimacydebatesastheyareshapedbytheeverydayinteractionbetweenpeople,
influenced by cultures and beliefs. Moreover, legitimacy discussions at the local level are
importantforunderstandingtherationalesthroughwhichpeoplemayassesslegitimacy,which
islargelyshapedbythemeaningcitizensattachtostatebehaviour(GuptaandSharma,2006).
According to Nora and Réginas (2014) differentials in how people may rate legitimacy and
ascribedifferent levelstovarious institutionswithinastate,181canbeaccountedforthrough
examinationof the local.Thus,examiningthe localisedconflictover theairportexpansion in
Hargeisa,willenableustounderstandmorecloselythepolitical,economicandsocialfactors
underpinningthevariouswaysinwhichperceptionstowardsthestatelegitimacyareformed.182
As legitimacy is characterised as a continuous process of social and political construction
conditionedbyconstantinteractionandcontestationbetweenvarioussocialandinstitutional
actors(Lund,2006),theairportexpansioninHargeisacanbestbeunderstoodasanattemptby
thestatetoincreaseitspoliticallegitimacyandstateviabilitybothlocallyandinternationally,
facingintheprocessastiffresistancefromothersocialactorsi.e.localresidentswhooppose
theairportexpansion forvariousreasons.Theproposedexpansionmainlyseeks topushthe
181i.e.localandnationalorexecutiveandlegislativeinstitutions.
182Forinstance,theremaybedifferenceinhowtheelitesandmasses,interestorsocialgroups,orpeoplefromdifferentregionsmayevaluatelegitimacy.
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airport boundary towards Uubaale settlement whose formation preceded the airport
establishment,datingbacktothemid1940s.Accordingtoanoldladyinher70swhospentmost
ofher life inthearea,thespaceonwhichtheairportstandsusedtobeaplaygroundwhere
youngpeopleperformSomalitraditionaldancesduringspring.183Thegrowthofthesettlement
gainedmomentumintheearly1950swhenSultanAbdullahiDirieoftheEidagaleclanregistered
33 farmswith the colonial government on grounds that hewanted to diversify his clan’s184
nomadiclifestylesoastomakethemresilienttoenvironmentalhardshipsbysettlingsomeas
farmersincloseproximitytothecitywheregreateropportunitiesexisted.185
Pioneersofthesettlementincludedthefamilyofafamousplaywright,AhmedSuleimanBidde,
andotherssuchasAwTahir,AwFarah,AliBarre,Bodle,LehTur,SalanJirde,AdanIman,and
Saqafale.Thesettlementgrew incrementallyasothernomadic families joinedthepreviously
smallbandofsettlers.186Infrastructuraldevelopmentintheareabegunintheearly1950sata
timewhenthecolonialgovernmentwaspreparingthecountryforpossibleattainmentofself-
rule or full independence subject to the then ongoing local, regional and global political
dynamics. Among the most significant of these developments was the construction of the
airportin1952.Priortothis,thecolonialgovernmentconstructedasemi-tarmacroadonthe
Southernsideoftheairportin1951.187Forthefirstfewyears,airportactivitiesremainedlimited
due to the fact that scant facilities andequipmentwere available for airlineoperations. For
instance,therewerenofirefightingmachinesandaccommodationtohouseambulancesatthe
airport.Thesituationwas,however,improvedintherun-uptotheindependencein1960when
theProtectorate’streasuryincludedtheprovisionoffirefightingmachinesfortheairportinits
1956/7 budget. Despite conflicting advice on the issue between the various departments
concerned (Treasury, 1958), the treasury approved a grant of 14,180 to finance 95% of the
construction cost for a new airport terminal in 1956/7 fiscal year. By the end of 1958, the
183Interviewee45April22,2014.LandOwner.
184Itishoweverimportanttonotethatindividualsfromotherclansarealsofoundinthearea.ButitisnotclearwhethertheytookadvantageoftheSultan’sproposalorsettledintheareaontheirown.
185Interviewee39June05,2014.Playright.
186Ibid.
187Interviewee51March30,2014.LandOwner.
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terminal, main building, garage and access roads for the airport were completed (British
SomalilandProtectorate,1958).
Theairportwasthereafterexpandedseveraltimes.Thefirstexpansionoccurredin1965when
aunitoftheSomaliArmedForcesestablishedabaseneartheairport.Theyconstructedfew
housesontheWesternsideandinstalledradarsontherightsideoftheairport.Themilitary
basewasfurtherexpandedundertheleadershipofMohammedMidahwhoservedinthearmy
atdifferentcapacitiesandlaterbecameaseniorofficial intheDefenceMinistry.Afewmore
military facilities were added. These included stores for light arsenals and fuel tanks.188
Accordingtolocalresidents,theinitialexpansionoftheairportdidnotencounterstiffresistance
fromlandownersintheareapartlybecauseofanunderstandingthatthemilitarywillnotfurther
theirpositiontowardsthefarmers.Thelandowners,fortheirpart,alsowereexpectednotto
encroachonthegovernmentpropertiesinthearea.Theexpansiononlyaffectedafewfarms,
so this probably compromised any greater resistance to the expansion at that time.
Furthermore, theGovernorof the thenNorth-WesternProvince forwhichHargeisawas the
capitalrefurbishedtheairportfacilitiesandaddedrestingroomsintheearly1970s.189
Asidefromthefactthattheairportwas,andstillis,avaluabletransporthubinthecountry,it
wasalso,andremainsastrategically important focalpoint forstate legitimacy.For instance,
duringtheconflictbetweenEthiopiaandSomaliainthelate1970sandearly1980s,thecityof
HargeisawasvulnerabletoEthiopianairpowerduetoitscloseproximitytotheborder.Asthe
airport is locatedonhighergroundthanmostpartsof thecity, it servedasoneof themost
importantstrategicplaceswhereairdefencesystemsaimedatpreventingEthiopianjetfighters
from bombarding the city could be installed. As a result, the Somali government placed a
significantarsenal inandaround theairport. Theairportalsobecamea strategicground for
politicalcontrolandpower.Thisstrategicrolebecamemoreapparentduringthecivilwar in
1988whentheairportbecameamajorhub for themilitaryactivitiesof the formerdictator,
MohamedSiyadBarre,whousedtheairportasakeybaseforhostinghisairpowerandartillery
aimedatshellingthecityinabidtobringtheSNMrebelliontoanend.
UponthedisintegrationoftheSomalistate,theairportbecameasignificantbaseforsomeof
theclanmilitia in thecity foralmost threeyearsbeforeMohamed IbrahimEgal, the second
188Interviewee39June05,2014.Playright.
189Interviewee10October29,2014.FormerGovernorofNorthWesternProvince.
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PresidentofSomaliland,cametopowerin1993.Oneofthemostdaringepisodesofresistance
the President faced during his time in office came from militias based in the airport. This
resistance finally resulted ina stalemateemanating from thePresident’s attempt to forcibly
demobilise themilitias andgaining control over the airport notonlybecauseof its strategic
transportationvitalitybutalsoforits importanceinstrengtheningstatecontroloverthecity.
MilitiasintheairportwhowereunconvincedaboutthelegitimacyofthePresident’sascentto
powerandthemeans throughwhichhewantedtogaincontrolover theairport resistedhis
attempt,leadingtoaninterclancivilwarthatlastedforalmostthreeyears.190Eventhoughthe
conflictinitiallybeganasalowlevelskirmishinvolvingclanmilitiafightingoverthedistribution
ofstateresources,itlaterdegeneratedintoabiggerpoliticalstruggleinvolvingpoliticianswith
varyingviewsandagendas.Theconflictwasexacerbatedbythefactthatasignificantnumber
ofthesecuritypersonneldefectedtotheirrespectiveclansandtheirmilitia.Theclashdisplaced
more than 150,000 people, and most of those fleeing the war sought refuge in areas
predominantlypopulatedbytheirclans(Bryden,1994a).Thiswarcametoanendin1997when
thePresidentagreedtomeetsomeofthedemandsputforwardbyresistingclans,Garhajisof
whichEidagaleispart,andtheirmilitias,andsackedsomeofhiskeypoliticalallieswhowere
consideredasspoilers inthepeaceprocess.Theculminationofthewarenabledthenascent
statetoimposeeffectivecontrolonalmostallthemajorgovernmentfacilitiessuchastheports
andairportsinthecountry.
7.3 TerritorialControlandSignificanceoftheAirport
Territorial and state-owned property control was an essential element of state building in
Somaliland throughout its post-conflict history. Itwas particularly a priority for Abdirahman
AhmedAli(Tuur)191andMohamedIbrahimEgal,thefirstandsecondPresidentsofSomaliland
whosecentralthemesforre-establishingthestaterevolvedarounddemobilisationofmilitias
andcontrolofessentialrevenuegeneratingproperties.InaninterviewwithMattBryden,along
time humanitarian worker and researcher in the region, Egal said “we are very much
handicappedbylackofresources,butmygovernmenthastoestablishitselfasbeingcompletely
incontrolofthecountrybeforewecanembarkuponaninternationalcampaignforrecognition”
190Thisconflictdeniedthestatetheabilitytoexercisecontrolovermostpartsofthecountry.
191AbdirahmanAhmedAli(Tuur)attemptedtotakecontrolofBerberaportasarevenuegeneratingstatepropertybutencounteredstiffresistancefromsomeofthelocalmilitia.
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(Bryden,1994b,p.4).Asevidenthere,fullterritorialcontrolwasanecessarypreconditionfor
thequestofstatelegitimacyintheeyesoftheinternationalcommunity,butitwasalsousedfor
bringingaboutlocallegitimacyasthestatesoughttoshowitseffectivenesstotheHargeisaand
broaderSomalilandpublic.ThesubsequentadministrationsinSomalilandbuiltonthisfocusof
controllingrevenue-generatingpropertiesandtreatedportsandairportsasimportantsitesfor
nationaldevelopment.For instance,theNationalDevelopmentPlanbandstheairportwitha
rangeofotherkeytransportinfrastructuresasvitaldriversforeconomicgrowth(MNPD,2011).
Hargeisa airport in particular continues to receive significant attention from authorities in
Somaliland partly because of the fact that traffic in the airport has seen significant growth,
generatingagreater levelof revenues for the state.192 For instance, flights from/toHargeisa
haveincreasedfrom1422to2581between2006to2007,asharpriseof82%193(Seetable1).
Correspondingly,boththecargoandpassengersintheairporthaveincreased.Forexample,in
2006, thenumberof incomingpassengersstoodat34566while thenumberof theoutgoing
passengers stood at 10519. In 2007, this number has increased by 125% for the incoming
passengersand542%fortheoutgoingpassengers.Thisincreasehoweverslightlydecreasedin
thefollowingyearforboththeincomingandoutgoingpassengersby19%and17%respectively.
Asforthefreight,theincomingandoutgoingcargoin2006roseby4%and46%respectively.
Whileingeneralthesefiguresshowfluctuations(wheretheydecreaseinsomeyearsbysmall
margins),theoverallpicturesuggeststhattrafficintheairportincreasedsignificantly.
Table4:NumberofflightsinHargeisaEgalInternationalAirport
Year Flights PercentageIncrease
2006 1422 0%
2007 2581 82%
2008 2783 8%
2009 2131 -23%
Source:(MNPD,2012)
192GraphsarereconstructedfromatableintheNationalDevelopmentPlan(seeMNPD,2012).
193Thisincreasecontinuedinthefollowingyearbutatamuchsmallermarginof8%.In2008,thenumberofflightshavedecreasedby23%possiblyduetotheglobalfinancialcrisis.
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Table5:TheVolume(Kg)ofcargoHandledatHargeisaAirport
Source:(MNPD,2012)
Table6:TheNumberofPassengersHandledatHargeisaAirport
Source:(MNPD,2012)
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
3000000
3500000
2006 2007 2008 2009
VOLUME(KG)OFCARGOHANDLEDATHGABETWEEN2006-2009
CGOin(Kg) CGOout(Kg)
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
2006 2007 2008 2009
NUMBEROFPASSENGERSUSINGHGABETWEEN2006-2009
Passengersin PassengersOut
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AuthoritiesinSomalilandenvisagethattheincreaseddemandforairportserviceswillhaveto
beaccompaniedbyacorrespondingincreaseininvestmentintherangeof9-11percentperyear
(Hassan,2012).TheMinisterofAviationobservesthat iftheairport’sroleasakeyeconomic
driverintheregionwastobeenhanced,suchinvestmentneedstobeintheregionof25million
dollars,194whichcanbemobilisedthroughacombinationoflocalresourcesandinternational
aid(MCAAT,2016).Nonetheless,Akweietal.(2012)arguesthattheenhancementofairports
performanceaskeyaspectsofnationalinfrastructuresshouldnotbefocusedonfinancialgains
alone, but attention has to be also directed at quality of services where airports take
environmentalaspectsofdevelopment195andperformanceintoaccount.Equally,community
relations with the airport is also vital. In other words, while conforming to international
standardsandpassengerratingarecrucialforappraisalofairportperformanceandimage,what
isequallyimportantishowcommunitiesseeandfeelaboutairportswithintheirvicinities.This
is because community life is affected and shaped by airport operations. In addition to the
economicdimensionsoftheairport(MCAAT,2012)citedin(Gandrup,2014),thecurrentfocus
of airport development in Somaliland is primarily targeted at the legitimisation of de facto
statehood inanenvironmentwhere de jure status isdenied.Similarly, theairport,asakey
revenuegeneratingfacility,alsoservesasasiteof interactionforstateviability,visibilityand
legitimacy.
According toGoodstein andVelamuri (2009), statesmay legitimise their power by attaining
exclusivepropertyrightssoastoincorporatesuchrightsinthestatebureaucracy.Theymayalso
legitimisetheirpowerthroughcollaborationwith"othercentresofpower"suchascorporations
andcustomaryinstitutions.Similarly,theyalso"engageinvariousstrategiesofinstitutionalwork
todisruptormaintainexistingstructuresandpracticesofinstitutionalcontrol"(ibidp.506).For
instance, post-conflict leaders use land as a way of legitimising their rule by promising to
implementcomprehensive reformsaimedat redressingpast injustice.This isparticularly the
caseinsituationswheretheinstitutionsoftheoustedregimesufferedfromacrisisoflegitimacy
brought about by administrative malpractices such as corruption, nepotism and unequal
exploitationofresourcesresultinginawidespreadpovertyandrampanteconomicinequality.
194Sayingthatheishopingtosecurefundingthroughgovernmentinitiativesandinternationalaid.
195Attemptsaimedatrespondingtotheneedforfocusingtheenvironmentalaspectsofimprovingairportservicesqualityhavebeenlargelydrivenbydonors.ThroughfundsprovidedbyUSAID,theairporthasforshort period operated on power provided through renewable energy project but the facilities wereparalyzedbylackofmaintenance(Somalilandgov,2013).
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Insuchcases,post-conflictadministrationsseekto improvetheirpolitical legitimacythrough
narrativesofgreatertransparencyandaccountability.
PoliticallegitimacyinSomalilandwasweakintheimmediateaftermathofBarre’souster,mainly
becauseoftheinter-factionalskirmishesbetweenmilitiasloyaltovariousclansinthecountry.
The state’s inability to deal effectively with these problems, for almost six years following
Somaliland’sunilateraldeclarationofindependencefromtherestofSomaliain1991,ledtoloss
of trust in theneworder.The terminationof thewar in1997howeverenabled thestate to
initiate efforts aimed at improving its image and control over state territories. This exercise
beganwithinstallationofthefirstpost-conflictbasicfencearoundtheairport,alongthelines
inheritedfromthemilitaryregime.Thiswasfollowedbyseveralrenovationsaimedatenhancing
the airport’s capacity for handling increased numbers of travellers at a timewhen diaspora
communitiesfromtheregionweresignificantlyincreasingconnectionswiththeirhomelanddue
to sustained peace and stability.Most of the airlines using the airport were Somali owned
companieswhomaderegularflightstotheMiddleEastwheretravellerscouldtransitmostlyto
international connections to North America and Western Europe. More recently, the
commercial viability of these movements has attracted the attention of giant international
carrierssuchasEthiopianAirlines.
