NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY AND ‘FIRST PHILOSOPHY’

@ The Metaphilosophy Foundation and Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 19Y5. Publishcd by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 lJF, and 238 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA MET APHTLOSOPHY Vol. 26, No. 1&2, January/April 1995 00261068

NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY AND ‘FIRST PHILOSOPHY’

HARVEY STEGEL

Many contemporary epistemologists and philosophers of science - Churchland (1979), Churchland (.1987), Fuller (1989), Giere (1988, 1989), Goldman (1986), Ketchum (1991), Kitcher (1992), Kornblith (1994), Laudan (l987,1990,199Oa), Roth (1983,1987) and many others - advocate the naturalization of those domains.’ They argue that epistemology must itself be regarded as a branch of natural science, and that the traditional construals of epistemology and philosophy of science as a priori disciplines capable of passing judgment on the normative merits of science from some non-scientific vantage point is but an anachronistic hangover from a philosophically more naive time. According to at least many of these epistemologists, Quine’s arguments for naturalized epistemology are sufficient to undermine any non- naturalist, ‘first philosophy’ conception of epistemology; given the strength of those arguments, they conclude, naturalism is the only viable option for epistemology.

But those arguments are more problematic than is commonly recognized. In what follows, I shall consider the arguments for the naturalizing of epistemology (and philosophy of science) put forward by Quine and by his commentator and defender, Roger F. Gibson. Gibson’s many writings on Quine have as one of their central goals the establishment of Quine as a systematic philosopher, at the center of whose system is a thoroughgoing and deep commitment to naturalism. (Gibson 1988, p. xvi). Gibson’s discussion of Quinean naturalism identifies that doctrine as the basis of the rest of Quine’s work; presents, analyzes and supplements Quine’s arguments for naturalism; and defends naturalism from a variety of criticisms and critics. While I cannot here conduct a full scale evaluation of Gibson’s defense of Quinean naturalism and the philosophical system built (according to Gibson) upon it, I will try in what follows to highlight important

’ In what follows I do not distinguish sharply between epistemology and philosophy of science, but rather treat them as overlapping domains: philosophy of scicnce is largely concerned, on this construal, with epistemological issues concerning the epistemic status of scientific theories, hypotheses, and inferences. This is in keeping with at least a lot of work in Contemporary philosophy of science, including Quine’s and Gibson’s, and allows me to discuss criticisms of ‘first philosophy’ and defenses of naturalism as they arise in either domain. The projects of naturalizing the two domains, if not reducible one to the other, are at least importantly continuous - or so I am assuming, at any rate, here.

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difficulties with that defense. In particular, I will argue that Gibson’s defense of (Quine’s defense of) naturalism, in terms of Quine’s rejection of traditional epistemology - also characterized by Quine and Gibson as ‘transcendental philosophy’ and ‘first philosophy’ - is in several respects problematic; and that their arguments against first philosophy and for naturalism do not succeed. If I am right, then the popular project of naturalizing epistemologjl is itself more problematic than is commonly supposed by many contemporary philosophers.2

1. No ‘First Philosophy’

Gibson argues - and offers numerous citations of Quine to support the point (Gibson 1988, pp. 23-24) - that for Quine, ‘naturalism’ amounts to the rejection of ‘first philosophy’, and to the acceptance of what Gibson calls ‘scientism’. On Gibson’s view, this rejection and acceptance constitute “the sense of Quine’s naturalism” (Gibson 1988, pp. 23-24, emphasis in original); they constitute the meaning of ‘naturalism’. Below we shall consider Gibson’s and Quine’s arguments for these doctrines. First, let us ask: what is Quine rejecting, in his rejection of ‘first philosophy’?

In rejecting first philosophy, Quine rejects the very idea of a philosophical justification of science from some vantage point outside of science. Gibson’s many citations of Quine’s writings make it clear that Quine does indeed reject any such a priori philosophical justification of science, to be carried out from some ground firmer than science. Rather, on Quine’s view, any justificatory questions concerning science must be answered from within science (hence ‘scientism’). To reject first philosophy is just to reject any appeal to some allegedly firmer, non- scientific ground. There simply is, on Quine’s view, “no such cosmic exile” that would afford the philosopher “a vantage point outside the conceptual scheme that he takes in charge” (Quine 1960, p. 275).

