North Korea’s New Leader

Kim Jong-Un has come to stay

Kim Jong-Il, the “Dear Leader” of the DPRK died suddenly three months ago, in December 2011. His death took the world by surprise. Especially the West and its allies, who learnt of it when the North’s national channel announced it on a special news broadcast, two days after the fact. The shock and panic that followed the announcement of Kim Jong-Il’s death was not only due to the fact itself, but also to the fact that none of the intelligence agencies that concern themselves with North Korea had even an inkling of there being something out of place within the world’s most opaque nation, until that time.

Although his health had been deteriorating since 2008, when he suffered a stroke, and various analysts had already began concocting scenarios about what the aftermath of his death would mean for the future of the region, it would seem that no one could have predicted that the end would come so soon. These scenarios included, among others, the possibility of social upheavals following the death of Kim Jong-Il, refugees flooding the borders of neighboring countries, such as China and the South, the military taking charge etc.

Speculations also abounded concerning who his successor would be. The first and more obvious choice, in the minds of a nation that has already undergone one such father-to-son succession in 1994, was Kim’s first son, Kim Jong-Nam. Only a Kim could hope to continue ruling North Korea, with minimal changes to the regime. However, Kim Jong-Nam was cut out of the line of succession after falling out of favor a few years back, as Kim Jong-Il’s second son did. Both of them were sent away by their father and left the way open to their younger brother, Kim Jong-Un.

Kim Jong-Un was handpicked by his father, who it seems believed that his third son was the only one that could rightfully and successfully lead the DPRK in the road that he himself had paved. Kim Jong-Il had been personally grooming his son for the past two years to succeed him in his position, though the only formal title he held and that was repeated constantly is that of Vice Chairman of the WPK Central Military Commission. By early January 2012, the title “Dear respected Comrade Kim Jong-Un“ has become a standard form of address.

With North Korea being one of the most secretive societies in the world, we can easily understand the lack of information concerning Kim Jong-Un’s background. The fact that no one even knows his year of birth (though recently the day and month of his birth were disclosed) clearly underscores how little is known about him. He is considered to be in his late twenties, which raises questions as to his ability to properly run the country; a number of analysts even go so far as to suggest that an eventual collapse of the regime is inevitable under such an untested leader. They point out that, in contrast with his father, who had about two decades to consolidate his power and was well-known to his people and the world, Kim Jong-Un has barely had two years of grooming and minimal exposure to the people he is supposed to lead.

Some find it encouraging that he was educated in Switzerland, pointing out that they hope to see a change for the better in the peninsula, the idea being that his experiences and education in Europe may have helped him shape his own views, different from those of his father’s. That seems rather unlikely, however. In the words of George Orwell: “The essence of oligarchical rule is not father-to-son inheritance but the persistence of a certain world view and a certain way of life, imposed by the dead upon the living.” So it is with Kim Jong-Un, and it may prove to be more important that he is Kim Jong-Il’s successor, familial ties aside, that he received his power from the former chairman, not his father, who apparently left clear instructions as to how to carry on his legacy. Therefore, at least in the short term, one cannot expect any serious deviation from the North’s long held positions. In order to consolidate his power base, he will have to be seen actively protecting the ideals entrusted to him, such as the “songun”, or military first, policy and the juche philosophy of the two former leaders, his father and grandfather. He might even need to make a point of holding his own against the West, both for internal consumption and as a way to prove he will not be played with by external forces, which makes many feel uncertain and fearful of the possibility of saber rattling from the North’s side.

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Some time ago, the DPRK’s state-run broadcaster aired a documentary that showed Kim Jong-Un observing an April 2009 launch of a long-range missile, suggesting that the North is anxious to show the world that the young Kim is on top of things, especially the all powerful military, and has been for some time now. Even more reports about his visit to army regiments at the border between the two Koreas have also circulated lately. Documentaries about his great leadership skills and public appearances to enforce those views put aside, it is uncertain at this time whether Kim Jong-Un holds as much power in the DPRK as the country’s media suggest he does. The question of whether he truly is the one calling the shots, the primary decision maker, or just a figurehead, is both interesting and hard to answer with certainty, given how little outsiders are allowed to see of the workings within the hermit state.

The most powerful figures in the emerging power structure are likely to be Kim Kyong-he and Chang Song-taek, (Kim Jong Un's aunt and her husband). The two had been chosen by Kim Jong-Il to help Kim Jong-Un along his way. Many had considered the possibility that these two might become regents of sorts for the young leader, as he consolidates his power. Officially, that did not happen. Officially it is Kim Jong-Un that holds the reins of North Korea. Behind the scenes, however, it is not unlikely that Kim Jong-Un is under the guidance of his more politically savvy relatives.