7.4 AirportasaSiteforStateLegitimation
Theincreasedcommercialviabilityoftheairportservedthequestforstatelegitimacyonthree
fronts.Firstly,itboostedtheimageofSomalilandasatrustworthyeconomicpartnerwithwhich
internationalcompaniescoulddeal.Secondly,itenabledtheadministration,whichwas,andstill
is strugglingwith theburdenofnon-recognition, tohaveaccess to internationalconnections
without having to go throughDubaiwhen travelling for diplomatic, commercial or personal
reasons.Andthirdly,itprovidedthestatewiththetoolsnecessaryforarguingthatitisdoinga
goodjobintakingthecountry’sdevelopmentforward.Theincreasedcommercialviabilityofthe
airport,however,camewithgreaterresponsibilitiesforauthorities inSomaliland. Inorderto
ensure that carriers operate in a safe and acceptable operational environment, aviation
authoritieshavetocomplywithinternationalregulationsscatteredovermorethan19annexes
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(ICAO, 1974), various manuals (ICAO, 2013b, ICAO, 2013c, ICAO, 2003, ICAO, 2014) and
treaties196(ICAO,1944).
Thesetreaties,annexesandmanualsproviderecommendationsrangingfromrunwayspecific
guidelines (ICAO, 2005) to principles and policy-making strategies for general airport safety
standards(ACI,2009).Theaimistostandardiserulesandregulationsgoverningairportsafety.
Standardisationherereferstothe“uniformandconsistentimplementationof[Standardsand
RecommendedPractices]SARPs”(ICAO,2013a,p.6).Forinstance,intheGlobalAviationSafety
Plan of 2014–2016, states are required to achieve “implementation of an effective safety
oversightsystem”by2017;fullimplementationoftheICAOStateSafetyProgramframeworkby
2022; and advanced safetyoversight system includingpredictive riskmanagement”by 2027
(ICAO,2013a,p.4).Thesetargetsaresetandinformedbyanarrowlydefinedconceptofsafety
asa“stateinwhichthepossibilityofharmtopersonsorofpropertydamageisreducedto,and
maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard
identificationandsafetyriskmanagement”(ICAO,2013c,pp.2-1).
In order to implement this narrowly defined view of safety, states are required to develop
processes and train skilled personnel for their implementation. At the heart of this are the
development of country specific safety guidelines,197 which include the formulation and
maintenance of State Safety Programs (SSP) (ICAO, 2013c). This entails the preparation and
enactmentofrulesandregulationsaimedatensuringefficientandeffectivedeliveryofaviation
serviceswhichincludethedevelopmentofVisualandInstrumentofFlightProcedures(VIFP)for
the navigation of aircraft aswell as the provision of other equipment deemed essential for
aircraft operations (ICAO, 2006). Additionally, states are required to provide aeronautical
informationservicetoaircraftsusingtheirairportsorairspaces(ICAO,2003)andalsoconform
tocertainchargingstandards(ICAO,2013b).Thepressureemanatingfromtheneedtoconform
tosuchstandardsisexperiencedvariedlybythememberstates.Countriesemergingfrompost-
conflict contexts go through a great deal of pressure not only because of their lack of the
necessaryresourcestoimplementthesestandardsbutalsoresistancefromtheirmainlypoor
196ThestateofSomalilandwasnotasignatorytothesetreatiesduetothefactthatitisnotrecognisedbytheunitednationsofwhichICAOisaspecialisedagency.
197informedbythetreatiesandannexesenactedsuccessivelysincethefirstChicagoconventionin1944.
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populations affected by the conformance related exercises.198 In the case of Somaliland, a
significant proportion of this conformance is managed by the ICAO office in Nairobi, Civil
AviationCaretakerAuthority for Somalia (CACAS),partlybecauseof the lackof capacityand
partly because of disagreement between Somaliland and Somalia regarding the control of
airspace(ICAO,2013b).
Informed by the aforementioned requirements,most international airlines tend to evaluate
airportsbeforetheystartoperations.Variousteamsaredispatchedtoassessthesituationon
theground.Someofthekeyaspectsthey lookat includethe levelofdemand,natureofthe
airportoperations,securityoftheterminals,existenceofexteriorfencesandboundaries,and
capacityforrespondingtoemergenciesi.e.theavailabilityoffirefightingmachines,existence
ofsufficientwatertanksaswellasskilledemergencypersonnel.199Sinceitsestablishmentinthe
late1950s,EgalInternationalAirportenjoysarelativelygoodsafetyrecord.Theonlyincident
reportedinwhichtheairportnamewasmentionedisanaccidentwhichoccurredin1989when
aSomaliAirlinesflightwhichflewfromHargeisacrashed10minutesaftertakingofffromthe
airport,killingallaboard(Ranter,2016).
Whiletheairportalreadymetsomeofthesespecificationsi.e.theavailabilityofterminalsand
provisionofadequateemergencyequipmentICAO(2014),compliancewithotheraspectsofthe
recommended standards such as the creation of a secure fence and boundaries are still
underway.Ofparticularsafetyconcernforauthoritiesare“freelyroaminganimals”,whichpose
a danger to the operation of aircrafts in the airport. According to theMinistry of National
Planning and Development, lack of “navigational aids and proper airfield lighting facilities”
hampertheabilityoftheairporttohandleairlinesduringlowvisibilityconditionssuchasrainy
andnon-daylighttimes(MNPD,2012,pp.123-4).Inadditiontotheseinfrastructuraldeficits,the
priorities identified by the Ministry of Aviation in the National Development Plan include
“introductionandimplementationofflightsafetyrulesandstandards,reviewofallexistingrules
andregulationstomeetFAAandICAOstandards,formulationandimplementationofanational
airtransportpolicy,andimprovementoftheoverallregulatoryframework”ofaviation(MNPD,
2012,pp.124-5).
198Giventhefragilesecuritysituationintheregion,themostpressingconformanceinthisregardwhichSomalilandseekstoimplementinthatwhichrelatestosafety.
199Interviewee70September05,2014.SeniorOfficial-MinistryofPublicWorks.
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As can be seen here, these priorities are designed to enable the state to conform to the
international standards forairnavigation.As such, theycanbeunderstoodasanattempt in
whichthestateistryingtolegitimiseitspresenceininternationalarenas.Theairportauthorities
arguethattheywouldberegionallycompetitiveiftheytakethelevelofcompliancetograde9
withinfourmonths.200
7.5 ExpropriationRationaleandResistance
Inthelightoftheabove,theauthoritiesarepursuingtoimplementtwoformsofboundaries,
thefirstofwhichistheimmediateairportsecurityfenceatadistanceofapproximately400m
awayfromtherunway.Thesecondistheairportboundaryrequiringanadditional1200m.While
unoccupiedlandformeetingtheserequirements isnotavailableontheNorthernsideofthe
airport due to the heavily built up nature of the area, vacant land for possible expansion is
availableinalltheotherthreedirectionsbutthisismostlyprivatelyownedland,exceptforfew
areas–suchastheEidagaleclansettlementarea-inwhichthegovernmentcontestslegitimacy
ofownership.201Theclaimstothelandwerebothformallegalentitlementsaswellastraditional
customaryrights.Claimants/ownerscanbecategorisedinto1)peoplewhoboughtthelandand
holdpapersfromboththegovernmentandthesellers,2)peoplewhoinheritedthelandfrom
theirparentsandclaimthattheyhavebeenstayinginthelandasfarbackasduringthecolonial
timebutwhodonotholdpaperstoascertaintheirclaims,and3)peoplewhoholdlegalpapers
from the previous governments but the grounds on which the land was given remains
dubious.202Asstatedabove,mostofthesepeoplewereunemployedmembersoftheEidagale
clan(plussomeprominentEidagalefiguresandafewnon-Eidagale).
In2012,thegovernmentorderedthedemarcationoftheairportboundaryandconstructionof
asecurityfence.Sevenseniorgovernmentofficialswereappointedasaselectcommitteefor
this task (Somaliland Post, 2015). These included theMinisters of Aviation, Defence, Public
Works, Interior, Presidency, and Health as well as the Director General of the Ministry of
Aviation’sand theMayor.Soonafter its formation, thecommitteecalled forameetingwith
landownersaroundtheairport.Theyputforwardtwopointsfordiscussion:1)thereroutingof
200Ibid.
201Ibid.
202Papersobtainedduetocorruptionorotheradministrativemalpracticessuchnepotism.
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thewhiteroad,whichisagravelledroughroadconnectingSomalilandwiththeEthiopianSomali
region and 2) the demarcation of the airport boundaries. Initially, the landowners’
representativeswereadamanttoengageinthediscussionabouttheexpansionoftheairport,
astheysensedthattheywerelosinglandgraduallytotheever-shiftingboundaryoftheairport.
Accordingtooneoftheland-ownerswhoattendedthemeeting,theytoldtheofficialsthat:
decisionsregardingthewhiteroadinvolvemuchmorethanthecommunities
inandaroundtheairportastheroutegoesasfarasEthiopia.Ontheother
issue of demarcation, we told them that the airport boundary has been
demarcated three times before by various administrations including the
colonial,post-colonial Somaliadministrationandpost-conflictgovernment
undertheleadershipofEgal.Wecannotcontinuelosingourlandallthetime
because of policies introduced by every new regime in the name of
development.203
AccordingtoMunene(2012),developmentprojectsserveasameansthroughwhichstateimage
is improved and deficit in political legitimacy is mitigated. For instance, the central state
toleranceforpoliticalelites’mobilisationoflocalresourcesforuniversitiesinKenyaviaethnic
communitieswasseenasameansoftryingtofillthelegitimacygapinthestate.204Theairport
developmentprojectcanbeviewedthroughasimilarlensasitwasadvancedonthebasisof
nationalinterestwhiletherealmotivemayhavebeentoachieveagreaterpoliticallegitimacy.
Evidenceforthiscanbefoundinthemannerinwhichthestatesoughttoconvinceland-owners
toaccepttheneedforexpansion.Theland-ownersdemandwastoretaintheirlandrightsorget
full compensation in linewith urban landmarket values. In a bid to loosen the community
representatives’standontheissue,thestateoveremphasisedthegreaterdevelopmentgood
thatcanresultfromtheairportexpansioninameeting[whoseexactdateintervieweesdidnot
recallbutapproximatedatFeb2012]betweengovernmentofficialsandlandowners.However,
asland-owners’representativeswereincreasinglyunconvincedaboutthegenericdiscussionon
thegreatergoodandeconomicgrowthadvancedinthemeeting,governmentrepresentatives
203Interviewee53March30,2014.Farmer.
204Thestatesufferedfromlackofpoliticallegitimacysinceitsestablishmentin1963.See(Munene,2012).
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felt compelled to divulge some of the specifics of such benefits. According to one of the
attendeesinthemeeting,thestateofficialspointedoutthatsomeofthelandinquestion:
would be used for the construction of major hotels and other executive
housing schemes which will boost the image of the city and provide
dignitariesandother importantguestsasecureenvironmentwithinwhich
theycouldundertaketheirdealingsinSomaliland.205
Nonetheless, most of those in themeeting remained unconvinced about the government’s
claims.Thegovernmentattemptedfromthebeginningtoinvolvetraditionalleaders.According
to Bennett et al. (2010), in circumstances where the state is emerging from a post-conflict
context,traditionalauthorities’powerandlegitimacyisreduced,resultingindefianceoftheir
orders.206Thisdoesnot,however,meanthatlegitimacyshiftstoelectedbodies,partlybecause
traditionalauthorities’poweremanatesprimarilyfromtheir lineageandthereforecannotbe
replacedbyelectedrepresentation.Whileontheonehandsomestrandsoftheliteraturepoint
toincreasingconcernaboutthereducedpublicimageoftraditionalinstitutionsinpost-conflict
contexts(Gundel,2006),theirvitalityisontheotherhandemphasisedsignificantly(Jeng,2014).
Itisalsoimportanttoacknowledgethatthislargelydependsonthecontext,asinsomecases
traditionalauthoritiesemergewith increased legitimacy.Regardlessofwhether legitimacyof
customaryinstitutionsisreducedornot,non-stateactors’cooperationwiththestateisvitalfor
voluntarycompliancewithrulesandregulationsinacontextoffragility.Inthecaseoftheairport
expansion, such cooperation is however unlikely to produce voluntary compliance as the
relationship between land-owners and the state is characterised bymutualmistrust. This is
becauseofthehistoryofexpansion,ineachthreephasesofwhich,land-ownersintheareawere
negativelyaffected.
Oneoftheland-ownerswhospokeinapressconference,onthe16thofDecember2013,pointed
outthattheyarefedupwiththeexpansionsastheykeeponloosinglandtothestate,allinthe
nameofdevelopment.Anotheroldman,TahirAliBarreaddedthat thecolonialgovernment
asked for a land in which it could build an airport and they provided space. The post-
independenceSomaligovernmentalsoaskedforfurtherspacetostoremilitaryhardwareand
205Interviewee44April18,2014.LandOwner.
206Forexample,somepeoplemayremovefencesorrefusetohonourordersbanningthemforentryinaparticularpieceofpublicland.
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theyalsograntedtheirrequest.Andbecauseofthistheycannotacceptanyfurtherlossofland
andwilldefendagainstanybodywhotriestoforcethemout(Hussein,2013).Muchoftheland-
owners’resistanceisinformedbygrowingsuspicionsaboutthelegitimacyofstateclaims-not
onlythenatureoftheexpansionitself,buttheextenttowhichthegovernment’srationalefor
landexpropriationisgenuine.Inotherwords,thissuspicionprovidesland-ownersgroundson
which they can resist the government’s intention to expropriate their land. They allege that
prominentpoliticianswanttotakeadvantageofthesituationandexpropriatelandgreaterthan
whatisneeded,soastomisappropriatethemlater.207Anotherintervieweewhoisalsoaland-
owneradded:
they'retellingusthegovernmentmayneedthislandinthefuturesoithasto
remainvacantbutwedon'tknowhowlongthatfutureisgoingtobe…isit
100years,10years,oreternal.Thisisunacceptable.Itdoesn'tmakesense.
Worstofall,considerationforforeignguests isnotsomethingthatcanbe
justifiedfortheexpropriationoflandfromthepublic.208
Poor strategies and coordination coupled with inconsistent land administrative practices
providedtheland-ownerswiththenecessaryjustificationforentrenchingtheirdoubtoverthe
legitimacyofstateactions.Thisisbecauseplanningpermissionforurbanresidencywasgranted
forsomeofthelandinquestion(particularlythatwhichwaspreviouslyclassifiedasagricultural
land). It involveddesignating30percentoftheplannedlandforpublicpurposes, in linewith
urbandevelopmentguidelines.Despiteconformingtotheserulesandobtainingthenecessary
papersforturningthislandintoresidentialsettlements,someoftheland-ownersarefurious
with the prospect of facing eviction. Moreover, multiple institutions are involved in the
proposedlandexpropriation,confusingthemainlyilliteratelandowners.Ontheonehandthe
military is putting pressure on the land owners by extending their bases beyond the main
securityfencewhileontheothertheMinistryofAviationintandemwiththeMinistryofPublic
Worksarepushingtheairportboundaries.Dealingwiththeseinstitutionsseparatelyputsthe
residentsintheareaunderagreatdealofpressure,aseachoneofthemrequiresthefulfilment
ofcertainregulationsandbureaucracy.Oneoftheland-ownerspointedoutthat:
207Interviewee44April18,2014.LandOwner.
208Interviewee53March30,2014.Farmer.
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toregisterland,legaliserightfulownershipandthenthreatentoevictpeople
arethingsthatcannotlogicallygotogether.Thereare20differentlawsand
institutions fromwhichwe had to seek legalisation, bearing inmind that
wheneverweneedsomethingfromthem,theyallrequiredrevenuesforthe
servicesprovided,yetcompliancewiththeserulesdonotgiveanyprotection.
Howarewethenexpectedtotrustthestate?.209
Asthemistrustbetweenthestateandlandownersgrew,publicofficialsadoptedadualstrategy
inwhichon theonehand theyengaged inadialoguewith landowners,acknowledged local
people’s land ownership and sought a negotiated settlement. On the other hand, they also
threatened land owners with forceful eviction and threw doubt on the legitimacy of local
people’slandownershipbysayingthatthegovernmenthastherighttousepubliclandforpublic
use, insinuating that the land is not owned.210 Furthermore, they also made inflammatory
remarksthroughthemedia,increasingtheriftbetweenthetwosides.Forinstance,theMinister
forCivilAviationwasallegedlyquotedinanarticlepublishedinalocalnewspaper,assayingthat
thelocalpeoplewanttoloottheairportland.Suchremarkshadallegedlydireconsequenceson
therelationshipbetweenthestateandthelocalpeoplewhosecooperationisdeemedvitalfor
airportsafetyatatimewhenthestatesecurityapparatusareillequippedtodealwiththerecent
threats in the region, due to lack of necessary training and equipment resulting from the
country’s lackof internationalrecognition.211From1997to2012beforetheconflicterupted,
thepeopleintheareahadacooperativerelationshipwithauthoritiesastheyofteninformed
themaboutanysecurityproblemsinthearea.Anotherland-ownerassertsthat:
people [land owners] have always been a protection for the airport from
1997. They guaranteed the security of the airport and therefore security
cannot be used as a justification for the removal of the very peoplewho
protectedtheairport.212
209Ibid.
