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Nicoleta Corbu

National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Romania,

nicoleta.corbu@comunicare.ro

Elena Negrea-Busuioc

National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Romania,

elena.negrea@comunicare.ro

‘Economy Matters!’ People’s Evaluation of their National Economies and the Success of

Populist Parties in Central and Eastern Europe

Abstract:

Populism is on the rise in Europe, as shown by the discursive power displayed by some parties

and populist leaders in Western Europe and, more importantly, by the recent electoral success of

populist parties in countries from Central and Eastern Europe. Populist parties‟ gain of power

calls for a thorough examination of the conditions that have led to their success. Economic

hardship has been considered in the literature as one of the factors that positively influence the

emergence of populism, since the economic crisis seems to nourish the spread of populist

attitudes. The economic downturn registered in many countries of the European Union and

people‟s dissatisfaction with the way in which the national governments responded to the crisis

may have favored the consolidation of populist attitudes and voters‟ choices of populist parties in

national elections. In this paper, we seek to empirically test this assumption by examining the

success of populist parties in recent elections in member states from Central and Eastern Europe

and people‟s perception of the evolution of their national economies. We analyze data from the

2007-2015 Eurobarometers and correlate them with the electoral scores of populist parties. Our

analysis shows a significant correlation between the success of populist parties and people‟s

assessment of the evolution of the national economy in the last years in these countries. Thus, the

more negative people‟s perception of the direction in which the national economy is going, the

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greater the electoral success of populist parties. Interestingly, we have found no correlation

between the electoral success of populist parties in these countries and people‟s perceptions of

the evolution of EU economy.

Keywords: populism, electoral success of populist parties, assessment of national economy,

Central and Eastern Europe

Introduction

Populism is on the rise in Europe, as shown by the discursive power displayed by some parties

and populist leaders in Western Europe and, more importantly, by the recent electoral success of

populist parties in countries from Central and Eastern Europe. Populist parties‟ gain of power

calls for a thorough examination of the conditions that have led to their success. It would seem

that populist rhetoric consisting of anti-globalization, anti-capitalist and anti-European overtones

(Taggart, 2000; Mudde, 2004, 2007; Bos et al., 2012) is quite appealing to many disenchanted

voters who no longer follow the parties belonging to the established political families.

Furthermore, the financial and economic crisis that hit Europe in 2008-2009 provided populists a

fertile ground for promoting their anti-establishment and anti-elites discourse. Undoubtedly, the

crisis has favored the emergence of new populist actors while contributing to the weakening of

established political systems (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015). Thus, we witnessed the spectacular

accession to power of SYRIZA in Greece, the electoral success of populist parties across both

Northern and Southern Europe (True Finns in Finland, Sweden Democrats in Sweden, M5S in

Italy) and the consolidation of populist parties par excellence (le Front National in France).

Could the economic crisis and, more specifically, people‟s perception of the evolution of their

national and of the European economies explain to some degree the rise of populist parties?

In this study, we start from the premise that economic hardship is one of the factors that

positively influence the emergence of populism, since the economic crisis seems to nourish the

spread of populist attitudes. People whose welfare has deteriorated during the crisis and who lost

confidence in their national governments‟ capacity to come up with efficient solutions to

overcome the consequences of the crisis may turn to populist discourse and even vote for

populist parties that overtly recognize the crisis (Rooduijn, 2013) and assign blame for the

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gravity of the situation to „others‟ (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Vasilopoulou et al., 2013), be they

parties in government, immigrants, the EU, etc. We further presume that the economic downturn

registered in many countries of the European Union and people‟s dissatisfaction with the way in

which the national governments responded to the crisis may have favored the consolidation of

populist attitudes and voters‟ choices of populist parties in national elections. In this paper, we

seek to empirically test this assumption by examining the success of populist parties in the last

two national elections in member states and people‟s perception of the evolution of their national

economies. We analyze data from the 2007-2015 Eurobarometers and correlate them with the

electoral scores of populist parties. Our analysis shows a significant correlation between the

success of populist parties and people‟s assessment of the evolution of the national economy in

the last eight years in most of the European countries. Thus, the more negative people‟s

perceptions of the direction in which the national economy is going are, the greater the electoral

success of populist parties. Interestingly, we have found no correlation between the electoral

success of populist parties in these countries and people‟s perceptions of the evolution of EU

economy.

