Nationalistic Policies on the Partition of India in 1947

1

Impact of Mohammad

Ali Jinnah’s

Nationalistic Policies

on the Partition of

India in 1947

Quaid-e-Azam, the Muslim League and Pakistan –

an insight into Jinnah’s nationalistic and political

policies and how it resulted in the creation of a

Muslim state in the Indian Subcontinent.

Word count: 4000

2

Contents

Introduction ................................................................................... 3

Ambassador of Unity .................................................................. 5

Partying of Ways ........................................................................... 8

Demand for Pakistan ............................................................... 11

The Cabinet Mission and Partition ...................................... 15

Conclusion .................................................................................... 18

Appendix ...................................................................................... 19

Bibliography ................................................................................ 20

3

Introduction

“Few individuals significantly alter the course of history. Fewer still modify the map of the

world. Hardly anyone can be credited with creating a nation-state. Mohammad Ali Jinnah did

all three.”1

When India was granted independence in the summer of 1947, it was a triumphant

moment for its 400 million2 inhabitants who had struggled to shake off the shackles of British

colonialism for decades. However, it lacked one element that the Indian leader, Mahatma

Gandhi, along with his loyal disciples, had aspired to achieve – the unity of India. In 1947, along

with the dominion of India, a new Muslim state was carved out of the Western and North-

Eastern wings of the Subcontinent – Pakistan or “Land of the Pure”3. While the Indian National

Congress advocated for the independence of India, the founding party of Pakistan was the

Muslim League. Though there were numerous political geniuses in the Congress, namely

Gandhi, Nehru, Patel and Azad, the leadership of the League predominately fell on the shoulders

of one man, Mohammad Ali Jinnah4. In accordance with the “Two-Nation Theory”5, Jinnah

argued that the 100 million Indian Muslims were a nation by definition and required a separate

homeland. Hence, the diplomatic skirmish for the acquisition of Pakistan ensued, resulting in the

Partition of India in 1947.

1

Wolpert, S. (1984). Jinnah of Pakistan (p.35). London: Oxford University Press.

2 Wolpert, S. (2006), Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India (p. 1). London: Oxford University Press.

3 G. Allana, Pakistan Movement Historical Documents (Karachi: Department of International Relations,

University of Karachi, nd [1969]), pp. 103-110. 4

Husain, M. (2019, December 21). Mohammed Ali Jinnah. Retrieved August 07, 2020, from

https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mohammed-Ali-Jinnah 5 The Two-Nation Theory is a thesis, first proposed by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817–1898), which suggests that Hindus and Muslims are

distinct nations by definition. They differ on social, economic, and religious grounds and therefore, can not co exist withou t discriminating

against each other. The Theory became the founding basis of a separate Muslim state – Pakistan. (SpringerLink)

4

Though he founded the first Muslim country in South Asia, Jinnah had been anything but

a Muslim nationalist during most of his political career. In fact, for his contributions in bridging

the gaps between Hindus and Muslims, Jinnah was granted the title of “The Best Ambassador of

Hindu Muslim Unity”6 by a Congress party mentor, Gopal Krishna Gokhale. It was not until

1940 that Jinnah addressed the League in its largest meeting at Lahore, calling for the creation of

a separate Muslim state7. Hence, the man who had devoted his early political years to

maintaining communal harmony between Hindus and Muslims set out on a mission to ensure a

separate Muslim state. It should be noted that the transition in Jinnah’s policies was not abrupt in

any sense of the word, nor was it the only factor that resulted in the Partition. The responsibility

for the Partition can also be attributed to the Congress as well as the circumstances that entangled

Jinnah. Therefore, the question ‘Was the Partition of India in 1947 due mainly to the

nationalistic policies of Mohammad Ali Jinnah?’ should be addressed to not only evaluate the

contributions of Jinnah to the Partition, but also to assess the role that his opponents and the

subsequent events played in the alteration of his ideologies.

