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Nonprolif Efforts Successful _________________________________________________________________ 3

Treaties Have Worked for Nonprolif _________________________________________________________________3

Nonprolif efforts also help combat WMD terrorism ____________________________________________________3

Nonprolif is Good________________________________________________________________________________3

Nuclear Nonprolif Treaty Successful _________________________________________________________________5

Nuclear Rollback Has Happened _____________________________________________________________ 6

WHY Nuclear Rollback Happens ____________________________________________________________________6

Countries Who Could Have had Weapons Abandoned Them _____________________________________________6

Countries Have Willingly Given Up Their Nuclear Weapons Programs ______________________________________6

Nonprolif Negotiations Have Been Successful _________________________________________________________8

Nunn Lugar Treaty is Good__________________________________________________________________ 9

MANY Missiles/Weapons Dismantled Because of Nunn-Lugar ____________________________________________9

Effects of Nuclear Weapon Use _____________________________________________________________ 10

One Nuclear Weapon = 1334 9/11s ________________________________________________________________10

EnvironmentNuclear Winter ____________________________________________________________________10

How to evaluate terrorism aspect__________________________________________________________________11

Are our expenditures cost-effective? _______________________________________________________________11

Death of Terrorist Leaders is Harmful _______________________________________________________________12

Bin Ladens Death Makes Him a Martyr _____________________________________________________________12

Death of Bin Laden Wont Kill Al-Qaeda _____________________________________________________________12

Leaderless Jihad is More Dangerous ________________________________________________________________13

Costs of War on Terror High ________________________________________________________________ 15

HUGE Monetary Amount ________________________________________________________________________15

Significant Cost in Money and in Lives ______________________________________________________________15

Very Expensive: Costs Consistently Outpace Predictions ________________________________________________15

War on Terror Not Efficient ________________________________________________________________ 16

US Focused on Countries Unrelated to Terrorism _____________________________________________________16

Al-Qaeda survived BECAUSE US Focused on Irrelevant Groups ___________________________________________16

War on Terror Makes It Harder _____________________________________________________________ 17

Diffusion Makes It Difficult to Track Al-Qaeda ________________________________________________________17

Increases Anti-American Sentiment ________________________________________________________________17

Anti-American Sentiment Helps Terrorist Groups _____________________________________________________18

War on Terror Hurts US Economy ___________________________________________________________ 19

Counterterrorism Negatively Affects the US Economy _________________________________________________19


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Homeland Security Spending NotCost-Effective ________________________________________________ 20

US Would Have to Protect >4 terror attacks/day for it to be worth it. _____________________________________20

Counterterrorism Doesnt Promote Democracy ________________________________________________ 21

War on Terror Undermines Democracy _____________________________________________________________21


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Nonprolif Efforts Successful

Treaties Have Worked for Nonprolif

Rauf 99.[Tariq Rauf. Director, International Organizations & Nonproliferation Project, Monterey Institute of International Studies @Middlebury College. Monterey Institute of International Studies, Middlebury College. October 8, 1999. Accessed July 18, 2011.

Curbing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/ionp/iaea.htm]

Despite these inauspicious auguries, as we wind down the clock to the end of this century, we can chalk up a number of important

non-proliferation successes (in addition to two failures and mounting new challenges). These successes include: the Non-

Proliferation Treaty and its associated regime comprising safeguards and export controls; nuclear weapons

renunciation by several countries; nuclear-weapon-free zones; a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; checking "loose

nukes" in the former Soviet Union; partial moratoria in production of weapon-usable fissile material; and

dealing (albeit with limited success) with two instances of material breaches of the NPT. These successes have

laid the basis for a solid foundation in checking the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, but the edifice of

global nuclear non-proliferation norms still requires robust maintenance and further work.

Nonprolif efforts also help combat WMD terrorism

ISAB 07.[International Security Advisory Board.Federal Advisory Committee, Department of State. February 5, 2007. Accessed July20, 2011. Building International Coalitions to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism.

www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=100032&coll=limited]International support for U.S. counter-terrorism policies and activities has been excellent in somecases, but weak in others. An example of where

the US worked effectively with the internationalcommunity to address the WMD terrorism threat was the unanimous passage of UNSCR

1540that requires states to enact legislation that criminalizes proliferation activities. The ProliferationSecurity

Initiative (PSI), which focuses on interdiction of WMD-related shipments, is anotherexample of success. Over

70 nations participate in PSI activities and dozens of interventionshave occurred,including one that led to

unraveling of the A.Q. Khan proliferation network andLibyas decision to give up WMD. Two other initiatives that havegarnered significantinternational participation are the Container Security Initiative and the Megaports Initiative. Afourth initiative, the Global

Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, has gotten off to a good startand holds great promise. Begun in 2006,

this group already has 13 partner nations and is movingforward on exercises and other cooperation.

Nonprolif is Good

IAEA.[IAEA Secretariat.International Atomic Energy Association.Accessed July 20, 2011. Multilateral Approaches to the NuclearFuel Cycle: Preliminary Views of the IAEA Secretariat for the Proposed Study.

http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/fuelcycle/preliminaryviews.pdf]

With the continuing spread of nuclear technology, controlling access to nuclear materials,equipment and

information that may be relevant for the development of a nuclear-weaponprogramme has grown increasingly

difficult. Throughout the past five decades, concernsand questions have been raised regarding the adequacy of international

safeguards to detect,and thereby deter, the misuse of nationally controlled nuclear fuel cycle facilities forproscribed

military purposes. This has been compounded by the fact that national controlsover access to nuclear

technology appear to be lacking. Moreover, some events have underscoredthe possibility that a State engaged in

declared enrichment and reprocessing activitiesfor peaceful purposes, could potentially misuse the nuclear

materials, technologyor know-how for the development of a nuclear-weapon programme. One possibility inthisregard could be the renunciation by a State of its nuclear non-proliferation commitmentsundertaken pursuant to the Treaty on

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) treaties, or other legally binding non-

proliferationagreements. Today, several non-nuclear- weapon States (NNWS) party to comprehensivesafeguards agreements (CSA)

operate enrichment or reprocessing plants in connectionwith peaceful nuclear development for energy production, and the future


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energy demands,as well as energy security concerns, could further stimulate countries to possess neededtechnologies. In this

connection, concerns have also been expressed that the possible abrogationof treaty commitments can have a negative impact on

the transferof civilian nucleartechnology to NNWS and thereby also impede the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.


