Mandate of Destiny: The 1947 United Nations Decision to Partition Palestine

MA

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ATE O

F DESTIN

Y The 1947 U

nited Nations D

ecision to Partition Palestine JBI

The Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights (JBI) was founded in 1971 and works to strengthen international institutions and the implementation of universal human rights norms. It is affiliated with the American Jewish Committee.

E. Robert Goodkind, Chair, Administrative Council Felice D. Gaer, Director

Copyright © 2008 Jacob Blaustein InstituteMarch 2008

Cover photo: Ad Hoc Committee Meeting on Palestine Question, November 22, 1947. Photo courtesy of UN Photo/KB

Mandate

The 1947 United Nations Decisionto Partition Palestine

DestinyOF

THE JACOB BLAUSTEIN INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments v

Introduction vii

International Commitments on the Middle East: A Timeline, 1917-48 xii

Documents

1. Correspondence between Felix Frankfurter and Prince Feisal of Saudi Arabia 1

2. Treaty of Peace between the Principal Allied Powers and Turkey, Sèvres* 4

3. League of Nations Mandate for Palestine* 5

4. American-British Palestine Mandate Convention* 9

5. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 106 (S-1) 13

6. UNSCOP: Report to the United Nations General Assembly* 15

7. Speech by Guatemalan Delegate Dr. Jorge Garcia Granados to the UN General Assembly 25

8. Speech by Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko to the UN General Assembly 28

*These documents are excerpted.

iii

9. Speech by Egyptian Delegate Mahmoud Bey Fawzi to the UN General Assembly 36

10. Report of UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question to the United Nations General Assembly* 39

Photo Spread 50

11. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) Recommending Partition of Palestine* 52

12. Verbatim Provisional Records, United Nations General Assembly, November 29, 1947* 59

13. First Special Report of the UN Palestine Commission to the Security Council, February 1948 62

14. United Nations Palestine Commission Report to the General Assembly, April 10, 1948 70

15. Trygve Lie: In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations* 76

16. Abba Eban: Israel: The Case for Admission to the United Nations* 91

17. UN General Assembly Resolution 273 Admitting Israel to the United Nations 112

*These documents are excerpted.

iv Contents

Acknowledgments

The Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights dedicates thispublication to Robert S. Rifkind, who served with distinction as chair of theAdministrative Council of the Institute from 2000-2007. Mr. Rifkind’s steadfastbelief in the efficacy of law and the indispensable need to guarantee and protect thehuman rights of every person has been an inspiration to all of the members of theInstitute’s Council and staff. The role of international organizations in promotingand protecting these rights is a core concern of the Blaustein Institute.

The Institute also wishes to acknowledge the many people who have con-tributed to the research, writing, and publication of this study. We thank Eric Post,Adam Goodkind, and Gabrielle Thal-Pruzan for their invaluable, indefatigable, andoften very creative research and editorial assistance. Further, for editing and designassistance, we thank Roselyn Bell and Linda Krieg of the American Jewish Com-mittee. For their help in obtaining library documents, we particularly thank MicheleAnish and Cyma Horowitz of the Blaustein Library of the American Jewish Com-mittee, as well as the staff of the Dag Hammarskjold Library at the United Nationsand of the UN Photo Archive. Ramu Damodaran and Stefan Dujarric, both of theUN Secretariat, helped us obtain access to important UN materials. We also appre-ciate the advice and assistance of Dr. Eve Epstein and the United Nations Founda-tion. Finally, special appreciation to Florina Jenkins for administrative assistanceand her steady hand in seeing all aspects of the project move forward.

E. Robert Goodkind Felice GaerChair Director

v

Introduction

The sixtieth anniversary of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 rec-ommending partition of Palestine into two states, one Jewish and one Arab, wascommemorated on November 29, 2007. The UN’s interest in this topic sixty yearsago was not a matter of chance, nor a result of cursory events or momentary politicalpressures. It emerged from a long history of international concern that had engagedthe attention of national governments, international organizations, and diplomats. Itabsorbed these diplomats, organizations, and governments with great intensity.

The Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights is con-vinced that the development and emergence of the UN’s partition plan can readilybe understood from a series of international documents that are presented in thisvolume. These documentary snapshots offer a picture of how hard the new interna-tional organization, the United Nations, worked to reach a fair and equitable solu-tion. They present a picture of the extensive deliberations, meetings, discussions,visits, and careful weighing of the pros and cons of every course of action open to thedecision-makers. They also reveal the views and the acceptance or rejection of theseproposals by the states and political actors concerned, the difficulties faced immedi-ately following the partition decision by the UN Commission charged with imple-menting the plan, and what transpired when the State of Israel was proclaimed andsought membership in the world body.

By gathering these documents that chart the diplomatic deliberations and deci-sions that took place, we hope both to clarify the historical record that underpins thecurrent situation in the Middle East and to recall that international institutions tookvery seriously their responsibility to promote peace and stability after World War II.

Background

The League of Nations, founded as a result of the Versailles Peace Conference afterWorld War I “to promote international cooperation” and “to achieve internationalpeace and security,” in September 1922 assigned to the United Kingdom a mandate toadminister and prepare for independence the territory of Palestine, which had beenrelinquished by the Ottoman Empire in the Treaty of Sevres. [See Document 2: Treatyof Peace between the Principal Allied Powers and Turkey, Sèvres (August 10, 1920), andDocument 3: League of Nations Mandate for Palestine (September 23, 1922).]

Two years after the British had received a mandate for Palestine from theLeague of Nations, an agreement was signed between the United States and Britain,specifically reaffirming the UK’s responsibility to put into effect the repeated inter-

vii

viii Mandate of Destiny

nationally recognized commitment to re-establish a national home for the Jewishpeople in Palestine, and their historic connection to Palestine. [See Document 4:American-British Palestine Mandate Convention (December 3, 1924).]

Decades of British responsibility and turmoil in the region, as well as conflictwithin and about British policy for the region, crystallized with the League ofNations rejection of Great Britain’s 1939 White Paper on Palestine—which wouldaim for independence in ten years, but make further Jewish immigration subject toArab consent and limit land sales as well—as “not in accordance with the interpreta-tion which the Commission had placed on the Palestine Mandate.”

In February 1947, following the end of World War II, with the British govern-ment retreating from many of its global commitments, British Foreign SecretaryErnest Bevin announced that his country would terminate its mandate for Palestineand turn the problem over to the United Nations. The UN was seen as the successororganization to the failed League of Nations, taking over many of its assets, issues,and problems, arguably in a stronger and better structured global organization. InApril, Britain followed up by offering an accounting to the UN of its administrationof Palestine under the League’s mandate, and a request for a special session of theUN General Assembly to consider the future government of Palestine. This placedthe subject squarely before the diplomats of the new world organization.

The UN created a Special Committee to investigate and propose solutions forthe “question of Palestine.” [See Document 5: United Nations General Assembly Resolu-tion 106 (May 15, 1947).] The committee, known as UNSCOP (United NationsSpecial Committee on Palestine), was comprised of representatives of elevennations—Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands,Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. It was empowered to “ascertain and recordfacts, and to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine.”

The members of UNSCOP convened immediately and, within weeks, traveledto Palestine and began a series of meetings, public and private, with all concerned par-ties to the conflict. After an intensive three-and-a-half-month period of study,UNSCOP issued its final report. The process involved sixteen public and thirty-sixprivate meetings and travel to and through Palestine, and to Lebanon, Jordan, andSyria. In its final report, UNSCOP unanimously decided to end the British Mandateand called, inter alia, for preservation of the Holy Places; a constitutional democracywith rights guarantees; settling disputes peacefully; and preserving the economic unityof Palestine. Additionally, a majority report (by seven members) recommended parti-tion of Palestine into two states with an internationalized Jerusalem and a minority

Introduction ix

report (by three members) recommended local self-government of Jerusalem andArab sectors within a unitary state structure. These proposals, as part of the finalreport of UNSCOP, were submitted for discussion by the UN General Assembly atits September 1947 session. [See Document 6: United Nations Special Committee onPalestine: Report to the United Nations General Assembly (August 31, 1947).]