To answer this question, primary sources like newspapers and accounts by the political

leaders of the Subcontinent, such as A.K. Azad8 and V.P. Menon9, were investigated to directly

observe the evolving situation within the Indian politics. Secondary sources, including reports

and biographies crafted by renowned researchers, such as Stanley Wolpert10 and Michael

Brecher11, were utilized to understand the contradicting viewpoints of historians on Jinnah, the


7 Lahore Resolution. (n.d.). Retrieved August 07, 2020,

from https://www.britannica.com/topic/Lahore-Resolution 8 Azad, A. K. (1960). India Wins Freedom: The Complete Version. New Delhi, India: Orient Blackswan Private Limited.

9 Menon, V. P. (1957). The Transfer of Power in India. London: Longman Green.

10 Wolpert, S. (1984). Jinnah of Pakistan. London: Oxford University Press.

11 Brecher, M. (1959). Nehru: A Political Biography.London: Oxford University Press.

5

role of his adversaries in the Partition and the circumstances and challenges that influenced his

policies.

This paper is arranged chronologically by the events that ensued after the creation of the

Muslim League in 190612, leading up to the Partition of India in 1947. Jinnah’s political

strategies and reactions are analyzed individually within the extent of each event. The primary

argument of the paper is that the shift in Jinnah’s policies significantly contributed to the division

of India; however, the failure of the Congress to reach a compromise with the League and to

pacify the alarmed Muslims can not be left unaddressed either. Furthermore, the Second World

War bestowed a novel importance upon India as a field of defence13, an asset that Jinnah took

full advantage of. Lastly, Nehru’s refusal to submit to the idea of an Indian Union, as proven by

the Cabinet Mission of 194614, dashed all hopes of a united India and brought an arduous fight

for freedom to an excruciating conclusion – Partition.

Ambassador of Unity

Fearing the mounting influence of the Congress in India, the British urged the Muslim

elites, led by the Aga Khan, to form a party of their own. Hence, the All-India Muslim League

was born on December 30th, 1906 in Dhaka15. It was not until 1913 that Jinnah joined the League

while, simultaneously, sustaining his membership in the Congress16. The zenith of Jinnah’s


13 Sarila, N. S. (2005), The Shadow of the Great Game: The untold story of India's partition (p. 24). London: Constable.

14 Noorani, A. G. (1970). The Cabinet Mission and its Aftermath (pp. 104-166, Edited by C.H. Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright). London:

George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 15 Wolpert, S. (2006), Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India (p. 3). London: Oxford University Press.

16 Zaidi, Z. H. (1970). Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy, 1937-1947 (p. 245, Edited by C.H. Philips and Mary Doreen

Wainwright). London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.

6

mediatorial career was the Lucknow Pact of 191617 which granted representation to religious

minorities in the provincial legislatures. However, before Jinnah could achieve eminence in both

parties, two mass agitations swept through the Subcontinent: Gandhi’s Satyagraha campaign and

the Khilafat Movement.

Both agitations were products of the Great War. As the War concluded, Mahatma

Gandhi, who had returned from South Africa in 1915, encouraged Indians to “refuse civilly”

from obeying the “Satanic laws” of the British Raj18 after the colonial government had denied

dominion status to India – an award that Indians had anticipated for their assistance in the Allied

War effort. Gandhi was seeking a prospect to mobilize masses against the British. The

opportunity arrived in 1919 when Mullahs across India vowed to launch Jihad against the British

who planned to depose the Caliph after the fall of the Ottoman Empire19. This pan-Islamist

campaign came to be known as the Khilafat Movement20. Though Gandhi formed a coalition

with the Mullahs, Jinnah completely denounced the Movement for undermentioned reasons.

Arguably, due to Jinnah’s refusal to provide his endorsement to the masses, the Khilafat

Movement caused the very first cracks in the communal concord between Hindus and Muslims

and laid the foundation of a separate Muslim state.

While Gandhi proclaimed that India could only gain freedom through non-cooperation

with the British through non-violent means, Jinnah not only denounced the Movement but also

condemned Gandhi’s endorsement of it: “It was a crime to mix politics and religion the way he

17 Sinha, A. (2015, December 29). Historic Lucknow Pact enters 100th year. The Times of India. Retrieved August 09, 2020, from

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/lucknow/Historic-Lucknow-Pact-enters-100th-year/articleshow/50360098.cms 18 Wolpert, S. (2006), Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India (p. 4). London: Oxford University Press 19

Sarila, N. S. (2005), The Shadow of the Great Game: The untold story of India's partition (p. 69). London: Constable.

