G.R. No. 191560 : March 29, 2011.HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL,COMMISSIONER NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION,Petitioner, v.HON. ALEJANDRO S. URRO, ET AL.,Respondents.BRION,J.:FACTS:WhenRoces, a former NAPOLCOM Commissioner, died in September 2007, PGMA appointed the petitioner on July 21, 2008 as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner in place ofRoces. On the same date, PGMA appointed Eduardo U.Escueta(Escueta) as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated him as NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman.Later, PGMA appointed Alejandro S.Urro (Urro) in place of the petitioner,ConstanciaP. de Guzman in place of Celia Leones, and Escueta as permanentNAPOLCOM Commissioners. In a letter dated March 19, 2010, DILG Head Executive Assistant/Chief-of-StaffPascualV.VeronCruz, Jr. issued separate congratulatory letters to the respondents, for being appointed as NAPOLCOM Commissioners. The petitioner then filed the present quowarrantopetition questioning the validity of the respondents appointments mainly on the ground that it violates the constitutional prohibition againstmidnight appointments. On July 30, 2010, Pres.BenignoS. Aquino III, issued Executive Order No. 2 (E.O. No. 2) "Recalling, Withdrawing, and Revoking Appointments Issued by the Previous Administration in Violation of the Constitutional Ban on Midnight Appointments."The petitioner argues that the appointment issued to him was really a "regular" appointment, and as such, he cannot be removed from office except for cause. Since the appointment paper of respondentUrro, while bearing a date prior to theeffectivityof the constitutional ban on appointments, was officially released (per the congratulatory letter dated March 19, 2010 issued toUrro) when the appointment ban was already in effect, then the petitioners appointment, though temporary in nature, should remain effective as no new and valid appointment was effectively made. The petitioner assails the validity of the appointments of respondents De Guzman andEscuetaon the same grounds.Both parties dwelt lengthily on the issue of constitutionality of the respondents appointments in light of E.O. No. 2.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Court can exercise its power of judicial reviewHELD:The petition lacks merit.POLITICAL LAW: Judicial power; kinds of appointments.When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lismota of the case.Lismota literally means "the cause of the suit or action. In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondents appointments is notthe lismota of the case. From the submitted pleadings, what is decisive is the determination of whether the petitioner has a cause of action to institute and maintain this present petition: aquowarranto against respondentUrro.The Court already held that for a petition for quowarrantoto be successful, the suing private individual must show a clear right to the contested office.Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition.The essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the appointing authority.Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary (acting) appointments, unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of the office involved.Here, nothing in the enumeration of functions of the members of the NAPOLCOM that would be subverted or defeated by the Presidents appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner pending the selection and qualification of a permanent appointee. Viewed as an institution, a survey of pertinent laws and executive issuanceswill show that the NAPOLCOM has always remained as an office under or within the Executive Department. Clearly, there is nothing repugnant between the petitioners acting appointment, on one hand, and the nature of the functions of the NAPOLCOM Commissioners or of the NAPOLCOM as an institution, on the other.Estoppelalso clearly militates against the petitioner. From the time he was appointed until apprised of the appointment ofUrro, the petitioner discharged the functions of his office without expressing any misgivings on his appointment. He cannot later on be heard to say that the appointment was really a permanent one so that he could not be removed except for cause.Petition is DENIED.

RAMIREZ V CA G.R. No. 93833

Facts:A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.As a result of petitioners recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit and penalize wiretapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.The CA declared the RTCs decision null and void and denied the petitioners MR, hence the instant petition.Issue:W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation.Held:

Yes.Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes, provides:Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed."

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent courts conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons.The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretlyoverhearing, intercepting or recordingprivate communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed.Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the word communication to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin wordcommunicare, meaning to share or to impart. In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in aconversation,or signifies the process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of meanings or thoughts which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latters office. Any doubts about the legislative bodys meaning of the phrase private communication are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms conversation and communication were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.

Garcia vs Exec Secretary211 SCRA 219 Political Law Congress Authorizing the President to TaxFACTS:In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5%ad valoremtax. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.ISSUE:Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.HELD:Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharf age dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the GovernmentThere is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose to fix within specific limits tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . . In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.

Basbacio vs. DOJ [G.R. No. 109445. November 07, 1994]

Ponente: MENDOZA,J.