For Gibson, as for Quine, the rejection of first philosophy is tantamount to the rejection of ‘transcendentalism’: one cannot transcend our conceptual scheme, whether of science or of common sense, in order to query the epistemic standing of science from some ontologically neutral perspective. There simply is no such ‘cosmic exile’. For Quine,

I should note that in criticizing Qiiine’s and Gibson’s arguments I am not criticizing naturalized epistemology per se; many contemporary naturalists (e.g. Goldman 1986, Kornblith 1994) explicitly claim to have gone beyond or superceded Quine’s original discussions. The merits of alternative conceptions of naturalized epistemology depend, of course, on the details of those conceptions. In this paper I am only criticizing the arguments put forward by Quine and Gibson. Nevertheless, to the extent that Quine’s work - and in particular, his arguments against first philosophy - is the point from which current efforts to naturalize epistemology proceed, my criticisms are relevant to those current efforts.

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according to Gibson, “epistemology is contained in ontology”; “epistemology does not exist in an ontological vacuum” (Gibson 1988, p. 63; cf. pp. 45-48, 59-64; Gibson 1989, p. 565; Gibson 1986, p. 152). According to Gibson, moreover, such transcendentalism is to be rejected because it is incoherent (Gibson 1988, p. 59). We shall consider Gibson’s argument for this claim below.

Quine’s rejection of first philosophy, and of transcendental epistemology, is equated by Gibson with Quine’s rejection of traditional epistemology: “As we have seen, Quine abandons traditional epistemology (first philosophy) . . .” (Gibson 1988, p. 43). According to Gibson,

Three central assumptions of [traditional] epistemology are: that if there is an external world, then its existence need% proving; that any such proof would be viciously circular should it depend essentially on any existential claim about the external world; and that knowledge, by its very nature, must be indubitable.

Quine rejects all three of these central assumptions of traditional epistemology. (Gibson 1988, p. 46)3

So: on Gibson’s construal, Quinean naturalism equates ‘first philosophy’, ‘transcendental epistemology’, and ‘traditional epistemology’, and rejects all three. I shall next inquire into the legitimacy of Gibson’s and Quine’s characterizations of these equated notions, and the wisdom of this tripartite equation; after that I shall examine Gibson’s and Quine’s arguments for their rejection, and for the concomitent embrace of naturalism.

2. Troubles over ‘Traditionalism’, ‘Transcendentalism’, and ‘First

The first worry, just noted, is Gibson’s characterization of ‘traditional epistemology’. On Gibson’s view, traditional epistemology includes the assumption that knowledge is, by definition, indubitable, incorrigible, or certain. Given this characterization, virtually no working epistemologist is a traditionalist, since virtually every working epistemologist rejects the view that knowledge entails certainty, and accepts that knowledge is fallible.4 On this point Gibson and Quine are criticizing a

Gibson elsewhere (1988, p. 83) again attributes to the traditional epistemologist thrcc presuppositions which Quine denies, but here two of the presuppositions are altcrcd: knowledge is presupposed to be incorrigible rather than indubitable; and the assumption concerning vicious circularity is replaced by the presupposition that “truth is correspondence”.

I hasten to acknowledge that there are contcmporary epistemologists who do hold this view, notably Klein (1981, 1983). Still, it is clear that it is a minority position in contemporary epistemology, even among non-naturalists, and is in no way a conceptual requirement of non-naturalism; consequently, Quine’s and Gibson’s saddling the traditional epistemologist with it seems straightforwardly to be a mischaracterization.

Philosophy’


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straw position. Gibson likewise mischaracterizes the traditional epistemologist as presupposing that “truth is correspondence” (Gibson 1988, p. 83), since inquiry concerning the nature of truth is typically regarded by traditionalists as taking place within traditional epistemology - a coherence theorist (for example) can be as much a traditionalist as a correspondence theorist. The other two assumptions or presuppositions Gibson attributes to the traditionalist - that if belief in the external world is to be rational, then that belief must be supported by relevant evidence of argument; and that any such argument would be viciously circular if it depended essentially on any existential claim about the external world (i.e. if it presupposed its concl~s ion)~ - are views correctly attributed to the traditionalist, but not, I think, as assumptions or presuppositions. The traditionalist does not assume these views, but is led to them by her conceptions of rationality, evidence, justified belief, and proper inference. Whether or not these conceptions are ultimately defensible, it is a mistake to regard them as (mere) assumptions or presuppositions. So Gibson’s way of characterizing traditional epistemology, and the dispute between it and naturalized epistemology, is neither fair nor helpful in understanding or resolving that dispute.