20 Sarila, N. S. (2005), The Shadow of the Great Game: The untold story of India's partition (p. 69). London: Constable.

7

[Gandhi] had done.”21 Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah’s biographer, asserts that Jinnah dreaded

Gandhi’s ‘revolutionary tactics’ would mobilize illiterate masses who were neither educated nor

disciplined enough to remain non-violent and, resultantly, would descend into violence22. While

Nisid Hajari, an Indian American analyst, suggests that Jinnah was primarily concerned about

the radical Muslims turning their hostility from the British to the Hindus, which would have

resulted in rigid relations with the Congress23. Jinnah’s fears, however, were evidently not

unfounded. After the abolition of the Turkish caliphate in 192424, the Khilafat Movement lost its

objective and collapsed, plunging the Hindu-Muslim relations to a historic low. David Hardiman,

an English historian, encapsulated the growing communal hostility in India; the Subcontinent

witnessed 11 riots in 1923 and by 1926, the number had almost tripled to 35 riots25. Though the

Khilafat Movement failed, it had a profound impact on India’s future. According to Pervical

Spear, an English historian, the Movement is believed to have laid the foundation for Pakistan

for it served as a bond between nationalism and pan-Islam, resulting in the promotion of Muslim

separatism26. Focusing on the magnitude of the Movement, Jinnah’s refusal to endorse it ignited

the first sparks of separatism in India. Had Jinnah supported the Movement, the rifts between

Hindus and Muslims might not have widened to the extent of separatism. Or, arguably, Jinnah

might have been able to diffuse tensions between the two communities by playing his

mediatorial role. However, as Gandhi began to shape the majoritarian opinion that civil

21

Hajari, N. (2015), Midnight's Furies: The Deadly Legacy of India's Partition (p. 28). Stroud, Gloucestershire: Amberley.

22 Wolpert, S. (2006), Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India (p. 3). London: Oxford University Press

23 Hajari, N. (2015), Midnight's Furies: The Deadly Legacy of India's Partition (p. 27). Stroud, Gloucestershire: Amberley. 24 The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2014, February 24). Khilafat movement. Retrieved September 27, 2020, from

https://www.britannica.com/event/Khilafat-movement 25

Hardiman, D. (2005). Gandhi: In His Time and Ours (pp. 165-166). Delhi: Orient Blackswan.

26 Spear, Pervical (1970). A Third Force in India 1920-47: A Study in Political Analysis (p. 497, Edited by C.H. Philips and Mary Doreen

Wainwright). London: George Allen and Unwin.

8

disobedience is the only compelling approach, Jinnah’s signature role of the mediator began to

disintegrate.

It is evident that Jinnah’s diplomatic strategies were neither sufficient to please his

British allies, nor were they effective amid the increasing populism in India. The Manchester

Guardian captured the circumstances that surrounded Jinnah: “The Hindus thought he [Jinnah]

was a Muslim communalist, the Muslims took him to be a pro-Hindu, the princes deemed him to

be too democratic. The Britishers considered him a rabid extremist…he was everywhere but no

where.”27 The final blow that shattered Jinnah’s determination came upon the death of his wife,

Ruttie, in 192928. Jinnah perceived Ruttie’s demise as “a failure and personal defeat in his

life...”29 Unable to find any reason to stay in India, Jinnah departed for England. The renowned

“Ambassador of Unity” would return to India in 1935, but with altered ideologies.

Partying of Ways

After his sojourn in England, Jinnah decided to return to India upon the promulgation of

the Government of India Act of 193530 – a legislation crafted to grant self-government to Indians

and ensure the safeguards of the minorities and the princely states. Indians would soon take

charge of their government through the forthcoming provincial Elections of 1937. Unlike in the

1920s, the onus of ‘promoting’ separatism would not fall on Jinnah, but on his Congressional

counterpart, Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru’s refusal to co-operate with the League after the Elections,

27 Alva, J. (1943). Leaders of India (p. 82). Bombay: Thacker.

28 Hajari, N. (2015). Midnight's Furies: The Deadly Legacy of India's Partition (p. 29). Stroud, Gloucestershire: Amberley.