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Nuclear Nonprolif Treaty Successful

Godsberg 2008.[Alicia Godsberg. Research Associate, Federation of Concerned Scientists. Federation of Concerned Scientists.2008. Accessed July 18, 2011. Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT]. http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/]

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also referred to as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), obligates

the five acknowledged nuclear-weapon states (the United States, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, France,and China) not to transfer nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices, or their technology to any non-

nuclear-weapon state. Nuclear weapon States Parties are also obligated, under Article VI, to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effectivemeasures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete

disarmament under strict and effective international control." Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties undertake not to acquire or

produce nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. They are required also to accept safeguards to detect

diversions of nuclear materials from peaceful activities, such as power generation, to the production of nuclear

weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This must be done in accordance with an individual safeguards

agreement, concluded between each non-nuclear-weapon State Party and the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA). Under these agreements, all nuclear materials in peaceful civil facilities under the jurisdiction of the state must be declared tothe IAEA, whose inspectors have routine access to the facilities for periodic monitoring and inspections. If information from routine inspections is

not sufficient to fulfill its responsibilities, the IAEA may consult with the state regarding special inspections within or outside declared facilities.TheTreaty was opened for signature on 01 July 1968, and signed on that date by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and 59 other

countries. The Treaty entered into force with the deposit of US ratification on 05 March 1970.

The NPT is the most widely accepted arms control agreement; only Israel, India, and Pakistan have never been signatories of

the Treaty, and North Korea withdrew from the Treaty in 2003.In accordance with the terms of the NPT, on May 11, 1995 more

than 170 countries attended the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) in New York . Threedecisions and one resolution emanated from NPTREC. First, the NPT was extended for an indefinite duration and without conditions. Second,

Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament were worked out to guide the parties to the treaty in the next phase of its

implementation. Third, an enhanced review process was established for future review conferences. Finally, a resolution endorsed the establishment

of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.There have been no confirmed instances of official states

party transfers of nuclear weapon technology or unsafeguarded nuclear materials to any non-nuclear-weapon

states party. However, some non-nuclear-weapon states, such as Iraq, were able to obtain sensitive technology and/or equipment from privateparties in states that are signatories to the NPT. South Africa conducted an independent nuclear weapons production program prior to joining the

NPT, however, it dismantled all of its nuclear weapons before signing the Treaty. In 1994, the United States and North Korea signed an "Agreed

Framework" bringing North Korea into full compliance with its non-proliferation obligations under the NPT. In 2003 North Korea announced it was

withdrawing from the Treaty effective immediately, and on October 9, 2006 became the eighth country to explode a nuclear device.



The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) signed on 1 July 1968 represents the world's single

most important multilateral nuclear arms control agreement, with the largest membership, and it remains the

most successful exemplar of arms control. Today, with 182 non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) and five NPT

nuclear-weapon states (NWS), the Treaty's membership stands at 187. The number of states with large nucleararsenals has been arrested at five. Today, only four states remain non-parties: Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan-however, the latter three

possesses nuclear weapons.The NPT remains the only global legally binding instrument committing the NWS to

disarm, and its indefinite extension in 1995 strengthened the global nuclear non-proliferation norm. Responding tothe most significant challenge to the NPT to date, i.e. the Indian nuclear detonations of May 1998, Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy stressed

that: "The nuclear non-proliferation regime is based on, and anchored in, international law and norms, as well as incorporated into international

mechanisms. The NPT is fundamental, but the broader regime is a complex system of multilateral and bilateral agreements, arrangements and

mechanisms intended to promote and achieve a world without nuclear weapons, sooner rather than later. This was valid during the Cold War and

remains valid today. At the same time, the regime is intended to provide a framework to enable the world to make effective use of nuclear

capability for peaceful purposes."


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Nuclear Rollback Has Happened

WHY Nuclear Rollback Happens

Katz 07. [Jonathan I. Katz. Professor of Physics, Washington University in St. Louis.Washington University in St. Louis. November 12,2007. Accessed July 19, 2011.Lessons Learned From Nonproliferation Successes and Failures.

http://wuphys.wustl.edu/~katz/ctbt.pdf]

Three causes of non-proliferation success can be identied. The rst is military or paramilitary action or

intrusive inspection following and backed by the threat of military action, which was successful against

Germany, Iraq, Libya and Syria. The second cause of success were democratic revolutions that led to reconciliation between formeradversaries (Argentina and Brazil) or with theworld community, and removed the strategic necessity for nuclear proliferation (South Africa). In

addition, democratic polities are less willing to paythe substantial economic and political costs of developing nuclear weapons,unless compelled by

strategic necessity as in the cases of the US and GreatBritain during the Second World War.The third cause of success was a

combination of democratic revolution and a security guarantee from a dominant power that removed the

strategic necessity for an independent nuclear force. This was the case for Taiwan, which came under the

American nuclear umbrella. Sweden and Switzerland, technically advanced democracies, abandonedembryonic nuclear weapons programs long before the test moratorium, partly because the costs were

forbidding and the strategic need lacking, in analogy to South Koreas and Taiwans situation and decision.