This conclusion is reinforced by noting that Gibson’s characterization of traditionalism says nothing about what traditionalists take to be its heart: namely, the centrality of issues concerning the nature of epistemic justification, criteria of justification and the warranting (or ‘ratification’) of those criteria, and the possibility of knowledge - including scientific knowledge - given those criteria. Traditional epistemology can be characterized in various ways; but the differences between alternative characterizations are sufficiently small that traditional epistemology, however characterized, can be easily distinguished from non-traditional, naturalized epistemology. For example: Kim (1988, p. 381) characterizes traditional epistemology as concerned to “identify the criteria by which we ought to regulate acceptance and rejection of beliefs, . . . to determine what we may be said to know according to those criteria”, and to “com[e] to terms with the skeptical challenge to the possibility of knowledge”. Haack (1989, p. 111) characterizes it as consisting in the project of explicating epistemic concepts, and in particular in “spelling out criteria of epistemic justification, warrant or ‘good evidence’ ”, and in the project of ‘ratifying’ those criteria of justification, i.e. “showing the proposed

’ This way of putting the point at issue between the traditionalist and the naturalist concerning circularity is not the standard way of putting it: the issue is usually (and I think more appropriately) framed in terms of the (i1)legitimacy of appealing to the results of scientific inquiry in order to establish the epistemic credentials of (the results of) that selfsame inquiry. See Siege1 (1995) for further discussion of naturalistic circularity.


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criteria of justification to be good, adequate or satisfactory”. Stroud (1981, 1984) characterizes traditional epistemology largely in terms of responding to the skeptical challenge to the very possibility of knowledge. While these and other authors emphasize different aspects of traditional epistemology, all are agreed that it involves identifying and spelling out criteria of epistemic justification; justifying (or ‘ratifying’) those criteria; determining, by reference to those criteria, what we know; and responding to the skeptical challenge to the possibility of our knowing anything at all. The QuineIGibson characterization of traditional epistemology is significantly different from those offered by its practitioners. In characterizing traditional epistemology as they do, then, Quine and Gibson in fact mischaracterize it; it is then unclear what the significance is of Quine’s rejection of ‘traditional epistemology’ so characterized .6

Gibson’s (and Quine’s) characterization of ‘transcendental’ epistemology is also problematic, for it trades on two fundamental equivocations. It is of course true that one cannot transcend all conceptual schemes at once, and see things from some scheme-neutral perspective. But one can transcend any particular scheme, although in doing so one must perforce adopt another, however tentatively (Siege1 1987, chapter 2). Philosophers generally - traditionalists and naturalists alike - reject the first sort of transcendentalism; Quine (along with virtually all other philosophers), in allowing the piecemeal alteration of one’s ongoing conceptual scheme, explicitly embraces the second sort. So it is unclear that the naturalist’s rejection of transcendentalism involves any sort of non-traditionalism: on the first reading of transcendentalism, both naturalists and traditionalists reject it; on the second reading, both accept it. Recognizing this equivocation has the effect of undermining this famous, but unsuccessful, argument for naturalism.

A further equivocation, considered and assessed by Haack (1993), is the one between transcending our current total scientific theory and transcending our entire conceptual scheme. Of course we cannot transcend or give up the latter, all at once - as Quine puts it, one “cannot revise the fundamental conceptual scheme of science and common sense without having some conceptual scheme, whether the same or another no less in need of philosophical scrutiny, in which to work” (Quine 1960, p. 276, emphasis added). All theorizing, Quine and non-Quineans are agreed, must be carried out from within some conceptual scheme or other. But this idea, on which all are agreed, is completely in keeping with the quite different idea that from within our

This point has been made by many others, who argue that Chine’s rejection of traditional epistemology in “Epistemology Naturalized” amounts - despite appearances and rhetorical flourishes - to little more than the rejection of certainty and of Carnap’s reductionist program, both of which can be readily rejected by traditionalists.


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overall conceptual scheme we can entertain questions about our science as a whole, including questions about the epistemic status of that science. In this sense we can ‘transcend’, and ask non-question-begging questions about the epistemic status of, our total scientific theory of the world. Quine of course frequently suggests that we cannot, as does Gibson, but the suggestion is undermined by the equivocation noted. There is no cosmic exile from our entire conceptual scheme of science, common sense, and the rest of our beliefs; but Quine has given us no reason to think that we cannot, from within our overall conceptual scheme, ask fundamental questions about that portion of it we recognize as science - including questions concerning the epistemic status of that portion as a whole - as judged from the remainin portions of the