29 Dwarkadas, K. (1963). Ruttie Jinnah: The Story of a Great Friendship (pp. 57-58).


9

arguably, caused a significant change in Jinnah’s policies as he decided to eliminate the objective

of a settlement with the Congress altogether.

Since Jinnah’s departure in 1929, the League had merely “lived on paper”31. Apart from

monetary obstacles, the party was facing a colossal challenge which restricted its participation in

the forthcoming elections – resolute leadership. Jinnah, persuaded by his admirers, seized the

opportunity of leading the League in the 1937 Elections. Jinnah did not believe that he was

undermining the concord between Hindus and Muslims by solely advocating for the latter. On

April 27th, 1936 in Bombay, Jinnah urged the Muslims to unite under a single party’s banner: “If

Muslims would speak with one voice, a settlement between Hindus and Muslims would come

quicker.” 32 However, Jinnah’s leadership was not sufficient to strengthen the League in time.

The results of the 1937 Elections proved that the League was no match for the Congress.

The results of the Elections could best be described as calamitous for the League. Out of

a total of 482 seats reserved for Muslims, it only managed to win 109. Of the 1,585 seats, the

Congress won 716 (about 44% of the total) while it only managed to secure 26 in the Muslim

electorate (roughly 5.4% of the total)33. Resultantly, Jinnah appealed to Nehru to form a coalition

of Congress-League ministries in India’s most populated provinces, chiefly the United

Provinces. Nehru not only rejected Jinnah’s request, he also claimed that the Elections had

proven that there were only two parties in India: “the British and the Congress”. Appalled by

Nehru’s remarks, Jinnah replied: “There is a third party – the Muslims.”34


Wainwright). London: George Allen and Unwin 32 Zaidi, Z. H. (1970). Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy, 1937-1947 (p. 246, Edited by C.H. Philips and Mary Doreen

Wainwright). London: George Allen and Unwin. 33 Zaidi, Z. H. (1970). Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy, 1937-1947 (p. 253, Edited by C.H. Philips and Mary Doreen

Wainwright). London: George Allen and Unwin. 34 Wolpert, S. (2006), Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India (p. 7). London: Oxford University Press.

10

Nehru’s refusal to cooperate with the League was, in his viewpoint, a hallmark of

Congress’s secular essence. However, the actions of the Congress leader had an unsolicited

effect; the Muslims began to perceive Congress’s attitude as dismissive towards their concerns.

A.K. Azad, a leading Congressman, summarized the fears of Indian Muslims in his

autobiography, ‘India Wins Freedom’: “They [Muslims] were…a minority in India as a whole

and were troubled by the fear that their position and status in independent India would not be

secured”35. Humayun Kabir, a Bengali poet, shared Azad’s argument by asserting that ‘the

Congress had aroused dissatisfaction among Muslims, with a real sense of injury behind it.’36

Hence, most politically minded Muslims were now beginning to dread the idea of a “Congress

Majority”. In Nehru’s defence, historians argue that he never felt the need to acknowledge the

“communal question”. According to Pattabai Sitaramayya, an Indian independence activist,

Nehru had recently returned to India filled with “communist and Marxist ideas.”37 To Nehru, the

most urgent problem of India was “the appalling poverty, unemployment, and indebtedness of

the peasantry”38. He upheld the belief that if the country was to solve its economic problem, then

the subsequent prosperity will ultimately solve the communal problem itself. As Hajari points

out, Nehru never showed religious prejudice himself. But the Congress party was predominantly

controlled by Hindus39 who, in all likelihood, would prefer Hindus over Muslims in the social

and political life once given the rein of power. As suggested by the evidence, Nehru either did

not acknowledge this possibility or overlooked its potential.


Wainwright). London: George Allen and Unwin. 36 Kabir, H. (1944). Muslim Politics, 1906-1942. (p.14). Calcutta.