210Ibid.
211Interviewee70September05,2014.SeniorOfficial-MinistryofPublicWorks.
212Interviewee51March30,2014.LandOwner.
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While land-owners complain about the government’s lack of sensitivity to the role the local
communities play in the security of the airport, the government on its part insists that it is
makingcompromisespreciselyinordertosafeguardtrustandcooperationwiththelocals.For
instance,thegovernmentofficialsclaimthatthereisasignificantdelaytotheimplementation
oftheairportexpansionprojectpartlyasaresultofavoidingactionsthatcouldjeopardisetheir
relationshipwiththelocalpeople.Oneoftheofficialssaid:
compromisesaremadeonthegroundsthatweneedthepeopleforsecurity
purposes.We also give jobs to the local people…all the people doing the
menialjobscomefromthelocalarea.Nobodycompeteswiththemasfaras
themenialjobsareconcerned.That'sbasicallytocreatearelationshipbased
ontrustbetweentheministryandthepeople.213
Contrarytothegovernment’sclaimofcautionandcare,theconstructionoftheairporthascut
offpeopleintheareafromaccessingnotonlyjobopportunities,butalsoessentialservicessuch
aszaribas(localgrocerymarkets),schoolsandhealthfacilities.Thisisbecausetheroutesthey
used to use for accessing the city are now closed and alternative routes have not been
provided.214 Speaking to the media, residents in the area claim that they have raised their
concernswiththeauthoritiesbutnothingwasthusfardone.Oneoftheresidentspleadedwith
authoritiestogrant“passagefortheirchildren,sickpeople,andthosewhowanttogotothe
cityforbasicserviceswhicharenotavailableinthearea"(TogahererNews,2016).Civilaviation
officialshoweverclaimthattheyareworkingontheseissuesandtheyhavealreadywrittento
relevantauthoritiestomakeessentialservicesavailableinthearea.Forinstance,theyclaimthat
theyrequestedthelocalgovernment,MinistryofHealthandanIslamicNGO215to,respectively,
constructazariba,MotherandChildHealthCenters(MCH)andmosqueforthepeopleinthe
area. Discussions were also underway, according to airport officials at the time of data
collection, for hiring a bus that takes children in the area to their respective schools while
awaitingprovisionoftheseamenities.216
213Interviewee70September05,2014.SeniorOfficial-MinistryofPublicWorks.
214Interviewee51March30,2014.LandOwner.
215LedbyShMohamedAliGeddi,aprominentlocalfigureinthenon-profitsector.
216Interviewee70September05,2014.SeniorOfficial-MinistryofPublicWorks.
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Thesepromises aremostly disregardedby thepredominantly Eidagale residents inUubaale,
whoseethestateasuncaringandunsympathetic,whichonlytakesfromthecitizensbutdoesn’t
giveback.Thisviewispartlycreatedbythegovernment’straditionalpoorservicedeliveryinthe
areabutwasmore recently activatedby theanticipated landexpropriationprocess that fell
short of people’s expectation from the post-Barre administrations. According to Nora and
Réginas(2014,p.23),perceptionof“statelegitimacydependsonthedegreetowhichspecific
societalexpectationsareperceivedasbeingmetbyaspecificstateinstitutionintheeyesofa
specific group of people in the context of a specific process in comparison with specific
alternatives”.Suchparticularitiesofexperiencesandhowtheseshapepeople’sperceptionof
the state resonate well with the situation in Somaliland where experiences with past
administrationsareusedaskeysignifiersforhowgovernmentsshouldorshouldnotbehave.
Thisisbecausesomeoftheland-ownerspointoutthatthisisthefirsttimetheyfacedalarge-
scaleevictionoveraperiodofthreedifferentgovernments.Oneofthefarmerswasquickto
pointoutthatthecurrentsituationcomparesunfavourablywiththecolonialeraas:
thecolonialgovernmentneverusedtobotherus….andtheyneverpressured
ustoregisterland.217
Anotheragedresidentintheareareinforcedthisclaim,sayingthatawhitemanvisitedthem
duringthecolonialtimeandaskedthem:
whoownsthecamelinthere?andwerepliedthatitbelongstoadisabled
man. Then he asked further how is it possible that a disabledman herds
camel,towhichwerepliedheisassistedbyhiswifeandbrothers-in-law.He
thenwenttothedisabledmanandrequestedhimtomoveoutoftheairport
vicinitybecauseofthefactthathiscamelswonderabouttherunways.But
thedisabledmantoldhimthathecannotmoveoutoftheareabecauseof
thefactthatthisishislandandallhisancestorsareburiedinthearea.Then
thewhitemanlefthimaloneandsaidtohim,pleasekeepyouranimalsout
oftherunway.218
217Interviewee45April22,2014.LandOwner.
218Interviewee43April22,2014.LandOwner.
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Struggles against the military regime and associated memories which resonate with many
peopleinthecityarealsousedasawayoflegitimisingpeople’srightforopposingexpropriation
andretaininglandownership.Thestateinthisregardispaintedasbeingguiltyofcommitting
thesamegovernancemalpracticesthatunderminedthepreviousregime.Oneofthefarmers
pointedoutthat:
ThereasonwhywefoughtagainstBarrewasinjustice….wefinallymanaged
toliberateourlandandpropertiesfromthosewhooccupiedorexpropriated
themillegally.Wewerenotexpectingthesamefromthisgovernment.Let
themknowthatwecannotgiveupourlandwhichourbrothers,cousins,and
uncleshavediedforliberating.Eachmeterofthislandcostsusblood.219
SimilarsentimentsareechoedbythefamousplaywrightAhmedSuleimanBiddewhotoldthe
mediathatmanyoftheforefathersof thecurrentresidentsdied"tryingto liberatethis land
fromthemilitaryregime.Heassertsthathecannotfathomhowcouldanybodydaretotellthem
tomoveawayfromtheirland".HeconcludedthatifthePresidentwasmadetosignadecree
orderingtheremovalofpeoplefromtheir landbysomeMinisterswithulteriormotives,“we
haveGodontheirsidewhosignedthelandforus”(Hussein,2013).Moreover,therolethelocal
clansplayed in the constructionof theairport is alsoevokedas reminder that theairport is
rootedinthehistoryofthecommunity.220Oneoftheland-ownerssaidthat:
peoplefromherecontributedtotheconstructionoftheairportasthecolonial
governmentenlistedworkersfromthisclan.Thewholeairportyouseetoday
wasonlyconsistingofthetowerandun-tarmackedrunway.Itissurprising
thatthisgovernmentwantstoremovethesettlementthatcontributedtothe
airportdevelopmentandwantstoevictuswithoutcompensation.221
219Interviewee45April22,2014.LandOwner.
220Ibid.
221Interviewee39June05,2014.Playright.
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7.6 Mediation,ValuationandCompensation
AstheconflictsbetweenthestateandlocalEidagalelandownersdeteriorated,thegovernment
embarkedonaneffortaimedatdefusing the tension through intermediary institutions.This
divergencefromitspreviouscourseindicatesthatthegovernmentrealisedthelowleveloftrust
itenjoysamongthepeople(mainlyGarhajisclansingeneralandEidgaleinparticular)inthearea
anddecidedtolegitimisetheprocessbybringinginotheractorswhomighthelpinthisregard.
JohnsonandHutchison (2012)argue thathybridpoliticalorderswhere statutory institutions
workintandemwithnon-stateactorssuchasthecustomaryinstitutionscanresultingreater
legitimacyastheyincreasepeople'strustinthestate.Inthesamemove,thestateinSomaliland
alsoenlistedthehelpofvariouscommunity-basedcommitteestoimprovethelegitimacyofthe
process.TheseincludedNeighbourhoodDevelopmentCommittees,ClanElders’Committeeand
Akils’andSultans’Committee.AmongtheAkilsandtheSultaninvolvedincluded,RashidJambiir,
AbdirizaqMohamedAskar,AkilAbdiWeli,andAkilHersi.TheDirectorGeneraloftheMinistry
ofAviationpointedoutthat:
thereasonweinvolvedallthesecommitteeswastoensurethatiftheland
ownersarewrongtheyshouldbecontainedandifwearewrongweshould
be told thatwearewrong. So inmanycases, these thirdpartymediators
wereabletoconfrontthelandownersandtellthetruth.Theywerealsoable
toreachuswithcomplaintsfromthelandowners.222
The legitimacyof the third-partymediationwashoweverunderminedbysuspicions that the
statewasusing them instrumentally (or indeedof setting themupas tools)with theaimof
smootheningthestancetakenby land-owners.For instance,thegovernmentwasaccusedof
financingtheCommitteefortheResolutionoftheAirportConflictwhoseexistenceland-owners
became aware of, after members of another neighbourhood development committee they
contacted tomediate informed themthat thegovernmentwasunwilling tomeet themas it
endorsed another committee for the mediation process.223 At one point, members of this
government-endorsed Committee for the Resolution of the Airport Conflict approached the
localcommunitiesbutfailedtomakeanymeaningfulbreakthroughpartlybecauseland-owners
222Interviewee71September05,2014.MinistryofAviation-Official.
223Interviewee42April15,2014.Lawyer-Farmer'sSon.
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sawthemasaproxythroughwhichthegovernmentwantstotaketheirland.Oneoftheland-
ownersassertedthat:
there was a substantial disagreement between us and this committee.
Chargingfromthewaytheywerespeaking,wethoughtthatthesepeople
wererepresentingthegovernmentratherthanbeingmediators.Wedonot
recognisetheirimpartialitytomediatebetweenusandthegovernment.They
have not been fair from the beginning. They were on the side of the
government. Usually Akils should be on the side of the people not the
governmentandwecannotaccepttheirmediation.224
Themediation, compensationandvaluationprocess for the landandpropertyexpropriation
aroundtheairportwascharacterisedbyastruggleforlegitimacy.Attheheartofthisstruggle
laythestate’sattempttotakeoverlandinthemostefficientandeffectivemanneramidstiff
oppositionfromdedicatedgroupofvocalland-ownerswhoareavowedtoretaintheirlandor
get the highestmarket value in the shortest timepossible, andwho also spoke for broader
communityoflocalpoor.Inthebeginningthegovernmentseemedtohavefavouredaprocess
inwhichitdealswithland-ownersonanindividualbasis.Butthestatesoonchangeditsmind
whenitrealisedthatitwouldbeadministrativelyeasiertodealwithrepresentativesnotonly
fornegotiatingwiththeland-ownersinthemediationprocessbutalsoregisteringthenumber
oflandownersinthearea.Additionally,thegovernmentmayhavefearedthatpeoplewilltake
thelawintotheirhandsandwantedtohaveachannelthroughwhichcommunicationcouldbe
maintainedtocalmthesituationdown.Nevertheless,thischangeinmindcoupledwithgrowing
realisationamongtheland-ownersaboutthedangerapparentinlackofunitypavedthewayfor
the formation of the Land Owners Committee. As the government did not have an easily
searchablerecordoflandownershipintheareas,thelandowners’committeehelpeditenlist
thelistofclaimants/owners.
As the current formal judicial landscape in the country is ill equipped to dealwith disputes
betweenthegovernmentandthepublic,thenewlyformedLandOwnersCommitteerealised
thatvery limitedformaloptionsexist ifanyforthe land-ownerstocomplainaboutor legally
resist the state’s intention to expropriate their land. As a result, they considered various
224Interviewee51March30,2014.LandOwner.
181|P a g e
mechanisms to mitigate the expropriation threats including both customary and statutory
adjudicationsystems.Butoneofthekeyobstaclestoaccessingstateinstitutionswasthatthey
wereunabletoaffordsthelawyers’fees.Accordingtooneofthecommitteemembers,they:
were unable to access state institutions…only those who have influence
amongthesocietyarewelcomedingovernmentoffices.Itisdifficultforusto
meetgovernmentofficials.Statecourtsarecorruptandwedonotbelieve
that they will bring about any resolution to this conflict. If we have had
effectivestatutoryjusticesystem,wewouldhavenotneededcommitteesor
eldersformediation.225
Giventhelandowners’scepticismabouttheabilityoftheformaljudicialsystemtoaddresstheir
problem,theyhaveonseveraloccasionsmadeattemptsaimedatexploringthepossibilityof
bringingaboutpoliticalintervention,buttheyoftenhaddifficultiesingettingaudiencewithkey
decisionmakers.Atonepointinearly2013,theymanagedtoregistertheircomplaintwiththe
thenpowerfulMinisterof thePresidency,HersiHajiAli.Thiswas followedbymeetingsheld
approximatelyinMay2013(facilitatedbyinfluentialclanelders,politiciansandreligiousfigures
fromGarhajis),inwhichthegovernmentacceptedthatthereweresomemalpracticesintheway
thecasewashandledbyboththeMinistryofAviationandtheMinistryofDefence.Butthose
negotiationsstalledduetothedepartureofsomekeyMinisters–whowereinstrumentalinthe
mediation–fromthegovernment.Thefailureoftheseattemptsseemstohaveconvincedland-
owners that they do not stand a good chance of resolving their case through the formal
governmentinstitutions.Moreover,theyalsoseemedscepticalofthestatutoryjudicialsystem
duetotheexistenceoflegalloopholesthatthegovernmentcanuseagainstthem.Forinstance,
theAgriculturalLandLawstipulatesthatanybodywhodidnotpaytaxesforhis/herlandcannot
claimcompensationforsuchlandfromthegovernment.
Asland-owners’manoeuvresforinterventionfromboththestateandnon-stateactorsfailedto
bringaboutanymeaningfulresolutiontotheproblemandtheprospectofviolentencounter
loomed,theMinisterofAviation,MohamoudHashi,calledforameetingwiththoseaffectedby
theairportexpansiononthe22ndofFebruary,2013.Heinformedthemaboutthegovernment’s
intention to buy the land at currentmarket values. TheMinistermade such remarks in the
225Interviewee42April15,2014.Lawyer-Farmer'sSon.
182|P a g e
presenceofSultanMohammedandothernotablefiguresfromtheEidagaleclan.Healsosaid
that they will process payment for the land-owners who are affected by the initial 400m
expansionwhile thoseaffectedby the1200mexpansionwillhave their claims recordedand
negotiations about possible solution will commence soon.226 For the land-owners this was
welcomebutwhileawaitingfurtherdetailsonthespecificsofthisproposal,theMinistermade
provocative remarks in the media, accusing Eidagale clan members of undermining the
government’sefforttoexpandtheairport,achargethatinfuriatedtheUubaaleresidentsand
prompteddoubtsovertheseriousnessofthestateabouttheresolutionoftheissuesamicably.
Many felt thiswas aU-turn in the government’s position in the land conflict,which greatly
underminedtheirtrustinthegovernment.
Lack of financial resources for adequate legal representation is also one of the othermajor
obstaclesthatinhibitland-ownersfromusingtheformaljudicialsystem.Thismakescustomary
institutions the most crucial avenue of mediation available to land owners. It is however
important topointout that themanner inwhich traditional authorities resolve issues isnot
alwaysjustorconvenientforpoorpeople.Inotherwords,traditionalinstitutionsattimesreach
decisionswithoutconsultingthestakeholders.Forinstance,inMay2013,theSultanofEidagale
clan,Mohamed,statedthathispeople(landowners)arewillingtogiveupsomeoftheir land
(i.e.thatwhichislocatedwithin400m)subjecttothegovernment’sacceptancetocompensate
landwithinthe1200mradius.Land-ownerspointoutthattheSultanmadeahugemistakeby
issuing this statement and they do not share his views. One of the reasonswhy this is not
practical,theysay,isthefactthattherearepeoplewhowillnothaveanylandremainingfor
themwhenthe400misgiventothegovernmentfreeofcharge.Forinstance,thereisaguywho
soldhislandto48differentpeopleholdingnotarysignedagreements.Hisonlyremainingland
is locatedwithin the400m. If thegovernmentexpropriates this landwithout compensation,
peoplelikehimwillgoemptyhanded.
Thislatestmeetingfollowedbyanincreasedpresenceofsecurityforcesinthearea.227Several
warnings,statingthatland-ownerswillfacedireconsequencesshouldtheytrytostoportamper
withtheconstructionofthenewairportfence,wereissued.Thesethreatswereapparentlynot
onlyaimedatsofteningtheland-owners’standinthemediationprocessbutalsodesignedto
226Interviewee39June05,2014.Playright.