Guatemalan delegate Dr. Jorge Garcia Granados addressed the GeneralAssembly in support of partition. He described how the hopefulness of theUNSCOP members that they would find a workable solution ran up against therealities of the Middle East, including what he described as “scowls and threateninggestures with which the Arabs greeted every Jew” and “a rancor which makes aneffort at conciliation ... seem useless.” Noting that “in the present ... the Jews couldexpect nothing from an Arab government but persecution, slavery, and death,”Granados expressed regret at the “intransigent attitude” of the Arab leaders whohave become an “obstacle” to forging ties between the Jewish and Arab peoples, andexpressed the hope that as time passes, “new ideas and new generations will wipe outthe old grudges between these two peoples,” promoting an era of peace. [See Docu-ment 7: Speech by Guatemalan Delegate Jorge Garcia Granados (November 1947).]

At its September 1947 second session, the UN General Assembly referredthree matters—the UNSCOP final report, a proposal of the United Kingdom, and aSaudi–Iraqi proposal for recognition of a single-state solution—to yet another body:a newly created Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question. Composed of allUN members, the Ad Hoc Committee deliberated for two months, examining someseventeen proposed resolutions submitted to it. It included both the Jewish Agencyand Arab Higher Committee in its deliberations, and set up three bodies to examinethe various proposals: a conciliation commission that tried to bring the partiestogether and two subcommittees. Subcommittee 1 was asked to draw up a detailedplan based on the majority proposals of UNSCOP; Subcommittee 2 was asked for adetailed plan based on the Saudi-Iraqi proposal for a unitary state. The conciliationcommission reported their work had not been fruitful. Subcommittee 1 modifiedthe UNSCOP partition plan slightly and called for creation of another new body—a five-member Palestine Commission—to implement it. Subcommittee 2 concen-trated on three issues: (a) legal questions such as the competence of the UN toaddress the issue and referrals to the world court proposed by Egypt, Iraq, and Syria;(b) Jewish refugees and their relationship to the Palestinian question, recommend-ing that countries of origin take back the refugees; and (c) the constitution andfuture government of Palestine, recommending a unitary state. The Ad Hoc Com-

x Mandate of Destiny

mittee, voting on November 24 and 25, 1947, rejected each of Subcommittee 2’s rec-ommendations, and adopted the recommendation of Subcommittee 1, for partition,by 25-13 with 17 abstentions. [See Document 10: Report of Ad Hoc Committee on thePalestinian Question to the United Nations General Assembly (25 November 1947).]

The Ad Hoc Committee Report was then sent to the General Assembly, whichexamined it between November 26 and 29. Many representatives expressed theirviews on the recommendations that emerged from the Ad Hoc Committee, includ-ing notably Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko, who advocated partition.Gromyko concluded that “all the alternative solutions of the Palestinian problemwere found to be unworkable and impracticable,” including the option of “creating asingle independent Arab-Jewish state with equal rights for Arabs and Jews.”Explaining that the solution advocated by the Soviet Union was based on “under-standing and sympathy” for national self-determination of peoples, Gromyko notedwith regret that the study by UNSCOP and others revealed that “Jews and Arabs donot wish, or are unable, to live together.” [See Document 8: Speech by Soviet Ambassa-dor Andrei Gromyko to the United Nations General Assembly (November 1947).]

Egypt’s representative expressed a number of procedural arguments, includingthat the General Assembly itself had no competence to “impose a solution” aboutPalestine, and that, while the partition plan may have succeeded in the Ad HocCommittee’s vote, too few UN members—fewer than a majority of UN members—had thus far voted in favor of partition. Fawzi warned that Egypt would not recog-nize any resolution adopted by the General Assembly, as in his view, it lacked com-petence on the issue. Instead, the whole matter should be sent to the world court foran advisory opinion. [See Document 9: Speech to UN General Assembly by EgyptianDelegate Mahmoud Bey Fawzi (November 1947).]