37 Sitaramayya, B. P. (1947). The History of the Indian National Congress (Vol. 2, p.11). Bombay: Paama Publ.

38 Congress resolution, Star of India, April 16, 1936.


11

Jinnah, while addressing the League in Lucknow in 1937, expressed his personal

exasperation with the Congress; “Unless the two parties learn to respect and fear each other,

there is no solid ground for any settlement. Offer of peace by the weaker party always means the

confession of weakness…”40. Abdullah Haroon, another prominent Leaguer, described the

outlook of Indian politics as “a partying of ways…”41. One can conclude, as it evident, that

Nehru’s deficiency in pacifying the Muslims regarding their political safeguards resulted in a

drastic change in Jinnah’s policies – he no longer desired the League to submit to Congress’s

authority. Dissimilar to what was observed during the Khilafat Movement, in this instance,

Jinnah’s policies were being shaped by the actions of his Congressional counterpart instead of

his own will. Nehru’s interpretation of the ‘communal question’ significantly contributed to the

Partition for it set Jinnah on the path of adopting the ideology of Muslim nationalism. Had Nehru

agreed to Jinnah’s demand of an alliance of ministries, the latter might not have reacted with an

ideological transformation and the separatism that had erupted after the Khilafat Movement

could have been subdued.

Demand for Pakistan

Thanks to the conflicting interpretations of the ‘communal question’, the agreement

between the League and the Congress was proving to be improbable. In November of 1937,

Nehru wrote to Nawab Ismail Khan, a leading Leaguer, “I do not know what our differences are

in politics, I had imagined that they were not very great.”42 The course of Indian history would

soon be set firmly towards partition, due to the occurrence of two decisive events: the Lahore

40 Ahmad, J. (1960). Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah (Vol. 1, p. 30) (Pakistan).

41 Star of India, October 10, 1938. 42 Nehru to Nawab Ismail Khan, November 10, 1937, Nehru-Jinnah Correspondence. (1938). Allahabad: All India Congress Committee.

12

Resolution and the Second World War. While the Resolution would unveil Jinnah’s advocacy for

a Muslim state, the Congress’s defiance against the British during the War would present him

with an opportunity to implement his policies.

Devoid of any hope of a settlement with the Congress, the League held its largest session

at Lahore on March 23rd, 1940. In what came to be known as the Lahore Resolution43, Jinnah

called upon Muslims to acquire a separate homeland. The envisioned state came to be known as

Pakistan. Unsurprisingly, the declaration came as a tremor to the Congress. Gandhi denounced

the idea of partition by calling it a “vivisection of India”44 while Nehru argued that establishing a

state on religious grounds was “medieval”45. Jinnah clarified that the Muslims stood for the

freedom of India, “But it must be freedom for all India and not freedom for one section

[Hindus]…”.46 The Indian perspective criticizes the nebulous nature of the Resolution by

claiming that Jinnah deliberately kept the parameters of Pakistan obscure to leave the possibility

of a large Muslim state open47. However, the Pakistani view suggests that the Resolution’s

ambiguity was an invitation for the Congress to negotiate with the League and, subsequently,

reach a settlement.48 Though the interpretation of the Resolution is disputed, its significance is

not. S.R. Mehrotra, an Indian history professor, outlines the undeniable change that the

Resolution denoted in Jinnah’s policies: “Jinnah had now crossed the Rubicon and that what he

demanded was the partition of India.”49 Wolpert, in his biography called “Jinnah of Pakistan”,

43 Lahore Resolution. (n.d.). Retrieved August 07, 2020,

from https://www.britannica.com/topic/Lahore-Resolution 44 Wolpert, S. (2006), Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India (p. 8). London: Oxford University Press.

45 Hajari, N. (2015), Midnight's Furies: The Deadly Legacy of India's Partition (p. 10). Stroud, Gloucestershire: Amberley.

46 Speeches and Writing of Jinnah, (vol. i, pp. 143-62)

47 Sarila, N. S. (2005). The Shadow of the Great Game: The untold story of India's partition (p. 81). London: Constable.

48 Khan, A. S. (2020, March 29). Lahore Resolution: A Critical Analysis. Retrieved September 02, 2020, from

https://dailytimes.com.pk/585400/lahore-resolution-a-critical-analysis/ 49

Mehrotra, S.R. (1970). The Congress and the Partition of India (p. 208, Edited by C.H. Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright).

London: George Allen and Unwin.