Countries Who Could Have had Weapons Abandoned Them

Cirincione 05.[Joseph Cirincione. Former Director for Non-Proliferation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. DeadlyArsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats. 2005. Accessed July 19, 2011. Part 6: States That Have Given Up Their Nuclear

Weapons. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/chapters/19-BelarusKazakUkraine.pdf]

One of the most striking and underappreciated facts of the nuclear age is the sheer number of countries that

either once possessed nuclear weapons or have pursued nuclear capabilities and that now have renounced

those ambitions to become established non-nuclear-weapon states. Before the negotiation on the NPT, more

than a dozen states, including Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Egypt, pursued their nuclear weapon options.It

was their decisions not to acquire nuclear weapons that, in part, helped establish the international non-

proliferation norm. While circumstances differ, in each of those cases where countries gave up their nuclear

weaponsincluding states of the former Soviet Union and South Africathe international non-proliferation

regime was an essential component in locking in their non-nuclear status. Without the international norm

against the possession of nuclear weapons and established legal mechanisms, denuclearizing those states may

well have proved impossible.In addition, among the states that have abandoned their nuclear ambitionsare Argentina andBrazil, where the establishment of a civilian government wasa critical factor in the elimination of weapon efforts. The international

non-proliferation regime drew attention to the efforts of those countries to acquirenuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and

slowed their pace, buying timefor democratic change to take place in those states.

Countries Have Willingly Given Up Their Nuclear Weapons Programs



While perhaps South Africa has been the most notable country to have rolled back its nuclear weapon

program, there are other examples of countries reversing themselves at various stages in their quest for a

nuclear weapon capability. Canada was the first state that had the capability to make nuclear arms to renounce

such a capability. Others under different circumstances have included among others, Australia, Argentina,

Belarus, Brazil, Italy, Kazakhstan, Sweden, Switzerland, and Ukraine.The three successor states to the USSR-Brazil, Kazakhstan,and Ukraine constitute special cases in terms of non-proliferation. None of the three former Soviet republics had indigenous nuclear weapon


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programs, rather they were accidental inheritors of the legacy of a collapsed nuclear superpower and did not have either the resources or

capabilities necessary to maintain a status as nuclear-weapon states. In the event, they agreed to the removal of former Soviet nuclear weapons on

their territory by a combination of financial inducements, security guarantees, and political considerations. Countries such as Australia

and Sweden never seriously took their interest in nuclear weapons to the point of developing nuclear

explosives, and chose to remain non-nuclear weapon states Argentina and Brazil agreed to renounce

aspirations of making weapons and agreed to set up a bilateral nuclear inspection system in addition to fully

implementing the Tlatelolco Treaty. Neither country achieved a significant capability to produce weapon-

usable fissile material or that of manufacturing nuclear weapons. Both Argentina and Brazil acceded to the

NPT. The Argentine-Brazilian model could have some precedents or lessons for other regions in terms of achieving a rapprochement and engagingin transparency in nuclear matters.

Pifer 11.[Steven Pifer. Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe, Brookings Institution. BrookingsInstiution. May 31, 2011. Accessed July 18, 2011. Ukraines Nuclear Nonproliferation Example.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0531_nuclear_ukraine_pifer.aspx]

Ukraines decision to give up nuclear arms came as the result of a trilateral negotiation with the United States

and Russia. Kyiv agreed in 1994 to give up nuclear weapons and accede to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as

a non-nuclear weapons state in return for security assurances, compensation for the value of the highly-

enriched uranium in the warheads, and assistance in dismantling the strategic missiles, bombers and nuclear

infrastructure on its territory. (For a more complete account of the trilateral negotiation, see The Trilateral Process: The United States,

Ukraine, Russia and Nuclear Weapons.)No less important for the Ukrainian government was the opening of doors to the

West that followed. The United States and Ukraine in September 1996 established a strategic partnership and established a senior-levelbilateral commission chaired by Vice President Gore and President Kuchma. In 1997, NATO and Ukraine agreed to a distinctive partnership and

created the NATO-Ukraine Council as a permanent consultative venue. Ukraines decision reminds us thatdespite the North Korean and Iranian

nuclear challengesthere have been victories in the fight to curb the growth of the nuclear weapons club. In addition to Ukraine:

Belarus and Kazakhstan had strategic nuclear systems on their territory following the Soviet Unions collapse in

1991, and each agreed to give them up and accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states.

In 1989-90, South Africa dismantled six nuclear weapons as well as a partially assembled seventh and acceded

to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state in 1991.

Earlier, Australia, South Korea and Taiwan each pursued but later abandoned nuclear weapons programs and

acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. (For a more detailed account of those countries decisions,

see The U.S. Policy of Extended Deterrence in East Asia: History, Current Views and Implications.)

Today, nine countries have nuclear weapons. But that is better than a world with 16 nuclear weapons states.

Rauf 99.[Tariq Rauf. Director, International Organizations & Nonproliferation Project, Monterey Institute of International Studies @

Middlebury College. Monterey Institute of International Studies, Middlebury College. October 8, 1999. Accessed July 18, 2011.Curbing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/ionp/iaea.htm]

South Africa's decision to destroy its six nuclear explosive devices as well as its weapons infrastructure and

then to join the NPT as a NNWS was unprecedented, but reflected changed political dynamics and threat

perceptions. The biggest challenge was not that of dismantling South Africa's weapon capability but that of the

IAEA subsequently verifying the completeness and correctness of Pretoria's declaration of inventory of nuclear

material and facilities. This was the first time that the IAEA had "looked back" at a state's nuclear activities and had to verify operatingrecords, declared outputs, completeness of dismantling and destruction, and the reassignment of dual-use equipment to peaceful or non-military

work. In this task, the IAEA's tasks were facilitated by full and extensive disclosures by South Africa and cooperative verification. The experience

gained by the IAEA will be useful in verifying other similar renunciations of weapon capabilities-were they to take place-in the NWS or the three

non-NPT weapon states.