On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly approved a res-olution to accept the UNSCOP and Ad Hoc Committee recommendations to par-tition Palestine into two states, one Arab and one Jewish, and declare Jerusalem aninternational territory. The Assembly approved the slightly revised partition plan bya vote of 33-13 with 10 abstentions, reaching a two-thirds vote in favor of the plan.[See Document 11: UN General Assembly Resolution 181(II) (November 29, 1947).]

In speeches following the General Assembly vote, the Arab states expressedtheir opinions of UN Resolution 181. Amir Arslan of Syria called the Charter “dead,”while the Saudi Arabian delegate said that they were not bound by the decision. Arabspokesmen claimed the resolution had destroyed the United Nations. [See Document12: Verbatim Provisional Records, UN General Assembly (November 29, 1947).]

The UN Palestine Commission was then created to oversee implementation of

Introduction xi

Resolution 181. Its first special report—on security issues in Palestine—was deliv-ered to the Security Council in February 1948. The Commission warned: “PowerfulArab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, are defying the resolution of theGeneral Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settle-ment envisaged therein.” Included in this special report were excerpts of a commu-nication to the Commission from the Arab Higher Committee. The Committeestates it will never accept partition or the idea of a Jewish state. [See Document 13:Report of UN Palestine Commission: First Special Report to the Security Council: TheProblem of Security in Palestine, Document A/AC.219 (16 February 1948).]

The final report of the UN Palestine Commission, on April 10, 1948, conclud-ed that the Jews cooperated with the Commission, but that the Arab states and theArab Higher Committee opposed Resolution 181(II). The report states that nonco-operation from both the British mandatory power and the Arabs meant the Com-mittee could not implement the UN resolution. Various problems that needed to beaddressed in Palestine were discussed in the report, such as: security, economy, thestatus of Jerusalem, and food supplies. [See Document 14: UN Palestine CommissionReport to the General Assembly (April 10, 1948).]

In his memoirs, Trygve Lie, the first secretary-general of the United Nations,gives a firsthand account of the proceedings at the UN concerning partition. Hereviews the history of UNSCOP and Resolution 181(II) and Jewish and Arab reac-tions to the Partition Plan. When the Arab invasion of Israel began in May 1948,Lie saw it as “armed defiance of the United Nations.” [Document 15: Trygve Lie, Inthe Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations.]

We have included in this collection a speech to the Ad Hoc Political Commit-tee of the United Nations delivered a year later, on May 5, 1949, by Abba Eban,Israel’s permanent representative to the UN and later foreign minister. Eban makesthe case for Israel’s entrance into the UN, examining the earlier issues reviewed bythe UN with regard to Palestine as well as other topics that arose in the year that fol-lowed, as independence was proclaimed and an armed conflict was in progress. Ebanargued that Israel had fulfilled the requirements of the UN Charter, and that a solu-tion to the conflict could only be found in cooperation between Israel and its neigh-bors. [Document 16: Abba Eban, Israel: The Case for Admission to the United Nations(May 5, 1949).]

UN General Assembly Resolution No. 273, admitting Israel to membership inthe UN, regularizes the status of the State of Israel among the nations of the world.[See Document 17: UN General Assembly Resolution 273, New York (May 11, 1949).]We offer it as a conclusion to this documentary record.

xii

International Commitments on the Middle East: A Timeline, 1917-48

19172 November Government of United Kingdom guarantees reconstitution

of a “national home for the Jewish people in Palestine,” signing Balfour Declaration.

19193 March Letters exchanged between Emir Feisal, who led

the Arab Hedjaz delegation to the Paris Peace talks, and Judge Felix Frankfurter, representing the Zionists.

28 June Treaty of Versailles ends World War I and creates League of Nations, an international organization of countries committed to “promoting international co-operation and achieving international peace and security.” The League Covenant enters into force 10 January 1920, and its Assembly first convenes on 15 November 1920.