13

shares Mehrotra’s claim by encapsulating the significance of the Resolution regarding Jinnah’s

political stance: “The ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity had totally transformed himself into

Pakistan's great leader.”50 The Lahore Resolution was, indeed, a pivotal moment in the Pakistan

movement – it denoted Jinnah as the mentor of a Muslim nation and made the demand of

Muslim autonomy official. It also became ostensible that Jinnah was no longer just reacting to

the growing tide of Muslim demand of a separate homeland. Through his nationalistic policies,

he was actively creating the possibility of an autonomous future for the Muslims of India.

In February of 194251, the War reached India’s doorsteps when Singapore fell to the

Japanese. The loss of Singapore’s fleet to defend the Bay of Bengal and Eastern India left the

region “in danger of attack”52. Acknowledging the gravitas of the situation, Churchill sensed the

necessity to mobilize Indians in the case of a Japanese assault. Subsequently, India was drawn

into the conflict without the consultation of the Congress ministries, an event that irretrievably

affected India’s future. In May of 1942, Gandhi launched his last Satyagraha campaign – the

“Quit India” movement. He demanded complete withdrawal of the British from India,

suggesting: “Presence of British in India is invitation to Japan to invade India. Their withdrawal

removes the bait.”53 Gandhi and other Congressional leaders were imprisoned in the Mughal Fort

prison for their “anti-British attitude”54. Retaliatorily, Congress members across India resigned

from the provincial legislatures – a decision that Jinnah rightly dubbed as the “Himalayan

50

Wolpert, S. (1984) Jinnah of Pakistan. (p.182). London: Oxford University Press.

51 Royde-Smith, J., & Hughes, T. (2020, August 14). The Fall of Singapore. Retrieved August 20, 2020, from

https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-II/The-fall-of-Singapore 52

Wolpert, S. (2006). Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India (p.13). London: Oxford University Press.

53 Wolpert, S. (2006). Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India (p.41). London: Oxford University Press.

54 Wolpert, S. (2006). Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India (p.45). London: Oxford University Press.

14

blunder”55, for it would pave the way for the League to not only gain endorsement of the British,

but also to renovate itself into a powerful party.

V.P. Menon, a notable civil servant, encapsulated the debilitating magnitude of

Congress’s approach; “Had it [Congress Party] not resigned its position of vantage in the

Provinces the course of Indian history might have been very different.” He further claims that

without Congress’s defiance against the British, “Jinnah and Muslim League would have never

attained the position that they did.”56 Narendra Sarila, a former Indian ambassador,

acknowledges Menon’s argument by describing another disastrous effect of Congress’s

insubordination – the loss of the strategic North West Frontier Province. Without the inclusion of

the NWFP, Pakistan would have geographically remained enclaved within India.57 As the

Congress gave up control in the Muslim majority province, they people of NWFP diverted their

support to the League. Khaled Sayeed, a professor of political studies at Queen’s University,

describes what the removal of the Congress from the political field signified for Jinnah – he

knew that the British would not lose the approval of Muslims after facing denunciation from the

Congress.58 Thus, Jinnah promised support for the Allied War effort and also commenced to

reorganize the League. The demand for Pakistan was no longer a reactionary call, it was

becoming a common goal for Muslims to restore their prestige in Indian politics.

55 Sarila, N. S. (2005). The Shadow of the Great Game: The untold story of India's partition (p. 38). London: Constable.

56 Menon, V. P. (1957). The Transfer of Power in India (p. 52). London: Longman Green.

57 Sarila, N. S. (2005). The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India's Partition (p. 38). London: Constable.

58 Sayeed, K. B. (1970). The Personality of Jinnah and His Political Strategy (p. 286, Edited by C.H. Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright).


15

The results of the 1946 Elections59 mirrored Jinnah’s dedication towards the League; out

of 494 seats reserved for Muslims, the League won 439. Jinnah’s League, which had failed to

secure a single province in 1937, had won a majority in the Punjab, Sindh, and Bengal60 –

giving Jinnah the basis for Pakistan. One can conclude that the Lahore Resolution of 1940

officialised the Muslim separatism that had been caused by Nehru’s indifference towards the

League after the 1937 Elections. Additionally, Jinnah would not have been able to implement his

separatist policies had the Congress supported the British warfare. Jinnah’s commendable

ingenuity to exploit the situation in the favour of the League enhanced the party’s position and

significantly aided the Partition.