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Nonprolif Negotiations Have Been Successful

Cirincione 05.[Joseph Cirincione. Former Director for Non-Proliferation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. DeadlyArsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats. 2005. Accessed July 19, 2011. Part 6: States That Have Given Up Their Nuclear

Weapons. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/chapters/19-BelarusKazakUkraine.pdf]

The existence of large numbers of advance nuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems in several non-Russian republics after the demise of the Soviet Union threatened the entire international non-proliferation

regime. Moreover,it could have led to the birth of four nuclear-weapon states after the Soviet collapse, instead

of just one. Such a situation would have irrevocably changed theinternational security landscape and increased dramatically the role played

bynuclear weapons in global affairs.The successful denuclearization of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine is

anunparalleled non-proliferation and security success story, and one that illustrates the value of international

norms against the spread of nuclear weaponsand other weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the

successful implementation of non-proliferation efforts in these three countries could not have

beenaccomplished without the provision of adequate financial, political, and technical resources to implement

the removal and elimination of these weapons.


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Nunn Lugar Treaty is Good

MANY Missiles/Weapons Dismantled Because of Nunn-Lugar


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Effects of Nuclear Weapon Use

One Nuclear Weapon = 1334 9/11s

Allison 2007. [Graham Allison. Council on Foreign Relations.How Likely is a Nuclear Terrorist Attack On the UnitedStates?http://www.cfr.org/weapons-of-mass-destruction/likely-nuclear-terrorist-attack-united-states/p13097 ]

What about the motivation of terrorists that have attacked the American homeland? Al-Qaeda spokesman Suleiman Abu Gheith has

stated al-Qaedas objective: to kill 4 million Americans2 million of them childrenand to exile twice as

many and wound and cripple hundreds of thousands. As he explains, this is what justice requires to balance the scales forcasualties supposedly inflicted on Muslims by the United States and Israel. Michael Levi argues, correctly, that such a tally could be reached in a

series of smaller installments, and our national security would benefit from insights into how to prevent such events. But ask yourselfhow many

9/11s it would take to reach that goal. Answer: 1,334, or one nuclear weapon.

EnvironmentNuclear Winter

Robuck 09.[Alan Robuck. Professor of Climatology, Rutgers University.The Encyclopedia of Earth. January 6, 2009. Accessed July

18, 2011.http://www.eoearth.org/article/Nuclear_winter]

A nuclear explosion is like bringing a piece of the Sun to the Earth's surface for a fraction of a second. Like a

giant match, it causes cities and industrial areas to burn. Megacities have developed in India and Pakistan and

other developing countries, providing tremendous amounts of fuel for potential fires. The direct effects of the

nuclear weapons, blast, radioactivity, fires, and extensive pollution, would kill millions of people, but only

those near the targets. However, the fires would have another effect. The massive amounts of dark smoke

from the fires would be lofted into the upper troposphere, 10-15 kilometers (6-9 miles) above the Earth's surface, and then

absorption of sunlight would further heat the smoke, lifting it into the stratosphere, a layer where the smoke

would persist for years, with no rain to wash it out.

Robuck 09.[Alan Robuck. Professor of Climatology, Rutgers University.TIME Magazine. January 22, 2009. Accessed July 18, 2011.Regional Nuclear War and the Environment. http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1873164,00.html]

We looked at a scenario in whicheach country [India and Pakistan]used 50 Hiroshima-sized weapons, which they

are believed to have in their arsenals. That's enough firepower to kill around 20 million people on the ground.

We were surprised that the amount of smoke produced by these explosions would block out sunlight, cool the

planet, and produce climate change unprecedented in recorded human history.It has nothing to do with the radioactivity

of the explosions although that would be devastating to nearby populations. The explosions would set off massive fires, which

would produce plumes of black smoke. The sun would heat the smoke and lift it into the stratosphere that's

the layer above the troposphere, where we live where there is no rain to clear it out. It would be blown

across the globe and block the sun. The effect would not be a nuclear winter, but it would be colder than the

little ice age [in the 17th and 18th centuries] and the change would happen very rapidly over the course of

a few weeks.


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How to evaluate terrorism aspect

Are our expenditures cost-effective?

Mueller and Stewart.[John Mueller, Professor and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center forInternational Security Studies and Dept. of Political Science, The Ohio State University. Mark G. Stewart, Professor of Civil

Engineering, University of Newcastle, New South Wales, Australia. Presentation for the Annual Convention of the Midwest Political

Science Association. April 1, 2011. Accessed July 18, 2011. Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of

Homeland Security.

In seeking to evaluate the effectiveness of the massive increases in homeland security expenditures since the

terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, the common and urgent query has been are we

safer? This, however, is the wrong question. Of course we are saferthe posting of a single security guard

at one buildings entrance enhances safety, however microscopically. The correct question is are the gains in

security worth the funds expended? Or as this absolutely central question was posed shortly after 9/11 by risk analyst HowardKunreuther, "How much should we be willing to pay for a small reduction in probabilities that are already extremely low?"