A further difficulty with Gibson’s and Quine’s depiction of ‘first philosophy’, which infects their discussions of ‘traditional’ and

overall scheme not at the moment put into question. F

Here I come close to the view Haack (1993) defends as ‘modest naturalism’. Gibson’s reply to Stroud - that Strouds skeptic “overreacts” because she fails to

appreciate the sense in which (for Quine) epistemology is contained in ontology (Gibson 1988, pp. 59-60), and so fails to see that “transcendental epistemology is incoherent” (p. 59) - also trades on the equivocations just noted. For the skeptic can call into question all scientific knowledge, without thereby abandoning her entire conceptual scheme; alternatively, she can call into question an entire scheme from the provisional perspective of another. Moreover, Gibson’s conclusions (a) that Stroud’s arguments against naturalism arc flawed “insofar as they both overlook the fact that for Quine epistemology is contained in ontology, the ontology of natural science” and (b) that “[tJranscendental skeptical doubts, like transcendental epistemology, are incoherent” (Gibson 1988, p. 64) seem not only to trade on these equivocations but to beg the question against Stroud as well.

Finally, I should note that Gibson’s rebuttal of Stroud’s charge - that naturalized epistemology fails to engage traditional issues concerning evidence and probative force because it trades in causal rather than evidential processes and relations - fails. Gibson argues (1988, pp. 6 5 4 6 ) that “nerve hits” can “be evidence”, and that we can see this as soon as we come to grips with Quine’s “genetic approach toward resolving the epistemological problem”. According to that approach, nerve hits play a role in explaining the relation between stimulus conditions and observation sentences - we learn the meanings of such sentences, and assent to them, when we are in the appropriate sorts of conditions, and so are stimulated, by nerve hits, to assent - and since these conditions are “just the conditions under which the sentence is true”, the nerve hits count as evidence for the sentence. Here Gibson makes clear that for him, as for Quine, the evidence relation is just a sort of causal relation. Later, he makes the point even more clearly: “A better interpretation of Quine’s intent would be the following: Forget justification in terms prior to science and look for causal mechanisms. In other words, Quine’s point about justification is not that science needs no justification but that it needs no justification in terms prior to science” (p. 75, second emphasis added). Here evidence just is causal: if science tells us that A causes B, then A i s evidence for B. Rather than rebutting Stroud’s criticism, this seems rather to grant it: Quine’s “reconstrual” of the epistemological problem changes it; his “genetic approach” transforms the study of the evidence relation into the identification of certain relations as causal. This is, I would have thought, exactly Strouds point. It is a point well made by Kim (1988) as well. (It seems to be Rorty’s point as well. Cf. Gibson 1988, pp. 74-75.)


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‘transcendental’ philosophy as well, is the insistence that first philosophy must not only be independent of (or autonomous from), but firmer than, science. The first or traditional philosopher wants some perspective independent of science from which to evaluate science and to consider questions concerning its epistemic status, because she wants to avoid the looming problem with circularity. But Gibson and Quine take the traditionalist to be holding out for standards which are both independent of and ‘firmer’ or better warranted than scientific standards and scientific knowledge. This is unfair to the traditionalist, who seeks independent standards in order to avoid a seemingly vicious circularity problem, but who need not hold that epistemological theory/knowledge is itself ‘firmer’ or better warranted than scientific theory/knowledge. The traditionalist may well hold that epistemological theory and judgments are less firm, and more tenuous, than at least some scientific theory and judgments; this may reflect nothing more than the traditionalist’s realization that epistemology is difficult and its results therefore less firm, and less warranted, than some, indeed many, scientific results. This is completely compatible with her holding, nonetheless, that the standards governing scientific judgment must be independent of science, on pain of circularity. So it is independence, but not superior firmness, to which the traditionalist is committed. Gibson’s and Quine’s’ insistence on holding the traditionalist to the view that epistemological knowledge or theory is or must be firmer, or better warranted, than (all) scientific knowledge or theory, again mischaracterizes the traditionalist’s position - and in doing so, again creates an opponent of straw.’

All of this suggests that Quine’s and Gibson’s rejection of ‘first’, ‘transcendental’ and ‘traditional’ philosophy is not as clear, or as compelling, as one might hope. ‘Traditional epistemology’ is mis- characterized in several respects, and it is unclear what exactly is being rejected by its rejection. The rejection of ‘transcendentalism’ is vitiated

’ In addition to the citations above, see, e.g., Quine (IYbO), p. 235; (1Y74), p. 34; Gibson (1989), p. 564; (1987), p. 62. Other naturalists have erred in this same way, e.g. Roth (1983), p. 487; (1987), pp. 7, 29; McCauley (1Y88). p. 150. ’ One might object that according to traditionalism as just depicted, one might rest or justify a firm belief o n the basis of a less firm one, whereas typically we want our inferences to run from the more firm to thc less - for othcrwisc, why should we think that the more firm gains in support from the less firm? This commonsensical objection falters, I think, with the realization that even the most firm belief or hypothesis typically rcsts on some prior belief that is philosophically contentious. For example, my very firm and well justified belief that Smith is angry or in pain in some sense rests on some philosophically contentious solution to the problem of other minds, which solution is less firm than the less contentious belicfs about Smith which rest upon it. Examples of firm beliefs which rest, in the relevant sense, on philosophically contentious, less firm beliefs, could be manufactured indefiniteiy. The point here is simply that the traditionalist needn’t (and shouldn’t) insist that philosophically contentious beliefs, on which less contentious scientific beliefs in some sense ‘rest’, are somehow ‘firmer’ than those of sciencc.