192019-26 April In Treaty of San Remo, principal Allied powers entrust

United Kingdom with Mandate to govern Palestine.

10 August In Treaty of Sèvres, Allied Powers assign United Kingdom responsibility for governance of Palestine, as the Ottoman Empire renounces all claims to region.

1922 The League of Nations assigns Mandate for Palestine to United Kingdom, asking it to prepare the territory for independence.

1936 Peel Commission recommends partition of Palestine.

1939May British issue a White Paper proposing an independent

Palestinian state in ten years, limiting Jewish immigration and making it subject to Arab consent, and prohibiting land sales to Jews.

June League of Nations says the new White Paper is “not in accordance with the interpretation which … the Commission had placed on the Palestine Mandate.”

International Commitments on the Middle East: A Timeline xiii

1939-45 World War Two

194524 October United Nations Charter signed in San Francisco

establishing new world organization devoted to preserving world peace and security.

194618 April League of Nations is formally dissolved.

1947February Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin says United Kingdom

wishes to refer Palestine Mandate to United Nations.

2 April UK requests special session of UN General Assembly to consider future government of Palestine.

28 April UN General Assembly session addresses Palestine issue.

15 May General Assembly establishes Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP).

26 May UNSCOP convenes at Lake Success.

15 June UNSCOP arrives in Palestine and begins series of hearings and meetings; travels within Palestine.

20 July UNSCOP travels to Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.

8 August UNSCOP Subcommittee travels to Germany and Austria.

31 August UNSCOP issues report. Unanimously decides to end UK mandate, and calls for preservation of Holy Places; constitutional democracy with rights guarantees; settling disputes peacefully; preserving economic unity of Palestine. Additionally, majority report (seven) recommends partition of Palestine with an internationalized Jerusalem, and minority report (three) recommends local self-government of Jerusalem and Arab sections.

13-16 September UN General Assembly begins annual session.

23 September UN General Assembly establishes Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question and refers UNSCOP report to it.

29 September Arab Higher Committee formally rejects UNSCOP plan.

xiv Mandate of Destiny

2 October Jewish Agency formally accepts UNSCOP partition plan.

22 October UN Ad Hoc Committee on Palestinian Question sets up subcommittees to examine UNSCOP proposals for partition and unitary state.

10 November Subcommittees conclude and recommend (1) measures for partition and (2) measures for unitary state. Ad Hoc Committee defeats proposal for unitary state by 16-16-23. Accepts partition plan by vote 25-18-17 and sends to General Assembly for final action.

25 November Report of Ad Hoc Committee on Palestinian Question brought to UN General Assembly

29 November UN General Assembly adopts Resolution 181 to partition Palestine and establish, by 1 October 1948, Jewish and Arab states, and internationalized Jerusalem, by 33-13-10 vote. Arab states reject Resolution 181 and declare UN Charter “dead.”

194816 February UN Palestine Commission sends first special report

to UN Security Council complaining that Arabs are “defying” Resolution 181, “have infiltrated into” Palestine, and are “defeating the resolution by acts of violence.”

10 April UN Palestine Commission issues report on implementation of Resolution 181, concluding that while the Jewish Agency has cooperated, its efforts to implement partition plan are hampered by the governments of Arab states and the Arab Higher Committee, who “actively opposed” the resolution.

14 May United Kingdom mandate over Palestine ends.

Declaration of statehood by Israel

1949May 11 State of Israel admitted to United Nations.

