Odgen Russell Meaning

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A)$T*ACT

This dissertation is a historical study of influential currents in the philosophy of language and linguistics of the first half of the

t+entieth century, e-plored from the perspective of the Englishscholar C. K. Ogden '//01'0234. Although no 56reat Man7 in hiso+n right, Ogden had a personal connection, reflected in his +or8, toseveral of the most significant figures of the age. The bac8ground tothe ideas espoused in Ogden7s boo8 The Meaning of Meaning , co9authored +ith .A. *ichards '/0(1'0304, are e-amined in detail,along +ith the application of these ideas in his international language

pro;ect )asic English. A richly interlaced net+or8 of connections isrevealed bet+een early analytic philosophy, semiotics and linguistics,

all inevitably shaped by the contemporary cultural and politicalenvironment. n particular, significant interaction is sho+n bet+eenOgden7s ideas, the varying versions of 5logical atomism7 of )ertrand*ussell '/3%1'03&4 and


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'. ?T*O!#CTO?

'. $etting the scene

n novels, #topias, essays, films, pamphlets, the antithesiscrops up, al+ays more or less the same. On the one sidescience, order, progress, internationalism, aeroplanes, steel,concrete, hygiene: on the other side +ar, nationalism, religion,monarchy, peasants, 6ree8 professors, poets, horses. istory ashe sees it is a series of victories +on by the scientific man overthe romantic man.

Or+ell '0/'0@'F:'@%4

=ritten during the most hopeless days of the $econd =orld =ar, thisis 6eorge Or+ell7s '0&(1'02&4 summary of the main themes in the+ritings of .6. =ells '/1'0@4. The faith in science andtechnology to effect progress for humanity that Or+ell identified in=ells is the same sentiment that drives the efforts recounted in these

pages, efforts to tame 5meaning7, pin it do+n, bring it under controlof science and engineer it ane+ for the benefit of humanity. Theseefforts +e e-plore from the perspective of the English scholar C. K.Ogden '//01'0234 1 the C and K stand for 5Charles7 and 5Kay7respectively, but he preferred to be 8no+n ;ust as 5C. K.7 1 +hosevarious pro;ects span from the first decade of the t+entieth century tothe end of the $econd =orld =ar, years typically identified +ith theage of modernism.

t is fitting that +e open +ith =ells and Or+ell. ?ot only did bothserve, as +e +ill see, as literary interpreters of Ogden7s later +or8,

but they also delineate our age. Each of them stands at one end of theera and of the cultural arc that begins +ith optimism and ends +ithdisillusionment: =ells at the hopeful beginning and Or+ell at thetroubled and sober end. This is the arc of the age of modernism.5Modernism7, as every te-t that invo8es it must observe, is anebulous term, con;uring up various fashions and associations. Thegeneral character of modernism7s broad contours as a socio9historicalcategory is +ell 8no+n and hardly needs to be rehearsed here.

?evertheless, the very breadth of the category necessitates somee-plicit attempt to delineate its contours +hich, as +e +ill see, arediscernible also in the specific ideas and events +e recount in thisdissertation. A prominent feature of the age of modernism, and a 8ey

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aspect for us, is technology. n this period, technology +as often praised as the driver of progress, but the unprecedented change it brought +as associated +ith tumult, revolution, and the resultinghuman catastrophes that marred the age. =ithin a single lifetime, the

transport and communication net+or8s of the +orld 1 driven byinventions perfected in the nineteenth century: rail+ays, steamshipsand the electric telegraph and telephone 1 +ere e-panded andconsolidated to the point that every part of the globe could be reached+ith unprecedented ease. =ith the turn of the t+entieth century

practical advances in radio technology 6uglielmo Marconi7s first practical demonstrations +ere made in England in '/034 and po+ered flight the =right brothers first flight +as in Kitty a+8, ?orth Carolina, '0&(4 e-tended this reach into the ether and air.

Enumeration of these advances and the inspiration they offer is, as +e+ill see, a mainstay of the rhetoric employed by the figures thatappear in these pages cf. obsba+m '0/3:%9((G chapter ' ofKra;e+s8i %&&4.

Concomitant +ith these technological advances +as rapid socialchange around the +orld. Mass political movements +ere formed 1depending on the region 1 by landless lo+er middle classes,industrial +or8ers, and +omen, and through such politicalmovements these oppressed groups asserted their rights. This brought

about the e-pansion of voting franchises and, in some cases, full9 blo+n revolution, such as the decisive '0'3 October *evolution in*ussia, and the uprisings in 6ermany and the absburg Empire afterthe Birst =orld =ar. Outside Europe 1 but by no meansindependently of events in Europe 1 political and social upheavalsoccurred in the Ottoman Empire, "ersia, China and Me-ico seechapters @ and '% of obsba+m '0/3G chapter % of obsba+m '00@for classic accounts4. =ithin Europe, and to varying degrees beyond,the containment of the tensions that brought about these revolutions+as finally bro8en through the catastrophe of the Birst =orld =ar, thefirst +ar in human history to dra+ most of the globe intosimultaneous hostilities, and a +ar that sa+ death and destruction ona scale never before 8no+n, facilitated by technological marvels ofthe same 8ind that had so visibly accelerated humanity7s progress.The events that follo+ed in Europe and the +ider +estern +orld, the6reat !epression of the '0(&s, the polarisation of politics in CentralEurope and *ussia, the rise of totalitarian dictatorships, and theeventual total +ar that began in '0(0 and continued for si- years,levelling cities and 8illing millions +ith bombers, roc8ets and, of

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course, the atomic bomb, complete our cycle see chapters ' and ( ofobsba+m '00@4. These latter catastrophes, and the e-tremist high9flo+n rhetoric and actions that caused them, are the source of thedisillusionment +ith +hich +e are left at the end of our period.

Crisis and revolution +ere not confined to technology and thesocial +orld. ?atural science 1 +hich freuently, but not invariably,

both learnt from and informed technological advance 1 +as +rac8ed by revolutions as it anne-ed ever more of the +orld to its descriptiveand e-planatory sovereignty. The classic e-ample here is of course

physics. Einstein7s theories of special and then general relativity 1 published '0&2 and '0'2, +ith full absorption into mainstream physics over the follo+ing years 1 not only eventually served to provide an alternative e-planation that rendered the postulation of the

recently conuered ether obsolete, but also bro8e do+n the oldob;ective certainties of ?e+to+nian physics and made them relativeto the observer. *esearch into atoms, +hich proved through the

possibility of their decomposition that they had been prematurely baptised, led to the development of uantum theory in the '0%&s,made up of numerous attempts to capture the unpredictability of thesubatomic realm see chapter '' of )o+ler and Morus %&&24. Therevolutionary advances made in the natural sciences, oftenintert+ined +ith technological brea8throughs and social

conseuences, inspired thin8ers in traditionally boo89bound, human9focused fields. The freuent invocation of 5science7 and 5scientific7methods that +e +ill encounter in the treatments of meaning andlanguage e-amined in this dissertation attest to the importanceattributed to the natural sciences as the source of rigorous and valid8no+ledge.

$imilarly in modernist art and literature old paradigms +ereoverturned. ere +e can recite the names of the numerous schoolsthat re;ected traditional measures of techniue and representation: the

mpressionists, the Cubists, the !adaists. This last group of coursemade an art out of deliberately shoc8ing the public out of theircomplacency, a tas8 they felt compelled to underta8e after +itnessingthe horrors of the Birst =orld =ar see Mac


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see, they +ere spar8ed and fanned by the same events and fashions,and e-hibit the same features as the modernist approaches to meaningthat +e treat.

5Meaning7, the rubric under +hich any layperson +ould order the

sub;ect of the studies +e e-plore here, eludes simple definition atleast as much, if not even more, than 5modernism7. To all thoseengaged in fashioning 5scientific7 theories of meaning in our periodthe problematic status of this term became uic8ly apparent. Openinghis contribution to a debate on 5the meaning of Imeaning7 in '0%&,the Anglo96erman philosopher Berdinand Canning $cott $chiller'/@1'0(34, +hom +e meet properly in the coming chapters,observed ho+ the notion is even uite peculiarly English andtherefore perhaps culturally restricted:

6ree8 F is so defective that it can hardly be said to have avocabulary for the notion of meaningF at all: it has to relyentirely on periphrases, and gets no nearer to saying 5it meansnothing7 than declaring that 5it says nothing7.


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narro+ly than in collouial usage, or to abolish it altogether,replacing it +ith a variety of alternative technical terms. The firstcourse +as that ta8en by >ictoria


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communication. Binally, in chapter @, +e loo8 at the later contact bet+een Ogden, and the philosophers Otto ?eurath '//%1'0@24 and*udolf Carnap '/0'1'03&4 of the >ienna Circle. =e see ho+ Ogdenand ?eurath7s vie+s came into alignment through their resulting

collaboration, and +itness the closing of our period in the shared fateof Ogden and his >iennese counterparts.

According to *ichards7 later mythologising account related inchapter %, section '4, it +as the defining disaster of the first decadesof the t+entieth century that brought him and Ogden together toconsider the problem of meaning. On Armistice !ay '0'/ the officesof Ogden7s Cambridge Magazine +ere ransac8ed by a rioting mobangry at the perceived pacifist stance of the magaHine. Ogden firstapproached *ichards, a +itness to the riot, for his help in identifying

the culprits. Their resulting conversation soon turned, *ichards tellsus, into a broad9ranging discussion of meaning in +hich the outlinesof The Meaning of Meaning emerged, a boo8 that +as eventually

published in '0%(. The motivating concern that runs through theentire boo8 is the establishment of an adeuate theory to fight thedangers of 5+ord9magic7, the confusions engendered throughignorance, +hether +ilful or not, of the +or8ings of language. $uchconfusions, argued Ogden and *ichards, abound in philosophy andother forms of abstract discourse, but they appear too in the most

pragmatically anchored discussions and, if acted on, may lead to themost catastrophic conseuences.

