New Distinctions, Same Troubles: A Reply to Haji and McKenna

Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

New Distinctions, Same Troubles: A Reply to Haji and McKennaAuthor(s): David PalmerSource: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 102, No. 9 (Sep., 2005), pp. 474-482Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3655634 .

Accessed: 26/05/2014 07:43

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Journal of Philosophy, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journalof Philosophy.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 194.81.199.109 on Mon, 26 May 2014 07:43:20 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=jphil

http://www.jstor.org/stable/3655634?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


474 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

COMMENTS AND CRITICISM

NEW DISTINCTIONS, SAME TROUBLES: A REPLY TO HAJI AND MCKENNA*

I shtiyaque Haji and Michael McKenna' present an argument that,

contrary to the received view, a prior-sign Frankfurt case that assumes causal determinism does not beg the question against

the incompatibilist and can support the conclusion that moral responsibility does not require alternative possibilities.2 In this paper, I aim to show that Haji and McKenna's argument fails and a prior-sign Frankfurt case that assumes determinism does beg the question against the in-

compatibilist. I. PRIOR-SIGN FRANKFURT CASES

The kind of Frankfurt case Haji and McKenna consider is the prior- sign type. Here is their example case.

Mork believes that in his circumstances it is wrong for him to lie to prevent embarrassment. In spite of this, he decides to lie and lies anyway. As he has no excuse or justification for lying, it seems he is deserving of blame for lying. Unbeknowst to Mork, though, he could not have refrained from lying due to the presence of Mindy who has the power to read and control Mork's mind. Mindy wields this power partly in virtue of possessing the following knowledge. Had Mork been about to refrain from lying, he would have displayed some involuntary sign-a neurological pattern, N*, in his brain-whereas if he had been about to lie, he would have displayed a different neurological pattern, N. Had Mindy detected N*, she would have interceded in Mork's deliberations via direct stimulation of Mork's brain and would, in this way, have caused Mork to lie. But Mindy detects N, the reliable sign for Mindy that she need not show her hand at all. As Mork lies on his own, in the absence of Mindy's intervention, it seems highly reasonable that Mork acts freely and is morally blameworthy for lying despite not having alternative possibilities (300).

* I should like to thank Robert Kane for comments on an earlier draft and helpful discussion.

'Dialectical Delicacies in the Debate about Freedom and Alternative Possibilities," thisJOURNAL, CI, 6 (June 2004): 299-314.

21 will switch in the rest of the paper between "causal determinism" and "determinism." This is just for exegetical convenience. I treat the terms synonymously.

From now on I will drop the "prior-sign" locution and just refer to "Frankfurt cases," although these are the only kinds I am concerned with here.

0022-362X/05/0209/474-82 ? 2005 The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.



COMMENTS AND CRITICISM 475

This situation seems a problem for those wanting to hold that moral responsibility requires that the agent have alternative possibilities. Many philosophers, particularly incompatibilists, have tried to argue that-contrary to the intuition-the Frankfurt cases do not show that one can be morally responsible without having any alternative possibilities. A popular strategy to do this, first developed by Robert Kane4 and David Widerker,5 is to claim that careful consideration of the cases points to a dilemma, both horns of which are problematic for those wanting to defend Frankfurt's conclusions. Following Haji and McKenna, I will call those who believe the Frankfurt cases establish that alternative possibilities are not necessary for moral responsibility, Frankfurt Defenders, and I will refer to those who claim the dilemma forces the rejection of Frankfurt's conclusions, Dilemma Defenders. I will now present a standard formulation of the dilemma defense.

II. THE DILEMMA DEFENSE

A standard way of presenting the dilemma is to consider what follows if the Frankfiurt case assumes either causal determinism or indeterminism. Assuming causal determinism obtains in the Frankfurt cases is to assume that there is a determined relationship between the prior sign Mork exhibits and his choice to act. This assumption-the first horn of the dilemma-begs the question against the incompatibilist who does not think that causal determinism is compatible with free will and moral responsibility, and so, from the outset, will not be able to hold Mork morally responsible for his action. The other horn of the dilemma covers the assumption of causal indeterminism obtaining in the Frankfurt case. While Mork might be held morally responsible for his action under such conditions, there is no longer a causally determined relationship between the prior sign and his choice since causal indeterminism denies this. Therefore, the only way in which Mindy could intervene would be after Mork has already begun to lie--surely a robust alternative possibility. If she intervened before that, Mindy would be determining the outcome and would be responsible. She would be an actual, and not mere counterfactual, intervener.