227Inabidtoshowhowseriousthegovernmentisaboutexpandingtheairportboundary.
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changetheirperceptionofthestateasweak.Whilethereisevidenceintheliteratureaboutthe
relationship between states’ capability and people’s perception thereof (Hutchison and
Johnson,2011),itisimportanttopointoutthatthreatsofthisnaturecontributedtoadverse
perceptionsofthestateastheyareassociatedwiththeformersocialistdictatorialregimewhich
oftenusedforcetoimplementpoliciesanddecisions.Assuch,theyformthebasisonwhichthe
legitimacyofstategovernancepracticesarequestioned.Thestalematebetweenland-owners
and thestatewas furtherexasperatedby the issuanceofapresidentialdecree in June2014
prohibitingsale,inheritance,subdivision,andtransferoflandwithin1200moftheairport.Land-
ownersinUubaalesawthisasinfringingontheirrightandlifeinthecity,bearinginmindthe
factthatlandistheonlysourceofincomeforsomeoftheresidentsinthearea.Butthefact
thatlandisincreasinglybecominganimportantwayofnegotiatingeconomicspaceinthecity
providedthegovernmentwithalineofargumenttodiscreditlandownershipclaims.Oneofthe
MinistryofPublicWorksofficialssaid:
Thesepeoplearenot legitimate land-owners.Theyare justpeoplewhodo
nothaveothersourcesofincomeandwhojustliveoffsellingpublicland.In
thepast,thereusedtobeapowerfulgovernmentandpeopleusedfearthe
statebutthisisnolongerthecase.228
Takingthefactthatlandisinevitablyoneofthemeansthroughwhichimprovementoflifeis
sought in a city ravaged by poverty, many people regard the government’s attempt to
expropriatelandwithouttangiblecompensationas“moralbankruptcyonthepartofthestate”
accordingtobothSomaliculturalvaluesandtheIslamicfaith.Onesuchcriticofthestatepointed
outthatthesepeople:
don’t own livestock or property and they don’t have someone supporting
themfromoutside.ItisnotrightforaMinistertosaythathewillcloseoff
theirland.Alltheyhaveispiecesoflandfromwhichtheygettheirlivelihoods.
Itisamoralobligationforthestatetogivereasonablecompensation,instead
ofstretchingitsmuscleonthesepoorpeople.229
228Interviewee10May29,2013.Official-MinistryofPublicWorks.
229Interviewee36August20,2014.DirectorofCivilUnit-LegalAidClinic.
184|P a g e
Compensation and property valuation remained thorny issues in the airport expansion row.
Whilethestatesoughttobeaseconomicalaspossibleinminimisingtheamountofmoneyspent
onthecompensation,land-ownerssoughttomaximisethevalueforwhichtheycangettheir
landandproperty,ofteninsistingthatanycompensationshouldbeonthebasisofmarketvalue.
Inordertoachievethis,theprocessremainednotonlycontroversialinthesensethateachside
wantedtolegitimateitsdesiresbutalsofluidinthesensethatthedynamicsoftheissuechanged
over time. For instance, the government was, in the beginning, adamant it would provide
compensationforlandwithin400mradius.Accordingtoresidentswhoparticipatedinsomeof
theearliermeetingsdiscussingtheairportexpansion,theMinisterofAviationinsistedthatthe
governmentwillconsidercompensationforbuiltstructureswithinthe400mradius,albeitonly
on thebasisof investment size.230 Thegovernment’spositionwas reinforced ina statement
madebyaSultanspeakingonbehalfofland-ownerswhotriedtobargainwithit,sayingthey
will give away land within the 400m radius if the government comes up with reasonable
compensation plan for the 1200m radius. Land-owners however rejected this proposition,
lambastingtheSultanformakingdecisionswithoutconsultingthosewhowouldbenegatively
affectedanddemandingthattheyshouldbegivenafullcompensation,theabsenceofwhich
will result in amajor conflictwith the government. Equally the land-owners rejectedpartial
compensationproposedintheearlierdiscussions,sayingthat:
whatthegovernmentisproposingisthattheywillcompensateanystructure
within the 400m but theywill not compensate for the land onwhich the
propertystands.Thisdoesnotmakesense.Howcanyouseparateproperty
andthelandonwhichitisbuilt?Weacquiredthelandbeforebuildingthe
propertyonit.231
Foritspart,thegovernmentconteststhatthepropertieswerebuiltonpubliclandillegallyand
hence they do not qualify for full compensation.While resistance to this position remained
strong, land owners have also shown willingness to accept what they called a multi-level
compensationstrategyinwhichthegovernmentfirstlycompensatesorswapslandwithsimilar
value for original landowners; secondly, addresses possible tension between original land-
230Subjecttovariationsinwhatpeoplehavebuiltwithinthisland.Somebuiltoneortworoomsandotherbuiltthreerooms.Somealsobuiltsmallbirkaswhileothersbuiltbigbirkas.
231Interviewee44April18,2014.LandOwner.
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ownersandthosewhoboughtlandfromthembycompensatingthelatterforbothlandvalue
andinvestmentmadesincethen;andthirdlydealdelicatelywiththosewhoselandwillentirely
beswallowedbytheairportextensionassuchpeople232cannotbesubjectedtothesamerules
as thosewhomayhavegreaterpiecesof land fromwhich thegovernmentcanobtain some
throughnegotiations.233Thiswashoweverrejectedbythegovernmentongroundsthatitdoes
nothavethefinancialresourcesformakingsuchacomprehensivecompensationforthe400m
radius.Itinsteadproposedthatitwillonlyprovidecompensationforthe1200moflandwhenit
managestogetthemoneyneededforthepurchase(Itisworthpointingoutthatthelandinthe
1200mradiusischeaperthanthelandwithintheimmediatesurroundingoftheairport,dueto
beingfurtherfromthecity).Eventhoughthegovernmentwentonrecordtosaythatitlacksthe
financialresourcesnecessaryforimmediatecompensation,land-ownersclaimthattheywere
informallytoldthatdirectivesforcompensationwillbeissuedwithinfourtosixmonths.This
promise was mainly interpreted as a delaying tactic for eventual expropriation without
compensation.Asaresult,land-ownersinsistifthegovernmentisunabletoprovidethemwith
compensationwithinreasonabletimeframe(i.e.1-12months),theyshouldletthepeopleretain
ownership.Notwithstandingthefactthatconcreteplansareyettobesharedpublicly,sources
close to governmentofficials involved in theprocess pointedout that compensationwill be
provided in a 50/50 ratio of monetary and land exchange.234 In 2014, the government
announced that itwill go aheadwith the expropriation of landwithin the 400m radius and
compensateforanystructuresbuiltinthereforvaluesdeterminedthroughagovernment-led
landvaluationprocess.Beingoneofthemostchallengingaspectsofthecompensationprocess,
thevaluationexercisewasheavilycontestedbytheland-ownerswhotermeditanexclusivist
process designed and led by government institutions without the involvement of the land-
owners. The key ministries involved in the process were the Public Works, Aviation and
232Additionally,thesepropositionsarealsomadeduetothefactthatsomepeopleareunwillingtoselltheirlandforinheritance.Forinstance,someoftheintervieweessaidthat“weinheritedthislandfromourforefathersandouridentityisingrainedinthisland.Wealsowanttoleavethesamepieceoflandtoourchildrenandthentheirchildren”it.Interviewee53March30,2014.Farmer.
233Interviewee46March30,2014.LandOwner-Taxidriver.
234Inotherwords,50%willbecompensatedformoneywhileanother50%wouldbecompensatedforlandofsimilarvalue.
186|P a g e
Agriculture.235Evaluatorslistedthelandandsharedcopieswiththelocalgovernmentandthe
MinistryofPublicWorks.While land-owners reject the legitimacyof theevaluationprocess,
officialsinvolvedintheprocessclaimthattheyhaveoverratedthepropertiesforpoliticaland
personalreasons.TheDirectorGeneralintheAviationMinistrystatedthat:
theevaluatorshaveincludedintheirreportthatIhavegiventhepeoplesome
surplus inadditiontowhatwastheirs. Iftheyhadonetraditionalmat,we
valueditastwo.Iftheyhadtwowemadethemthree.Forinstance,wehave
evaluated a house belonging to an old lady whose name is Raha for
US$30,000.Iftodayshegoestoaprivateevaluator,theymaygiveheralot
lesservalue.IwasdoingthisbecauseIalsohadapersonalresponsibilityto
thelocalpeoplefromwhomIhail236
Inspiteofassurances that land-ownershavethechoiceofconsultingprivateevaluators, the
government put in place strict guidelines. These guidelines require that any follow up
evaluationsmustbeconductedbypeoplewithatrackrecordofappraisalexercises.Oneofthe
officialsintheMinistryofPublicWorkspointedoutthat:
IfyoujustcallsomeonefromyourclanwhothenjustarguesIspentalotof
moneyinthecementofyourhousethereforeit ismorevaluablethanwas
giventoyou,thatisnotgoingtobeacceptablemeansofevaluationforus.
Sotheyhavetherightofcallinginanindependentevaluator.Theelderswill
alsobepresentintheprocess.237
However,manypeople interprettheserequirementsasastrategyaimedat limitingpeople’s
abilityinfindinglandsurveyorswhomighthavetheskillsnecessaryforpropertyevaluationbut
whodonotmeet thegovernmentbenchmark forexpertise.Moreover,manypeople cannot
affordthisexpertise.Sofar,theauthoritiesannouncedthattheycompensatedforabout90%of
the buildings, birkas (cementedwater reservoirs), bali (non-cementedwater reservoirs) and
235Theseinstitutionshaveundertakentheevaluationsprocessanddeterminedcompensationforvariouspropertiesincludingfarms,birkas,baliyo,andbuildings.
236Interviewee70September05,2014.SeniorOfficial-MinistryofPublicWorks.
237Interviewee10May29,2013.Official-MinistryofPublicWorks.
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farmswithintheimmediatevicinityoftheairport.Theypointoutthat11familiesweregivena
totalof$300,000whileanother30familiesawaitlandswaps.Theremaininglandamountingto
800,000m²,was documented and copieswere sent to the relevantministries and the local
councilrespectively(SomalilandPost,2015).Thesourceofthemoneyforthiscompensationis
contested.While the government officials claim that the treasury provided the funds, land-
owners charge that theMinistry ofAviationwasprovidedwith funds by the government of
Kuwait for not only the construction but also for the compensation of the land to be
expropriatedfortheexpansion.TheDirectorGeneraloftheMinistryofAviation,OmarSayid
AbdullahiAdam,categoricallydeniedthis,sayingthatKuwaitdonated$10mforHargeisaand
Beberaairportsbut thiswasonly for theconstructionof the fencesandrunways (Togaherer
News,2015).
Thosewhofailtoagreetothegovernmentcompensationorrefusetoselltheirlandarefaced
with theharsh realityofbeingevicted forcefully. Thegovernment isby largeunsympathetic
abouttheuseofforcetoimplementitsdecisions.Widespreadfeelingsamongthepublicofficials
indicatethattoomuchdemocracyistoblamefortheslowmotionoftheexpropriationprocess.
Oneoftheirmajorpointsofcontentioninlegitimatingsuchfeelingisthatpreviousregimeshad
nodifficulties inexpandingtheairport.The lastofthesewasSiyadBarrewhomovedpeople
awayfromtheirlandinordertopavewayfortheadditionofasecondrunway.Land-ownersare
quicktopointoutthatthereisnoreasonablecomparisontobedrawnherebecauseofthefact
thatthemilitarygovernmentatthetimewasintentonjailingpeopleforpoliticalresistanceon
theslightestpretextanddidnotdisputelandclaimsclosely.Peoplerememberedtheydidnot
care about whether the government expropriated land from them as it was increasingly
becomingapparentthattheregime’stimewasover.Theyclaimthattheyalwaysknewthatthe
regimewillbetoppledandpeoplewillgettheirlandback.238
Asevidentabove, theattempt to resort to forcebya supposedlydemocraticadministration
forms the basis on which post-conflict urban governance practices are delegitimised. For
instance, forceful eviction is believed to be tantamount to authoritarianism akin to that
experienced during the military regime, a formidable period through which government
administrativepracticesarebothlegitimisedanddelegitimised.Ontheonehand,thisperiodis
associatedwithstateeffectivenessandbureaucraticdevelopmentasthestatewaspresumably
238Interviewee46March30,2014.LandOwner-Taxidriver.
188|P a g e
able to implement its policies and practices to the book, amid divided perception of the
legitimacyofsuchactionsamongthepopulace.Ontheotherhand,thisperiodisassociatedwith
suppressionandabsenceofdialoguebetweencitizensandthegovernmentasthestateoften
employed repressivemeans to subdue any resistance to its policies or politics. The current
state’s determination to show its capacity for implementing decisions and the people’s
determination to resist such moves, makes violent confrontation almost imminent. In one
instance, eleven people accused of breaking a deal which the aviation authorities have
apparentlyreachedwithland-ownerswerearrested.Fourothersuspectschargedwiththesame
offensewerealsowantedbythesecurityagencies,andsoughtrefugeinthehouseofaSultan
whorequestedthesecurityagenciestopardonthesuspects.Thiscrimewasinrelationtothe
prohibitionagainsttamperingwiththeairportfence,breachofwhichwillallowsofficialsfrom
the Ministry to’ seek their rights from the state’. Land-owners deny the existence of this
agreement.239Inanotherinstance,seriousviolencealmosteruptedbetweenland-ownersand
security forcesasthegovernmenttriedtostopthediggingofbirka ina landadjacenttothe
Southernsideoftheairport.240
Theresidentsintheareaandmilitaryunitsalmostclashedinlate2012whenthegovernment
officialsside-steppedongoingdiscussionsanddeployedsurveyorsandconstructionworkersin
contradiction to earlier understanding that the government will not take unilateral action.
According to a local resident, government officials camewith construction technicians who
startedsurveyingtheareawithouttheconsentofthelocalland-owners.Whenresidentsasked
aboutwhatisgoingon,theyweretoldthattheofficialswillcomebackfordiscussion.Inafew
days’time,militaryunitsmovedintheareaandsetupafence,sayingthattheywillnotallow
any body to trespass. Some of the residents defied this order andwent to see themilitary
officialstoenquireabouttheirpresencebutweredetainedforbreachingthegovernmentorder.
Oneofthepeoplewhowasdetainedintheskirmishsaid:
Iwasarrestedinthebarrackandthreatenedbecauseofmyoppositiontothe
militarypresence.TheproblemstartedwhenIwastoldtomoveawaybutI
resistedandItoldthemthatIamnotgoingtobeaballoonthatgoeswith
thewind.IwasbornhereandIhavehadchildrenhereandtherestofthe
239Interviewee70September05,2014.SeniorOfficial-MinistryofPublicWorks.
240Interviewee45April22,2014.LandOwner.
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peoplearelikeme.Astheissuedragged,reinforcementwascalledinandour
childrenandwomenwerebeaten.Themilitarywasremovedbrieflyfromthe
areaonlytobereplacedwithacommando’sunit.241
Thereinvigoratedmilitarypresenceintheareahasfurtherfuelledsuspicionsandfearsabout
imminentuseofforce.Airportauthoritiesareawareofthesesuspicionsbutinsistontheroleof
themilitaryintheairportsecurity.242LocalpeoplehowevercontendthattheMinistryofAviation
ispushingthemilitaryfrombehindusingthemasaproxytofurtheritsinterest.Theyclaimthat
theAviationMinisteroncetoldthemthattheywillhavenoproblemswiththemilitaryifthey
agree with him.243 These accusations gained momentum when reports emerged about
disagreementbetweenthemilitaryandtheCivilAviationMinistry(SomalilandPost,2015).Even
though the main points of their contention remain unrevealed officially, the Ministry of
Aviation’sintentiontoregisteritscomplaintagainstthemilitarywasreportedinthepress.This
complaint apparently emanatesmainly from aviation authorities’ concern about the limited
spaceavailableattheairportfornotonlymeetinginternationalstandardsbutalsodeveloping
additionalfacilitieswhicharenecessaryforthecontinuedgrowthoftheairport.