FACTS:Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder. Both were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained the cancellation of their bonds. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, Sec. 3(a), which provides for the payment of compensation to any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal.The claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground that while petitioners presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad blood between him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he was probably guilty. Petitioner brought this petition for review oncertiorarias a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner is entitled of the claim under R.A. No. 7309.HELD:NO. Petitioners contention has no merit.RATIO:Verba legis non est recedendum from the words of a statute there should be no departure.To say then that an accused has been unjustly convicted has to do with themannerof his conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the crime, but that doesnot necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an unjust conviction. If his conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of the evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct to say as does respondent that under the law liability for compensation depends entirely on the innocence of the accused.

The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment", it must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it iscontrary to laworis not supported by the evidence, and the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice . . . .

Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation. Conversely, if the prosecution is not malicious any conviction even though based on less than the required quantum of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.

Manuel de Guia vs. COMELEC [G.R. No. 104712. May 06, 1992]

FACTS:Congress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November 26, 1991. It is An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines in the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the preparation of the Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars, Resolution No. 2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant to Resolution No. 2313, and Resolution UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence of par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in promulgating the aforementioned resolutions, and maintained that election of Sanggunian members be at large instead of by district.ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioners interpretation of Sec.3 of R.A. 7166 is correct in assailing the aforementioned COMELEC Resolutions.HELD:NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of meritRATIO:Spirit and purpose of the law The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 1861, and that respondent COMELEC is cognizant of its legislative intent.No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much lessinutile. We must therefore, as far as we can, divine its meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key to open the door to what the legislature intended which is vaguely expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact the statute.The true import of Par. (d) isthat Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remained single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 will have to continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they shall all be elected by district to effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166.

Chua v. Civil Service CommissionG.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)

FACTS:RA 6683 provided benefitsforearly retirementand voluntary separation aswell as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers those whoare qualified:Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employeesofthe NationalGovernment. The benefitsauthorized underthisActshallapply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardlessof age,who have rendered at least a totalof two (2) consecutive years ofgovernment service as of the date of separationPetitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits ofthe program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with RespondentAdministration, which, however, denied the same. Recourse by the petitionertoRespondent Commission yielded the same result.

ISSUE:W/NPetitionersstatusasaco-terminusemployeeisexcludedfrom thebenefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law).

HELD:The petition isgranted.The Early Retirement Law would violate the equalprotection clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustainRespondents submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class ofgovernment employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law.The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case which states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.Ex necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the Maxim,in eo plus sit, simper inest et minus.18

People v. Mapa (GR L-22301, 30 August 1967) Facts:Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in an information dated 14 August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative Code in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 and as further amended by RA 4. Accused admits to possession of firearm on ground of being a secret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. On 27 November 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and one day to two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated to the Supreme Court.Issue:Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearmHeld:No. The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition except when such firearms are in possession of such public officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties; as those firearms and ammunitions which are regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors or marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails. It is the first and fundamental duty of courts to apply the law; Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. The law cannot be any clearer, there being no provision made for a secret agent. Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no longer speaks with authority to the extent that the present decision conflicts with. It may be note that in People vs. Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put him within the category of a peace officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879, Thus, in the present case, therefore, the conviction must stand. The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed judgment.

People vs Judge Antonio Evangelista and Guildo Tugonon GR No. 110898, February 20, 1996Facts:Private respondent Guildo Tugonon was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide. He filed a petition for probation. However, the Chief Probation and Parole Officer recommended denial of private respondents application for probation on the ground that by appealing the sentence of the trial, he had already waived his right to make his application for probation. The RTC set aside the Probation Officer's recommendation and granted private respondents application on April 23, 1993.Issue: W/N respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion by granting private respondent's application for probation despite the appeal filed by the private respondent.Held: Yes. Private respondent filed his application for probation on December28, 1992, after PD 1990 had taken effect. It is thus covered by the prohibition that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfect the appeal from the judgment of conviction" and that "the filing of the application shall deemed a waiver of the right to appeal." having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction, private respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation. Furthermore, the law makes no distinction between meritorious and unmeritorious appeals so neither should the court.

Statutory rule: If the law makes no distinction, neither should the court.

Mariano v COMELECG.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995,242 SCRA 211

FACTS:This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing astaxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854as unconstitutional.

ISSUE:Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of the questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.

HELD:The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) theconstitutionalquestion must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on theconstitutionalquestion must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events,i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet toripento an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the properparties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has nojurisdiction.