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by two crucial equivocations. First: on a strong reading of ‘transcendentalism’, traditionalists reject it as emphatically as Quine does; on a weaker reading, both Quine and his traditionalist opponents accept it. Second: Gibson and Quine equivocate between the transcending of our science, and the transcending of our entire conceptual scheme. While they are right to reject the second sort of transcendence, it is not at all clear that they are right to reject the first. ‘First philosophy’ is also equivocally and uncharitably characterized; when more carefully depicted, it is unclear why Quine’s or Gibson’s rejection of it is better justified than the sort of moderate first philosophy, which eschews certainty but which allows for the independence (of epistemology from science) sought by the traditionalist, proposed elsewhere.” Finally, Quine and Gibson too quickly equate ‘first’, ‘traditional’, and ‘transcendental’ philosophy/epistemology . These positions are not only distinct, they are uncarefully characterized by Quine and Gibson. Full understanding of the issues dividing Quinean naturalists from their traditionalist opponents requires a more careful account of what exactly is being rejected by the rejection of ‘first philosophy’. Once care is taken to articulate these several views more clearly, it is far from clear that their rejection is called for, as Quine and Gibson too glibly suggest. The rejection of ‘first philosophy’ is of course routinely conjoined by Quine and Gibson with the acceptance of naturalized epistemology. What, specifically, are the arguments advanced for naturalism?

3. Arguments for Naturalizing Epistemology

It must be made clear at the outset that Gibson cannot argue for naturalism on the basis of the rejection of first (traditional, transcendental) philosophy. For, as noted near the start of this discussion, Gibson regards ‘no first philosophy’ as the ‘‘sense” of naturalism. Naturalism surely cannot be established on the basis of its own meaning. So what are the arguments for naturalism? Gibson lists two: holism, and scientism.

According to Gibson, Quine’s “holism argument serves to refute traditional epistemology (first philosophy) . . .” (Gibson 1988, p. 24). How does holism refute traditional epistemology? Holism accomplishes this feat by inducing “despair of being able to define theoretical terms generally in terms of phenomena, even by contextual definition” (Quine 1981, p. 72, cited at Gibson 1988, p. 24). Here Quine, who identifies traditional epistemology as the program committed to such reductionistic definition, notes that holism undermines the prospects of this program, and concludes that the program - i.e. traditional epistemology - must be rejected.

’” I trust that these remarks will suffice as a reply to Gibson’s criticism of my earlier (1984) paper, offered at Gibson (1988), pp. 6749.


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The shabbiness of this argument is stark - even leaving aside questions about the justification of holism - for its putative force stems from identifying traditional epistemology with that reductionistic program. As we have seen, though, this is a quite indefensible characterization of traditional epistemology, most of whose practitioners happily join Quine in rejecting that program, but who nevertheless continue to worry about the issues long at the heart of traditional epistemology: issues concerning the nature of epistemic justification, criteria of justification and the justification of those criteria, and the possibility of knowledge given those criteria. The reductionistic program Quine rejects is one possible approach to these issues; though historically important, it is not the only possible, or the dominant, or even (today) an important actual approach. If Quine’s and Gibson’s characterization of traditional epistemology is deficient, as argued above, then the argument against traditionalism by way of holism fails - not because of any defect with holism, but because holism is used against the wrong, or at least an inadequately characterized, target. Leaving all issues concerning holism aside, traditional epistemology easily survives this criticism. Here is one place where Quine’s and Gibson’s mischaracterization of traditional epistemology comes home to roost. Their superficial characterization of traditional epistemology (Gibson 1988, pp. 25-28; Quine 1969, pp. 69-75) strongly suggests that they understand by that phrase little more than orthodox Cartesian rationalism and Carnapian reductionism. Once the traditionalist project is more carefully and accurately specified, however, it becomes clear both that holism is inadequate to upend that project, and that a traditionalist might well embrace Quinean holism and yet still pursue traditionalist issues concerning justification. ’ ’

The second argument for naturalism discussed by Gibson is based on ‘scientism’ - the view that epistemology can make free use of natural science and is in fact to be pursued within the framework of natural science (Gibson 1988, p. 29) - which is itself argued for on the basis of ‘unregenerate realism’, i.e. “the robust state of mind of the natural scientist who has never felt any qualms beyond the negotiable uncertainties internal to science” (Quine 1981, p. 72, cited at Gibson 1988, p. 24).’’ This realism is defended in two ways: “First, [Quine] argues that skepticism about science presupposes science. Second, he

” An example of such a traditionalist might bc Bonjour (1Y85). Moreover, Gibson argues in a circle when he argues that ‘radical empiricism’, a traditionalist movement, fails because “there is no successful first philosophy” (1988, p. 27), that this failure contributes to the case for holism, and that holism in turn establishes the failure of first philosophy

’’ The relation between scientism and unregenerate realism is unclear in Gibson’s discussion in these pages: at some points (e.g. 1988, p. 24) Gibson suggests that the latter supports the former; at other points (e.g. p. 31) he treats them as equivalent.

(1988, pp. 27-28).


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argues that science needs no justification beyond measuring up to the demands of observation and the hypothetico-deductive method” (Gibson 1988, p. 29).

Gibson goes to some lengths to establish the first point (1988, pp. 29- 31). Nevertheless, his discussion fails. Even if skepticism about science presupposes science, it does not follow that a non-question-begging defense of science can make free use of that same science. The fact - if it is a fact - that skepticism arises from within or presupposes science, does not in the least establish that the naturalist, in answering skeptical questions, can freely appeal to the results of scientific inquiry in answering those questions. Quine allows that the skeptic “is quite within his rights in assuming science in order to refute science; this, if carried out, would be a straightforward argument by reductio ad absurdum” (Quine 1975, p . 68). But as Stroud (1984, pp. 224-229) compellingly argues, Quine’s ceding this point undermines any force he might think accrues to his insistence that “sceptical doubts are scientific doubts” (Quine 1975, p. 68). For if skepticism concerning science arises from within science, it is nevertheless clear that, once arisen, it cannot be defeated by the deliverances of the very science it calls into question. As Stroud puts the point:

Suppose we ask, as Descartes does, whether we know anything about the world around us, and how any such knowledge is possible. And suppose we ask this question and find an answer to it difficult because of certain things we take at the outset to be true about the physical world and about the processes of perception which give us the only access we have to it. If we then reasoned as Descartes reasons and arrived by reductio ad absurdurn at the conclusion that we know nothing about the physical world, and we found ourselves dissatisfied with that conclusion, clearly we could not go blithely on to satisfy ourselves and explain how knowledge is nevertheless possible by appealing to those very beliefs about the physical world that we have just consigned to the realm of what is not known. By our own arguments, despite their scientific origin, we would find ourselves precluded from using as independently reliable any part of what we had previously accepted as knowledge of the world around us. The scientific origin of our original question or doubts would therefore do nothing to show that the answer to our question or the resolution of our doubts can be found in an empirical study of human knowledge as an observable phenomenon in the physical world. (Stroud 1984, p. 229; see also Stroud 1981, pp. 84-85)

Even if Quine is right that “sceptical doubts are scientific doubts”, it hardly follows from this alleged fact about the origins of skepticism that it can be acceptably or usefully responded to by appealing to science. For once the skeptic calls the deliverances of science into question, then, even if her skepticism springs from within science, it will not be resolved on the basis of further scientific pronouncements. For her


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skepticism calls all such pronouncements into question. The origin of her skepticism in science, even if true, is irrelevant here, and is unable to resolve her skeptical doubts in an acceptable, non-viciously circular way. Gibson’s reply that “it only seems fair that the defenders of science should be availed of the same caliber of ammunition as their attacking skeptics” (1988, p. 51; see also p. 42) is but a red herring. “Fairness” has nothing to do with this debate. Whatever the skeptic presupposes by way of her reductio, it is nevertheless the case that the naturalist who presupposes science in order to justify science thereby argues in a circle as vicious as you like. Moreover, skepticism about science needn’t arise from within science, unless ‘science’ is defined so broadly that everything is within science (Haack 1993; Siege1 1984). Thus, this first point in support of unregenerate realism and scientism is arguably false; moreover, even if true, it is without force as an answer to the skeptical challenge. The “therefore” of Gibson’s summary - “The new epistemologist’s undertaking is enlightened because he recognizes that the skeptical challenge to science springs from within science itself and, therefore, that in coping with this challenge the epistemologist is free to use whatever scientific knowledge is available” (1988, p. 30, second emphasis added) - is thus misplaced: the conclusion does not follow, even if the premise is granted.

The second point is also uncompelling. It is true that, once naturalism (or scientism) is granted, the only source to which we can appeal in delineating the requirements of the epistemic justification of scientific knowledge will be those given by science itself: i.e., “the demands of observation and the hypothetico-deductive method”. But if naturalism is not granted or presupposed, then the traditionalist is surely within her rights to ask why we are justified in believing that the standards of justification presumed by or operative in natural science in fact afford justification to scientific claims. That is, she is within her rights to ask about the epistcmic status of science. If this is the question under consideration, it will not do to say, in effect, that scientific claims are justified because they meet the standards imposed by science on itself - for, understood naturalistically, those standards are themselves scientific, and the question asked calls them into question as much as it calls into question the justification of more straightforwardly scientific claims. In short, this defense of unregenerate realism, in terms of the requirements of scientific justification, fails, because it begs the question. It presupposes the very naturalism it seeks to establish.

Thus neither of these arguments for naturalism succeed. Holism fails to “refute” traditional philosophy, because that philosophy is mis- characterized by Gibson’s and Quine’s argument. Holism at most upends Carnapian reductionism. It does not touch most approaches to traditional questions about knowledge and justification. Scientism and unregenerate realism fail to “usher in” (Gibson 1988, p. 31) naturalism,

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both because the ‘skepticism presupposes science’ move fails to save the naturalistic defense of naturalism from vicious circularity (see below), and because naturalism is presupposed in the very arguments for those Quinean ushers. In general, those arguments of Gibson and Quine which we have been considering have one or both of two flaws: either they uncharitably characterize first/traditional/transcendental philosophy/epistemology, and in so doing address themselves not to their genuine traditional opponents, but rather to straw versions of those opponents and of traditionalism; or they beg the question by presupposing naturalism in their arguments for it.

4. Are the Arguments for Naturalism Naturalistic?

Some commentators on Quinean naturalism suggest that the doctrine is self-reflexively incoherent, or at least dangerously close to such incoherence, because the arguments for naturalism are themselves non- naturalistic (Roth 1980; Siege1 1984). Gibson is concerned to deflect this criticism with respect to one such argument, namely, the argument from holism. He argues that Quine’s holism is itself justified naturalistically, so that this argument avoids this self-reflexive criticism: “Quine bases his holism on observations about the actual practices of scientists, on his theory of language learning, and on a reductio of epistemological reductionism. In short, holism is an empirical hypothesis about sufficiently rich languages - languages rich enough for the purposes of science” (Gibson 1988, p. 51). Gibson offers a very plausible re- construction of Quine’s “naturalistic explanation of why holism occurs”, in terms of Quine’s account of language learning: as the complex language of scientific theory is mastered, the scientist relies on “analogic synthesis”, which affords the language/theory more power “as a means for anticipating experience”, but at the cost of introducing choice in revision of the languagehheory in the aftermath of failed prediction, such choice in revision being the concrete manifestation of holism (1988, p. 37, emphasis in original). As a naturalistic explanation of holism, I find Gibson’s discussion here compelling. That is, I think Gibson’s account of Quine’s “naturalistic explanation of why holism occurs” is both enlightening and essentially correct. But does it establish holism’s cognitive status as naturalistic? And if so, can holism so understood serve to justify naturalism? Here I think Gibson’s discussion is less successful.

First: is Gibson correct that Quine’s holism thesis is a naturalistic one, justified by observation of “the actual practice of scientists” and “explained scientifically within the science of linguistics”‘? (1988, pp. 36- 37). It is less than clear that he is. What observations of the actual practice of scientists are actually cited by Quine or Gibson? How good is this evidence? To what extent does it support the thesis? These latter


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two questions are exceedingly difficult to answer, because the answer to the question preceding them is, embarrassingly: none. There is no such evidence either presented or discussed in the entire Quine/Gibson corpus. Tn these salad days of thc empirical study of science, this is an embarrassing lacuna indeed. Further, the putative scientific explanation of holism, offered from within the science of linguistics, seems equally thin. For this explanation is offered from the vantage point of Quine’s speculative musings concerning how language might be learned. He himself acknowledges that his account of language learning is “imaginary” (Quine 1974, p. 123; cf. passim). Thus the naturalistic credentials of the holism thesis - both in terms of the observational evidence (not) cited, and in terms of its claim to spring from the “science of linguistics” - are thin indeed. And of course in many of Quine’s key writings on holism, the thesis is presented as a straightforwardly logical one, defended on seemingly apriori grounds (e.g., Quine 1953).’3 Thus it is far from clear either that holism is a naturalistic thesis in Quine’s hands, o r that, if so, i t can be justified as such by the arguments Gibson offers for it.