Tothisend,aviationauthoritieswereapparentlyadvocatingfortherelocationofthemilitary
barracks to other parts of the city so as tomake the land exclusively airport property. The
differencesbetween theMinistryofAviationand themilitary forceswasmadeall themore
difficultbythePresident’sreluctancetoappeartobesidingwithoneinstitutionoveranother,
particularlyinacaseinvolvingpowerfulindividualswhoseclansareimportantforhispolitical
survival.ThisissoduetothefactthattheMinistercomesfromthePresident'sclanwhilethe
chiefofthearmedforcescomesfromequallyimportantclanfortherulingpoliticalparty,making
itdifficultforthePresidenttotakeadecisionwhichmayhavenegativepoliticalconsequences
forhisfuture.Thedivisioningovernmentinstitutionshasnotborneanymeaningfulimpacton
howthegovernmentrelatestothelandownersinUubaaleandtheirriskofforcefuleviction.
Thedangerapparenthereisthatthelackofpoliticalpowerandthefinancialresourcesnecessary
241Interviewee53March30,2014.Farmer.
242 They charge that the airport does not face a threat from outside the country and hencemilitarypresenceinthiscivilianinstallationisnotnecessary.
243Interviewee46March30,2014.LandOwner-Taxidriver.
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forland-owners’defenceoftheircaseincourtmayleadtogreaterdesperationandtherefore
violentresistance.Oneoftheland-ownersintheareasaid:
Wewilldefendourlandfromthosepeopleevenifitisgoingtoleadtomajor
conflict.Theant isaverysmall insectandyoumayknowhowpainful it is
whenitstings,Icanassureyouthatourfightisnotgoingtobelessstingier.244
The soldiers shouldbe told that they should stayaway fromour landand
containthemselveswithintheirbaseswhichdoesnotgobeyondtheairport
fence.Thisisnotawartime.TheGeneralChiefofStaffoftheArmedForces
doesnothavetherighttoextendthebaseintoourfarms.Wearegoingto
organiseourselvesandwewilldosomethingaboutthis.Theresultofthese
mightbeverycatastrophic.Heshouldkeephissoldiersoffourland.Nomore
bulldozersandnomorefootsoldiersrunningaroundourfarms.
Thepeoplewhowillbeaffectedbyourviolencearepoorpeoplewhoareused
by the government such as the soldiers or junior officials. Thosewho are
violatingourrightsandwantingtoexpropriate landareneveraffectedby
theactionswetakeandtheinducedviolence.245Nowlandisintheplaceof
camelthatpeopleusedtofightover.Thereisnolandthatdoesnotbelong
tosomeone.Awrongdoingmustnotbedonetoanyone.Itisbestthatthey
(government)comewithagoodheart,notevictionsandillegalexpropriation
threats.246
Thelandexpropriationaroundtheairportcanthusbeunderstoodasawayinwhichthestateis
tryingtoincreaselegitimacy.Attheheartofthisexerciseisthestate’sdeterminationtoshow
itsstrengthandabilitytocontrollandandimplementdevelopmentplansandpolicieswithout
anyformofimpediment.Butthedangerapparentinsuchanapproachtostatelegitimacyisthe
factthatitcanfacilitatefurtherlossofpublicsupportandtrustinthestate.Huntington(2006)
rejectsthenotionthatthestrengthof thestate isamajor indicatorof legitimacyandrather
244Interviewee44April18,2014.LandOwner.
245Interviewee46March30,2014.LandOwner-Taxidriver.
246Interviewee53March30,2014.Farmer.
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placestheemphasisontherelationshipbetweentheinstitutionsandthosewhoelectedthem.
Someofthekeypointersthroughwhichthehealthofsuchrelationshipcanbemeasuredare
foundinthewaythestateseekstobringaboutconsensusonregulatoryconformanceaswellas
themeans throughwhich it overcomes social, economic and legal obstacles to its policy or
developmentproposals.Inthecaseoftheairportexpansion,theresidentsintheareaseemto
havelosttrustinthestate.ThisisbecausepeopleinUubaalearepoorandmarginalisedbythe
systemthroughitscostlyandfrustratingredtapebureaucracy.Astheirmarginalityisreinforced
bythegovernment’seffortsaimedatimprovingpoliticallegitimacy,thepoorareforcedtoturn
to other avenues for justice and governance. The consequence is that state institutions are
weakened and people are obliged to make “further investment in non-state institutions as
potentialchannelsof”servicedelivery(Berry,2007)andprotectionagainststateaggression.The
geographical manifestation of this marginalisation of the poor emanating partly from the
struggleforlegitimacycanpartlyexplaintheperpetuationoftheclanbasedspatialsegregation
evidentinthecity.
Similarly, the mediation and compensation processes were characterised by a legitimation
struggleandmutualmistrust.Attheheartofthisstrugglewastheland-owners’reluctanceto
acceptexpropriation ingovernment termsandthestate’s inability tomeet the landowners’
demands.Nonetheless,duetotheunequalpowerrelationsbetweenthetwosides,thestate
oftenhadtheupperhandintheprocess.Forinstance,iteithercontrolledormanipulatedthe
instrumentsofmediationsuchasthecommitteesandelders.Equallytheevaluationprocesswas
controlledandledentirelybythestate.Takingthesefactorsintoaccount,itisfairtoarguethat
thelimitedmediationspaceforlandconflictsinvolvingthestateandtheinabilityofnon-state
actorssuchasthetraditionalleaderstoadjudicatetheseconflictsinamannerindependentfrom
statemanipulationsmarginalisesthepoor.Itleadstofurtherconcentrationofclansindiscrete
geographical locations, which is itself one of the single most serious obstacles to the
implementationofpoliciesandplans,asgroupidentityisusedtomobilisepeopleandresources
toresistthestate.
7.7 Conclusion
Inthischapter,Ihaveshownthatthecontrolofstatepropertyisusedasameanstolegitimise
newpoliticalorders.Butequally,thesearealsothesitesinwhichresistancetosuchordersis
mostlydemonstrated,oftendenyingfragilestatesthelegitimacytheysodesperatelyneedto
show that they are not only in power but also a better alternative to those they deposed.
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HutchisonandJohnson(2011)observethatinstitutionalperformanceingovernance,security
andjusticeplayasignificantroleinhowpeopleascribelegitimacytothestate.Themannerin
whichtheinstitutionsbehaveoftenunderpinsthetrustthatpeoplemayhaveinthestate.As
shown in this chapter, land and property owners in Hargeisa, particularly those involved in
conflicts, seldomtrust the state.Evidence for this canbe found in the fact thata significant
proportionofthelandconflictsinthecityaresolvedthroughpersonalnegotiationsorcustomary
mediations. It is important to point out thatwhereas peoplemay have resort to customary
institutionsasoneofmanypossibilitieswhendealingwithoneanother,thesamecannotbesaid
whenthestate isoneofthedisputantsduetothefactthatcustomary institutionsareoften
susceptibletostatemanipulation.Thesemanipulationsshrinkthemediationspaceavailablefor
urbanlandconflictinwhichthestateisapart.Asaresult,clanisoftenseenasanarenainwhich
peoplecanseekshelternotonly fromthehostilityofotherclansbutalsofrominjusticeand
aggressionbythestate.
Thelegitimacystruggleprofiledinthischapterheightensendearmenttowardscollectiveclan
identityandreinforcesthemannerinwhichpeoplemakedecisionsabouttheirchoicesofabode.
In other words, individuals who are concerned about state violence are likely to maintain
propertiesinareaspredominantlypopulatedbytheirclansoastomobilisethepublicsupport
and resources necessary for resisting against the state. This is not however to say that
concentration of clans in certain geographic locations is a complete deterrent against state
aggression.Inmanyinstances,thestateattemptstoenforcedecisionsinareawhereresisting
clansmadeastrongfoothold.Suchattemptsarehoweverbloody,resultinginserioussecurity
repercussions. In the case of the airport expansion, attempts aimed at implementing
governmentdecisionsmayontheonehandresultinpeopleputtingupviolentresistance,which
cancausedeathanddestructionofproperties,whileon theother,airport securitymightbe
compromised. This is because airport security was dependent for a long time on the local
people’scollaborationwithauthoritiesastheyusedtoinformtheauthoritiesofanyproblems
posedtothesecurityoftheairport.Ifthisissueisnotresolvedamicably,peopleintheareawill
seenoreasonwhytheyshouldcooperatewithastatethatmarginalisesthem.
In the next chapter, I discuss the breakdown of security that can result from the limited
mediationspaceforurbanlandconflictsinwhichthestateisoneofthedisputants.
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CHAPTER8 SECURITYIMPACTOFVIOLENTURBANLANDCONFLICTS
8.1 Introduction
Stability in Somaliland fairs better than most parts of what used to be called the Somali
DemocraticRepublicwhichdisintegratedin1991(Ali,2014,Bradburyetal.,2003).Thisispartly
attributabletothefactthatsecuritywasoftenandstillremainstobeprioritisedovertheother
functionsofthestate,247underanassumptionthatifSomalilandistobeconsideredalegitimate
polityintheregion,ithastomonopolisesecurityprovisionsinitsterritory,attimesevenatthe
expenseofcivilliberty(Stremlau,2013).Inurbancontexts,thisrelativestabilityishoweverfaced
withathreatemanatingfromstateinvolvedlandconflicts,whichinduceasignificantlevelof
violence,pittingauthoritiesagainstlocalland-ownersorclaimers.Inthischapter,Iarguethat
limitedorlackofcrediblemeansofadjudicationfortheseconflictsleadstodesperationamong
localandoftenpoordisputantswhoasaresulttakethelawintotheirhands,jeopardisingthe
relativesecurityinthecountryatlargeandHargeisainparticularandcementingclan-basedself-
segregation.Thechapterisorganisedintothreesections.Inthefirstsection,Ilookattheurban
securitydynamicsinaSomalisettingwhileinthesecond,Idemonstratehowviolenceemanating
fromurbanlandconflictsinwhichthestateisapartycanthreatenurbansecurity.Inthefinal
section,Ishowhowstatelawenforcementismitigatedbyothersocialactorsandbrieflydiscuss
theimplicationofthisforurbansecurity.Thesecomplexurbansecuritydynamicsareobscured
thanilluminatedbysimplyinvoking'hybridity'andtheideaofafusionofinstitutionsatalllevel
ofgovernance.Indeed,inthisinstance,claneldersappearnotasmanipulatedorusedbythe
state (as in the previous chapter), but rather provided recourse from outside the state to
mediateinthewakeofviolentconflicttowhichthestatewasparty.
8.2 UrbanSecurityinaSomaliSetting:TheStatusQuo
SecurityinSomalilandoperatesinacontextofpluralinstitutions–i.e.clan,Islamicandstate–
asIhavedetailedinearlierchapters.PriortothearrivalofthecolonialpowersontheSomali
shores, individualandcommunal securitywasprovided throughcontractualagreementsand
clanmembership(Lewis,1958).Beingamemberofaclan,providedonewithasenseofsafety.
Inotherwords,his/herrightscouldnotbeviolatedwithoutarepercussionfromtheclanhe/she
247Somecommentatorshavecriticisedthissecure-centricapproachtogovernanceandtermed itasanationhostageforpeace.See(Stremlau,2013).
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belongs.Thisistosaythatifsomeonewasharmed,revengeoftenusedtofollowquicklyunless
a peaceful resolutionwas reached before the incident deteriorates intomore violence. The
arrivalofthecolonialpowersaddedanewdimensiontothistraditionofsecurityprovisionas
theyintroducedcentralisedandhierarchicalstatesecurityinstitutions.Salariedstandingarmies
andpolicewithwhichpeoplewerenotfamiliarwereestablishedmainlyintheurbancentresin
thecoastatthebeginningbutthesewerelaterexpandedtotheinteriorpartsofthecountry.As
Ielaboratedinchapters2and4,thenewsecurityagenciesdidnothoweverreplacetheexisting
traditionalmechanismnotonlybecausethecolonialadministrationoptedtousethemasan
indirectrule,butalsoduethefactthatthenewinstitutionslackedthelegitimacyrequiredfor
peopletotrustthem.248Inchapter4,Ishowedhowsuccessivepostcolonialattemptstoremove
theclan fromthearenaofcommunalandpersonalsecurityprovisions inthecountry leftno
noticeablebehavioural,culturalandsocialchangeamongtheSomalipeople,notleastbecause
oftheutilityofAkilsasstateagents.Evenattheheightofthedictatorshipwhereclannismwas
denouncedandactsofdisobediencetostatepoliciesweremetwithaswiftandsevereresponse,
traditionalinstitutionsremainedakeyproviderforsecurity,justiceandgovernance.
Inthiscontextofthe2012violentconflictbetweenclanmilitiaandthestateIanalysehere,itis
worth invoking the various explanations for the persistence of clan loyalty for reasons of
security. Lewis (2008b)’s contention that both violence and its resolution mechanism are
inherentinSomalicultureandthereforethestatehadtoaccepttheclanasarealitythrough
whichpeople’ssocialandsecurityneedsaremanaged,isonepertinentview.Yetitiscontested
by Samatar and Samatar (1988, 1997) who blame a dishonest elite for preventing the
advancementofcivicgovernancewherethesecurityagenciescanearnthetrustofthepeople
andpromotecitizenshipasopposedtoclanship.Hispropositionthatpoorgovernancepractices
are to a significant degree an explanatory factor for endearment to clan ideals and identity
appearsrelevantinthecasediscussedherewherelandownersresortedtoarmstotrytoprevent
theirlandbeingappropriatedbythemilitaryandgrantedtoanotherindividual.
Tounderstandthedynamicsofthemilitarybaseconflict,itisimportanttounderstandthekey
actors and dynamics of urban security in the post-conflict context. Scholars have invoked a
trajectory fromtheheightenederaof clanprotection in the immediateaftermathofBarre’s
248 For instance, it could notmake sense to trust amulti clan police forcewhere in some cases theperpetratorcouldbelongtothesameclanasamemberofapoliceinvestigatingacaseinvolvingavictimfromanotherclan.
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removalfrompowerthroughthetimewhentheSNMadministration’slackoforganisational
cohesion and capacity to maintain public order, necessitated the use of clan elders as the
ultimatesecurityprovidersinthecountry(APD,2010).AsIdetailedinchapter2,theycastthis
asmarkingthebeginningofa‘hybrid’processinwhichthestateformalisedbyrelyingheavily
on,andincorporatingexistingtraditionalinstitutionsinordertolegitimiseitselfandbringabout
lawandorder.Thereisadebateastowhetherthishasdefusedclanconflictorgivenclanidentity
hasgainedarenewedmomentuminthepost-conflictcontext.Myargumentinthisthesis,is
thatwhatIseeastherenewedroleofclanhasunderminedtheprospectsofcosmopolitanism
inurbanplacesaspeopleinmulticlanneighbourhoodshaveself-segregatedandmovetoareas
predominantly populated by their clans (APD, 2010). The primary motivation for this self-
segregationwassecuritygrounds,aspeoplesurroundedbytheirownclanmembersperceive
themselvestobelessvulnerabletocriminalhooligansthanthoseinlessclannedspaces.
Whiletheco-existenceofpluralsecurityprovidersinSomalilandmayhaveplayedacrucialrole
in the post-conflict state building processes, their role is ambiguous, and theymay equally
becomeanobstacletoprogresspartlyduetothelackofclarityontheirrespectiverolesand
responsibilities.Sofar,veryfewattemptshavebeenmadetoconsolidatethevarioussecurity
providersinthecountryandtheseattemptshavesofarfailedtoprovideaframeworkwithin
which these institutions could be enhanced to complement each other. The existing
administrativepracticesfailtodelineatethenecessaryboundariesandconvergencesbetween
thestateandotheractorssuchastraditionalandreligiousleaders.Whileemphasisisplacedon
thedecentralisationofthestatesecurityservicesthroughtheRegionalGovernorsandtheuse
ofthetraditionalleaderswhoareongovernmentpayrolls,itsetsnoguidelinesaroundwhich
theirworkingrelationshipcouldbeshaped.Suchlackofclarityontherelationshipbetweenthe
variousactorsinvolvedinsecurityprovisionisdangerousinacountrywheregunownershipis
high(Hammond,2013),249makingviolentconfrontationbetweenclansandthestateandwithin
clanmoreimminent.
According to a report by the Danish Demining Group (2009, p. 35), some of the [key]
“characteristics of the internal safety and security environment….in Somaliland…are the
overlapping responsibilities and competencies of different security providers that have
249AccordingtoHammond(2013),41percentoftherespondentssurveyedinBuraoclaimthattheyownfirearms.Theseweaponsaremainlyautomaticrifleswhichhavethepotentialofformingaformidablemilitiashouldsomeoftheclanschoosetoresistthestateviolently.Inadditiontothishighrateofgunownershipinthecities.