1

Document 1: Correspondence between Felix Frankfurterand Prince (Emir) Feisal of Saudi ArabiaMarch 3, 1919

In 1919, this correspondence between the Emir of Saudi Arabia, as a representativeof the Arab Kingdom of Hedjaz (later Saudi Arabia), and Felix Frankfurter, as arepresentative of the Zionist Organization (later an associate justice of the U.S.Supreme Court), describes their mutual support for both the Jewish and Arab questto establish independent states, free from colonial or imperialist domination. EmirFeisal expresses sympathy for the Zionist movement and affirms that both the Araband Zionist movements are nationalist not imperialist, and there is room for both inthe Middle East. He attributes controversy between Arabs and Jews to “people lessinformed and less responsible” who have tried “to exploit” and misrepresent bothmovements. Feisal says the differences are not matters of principle, but details thatcan be “easily adjusted by mutual goodwill.” Feisal describes the Arabs and Jews as“cousins in race” and yearns for cooperation and understanding between the twopeoples. He states that together they can bring about a “reformed and revived NearEast.”

Delegation Hedjazienne, Paris, March 3, 1919.

Dear Mr. Frankfurter: I want to take this opportunity of my first con-tact with American Zionists to tell you what I have often been able to sayto Dr. Weizmann in Arabia and Europe.

We feel that the Arabs and Jews are cousins in race, having sufferedsimilar oppressions at the hands of powers stronger than themselves, andby a happy coincidence have been able to take the first step towards theattainment of their national ideals together.

We Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with the deepestsympathy on the Zionist movement. Our deputation here in Paris is fullyacquainted with the proposals submitted yesterday by the Zionist Organi-zation to the Peace Conference, and we regard them as moderate andproper. We will do our best, in so far as we are concerned, to help themthrough: we will wish the Jews a most hearty welcome home.

With the chiefs of your movement, especially with Dr. Weizmann,we have had and continue to have the closest relations. He has been agreat helper of our cause, and I hope the Arabs may soon be in a position

2 Mandate of Destiny

to make the Jews some return for their kindness. We are working togetherfor a reformed and revived Near East, and our two movements completeone another. The Jewish movement is national and not imperialist. Ourmovement is national and not imperialist, and there is room in Syria for usboth. Indeed I think that neither can be a real success without the other.

People less informed and less responsible than our leaders and yours,ignoring the need for cooperation of the Arabs and Zionists have beentrying to exploit the local difficulties that must necessarily arise in Pales-tine in the early stages of our movements. Some of them have, I am afraid,misrepresented your aims to the Arab peasantry, and our aims to the Jew-ish peasantry, with the result that interested parties have been able tomake capital out of what they call our differences.

I wish to give you my firm conviction that these differences are noton questions of principle, but on matters of detail such as must inevitablyoccur in every contact of neighbouring peoples, and as are easily adjustedby mutual goodwill. Indeed nearly all of them will disappear with fullerknowledge.

I look forward, and my people with me look forward, to a future inwhich we will help you and you will help us, so that the countries in whichwe are mutually interested may once again take their places in the commu-nity of civilised peoples of the world.

Believe me,Yours sincerely,(Sgd.) FEISAL. 5th March, 1919.

Royal Highness:Allow me, on behalf of the Zionist Organisation, to acknowledge

your recent letter with deep appreciation.Those of us who came from the United States have already been

gratified by the friendly relations and the active cooperation maintainedbetween you and the Zionist leaders, particularly Dr. Weizmann. Weknew it could not be otherwise; we knew that the aspirations of the Araband Jewish peoples were parallel, that each aspired to reestablish its

Correspondence between Felix Frankfurter and Prince (Emir) Feisal 3

nationality in its own homeland, each making its own distinctive contribu-tion to civilization, each seeking its own peaceful mode of life.

The Zionist leaders and the Jewish people for whom they speak havewatched with satisfaction the spiritual vigour of the Arab movement.Themselves seeking justice, they are anxious that the national aims of theArab people be confirmed and safeguarded by the Peace Conference.

We knew from your acts and your past utterances that the Zionistmovement—in other words the national aims of the Jewish people—hadyour support and the support of the Arab people for whom you speak.These aims are now before the Peace Conference as definite proposals bythe Zionist Organisation. We are happy indeed that you consider theseproposals “moderate and proper,” and that we have in you a staunch sup-porter of their realisation. For both the Arab and the Jewish peoples thereare difficulties ahead—difficulties that challenge the united statesmanshipof Arab and Jewish leaders. For it is no easy task to rebuild two great civil-isations that have been suffering oppression and misrule for centuries. Weeach have our difficulties we shall work out as friends, friends who are ani-mated by similar purposes, seeking a free and full development for the twoneighbouring peoples. The Arabs and Jews are neighbours in territory; wecannot but live side by side as friends.