Ogden and *ichards7 ans+er to 5+ord9magic7 +as their 5science of$ymbolism7, +hich had both a descriptive and a normativecomponent. On the descriptive side, their theory offers a modelaccounting for the +or8ings of language +hich +e outline in chapter%, section %4. Central to this model is the notion that language has anumber of different functions and that all of these, in different +ays,shape linguistic e-pressions. )ut Ogden and *ichards devoted most

of their attention to the 5symbolic7, or referential, function oflanguage, +hich they sa+ as the most important in modern, scientificdiscourse. The normative component of their theory consists of rulesfor the most honest and efficient use of language in its referentialcapacity, coupled +ith a method of definition designed to guaranteethe reliability of reference section (4.

!espite *ichards7 legend9ma8ing narrative about the origins ofThe Meaning of Meaning , and the boo87s proud proclamation of itso+n originality in addressing the problem of 5+ord9magic7, the ideas

it contains have roots e-tending far bac8 and +hich tap deeply into


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e-isting intellectual seams. The closest of these to Ogden and*ichards7 vie+s are the various forms of 5logical atomism7 of)ertrand *ussell '/3%1'03&4 and


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in science, technology and business section (4. =e then e-amine the5common solution7 that emerged as a general pattern for the design ofan international language became established section @4.

)asic +as in some +ays highly typical of international language

pro;ects at the time, and in others highly unusual. As essentially animplementation of the philosophy of language contained in The

Meaning of Meaning a point +e demonstrate in sections 934, itstrove for many of the ideals espoused by technocratic languageconstructors. )ut Ogden7s avo+ed pacifism brought him intoalignment also +ith many humanitarian language constructors.o+ever, +hile most international language constructors agonisedover ensuring that their pro;ects did not privilege the spea8ers of anye-isting languages, Ogden sa+ all that +as reuired for the

international language in English. English, he felt, already e-hibitsmost of the 5logical7 properties desired for the international language,in a proven form, and its natural superiority in this respect trumpedall other concerns. The charges of chauvinism that Ogden faced hesimply rebuffed. This is no peculiarity of Ogden7s: +e see the samesentiments in appraisals of )asic from such a diverse range of figuresas *ichards, +ho promoted )asic in China, and the )ritish "rimeMinister =inston Churchill, +ho at one point hoped to reconstructthe +orld after the $econd =orld =ar along the lines suggested by

)asic section 24.n the early '0(&s, shortly after the appearance of )asic, Ogden

came into contact +ith ?eurath and Carnap of the >ienna Circle, t+oleading philosophers of the time +ho had much in common +ith him,a fact that +as apparent to them all. After briefly placing ?eurath andCarnap in conte-t chapter @, section %4, +e turn to the commonalities

bet+een their philosophy and Ogden7s section (4. Carnap and ?eurath +ere also enthusiastic about the concept of universallanguages, both of the philosophical and the international varieties.

They +ere engaged in a campaign in +hich they pitched their ne+5scientific +orld conception7 against the confusions of traditional5metaphysics7, a term that they used to describe any philosophy thatdid not meet their standards of scientific rigour.


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?eurath +as more sceptical. e believed that the universal language+ould be based on the everyday language and +ould never be

perfect: it could only be approached through the gradual eliminationof metaphysical terms.

Ogden had the most in common +ith ?eurath, and this is visible intheir resulting collaboration +hich +e e-plore in section @4. $incethe Birst =orld =ar, ?eurath had been developing his system of

picture statistics, initially in order to e-plain the +or8ings of the6erman +ar economy to the general population, and then later toe-plain the revolutionary economic policies of the socialistgovernment of >ienna after the +ar. ?eurath sa+ pictures as perhapsthe best basis for a universal language since, as he believed, they arefree of the confounding influence of abstract language, being

inherently concrete, and able to represent only tangible ob;ects in thereal +orld. This vie+ +as further elaborated in his collaboration +ithOgden, in the course of +hich his picture statistics evolved into5sotype7, a contribution to the international language movementaligned +ith )asic. =e gain further insights into the thought ofOgden, ?eurath and Carnap and their interaction in our e-aminationof their unpublished correspondence section 24. Ogden sought to +in

both ?eurath and Carnap over to the )asic cause, and in the ensuingdiscussion +e see their vie+s on the problem of international

language and its place in their philosophical and social thought.The clearest parallel bet+een Ogden and his >iennese

correspondents comes through the bac8lash they faced at the end ofthe age. Modernist approaches to meaning, and the relatedtechnocratic element in the international language movement, +ere

predicated on a belief in enlightened benevolent control. t +as thetas8 of scientists and engineers to decide on and propagate the perfectform of language. Ogden7s adherence to this belief comes out mostclearly in his appeal to the English #tilitarian philosopher Jeremy

)entham as the main inspiration for )asic, in particular )entham7s5"anopticon7, an ideal prison designed to control its inmates by+inning 5po+er of mind over mind7 chapter (, section /4. Ogdentoyed +ith the connotations and implications of the "anopticon increating )asic, and this sense of benevolent control +as eagerlyadopted by )asic7s chief literary interpreter, .6. =ells, +ho, li8emany others, sa+ a solution to the crises of the times in suchtechnocratic direction of human affairs. n the minds of many,ho+ever, any idealistic efforts to guide people7s thoughts and actions

had as their inevitable conseuence the intolerant totalitarianism that0


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brought about the +ave of barbarity in Europe that pea8ed in the$econd =orld =ar. This is the sentiment that lay behind Or+ell7scritiue of )asic and other proposed international languages in

?e+spea8 section 04. ?eurath and Carnap, +ith their demarcation of

5science7 and 5metaphysics7, faced similar criticisms from +ithin thelogical positivist movement amid the gro+ing malaise anddisillusionment at the end of our period chapter @, section 4.

(. *ationale

understand this dissertation as a contribution to the history of ideas,a form of scholarship at its best +hen it reaches over disciplinary

boundaries. !isciplinary subdivision entails a narro+ing of focusonto a circumscribed sub;ect matter, to be dealt +ith using a limitedrange of recognised conceptual tools. =hile this may be a desirable

prereuisite for efficient co9operation bet+een scholars +or8ing on adefined tas8 1 as Kuhn '0%4 famously postulated in his account of5normal science7 1 there is also enormous value in being conscious ofthe bigger picture that lies beyond the limits of any one discipline. nloo8ing at the treatment of 5meaning7 in the early t+entieth century,this dissertation e-amines ideas and figures that are claimed by such

present9day disciplines as analytic philosophy, semiotics, linguistics,

and also the much less +ell established field of 5interlinguistics7, thestudy of international au-iliary languages see chapter ' of )lan8e%&&G $chubert '0/0 for an outline of interlinguistics4.

A common charge levelled at present9day analytic philosophers isa disregard, or even disli8e of history see chapter @ of 6loc8 %&&/for discussion4, and the same charge could very +ell be levelled atmany linguists cf. chapter 2, section '4. !espite this, both fields

possess a vast historiographyG this is also true of semiotics, and eventhe much smaller field of interlinguistics. Bor the most part, noattempt is made in this dissertation to overthro+ e-istinginterpretations in these historiographic traditionsG rather, thesetraditions inform the account given here. Although numerous

previously un8no+n or very poorly 8no+n details come to light inthe course of our e-position and discussion, the chief novelty andvalue of this dissertation lies in the +ay it complements e-istingaccounts to paint a broader picture of the various ideas e-amined.The amalgamation of different historiographic traditions and the

placing of them in their social and political conte-t that +e effect

serves to decompartmentalise e-isting accounts, and to produce a'&


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more integrated historical narrative. To establish common ground+ith all readers, no matter +hat their bac8ground, it is in placesnecessary to summarise 8ey points that are +ell 8no+n in thehistoriography of some disciplines, but largely un8no+n in others.

Analytic philosophers, for e-ample, +ill already be familiar +ithmuch of the material in the e-position of the logical atomism of*ussell and =ittgenstein chapter %, section @4, and of the protocolsentence debate +ithin the >ienna Circle chapter @, section @4.iennaCircle. )y e-ploring Ogden7s many connections to significant playersof the time, and seeing ho+ their ideas are reflected in his +or8, +ecan acuire a broader and more representative picture of the age than+ould be possible through the investigation of a single prominentfigure.

n loo8ing at these connections, and positing lines of influence, preference has been given to cases +here there +as personal contact bet+een individuals. This is partly a matter of evidence: the surviving published and unpublished documents 1 speeches, papers, personal

accounts and letters 1 provide a record of the events and personalities''


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of the time. =ithout these, the historian7s +or8 +ould simply bespeculation. ntuitive 8no+ledge of people and the social groups in+hich they live +ould also suggest that the people +ho are in theclosest personal contact have the greatest influence on one other,

+hether that influence leads to a convergence of ideas or a repulsionto opposite poles on an issue. This is not only a theory of ho+ ideasemergeG it is also a belief in the best +ay to recount this emergence: anarrative of the interaction of human characters, possessing

personalities, their o+n histories, ideals and goals, offers a morenatural and engaging, and perhaps even accurate and truthful, accountthan the story of disembodied discoveries in "lato7s +orld of forms.)ut the personal interaction of thin8ers does not e-haust the

possibilities for the gro+th and transmission of ideas, especially in

the case of someone as +idely read as Ogden, +hose intellectualreach +as not confined to contemporary thought, but e-tended toideas +ritten do+n long ago, in )ritain and Europe, but also in landsfar a+ay. Throughout this dissertation reference is made to insightsOgden +ould seem to have dra+n from beyond his personal milieu.n many cases, too, there is a sense in +hich some ideas are simply5in the air7. n these cases, the most prominent contemporarye-ponents of the ideas must be ta8en as their representatives. Theseoccasional e-cursions into more remote regions of early t+entiethcentury thought lend this dissertation a slightly centrifugal character

but, ;ust as follo+ing a single established disciplinary history +ould be e-cessively constrictive, limiting ourselves to Ogden7s biographyalone +ould result in a blin8ered vie+ of the period.