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developedasaresponsetotheinitial–andtosomeextentremaining–capacitygaps”instate
securityprovisions. Inaddition to the traditional and religious leaders, this capacitygapwas
morerecentlyfilledbyyouthgroupswhohaveemergedasnewactorsinthepost-conflicturban
securitylandscape.Theseyouthgroupspatroltheneighbourhoodsforasmallfeeandclaimto
protectresidentsfrompettycriminalswhooftensnatchmobilephonesandburglarisehomes.
Theychargethecustomersafeerangingfrom$5to$30,dependingonthesizeoftheproperty
and thewealth of customer. Moreover, various other –more serious - challenges face the
provisionofurbansecurityinSomaliland.Theseincludethesecuritythreatsposedbyextremist
organisationsbasedintheSouth,whichhavereceivedthemostinternationalattention.In2001,
anItalianaidworkerwaskilledinBoramawhileayearlatertwoEnglishteacherswereslainin
Sheikh.Thebiggestthreatcamein2008whenamajorattack,claimingthelivesofmorethan20
peoplewascarriedoutagainsttheEthiopianconsulate,UNDPcompoundandthePresidential
HouseinHargeisa(APD,2010).Theseincidentshaveledtoarapidincreaseintheemergenceof
gatedcommunitiesinthecityasaresponsetothethreats.Almostallthemajorgovernmental
offices, aid agencies and themajor hotels in the city have fortified gates surrounding their
immediatevicinities.Nonetheless,accordingtolocalsecurityofficials,violenceandinsecurity
emanatingfromurbanlandconflictspresentsauthoritieswithmoreimmediateurbansecurity
challengesthantheoccasionalterroristrelatedthreats.250
8.3 UpsettingtheStatusquo:TheEarlyMorningWarCall
Acaseinpoint,whichcanillustratetheprecariousdynamicsofurbansecurityinSomalilandand
readyrecoursetoclanoccurredinHargeisain2012,whereclashesbetweensecurityforcesand
armedmilitiasentshockwavesthroughthecity.Theproblemwasrootedintheconfiscationof
a piece of land, located inMalka Durduro near the Somaliland Army headquarters, from a
prominentEthiopianSomalipolitician,AbdikarimAwRali.251Themovewassaidtohavebeen
necessitatedbythefactthatthearmyneededextraspaceforstoringitsmilitaryhardware.Upon
findingoutthathislandwasconfiscatedbythegovernment,theEthiopianSomalipoliticianwho
wasatthetimebasedinAddisAbaba,cametoHargeisatogetexplanationfortheconfiscation
of his land. He held high profile meetings with senior politicians and government officials
250Interviewee66August10,2014.PoliceStationCommander.
251Thelandtheyconfiscatedfromhimwasabout600x600mwhereasthelandtheygavehimwas400x400minwherethedisputehasarisen.
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includingthethenPresidentofSomaliland,DahirRayaleKahin.Followingthesemeetings,the
government decided to compensate him with alternative land located in a military barrack
towardstheEastofthecity.252Thebarrackswereestablishedintheareainthelate1970swhen
thesocialistmilitaryregimeexpandeditssecuritypresenceinthecityandconfiscatedlandfor
establishingmilitarybasesfromthepeopleinthearea.Accordingtolocalresident,thelandused
tobefarmsownedbyseminomadicfamilieswhosesettlementintheareadatesbacktonearly
70years.253Whilethegovernmentconstructedbuildingsandmilitaryfacilitiesinsomepartsof
the confiscated land (i.e. factory that fixes broken weapons, firearm testing facilities, and
military training grounds), other parts remained vacant. The post-conflict administration
followedsuit,limitingthemselvestothefacilitiesestablishedbytheirpredecessors.According
toaSultanwhohailsfromthearea,thisstateofvacancyseemstohaveprovidedreasonforthe
reoccupationofthelandbythepreviouscivilianowners:
Whenpeoplecamebackfromtherefugeecamps,theyresettledinthearea
which was confiscated from them. The land was vacant… they never
constructedbuildings,theyneverfencedit...inotherwordsitwasasvacant
aswhenitwasconfiscatedfromthem.254
Claimantsofthis landcontendthatthetransferofthelandconfiscatedfromthemforpublic
purposestoanotherpersonisillegalandunacceptable.Attemptsaimedatresolvingtheissue
peacefullydidnotyieldresults.Someofthegovernmentofficialswhoweresympathetictothe
civilian claimants covertly advised them that the only mechanism through which they can
pragmatically open a case against themilitary establishmentwas through their own courts.
Heedingthisadvice,theytriedtoopenacaseinthemilitarycourtsbutthecourtsrefusedto
accepttheirsubmission.Assuingthearmythroughitssubsidiaryorgansdidnotbringaboutany
change, they thenmadeanattempt tobypass the court.According to close relatives,255 the
claimantshavevisitedallthemajorfiguresinthemilitaryestablishmentincludingtheGeneral
ChiefofStaff,theDeputyGeneralChiefofStaff,andtheHeadoftheMilitaryOperations.Their
252Interviewee52June15,2014.Sultan.
253Interviewee40April25,2014.DistrictOfficer.
254Interviewee52June15,2014.Sultan.
255Interviewee83June21,2013.RelativesofOneoftheAttackers.
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pleaswiththemilitaryofficialsdidnothoweverresultinanyintervention.Realisingthatthey
willgetnohelporsolacefromthemilitaryestablishment,theytriedtotaketheircasetothe
SupremeCourt,thehighestcourtintheland,buttheirrequestforopeningacaseagainstthe
ArmedForceswasagaindeclined.Frustratedbythejudicialsysteminthecountry,theytriedto
getapoliticalintervention,writingaletteroutliningtheirgrievancestotheMinistryoftheOffice
ofthePresidency.TheyalsoapparentlysoughtaudiencewiththePresidentbutsixmonthsafter
theirrequest,theywerestillunabletoseehim.
IntheearlymorningofTuesday,15thofMay2012,thelandclaimantsstagedasurprisingbut
daringattackonthemilitarybarrackinquestion.Sevenpeoplelosttheirlivesandnineothers
wereinjuredintheattack(BBCSomali,2012).Thecasualtiesincludedthreemilitarypersonnel,
twomilitiamenandtwocivilianbystanderswhowereapparentlyearlyriserspreparingfortheir
nextday’sactivities.Accordingtopoliceandmilitarychiefswhocalledforapressconferenceon
thefollowingday,themilitiawerearmedwithvarioustypesofsmallarmsincludingautomatic
machineguns.ThisishardlysurprisinginSomalilandwhereavailabilityofsmallarmsisamong
thehighest intheregion.Thesecuritychiefsreportedinthemeetingthat28peoplewere in
custody,nineofwhomwereinjured(HaatufNews,2012b).Oneoftheattackers,whoidentified
himselfasSaeedMohamedAbdullah,spoketotheVoiceofAmerica’sSomaliServicefollowing
theattackandarguedthattheycarriedouttheattackbecausethegovernmentoccupiedland
theyownedforgenerations.Hesaidthelandwasforciblyconfiscatedfromthembytheprevious
militaryregimeforpublicuseonlytobegiventoabusinessman(HaatufNews,2012b).
Competing narratives surround themanner in which the incident began. The government’s
versionisthattheciviliansattackedthemilitarybasewithoutprovocation.Ontheirpart,the
assailantscontestthattheydidnotgotoattackthemilitarybutrathertoreoccupytheirland.
Whenthemilitarysawthemcampinginthecontestedland,theyrequestedthemtovacatebut
thearmedciviliansrefusedtoabidebythemilitaryorders.Nevertheless,theincidenttookthe
citybysurpriseandpoliticianswerecautiousabouttheirremarksduetotheclandynamicsof
thesituation.Itisimportanttorememberherethattheincidenthadtwodimension.Ontheone
hand, the conflictwasbetween the stateand the landowners.Butbeneath this layerof the
conflictistheclandynamics.Surprisingly,thesoldierswholosttheirlivesallcamefromtheSa’ad
MuseoftheAwalclans.Equally,theattackersallcamefromtheHabarYonissub-clanofthe
Grahajisclans.Bothclanshavemajorpresenceinthecapitalandinflammatoryremarkscould
havesparkedaclash.TheMayorofthecitywhospokeshortlyaftertheattackonanational
televisionencouragedpeoplenottotakethelawintotheirhands.TheMinisterofDefencealso
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condemnedtheattackbutspokeinaconciliatorymannermakingamentiontothefactthatthe
peoplewhoarefightingoverthelandnowarethesamepeoplewhofoughttogetheragainst
the previous military regime (Berbera News, 2012). Similarly, a former Minister in the
governmentAliMohamedWaranadde256whospoketothemediasaidthat"Iwanttotellthe
peoplethatwehavecomethisfarthroughdialogueandcompromisesandIamurgingpeople
nottoabandonthis....IamawareofthisproblemandIamprettysurethatithasreachedthis
farbecauseofmismanagementbutIdonotbelievethatitshouldhavereachedtothepointof
violence".257(Faarax,2012a).
8.4 CourtMartialandPostViolenceCustomaryMediation
Themilitaryandtherestofthestateinstitutionswereembarrassedandfuriousabouttheattack
stagedagainstakeymilitarybaseintheheartofthecountry.Partofthisangerwasrootedina
concernaboutpossibledamagetothestate’simage.Thisshapednotonlythemannerinwhich
the state responded heavy-handedly to the incident but also the swiftness with which it
prosecutedsuspects.Forinstance,disproportionatelevelofsecuritypersonnelandmachinery
wereusedtobringthesituationundercontrolwhileprosecutionwasspeedilyputtogetherand
militarycourtconvenedwithinunrealistic timeframe (in theSomalilandcontext)of12hours
fromthetimewhenthe incident tookplace.Onthe followingday, thecourtpassedadeath
sentenceto17peoplewhile5others,whowereunderage,weresentencedtolifeimprisonment.
Threemore peoplewhowere treated for injuries sustained during the attack awaited trial.
Speakingtothemedia,thechairmanofthefirstlevelmilitarycourtinHargeisaCol.YusufFarah
Sharmarkesaidthatthecourt’ssittingbeganintheearlymorningof16May2012andcameto
anendatabout4o'clockinthesameday(HaatufNews,2012a).Headdedthatthetrialwas
fast-trackedduetoassailants’confessionsfortheircrimes.
Concernshavebeenraisedaboutthemannerandswiftnesswithinwhichthesentenceswere
handeddown(BBCWorld,2012).Criticsarguedthatitissurprisingforadeathsentencetobe
issued within 24 hours without proper investigation to the root causes of the problem.
Moreover,thelegalityoftryingthecaseinamilitarycourtwasalsoquestioned.Accordingtoa
criminal lawyer in Hargeisa, civilians cannot be tried in a military court under the existing
256HeisnowthecurrentMinisterofInterior
257TheMinisteralsodeniedallegationslevelledagainstaprominentbusinessmancalledtheDAHASHILtohaveboughttheplace.
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Somalilandcriminal laws.258Themilitaryhowevercontestedifamilitaryactioniscommitted,
militaryrulemustbeapplied.259Oneofthewaysinwhichthesecuritypersonnelsoughttojustify
theirpositionwasthefactthattheydisplayedthemilitaryweaponsusedbythesuspectsina
pressconferencesheldsoonaftertheattackersweredetained(Seefigure1and2).
Figure6:Weaponsusedintheattack,asclaimedbysecurityofficials
Source:(Faarax,2012b)
258Interviewee88June14,2014.CriminalLawyer.
259Interviewee86June1,2014.MillitaryOfficial.
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Figure7:Governmentofficialsspeakingtothemediaintheaftermathoftheincident
Fromrighttoleft:DefenceMinister,AhmedHajiAliAdani,InteriorMinister,MohamedNurArale(Du)r,ArmyChief,IsmailShaqale,andPoliceCommissioner,AbdullahFadalIman.Source:(Faarax,2012b)
Thesentencescausedwidespreadfearaboutpossibledeteriorationofthesituation.According
toQaranNews(2012),tensionwasrunninghighinthecityaspeoplewereshockedaboutboth
theattackonthebarracks,butalsothepassingofsuchaharshsentenceagainstciviliansina
military court. This website, which is run by a blogger who hails from the Eastern
neighbourhoods of the city, reported that a demonstration was organised in New Hargeisa
neighbourhoodinresponsetothesentences.Accordingtooneofthegovernmentcritics,the
samemilitarycourtwhichrefusedtoaccepttheirsubmissionsandhearwhattheyhavetosay
aboutthelandinquestionsentencedthemtodeath.260
The military court was accused of human rights violations as it denied the suspects their
constitutional rights for fair trial and legal representation. This is because none of those
sentencedwasdefendedorlegallyrepresentedinthecourt.Someoftheotherproblemswith
the trialwere investigative flaws relating to theprosecutor’spreparationof thecase.This is
apparentinthemannerinwhichthesentencewascollectivelyrenderedwithoutaddressingkey
260Interviewee87June4,2014.OppositionMemberofParliament.
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investigativequestionssuchaswhetheralltheaccusedpeoplecommittedthecrimeorwhether
theywereallarmedorfiredtheirgunsatthesoldiers.Moreover,someofthepeoplewhowere
sentenced todeathwereunderageboyswhoseage ranged from15 to17.The irregularities
apparentinthewaythecasewashandledattractedcriticismfromnotonlywithinthecountry
but also outside the country. For instance, the United Nations envoy in Somalia, Augustine
Mahiga,expressedhisorganisation’sconcernovertheviolencebetweenciviliansandmilitaryin
HargeisaaswellasthesubsequentmishandlingofthecasebytheSomalilandauthorities.The
envoyinastatementexpressed:
concern about the [manner in which the] trial of these civilians was
conducted by a military [court] in contradiction of both applicable local
statutesand…[internationallawsandnorms]….Heurges[d]theimmediate
transferofthecasetoacriminalcourtandencourage[d]theauthoritiesto
ensure that fair trial rights are respected…. [finally] calling for a full,
impartial, independentandtransparent investigation intothe incidentand
itsaftermath(UNNewsCentre,2012).
Relativesofthosesentencedtodeath261suspectthatthereasonwhythecapitalpunishment
wasissuedwithinaveryshortperiodoftimeisattributabletothefactthatallthekeyfigures,
includingtheheadofthearmy,thechairmanofthecourt,andthetwoprosecutorshandlingthe
trial,werefromthesameclanasthosesoldierskilledintheattack.262Itisalsoimportanttonote
thatalltheattackerswerefromthesamesubclan,HabarYonisoftheGarhajis,inadditionto
thelocaltensions,thecasealsoattractedtheattentionoftheSomalilanddiasporawhousedit
forcritiquingthestatebuildingprocessinSomaliland.Buttheiropinionwasdivided.Whilesome
supportedthegovernmentresolvetoquickactionagainstthosewhostagedtheattackagainst
themilitary,othersweredisappointedinthemannerinwhichthegovernmenthandledthecase.
Forinstance,Yare(2012)arguedinanarticlecarriedinadiasporaownedwebsitethat:
onewouldseenoreasonwhythegovernmentmaintainsamilitarybasein
the middle of densely populated and residential area. The military is the
defenceforcesofthenationthataredesignedtoprotectthecountryfrom
261Interviewee84June15,2013.RelativesofOneoftheAttackers.
262Interviewee52June15,2014.Sultan.
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externalandforeignenemy.Logicallythebasesshouldhavebeenrelocated
intheborderareaofthecountryandinarm’slengthofcivilianpopulation.
Only dictatorial regimes keep a heavily fortified military base within the
vicinity[ofacivilianresidentialarea].
Someofthemessagescarriedinthediasporawebsitesweremainlyaimedatraisingawareness
about the issue and bringing about not only local resistance to the sentences but also
internationalpressureonthegovernmenttorethinkitsdecisions.Suchmessagesamplifiedthe
securitythreatsthatcanemanatefromtheviolenceandtheimplicationsthiscouldhaveonthe
relativestabilityanddemocratisationprocess inthecountrywhicharebothheavilyaidedby
Westerndonors.263Inablogpostedontheinternetintheimmediateaftermathoftheattack,
Yare(2012)arguedthat:
whatdistinguishesournationandthethingweareproudofisourtolerance
and respect for human dignity. We would not be any different from our
brothersandsistersinSomaliaifwemilitariseeverycivilissue.Civilianswho
havebeen frustratedby thewebofoppressionsandsystematicalienation
wouldhavenooptionthanusingallmeansnecessarytodefendtheirright.It
is from the government we have to expect patience, tolerance and fair
treatment. There is no doubt that the military and the police have used
excessive forces. [This] would be an insult to [the] European donors that
financetherecurrenttrainingandsalaryofthespecialpoliceunit.