Defining and measuring populism

The literature in the field has largely acknowledged the challenge that defining populism poses to

many scholars and the „slippery‟ nature of the concept (Taggart, 2000; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015).

As Taggart (2000) metaphorically put it, “populism serves many masters and mistresses” (p. 10).

It is a highly context-sensitive concept, which makes it hard to encapsulate in an encompassing

definition that hold over time and space. Despite the lack of conceptual clarity of the concept,

populism has been approached mainly from three perspectives: a) as a (thin) ideology that splits

society into two antagonistic groups, the „pure‟ and virtuous people and the corrupt elite

(Canovan, 1999; Mudde, 2004); b) as a communication style displaying particular discursive

patterns used by politicians to talk about the people (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Albertazzi &

McDonnell, 2008); and c) as a political strategy employed by charismatic leaders to gain power

(Weyland, 2001; Kriesi, 2004). However, irrespective of the view adopted, scholars have come

to an agreement upon the basic characteristics that populism and populists everywhere share.

Thus, all populists emphasize the importance of the people; they criticize the corrupt elite;

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populists conceive the people as a homogenous entity, and they always proclaim a crisis

(Rooduijn, 2013, p. 2). People-centrism and anti-elitism are, in fact, the two component of the

minimal definition of populism, which help distinguish between populists and non-populists

parties and actors (Mudde, 2007).

While defining populism proved to be challenging enough, measuring it seems to be even

harder. In attempting to conceptualize populism, many scholars have focused primarily on the

content of populist ideology and discourse and on explaining the rise of populism in different

countries (Hawkins et al, 2012), that is on the analysis of the supply-side for the success of

populism. Many studies on populism have relied on party manifestos (Pauwels, 2011), election

manifestos (Rooduijn & Pauwels, 2011), party broadcasts (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) or

experiment (Bos et al, 2012) to analyze different dimensions of populism and the effects that

populist rhetoric has on voters.

Comparatively fewer studies have attempted to measure populism empirically, at a

micro-level, i.e. to measure to what extent people themselves are populists. Research on attitudes

of voters and the cognitive mechanisms that allow such attitudes to be activated and mobilized

(the demand-side of populism) relies mainly on surveys and experiments and attempts at offering

micro-level explanations for the causes and the success of populism. For instance, Hawkins et al.

(2012) used a survey-based design to measure populist attitudes in the United States. Their

research contrasted populism with pluralism and elitism. They found that populist attitudes are

widespread in the U.S., and that populism correlates with lower education, with identification

with third parties and ideological radicalism and with an anti-immigration stance (Hawkins et al,

2012, p. 23).

Another relevant research carried out by Akkerman et al. (2013) linked populist attitudes

to party preference. They measured people‟s attitudes to both a right-wing populist party (PVV)

and a left-wing populist party (SD) in the Netherlands. The study showed that left-wing

populism is more inclusive, while right-wing populism is more exclusive, which reflected in the

fact that SD voters are more willing to listen to the opinions of others, while PVV voters are not

(Akkerman et al, 2013, p. 22).

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Examining populism empirically has proved to be a difficult task, given that there is no

established scale that allows scholars to measure populist attitudes per se in the surveys they

design. The scales used in the studies on populism as an individual-level attitude differ with

respect to the dimensions and the items they contain. Furthermore, the scales used contrast

populism with other attitudes on politics and society, e.g. populism vs. pluralism and elitism

(Hawkins et al., 2012; Akkerman et al., 2013). Thus, further research is needed in order to

systematically describe populist attitudes and to disentangle them from other attitudes. Another

important aspect of measuring populist attitudes consists of identifying and describing the

perceptions and emotions that may correlate with people‟s predispositions to vote for populist

parties. Ivarsflaten (2008) showed that appeal to the danger of immigration and mobilization of

grievances over this issue correlate to the electoral success of populist parties. A different result

was obtained by Oesch (2008) when examining the motivation of workers in five Western

European countries to vote for right-wing populist parties. He found that the strongest predictor

of right-wing populists‟ electoral success was the perception of a cultural rather than an

economic threat by immigration. In this paper, we seek to investigate if and to what extent

Europeans‟ perceptions of their national economy and of the EU economy correlate with the

electoral success of populist parties in those countries. More specifically, we aim to test if

negative perceptions of national and European economy positively correlate with the success of

populist parties in Europe.