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Death of Terrorist Leaders is Harmful

Bin Ladens Death Makes Him a Martyr

Husain 11.[Ed Husain.Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council for Foreign Relations. The Times of London. May 4, 2011.Accessed July 18, 2011."Bin Laden is More Dangerous Dead than Alive.http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/bin-laden-more-dangerous-

dead-than-alive/p24891]

Bin Laden is more valuable to al-Qaeda and global jihadism dead. He has spent the past decade in hiding, issuing the

occasional statement but increasingly fading from the Muslim imagination. When I visited Cairo last month, he was seen as

remote and irrelevant to the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood that I met. This week they respectfully referred to him as

Sheikh Osama a title reserved for respected clerics, which he was not. But in death, he is fast becoming an icon of a new

sort.Without doubt, the US was right to remove bin Laden, but it is wrong to think that his death will weaken al-Qaeda. Yes, a colossal

psychological blow has been dealt, but al-Qaeda is no longer a mere organisation, but a global brand, an idea, a

philosophy that now has its first Saudi martyr from the holy lands of Islam.Al-Qaeda can, arguably, become

stronger in years to come. After all, the killing of the Muslim Brotherhood's leader in Egypt in 1949 did not

weaken it. The hanging of Sayyid Qutb in 1956 produced a generation of jihadists. Bin Laden and his second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, were both Qutbists. More recently, in 2006 when Ahmed Yassin, Hamas'

founder and charismatic leader, was killed, Israelis thought that Hamas would be weakened. Today, it is

stronger than ever, and governs Gaza.

Reuters 11.[May 11, 2011. Guardian.Al-Qaeda Leader Warns in Eulogy to BinLadenhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/11/al-qaida-leader-warns-in-eulogy-to-bin-laden]

The leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has vowed to fight on after the killing of Osama bin Laden, saying: "What is coming is

greater and worse" in a statement posted on the internet."You have to fight one generation after the other, until your

life is ruined, your days are disturbed and you face disgrace. The fight between us and you was not led by

Osama alone," Nasser al-Wuhayshi, addressing al-Qaida's enemies, said."What is coming is greater and worse, and what you

will be facing is more intense and harmful," Wuhayshi added in a eulogy to Bin Laden posted on the militant Islamist As-Ansarwebsite.[Bin Laden said before his death to] "Tell the Americans that the ember of jihad is glowing stronger and brighter

than it was during the life of the sheikh."

Death of Bin Laden Wont Kill Al-Qaeda

Sanderson 11.[Thomas M. Sanderson. Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Transnational Threats Project, Center for Strategic andInternational Studies. Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and

Trade. May 24, 2011. Accessed July 18, 2011. Future of Al-Qaeda. http://csis.org/files/ts110524_Sanderson.pdf]

So what are al Qaedas prospects going forward? I believe the broader al Qaeda movement will survive the death of bin

Laden for several reasons. First, al Qaedas many affiliates are financially and operationally autonomous andtheir day-to-day activities will not be significantly altered by bin Ladens removal. Second, al Qaedas narrative

that Islam is under attack is embedded and continues to resonate, even if its violent strategy does not. Third,

existing conditions, such as the safe-haven in Pakistan and the chaos in Libya, offer lifelines for al-Qaeda. The

movement will change or even splinter, but al Qaeda will remain relevant for a host of reasons. The intractable

Israel-Palestine situation, Western influence and military forces in Muslim-majority countries, lethal partners

and a safe haven in nuclear-armed Pakistan, and a long list of underlying conditions can all facilitate

recruitment and operations. With so many unknowns, the US and its allies will have to maintain pressure on al Qaeda and its associated

movements for the foreseeable future. Pursuing policies based on the notion that Osama bin Ladens death signals the


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end for al Qaeda and its affiliated groups would a premature, unwise, and dangerous position to take at this

time.

Greenblatt 2011.[Alan Greenblatt. GOVERNING Correspondent.NPR. May 3, 2011. Without Bin Laden, How Dangerous is alQaeda? http://www.npr.org/2011/05/03/135953238/without-bin-laden-how-dangerous-is-al-qaida]Al-Qaida has metastasized over the past decade into a decentralized organization something almost akin to a franchise operation. With bin Laden

and his top deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, subject to intense manhunts, semi-independent affiliate groups in places like Iraq,

Somalia and Yemen have proved more deadly in recent years than al-Qaida central.

Leaderless Jihad is More Dangerous

Sinai 2008.[Joshua Sinai. Counterterrorism Analyst and Program Manager at the Analyst Corporation in McLean.Washington Post.February 19, 2008. Leaderless jihad.http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/feb/19/leaderless-jihad/ ]

Moreover, while al Qaeda Central is currently headquartered along the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier, its social movement has spread

far beyond the original organization. This makes it even more dangerous, according to Dr. Sageman, because

as a social movement it has dramatically grown beyond its organizational origins. The third wave, however, is the post-

2001 generation of radicals, who joined al Qaeda following the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq.Although it lost its safe haven and training facilities in Afghanistan, the al Qaeda-led social movement is even

more pervasive because of its global reach as well as its links to al Qaeda Central along the Pakistan-Afghan

border and on the Internet, where it has succeeded in radicalizing a new generation of activists, including

many among second-generation Muslim immigrants in Europe and North America. This was the cohort, for example,that carried out the suicide attacks against Londons transportation system in July 2005.


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Costs of War on Terror High

HUGE Monetary AmountBelasco 11. [Amy Belasco. Specialist in US Defense Policy and Budget, Congressional Research Service.Congressional ResearchService. March 29, 2011. Accessed July 18, 2011. The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since

9/11. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf]

With enactment of the sixth FY2011 Continuing Resolution through March 18, 2011, (H.J.Res. 48/P.L. 112-6) Congress

has approved a total of $1.283 trillion for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid,

embassy costs, and veterans health care for the three operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks: OperationEnduring Freedom (OEF) Afghanistan and other counter terror operations; Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), providing enhanced security at military

bases; and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This estimate assumes that the current CR level continues through the rest of the year and that agencies

allocate reductions proportionately.