It had been often speculated that the death of Kim Jong-Il would follow a power struggle, possibly bloody, among the elite that would make a grab for power and the number one seat in the DPRK. That didn’t happen, as far as we can see, and while the possibility of it happening in the future, or behind closed doors, is still there, it is somewhat unlikely that anyone will challenge Kim Jong-Un’s rule outright. The elite has no legitimacy in the eyes of the average Korean. They are not the grandson of the “Eternal President” of the Republic. We can estimate that many individuals and groups will compete for control of the center, which is shaped by or around Kim Jong-Un. We may sooner or later witness advisors and officials jockeying for power behind the throne and their struggle might become quite violent. At this time, no one can answer with certainty whether the Chang-Kim-Yi troika will be efficient concerning their position as advisors of the young leader. One would expect a power struggle and conspiracy in Kim Jong-Un's entourage, at least as far as the top positions around him are concerned. Kim Jong-Un himself seems to be relatively secure for the time being, since he is protected by his origins and perceived legitimacy.

A cause of concern, however slight, for Kim Jong-Un might prove to be his brother’s, Kim Jong-Nam’s, recent statements to the press. Though, given the fact that he is virtually living in exile, disallowed to return to the DPRK, even for his father’s funeral, he hardly seems to have any standing worth mentioning in the North. However, his very public criticisms of the succession from his base in China make one wonder, who is Kim Jong-Nam’s protector. It is not safe for an exiled brother to try and detract from the new leader’s legitimacy in such a manner. Kim Jong-Il never had such troubles, like challenges to his right to the top spot in the DPRK; all of his half-brothers, that might have challenged him back then, were long dead, even before his own father, founder Kim Il-Sung, died in 1994. China presumably sees an advantage in protecting Kim Jong-Nam – a reform-minded Kim family member who is indebted to China – as a possible alternative leader in case of a failure of Kim Jong-Un’s regime. Yet China is also very pro Jong-Un, as things stand, if only for the sake of maintaining the status quo in the region.

Looking at the domestic issues; time is running and Kim Jong-Un must find a way to resolve his country’s economic troubles, food shortages being his number one priority. A change of the system, rather than mere coping measures, is now required. North Korea may have survived for a long time on a muddle-through strategy, but this does not change the truth, that its economy is unsustainable. North Korea, a nuclear state, now stands at a major juncture in its development and it can either swim or sink. Nevertheless, the country has made it clear that Kim Jong-Un will continue Kim Jong-Il’s “songun,” or military-first, policy, and a steady stream of information and snapshots from state media has sought to show him as a fearless military commander who is comfortable with leadership. Yet no one so much as touches the issue of the possibility of reforms, choosing to focus on not straying off the former leader’s policies.

A boost to the relations with Lee Myung-bak’s South Korea is not at the top of Kim Jong-Un’s list of priorities. However, unification is still a state goal, and South Korea is the most natural cooperation partner for economic exchanges, which are crucial for achieving the promised improvement in the North Korean people’s living standard– a promise that stated

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that by 2012 the North would have become a prosperous and great nation. It will be interesting to see whether there will be any reaction at the end of the year, since the state will have, no doubt, failed to deliver, or if the ever creative media will manage to give the situation a different spin and convince the suffering citizens that the promise was kept.

The international response to the change of leadership has invariably been caution, a wait and see strategy lacking any real initiative, save for a lot of meetings between high ranking officials of the US, South Korea, Japan and China, so as to avoid any “misunderstandings” between them about their goals for the future, as the international media often quoted.

To begin with, Washington was weary of all possible consequences of Kim Jong-Il’s death, ever since its announcement. His demise was cause of concern enough on its own, without the added weight given to it by the fact that not a single piece of US intelligence so much as alluded to it, until the broadcast was aired. Moreover, Kim Jong-Il was, for all the headaches he caused in the US, a known entity. He had been in a position of power for years before he officially became the ruler of the North. His son is a “new face” and that adds an element of further uncertainty as far as the future direction of US policy for the region is concerned. The possibility that in order to consolidate his power he might take to saber rattling, an old tried North Korean recipe, is not one the US can ever readily discard. Many an expert has suggested, however, that though the US may not wish for the peninsula to become destabilized, a “controlled instability” may just be what the doctor ordered to bring Seoul and Tokyo once more closer to Washington. The problem is that, unless the new leader decides to let the Americans in, either by resuming talks for nuclear disarmament, or by requesting food aid, the US have little to no leverage to hold over the North and try and manipulate events in their favor. At present, the most they can do is keep reaffirming their commitment to protecting their allies in the region, the South and Japan, and press China to start using whatever influence it has over the North to keep things stable and avoid a conflict between the North and the South, which they feel must be avoided.