Very respectfully,(Sgd.) Felix Frankfurter.

Document 2: Treaty of Peace between the Principal Allied Powers and TurkeySèvres, August 10, 1920

The Treaty of Sèvres was a post-World War I agreement between the victoriousAllied powers and representatives of the government of Ottoman Turkey. As a resultof the treaty, Turkey renounced all rights over Arab Asia and North Africa, includ-ing the area known as Palestine. The treaty stated that the United Kingdom was tobe responsible for Iraq and Palestine, and France would control Lebanon and anenlarged Syria. Article 95 specifically stated that the Mandatory Power will betasked with implementing the Balfour Declaration.

Treaty of Peace Between the Principal Allied Powers and TurkeySèvres, August 10, 1920Article 95

The High Contracting Parties agree to entrust, by application of theprovisions of Article 22, the administration of Palestine, within suchboundaries as may be determined by the Principal Allied Powers, to aMandatory to be selected by the said Powers. The Mandatory will beresponsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made onNovember 2, 1917, by the British Government, and adopted by the otherAllied Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a nationalhome for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shallbe done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyedby Jews in any other country.

4

Document 3: League of Nations Mandate for PalestineSeptember 23, 1922

In September 1922, the League of Nations, an international organization created asa result of the Versailles Treaty, decided that Palestine was to be under a BritishMandate. The British were charged with promoting local autonomy and preparingPalestine for eventual independence. The British would administer Palestine forover two decades before they handed their mandate back to the United Nations, theworld body that was created after World War II.

League of Nations Mandate for Palestinetogether with a Note by the Secretary-General Relating to its Applications to the Territory Known as Trans-Jordan under the Provisions of Article 25

The Council of the League of Nations:Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of

giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the Leagueof Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers theadministration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged tothe Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that theMandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declarationoriginally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Bri-tannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establish-ment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clear-ly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civiland religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, orthe rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connec-tion of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconsti-tuting their national home in that country; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His BritannicMajesty as the Mandatory for Palestine; and

Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated inthe following terms and submitted to the Council of the League forapproval; and

5


Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respectof Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League ofNations in conformity with the following provisions; and

Whereas by the afore-mentioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is pro-vided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exer-cised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by theMembers of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of theLeague of Nations;

Confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows:Article 1.The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of adminis-

tration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.Article 2.The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under

such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure theestablishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble,and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safe-guarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine,irrespective of race and religion.

Article 3.The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local

autonomy.Article 4.An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for

the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration ofPalestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect theestablishment of the Jewish National home and the interests of the Jewishpopulation in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Adminis-tration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.

The Zionist organisation, so long as its organisation and constitutionare in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised assuch agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His BritannicMajesty’s Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are will-ing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.

Article 5.The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine terri-

tory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of,the Government of any foreign Power.

Article 6.The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and

position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facili-tate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, inco-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settle-ment by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands notrequired for public purposes.

Article 7.The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a

nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so asto facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take uptheir permanent residence in Palestine.

Article 8.The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of

consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation orusage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine.

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the afore-mentionedprivileges and immunities on August 1st, 1914, shall have previouslyrenounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to theirnon-application for a specified period, these privileges and immunitiesshall, at the expiration of the mandate, be immediately re-established intheir entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed uponbetween the Powers concerned.

Article 9.The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial sys-

tem established in Palestine shall assure to foreigners, as well as to natives,a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and communi-ties and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular,the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in accordancewith religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

League of Nations Mandate for Palestine 7


Article 10.Pending the making of special extradition agreements relating to

Palestine, the extradition treaties in force between the Mandatory andother foreign Powers shall apply to Palestine […]

Article 22.English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Pales-

tine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Pales-tine shall be repeated in Hebrew, and any statement or inscription inHebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.