Populism in times of economic crisis

Previous studies on populism across Europe have emphasized the role that perceptions of social

and political reality and attitudes play in explaining people‟s voting for populist parties (Bos et

al., 2012; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Oesch, 2008). It seems that perceptions of economic, political,

cultural and security threats, fear of immigration, perceptions of powerlessness European Union

serve as predictors of populist voting. Given the success of populist parties in countries that were

badly hit by the economic crisis (Greece is the most eloquent case, with SYRIZA coming to

power in 2015, but Spain and Italy also serve as cases where populist parties scored well in

elections), one could assume that there is a direct link between the rise of populism in Europe

and the economic crisis of 2008-2009 that affected, albeit unevenly, the EU countries. The

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economic factor might have contributed to the increase of anxiety and unease among Europeans,

which might have led to the proliferation of their voting preference for populist parties. This does

not mean that the economic crisis is the sole cause of the rise of populism in Europe. On the

contrary, populist parties existed in Europe before the crisis and in some countries where parties

were and still are an established, nationally recognized political force. Furthermore, there is

considerable evidence that populist parties, especially right-wing populist parties (e.g. SD –

Sweden Democrats, FPÖ – Austrian Freedom Party), thrived in times of economic stability and

prosperity (Pappas & Kriesi, 2015; Mols & Jetten, 2016). Admittedly, the crisis has not been the

unique cause of the consolidation of populism in Europe; this process has been a continuous one,

with populist parties gradually consolidating their status and position by politically capitalizing

on the erosion of the political system in various countries, the erosion of mainstream parties and

the lack of confidence of citizens in governments and mainstream politicians, which ultimately

led to an increasing electoral volatility that has been successfully exploited by populist parties.

Nevertheless, the economic crisis, together with the political crisis it has generated in many

countries, has contributed to the consolidation of populism and the development of populist

attitudes across Europe (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015). The economic turmoil and its grave

consequences provided a fertile ground for populist parties and leaders to become a powerful

voice in many countries and claim that they speak on behalf of the powerless people, defending

its interests against those of the corrupt and deceiving elites.

The idea that the economic factor alone is not a strong predictor of the success of populist

parties in Europe has been empirically tested and confirmed by a large scale research that

analyzed the electoral success of 25 populist parties in 17 European countries grouped by regions

(Nordic, Western, Southern, Central-Eastern and Anglo-Celtic) in national elections that took

place before (2005-2008) and after the crisis (2009-2013), and in the 2014 European elections.

The findings were presented in a book edited by Kriesi and Pappas (2015) and suggestively

entitled European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession. This comprehensive and

comparative study shows that, contrary to intuition, populism did not register a spectacular

electoral success during the crisis, although the success of populist parties varies significantly

across regions (Pappas & Kriesi, 2015). Put it differently, the case studies included in the book

show that there is an overall weak correlation between economic hardship and the success of

populist parties in elections. There are cases where populism strongly surged during the crisis

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(e.g. Greece, Hungary, Italy, the UK), albeit following different patterns. In countries such as

Sweden, Finland or Norway, populism also increased not necessarily as a result of these

countries‟ experience of the crisis, but rather as a reaction to national political crises combined

with the discursive opportunity provided by the manifestation of economic crisis in other EU

countries. In Western Europe, with the notable exception of France, where le Front National

registered significant electoral success, populist parties scored relatively poorly during the crisis.

Probably the most intriguing case is that of Ireland, a country severely hit by the crisis that did

not experience populism in elections. In conclusion, there is no strong correlation between the

economic crisis and the success of populist parties in Europe, but there is substantial evidence

that an economic crisis combined with a political crisis contribute to the consolidation of

populism, with one exception, Ireland (Pappas & Kriesi, 2015, p. 303).