SignificantCost in Money and in Lives

Gude et al. 11.[Ken Gude, Managing Director for National Security; Ken Sofer, Special Assistant; Aaron Gurley, Intern.Center forAmerican Progress. July 1, 2011. Accessed July 18, 2011. More Efficient Counterterrorism.

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/07/more_efficient_counterterrorism.html]

Counterinsurgency has proven costly and ineffective in battling terrorists. A new study finds that the wars in

Iraq and Afghanistan will ultimately cost between $3.2 trillion and $4 trillion at a time when Congress is looking to slash

vital domestic programs. Worse, the human costs of the wars exceed 6,000 U.S. soldiers killed and 40,000 wounded

both physically and mentally. The number of civilians killed in Iraq and Afghanistan as a result of the war is,

by very conservative estimates, over 132,000. These expensive endeavors actually played into Osama bin

Ladens strategy of bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy. In contrast, the mission that killed bin Laden

was undertaken by a mere two dozen soldiers at a tiny fraction of the price.

Very Expensive: Costs ConsistentlyOutpace Predictions

Teslik 2008.[Lee Hudson Teslik.Commodities Analyst and Senior Editor at Roubini Global Economics.Council on ForeignRelations.Iran, Afghanistan, and the U.S. Economy.http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/iraq-afghanistan-us-economy/p15404]

Following 9/11, the United States launched new military endeavors on a number of fronts, including in Iraq. Estimates for the total costs of these

efforts remain sharply politicized. Costs have consistently outpaced government predictions. In September 2002, White Houseeconomic adviser Lawrence B. Lindsey estimated the cost of invading Iraq could amount to between $100 billion and $200 billion. Mitch Daniels,

who at the time headed the White House budget office, called Lindseys estimates very, very high (MSNBC) and said the war would cost $50

billion to $60 billion; shortly thereafter, Lindsey left the White House. In January 2004, a report from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)

estimated the total costs of Iraqs reconstruction would land between $50 billion and $100 billion. But in October 2007, the CBO said in a

new report that the United States had already spent $368 billion on its military operations in Iraq, $45 billion

more in related services (veterans care, diplomatic services, training), and nearly $200 billion on top of that in

Afghanistan. The CBO now estimates the costs of the Iraq war, projected out through 2017, might top $1

trillion, plus an extra $705 billion in interest payments, and says the total cost of Iraq and Afghanistan

combined could reach $2.4 trillion.


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DJHS Debate

War on Terror Not Efficient

US Focused on Countries Unrelated to Terrorism

Van Evera 07. [Stephen Van Evera. Professor of Political Science, MIT.Middle East Policy Council.Summer 2007. Acessed July 21,2011. The War on Terror: Forgotten Lessons FromWWII. http://web.mit.edu/ssp/people/vanevera/War%20on%20Terror%20-

%20Middle%20East%20Policy%20Updated.pdf]

In contrast, the Bush administration has not put top priority on defeating Americas most dangerous current enemy, al-Qaeda. Instead, it

focused only briefly on al-Qaeda and then diverted itself toward other projects. The administration launched

the war on terror in October 2001 by invading Afghanistan and ousting the Taliban regime, which had

sheltered alQaeda. This was clearly the right move. But soon the administration took a left turn into Iraq to

oust Saddam Hussein, although Saddam was not involved in the 9/11 attack, was not cooperating with al-

Qaeda in other ways, and was otherwise contained. The administration also pursued hostile policies toward

Iran and Syria, talking of ousting both regimes, in another left turn away from combating al-Qaeda. Iran and Syriahave nasty rulers, but they are not in league with al-Qaeda. Conflict with all three states Iraq, Iran and Syria is a diversion from fighting al-

Qaeda, the main threat.

Al-Qaeda survived BECAUSE US Focused on Irrelevant Groups

Van Evera 07. [Stephen Van Evera. Professor of Political Science, MIT.Middle East Policy Council.Summer 2007. Acessed July 21,2011. The War on Terror: Forgotten Lessons FromWWII. http://web.mit.edu/ssp/people/vanevera/War%20on%20Terror%20-

%20Middle%20East%20Policy%20Updated.pdf]One Bush administration official, thenDeputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, even argued soon after the 9/11 attack that the United States

should respond by attacking Iraq instead of Afghanistan. This would have left alQaeda free to launch more attacks on the United States from its safe

haven in Afghanistan hardly a good result. The administration rejected Wolfowitzs suggestion, butit did transfer resources away from

Afghanistan and toward Iraq in early 2002, before it finished destroying the alQaeda leadership then hiding in

Afghanistan, and before it finished consolidating the new Afghan government. This allowed important al-

Qaeda elements to escape to Pakistan and fight another day. They have now reconstituted a dangerous al-Qaeda command in Pakistan. It also allowed the Taliban to survive and later recover strength in Afghanistan.

Today the Taliban poses a serious threat to the new Afghan government of Hamid Karzai.