Valuesandprinciplesofdemocracyenshrinedintheconstitutionwerealsousedasapointof
departureforcondemningthegovernment’sactionagainsttheassailants.IbrahimMead(2012)
whoisapoliticalanalystbasedinCanadaandcriticoftherulingparty,KULMIYE,pointsoutthat
theconstitutionsofSomalilandupholdstherightofciviliantofairtrial inaciviliancourt.The
commentatorsuspectsthatthegovernmentanticipatedthesekindsofproblemsandwasintent
to create security problems as thatwould enable it to distract the public attention from its
institutionalfailures.Heasks:
263Whoseruleoflawvalues,accordingtothesebloggers,weresupposedlyreflectedintherelationshipbetweenthepeopleandthestatetheyaid.
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why are the soldiers [who] were sent to the place of the incident were
selectivelyfromaparticularclantofaceaparticularclan?Manypeoplein
Hargeisabelievethatitwasdeliberatelyplannedtocreateawedgebetween
the brotherly communities [in Hargeisa] so that Siilanyo could fish in the
newly created mistrust and implanted hate between these brotherly
communitiesasabenefactoroftheseevilactivities!
Thecommentator furtheraccusedthegovernmentofpolarisingthecountryalongclan lines,
contributingsignificantlytothewideningriftsbetweenclansinSomaliland.Anexampleofthis
isthefactthatsomeeldersandbusinessmenfromGabileycalledforthegovernmenttospeed
up transportation of the bodies of their military men, also echoing out clan inclined
inflammatoryremarksintheaftermathoftheattack.Theauthorasks,‘thequestioniswhothe
soldiers died for, for a merchant or for the nation?’ Following both local and international
pressureonthegovernment,theDefenceMinisterrevealedduringabriefingtotheparliament
thatthegovernmentwasreviewingthedeathandlifeimprisonmentsentences(Hasan,2012).
Subsequently,theappealcourtofthemilitaryoverruledtheprevioussentences,reducingdeath
sentencestolifeimprisonmentandthelifeimprisonmentto10years.
TheeldersoftheHabarYonisclanfromwhichtheassailantshailwerestillunhappyaboutthe
jailingoftheirmenandthushaveembarkedoneffortsaimedatbypassingthestateinstitutions
and making the matter inter-clan issue. To this end, the elders used their network in the
customaryinstitutionstobringaboutasolutiontothisproblem.Theymetrepresentativesfrom
the deceased men’s’ clan. The point of departure for these elders was the fact that the
assailants’clan,HabarYonis,hadnointentionofengagingviolentlywiththeSa’adMuseofthe
Awal clans, of thedeceased soldiers therefore cannotbe subjected, according to customary
laws,topunitiveactionssuchasrevenge(assailants).Afteralongdiscussionbetweentheelders
ofthetwoclans,intheendtheclanofthedeceasedsoldiersagreedtotakebloodmoneyfor
theirdeceasedmembers.TheSultanwholedthedelegationfromEasternHargeisaclanssaid:
wemettheirclanleaderssuchastheSultanandtheAkilsandwerequested
themtotakemagordia(bloodmoney)264sincetheassailantsdidnotknow
theclanbackgroundofthedeceased.Wealsotoldthemthattheydidnot
264MaganddiaareSomaliorSomalisisedwordswiththesamemeaninginterchangeablyusedforbloodmoney.
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intendtokillthemforclanrelatedpurposes.Thehostelderswereconvinced
withourargumentandweagreedonabloodmoneyof300camelsforeach
personkilled.Eachcamelwasestimatedtocost$500.265
Theassailant’sclanbroughttheagreementpaperstocourtdemandingthattheirmenshould
bereleasedsincethetwoclanshaveagreedwithinthemselves.Thecourt,however,imposed
furtherconditionsbyinstructingtheelderstobringcloserelativesofthepeoplewhowerekilled
intheattacktocourtsoastoensurethattheyarehappywiththedecisionsmadebytheirelders.
Theassailant’selderswentbacktothedeceased’sclaneldersrequestingthemtofacilitatethe
consentofthedeceased’srelativesinwriting.ASultanfromtheHabarYonissaidthat:
webroughtthenotarysignedbytheclosefamilymembersinordertoshow
thatthecloserelativesagreedtothisarrangement.Wepaidabout$600for
theprocessofbringingthemfromtheirhometothecity.266
The aforementioned efforts aimed at releasing the jailed assailants through clan-based
negotiationswerealsoaccompaniedbysimilareffortsaimedatconvincingthestatetorelease
the assailants. For instance, six people including three Sultans, businessman, and other key
figuresrepresentingtheclansintheEasternsideofthecitymetwiththePresidentofSomaliland
and a select committee of high ranking officials including the Government Spokesman and
MinistersofInterior,Defence,ForeignAffairs,andPresidencytodiscusspossiblesolutionsfor
theviolenceanddeathofsoldiersaswellastheoutstandinglandissues.267Themeetingwith
thePresidentwasparticularlyimportantbecauseofthefactthatthemilitarycourtcomplicated
theissuefurtherbysayingthattheonlywaythroughwhichtheassailantscouldbereleasedis
through a presidential pardon. Following successful lobbying the President finally agreed to
issueapardonontheoccasionof18MaywhenSomalilandunilaterallydeclaredindependence
fromtherestofSomalia.
265Interviewee49June15,2014.Sultan.
266Ibid.
267TheSultanagainsaidthattheyinsisted:thistimeweareonlydealingwiththePresidentsinceallotherinstitutionsareunabletodoanythingabouttheproblem.Wealsotoldthemthatwestilldidn'tgiveupourlandandweneedtotalkaboutitinanothersettingandanothertimeibid.
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Amidweak justice system, violence emanating fromurban land conflict is the single biggest
threattosecurityinSomaliland(OCVP,2012,OCVP,2013a,OCVP,2013b).Whilethetraditional
systemiscriticisedforinabilitytodealwithlanddisputesincomplexurbansettings,theyproved
tobeuseful inresolvingdisputes inwaysthatarenotnecessarily justice-orientedbutrather
solution-oriented.Thestate’sinabilitytodeliverequitablestatutorysystemnotonlyempowers
thecustomaryinstitutionsbutalsounderminesstatelegitimacy.ForBelaundeetal.(2010,p.
50),“competinglegalregimesservetounderminethelegitimacyofthestateintheeyesofits
citizensduetothelackofcitizenparticipationinlandprocessesandtocompetingmeaningsand
usessurroundinglandbetweenandwithinthelocal,nationalandinternationallevels”.While
thisassertionisrelevant,dismissaloflegalpluralisminpost-conflictcontext,wherethestateis
unwillingorunabletodischargepublicserviceinanequitablemanner,issimplistic.Themore
pertinentquestionrelatestohowcouldtheirinteractionbemanagedinamanyinwhichthey
couldfunctionalongsideeachotherwithminimalnegativeimpactonthepopulationtheyserve.
8.5 Conclusion
Theabovecasehighlightsthedangerapparentintheunresolvedurbanlandconflictinvolving
thestate.Inotherwords,thelackofacrediblemediationavenueforsuchconflictsmayleadto
a violent encounter and undermine the long-invested security in the city. This may in turn
cementthespatialsegregationinthecityaspeoplewillseeitbeneficialtostayinareaswhere
theycouldresistthestatemoreeasilyorescapeconflict(Bryden,1994a).268Theauthoritieshave
in many cases expressed concerns about the challenges presented by the concentration of
groupsinspecificgeographicallocationstolawenforcement.Thehighrateofunemployment
amongtheyouthandtheexploitationofclanidentitycanfuelinsecurityinthecity.Riskfactors
that could draw the youth into criminal activities of this nature are “social and economic
marginalisationandvulnerability”(Widmer,2013,p.2).Thiscoupledwithstateimpunityabout
thewayinwhichitmanagesconflictscanresultinamajorshocktothealreadyfragileurban
securityinHargeisa.Notwithstandingthefactthatthestateoftenenjoys269theupperhandin
violent encounters with resisters owing to greater availability of resources and quicker
organisationalcapacity,itisimportanttobearinmindthatsuchindividualsorgroupsmayoften
havetheabilitytoexploitexistingsocialandpoliticalcleavagestodenythestatethelegitimacy
268Manypeoplefledthecityforareaspopulatedbytheirclansduringthecivilbetween1994and1997.
269Atleastforthetimebeing.
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andvoluntarycomplianceofrulesandregulationsitsodesperatelyneedsatatimewhenitis
grapplingwiththeburdenofnon-recognition.
Inthisexampleofaclan’srecoursetoviolenceindefenceofclanmembers’landsagainststate
appropriation,oneseestheambiguityofpluralinstitutionsofprotection,andadynamicconflict
thecontoursofwhichcannotbeexplainedby‘hybridity’insofarasthisimpliesfusedpowers
withininstitutions,ratheritpresentedacaseofoppositionbetweenclandefenceofitsmembers
interestsandstate(thelatteralsoperceivedasactinginaclannistmanner).Theresolution–if
itcanbetermedassuch,whichhasmetwithwidespreadconcernanddissatisfaction–involved
attemptsatclan-basedmediationtoreducetheseverityofchargesagainstciviliansincluding
marginalisedyouth,andhasonceagainunderminedtrustinthestateandraisedconcernsover
thelegitimacyofstateactions.Asarguedintheliteraturereviewandshownintheempirical
chapters,thecurrentdebatesabouthybridgovernancewithinwhichpluralismsits,runshortof
explaining the spatialmanifestation of the quality of interaction between the state and the
public.Thismakestheuseofalternativeconcepts,suchaslegitimacyandtrust,necessaryfor
capturingthedynamicsoftheseimperative.Thisthesisaimedtocontributeinthisregard.
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CHAPTER9 CONCLUSION
This thesis is the first analysis of the shapingof city space in Somaliland. I highlightedhow
currentdebatesonSomalilandexaminemainlynational levelpoliticsandgovernance. Ihave
therefore, suggesteda shift in focus to theneglected city spaceandauthority,whereurban
subjects/citizensencounterthelocalstateonadailybasis,andwherethemanifestationoflack
oftrusthasrepeatedlyfosteredatrendtowardsspatialsegregation.Thethesisshowsthatan
understanding of urban segregation in Somaliland requires going beyond the debates over
hybridpeaceandstatebuilding.Itthusextendsinsignificantnewwaystheworkofkeytheorists
ofhybridityinpost-conflictstatebuildingsuchas(Walls,2009,WallsandKibble,2010,Hagmann
andPéclard,2010,Hoehne,2013)(reviewedinchaptertwo).Thefocusinexistingdebateson
theintersectionbetweenpeaceandstatebuilding,Iargued,canobscureratherthanilluminate
theurbangovernancedynamicsthatshapesegregationofcitiesinSomaliland.Thereisaneed
toadoptconceptsthatareaimedatcapturingthequalityofinteractionbetweenthepublicand
the state at city level so as to understand the making and unmaking of urban places in
Somali/land.Thisfocusonthecityisespeciallyimportantinthelightofalarmistprojectionsof
exponentialgrowthinSomaliland’scitypopulations(UN,2014,TheWorldFactbook,2015b)yet
thereisasignificantdearthofunderstandingofurbandynamicsandconflictsoverlandwithin
cities.
Inthisstudy,Ihaveusedtheconceptsoflegitimacy,trustandsegregationtomakesenseofthe
configurationandreconfigurationofHargeisaandtoexploreurbanlandconflicts.Tocapture
howthesetheoreticalargumentsarerootedinempiricaldynamicsofurbanconfigurationand
reconfiguration, I examined urban governance in Hargeisa with the aim of explaining how
segregationhasdevelopedovertime.Iapproachedthisanalysishistoricallyandadvocatedan
urbanethnographicapproach(chapterthree).Thestudy’sempiricaldiscussionbeganwithan
examinationofthehistoryofmunicipalgovernance/politics (chapter4). I thenzoomedinon
particularaspectsofurbangovernance suchas landadministrationandconflict adjudication
mechanisms(chaptersfiveandsix).Ifinallyexaminedspecificlandconflicts–aroundHargeisa
airport and military base - to show how the interaction between the state and the public
underminestrustandfostersurbansegregation(chapterssevenandeight).
Theoverallthesiswasguidedbythequestion:whatarethekeyhistoricalprocessesandrecent
socio-political dynamics underpinning Hargeisa’s spatial character as clan-based segregated
urbanspace?Iansweredthisquestionbyarguingthaturbangovernancewas,andstillremains,
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acrucial factor inunderstanding theprocessandpracticesunderpinning theemergenceand
perpetuationofsegregation.ThroughoutthethesisIarguedthattheinteractionbetweenthe
stateandthepeoplecanprovideimportantcluesinunderstandingHargeisa‛sspatialcharacter.
Imaintainedthatthepolitical,economicandsocialutilitiesofclanrelationshipsinfluencehow
people choose spaces in the city. For instance, theuseof kinship as ameansofnegotiating
accesstoservicesandsupportshowshowgovernancepracticesintersectwithsocialdynamics
in shaping the configuration and reconfiguration of urban spaces in the city.My analysis of
Hargeisagovernanceandspecialdynamicswasguidedbythefollowingsub-questions:
Inthefirstsub-question,Iasked:
• Howdothehistoricallyrootedhybridmunicipalpoliticsandthetopdownurban
landadministrationexplaintheconfigurationandreconfigurationofHargeisa’s
spatialcharacter?
Toanswerthis,Iexaminedthehistoryofurbangovernanceanditslinkwiththeemergenceand
perpetuationof urban segregation. I discussed the introductionof local governanceand the
urban development trajectory in Hargeisa over time (chapter four). I argued that urban
segregationinthecityisthespatialoutcomeoftheantagonisticinteractionbetweenrulerand
ruled over time: an interaction whose foundation was laid during the colonial period and
reinforced thereafter. In other words, regimes in Somalia continued the centralised
authoritarian urban governance practices inherited from the colonial administrations. I
thereforearguedthatsegregationcanbeattributedinitiallytothecolonialstate’scentralised
topdownandrepressiveurbangovernance,andthereaftertothepostcolonialstate’sfailureto
breakwith the past. Postcolonial authorities have not Instituted effective and accountable
controloverthearbitraryterritoriesinheritedfromtheimperialpowers,andremainunableto
deliverservicesinanequitablemannerbasedonnationalcitizenship.Thisinabilityreinforced
theneedforlocalisedbelongingbasedonclanasameanstonegotiatespaceinthecity.The
consequenceisthatmostpeopledevelopedatendencyoflocatingthemselvesinareaswhere
theycouldgetaccesstoservicesandsupport(rangingfromsocio-politicaltosocio-economic)
throughtheirclannetworks. Inotherwords,segregation inHargeisacanbeunderstoodasa
response to political, economic and security problems in the city, persisting because of the
state’s incompetence inmanagingpublicservices. In the few instancewherethestatemade
concertedeffortsinimprovingaccesstoservicesonanationalbasis,cosmopolitanspaceshave
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emergedwhere individuals’ choiceof residencewere ratherbasedon factorsother thanan
associationwithaclan.Iarguedthatthesebriefhistoricalepisodesinwhichthestatemadean
attempttochangethefactorsunderpinningtheclan-basedcharacterofcitieswereundoneby
thefactthatthestaterevertedtotheclannishgovernancepracticesfromwhichitclaimedto
havedeparted.
Tofurthergroundtheaboveargument,Ifocussedonurbanlandmanagement(chapterfive).I
argued that landmanagementpractices inSomalilandwereoftenunderpinnedby top-down
processes inbothcolonialandpostcolonialperiods.For instance, thecolonialadministrators
hadrarelyconsultedthepeoplenortheintermediarycustomaryinstitutionsabouturbanland
management. The underlying justifications for ignoring local opinion hinged on low-level
urbanisationandtheperceptionofSomalisasbeingtooignoranttocontributetomattersof
townplanning.Thistop-downapproachcontinuedalongthesamelinesduringthepostcolonial
periodasmanyoftheurbanlandmanagementpracticesandpoliciesremainedunchanged.The
fewattempts aimedat bringing about land reforms failed. Thepolicymakingprocesses and
practicesremainlargelyimposedfromabove.Forinstance,boththeNationalUrbanPlanning
BoardandtheNationalUrbanPlanningInstituteoperateabovethelocal.Thehighlycentralised
nature of policy making instruments make local authorities junior partners. This top-down
process and the inabilityof the state to consult people about theirurbandestiny shape the
persistently negative attitudes towards the state. Thus, urban segregation is the spatial
manifestationofthedwindlingtrustinthestate.Thecontinuationofthespatialsegregationof
Hargeisa resulted froma longhistoryof top-downurban landmanagementapproach,which
alsomarginalisesthepoor.Equally,Iarguedthattheremakingoftheurbanlandmanagement
regulatoryframeworkpost-conflictwascharacterisedbyweakinstitutions,whichfailedtomake
significantchangestothequalityofinteractionbetweenthestateandthepublic.
Inthesecondsub-question,Iasked:
• What are the drivers and dynamics of urban land accessibility, conflicts and
adjudicationandhowdotheyrelatetotrust/mistrustofthestateandthecity’s
patternofsegregation?
Toanswerthis, Ishowedthattheurban landconflicts inSomalilandareadjudicatedthrough
pluralinstitutions-statutory,traditionalandtoalesserextentIslamicinstitutions(chaptersix).
Themultiplicityofactorsinvolvedinconflictresolutionishowevercharacterisedbycompetition,
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complementarityandcoexistence.Therelationshipsamongthemarenotaccuratelycaptured
bytheideaofhybridity.Onewayinwhichtheinstitutionscomplementeachotheristhefact
thatthetraditionalinstitutionsareendorsedbythestatetomediatecasesthatitisunableor
unwillingtoresolvethroughthestatutorysystemforpoliticalorsecurityreasons.Insuchcases,
the traditional authorities fill the gap in the state’s inability to deal with conflict. In other
instances, however, the institutions contradict each other, as the traditional institutions
interferewithcasesinthestatutorysystemintheinterestoftheirparticularclans.Customary
institutionshavesuccessfullypositionedthemselvesasabetteralternative forresolving land
conflictsforanumberofreasons.Firstly,theyarecheaperthantheprotractedandexpensive
courtprocesseswhichrequirelegalrepresentation.Secondly,theyaremoretimeeffective,as
the judgments are reachedwithin a reasonable time, ranging fromoneday to twoor three
weeks.Thirdly,theirlevelofcomplianceisgreaterasthepartiesarerepresentedbykeyfigures
fromtheirfamilywhooverseecompliance.Hencemyargumentwasthattheclan-basedspatial
segregationofHargeisaispartlyalsoageographicalmanifestationofthestrugglebetweenthe
statutoryandcustomaryinstitutions,aspeoplehavedevelopedgreaterconfidenceinthelatter
andchoosealocationwithinthecitywheretheyareaccessible.
Thethirdsubquestionasked:
• Howdo people navigate the terrain of urban institutions and howdoes this
shapethemakingandremakingofurbanspaceinHargeisa?
Theinvestigationofthissub-questioninmanywayslayattheheartofthethesisandcross-cuts
itschapters,astheanswerhingesontheresorttoclananddisaffectionwithstateinstitutions
bothlocalandnational.Popularresponsestostateurbangovernancehavehelpedproducedthe
clanbasedspatialformthatIhavesoughttoexplainthroughout. Ishowedhowthispopular
disillusionwithstatemunicipalinstitutions’authoritarianism,lackofcapacityorcorruptpractice
wasreproducedatdifferentjuncturesinthecity’smunicipalhistory(chapterfour),andinthe
disputesoverlandbroughtbeforetheLandCommission,orwhichoccurredovertheairportand
militarybasewhere the statewasparty. When investigatingeithermunicipal elections, the
workingsoftheLandCommissionortheviolencethatflaredupoverthestate’sexpansionist
endeavoursattheairportandmilitarybase,myapproachdependedoninvestigatingHargeisa
residents’viewsandpracticesinrelationtostateinstitutionsandtheirimpactonurbanspace.
The city’s inhabitants’ resort to clan and greater confidence in customary institutions, the
efficacyofthelatterinsomeinstancesofconflictresolution,andtheprominentroleofAkilsand
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clan elders in mediating state practice at local level remain important in explaining the
persistenceofsegregationovertime.
Inthefinalsub-question,Iasked:
• Whatarethesecurityimplicationsofunresolvedurbanlandconflictsinthecity,
howdotheyinfluencestatelegitimacyandaffectthecity’sspatialcharacter?
Thethesisshowedhowthecontrolofpublicpropertiesandinfrastructureplaysanimportant
roleinthelegitimationofnewpoliticalorders.Thiswasparticularlytransparentinthedisputes
over landat theairportandmilitarybase (chapter sevenandeight).On theonehand, such
propertiesarethesitesinwhichstatevisibilityandeffectivenessisdemonstrated,whileonthe
othertheyarethesitesinwhichstatelegitimacyiscontested.Thisstrugglecanbestbeseenin
conflictswherethestate isat loggerheadswith local landowners,as inthecaseofboththe
airportandmilitarybase.Insuchconflicts,intermediarynon-stateinstitutionssuchastheAkils
and eldersmediate between the actors in the conflict.While peoplemay have leverage on
customary institutionswhendealingwithone another (chapter 6), the same cannotbe said
whenthestateisoneofthedisputants.Thisresultsinalegitimacystruggleinwhichthestate
seekspowersinheritedfrompriorregimesandthepublicregardsthisbehaviourascomparable
totheregimestheydeposed,creatingaconditioninwhichlegitimacyisseenthroughdifferent
lenses. Such legitimacy struggles shape attitudes of endearment towards clan identity and
reinforcethemannerinwhichpeoplemakedecisionsabouttheirchoicesofabode.Individuals
whoareconcernedaboutstateviolencearelikelytomaintainpropertiesinareaspredominantly
populatedbytheirclansoastomobilisepublicsupportandresourcesnecessaryforresisting
the state. In the case of the airport expansion, the resultwas violent resistance, death and
destructionofproperty.
Ihavealsoshownthatthestate’smanipulationofthestatutoryjudicialsystemlimitsthespace
availableforurbanlandconflictadjudicationswherethestateisoneoftheactorsintheconflict.
(ItisimportanttonotethattheurbanlandCommissioninHargeisadoesnotmediateconflicts
inwhichthestateisoneofthepartiesintheconflict,asexploredinchapter5).Thisreinforces
clanandidentitypoliticsasameansofmutualsupportagainstthestate.Violentencounters
betweenthestateandthepublicreflectthelimitedspacetoengagewiththestatethroughthe
current highly corrupt judicial system. This creates dire security consequences for a town
recovering from many years of poverty and civil war, which in turn cements the spatial
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segregationinthecityaspeoplecontinuetoseebenefitsinstayinginareaswhere–thanksto
a concentration of fellow clan members - they can resist the state more easily. While the
authoritiesfeartheescalationofconflictswiththepublic,seeingthisasoneofthemajorthreats
facingstatestabilityingeneralandurbanplaces,inparticular,theyfailtocomeupwithpolicies
thatenabletheamicablemediationandresolutionofconflicts.Thehighrateofunemployment
amongtheyouthandthestate’simpunityaboutthewayinwhichitmanagesconflictscanresult
inamajorshocktothealreadyfragileurbansecurityinHargeisa,andhencefurtherentrench
urbansegregation.
Towrapupmyargument,itisimportanttorememberthatthecurrentfocusofstatebuilding
debates in Somali/land are concentrated at the national and subnational level (i.e., paying
attentiontoregionalratherthanurbancontexts).Keyinthesedebatesarethediscussionson
the intersection between peace and state- building. These have obscured rather than
illuminatedtheurbangovernancedynamicsthatshapesegregationofcitiesinSomaliland.The
hybridnationalorder,onwhichmuchofthedebateisfocused,failedtoshiftthecountryaway
from pastmalpractices (such as corruption, cronyism and nepotismwhere one’s economic,
politicalandsocialbelonging liesat theheartofaccess toservices).Thiscementedtheclan-
basedspatialcharactersofurbanspacesinSomaliland.Inotherwords,ashybridgovernance
failedtopresentthepeoplewithanalternativeformofbelongingbasedonaspirationsbeyond
clan. Rather, social networks based on clan remain prevalent in segregated urban spaces,
reinforcing the clan as a primeway inwhich people seek to negotiate relations and service
deliverywiththeformalstateinstitutions.
This thesis thus provides greater understandings of the plurality of urban governance
institutions, land conflicts, lack of legitimacy and their historical roots, providing important
informationnotonlytofilgapsintheacademicliteratureonSomalistudies,butalsoforallthose
engagedwithtryingtobuildaccountableurbaninstitutions,orcitizenstryingtoholdthemto
account.Thestudyhopedtoredressadearthofattentiontokeyurbanissues.Thescaleofurban
land conflicts necessitated academic enquiry, particularly to redress their neglected spatial
aspect.Moreover,therapidityofurbanisationdemandedgreaterunderstandingoftheevents,
policies,andhistoricalepisodesthathaveshapedcurrenttrendsofurbanforminthecountry,
andarelikelyalsotoinfluencefuturedynamics.Ihopetohavebeguntorectifythelacunaof
understandingaboutcontrolsoverurbanspaceandpopularresponsestocityauthorities,which
begged for urban level academic enquiry to complement the existing state-building and
governancedebates inSomaliland. Finally, thestudyprovidesan importantbasis forfurther
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researchontherelationshipbetweenspatialandsocio-economic trends in theconfiguration
andreconfigurationofurbanspacesinSomali/land.Littleisknown,forexampleaboutthelink
betweenurbanandruralcontextsandtheirinterdependencies,migrationanddiaspora,orhow
theinformalurbaneconomycontributestothemakingandremakingofurbanspaces.Thethesis
thus ends in the hope that this initial investigation of urban governance, land conflicts and
segregationinHargeisaandtheinsightsithasprovidedintourbanspatialformpastandpresent
canleadontonewresearchthatcandeepenunderstandingofSomaliland’scitiesandaccessto
land,justiceandsecuritywithinthem.
As shown in the restof the thesis, segregatedurban spaces canhavemajor implications for
urban governance in Somaliland. At the heart of these implications are the issues of state
legitimacy and trust. The two are interdependent: for state legitimacy cannot be achieved
withoutlayingthefoundationforpublictrustinthestate.TheSomalistate-buildingprocesses
hassofar failedtowinthetrustofthepublic, resulting intheemergence,developmentand
perpetuation of survival mechanisms (at the front of which stand segregation) aimed at
negotiating life in unfavourable spaces governed by untrusted state. On the one hand,
segregationmight enable newmigrants to negotiate space (s) in the city through their clan
networks andenabledisadvantaged communities tomobilisepeopleand resources to resist
against government policies which do not reflect their interests. But on the other hand,
segregated urban spaces might undermine security and political stability as they might be
exploitedbyindividuals(mainlyelites)hidingbehindclanidentityforpersonal,economicand
politicalgains.
Having argued throughout the thesis that urban governance contributed significantly to the
segregationinHargeisa,itisalsoimportanttonotethaturbangovernancehasthepotentialof
undoingsuchsegregationinthecity.Thisissoduetothefactthatattheheartoftheresidents’
tendencytolocatethemselvesinanareapopulatedbytheirownclanisthelackoftrustforthe
stateinstitutions.Ithereforearguethatthecreationofajust,equitable,efficient,andeffective
servicedeliverysystemislikelytobringaboutachangeinhowurbanspacesareorganisedin
Somalicities.Inotherwords,thestatehastobehaveinamannerwhichcanencouragepeople
toattachgreaterimportancetonationalcitizenshipoverclancitizenship.Stepsthatcouldbe
takenincludetheprovisionofunmediatedservicedeliverywherecitizensareabletogetaccess
to public services without beingmediated by intermediary institutions or persons. This will
reducethesignificanceandincentiveofonelocatinghim/herselfinaneighbourhoodpopulated
bytheirkinsmenandhencecosmopolitanspacesarelikelytoemerge.
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Thisresearchwasmainlyconcernedwithshowingthehithertoun-researchedurbangeography
ofHargeisa.Theaimwasnottocomparetheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofsegregatedforms
ofurbansettlements.Thiscouldbethesubjectofafutureresearchintotheurbangeographyof
SomalicitiesingeneralandHargeisainparticular.
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TNACAA/23/6/01FutureorganisationoftowncouncilsinSomaliland.
TNACO535/80/1Townshipamendmentordinance.Expropriationoflandordinance.
TNACO535/126/16FutureAdministrationofSomaliland.
TNACO535/126/20CompensationfortheremovalofwattleanddaubstructuresinHargeisatown.
TNACO535/141/7Theseatofgovernment.
TNACO535/141/11Reorganisationofadministration:advisorycouncillegislation.
TNACO535/149/4LandTenure.
TNA CO 535/152/3 The reorganisation of native administration: Somali representation andintroductionoflocalgovernment.
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APPENDIXES
I. ConsentFormforProjectPartcipants
CONSENTFORMFORPROJECTPARTICIPANTS
PROJECT TITLE:Urbangovernance, land conflicts and segregation inHargeisa, Somaliland:
historicalperspectivesandpost-conflictdynamicsProjectApprovalReference:
Iagreetotakepartintheabovementionedresearchproject.Ihavehadtheprojectexplained to me and I have accepted to participate in the study. I understand thatagreeingtotakepartmeansthatIamwillingto:- Beinterviewedbytheresearcher- Allowtheinterviewtobevideorecorded/audiorecorded- MakemyselfavailableforafurtherinterviewshouldthatberequiredIunderstandthatanyinformationIprovideisconfidential,andthatnoinformationshallberevealedinamannerthatwillleadtothediscoveryofmyidentitylessotherwiseallowed.Iunderstandthatmyparticipationisvoluntary,thatIcanchoosenottoparticipateinpartorallofthestudy,andthatIcanwithdrawatanystage.Name:Signature:Date:Ibelievethat___________________________(name)understandstheaboveprojectandgiveshis/herconsentvoluntarily.Name:Signature:Address:Date:
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II. InformationSheetforProjectPartcipants
INFORMATIONSHEETFORPROJECTPARTICIPANTS
DearSir/Madam,YouareinvitedtotakepartinastudyonPost-conflictinstitutionaldynamicsandaccesstoland,justiceandsecurityinHargeisa,Somaliland.Participationinthisstudyisvoluntaryandwhetherornotyoutakepartinthisstudyisyourchoice.Participantscanwithdrawfromtheinterviewatanypointduringtheresearchprocess.ThisParticipantInformationSheetwillhoweverhelpyoudecideifyou’dliketotakepart.Itsetsoutwhywearedoingthestudyandwhatyourparticipationwouldinvolve.Wewillgothroughthisinformationwithyouandansweranyquestionsyoumayhave.Ifyouagreetotakepartinthisstudy,youwillbeaskedforeitheraverbalorwrittenconsent.YouwillbegivenacopyofboththeParticipantInformationSheetandtheConsentFormtokeep.Pleasemakesureyouhavereadandunderstoodallthepages.YoursfaithfullyAbdifatahTahir
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WHATISTHEPURPOSEOFTHESTUDY?
Thepurposeofthisstudyisto:¾ understandtheinstitutionaldynamicsinthepostconflictSomalilandandtheprocessesand
conditionunderwhichtheyemerge.¾ documenttheexperienceoflocal/urbancommunitieswithinstitutionsgoverningresources
andservices.¾ fill the gaps in knowledge about the nexus between institutional dynamics and access to
resourcesandservices.¾ provideaninputintothedebatesoninstitutionalbuildingandcontributetotheenhancement
ofcurrentprocessesandthinking.WHATWILLMYPARTICIPATIONINTHESTUDYINVOLVE?
Youmightbeaskedto:¾ participate inasemistructured interviewwhereyouwouldbe interviewed individuallyand
couldalsobere-interviewed.¾ participateinakeyinformantinterviewsandyouwouldbeinterviewedindividuallyandcould
alsobere-interviewed¾ participateinafocusgroupdiscussionwhereyouwillparticipateinagroupdiscussionwith
otherparticipants.¾ sharedocumentsorinformationnecessaryforthisstudy.
WHATHAPPENSTOMYINFORMATIONAFTERITHASBEENCOLLECTED?
Theinformationcollectedfromyoumightbe:¾ usedforresearchpurposesonly¾ sharedthroughacademicforums¾ sharedthroughacademicpublications
WHODOICONTACTFORMOREINFORMATIONORIFIHAVECONCERNS?
Ifyouhaveanyquestions,concernsorcomplaintsaboutthestudyatanystage,youcancontacttheresearcherortheresearchandEnterpriseCo-OrdinatorattheSchoolofGlobalStudies:AbdifatahTahirDoctoralResearcherEmail:[email protected]:+252634891188
OrMrsJaynePaulinResearchandEnterpriseCo-OrdinatorGlobalStudies,ArtsCC162Email:[email protected]:+441273877107