As a contribution to Ogden7s biography and an e-egesis of hisideas, this dissertation adds considerably to the e-isting secondaryliterature. A firm foundation for studies into Ogden7s +or8 hasalready been laid by 6ordon e.g., '00&aG '00&bG '00'G '00@G %&&4,

but these publications 1 mostly reprints of Ogden7s 8ey +ritings and bibliographies, +ith some e-position and analysis 1 represent only a beginning. "reliminary e-plorations of the influence of *ussell and of=elby on Ogden can be found in =olf '0//4 and 6ordon '00&a4respectively, but the account offered here goes to a much greater levelof detail and reveals many further nuances. =e build on numerousother secondary sources that deal +ith the most important

personalities in Ogden7s early life, including Mon87s '00&G '00G%&&&4 biographies of *ussell and =ittgenstein, $chmitH '0/2aG'00&4 and "etrilli7s %&&04 studies of =elby7s life and +or8, and*usso7s '0/04 biography of *ichards. =e also dra+ on ?erlich7s

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'00&G '00%4 studies of early semantic and semiotic theories +ithin philology and linguistics to see the inspiration Ogden could havedra+n in his +ider reading. Our account is further fortified bye-tensive research into the primary literature, as +ell as numerous

other minor secondary sources.Even though it has largely disappeared into historical obscurity

since the end of our period, a foundation of secondary sources e-istsalso for our treatment of the international language movement. Thesmall band of interlinguists have 8ept the memory of the internationallanguage movement alive amid the other+ise +idespread scholarlyamnesia that surrounds the topic. n s8etching out the internationallanguage movement and placing )asic into it, +e dra+ on suchsecondary +or8s as Borster '0/%4, erymany points that +e ma8e in our analysis of the movement are,ho+ever, novel. Although the recurring appeals to logic and sciencefrom many in the movement have not gone unnoticed in e-istinghistorical scholarship, the 5technocratic7 stream that +e identify, andinto +hich +e place )asic, has not previously been described in

precisely these terms chapter (, sections @924. $imilarly, the philosophical and aesthetic concerns that +e sho+ uniting languageconstructors, logicians, epistemologists and linguistics have

previously been noticed but never been connected as manifestationsof similar sentiments +ithin a single milieu section @4. =e also postulate a possible pro;ection of the ideals held by modern languageconstructors into the past through their search for antecedents in the

philosophical language pro;ects of the Enlightenment section %4.This may be of some significance, given the recent re9assessment ofthe standard perception of these pro;ects by Maat and Cram seeMaat and Cram %&&'G Maat %&&@4: the possibly s8e+ed vie+ +e haveof Enlightenment pro;ects may be a product of these early t+entiethcentury language constructors.

ienna Circle have, in recent years, been the sub;ect of numerous studies 1 such as aller '00(4, $tadler'0034 and #ebel %&&34 1 +hich have revealed the comple-ity of theCircle7s inner dynamics.' =e build also on these, and supplementthem +ith published papers and boo8s by ?eurath and Carnap, as+ell as Ogden, ?eurath and Carnap7s unpublished correspondence.

' There is an English translation of $tadler '0034, +hich +as not consulted in +riting thisdissertation: $tadler, Briedrich. %&&'. The Vienna Circle. Studies in the Origins, Develoment

and !nfluence of "ogical #miricism. >ienna: $pringer.

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?eurath7s sotype has also recently been e-amined in light of his philosophy of language e.g., MDller '00'G )ur8e %&''4, althoughthese short studies have not loo8ed at the pro;ect in the conte-t of theinternational language movement, as is done here.

The impact of e-ternal social and political developments on theefforts of this era, and their literary e-pression, has not goneunnoticed, but they have never been dra+n together in the form

presented in this dissertation chapter (, section 0G chapter @, section4. Koene8e %&&@4 has loo8ed at the history of *ichards7 promotionof )asic in China, and its political implications, but his treatment of)asic7s place in the international language movement is fairlysuperficial. The critiue of )asic and other constructed languages inOr+ell7s ?e+spea8 has received some attention e.g., Bin8 '03'G

Courtine '0/G *ai '0//G Joseph %&&'4, as has Kallen7s critiue ofthe >ienna Circle7s logical positivism either side of the $econd =orld=ar e.g., in chapter 0 of *eisch %&&24, but the ;u-taposition of theset+o related critiues in the general climate of disillusionmentsurrounding the $econd =orld =ar helps to fill out this picture andsolidify connections previously only glimpsed.

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%. TE MEA??6 OB MEA??6

'. ntroduction

)y the turn of the nineteenth century to the t+entieth, the naturalsciences 1 +hich have come in the English language to en;oy almoste-clusive rights over the designation 5science7 1 +ere rapidlydiscovering and recording the details of the natural +orld. =anted+as the same po+er over the +orld of the peculiarly human,

populated by thoughts and ideas. )ut these are perceptible onlythrough signs, such as +ords and sentences, +hich are freuentlyunfaithful and deceiving representatives. t is this tas8 of sub;ugatingsigns to science and bringing order to meaning that Ogden and his

main collaborator in his early career, vor Armstrong *ichards'/0(1'03(4, too8 up in their boo8 The Meaning of Meaning Ogdenand *ichards '0/0'0%(F4, an assault in eual measure oncontemporary theorising about language and on the +ay languageitself is used.% Their approach they dubbed the 5science of$ymbolism7, a label designed to declare the doctrine7s scientificcredentials . t +as intended to provide both a suitable theory for theanalysis of language and practical methods for overcoming 5+ord9magic7, their term for the superstitious belief in the po+er of +ords.

A disaster e-acerbated by +ord9magic looms large in The Meaning of Meaning : +hile gas and machine guns created the physical horror of the Birst =orld =ar of '0'@1'0'/, propaganda, ;ust one manifestation of +ord9magic, contributed to its intellectualhorror. Birst =orld =ar propaganda sharpened Ogden7s sense for

% There are ten editions of The Meaning of Meaning published in Ogden and *ichards7 lifetime,the first from '0%( and the last from '0@0. Although Ogden and *ichards later discussed thedesirability of ma8ing revisions to the '0@0 edition see volume ( of 6ordon '00@:--ii9--v4,this never occurred. The first edition is significantly longer than all subseuent editions: under

pressure from their publisher, +ho +anted to reduce production costs, chapter %, 5The po+erof +ords7, +as shortened in the second edition of '0%3 to a uarter of its original siHeibid.:--i4. Ogden had intended to publish the cut material as a separate +or8 on 5+ord9magic7G this never appeared as an independent boo8, although portions +ere published as thearticles Ogden '0(@b4 and '0(/9'02%4. The revisions made from the second to the tenthedition are all minor see 6ordon '00&b:39/4. The discussion in this chapter is based on a'0/0 reprinting of the '0@0 edition, +hich represents the boo8 in the final state that Ogdenand *ichards left it. There is a more recent critical edition volume ( of 6ordon '00@4, butthis is an idealised version of the boo8 that combines later revisions +ith the material cut fromthe first edition. There are various in9depth critiues of the theory of meaning presented inThe Meaning of Meaning . $ome of the most significant of these are collected in volume 2 of6ordon '00@4. $ee also otopf '02:'&9(%4 and chapter 3 of *usso '0/04. 6ordon %&&4

presents a comprehensive, up9to9date, and very compact assessment of The Meaning of

Meaning and its subseuent influence in linguistics and semiotics.

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+ord9magic7s dangers and, although the roots of the boo8 go muchdeeper, it +as at the end of the +ar, on Armistice !ay, '' ?ovember'0'/, that The Meaning of Meaning first started to ta8e concreteshape. The plan for the boo8, *ichards tells us, +as +or8ed out on,

and as a serendipitous result of, that day. As ne+s of the armistice bro8e in Cambridge, a mob of angry rioters, incensed by the apparent pacifist stance of Ogden7s The Cambridge Magazine, ransac8ed oneof his boo8shops, +here it +as sold see 6ordon '00&b:'%9%& for thehistory of The Cambridge Magazine4. That evening Ogdenapproached *ichards, +hom he had seen across the suare +here theriot too8 place, to as8 him if he could identify any of the perpetrators.As they spo8e, the conversation turned to 5meaning7 and severalhours later they had outlined their future boo8 and embar8ed on their

collaboration:

After collecting my useless impressions of the rioters, Ogdenstarted off, steadily tal8ing, for Top ole, his fantasticallycluttered attic above Mac9Bisheries in "etty Cury. alf9+aydo+n the tightly t+isting stairs, under an aged, faintly+histling, )at7s =ing gas ;et, he stopped to ma8e some remar8upon a recent controversy in Mind . An hour or t+o later +hen+e +ent do+nstairs, the main outline of The Meaning of

Meaning +as clear enough, and plans for a ;oint +or8 to

embody it +ere in being. remember that turn of the stair+ayand the flic8ering of the )at7s =ing flame.*ichards '033:004(

The final product, *ichards '033:'&&4 +ould later say, +as a trulycollaborative effort, though Ogden 5held the pen7 +hile they ;ointlycomposed the te-t. The Meaning of Meaning is triumphant indeclaring the validity and originality of the solutions it offers and 1although it brims +ith footnotes reaching out into the +eb ofscholarship from ancient times to the present 1 the treatment of allother vie+s, +hether contrary to or anticipatory of those it contains,is superficial and dismissive. The boo8 +as published in Ogden7sthirty9fifth year and *ichards7 thirty9first: they +ere both, byacademic standards, 5young men7. A historian of more advancedyears might put the boo87s brashness do+n to youthful e-uberance,an e-uberance that freuently mas8s its place in its contemporary

( *ichards tells another version of the story, +ith only inconseuential differences in details, in)ro+er '03(:'0, %%4. *usso '0/0:3&@, note 24 catalogues *ichards7 different versions of thestory. $ee also Joseph '000:2'92(4.