SALENILLAS VS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALSFacts:The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248, issued by virtue of Free Patent Application No. 192765, in favor of the spouses, Florencia H. de Enciso and Miguel Enciso. The said original certificate of title was inscribed in the Registration Book for the Province of Camarines Norte on December 10, 1961. On February 28, 1970, the patentees, the Enciso spouses, by an Absolute Deed of Sale, sold the property in favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of P900.00. Petitioner Elena Salenillas is a daughter of the Encisos. As a result of the aforementioned sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8104 of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte was issued in the name of the Salenillas, cancelling Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248. On June 30, 1971, the petitioners mortgaged the property now covered by T.C.T. No. T-8104 with the Rural Bank of Daet, Inc. The mortgage was subsequently released on November 22, 1973 after the petitioners paid the amount of P1,000.00. Later, or on December 4, 1975, the petitioners again mortgaged the property, this time in favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a loan of P2,500.00.For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding, pursuant to Act No. 3135, was instituted by the Philippine National Bank against the mortgage and the property was sold at a public auction held on February 27, 1981. The private respondent, William Guerra, emerged as the highest bidder in the said public auction and as a result thereof a "Certificate of Sale" was issued to him by theEx OfficioProvincial Sheriff of Camarines Norte. Ultimately, on July 12, 1983, a "Sheriff's Final Deed" was executed in favor of the private respondent.On August 17,1983, the Philippine National Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte at Daet, a motion for a writ of possession. The public respondent, Judge Raymundo Seva of the trial court, acting on the motion, issued on September 22, 1983 an order for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the private respondent. When the deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte however, attempted on November 17, 1983, to place the property in the possession of the private respondent, the petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the possession of the same and instead offered to repurchase it under Section 119 of the Public Land Act. On August 15, 1984, another motion, this time for the issuance of an alias writ of possession was filed by the private respondent with the trial court. The petitioners, on August 31, 1984, opposed the private respondents' motion and instead made a formal offer to repurchase the property.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner have the right to repurchase the property under section 19 of the Public Land Act.Held:Yes. Under Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in full:Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three classes of persons are bestowed the right to repurchase the applicant-patentee, his widow, or other legal heirs. Consequently, the contention of the private respondent sustained by the respondent appellate court that the petitioners do not belong to any of those classes of repurchasers because they acquired the property not through inheritance but by sale, has no legal basis. The petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of the Encisos, patentees of the contested property. At the very least, petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction.Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.

Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private respondent and the appellate court would be to contravene the very purpose of Section 119 of the Public Land Act which is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the State had gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in clearing and cultivating it.9Considering that petitioner Salenillas is a daughter of the spouses Florencia H. Enciso and Miguel Enciso, there is no gainsaying that allowing her (Elena) and her husband to repurchase the property would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law. We have time and again said that between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.

BOARD OF OPTOMETRY VS HON. ANGEL B. COLET

FACTS:An examination of the petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74770 in Branch 29 of the RTC of Manila, disclosed that among the petitioners included in the caption of the petition were Acebedo Optical Co., Inc.; Optometry Practitioner Association of the Philippines (OPAP); Cenevis Optometrist Association (COA); Association of Christian-Muslim Optometrist (ACMO); and Southern Mindanao Optometrist Association of the Philippine (SMOAP) each allegedly represented by its president. The body of the petition, however, gave no details as to the juridical personality and addresses of these alleged associations, save for Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. It merely listed the names of the alleged presidents as well as their profession and home addresses.As likewise disclosed in the petitioners' Compliance8filed with the trial court on 18 August 1995, the names of Miguel Acebedo, representing Acebedo Optical Co., Inc.; Miriam F. Llave, representing the OPAP; and Republica A. Panol, another petitioner in Civil Case No. 95-74770, did not appear in the registration books of the Board of Optometry to be authorized optometry practitioners in the Philippines, as evidence by certifications issued by the Professionals Regulation Commission (PRC). Private respondents CAO and ACMO were neither registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as evidence by the certifications issued by the latter.On 1 August 1995, the trial court, per respondent Judge Angel V. Colet, issued a Temporary Restraining Order9enjoining the respondents from enforcing or implementing R.A. No. 8050 or its Code of Ethics, until further orders of the court; directing that summons, with a copy of the petition and of the temporary restraining order, be served immediately; and setting the application for a writ of preliminary injunction for hearing on 15 August 1995.On 31 July 1995, the private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a petition for declaratory relief and for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused his discretion.

Held:Yes. The conclusion then is inevitable that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the implementation of R.A. No. 8050, as well as of the Code of Ethics promulgated thereunder, if one has been issued. Even if there was before him a case involving the law, prudence dictated that the respondent Judge should not have issued the writ with undue haste, bearing in mind our decision.Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers.