Today’s Lecture Bertrand Russell Preliminary comments on Goldman and naturalized epistemology Alvin Goldman

Today’s Lecture

• Bertrand Russell

• Preliminary comments on Goldman and naturalized epistemology

• Alvin Goldman

The Problems of Philosophy: Appearance and Reality

• “When, in ordinary life, we speak of the colour of the table, we only mean the sort of colour which it will seem to have to a normal spectator from an ordinary point of view under usual conditions of light. But the other colours which appear under other conditions have just as good a right to be considered real; and therefore, to avoid favouritism, we are compelled to deny that, in itself, the table has any one particular colour” (FP, p.246).

The Problems of Philosophy: Appearance and Reality

• Note something that may be important in what Russell claims here. He suggests (though remember he has actually argued for this suggestion) that our ordinary claim to know the color of a table presupposes a set of standards covering the truth conditions for the claim. What’s more, these truth conditions contain specifications regarding the noetic health of the putative knower, perhaps her level of education or degree of socialization, her location and the conditions of viewing.

The Problems of Philosophy: The existence of matter

• Two things to note about Russell’s opening paragraph in the second chapter.

• (1) The philosophical problems surrounding our knowledge of the external world have a ripple effect. (i) If we do not have knowledge of objects in the external world, we do not have knowledge of other people’s bodies. (ii) If we do not have knowledge of other people’s bodies, we do not have knowledge of other people’s minds (FP, p.249).


• (2) Though we cannot prove that epistemological skepticism about the existence of an external world is false, we have no good reason to think it is true.

• In this view Russell again agrees with Locke (FP, p.249).

• Do be careful with this kind of argument. As it stands, this is neither a rebuttal nor refutation of skepticism. If Russell had gone as far as to suggest that epistemological skepticism, on these grounds, was false he would have committed the fallacy known as ‘Argument from ignorance’.


• Before Russell enters a brief discussion of Descartes’ method of doubt, he notes two further things: (1) at least some of our immediate experiences are “absolutely certain” (FP, p.249) and (2) and they concern our awareness of sense data.


• Russell also disputes Descartes’ claim to know with certainty that “I think” and “I think, therefore I am” (FP, p.249).

• Russell suggests that all that can be concluded from Descartes’ method of doubt is that, when having the sense data of the desk in front of me, ‘a green color is being seen’ (FP, p.250). This, argues Russell, only suggests that something is seeing green, and that is not enough to ground a claim about “that more or less permanent person whom we call ‘I’” (FP, p.250).

• Is he right? Has he helped himself to more than he should have?


• Russell provides the following considerations for believing that there are external material objects behind and causing our experiences.

• (1) Many people have similar sense data when finding themselves in “a given place at different times” (FP, p.250). When I buy a table from someone else and use it as furniture in my abode, I will have relevantly similar sense data to those enjoyed by that other person when she was in possession of the table in question. The best explanation of these regularities is the presence of a public neutral object lying behind our various experiences (FP, p.250).

• This argument fails because it is question-begging (FP, pp.250-51).


• (2) The hypothesis that external objects cause my inner experiences is a simpler hypothesis than any of the skeptical alternatives. A simpler hypothesis should be valued more than a less simple hypothesis. Therefore, I should value the hypothesis that external objects cause my inner experiences more than any of the skeptical alternatives (FP, p.251).


• The value of simple hypotheses, on which this point rests, arises from such considerations as Ockham’s Razor. Ockham’s Razor is the following: “[E]ntities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity” (Papineau, David. 2003. “Philosophy of Science”. In The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy. Second Edition. Edited by Nicholas Bunnin and E.P. Tsui-James. Malden (MA): Blackwell Publishers, Ltd, p.298).


• The thought is that when an explanation or metaphysics positing fewer entities than its competitors can do the same job (i.e. is as predictive, yields useful ways of understanding and thus manipulating phenomena, et cetera) as its competitors, it is to be preferred over the others.

• This kind of maxim or principle has been used to move beyond appeals to supernatural forces, occult forces or mysterious powers when explaining events in the world or ourselves.


• Why is the view that external objects cause my inner experiences a simpler hypothesis than the skeptic’s?

• Russell asks us to consider the interactions we may have with a cat. Imagine that we do not see this cat constantly throughout a day, but only encounter her from time to time.

• We note that the cat appears at various parts of the house. If the cat were sense data, we would have to suppose it comes into and out of being as our sense data of the cat appears and disappears. It is simpler (assumes a simpler set of regularities ‘governing’ the universe) to suppose she exists independently of our perceptions of her and simply roams the establishment (FP, p.251).


• It is difficult to explain the recurring hunger behavior of the cat if it ceases to exist between feedings (imagine the cat only shows up during the day for feeding and is otherwise out of sight). It is simpler to suppose that she exists during the rest of the day, though out of sight, and slowly gets hungry again over that period of time.

• What’s more, if the cat is mere sense data it cannot be hungry, as I can only sense my own hunger, thus what I thought of as her hunger behavior becomes inexplicable. It is thus simpler to suppose she exists independent of my sense data and is capable of having her own inner sensations (FP, p.251).


• Note Russell’s talk of what he calls “instinctive belief” on pages 251 and 252 of your FP.

• He seems to think that we find a class of beliefs already formed within our belief systems when we begin to (philosophically) reflect (FP, p.251). These beliefs appear to commit us to a mind-independent world (FP, p.252).

• We do not believe these beliefs as a result of any overt investigation, inquiry or argument into the discoverable truths about the world (FP, p.251).

• It is instinctive, Russell suggests, to believe in the external world (FP, p.252). Is he right, is such a belief ‘instinctive’? What is instinct? What he is after here?


• This notion of instinctive belief gives Russell a third argument against the skeptic.

• (3) We have instinctive beliefs that the external world exists (independent of our perceiving it). These beliefs persevere through our reflections concerning the distinction between appearance and reality. What’s more, if we are to have any knowledge at all, we must take at least some of these instinctive beliefs to be true. Since these beliefs do not lead to any substantial philosophical or practical difficulties and they “simplify and systematize our account of our experiences” (FP, p.252), we have no good reason to reject them (FP, pp.251-52).


• This is admittedly an odd argument. It’s also pretty weak, at least on the face of it.

• It seems to accord positive epistemic status to a set of beliefs merely on the grounds that (i) we can’t possess knowledge without assuming the truth of at least some of them and (ii) we have no good reason to reject them all as false.


• I suspect that we should understand these beliefs as in some sense basic. Russell seems to privilege these beliefs and set them apart from the more ‘run of the mill’ varieties. He goes as far as to claim that “[t]here can never be any reason for rejecting one instinctive belief except that it clashes with others” (FP, p.252). This seems to indicate that they are more foundational than other beliefs. This coupled with his claim that without these beliefs we wouldn’t have any knowledge (FP, p.252), gives us reasonably good textual evidence that Russell held them in this way.


• Russell suggests that philosophy should try and extract a harmonious set of instinctive beliefs, stripped of any additional irrelevancies (whatever that may mean). We are already disposed to treat such a set of beliefs as true. If we can arrive at a coherent set of such instinctive beliefs by eliminating those that generate incoherence and which can be removed without detrimental effect to the scope of the remaining beliefs within the set, this will, according to Russell, only enhances the presumption of their truth (FP, p.252).

The Problems of Philosophy: The Nature of Matter

• In the opening of the third chapter Russell attempts to present the scientific view of the world. Part of the purpose of this discussion is to fully appreciate the nature of the wedge between appearance and reality. The world outside of ourselves is one devoid of those qualities that are mind-dependent.

• He will also discuss what we can reasonably suppose to know about the external world based on the information derived from our senses.


• “Physical science ... has drifted into the view that all natural phenomena ought to be reduced to motions. ... The only properties which science assigns to it [i.e. matter] are position in space, and the power of motion according to the laws of motion” (FP, p.253).

• “It is not only colours and sounds and so on that are absent from the scientific world of matter, but also space as we get it through sight or touch” (FP, p.253).


• He makes the following point about light (this point can be applied to other constituents of our sensible world that we believe to exist mind-independently) (FP, p.253).

• We can divide up what we mean by light into that which can be intersubjectively known and that which can only be known privately. On the one hand we have waves of a certain frequency of motion in physical space, and on the other hand we have various color and brightness sensations (FP, p.253).


• That which can be intersubjectively known is that which can be fully communicated, discussed and investigated because such knowledge makes no reference to properties that are not third person observables.

• That which can only be known privately is so because it (i.e. this kind of knowledge) makes reference to properties that are only first person observables (FP, p.253).


• The privacy of our inner life (or the privacy of our thoughts and sensations) will come up again as an issue in the Philosophy of Mind section of the course. One of the problems such a view of our minds creates is that we can only have indirect (probabilistic) evidence of the existence of other minds (be they human or nonhuman minds).


• What we can surmise from our experience, though only after presuming that our sense data are in fact caused by mind-independent objects in a mind-independent world, are certain relations that must hold between objects in the world.

• The substantive properties we associate with these objects are too variable, within our own experience, to be plausibly regarded as inhering in external objects. There is no reason to think that any one of these properties is anything more than the product of objects impacting on our senses.


• However, these external objects must be in a physical space not unlike our ‘private spaces’ and in an order not unlike what we experience if they are the objective causes of our experience.

• Though we can have a knowledge of the relations that must hold between external objects based upon our experience, we can have no knowledge of what these objects are in themselves “so far at least as can be discovered by means of the senses” (FP, p.255).

Preliminary comments on Goldman and naturalized epistemology

• Alvin I. Goldman was born in 1938 and is still ‘among us’.

• I think that he may be in the Department of Philosophy at Rutgers University (he was up until recently in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Arizona).

• He primarily writes in both cognitive science and epistemology.

• I hesitate to say this, but I think it true to say that he is a foundationalist. He is also an externalist.


• The essay we see of Goldman’s can be understood within two contexts: The Gettier problems and naturalized epistemology.

• Edmund Gettier, who is also still ‘among us’, is Professor Emeritus at the University of Massachusetts.

• He wrote a 1963 paper entitled “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” in which he attacked the JTB analysis of knowledge (it first appeared in the philosophy journal Analysis Vol.23).

• He did this by devising thought experiments containing true beliefs that are justified, but which are, nevertheless, not known.


• The JTB analysis is attractive because it seems to cohere well with our considered judgments about knowledge.

• First, for something to be known it must be true. You cannot know falsehoods.

• Second, for something to be known it must be believed. Though there may be many truths about the universe to be discovered, they are only properly regarded as knowledge when they are believed by someone.


• Third, it can’t be that merely true beliefs are knowledge. You might form the belief that Jean Chrétien is Prime Minister of Canada on no other grounds than that this popped into your head. Your belief is true, but we’d hesitate to say you knew it.

• This seems to point to a much needed third condition of knowledge, something that requires that your true beliefs are not accidentally true. This is where justification comes in, on the traditional account.


• Gettier’s argument depends on what logicians call truth-functionality. The truth value of declarative compound sentences is a function of the simple sentences out of which they are constructed. This formal notion of truth, when coupled with certain rules of inference in deductive logic, makes it possible to think of justified true beliefs that are nevertheless not known.


• Luckily we don’t need to enter the ‘realm’ of truth-functionality to see the effect of this type of argument. Subsequent Gettier Problems (which were counter-examples to various suggested amendments to the traditional JTB analysis of knowledge, though not by Gettier) have the following form.

• You take a belief that is true.• You find a belief context in which it can be held to be both true

and justified (and whatever else is added to compensate for the [perceived] shortcomings of justification).

• The justification (and whatever else is added) is insufficient for knowledge.


• Here’s an example:• Imagine Jennifer is in a hospital ward after suffering an

unfortunate boating accident.• It’s June and various international tennis stars have

gathered to compete at Wimbledon.• Jennifer is a moderate fan of Wimbledon (she watches it

when she can and enjoys it).• Her partner manages to secure her a t.v. with a sports

network carrying the tennis matches, though only pre-recorded.


• Unbeknownst to Jennifer, one of days she is watching the tennis she watches two competitors play in the quarter finals of last year’s Wimbledon. It turns out that these same players have indeed played in this year’s quarter finals earlier in the day.

• Jennifer forms the belief that T won after seeing T win the match on t.v. It turns out that T has indeed won the match played earlier in the day. The grounds on which Jennifer has formed this belief would be sufficient under normal circumstances to grant that she knows T has won the Wimbledon quarter finals. It seems at the very least that her belief is justified, though not known.


• Some early attempts to defeat these Gettier problems involved trying to show that there must be a causal connection between S’s belief that p and the fact that p.

• Goldman himself suggested such an early causal theory of knowledge. You can read this in his essay “A Causal Theory of Knowledge” (see the 1967 Journal of Philosophy, 64, 12).

• This theory fails because it cannot accommodate mathematical knowledge, knowledge involving universal generalizations, and knowledge involving counter-factuals (statements that could have been true but in fact are not).


• This is the immediate background for the paper.

• There is another context for this paper and all of Goldman’s subsequent work in epistemology, and that is naturalized epistemology.

• Naturalized epistemology represents a significant methodological change in doing epistemology.


• Up to the emergence of naturalized epistemology, the epistemologist basically did her work at her desk. Formulating conditions or analyses of positive epistemic status and testing them against various counter-examples cooked up by the imagination.

• Naturalized epistemology represents a rejection of this method of doing epistemology. Instead Naturalized epistemologists look to actual epistemic practices and the relevant experts in these practices and proffers analyses of knowledge based on such inquiries.


• The natural sciences are thought to be necessary for this kind of inquiry. It is through there studies that we can learn about how we actually go about our lives forming and evaluating beliefs. We can also learn something of the cognitive limitations of our hardware and from this make informed judgments about what we are, and are not, able to do when evaluating or revising our beliefs.

• This will in turn inform our talk of epistemic responsibility or duty. After all, if we can’t do something it makes no sense to say we have a duty to do it. Conversely, if we have a duty to do something it must be possible for us to do it.


• Perhaps more importantly, naturalized epistemologists are concerned to better under the sense faculties that are only vaguely talked about by previous epistemologists in the Western canon. The presumption of philosophers, at least historically, has been that these faculties must be trustworthy. It has also been presumed that we can know what we have as sense faculties without leaving the proverbial armchair. Naturalized epistemologists have an interest in investigating both the trustworthiness, and nature, of our sense faculties.


• This means that naturalized epistemologists must make some assumptions before they begin their inquiries (e.g. assumptions about the nature of the world and our embodiment). This is a problematic feature of naturalized epistemology.

• In saying this, however, the assumptions being made are well within the parameters assumed by traditional epistemologists.

• Also, there is albeit limited room for revision of the initial assumptions as philosophers continue their investigations of the nature of our embodiment, our noetic equipment and the nature of the external world.


• Goldman’s work in naturalized epistemology has primarily focused on cognitive science and what we can learn about our cognitive processes from this science.

• Other naturalized epistemologists are now beginning to consider cognitive studies in such diverse areas as ethology, cognitive ethology, primatology, comparative psychology and studies in artificial intelligence.

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Today’s Lecture Bertrand Russell Preliminary comments on Goldman and naturalized epistemology Alvin Goldman