China also wishes to avoid the possibility of a conflict, as well as the region becoming unstable, seeing as that would create more problems than it can solve. Refugees would be likely then to flood China’s border and its provinces would strain to deal with the situation. China right now needs a peaceful region so that it can continue growing economically and clearly believes that, if only for lack of any better alternatives at this critical juncture, Kim Jong-Un is the answer. It was this very reason that China supports a North Korea under the leadership of Kim Jong-Un, as was pointed out in the condolence letter it sent, following Kim Jong-Il’s death. China’s endorsement must have pleased the North and helped further legitimize the young Kim’s bid for power. After all, China has been a long time ally of the North, lately the only ally. The DPRK’s adventurism has always been a concern for China, but it has soldiered on and supported it even when it made no sense to do so, because North Korea has served as a precious buffer zone, between China’s border and the US troops stationed in the South. There is likely no security nightmare that China can dream of worse than the two Koreas united under the aegis of a Westernized South along its border and US troops stationed on the other side of that border.

Russia is also watching events unfold carefully and has also taken a wait and see stance like the US. It, like everybody else in the region, possibly the planet, does not wish for conflict in the region. Russia does not have much influence in the region, certainly less than it would like to have. It has advocated nuclear non-proliferation, since having a nuclear state, and one like North Korea at that, so close to one’s border is not something any country would wish. More recently though, Russia has managed to secure deals with both the South and the North to undertake projects that will give Moscow more of a footing in East Asia. A railway, a gas pipeline and a power line are the three projects that Moscow counted on to make a comeback in the East Asian region, and all three rely on the cooperation between the two Koreas. Therefore the death of Kim Jong-Il was rather unfortunate for Moscow as well, who at the very least is looking at a setback for its projects. Now if the situation between the two Koreas were to become more volatile, Moscow’s projects may yet be the ones up in the air.

Japan is also a country worried about the situation in the peninsula, though it too has no influence in the current status quo. Immediately following the announcement of Kim Jong-Il’s death Tokyo hurried to get in contact with the leaders of the US, the South and China. Japan needs its allies at this time more than ever and it would happily put aside any territorial differences it has with China at the moment, as the possibility of North Korea collapsing is not one Tokyo

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would like to consider right now. Japanese interests can be summed up in a few sentences. Japan still hopes to broker a deal with the North to return Japanese abductees. The new leader may be their best hope yet for a reopening of this particular matter, which Kim Jong-Il declared closed in 2002, when he returned some Japanese back to their homeland. Japan also worries for its security, as anti-Japanese sentiment has always run rampant in the North. Equally worrisome though would be if the DPRK collapsed and fell under Beijing’s direct control– the Sea of Japan might then become the Sea of China.

In recent weeks, predictions for some light saber rattling have partly come true, as well as predictions that the North will continue to use its nuclear program as a bargaining chip for humanitarian aid. The signals the new leader has been sending out have been somewhat mixed. Kim Jong-Un did threaten retaliation and a strike against the South if they went ahead with the joint military exercises with the US, but he also agreed to freeze the North’s nuclear program in exchange for food aid from the US. It makes many think that his power base is still not quite as solid as the DPRK’s top officials claim. However, that may soon change as a date for the Party’s meeting has been set for April. Kim Jong-Un is expected to assume more power in the form of titles bestowed upon him by the Party’s elite, namely General Secretary of the party and Chairman of its Central Military Commission. If that happens, the power transfer will be all but complete. Until that moment, though, Kim Jong-Un’s hold on power will still be considered shaky by most.

When all is said and done, despite all the speculations that have abounded since his father’s death, Kim Jong-Un, it seems, will assume full power in the next month and solidify his position as the North Korea’s top decision maker, if only in name, since it is impossible to know for sure what goes on behind the scenes in the world’s most clandestine regime. All speculations, about his being untested, untrusted by the older members of the elite and so on, will have been rendered moot then. In spite of all the calls for a more democratic North Korea, or an outright revolution against the regime that everyone around the world loves to hate, the response to Kim Jong-Un’s taking over has largely been acceptance, and even relief, given the ripples of worry and uncertainty that the former chairman’s death caused around the world, when first announced.

If Kim Jong-Il’s death taught us something it is that Western and Eastern powers alike are reluctant to see any sudden change happening to the rules of the game they have been playing in the region for decades. The change of the status quo brought about by a fall of the draconian regime, in spite of the gains it could have brought the people of the North in the long run, in the form of freedom for example, was not really in the best strategic interests of any state, liberal, communist, or otherwise. The Worker’s Party of Korea would have been against any change, not outlined by the “Dear Leader” before his death, by virtue of the fact that its high ranking members know for sure that unless they hang together, they will most assuredly hung separately, as Benjamin Franklin once eloquently put it. As for the rest of the world, the thought of a nuclear North Korea embroiled in civil war, or otherwise out of control would practically be a nightmare come to life. So it is that another Kim will, for now at least, continue as the leader of the dynasty and North Korea, the world at large will be forced to accept him, for lack of any viable alternatives and the status quo in the region will survive this newest bump in the road. With no drastic reason for change visible in the horizon, and with half the world being in election mode for 2012, come tomorrow it will still be business as usual in one of the world’s eternal hot spots.

Kourou Ifigeneia

Fragkiadakis Aris

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