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War on Terror Makes It Harder

Diffusion Makes It Difficult to Track Al-Qaeda

Nelson 11.[Rick Nelson. Director, Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program, and Senior Fellow, International SecurityProgram, Center for Strategic and International Studies.Center for Strategic and International Studies. February 2011. Accessed July

19, 2011. A Threat Transformed: Al Qaeda and Associated Movements in 2011.

http://csis.org/files/publication/110203_Nelson_AThreatTransformed_web.pdf]

The transformation of the al Qaeda threat into a broader movement has important implications for US and

international counterterrorism strategy. First, the diffusion of global Islamist terrorism has greatly complicated

the work of policymakers and national security practicioners. Al Qaeda core, while operationally diminished,

plays an active role within the syndicate of armed groups active in Pakistan and Afghanistan, often facilitating

attacks that it could not perpetrate alone. Emerging affiliates pose a range of threats; in less than a year, AQAPattempted two attacks on the US homeland, and Lashkar-e-Taiba, in carrying out the 2008 Mumbai bombings, provoked further military tensions

between Pakistan and India. Nonaffiliated cells and individuals, while mostly unsophisticated, represent a unique

threat; homegrown extremiststhat is, those who tend to be legal US or European residents or citizens thatpossess certain qualities, including legal status and language and cultural skillscould enable domestic attacks

Sandler and Enders 06.[Todd Sandler and Walter Enders.Professors at the University of Alabama and the University of SouthernCalifornia. International Studies Quarterly. June 9, 2006. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00406.x/full]We are particularly interested in investigating transnational terrorism before and after 9/11, insofar as this type of terrorism poses the greatest

concern for the global community.At an earlier time, we would have said that it presented the greatest security challenge to developed countries,

but with security upgrades in the United States and some other rich countries,transnational terrorism is a potential exigency for all countries

owingto attack transference.The dispersed al-Qaida network of affiliated groups heightens the interest in

transnational terrorism.Actions by countries to implement defensive countermeasures are anticipated to influence thedistribution oftransnational terrorist attacks across countries.Hence, our focus is solely on thisform of terrorism.

Increases Anti-American SentimentVan Evera 05. [Stephen Van Evera. Professor of Political Science, MIT.Audits of the Conventional Wisdom, MIT Center forInternational Studies. April 2005. Accessed July 21, 2011. Why US National Security Requires Mideast Peace.

web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit_5_05_VanEvera.pdf]

Arab/Islamic hostility toward American policy translates into enmity for the U.S. as a whole. A March 2004 Pew

ResearchCenter poll of four Muslim countries found unfavorable views ofthe U.S. outnumbering favorable

views by 61 to 21 percent inPakistan, 63 percent to 30 percent in Turkey, 68 to 27 percent inMorocco, and a

remarkable 93 percent to5 percent in Jordan. A ZogbyInternational study taken three monthslater found even deeperhostility towardthe United States in six Arab states: thosewith unfavorable views of the U.S. outnumbered those with favorable views

by69 percent to 20 percent in Lebanon, 73percent to 14 percent in the UAE, 88percent to 11 percent in Morocco, 78 percent to 15

percent in Jordan, 94 percentto 4 percent in Saudi Arabia, and 98 percent to 2 percent in Egypt. The hostilitythese polls reveal

is especially ominous asit extends even to traditional U.S. allieslike Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and

Pakistan.Finally, Arabs and Muslims explain theirenmity toward the United States as stemming largely from

U.S. policies towardthe Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Pace President Bush, they do nothate us for our freedoms. They hate

our policies. Zogby again,May 2004: 76 percent in Jordan, 78 percent in the UAE, 79 percent in Lebanon, 81

percent in Saudi Arabia, 84 percent inMorocco, and 95 percent in Egypt declared that American policytoward

the Arab-Israeli dispute was quite important orextremely important in shaping their attitude toward the

U.S. Similar majorities indicated that their views of the U.S. areshaped more by American policy than American

values, bymajorities ranging from 76:16 in Jordan up to 90:1 in Egypt.


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Husain 11. [Ed Husain. Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council for Foreign Relations. The Times of London. May 4, 2011.Accessed July 18, 2011."Bin Laden is More Dangerous Dead than Alive. http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/bin-laden-more-dangerous-

dead-than-alive/p24891]In stark contrast to American jubilation on the airwaves and in the streets, Arab media coverage was cautious, sober and muted. Where

broadcasters on Fox News exchanged high-fives on air, al-Jazeera was solemn. But beneath the attempted objectivity was something more

disturbing. Its Arabic language website has become a place to pay homage to bin Laden. Young people from across the MiddleEast left comments condemning the West, accusing the US of lies and lauding bin Laden as a martyr (if he was

indeed killed, as many queried) and suggesting that a thousand bin Ladens were born today.

Anti-American Sentiment Helps Terrorist Groups

Van Evera 05. [Stephen Van Evera. Professor of Political Science, MIT.Audits of the Conventional Wisdom, MIT Center forInternational Studies. April 2005. Accessed July 21, 2011. Why US National Security Requires Mideast Peace.

web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit_5_05_VanEvera.pdf]

Anti-Americanism in the Arab/Islamic world matters because it fosters a friendly environment where al-Qaeda

can flourish, raising new recruits and money while evading the American dragnet. An Arab/Muslim public

friendly to the U.S. would act as its eyes and ears, helping it glean the intelligence that is vital to successful

counter-terror. But publics hostile to the U.S. sit on their hands, letting the terrorists hide in their midst while

the U.S. searches blindly. Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other alQaeda leaders run free in northwest Pakistan today

because thepeople of that region are militantly anti-America and pro-alQaeda. These dangerous fish could swim no more in

Maos metaphorical sea if the public willed otherwiseas it would if it viewed the U.S. with more approval.The

Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not the sole cause ofArab/Muslim popular hostility toward the U.S. The war in Iraq and the impact

of virulent anti-American propaganda from alQaeda and other Islamist movements also stoke the fire.Windingdown the Iraqi occupation would help, as might stronger public diplomacy to counter al-Qaedas propaganda. But U.S.-

Mideastrelations will not heal fully while irritation from the IsraeliPalestinian conflict persists. In the meantime Al-Qaeda will benefit

accordingly.Al-Qaedas leaders will not be weaned from their campaign of terror by an Israeli-Palestinian peace

settlement. Terror is their way of life, their reason for being. They cannot be conciliated; they must be

destroyed. To achieve this their support base must be stripped away, and that can only come by engineering alarge improvement in Arab/Muslim public attitudes toward the U.S. This will leave the extremists friendless

and exposed, soon to face capture or death. The IsraeliPalestinian conflict should be ended not toappease their anger but tobring theirdemise.