'


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intellectual setting.@ )ut The Meaning of Meaning is most certainly a product of its times, in the themes it addresses and the solutions it proposes. The Anglo9"olish anthropologist )ronisa+ Malino+s8i'//@1'0@%4, +riting in his 5supplement7 to the boo8 Malino+s8i

'0/0'0%(F4, commented:

t is remar8able that a number of independent inuirers, MessrsOgden and *ichards, the neurologistF !r enryF ead, the

philologistF !r Alan endersonF 6ardiner and myself, startingfrom definite and concrete, yet uite different problems, shouldarrive, if not e-actly at the same results stated in the sameterminology, at least at the construction of similar $emantictheories based on psychological considerations.

Malino+s8i '0/0'0%(F:%004

The similar ideas these figures stumbled upon +ere no doubt 5in theair7 1 discussed in private and public forums, +ritten do+n in

;ournals and boo8s 1 and served to focus attention on a common setof issues +ith the suggestion of similar solutions. E-amining a singlemonument of the age, such as The Meaning of Meaning , ho+ever,allo+s us to identify its particular pedigree and the immediateenvironment in +hich it +as created. This is the approach +e +illta8e in this chapter, treating The Meaning of Meaning and its closest

relatives.The material that finds its final form in The Meaning of Meaning

+as +ritten in the Cambridge of the first t+o decades of the t+entiethcentury. Although Ogden had already declared his devotion to the

problem of meaning upon his arrival in Cambridge in '0&/ 1 he cameon a classics scholarship to study the topic of the influence of 6ree8language on 6ree8 thought see 6ordon '00&b:24 1 the intellectual

@ otopf '02:'&4 remar8s: 5"erhaps the best +ay of describing it The Meaning of Meaning Fis as a boo8 +ritten by t+o young men +ho pretend to be angry. t is an immensely high9spirited boo8. They attac8 almost everybody, and claim to solve a host of fundamental

problems in philosophy, psychology, linguistics, and aesthetics, or, if not to solve them, atleast to indicate the general lines upon +hich others might no+ proceed to their solution.$ome of the brash positivism associated +ith youth reveals itself in their attitudes. t sho+sitself in great hopefulness, in impatience +ith uncertainties, in a belief in the practicalimportance of their mission.7 Carington '00@'0@0F:'/4 says of The Meaning of Meaning :5, personally, find it most gratuitously +ritten, and in places uite gratuitously obscureG itgives me the impression, perhaps uite un;ustly, that the authors are more interested inma8ing the reader feel small and ignorant than in e-plaining pellucidly to him ;ust +hat they+ant to say 1 but this may be my fault. F )ut despite these animadversions regard it as a+or8 of the utmost importanceG in fact, do not thin8 it too much to say that it is one of the8ey boo8s of the century, and one that should not only be read but closely studied by anyone

+ho is an-ious to thin8 clearly on any but the most concrete sub;ect9matter.7

'3


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environment of Cambridge could only serve to further incubate thisinterest. This environment +as dominated by )ertrand *ussell'/3%1'03&4, +ho 1 follo+ing the lead of 6eorge Ed+ard Moore'/3(1'02/4 and ;oined soon by his student


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enduring role the boo8 may have played in bridging the t+o ma;orantagonistic traditions from +hich it comes. Binally, in section 0 +ema8e a broader survey of the contemporary intellectual scene, to seethe ideas put for+ard by philologists, psychologists and

anthropologists that +ould seem to find some reflection in The Meaning of Meaning .

%. The many functions of language

The basis of Ogden and *ichards7 philosophy of language is a beliefin language7s multifunctional nature, a vie+ of language as a tool+ith many purposes. Brom the very outset of their boo8, they

postulate a multifunctional model of language, +ith a primarydivision bet+een the 5symbolic7, or referential, function, and the5emotive7 functions, a collection of +hat +ould no+ be consideredvarious pragmatic and attitudinal aspects. )ut the referential useal+ays has priority: it is not only the first to be e-plicated 1 and theonly function to receive a truly comprehensive e-position 1 but it isalso considered crucial for the 5reflective, intellectual use oflanguage7 Ogden and *ichards '0/0'0%(F:'&4, the 8ey to moderndiscourse. *eference may not e-haust meaning, and in non9intellectual conte-ts or in more 5primitive7 societies it may be only a

subordinate function, but for the modern thin8ers of the civilised+orld, for +hose benefit Ogden and *ichards7 5science of$ymbolism7 +as chiefly conceived, it is of utmost importance:

The reference of a symbol F is only one of a number ofterms +hich are relevant to the form of a symbol. t is not eventhe dominant factor in most cases F ?one the less, since, forall our finer dealings +ith things not immediately present 1 i.e.,not in very close and simple conte-ts +ith our present

e-perience 1 since for all our more complicated or refinedreference +e need supports and distinguishing mar8s, thisstrictly symbolic function of +ords easily becomes moreimportant than any other.

Ogden and *ichards '0/0'0%(F:%((4

The model they develop for the symbolic function is introduced inthe first pages of their boo8 +ith the 5Triangle of *eference7, sho+n

'0


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in Bigure ', a diagram that has gone on to achieve iconic status int+entieth century semiotics.

Bigure '. The Triangle of *eference Ogden and *ichards'0/0'0%(F:''4

Each of the points in the triangle represents an entity assumed to beinvolved in an act of referenceG the sides in turn illustrate the relations

bet+een these entities. A 5symbol7, a +ord or any other type of sign,evo8es a 5thought or reference7, an idea or 5image7 in the mind of thehearer or perceiver of the sign, +hich is then directed to a 5referent7,some entity or ob;ect in the +orld. Ogden and *ichards do not restricttheir account to the purely linguistic. They base their model on the

notion of 5engram7, proposed by the


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+or8ings of engrams Ogden and *ichards '0/0'0%(F:2%, 2292,/'9/@4. n the same +ay, repeated occurrences of a +ord in the

presence of its referent lead to the development of the engram, or5thought or reference7, that connect them. n fact, Ogden and

*ichards '0/0'0%(F:(4 argue that all cognition is a matter ofrecursive inferences and interpretations that start +ith the engramsformed from direct sensations.

The moral they intend to be ta8en a+ay from their model is thatthere is no direct connection bet+een the symbol and its referent. Therelation bet+een them is rather 5imputed7, as the dotted base of thetriangle and its caption tell us. Bor any act of reference to succeed, itmust first pass through the intermediate step of 5thought or reference7Ogden and *ichards '0/0'0%(F:09'%4. Bailure to recognise this

intermediate step results in 5+ord9magic7, here the superstitious belief that for every +ord there is a corresponding entity in the +orld.This superstition, they claim, plagues modern philosophers, logiciansand grammarians ;ust as much as 5primitive7 people, as the cascade ofe-amples that ma8es up most of chapter % demonstrates. Theyrhapsodise:

=Fords may come bet+een us and our ob;ects in countlesssubtle +ays, if +e do not realiHe the nature of their po+er. n

logic, as +e have seen, they lead to the creation of bogusentities, the universals, properties and so forth F )yconcentrating attention on themselves, +ords encourage thefutile study of forms +hich has done so much to discredit6rammarG by the e-citement +hich they provo8e through theiremotive force, discussion is for the most part rendered sterileG

by the various types of >erbomania and 6raphomania, thesatisfaction of naming is realiHed, and the sense of personal

po+er factitiously enhanced.Ogden and *ichards '0/0'0%(F:@24

The Triangle of *eference is intended to e-plode +ord9magic byhighlighting the mediating role of thoughts, severing the direct lin8

bet+een +ords and ob;ects. Ogden and *ichards go on to furtherfortify language against +ord9magic through guidelines for cleanreferences and methods for achieving clarity +hich +e ta8e up insection (4. )ut referring to the +orld does not e-haust the uses oflanguage: symbols are also used to convey the spea8er7s 5attitude,mood, interest, purpose, desire, and so forth7 Ogden and *ichards

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'0/0'0%(F:%%(4. n addition to the 5symbol situation7 of the Triangleof *eference, +here a sign stands as the mar8 of a reference, there isthe 5verbal sign9situation7, +here the sign reflects the internal state ofthe spea8er ibid.:%%(9%%@4. These t+o 5situations7 cause the primary

functional division in language, bet+een the symbolic use and theemotive use of language the latter they also call 5evocative7,ibid .:%(0 et assim4. "roviding a more finely grained brea8do+n ofthese t+o uses, Ogden and *ichards enumerate a total of five5functions7 that language can perform:

i4 $ymboliHation of referenceGii4 The e-pression of attitude to listenerGiii4 The e-pression of attitude to referentG

iv4 The promotion of effects intendedGv4 $upport of reference. Ogden and *ichards '0/0'0%(F:%%9%%34

Bunction i4, 5symboliHation of reference7, stands alone as thesymbolic function, in +hich language has a solely referential useG thefour remaining functions together constitute the emotive functions,+here language reflects the spea8er7s emotional and attitudinal statesand, in the case of 5promotion of effect intended7, can manipulate thehearer7s emotions for a particular reaction Ogden and *ichards

'0/0'0%(F:'239'20, %%(9%%@4. All functions may play a role inshaping linguistic form, but the significance of their role varies +iththe type of discourse: in scientific discourse the symbolic function is

primary and all other functions should be eliminated as much as possible to avoid bringing e-traneous concerns into +hat should bean e-change of direct, referential statements. On the other side,e-clamations, oaths and greetings, have no symbolic content at allGthey are purely emotive. Commands and threats similarly put moreemphasis on the emotive than on the symbolic. Commands must at

least refer to some action that can be performed properly, but threatsdo not have to ma8e such references ibid.:%(@9%(24.