Consider next the question of the role of Quine’s holism thesis in the justification of naturalism. If Gibson is correct, that thesis is a naturalistic one, justified by observation of “the actual practice of scientists” and “explained scientifically within the science of linguistics”. If so, then what rol6 can holism, so understood, play in the justification of naturalism? It can, alas, play no such justificatory role, for it can itself be regarded as justified only if the justificatory status of naturalism is already established. Gibson’s view thus presupposes naturalism, uses it to justify holism, then uses holism to justify naturalism. This is as vicious a circle as can be. In short, if holism is taken, as Gibson takes it, as a naturalistic thesis, then it is powerless to justify naturalism. Gibson avoids thc sclf-refcrential incohcrcncc problem by rendering the holism thesis as naturalistic, but in doing so he denies it the ability to justify naturalism - and of course it is a key player, on Gibson’s view, in that justificatory effort. Thus this naturalistic reading of the holism thesis creates for the naturalist a rather more debilitating problem than the problem i t was to have solved.

Gibson’s attempt to construe the holism thesis as a naturalistic one, then, is problematic. So understood, the naturalistic evidence for the thesis is exceedingly thin. More seriously, if holism is properly understood as a naturalistic thesis, then it cannot serve to justify naturalism. And this is the primary purpose to be served by Gibson’s

l 3 Quine has recently clarified his commitment to what he now calls “moderate holism”, i.c. the thesis that “a scicntific scntcncc cannot in general be expected to imply empirical consequences by itself.” (Quine 1YY1, p. 272) This seems a rather dramatic trivialization of his holism; it is surely much weaker than the thesis of that name in his earlier writings, and the thesis which Gibson, in Quine’s name, defends.

@ The Mctaphilosophy Foundation and Blackwell Publishci-s Ltd. 1995.


naturalistic portrayal of the thesis. Finally, if holism is understood non- naturalistically, the old problem concerning self-referential incoherence remains. In the end, then, Gibson’s portrayal of the holism thesis as naturalistic is both problematic and unsuccessful in defending naturalism from traditionalist criticisms. l4 Moreover, the same difficulty will plague any other argument for naturalism: if the premises of any such argument are justified non-naturalistically, then self-referential incoherence threatens; if they are justified naturalistically, they will be unable to play any non-circular (or non-question-begging) role in the justification of naturalism.

5. Conclusion

I hope to have shown that Gibson’s and Quine’s arguments against ‘first philosophy’, and for the naturalizing of epistemology, are unpersuasive. Their characterizations of ‘first philosophy’, ‘traditional epistemology’ and ‘transcendental epistemology’ are sloppy and frequently mistaken. Their arguments for naturalism are uniformly uncompelling. To the extent that recent exhortations to naturalize epistemology depend upon those arguments, they too should be judged to be unpersuasive. I suggest, therefore, that advocates of naturalistic epistemology would do well to reconsider their rejection of traditional epistemology and their embrace of naturalism. l 5

Department of Philosophy University of Miami P. 0. Box 248054 Coral Gables, FL 33124-4670 USA

l4 I must acknowledge that my discussion of holism concentrates only on Quine’s and Gibson’s work on that subject; I have not referred to the important more recent works on holism in related areas of philosophy - philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and feminist epistemologylphilosophy of science - which criticize/defend holism in ways othcr than those canvassed here. In particular, the widely discussed work of Fodor and Lepore (1992) in the former areas, and Nelson (1990) in the latter, deserve explicit attention that 1 haven’t given here. But I should go on record and make cxplieit my view that this other work does not successfully challenge the arguments concerning holism and naturalism offered in the text.

A further argument for naturalism, suggested by this journal’s referee, is that “surrounding disciplines, upon which epistemologylphilosophy of science frequently draw and with which they at least in theory interact [in particular, philosophy of mind], are already strongly naturalized”; in view of this interaction, indeed dependence, it might be thought that epistemology too ought to he naturalized. The force of this argument would depend on a careful spelling out of the alleged intcraction/dependence; while I cannot argue the point here, 1 see no reason to think that naturalism in the philosophy of mind forces epistemology’s naturalization. Here as elsewhere I am grateful to the referee’s stimulating criticisms and suggestions.

l5 I am grateful to Edward Erwin, Roger F. Gibson, Susan Haack, Jaegwon Kim, E. R. Klein, and an anonymous referee for comments on an earlier draft.


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NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY AND ‘FIRST PHILOSOPHY’