The book edited by Kriesi and Pappas comprises a comparative analysis of the electoral

success of populist parties before and after the crisis. The indicators used to define the economic

crisis are unemployment rate, public debt and growth rate; whereas the indicators for a political

crisis are trust in parliament and satisfaction with the way democracy works in the countries

analyzed (Kriesi & Pappas, 2015, pp. 16-17). All measurements referring to the indicators

mentioned come from Eurostat and Eurobarometers. Similarly to the design of the book, our

study also uses electoral volatility to assess the success of populist parties. We take into account

scores obtained by populist parties across Europe in the last two national elections, without

differentiating between pre-crisis and post-crisis elections (as it is the case in the comparative

analysis presented in Kriesi and Pappas‟s edited book). However, when it comes to defining the

economic factor, our analysis defines and measures four dimensions referring to European‟s

evaluation of national economy and European economy, respectively. Thus, unlike the studies

included in the Kriesi and Pappas‟s edited volume, we do not measure the economic crisis as

such (characterized by specific indicators), but people‟s perceptions of national and European

economy. Our analysis is based on measurements and data from the Eurobarometers. In the

following sections, we present the methodology used and the findings of our study.

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Methodology

In order to assess to what extent economic indicators influence the success of populist parties in

Europe, we used data available from the Eurobarometers from spring 2007 to autumn 2015,

measuring four dimensions of the economic situation in each country: 1. expectation about

national economy for the next 12 months (sociotropic evaluations); 2. expectations about EU

economy for the next 12 months (supranational evaluations); 3. evaluation of national economy;

4. evaluation of EU economy. We then matched the data with the success of populist parties in

23 countries of the European Union, for which full data for all variables and party success in the

last two national elections were available.

We expect the level of contentment with the economic situation of own country or of the

European Union, and the expectations for the future for these two indicators to be correlated to

the success of the populist parties, in the sense that:

H1a. The more pessimistic people are about the national economy (next 12 months), the

more successful the populist parties.

H1b. The more pessimistic people are about national economy from one election to the

next, the more successful the populist parties.

H2a. The more pessimisic people are about the direction of the EU economy, the more

successful the populist parties.

H2b. The more pessimistic people are about the direction of the EU economy from one

election to the next, the more successful the populist parties.

H3a. The worse people‟s estimations of how good the national economy is performing,

the more successful the populist parties.

H3b. The worse people‟s estimations of how good the national economy is performing

from one election to the next, the more successful the populist parties

H4a. The more pessimistic people‟s evaluation about the EU economy, the more

successful the populist parties.

H4b. The more pessimistic people‟s evaluation about the EU economy from one election

to the next, the more successful the populist parties.

As formulated in the hypotheses, we measured both the success of populist parties in the

last and previous elections (that is to say the last national election and the one before that), as

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well as the evolution of people‟s opinion about the state of the economy from one election to the

next. The logic of this doing is to understand to what extent the ascension of populist parties in

some countries could be correlated with the worsening of people‟s opinion about the economy.

Measurements

The variables measuring people‟s perceptions about the state of the economy were taken from

the Standard Eurobarometers, with the following wording:

1. expectation about national economy for the next 12 months (sociotropic evaluations):

What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better,

worse or the same, when it comes to the economic situation in (OUR COUNTRY)? (we used the

percentages for “better”).

2. expectations about EU economy for the next 12 months (supranational evaluations):

What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better,

worse or the same, when it comes to the economic situation in the EU? (we used the percentages

for “better”).

3. evaluation of national economy: How would you judge the current situation of the

(NATIONALITY) economy? (we used the percentages for “good”).

4. evaluation of EU economy: How would you judge the current situation of the EU

economy? (we used the percentages for “good”).

As far as the success of populist political parties in various countries is concerned, we

constructed variables measuring the success of populist parties by adding the percentages won by

populist parties in each country in the last election, and the one before that (we labeled it

“previous election”).

We also took into consideration the year of national election for each country. We

constructed new variables that would make estimations more accurate, for each of the four

variables from Eurobarometers. Thus, the variable “expectations about national economy in the

next 12 months (better)” was transformed, so as to include data from the spring Eurobarometer

of the year of the election (last and previous)1. Then a third variable was created, measuring the

1 Thus, for instance, in the case of Romania, where national elections were held in 2008 and 2012, these variables

would have the data from the spring Eurobarometer from 2008 and spring Eurobarometer from 2012. But in the case

of Poland, where elections were held in 2011 and 2015, this variable would have the data from the spring

Eurobarometers from 2011 and 2015, respectively.

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difference between the two, in order to assess to what extent people‟s opinion worsened or

improved from one election to the next in each country, even though these years were specific to

each country. For this variable, a negative value would indicate a worsening in people‟s opinion

about the economy, and a positive value would show an improvement from one election to the

next.

Correspondingly, we created o variable measuring the difference of the percentages won

by populist parties from last election to the previous (in other words if they gained or lost ground

from one election to the next, thus measuring a trend). Thus, we could test whether the success of

populist parties in national elections is correlated to peoples‟ expectations about the economy at

the sectional level (the year of previous and last election in each country), or whether an increase

or decrease in the general level of expectations (from one election to the next) might influence

the success of populist parties (from one election to the next). For this variable, a negative value

would indicate that the populist parties‟ success declined from one election to the next, and

conversely, a positive value would show the ascension of populist parties in an individual

country.

Findings

Before proceeding to the analysis of the factors included in the hypotheses, we begin this section

with general remarks about the success of the populist parties in the previous and last elections,

as well as with the trends of evolution of their success in the last years.

In the previous national election in the European Union, the mean of the percentages

obtained by populist parties across Europe (the 23 countries taken into account) was 15.66, while

for the last election this mean raised to 21.13%. The countries with the most successful populist

parties were Hungary (69% in the last election, 65% in the last one), Italy (46% in the last

election, 51% in the last one) and Greece (24% in the last election, 46% in the last one), followed

by Austria and Lithuania.

As a general observation, only in 8 countries out of the 23 included in this study, the

populist parties lost some of the success they previously had, whereas in the other 15, the

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populist parties gained more ground, with impressive differences from one election to the next in

Spain, France, Poland or Latvia.

Expectations about the national economy

The correlation between people‟s expectations (for the next twelve months) regarding their own

country‟s economy in the year of previous election and the success of populist parties in that

particular election show a pattern, when four countries were omitted from the correlation (r=-

.456, p<.05, N=19). Thus, results show that the more pessimistic people are about the trend of

the national economy for the next twelve months, the more they vote with one of the populist

parties in the country. The four exceptions are Hungary, Croatia, Poland, and Bulgaria. Hungary

has a particular situation, usually out of any pattern, with very successful populist parties in both

previous and last election, even though the economic indicators are somehow moderate.

Explanations for this particular situation should be looked elsewhere, as it seems that Hungary‟s

situation is not related to a great extent to how people assess the economy, in all its nuances. As

far as Croatia is concerned, a newcomer to the Union, we expect to find different patterns in

general, as results date from before the country was a member of the European Union. The other

two countries, Poland and Bulgaria, (and, as Figure 1 shows, one could also include the Czech

Republic), are both East European countries, in which the populist parties knew little success in

the last years, despite the rather poor evaluations of the economy.

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Figure 1. People‟s expectations about the national economy for the next 12 months by the

success of populist parties in the previous election.

The situation for the last election is rather fuzzy, with no significant correlation between

the two variables, which shows that, in the last 3-4 years the situation has somewhat changed.

(Figure 2)

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Figure 2. People‟s expectations about the national economy for the next 12 months by the

success of populist parties in the last election.

The same holds true for the trends from one election to the next. Figure 3 shows,

nonetheless, that in only two countries, Sweden and Estonia, people‟s expectations about the

national economy worsened dramatically from one election to the next.

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Figure 3. People‟s expectations about the national economy for the next 12 months by the

success of populist parties from the previous election to the last.

At the same time, in 15 countries out of 23, the populist parties in the country became

more successful from one election to the next. However, there is no significant correlation

indicating that this success is related to how people estimate the state of the national economy for

the next 12 months, from one election to the next.

Expectations about the EU economy

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Interestingly, the patterns related to people‟s expectations about the EU economy for the next

twelve months are more stable, in the sense that, with the exception of Hungary for the previous

election, (Figure 4, r=-.430, p<.05, N=22), of Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Netherlands

and Germany for the last election (Figure 5, r=-.485, p<.05, N=18), and with no exception for the

trend from one election to the next (Figure 6, r=-.504, p<.05, N=23), a significant correlation was

found, showing that, the more pessimistic people‟s expectations about the EU economy for the

next twelve months, the more successful the populist parties in the country.

Figure 4. People‟s expectations about the EU economy for the next 12 months by the

success of populist parties in the previous election.

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Figure 5. People‟s expectations about the EU economy for the next 12 months by the

success of populist parties in the last election.

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Figure 6. People‟s expectations about the EU economy for the next 12 months by the

success of populist parties from the previous election to the last.

We believe that the most reliable correlation is the one showing a stable trend from one

election to the next. Not only there are no exceptions, but also we could understand that, actually

more important than people‟s opinion at a given time, the trend of evolution of people‟s opinion

is a stronger indicator of how people would vote in an election campaign. At the same time,

Figure 6 shows that in only 7 countries people‟s expectations about the EU economy changed for

the better, with Turkey being the most optimistic country, which comes as no surprise, since

Turkey is not part of the European Union.

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Evaluation of the national economy

Although the evaluation of the country‟s economy could be one of the most powerful correlation

factor to the success of the populist parties, the results showed a significant correlation only for

the last election (r=-.440, p<.05, N=21) and, even in this case, with the exception of Croatia and

the Czech Republic.

Figure 7. People‟s evaluation of the national economy by the success of populist parties

in the previous election.

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Figure 8. People‟s evaluation of the national economy by the success of populist parties

in the last election.

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Figure 9. People‟s evaluation of the national economy by the success of populist parties

from the previous election to the last.

When looking about the differences at the level of the economic evaluations, one could

notice that only in 7 countries out of the 23, people evaluate worse the economy, from one

election to the next, with very optimistic evaluations in Germany, the United Kingdom, and

Denmark. Interestingly, 6 of them evaluate exactly in a similar way the evolution of the EU

economic situation. Only one country of the seven evaluates the national economy as worse and

the European economy as better, namely Bulgaria, and another country evaluates positively the

evolution of the national economy and negatively the evolution of the EU economy, namely

Latvia.

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Evaluation of the EU economy

As far as the EU economy evaluations are concerned, they are only significantly correlated with

the success of populist parties when differences from one election to the next are taken into

account (Figure 12, r=-.501, p<.05, N=19), and this holds true only with Estonia, Greece,

Bulgaria and the Netherlands excluded. The first three are countries in which populist parties

were more successful (above the general trend of the other countries) from one election to the

next, despite the fact that people evaluated more positively the state of the economy at the Union

level (from the previous election to the last), whereas populist parties in the Netherlands became

less successful, despite the fact that the Dutch appreciate that the EU economy has worsened.

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Figure 10. People‟s evaluation of the EU economy by the success of populist parties in

the previous election.

Figure 11. People‟s evaluation of the EU economy by the success of populist parties in

the last election.

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Figure 12. People‟s evaluation of the EU economy by the success of populist parties from

the previous election to the last.

The evaluation of the EU economy does not seem to play a role per se in the success of

the populist parties in national elections, but the way in which people evaluate, from one election

to the next, the state of the European economy seems to be a good indicator for the success of the

populist parties across Europe.

Discussion

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Overall, our findings are consistent with the general conclusion of Pappas and Kriesi‟s (2015)

comparative analysis of the development of populism during the crisis: the economic hardship

that different countries faced is a rather weak predictor of the success of populist parties in

Europe. Furthermore, another important result is that, similarly to the research on the impact of

economic crisis on the dynamics of the electoral performance of populist parties, the relationship

between people‟s perceptions of the national and European economies and the success of

populist parties shows different pattern across different regions and different countries in Europe.

This is a crucial aspect that should be taken in consideration when studying the causes of

populism and the success of populists in elections. The economic factor alone (measured either

in terms of well-established growth indicators, e.g. GDP, unemployment rate, public debt, etc.,

or in terms of people‟s perceptions of the economic situation in their countries and their

expectations of future evolutions of economy) cannot account for the dynamics of populist

growth in different countries across Europe. It is the perception of economic and political

situation in one particular country, combined with various emotional and attitudinal

predispositions of voters and with an anti-European general feeling that seemingly contribute to

the success of populist parties in that country.

Our study shows a partial confirmation of the relationship between Europeans‟

perceptions of the evolution of their national economy and of the EU economy, respectively, and

the success of populist parties. The correlations between people‟s perceptions of national and EU

economies and electoral success of populists that we have found hold when some countries are

omitted from the model, a fact that is consistent with the idea that the rise of populism varies

considerably from one country to another (and from one region to another) and that the success

of populist parties cannot be attributed solely (or primarily) to the impact of the perceived

economic situation. Thus, we have found a significant correlation between people‟s expectations

about their national economy and the success of populist parties in the previous elections (i.e.

next to last, most recent elections held in that particular country). The more pessimistic people

are about the trend of the national economy for the next twelve months, the more they vote for

one of the populist parties in their country. However, this pattern holds for all EU countries in

our sample with the exception of Hungary, Croatia, Poland and Bulgaria. As Pappas and Kriesi

(2015) also noted, populism in Central and Eastern European countries follow a specific pattern,

which is not necessarily related to the outburst of the economic crisis or, in our case, to popular

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perceptions of national and European economies. Hungary‟s Fidesz has been a highly successful

populist party long before the crisis and its accession to power and preservation of political

supremacy during successive elections seem to have been favored by a political crisis and an

anti-establishment mobilization (Pappas & Kriesi, 2015, p. 323). As far as Poland and Bulgaria

are concerned, populism was not a constant presence in these countries in post-1989 transition

period, certainly not like in the case of Hungary. In Poland, the Law and Justice Party promised

“an elite replacement” (Stanley, 2012, p. 17) in order to break with the communist past and to

pursue the country‟s authentic interests and values and to defend its status in Europe.

We have also examined the patterns related to people‟s expectations about the EU

economy and the way in which these expectations might influence the success of populist

parties. Our results show a significant correlation between expectations about the EU economy

and the trend from one election to the next, which means that the more pessimistic people‟s

expectations about the EU economy for the next twelve months, the more successful the populist

parties in the country. Thus, it would seem that people‟s perceptions of the functioning of the

European Union, in this case, the EU economy, are a predictor of their predisposition to vote for

populist parties. The finding is consistent with the idea that anti-European and Euroscepticism

are strongly related to the electoral success of populist parties, especially of radical right parties

(Rooduijn, 2015).

When evaluation of national economy is measured, our study has found a significant

correlation between this factor and the success of populist parties only when results of last

elections are taken into consideration; and, even in this case, only when Croatia and the Czech

Republic are taken out of the selected cases. One could explain this as a matter of the impact of

the crisis on people‟s welfare. It takes time for the negative consequences of a degrading

economy to be felt by the population. To this adds the ability of populist parties to capitalize on

the situation of the national economy and to make the case for their short-cut populist solutions

(Kriesi & Pappas, 2015, p. 1), which seem to appeal to discontent and disillusioned voters.

Finally, we have found a significant correlation between people‟s evaluations of the EU

economy and the success of populist parties only when differences from one election to the next

are taken into account. Moreover, this correlation holds only when Estonia, Greece, Bulgaria and

the Netherlands are excluded from the sample. Estonia, Greece and Bulgaria are countries where

populist parties were more successful (above the general trend of the other countries) from one

26

election to the next, despite the fact that people evaluated more positively the state of the EU

economy (from the previous elections to the last), whereas the populist parties in the Netherlands

became less successful, despite the fact that its citizens considered that the EU economy has

worsened.

Conclusions

As with previous studies, there is a significant difference between a general intuition that the

economic crisis and, consequently, people‟s evaluation of their national economy and of the EU

economy, respectively, are strong predictors of the electoral success of populist parties and the

results of empirical investigations of this assumption. The study presented in this paper showed a

partial relationship between the two variables mentioned above. People‟s expectations about the

evolution of their national economy correlate with the electoral success of populist parties in

those countries (with some exceptions). Thus, the more negative people‟s perceptions of the

direction in which the national economy is going are, the greater the electoral success of populist

parties. Interestingly, we have found no correlation between the electoral success of populist

parties and people‟s perceptions of the evolution of EU economy.

Based on the findings of our analysis, we conclude that the evaluation of the EU

economy does not seem to play a role per se in the success of populist parties in national

elections held in EU countries. However, the way in which people evaluate the state of the EU

economy form one election to the next seems to be a good indicator for the success of the

populist parties in different countries across Europe.

Finally, we note that people‟s evaluation of the economy is but a small piece of a much

bigger puzzle in the complex social and political phenomenon of populism. The recent events in

the European Union, the migration crisis and the Brexit vote might change even more

dramatically the political scene of the next national and European elections.

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