!espite Ogden and *ichards7 repeated assertion that all functionsare important in language, only the symbolic function receivesdetailed e-amination in The Meaning of Meaning , through theTriangle of *eference modelG the other, 5emotive7 functions arelargely neglected. This differential treatment continued tocharacterise Ogden7s +or8: his ne-t ma;or linguistic pro;ect, theinternational language )asic English see chapter (4, pursued very

much the goal of purifying language to its scientific, 5symbolic7%%


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essentials. )ut *ichards follo+ed a slightly different course. n theyears follo+ing the publication of The Meaning of Meaning , he +enton to develop fuller accounts of the emotive functions in a number of

boo8s on literary criticism e.g., *ichards '0%'0%@FG '0%G '0(&4,

and later e-plicitly stated that he did not +ant his early +or8 to beinterpreted as a defence of 5scientism7 see *ichards '0@/:'2', note('4, the idolisation of natural science as the sole source of8no+ledge. =hile he ac8no+ledged both the importance of scienceand its intellectual autonomy, he +as careful to maintain that thereare provinces of 8no+ledge and e-perience beyond it:

To declare $cience autonomous is very different fromsubordinating all our activities to it. t is merely to assert that so

far as any body of references is undistorted it belongs to$cience. t is not in the least to assert that no references may bedistorted if advantage can thereby be gained. And ;ust as thereare innumerable human activities +hich reuire undistortedreferences if they are to be satisfied, so there are innumerableother human activities not less important +hich eually reuiredistorted references or, more plainly, fictions.

*ichards '0%'0%@F:%4

)ut the emotive functions continued to evade precise analysis in*ichards7 subseuent +or8s. Although Ogden and *ichards'0/0'0%(F:%%39%%/4 had cautiously claimed e-haustiveness fortheir list of functions 1 or at the very least that the list contains theabsolute minimum of functions 1 *ichards 8ept tin8ering +ith it. n*ichards '0(&4 he eliminated the fifth function, +hich +as thenreinstated in modified form in *ichards '0(:2&4G in later years hee-panded the list of functions to si-, seven, and finally eight see*usso '0/0:'(34. =hen as8ed in a lecture 5around '03&7 +hy thenumber of functions had increased, he is said to have replied thatthere is nothing magical about the number of functions, and that theremay be 5as many functions as one li8es provided each is given itsspecific +or8 +ithin the conte-t7 as reported in *usso '0/0:'(34.This enduring imprecision +as not a failing in *ichards7 eyes:emotive language, he came to believe, is not amenable to the strict

n saying 5fictions7 *ichards most probably intended to invo8e the theory of fictions of theeighteenth9century English utilitarian philosopher Jeremy )entham, +hom Ogden +asrediscovering and reinterpreting around the time *ichards +rote these +ords see chapter (,section 34. A 5fiction7 under this conception is essentially an abstract entity +ith no real

e-istence in the +orld that +e create and use in our thin8ing.

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The t+o symbols, I seem to remember ascending MountEverest, and I +ent up Everest, may, on occasion, stand forno difference in reference and thus o+e their dissimilaritysolely to degrees of difficulty in recalling this uncommone-perience. On the other hand this may, of course, be a real

symbolic difference +hich does not merely indicate differenceof difficulty but states it.Ogden and *ichards '0/0'0%(F:%%29%%G emphasis original43

t +ould seem that they ta8e the relative comple-ity of the t+osentences as mar8ing a difference in the difficulty of recalling thereferent, in this case, the memory of climbing Mount Everest.Bunction v4, they insist, is not concerned +ith 5certainty or doubt7 or5degree of belief or disbelief7 that the spea8er attaches to thereference Ogden and *ichards '0/0'0%(F:%%4, aspects that could

be assimilated to the modern conception of evidentiality, and +hichthey +ould treat under function iii4, 5attitude to+ards the referent7.Bunction v4 reflects specifically the difficulty in recalling memories,a seemingly strange inclusion in the paradigm of emotive functions,+hich are other+ise concerned +ith e-pressions of attitude ordeliberate pragmatic effects. *ichards7 later elimination of thisfunction may be an indication that he +as conscious of its oddness.=hen it briefly reappeared, in *ichards '0(:2&4, it became 5theconfidence have in the soundness of the remar87, +hich sounds

much more li8e evidentiality see also otopf '00@'02F:%/0, note(04.


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and 5emotive7, +hose ineuality is revealed by their uneventreatment. Although *ichards alone +ent on to ma8e amends in later+or8s, in The Meaning of Meaning , as +e have seen, it is only thesymbolic function that receives proper elaborationG the emotive

functions are left as a list of seemingly miscellaneous linguisticdevices that e-press emotional attitudes, reach for certain pragmaticends, or reflect the difficulty of mental processes. As *ichards +ouldlater argue, this apparent miscellaneous character and fluidity could

be an inherent property: the emotive functions do not lend themselvesto the 8ind of rigorous analysis to +hich the symbolic function can besub;ected. n The Meaning of Meaning , ho+ever, Ogden and*ichards not only suggest that the emotive functions operate in

parallel fashion to the symbolic function, but also allo+ for them to

be realised in symbolic terms, suggesting that an analysis of theemotive functions in symbolic terms ought to be possible. Thereferential use of language, and its abuse in +ord9magic, remainho+ever the focus of The Meaning of Meaning . =ith their descriptiveframe+or8 in place, they turned to combating +ord9magic through acombination of referential hygiene and methods for clarifyingreference.

(. !efinition and the canons of symbolism5=e ought to regard communication as a difficult matter,7 +riteOgden and *ichards '0/0'0%(F:'%(4, 5and close correspondence ofreference for different thin8ers as a comparatively rare event.7 To helpsafely navigate these perilous regions +here +ord9magic d+ells andsecure reliable references in discourse they offered their method ofdefinition, a techniue for ma8ing references more precise and moreli8ely to correspond for the spea8er and their interlocutors. !efinitionrests in turn on their 5Canons of $ymbolism7, a set of ground rules

+hose observance guarantees honest and valid references.The method of definition is a means for 5e-panding7 a symbol so

that it reflects the 5thought or reference7 it stands for more clearlyand, preferably, more analytically. )ut a definition has no priorityover the term it replaces: it is simply an alternative to the originale-pression, a better alternative, but not necessarily a scientificallyvalid decomposition that e-poses the true parts and structure of thereferent cf. the later debate, in +hich Ogden +as involved, aboutdifferent forms of analysis, in chapter @, section (4. $uch definitions

may be possible, they argue, but:%


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F this process of scientific classificationF is only possible+ith comple- ob;ects +hich have been long studied by somescience. =ith simple ob;ects, or those +hich for lac8 ofinvestigation are not 8no+n to be analysable, as +ell as +itheverything to +hich classificatory methods have not yet been

applied, such a method is clearly not available, and here othersymbols must be found as the substitutes +hich symbol9definition see8s to provide.

Ogden and *ichards '0/0'0%(F:''&4

Their definitions are merely provisional paraphrases of the originalsymbol negotiated bet+een the participants in a discourse through adialectical process. To ensure a successful definition it is necessary tohave a shared starting point and a clear route to reach the reference:5t is never safe to assume that it correspondence of reference for

different thin8ersF has been secured unless both the starting9pointsand the routes of definition, +hereby the referent of at least ama;ority of the symbols employed have been reached, are 8no+n7Ogden and *ichards '0/0'0%(F:'%(4. These starting points are bestsought 5outside the speech situation7G they should be 5things, that is,+hich +e can point to or e-perience7 ibid.:''24. ere +e see a faithin ostension and the concrete ob;ects of the e-ternal +orld as anchorsfor meaning, a faith that +as common to their philosophicalcontemporaries and +hich +ould develop into an emphasis on the

5pictured7 in Ogden7s )asic English see section @G chapter (, sections and 3G chapter @, section @4.

After introducing their method of definition, Ogden and *ichardschapter 390 of '0/0'0%(F4 demonstrate its application and efficacyin defining the contentious and primarily emotive term 5beauty7, andthe uarry of their boo8, 5meaning7. )oth terms, they find, have arange of senses see the tables ibid .:'@%9'@(, '/9'/34, used bydifferent people in different conte-ts. This laying out of the range ofinterpretative possibilities *ichards pursued further in his later +or8,

developing it into 5multiple definition7, a techniue he used toe-plore the range of interpretation in cases +here large differences in

bac8ground bet+een author and reader lead to potentially e-trememisunderstandings. This is the techniue used in *ichards '0(%4 toe-plicate in English the +or8s of the classical Chinese philosopherMencius. Ogden, by contrast, moved a+ay from e-amining the

possibilities of interpretation, and instead became interested in moreor less laying do+n fi-ed paraphrases to capture concepts in )asicEnglish see chapter (, section 4.

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The bedroc8 on +hich definition is built is made up of the 5Canonsof $ymbolism7, +hich 5allo+ us to perform +ith safety thosetransformations and substitutions of symbols by +hich scientificlanguage endeavours to reflect and record its distinctions and

conclusions 1 those operations +hich F appeared to primitive manto parta8e of the nature of magic7 Ogden and *ichards'0/0'0%(F:'&/4. These canons are the rules, si- in number, that must

be follo+ed in constructing references to ensure that they efficientlyand unambiguously ta8e all participants in a discourse to the rightreferents:

i4 One $ymbol stands for one and only one *eferent.ii4 $ymbols that can be substituted one for another symbolise

the same reference.iii4 The referent of a contracted symbol is the referent of thatsymbol e-panded.iv4 A symbol refers to +hat it is actually used to refer toG notnecessarily to +hat it ought in good usage, or is intended by aninterpreter, or is intended by the user to refer to.v4 ?o comple- symbol may contain constituent symbols+hich claim the same 5place.7vi4 All possible referents together form an order, such thatevery referent has one place only in that order.

Ogden and *ichards '0/0'0%(F://9'&4

Canon i4 establishes the basic principle of unambiguouscommunication, that there should be a uniue and e-clusive relation

bet+een the symbol and its referent Ogden and *ichards'0/0'0%(F://90'4, the central point of their scheme on +hich all thefollo+ing canons essentially elaborate. T+o of the three 5subterfuges7that they ibid.:'(%9'(@4 identify 1 common 5tric8s7 that people useto obfuscate references, +ith or +ithout intent to deceive 1 areviolations of this first canon. The 5"honetic subterfuge7, the abuse of

homonyms, involves using t+o symbols +ith the same form butdifferent referents, all the +hile claiming that the referents are thesame. An alleged e-ample of this abuse is English philosopher John$tuart Mill7s '/&1'/3(4 treatment of the 59able7 in 5desirable7 as

being the same as that in 58no+able7 or 5visible7. n the latter t+o+ords, it carries a sense of possibility, 5able to be7, argue Ogden and*ichards '0/0'0%(F:'((4, +hile in 5desirable7 its sense is moredeontic, 5ought to be7./ The 5#trauistic subterfuge7, the misuse of

/ This e-ample +as first raised by 6.E. Moore in his critiue of Mills7 utilitarian ethics Moore'00('0&(F:''/9''04. Ogden and *ichards do not cite Moore, presumably on the assumptionthat their readers +ill recognise the e-ample and its pedigree.

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polysemous terms, occurs +hen a spea8er moves freely among themany referents that a single symbol may have, such as +hen aspea8er says 58no+ledge7 and means variously, but +ithout duerecognition, that +hich is 8no+n and the act of 8no+ing it.

Canon ii4 provides the foundation for the process of definition: itestablishes the principle that interchangeable symbols have identicalreferences, an essential reuirement for definition, +hich involves thes+apping out of referentially euivalent symbols Ogden and*ichards '0/0'0%(F:0'90%4. Canon iii4 then introduces the otherreuirement for definition, the notions of 5contracted symbol7 and5e-panded symbol7, by +hich they ibid.:0%9'&(4 mean less and morespecific terms. An 5e-panded symbol7 goes to a more detailed 5levelof interpretation7 than its 5contracted7 counterpart, as +hen the

contracted term 5that animal7 is substituted +ith the more e-panded5that lyn-7. This is ho+ definition functions: a more specific term, inthe current discourse conte-t, is substituted for a more general term.This more specific term, as in the case of 5animal7 and 5lyn-7, neednot offer an analysis but, as they ma8e clear in their discussion, ananalytic paraphrase is preferable to one that is merely more specific

but perhaps eually opaue. The root of their third subterfuge, the5ypostatic subterfuge7, lies in ta8ing a contracted symbol asreferring to individual real entities, the mista8e that philosophers

ma8e in proposing the e-istence of classes and universal ualitiesibid.:02, '((9'(@4:

n this +ay universal Iualities arise, phantoms due to therefractive po+er of the linguistic mediumG these must not betreated as part of the furniture of the universe, but are useful assymbolic accessories enabling us to economiHe our speechmaterial. #niversal Irelations arise in a precisely similarfashion, and offer a similar temptation. They may be regardedin the same +ay as symbolic conveniences. ...F

Ogden and *ichards '0/0'0%(F:04

=ith Canon iv4 they give a direct +arning against the creation ofsuch entities from symbols Ogden and *ichards '0/0'0%(F:'&(9'&24. A symbol, according to Canon iv4, can refer only to +hat itactually refers to, regardless of +hether this is the referent thespea8er intended, ho+ the interpreter understood it, or +hat goodusage in the speech community +ould dictate. f the spea8ermista8enly says 5My pipe is alight7 +hen it is in fact out, there is no

%0


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member and president of the 5eretics7 discussion society seesection G 6ordon '00&b:29/4 and editor of The Cambridge

Magazine, Ogden constantly pursued *ussell to have him tal8 and+rite in these forums. Ogden and *ussell +ere also both active in the

+omen7s suffrage and pacifist movements. t +as at a meeting bet+een *ussell and Ogden +here such matters +ere being discussedthat =ittgenstein first burst onto the stage. The scene is passed do+nto us as an evocative vignette, +ritten by *ussell that night in a letterto


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'0'/ lectures 1 +hich, as +e +ill see, +ere influential on The Meaning of Meaning 1 as being 5very largely concerned +ithe-plaining certain ideas +hich have learnt from my friend andformer pupil


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converted to the 5logicist7 camp, +hich sought the foundations ofmathematics in logic: all mathematics could be reduced to arithmetic,and this in turn to logic.'% This led *ussell to a direct engagement+ith logic, and the problems of meaning attached to these ne+ logical

formalisms.)y the '0%&s *ussell7s philosophy, +hich he dubbed 5logical

atomism7, had gro+n from purely logical concerns to addressuestions in metaphysics, epistemology and psychology see *ussell'0%'0'@FG '0'/9'0'0G '0%'G '0%@G chapter % of '0204. Although heclaimed only to have become interested in language after '0'/*ussell '020:'@2G cf. Mon8 '003:(04, the formal innovationsleading to logical atomism all e-hibit a linguistic character, and theseoccurred around the turn of the century and the years immediately

follo+ing see *ussell '020:'(9'@, (9@ for a chronology4.


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+anted only to recognise propositions that are either true or false andnothing else. e proposed a paraphrase that lays bare the logicalstructure of the proposition and thereby sho+s +hy it is false.*ussell7s '0&2:@034 paraphrases are anchored in a distinction

bet+een 58no+ledge by acuaintance7 and 58no+ledge bydescription7: +e are acuainted only +ith +hat +e can perceivedirectly and everything else +e 8no+ only by description. n his laterelaboration of logical atomism, it is only the evidence of the senses,so9called 5sense9data7 that +e 8no+ by acuaintance, and all otherentities are 5logical constructions7 that +e ma8e from these accordingto the la+s of logic, +hich +e 8no+ only by our descriptions seechapter ( of *ussell '0%'0'@F4. 5The present King of Brance7, inthe terms of *ussell7s later elaborated theory, is a logical

construction, and the uttering of this e-pression assumes hise-istence. f +e replace the e-pression +ith a logical analysis, thefact that it asserts the e-istence of the construction +ill be apparentG+e recognise that this assertion is false and that, as a conseuence,the entire proposition is false *ussell '0&2:@//G for a moderne-position, see chapter 2 of $oames %&&(4. n the case of *ussell7ssecond proposition, 5$cott +as the author of *averley7, the puHHle isho+ this sentence is informative: if 5$cott7 and 5the author of*averley7 are simply labels that point to entities in the +orld and they

point to the same entity, +e might as8 ho+ our 8no+ledge isfurthered to be told that they are euivalent. ere again analysis

provides the ans+er: 5$cott7 is indeed simply a label, but 5the authorof *averley7 is a comple- description that both asserts the e-istenceof an entity and points it out. The proposition therefore tells us thatthe label 5$cott7 can be applied to the e-istent entity that is the authorof *averley.'(

Ogden and *ichards7 definitions are clearly a8in to *ussell7sdescriptions. )oth are aimed at the rectification of names through

paraphrase.


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Maat %&&@:(&(4 says, 5...it +ill no longer be necessary to deal +iththe matter by screaming, but one can say to the other: let7s calculate7cf. chapter (, section %4 1 *ussell sought a 5logically perfectlanguage7, +hich +ould s+eep a+ay the confounding form of our

ordinary language and replace it +ith its true logical form Brege'03%'//%F:0&90', in his 'egriffsschrift , also loo8ed to the e-ampleset by


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leader of the behaviourists, but he still accorded a place for mental5images7, mental occurrences not caused by immediate sense9data,and remained critical of =atson for not permitting these in hisanalyses see chapter / of *ussell '0%'G '0'0:'&9'', %%G cf. *ussell

'0'@4. Ogden and *ichards in turn sa+ the nature of their 5thought orreference7 as contrasted to *ussell7s 5images7 as the main point at+hich their theories differed: 5t is mainly on this point the use ofimagesF that the vie+ here developed differs from Mr *ussell7saccount of meaning7 Ogden and *ichards '0/0'0%(F:%4. They+ere targeting specifically the notion that images are 5revivals orcopies of sensory e-perience7 ibid .:&4. Their 5thoughts orreferences7, by contrast, need not replicate sense9data, but merelydirect, in some non9specific +ay, the interpreter7s attention to a

referent see further chapter ( of ibid .4. )ut this is a minor difference:5thoughts or references7 and 5images7 are still fundamentallycomparable in both being some sort of acuired mental refle- of anorganism generated as a response to e-ternal stimuli.

n later moving closer to orthodo- behaviourism, *ussell e.g.,'0%4 retreated from images as necessary methodological posits ine-plaining meaning, although he remained agnostic about +hether ornot they do in fact e-ist in some form. )ut his images +ere never+holly incompatible +ith behaviourism, in that they did not inhabit a

separate mental realm. #nder his metaphysical doctrine of 5neutralmonism7, 5mind and matter ali8e are F constructed out of a neutralstuff7 *ussell '0%':%@@4: there is therefore no separate plane ofmental e-istence, independent of the material +orld see chapter '2of *ussell '0%'G cf. *ussell '0'@G cf. also the logical positivists75physicalism7, discussed chapter @, section (4.'2 mages, argued*ussell, act through a process of 5mnemic causation7. This is theconnection bet+een a stimulus and a response: after repeatedoccurrences of a stimulus, an organism becomes conditioned torespond in a particular +ay. The term derives from the +or8 of the


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absorbed the scholastic model during the course of their education asan unuestioned fundamental assumption.

A more recent antecedent for the precise trigonometry of Ogdenand *ichards7 model can be found, ho+ever, in the +or8 of the

Austrian philosopher einich 6omperH '/3(1'0@(4. At the centre ofhis Semasiologie 1 a term +idely used in 6erman at the time for signtheories, especially in their semantic aspect see chapter % of ?erlich'00%4 1 +as a semiotic model 6omperH illustrated +ith the Schemain Bigure %.

Bigure %. 6omperH7 '0&/:334 Schema

The resemblance of 6omperH7 Schema to the Triangle of *eferencegoes beyond the merely superficial: both triangles represent verysimilar semiotic models. The outer triangle of 6omperH7 diagram isin fact directly comparable to Ogden and *ichards7: 6omperH7

)ussagelaute, the 5sprachliche Borm7 linguistic form4, matchesOgden and *ichards7 symbol G the )ussageinhalt , the 5$inn derAussage7 sense of the proposition4, corresponds to the thought or

referenceG and the )ussagegrundlage, 5;ene Tatsache, auf die sich dieAussage beHieht7 that actual fact that the )ussage relates to4, iseuivalent to the referent . The relations bet+een each of theseelements recall those bet+een the entities in Ogden and *ichards7model: the )ussage is the )usdruc- e-pression4 of the

)ussageinhalt , +hich is in turn the )uffassung interpretation4 of the )ussagegrundlage see 6omperH '0&/:'4.'3 n the same +ay, Ogdenand *ichards7 symbol causes the thought or reference to be brought to

'3 5nterpretation7 is the English translation Ogden and *ichards '0%('0/0F:%324 use for6omperH7 term )uffassung .

@%


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position and perhaps as a result of her unconventional upbringing,she developed an interest in the philosophy of language that she +asable to e-ercise through her net+or8 of scholarly contacts, anachievement she shared +ith only a small number of other +omen in

that era.'0

=elby7s privileged social position came by birth: li8e*ussell, she +as a member of the English high aristocracy, god9daughter of ueen >ictoria, in +hose honour she +as named and in+hose court she served as Maid of onour. er unconventionalupbringing came through spending her formative years travelling the+orld +ith her mother bet+een '/@@, the year of her father7s death,and '/22, +hen her mother died on the road to )eirut. After fulfillingher +omanly duties of marriage and raising children, =elby thre+herself into her philosophical studies and soon built up a circle of

correspondents and discussion partners see "etrilli %&&0G $chmitH'0/2a4. $ome +ere enthusiastic supporters of her +or8 and othersnot. ?otable members of the former camp include "eirce, +hosecorrespondence +ith =elby +as in his later years one of his fe+intellectual outlets the correspondence is published in ard+ic8'0334, and the English idealist philosopher 6eorge Brederic8 $tout'/&1'0@@4, +ho taught both Moore and *ussell at Cambridge, and+ho not only encouraged =elby to publish her ideas in the

philosophical ;ournal Mind , +hich he edited, but also co9authored a paper +ith her =elby, $tout and )ald+in '0&%4. n the latter campare such scholars as the Brench philologist Michel )rNal '/(%1'0'2Gsee Aurou- and !elesalle '00&4 1 coiner of the term smanti/ue,+hich became in English 5semantics7 1 and *ussell himself $chmitH'002G '0/2a:clvii9cl-iiiG see section 4.%& er detractors +ouldeventually gain the upper hand: after her death, =elby7s +or8disappeared into relative historical obscurity. Only a small band ofintellectuals in the ?etherlands, the 5!utch $ignifics Movement7,founded by Brederic8 van Eeden '/&1'0(%4, e-plicitly understoodthemselves as carrying on the tradition she established see $chmitH

'0 $ome other 5ladies of the time +ho +or8ed in logic and philosophy7 mentioned by 6rattan96uinness '033:'''4 include Mary Everest )oole a friend of =elby and +ife of the logician6eorge )oole4, $ophie )ryant, Emily EliHabeth Constance Jones +ho engaged in academicdebate +ith *ussell over meaning and reference: see Jones '0'&G '0'&9'0''G *ussell '0'&9'0''4, Eleanor Jourdain sister of "hilip JourdainG see section 34, and Christine


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'0/(G '0/2aG '0/2bG "etrilli %&&0:3@/93, 3/%930, /%09//2G theyreappear briefly in chapter (, section /G chapter @, section (4.

=hen Ogden approached =elby in '0'& she +as at the height ofher fame and, it +ould seem from their correspondence, Ogden +as

already a 8een admirer. =elby, for her part, perhaps conscious thather time +as limited she +ould die ;ust over a year later4, +asloo8ing for a young and energetic successor see 6ordon '00&aG"etrilli %&&0:3('93@3, 3393/%G $chmitH '0/2a:cl--viii9cl---iv4.T+o months after his first letter, in January '0'', Ogden accepted aninvitation from =elby to spend three days in her house, filled +ithconversation and perusal of her library, including her correspondence+ith noted scholars 6ordon '00&a:'/%4. $hortly after this first visit,=elby described to "eirce +ith evident ;oy her ne+ apprentice and

his interest in "eirce7s +or8 and her o+n theory of significs:

Mean+hile the ne+s that +as an-ious to impart to you +hen +rote my post9card is that have found you, thin8, a discipleat Cambridge. e has been studying +ith care all could sho+him of your +riting on E-istential 6raphs, and is an-ious to seeyour contribution to the volume of Essays +hich "rof. $tout isstill holding bac8, in hopes of receiving it. The name of therecruit is C. K. Ogden, and he is at Magdalene College. eenters also +ith enthusiasm into the possibilities of $ignifics.

=elby to "eirce, % May '0'', in ard+ic8 '033:'(/9'(04

Ogden soon assumed this role of protNgN. Around Cambridge hespo8e freuently on significs, and began, probably in '0'', to +rite amanuscript on it, +hich he may have continued to revise up until'0%%, one year before the publication of The Meaning of Meaningsee 6ordon '00&a:'/29'/G "etrilli %&&0:3(%93(G Ogden'00@'0''F is a reproduction of a later version of this manuscript4.The Meaning of Meaning in turn contained +hat +as to remain for

many years the most accessible account of "eirce7s theory of signsOgden and *ichards '0/0'0%(F:%309%0&4, based on thecorrespondence bet+een =elby and "eirce, +hich Ogden had firstseen on his visits to her house. )ut in the face of the poor receptionhis tal8s en;oyed in Cambridge see 6ordon '00&a:'/'9'/%4,Ogden7s publicly avo+ed enthusiasm for significs soon +aned. Thismay have contributed to the almost complete lac8 of e-plicit mention=elby received in Ogden7s later +ritings. Even during the period he

publicly supported significs, his relationship to =elby +as not

+ithout friction: =elby7s un+avering Christian belief did not sit +ell@


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+ith him, a founding member and president of the Cambridge5eretics7, a student discussion group +hose original purpose +as to

protest against compulsory student attendance at chapel, and +hichrepeatedly made its opposition to all forms of institutionalised

religion 8no+n see Bran8 %&&/4. =elby specifically addressed thisissue +ith Ogden, e-pressing her disli8e of the name 5eretic7, 5fForthe eretic in the last resort only differs and ob;ects7 =elby toOgden, 2 May '0'', "etrilli %&&0:33, and uoted p.3@%4. $hecontinued to proclaim the importance of her religious convictions inher correspondence +ith Ogden: 5As to *eligionP That is +here

began. found out that none of us 8ne+ +here +e +ere or +hat +e+ere battling for at the very centre of life, that %hich ought to focusall our interests and o%ers7 =elby to Ogden, %@ !ecember '0'&,

in "etrilli %&&0:33'G emphasis original4. Ogden did not bac8 do+n,ho+ever. n a tal8 on significs, he commented: 5ndeed, all +ho ma8eany study of the problems of significs must find themselves inagreement +ith Ellen Key +hen she says that the most demoraliHingfactor in European education is Christian *eligious instruction7Ogden '00@'0''F:(24.%' This is hardly a conclusion =elby +ouldhave endorsed see further "etrilli %&&0:3@%93@(4.

=elby7s significs, to the study of +hich the young Ogden appliedhimself, +as essentially a theory of interpretation, but it +as never

;ust that. 6ro+ing originally out of =elby7s interests in theology and)iblical te-tual criticism, it came, li8e *usell7s logical atomism, toencompass positions in metaphysics and epistemology see $chmitH'0/2a:--i-4. =elby sa+ meaning not ;ust as a property of language,

but as part of all human e-perience. $he dre+ on a broad range ofcontemporary scholarship, from philosophy and psychology to

biology and evolutionary theory, and +ove this +or8 into a ratheridiosyncratic thesis.%%

At the centre of significs stands the act of interpretation, +hich

consists in an interpreter assimilating +hat is said to their o+n

%' Ogden +as presumably referring to Ellen Key '/@01'0%4, the $+edish feminist andeducational reformer.