Much of the response to this dilemma in the literature has focused on the indeterminism horn. Indeed, the main compatibilist project has been to construct cases in which an agent is morally responsible for his action though he has no alternative possibilities and acts in

4 Free Will and Values (Albany: SUNY, 1985). 5 "Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilit-

ies," Philosophical Review, civ (1995): 247-61.




an indeterministic setting (see Alfred Mele and David Robb" for examples of such cases). By contrast, little attention has been paid until recently to the determinism horn. That is, Frankfurt Defenders have tended not to continue to construct prior-sign Frankfurt cases within a causally determined setting. An obvious reason for this is common acceptance that these sorts of cases really are question-begging against the incompatibilist.

Haji and McKenna's goal, however, is to challenge the question- begging charge. More specifically, they attempt to analyze the causal determinism assumption carefully to see what it entails. They claim it is possible for the Frankfurt Defender to overcome the question- begging charge. That is, Haji and McKenna claim that causal determinism can be assumed within a Frankfurt case without begging the question against the incompatibilist. I want to show their argument for this fails.

III. HAJI AND MCKENNA'S DISTINCTION AND THE

"BROAD" DIALECTICAL CONTEXT

Recall that the question-begging charge goes like this. If a causally determined relationship is assumed between the prior sign and Mork's choice to act, then the incompatibilist cannot hold Mork morally responsible for his action, since the incompatibilist does not believe determinism is compatible with free will and moral responsibility. In a situation designed to test requirements for free will and moral responsibility, this assumption begs the question against the incompatibilist. Haji and McKenna begin by distinguishing two readings of the question-begging charge: a broad, and narrow, interpretation. The broad interpretation, they claim, "begs the question against the incompatibilist because a deterministic relation obtains-simpliciter" (303). This is to say that determinism is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility for the simple reason that determinism itself is incompatible. As a contrast, they argue the narrow interpretation "begs the question against the incompatibilist because the deterministic relation expunges alternative possibilities" (303). Here the claim is not that the situation is question-begging because determinism itself is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility. Rather, it is the absence of alternative possibilities, which determinism entails, that is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility.

Each of the two interpretations, Haji and McKenna suggest, have different audiences to which they are appropriately aimed. The broad

6 "Rescuing Frankfurt-style Cases," Philosophical Review, cmI (1998): 97-112.




reading concerning determinism itself is "most reasonably suited for a dialectic in which Frankfurt's argument is directed at a philosophically committed audience" (302). By this, they mean an audience who firmly believes determinism itself is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility. On the other hand, the narrow interpretation focusing on the role of alternative possibilities in moral responsibility is "most reasonably suited for a dialectic in which Frankfurt's argument is directed at an undecided audience" (302). Haji and McKenna claim that if the incompatibilist is to be fair to the Frankfurt Defender, he must suspend judgment on whether alternative possibilities are required for free will and moral responsibility. Hence, they say the narrow interpretation ought to be aimed at an undecided audience. Haji and McKenna feel this distinction is important as it both gives some insight into the kind of response Frankfurt Defenders might give, and it outlines the commitments of the Dilemma Defender. They draw two main conclusions.

First, Haji and McKenna admit that, under the broad reading, "the Dilemma Defender is entitled to the complaint that the first horn of the dilemma [that is, assuming determinism] is question-begging [against incompatibilists]" (313). This is because the broad interpretation objects that determinism simpliciter obtains in the example. If the Frankfurt Defender wants to work under the broad interpretation, he must offer an example that does not assume the agent is determined (as, for instance, Mele and Robb do). Haji and McKenna claim that if an incompatibilist is willing to consider an indeterministic Frankfurt case, he must suspend judgment on the role of alternative possibilities. The incompatibilist, in such an instance, is "not entitled to demand that (absent Frankfurt's counterfactual machinery) the relevant case involves an agent with alternative possibilities. Demand- ing this is tantamount to refusing Frankfurt a fair hearing" (311).

The upshot--under the rules of considering an indeterministic Frankfurt example-is that Dilemma Defenders are "dialectically committed at least to the possibility that determinism might rule out free will and moral responsibility for reasons other than ruling out alternative possibilities" (313). Furthermore, Haji and McKenna argue that "if incompatibilists wish to grapple with Frankfurt given a broad dialectical situation, we believe they do so in bad faith. By demanding that Frankfurt begin with a case of a libertarian free agent, they are demanding that Frankfurt provide a case in which any freely willing and morally responsible agent does have alternative possibilities. This of course is just what Frankfurt wants to disprove" (313).