The Cabinet Mission and Partition

As the War concluded, the British started to focus on the transfer of power to India. In

Britain, Churchill’s Conservatives were replaced by Attlee’s Labour Party with a majority in the

House of Commons61. India was no longer the bountiful market for the British to make profit off

of, in fact, the British government had accumulated huge debts to India during the War62. It was

imminent that the British had to withdraw soon. But with rifts between Hindus and Muslims

wider than ever before, the Viceroy, Archibald Wavell admitted that a close assessment of the

“Pakistan issue” was “necessary”63. Hence, the Cabinet Mission64 was sent to India in early 1946

59 After the provincial Elections of 1946, the League demanded the Muslim majority regions; Bengal and Assam in

the North east of India and the Punjab, NWFP, Sindh and Baluchistan in the West to be incorporated in the

sovereign state of Pakistan. [Khaliquzzaman, C. (1961). Pathway to Pakistan. (pp. 340–41) Lahore: Longmans] 60 Ahmad, J. (1961). Final Phase of Struggle for Pakistan. (p. 26) Lahore: Publishers United.


62 Hajari, N. (2015), Midnight's Furies: The Deadly Legacy of India's Partition (p. 7). Stroud, Gloucestershire: Amberley.


64 The Cabinet Mission consisted of 3 British officials: Lord Pethick-Lawrence (the Secretary of State for India),

Sir Stafford Cripps (President of the Board of Trade) and A.V. Alexander (the Minister of Defence). [A.G. Noorani, The Cabinet Mission and its Aftermath (1970)].

16

to ensure a settlement between the League and the Congress before the withdrawal of British

power from the Subcontinent65. The Cabinet Mission caused a temporary reversal in Jinnah’s

policies and momentarily revived India’s unity. However, similarly to the aftermath of 1937

Elections, the responsibility of Mission’s failure primarily falls on Nehru who, yet again,

exhibited dismissal towards the safeguards of Muslims – sealing the fate of India’s unity.

The premise of the Mission’s preposition was that India would be divided into three

groups with one Centre; two of the groups would entail Muslim majority provinces while one

would be constituted by the rest of British India. Assets such as foreign affairs, defence,

currency, and communication would fall under the Centre’s authority and the Provinces would

enjoy the remaining autonomy66. Jinnah, to utmost surprise, showed interest in the Mission’s

proposals. Barbara and Thomas Metcalf, American historians of South Asian history, assert that

the motivation behind Jinnah’s acceptance of the Mission was his desire of equivalence between

India and Pakistan. He had feared that a truncated Pakistan would not be able to withstand

potential Indian aggression after the British had withdrawn. Mehrotra, on the contrary, claims

that Jinnah was attempting to secure a larger Pakistan through the mechanism of groupings67 as

partition of India would have entailed the partition of Bengal and Punjab, leaving large Muslim

minorities in mostly Hindu provinces. Though Jinnah’s motives behind nearly abandoning his

Pakistan manifesto are debatable, they were undisputedly in the interest of autonomy for the

65

Noorani, A. G. (1970). The Cabinet Mission and its Aftermath (p. 105, Edited by C.H. Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright). London:

George Allen and Unwin. 66

Metcalf, B., & Metcalf, T. R. (2006). A Concise History of Modern India. (p.215) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

67 Mehrotra, S.R. (1970). The Congress and the Partition of India (p. 188-221, Edited by C.H. Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright).


17

Muslims. Hence, Jinnah vowed that if the Congress would accept the Groups, the League would

accept the Union.68

Nehru, however, hesitated to accept the facet of groupings. He claimed that groupings

would assign too much power to the Provinces, leaving behind a fragile central government.

Furthermore, Nehru maintained that Provinces should be allowed to disjoin the Union upon will,

while Jinnah demanded that groupings should be mandatory and permanent. 69 Nehru criticized

Jinnah’s stance by commenting that the League could have its Pakistan, but it had no right to

demand to the inclusion of the areas which did not wish to join it.70 Nehru’s biographer, Michael

Brecher, described Nehru’s statements as “the most fiery and provocative statements in his forty

years of public life”71. A.G. Noorani, an Indian political commentator, also criticizes Nehru’s

vision of a unitary government in India: “One man, one vote or bare majority rule in a country of

diversities spells the dictatorship of the majority”72. It is obvious that the indifference Nehru had

displayed towards the League in 1937 was repeated after the Cabinet Mission in 1946. Hence,

Nehru’s repetitive dismissal towards the safeguards of Muslims revived Jinnah’s nationalistic

stance and drove him to accept nothing less than partition.

