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Network Competition:II. Price discrimination
J ean-Jacques LaffontPatrick ReyJ ean Tirole
M a a r t e n W i s m a n s ( 2 0 0 7 6 2 0 7 ) M i c h i e l U b i n k ( 2 0 0 7 6 2 0 4 )
Agenda
• Introduction
• The model
• Main insights
• Propositions
• Conclusions
Companion article
• Framework of interconnection agreements between rival operators
• Studied competition between interconnected networks
• Assumption of non-discriminatory pricing
Our article
• Relaxes the assumption of non-discriminatory pricing
• Shows that the nature of competition is affected by price discrimination (in the entry and mature phase of the industry)
Free competition
• Unconstrained interconnection agreements• Entrants may be handicaped (entry phase)
• Enforce collusive behavior (mature phase)
Our article
Fixed cost and marginal cost
• Marginal cost technically determined for on-net call
• Depends on interconnection price of rival network
for off-net call
Assumptions
• Percentage of calls terminating on net is equal to the fraction of consumers subscribing to the network
• The interconnection price charged by the two companies is equal
• Two differentiated networks in the market have full coverage and can serve all consumers
The model
Total marginal cost
C= 2C0 + C1
C0 = MC originating and terminating
C1 = MC in between
D emand stucture is differentiated à la H otelling
The model
Pi = On-net prices
^Pi = Of-net prices
i = Market share
a = Unit access charge
The model
Fixed cost and marginal cost
• Marginal cost technically determined for on-net call
• Depends on interconnection price of rival network
for off-net call
The model
Consumer Welfare is given by:
v(p) = Consumer variable net surplus
Consumer expectations and market shares
Price discrimination creates positive, tariff-mediated, network externalities. Customers of network i are better off the more (fewer) consumers join it if pi < p^i
(pi > p^i)
This article only focusses on a stable equilibrium situation
Main insights (1)
• Network interconnection eliminates network externalities under nondiscriminatory pricing
• Positive (negative) network externalities exist if the access price embodies a markup (discount) relative to marginal cost
Main insights (2)
• Ratio of off- and on-net call prices reflects the relative markup on access
• Price discrimination introduces a wastefull distortion in the consumers’ marginal rate of substitution between on- and off-net calls
Main insights ( 3 )
• Trigger intense competition for market share. The bigger the market share, the less off-net cost have to be paid
• When the networks are poor substitutes, price discrimination decreases the double markup for on-net calls and raises it for off-net calls; This price dispersion benefits those whose net surplus function is convex
• A full coverage incumbent can squeeze out smaller competitors by raising interconnection prices (anticompetitive concerns)
Stable symmetric equilibrium
When
= 0
a = Unit access charge (the charge asked by a rival firm for an off-net call)c0 = Marginal costs of terminating end of call
m = Markup on access (relative to total cost of call)
Stable symmetric equilibrium
The proportionality rule ( Lemma 1) says:
Because 1 + m = 0, there is an unique equilibrium under discriminatory pricing that is symmetric and moreover stable. (The price of on and off-net calls is equal)
Optimimal access charge
Aw = Unit access charge that is socially preferred
aπ = Unit access charge that maximizes profit
σ: = Index of substitutability.
When: σ = 0: aw < aπ = c0 Then: and profit is maximized
When: σ > 0: aw < c0 < aπ Then:
An small increase in the substitutability parameter σ first increases both aw and aπ and cares fore monopoly prices. If σ gets larger people are more interested in substituting providers and logically aπ and p decrease again.
Impact of price discrimination
Price discrimination may increase social welfare when applied to competition between equals:
(i) Price discrimination may alleviate double marginalization
(ii) Price discrimination intensifies competition
1. D ouble marginalization
If the two networks are poor substitutes and if there is a markup on access (a > c0 ), social welfare is higher under price discrimination than under uniform pricing.
The function W(p) reaches a max at p=c. Since all prices exceed the monopoly price because of the markup, a mean-preserving price spread stricly raises social welfare.
2. Intensified Competition
Price discrimination lowers the average price for small markups.
Pd = On-net price under discrimination
^Pd = Off-net price under discrimination
Pu = Price under uniform pricing
Nonlinear pricing
Firms know their consumers’ variable surplus function
Firms set two-part tariffs
Network i therefore charges:
Fi = Fixed fee (subscriber line charge)
Ti = Total revenue
Qi = Consumption of on-net calls
^Qi = Consumption of of-net calls
Nonlinear pricing
In a competition with nonlinear tariffs, if the access charge is small (a close to C0) or the networks are poor substitues, then:
(i) There exists a unique equilibrium (dynamic and stable)
(ii) The marginal prices are the perceived marginal costs Pi = c and ^Pi = (1+m)c
1. Unique equilibrium
Market shares are:
This defines a stable shared market equilibrium (from the point of view of consumer behavior) if which holds if either is small enough.
2. Marginal prices
By fixing the market shares, a network i maximizes over its marginal prices Pi and ^Pi. Marginal-cost pricing is obtained, thus:
Pi = C
^Pi = (1 + m)c
Blockaded entry
A sufficient condition for the full-coverage incumbent to enjoy the full monopoly profit is that the entrant's coverage not exceed:
μ0 = Minimum coverage that makes network 1 to enjoy full
monopoly profit
v(pm) = Consumer’s variable net surplus with monopoly price
v(pR) = Consumer’s variable net surplus with Ramsey price
Conclusions
Two key points of departure from the non-discriminatory pricing analysis:
• Raising costs through high access prices, leads to more intense competition for market share. Not necessarily to higher prices and profitability
• Price discrimination by a dominant operator should be opposed by potential entrants and customers. Entrants should be protected.