Given what Haji and McKenna have said about the incompatibilist's dialectical commitments and his bad faith in pursuing the broad




dialectical situation, they claim incompatibilists must concede "they are not entitled to the dilemma defense if it is meant to address a broad dialectical situation. If these incompatibilists wish to rely upon the dilemma defense, then they must accept the conditions of the debate established by the narrow dialectical context" (312).

IV. THE "NARROW" DIALECTICAL CONTEXT

Haji and McKenna's discussion of the broad dialectic yields two main conclusions. First, Frankfurt Defenders must grant the question-begging nature of assuming determinism, and try to prove their point only by using Frankfurt cases that assume indeterminism. Second, incompatibilists should consider cases in the narrow context, and so give Frankfurt a fairer hearing. The point of the second conclusion seems to me to be that if the Dilemma Defender is forced to consider Frankfurt cases under the narrow context, the dilemma defense cannot work. Haji and McKenna believe the determinism assumption is not question-begging (the Dilemma Defender's charge) and so it seems that the Dilemma Defender's claim falls away, entailing Frank- furt's original conclusions have to be accepted. However, I do not believe their argument works. They do not show that determinism can be assumed in a nonquestion-begging manner.

Recall, the narrow dialectic is aimed at a philosophically uncommitted audience, and the question-begging charge is aimed specifically at how the assumption of determinism rules out alternative possibilities before the counterfactual intervener is introduced. The idea is that an uncommitted audience might think the Frankfurt Defender is begging the question against the incompatibilist not simply by assuming determinism simpliciter, but by the fact that alternative possibilities are eliminated by determinism even prior to the introduction of the counterfactual intervener. The counterfactual intervener is doing no work in the case since determinism already rules out alternative possibilities. A common motivation for incompatibilism is the feeling that in a determined environment, given the prior causal history and laws of nature, at the moment of choice, an agent cannot truly possess alternative possibilities. And if an agent does not have alternative possibilities, how can the choice be his? As soon as determinism is assumed, the notion of the agent having alternative possibilities is ruled out. Haji and McKenna present the Dilemma Defenders' claims (under the guise of the uncommitted philosopher), according to the narrow reading, as being "to insure an important question is not begged...we need a case which the only manner of ruling out alternative possibilities is by way of the counterfactual intervener" (309).

Haji and McKenna agree that "the Frankfurt Defender's case would




be more convincing-there would be less to contest-if it were beyond dispute that an agent's alternatives were ruled out only by virtue of the counterfactual intervener and not by virtue of the truth of determinism" (310). However, they do not believe it is correct to say the Frankfurt Defender is begging the question in his argument. Haji and McKenna claim the Frankfurt Defender has a nonquestion-begging reply. I will present their reply in three stages so as to get clear about what is being said.7

(1) The counterfactual intervener and causal determinism are individually sufficient to rule out alternative possibilities.

"The counterfactual intervener's presence in a deterministic sce- nario, while perhaps not necessary for ruling out alternative possibilities, is sufficient for doing so" (310). In other words, "even if determinism rules out alternative possibilities, so does the presence of Frankfurt's counterfactual machinery" (313).

(2) The counterfactual intervener's ruling out of alternative possibilities is irrelevant in judging the agent not morally responsible.

"Furthermore, [the counterfactual intervener's ruling out of alternative possibilities] is irrelevant to anyjudgment that the agent is not free or morally responsible" (310).

(3) Determinism's ruling out of alternative possibilities is irrelevant as well for judging the agent is not morally responsible.

"The [counterfactual intervener] way of ruling out alternatives is irrelevant to an evaluation of an agent's freedom and responsibility, and this provides plausible grounds for the suggestion that [the assumption of determinism] is as well" (313).

To summarize, Haji and McKenna's reply on behalf of the Frankfurt Defender seems to be:

(1) Determinism and the counterfactual intervener are individually sufficient for ruling out alternative possibilities.

(2) The counterfactual intervener way of ruling out alternative possibilities is irrelevant to judging whether an agent is free and has moral responsibility.

(3) So, from (1) and (2), the determinism way of ruling out alternative

7 To complicate matters somewhat, Haji and McKenna present the reply on two occasions in their paper (310 and 313) but the later presentation is the fuller account of the reply. In many ways, though, the earlier rendering is the easiest to follow. This accounts for the chopped up quotations in my presentation of their idea.




possibilities is irrelevant to judging whether an agent is free and has moral responsibility.

This conclusion, say Haji and McKenna, is not question-begging. Recall the narrow dialectic charge of question-begging focused on the deterministic relation ruling out alternative possibilities indepen- dently of the counterfactual intervener.

However, this argument is not sound. (1) is false. Determinism and the counterfactual intervener are not individually sufficient for ruling out alternative possibilities. Only determinism is sufficient for ruling out alternative possibilities. The counterfactual intervener can only rule out alternative possibilities in conjunction with an assumption that determinism holds. Put another way, the counterfactual intervener qua counterfactual intervener is not sufficient to rule out alternative possibilities. It only rules out alternative possibilities in a determined environment. To see that this is so, let us return to my presentation of the dilemma at the beginning of the paper. For the counterfactual intervener (Mindy, in the example) to pick up on the "prior sign" as a reliable indicator of the agent's (Mork's) choice and action, determinism must hold, since indeterminism would deny a reliable relationship between the two. Imagine Mork decides not to lie. In order for Mindy to intervene successfully, without Mork's knowledge, determinism must hold, since Mindy detects the prior sign and activates different neural pathways sufficient for Mork ac- tually to lie. However, if we assume an undetermined environment, there will be no determined relationship between the prior sign and the choice. So, if Mindy is to intervene, she will have to wait until Mork has already, in some sense, chosen to lie before being able to alter Mork's neural mechanisms. The Frankfurt Defender wants, of course, to rule out such a possibility for this is an instance of a robust alternative possibility. So, for the counterfactual intervener to rule out alternative possibilities, which would involve him picking up on the prior sign, the relevant Frankfurt case must assume determinism holds. To repeat, the counterfactual intervener can only rule out alternative possibilities in an environment that assumes determinism. Because of this, it is incorrect to claim that the counterfactual intervener alone is sufficient for expunging alternative possibilities. Only determinism is sufficient for this. In other words, the counterfactual intervener together with determinism is sufficient but that is because determinism is already sufficient in itself.

I now want to say more about why the falsity of (1) undermines Haji and McKenna's argument. The truth of (3), which effectively purges the Frankfurt Defender of the question-begging charge, rests




on the parallel presented in (1)-that is, the claim that determinism and the counterfactual intervener are individually sufficient to rule out alternative possibilities. If (1) is not true, then (3) does not follow, and the question-begging charge will not have been overcome. If we accept (1), and believe the counterfactual intervener is irrelevant to judging the moral responsibility of the agent, it follows that determinism would also be irrelevant tojudging the agent not morally responsible. The way this conclusion about determinism is established does not seem to beg any questions against the incompatibilist. However, given that (1) is false, (3) does not follow. In other words, it is not the case, contrary to what (3) asserts, that the determinism way of ruling out alternative possibilities is irrelevant to judging whether agent is free and has moral responsibility. In fact, the way determinism rules out alternative possibilities, prior to the introduction of a counterfactual intervener, is going to be relevant to judging if the agent is free and morally responsible for his choice and action. Recall, the narrow dialectic begs the question against the incompatibilist because the deterministic relation expunges alternative possibilities. Haji and McKenna try to show that determinism can be assumed without begging any questions. However, what I have shown is that the way in which Haji and McKenna try to avoid the question-begging charge does not work. I still maintain therefore, that even under the narrow interpretation, the assumption of determinism begs the question against the incompatibilist. The only way, it seems to me, to avoid the question- begging is for the Frankfurt defender to go back to the broad dialectic and construct a case that assumes indeterminism. (This is, of course, the technique Mele and Robb and others employ.)

V. CONCLUSION

I have tried to show that Haji and McKenna are mistaken in claiming that the Frankfurt Defender can assume determinism holds in a Frank- furt case in a nonquestion-begging manner. There is no way, it seems to me, to construct a prior-sign Frankfurt case that assumes determinism and does not beg the question against the incompatibilist. What the Frankfurt defender must do, therefore, is move to challenge incompatibilists on the other horn of the dilemma. They must construct cases that assume indeterminism obtains. This recommendation is in line with that of Haji and McKenna's conclusions after their assessment of the broad dialectical reading. They made this recommendation while believing that Frankfurt Defenders could still appeal to the narrow context to save the assumption of determinism. How- ever, now that I have shown their strategy fails, I challenge Frankfurt Defenders to adopt Haji and McKenna's insistence that if they want




to continue to use these kind of examples, they must do so in an environment that assumes indeterminism. The determinism horn of the dilemma, under both Haji and McKenna's dialectical contexts, is impeachable. Frankfurt Defenders should recognize this and drop their reliance on the examples or focus on cases that assume indeterminism.

DAVID PALMER

University of Texas/Austin



Documents

New Distinctions, Same Troubles: A Reply to Haji and McKenna