%% er uniueness is undoubtedly a result of her lac8 of formal education, and renders her +or8difficult to those approaching it for the first time. Bor the uninitiated, her papers such as=elby '/0(G '/0G '0''4 rather than her boo8s offer the clearest e-position of her ideas. er

papers are more restrained, generally treating a more clearly defined topic in a succinctfashion, and do not drift off into the +ider metaphysical, epistemological and mysticalconcerns dealt +ith in her boo8s the t+o most important of +hich are =elby '0/('0&(FG'0/2'0''F4. E-egeses of =elby7s +or8s have multiplied in recent years, +ith her adoption

by semioticians e-ploring the historical roots of their discipline e.g., "etrilli %&&0G $chmitH

'0/2a4.

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understanding of the +orld, built up through previous e-perience andinformed by the present conte-t. 5=e ta8e his the author7sF +ords,+e ta8e his phrases,7 +rites =elby '/0(:2'%9(4, 5+e fill them out+ith that same content as our o+n, +e ma8e him mean precisely

+hat +e ourselves mean. And be it noted that it is al+ays +hat +emean no%. That this in any +ay varies from +hat +e meant at sometime +hen, e.g., our attention +as differently focussed, rarely entersour heads.7 There can therefore be no 5literal7 meaning or 5"lainMeaning7. All language has a metaphorical ualityG any e-pressionthat is not obviously metaphorical is simply so deeply engrained thatits metaphorical character is no longer noticeable.%( 5The +ordIliteral itself,7 points out =elby '/0(:2'%4 cleverly, 5is indeed acase in point. t has rarely, if ever, any reference to +riting.7 Our

inherited language necessarily contains an accumulation of thesedead metaphors. Even +hen +e use the most direct, literal language+e can muster, +e cannot avoid evo8ing the assumptions andassociations fossilised, layer upon layer, in our language:

=e all Icompound for sins +e are inclined to, )y damningthose +e have no mind to. Thus +e are no+ freely banning as5superstition7 the animistic and mythical beliefs of ourforefathers. Qet all the +hile +e retain these very associationsin our inherited language, the surface9sense only being altered,and the old associations being unconsciously but coercivelycalled up in the 5subconscious7 region +hence come the most

po+erful of our impulses and tendencies, since there act notmerely the individual but the *ace +hose tradition he carries.

=elby '0/2'0''F:%09(&G see also =elby '/0(:2'24

=hen unnoticed and unappreciated metaphor can lead to confusion, but it is also the very lifeblood of language and the only means +ehave to render comprehensible levels of e-perience andconsciousness beyond the immediate. =hat is reuired is a mastery

of metaphorG +e must be conscious of its e-istence and operation andma8e it our servant see =elby '0/2'0''F:(%4. The practical methodfor achieving this mastery is 5translation7, +here +e see8 to restate+hat is said in terms of another vie+, thereby revealing +hich pointsof similarity targeted in a metaphor or analogy are real and +hich aremerely superficial =elby '0/('0&(F:%/39%//, '(&9'(/G5translation7 is first used in manuscripts from '///, see $chmitH'0/2a:---vi4:

%( The parallel to modern studies of conceptual metaphor based on


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)ut there is a method both of discovering, testing, and usinganalogy or in some cases homology4, the value of +hich doesnot yet seem to be recognised G and this may be called in ane-tended sense Translation. F The mere attempt to state onesub;ect in terms of another, to e-press one set of ideas in those

+ords +hich seem to belong properly to another, changing onlythe leading terms, could not fail, if done systematically andcritically, both to enlighten us on points of connection orcorrespondence +hich have not been suspected, and also,

perhaps, to reveal ignorance in some cases +here +e haveta8en 8no+ledge for granted. t +ould automatically sift thesuperficial and partial from the deep or comple- li8eness G andit +ould lead to the recognition of a +ide difference bet+eenthe casual, the merely illustrative analogy, and that +hichindicated inter9relations not yet recognised and utilised.

=elby '0/('0&(F:'%9/4

The proper application of translation depends on an understanding ofthe process of interpretation, +hich, in =elby7s final model,consisted of three stages, or levels of 5e-pression9value7: 5sense7,5meaning7 and 5significance7 =elby '0/('0&(F:%90 et assim4.Triads occupied a special place in =elby7s thought. $he +rote herfirst unpublished4 essay about the triadic nature of the universe in'// reproduced in "etrilli %&&0:'33, (('9((04, and a triadic modelof meaning is found already in "art of =elby '/0G e.g. p.'/34,

but this is not identical to her mature model of '0&(. n this finalmodel, 5sense7 is the immediate, unreflective response an interpreterhas to a sign, 5meaning7 the actual sense that the creator of the thesign +ants to convey, and 5significance7 the ultimate effect that thesign has see "etrilli %&&0:%@9%3'G $chmitH '0/2a4:

a4 The first of these levels of 5e-pression9value7F at the outset+ould naturally be associated +ith $ense in its most primitivereferenceG that is, +ith the organic response to environment,and +ith the essentially e-pressive element in all e-perience.=e ostraciHe the senseless in speech, and also as8 Iin +hatsense a +ord is used or a statement may be ;ustified.b4 )ut I$ense is not in itself purposeG +hereas that is themain character of the +ord IMeaning, +hich is properlyreserved for the specific sense +hich it is intended to convey.c4 As including sense and meaning but transcending them inrange, and covering the far9reaching conseuence, implication,ultimate result or outcome of some event or e-perience, theterm I$ignficance is usefully applied.

=elby '0'':'&(4@0


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The feeling that =elby7s definitions are impressionistic +ould not bemisguided: +hether motivated by modesty or a genuine belief thather +or8 +as only preliminary, =elby insisted that her terms +erenot intended to be precise, but simply a stimulus for future, more

systematic studies, a point $chmitH '0/2a:-civ4 highlights, +ithreference to =elby7s '/ ?ovember '0&(, in ard+ic8 '033:934letter to "eirce: 5Qou have observed that have made no attempt atformal definition of the Itriad of signification. t seemed better tostate it vaguely in as many +ays as possible first F in order that thevery inconsistencies, apparent or real, bet+een them, may besuggestive of the need of systematic study, and the re+ards that thismust bring.7 =e see also in the framing of her terms that her theoryaimed to be much more than simply an account of meaning in

language, or even necessarily an account of sign systems as they aretypically understood. t +as instead an account of ho+ a biologicalorganism responds to its environment, grounded in contemporary

biological theory, especially !ar+inism see "etrilli '0004, and at this point +here she broadened her scope her theory too8 on a mysticalaspect.%@ To each level of e-pression9value she assigned a level ofconsciousness. 5$ense7, the direct response of an organism to itsimmediate, earth9bound environment, corresponds to 5planetary7consciousness. n this category belongs all 8no+ledge +e acuirefrom our senses of touch, smell, taste and hearing, as +ell as ideas +earrive at through inductive and deductive reasoning =elby'0/('0&(F:0@4. 5Meaning7 corresponds to 5solar7 consciousness.This is a consciousness that comes to us through 5feeling7 1 +e canfeel the heat of the sun 1 and through further reflection on +hat +e

%@ A further mystical aspect to =elby7s thought, +hich lies at its base, hidden and unpublished,is her notion of the 5mother9sense7 or 5primal sense7, the force that drives interpretation, thatcauses us to pic8 out 5sense7, 5meaning7 and 5significance7 from our environment. Althoughthe term 5mother9sense7 never appeared in her published +or8, =elby elaborated it inmanuscripts from '0&@ and '0&3, +ith suggestions of the concept going bac8 to '/0& see$chmitH '0/2a:cc---vii9ccl-vii, ccc---viiG "etrilli '000:2(9'G chapter of "etrilli %&&0 for

reproductions of the manuscripts +ith commentary4. The mother9sense is the complement ofthe intellectG it ma8es an interpretation of e-perience +hile the intellect constructs rational,logical schemes. This term remained a point of unresolved disagreement bet+een =elby andher academic supporters 1 in particular the pragmatic philosopher Berdinand Canning $cott$chiller and the founder of the !utch significs movement Brederi8 van Eeden 1 +hich maye-plain +hy it never found its +ay into her published +ritings. They ob;ected to the overtfemininity of the term, +hich =elby strenuously defended, claiming: 5TFhe dominant Man+ith his imperious intellect has for uncounted ages stamped do+n their +omen7sF originalgift: all the activities beyond the nursery and, alas, there also, no+4 are masculinised F the+hole social order is laid do+n, prescribed for the +oman on masculine lines only7 =elby to$chiller, October '0&3, in $chmitH '0/2a:cc-li-9ccl and "etrilli %&&0:(@4. Although she +as

by no means a conventional feminist 1 li8e her namesa8e ueen >ictoria, she had nosympathy for the suffragettes, the contemporary vanguard of political feminism seeChipchase '00&:(04 1 =elby clearly possessed her o+n feminist sensibilities.

2&


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influence. #nli8e *ussell and =ittgenstein, +ho sought to legislate ane+, unambiguous form for language, =elby sa+ significs as part ofa program of training to cultivate 1 through such methods as5translation7, +hich she also called 5definition7 see "etrilli %&&0:2&4

1 a+areness of the process of interpretation, all +ith the goal ofimproving our communication +ith one another:

$ignifics F must therefore be considered first as a method ofmental training, +hich, though implied in all true vie+s ofeducation, is not yet practically recognised or systematicallyapplied. n a special sense, it aims at the concentration ofintellectual activities on that +hich +e tacitly assume to be themain value of all study, and vaguely call 5meaning.7 tsinstructive and disciplinary value must be secondary to this, as

they are both ultimately

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