The transfer of power to India was crafted on June 3rd, 1947. Nehru announced the plan

of Partition on All-India Radio: “The sands of time run out and decisions cannot wait the normal

course of events…We have, therefore, decided to accept these proposals…”73. Communal


Wainwright). London: George Allen and Unwin. 69

Metcalf, B., & Metcalf, T. R. (2006). A Concise History of Modern India. (p.216) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

70 Noorani, A. G. (1970). The Cabinet Mission and its Aftermath (p. 114, Edited by C.H. Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright). London:

George Allen and Unwin. 71 Brecher, M. (1959). Nehru: A Political Biography. (p. 316) London: Oxford University Press. 72 Noorani, A. G. (2019, August 1). Who Destroyed the Cabinet Mission’s Plan & Why? Retrieved September 02, 2020, from

https://criterion-quarterly.com/destroyed-cabinet-missions-plan/ 73 Wolpert, S. (2006), Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India (p. 153). London: Oxford University Press.

18

violence, which had been seething for years, swept through the Subcontinent like wildfire. After

paying a hefty price of nearly a million lives, with 14 million displaced74, Pakistan came into

being on August 14th, 1947, while India won its independence a day later75. The Subcontinent

was at last free from the chains of colonialism.

Conclusion

It is evident to conclude that Jinnah, through his adamant demand of a separate Muslim

state, played a crucial role in the Partition of India. It is, indeed, difficult to conclude that

Pakistan would have came into being had it not been for Jinnah’s nationalistic advocacy for the

country. However, it would not be satisfactory to argue that he singlehandedly divided the

Subcontinent; the denial of the Congress to acknowledge the susceptible position of Muslims in

politics greatly encouraged Jinnah to modify his policies which, eventually, resulted in the

Partition. Additionally, the outbreak of the Second World War, coupled with Congress’s refusal

to aid the Allied warfare, provided an opportunity for Jinnah to make the League resilient enough

to demand and sustain autonomy. Lastly, the failure of the Cabinet Mission in 1946, partly due to

Nehru’s refusal to submit to the idea of groupings, sealed the fate of India’s unity. Though

Jinnah remains to be absolved in India, he gave an enfeebled minority a voice in the political

affairs of the Subcontinent – a contribution for which Pakistanis remember him as “Quaid-e-

Azam”; “The Great Leader”76. During the Pakistan Constituent Assembly in Karachi on August

11, 1947, Jinnah stated: “Maybe that view [for a united India] is correct. Maybe it is not. That

74

Hajari, N. (2015), Midnight's Furies: The Deadly Legacy of India's Partition (prologue). Stroud, Gloucestershire: Amberley.

75 History.com Editors (2010, February 09India and Pakistan Win Independence.). Retrieved August 25, 2020, from

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/india-and-pakistan-win-independence 76


https://www.britannica.com/biography/Mohammed-Ali-Jinnah

19

remains to be seen.”77 Unfortunately, the surging Hindu nationalism in modern India, as

demonstrated by the constitutional Islamophobia78, would have astounded Gandhi and Nehru,

but probably not Jinnah.

77 Sarila, N. S. (2005)., The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India's Partition (p. 93). London: Constable.

78 Swart, M. (2020, March 30). Does CAA comply with India's human rights obligations? Retrieved August 25, 2020, from

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/holdstopping-stateless-challenge-india-citizenship-law-200312071917304.html

20

Appendix

79

80

79 Wolpert, S. (2006). Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India (Illustrations – following p.114).

London: Oxford University Press. 80 Wolpert, S. (2006). Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India (Illustrations – following p.114).

London: Oxford University Press.

Fig. 1 A map of pre-partitioned India,

with major princely states highlighted.

Fig. 2 A map of partitioned

India, with the partition of the

Punjab and Bengal shown.

21

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