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DJHS Debate

War on Terror Hurts US Economy

Counterterrorism Negatively Affects the US Economy

Teslik 2008.[Lee Hudson Teslik.Commodities Analyst and Senior Editor at Roubini Global Economics.Council on ForeignRelations.Iran, Afghanistan, and the U.S. Economy.http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/iraq-afghanistan-us-economy/p15404]The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan touch the U.S. economy in a variety of ways beyond the impact of direct spending. First, Iraq has a lot of oil,

and swings in the countrys production levels have an effect on global oil pricing. By some estimates, Iraq has the second-highest amount of oil in the world, behind Saudi Arabia. The Wall Street Journal reported in December 2007 that improving security conditions had

allowed Iraqi oil production to return to pre-war levels. But the former Iraqi oil minister said in an interview with the Journal

that maintaining current production levels would be a challenge. Whether Iraq is able to sustainor possibly increaseits oilproduction, the fighting of the Iraq war ground production nearly to a halt in 2003. In the years since, production gains have proved choppy, as

noted in a recent Backgrounder on Iraqs infrastructure.Geopolitical turmoil can also affect oil prices. Crude prices have

spiked since the inception of the Iraq war, though experts say turmoil in Iraq is only one of several factors influencing this increase.Still, Iraqi production currently accounts for 3 percent of global oil production, and thus turmoil in Iraq can have a substantial effect on oil prices.

This, in turn, bears heavily on the U.S. economy. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, a former director of the CBO who currently serves as a campaign adviser to

Republican presidential candidate Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), notes the impact in a 2006 Financial Times op-ed, saying it could have significant

business cycle effects by bringing higher oil prices and lower U.S. growth rates.

McKibben and Stoekel 2003.[Warwick J McKibben and Andrew Stoekel.Analysts. March 7, 2003. Brookings Institute. TheEconomic Costs of a War in Iraq.http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/mckibbin/20030307.pdf]

Iraqs oil reserves are the second largest in the world behind Saudi Arabias.Butproduction is well down and now

represents around 2 million barrels per day (2 to 2.5 percent of world oil use). The Gulf War in 1991 saw prices rise by 90 per cent,only to fallagain (Figure 1). Again, any number of scenariosare possible including sabotage of oilfields by Iraqi forces or destruction of oil-producing

capacity in neighboring countries.One set of estimates putsoil prices at US$75 per barrel under a best case scenarioand

US$161 per barrel for a worst case scenario. The oil price shock for the twoscenarios for a short and long war are benchmarked tothe price of oil from an averagelevel in the baseline (or business as usual) projection of US$25 per barrel (figure 2).In both scenarios, there is an

initial 90 percent rise in the US$ price of oil. The differenceis that, under the short war scenario, the price spike quickly dissipates and the worldoilprice falls to a level below baseline once the war is over. That is realistic since a warpremium has already been built into oil prices for some time

and the United Statesgovernment has been purchasing oil to add to its strategic petroleum reserve.


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DJHS Debate

Homeland Security Spending Not Cost-Effective

US Would Have to Protect >4 terror attacks/day for it to be worth it.

Mueller and Stewart.[John Mueller, Professor and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center forInternational Security Studies and Dept. of Political Science, The Ohio State University. Mark G. Stewart, Professor of Civil

Engineering, University of Newcastle, New South Wales, Australia. Presentation for the Annual Convention of the Midwest Political

Science Association. April 1, 2011. Accessed July 18, 2011. Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of

Homeland Security.

The cumulative increase in expenditures on US domestic homeland security over the decade since 9/11

exceeds one trillion dollars.It is clearly time to examine these massive expenditures applying risk assessment and cost-benefit approachesthat have been standard for decades. Thus far, officials do not seem to have done so and have engaged in various forms of probability neglect by

focusing on worst case scenarios; adding, rather than multiplying, the probabilities; assessing relative, rather than absolute, risk; and inflating

terrorist capacities and the importance of potential terrorist targets. We find thatenhanced expenditures have been excessive: to

be deemed cost-effective in analyses that substantially bias the consideration toward the opposite conclusion,

they would have to deter, prevent, foil, or protect against 1,667 otherwise successful Times-Square type

attacks per year, or more than four per day. Although there are emotional and political pressures on the terrorism issue, this does notrelieve politicians and bureaucrats of the fundamental responsibility of informing the public of the limited risk that terrorism presents and of

seeking to expend funds wisely. Moreover, political concerns may be over-wrought: restrained reaction has often proved to be entirely acceptable

politically.

Benefit = (probability of a successful attack) (losses sustained in the successful attack) (reduction in risk)


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Counterterrorism Doesnt Promote Democracy

War on Terror Undermines Democracy

Telhami 2003.[Shibley Telhami. Nonresident Senior Fellow at theSaban Center for Middle East Policy.Brookings Institute. March16, 2003. Arab Countries: Chances For Democracy Could Decrease.

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2003/0316middleeast_telhami.aspx]

If history is a guide, the bet is probably safe, despite the information revolution. If they win the bet, the outcome will be clear: more

repression and less democracy. Maybe the biggest irony of all is that pursuing a very unpopular policy in the

region while demanding support from Arab governments will probably undermine one of our stated goals of

going to war: spreading democracy.

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