Article 23.The Administration of Palestine shall recognise the holy days of the

respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the membersof such communities.

Article 24.The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations

an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures takenduring the year to carry out the provisions of the mandate. Copies of alllaws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be com-municated with the report.

Article 25.In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary

of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled,with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone orwithhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consid-er inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provisionfor the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable tothose conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsis-tent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.

Article 26.The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise

between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nationsrelating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of themandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be sub-mitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for byArticle 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Document 4: American-British Palestine Mandate ConventionDecember 3, 1924

Two years after the British received a mandate for Palestine from the League ofNations, an agreement was signed between the United States and Britain, settingforth goals and details of the mandate and how the British were expected to admin-ister it. The convention specifically reaffirms the United Kingdom’s responsibility toput into effect the internationally recognized commitment to reestablish a nationalhome for the Jewish people in Palestine and the historic connection of the Jewishpeople with Palestine, and encourages the British to do everything possible toensure this reality. Relevant articles of the convention are presented below.

American-British Palestine Mandate Convention of December 3, 1924

Whereas by the Treaty of Peace concluded with the Allied Powers,Turkey renounces all her rights and titles over Palestine; and

Whereas article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations in theTreaty of Versailles provides that in the case of certain territories which, asa consequence of the late war, ceased to be under the sovereignty of theStates which formerly governed them, mandates should be issued, andthat the terms of the mandate should be explicitly defined in each case bythe Council of the League; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed to entrust the man-date for Palestine to His Britannic Majesty; and

Whereas the terms of the said mandate have been defined by theCouncil of the League of Nations, as follows:

The Council of the League of Nations:Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of

giving effect to the provisions of article 22 of the Covenant of the Leagueof Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers theadministration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged tothe Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that theMandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declarationoriginally made on the 2nd November 1917, by the Government of hisBritannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the estab-

9


lishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it beingclearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice thecivil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine,or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connec-tion of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconsti-tuting their national home in that country; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His BritannicMajesty as the Mandatory for Palestine; and

Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated inthe following terms and submitted to the Council of the League forapproval; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respectof Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League ofNations in conformity with the following provisions; and

Whereas by the aforementioned article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provid-ed that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised bythe Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the membersof the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League ofNations….

Article 26.The Mandatory agrees that if any dispute whatever should arise

between the Mandatory and another member of the League of Nationsrelating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of themandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be sub-mitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for byarticle 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Article 27.The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for

any modification of the terms of this mandate.Article 28.In the event of the termination of the mandate hereby conferred upon

the Mandatory, the Council of the League of Nations shall make sucharrangements as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity,under guarantee of the League, the rights secured by articles 13 and 14,and shall use its influence for securing, under the guarantee of the League,

American-British Palestine Mandate Convention 11

that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial obliga-tions legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during theperiod of the mandate, including the rights of public servants to pensionsor gratuities.

The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archivesof the League of Nations, and certified copies shall be forwarded by theSecretary-General of the League of Nations to all members of the League.

Done at London, the 24th day of July, 1922; andWhereas the mandate in the above terms came into force on the 29th

September, 1923; andWhereas, the United States of America, by participating in the war

against Germany, contributed to her defeat and the defeat of her Allies,and to the renunciation of the rights and titles of her Allies in the territo-ry transferred by them but has not ratified the Covenant of the League ofNations embodied in the Treaty of Versailles; and

Whereas the Government of the United States and the Governmentof His Britannic Majesty desire to reach a definite understanding withrespect to the rights of the two Governments and their respective nation-als in Palestine;

The President of the United States of America and His BritannicMajesty have decided to conclude a convention to this effect, and havenamed as their plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States of America:His Excellency the Honourable Frank B. Kellogg, Ambassador

Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States at London:His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:The Right Honourable Joseph Austen Chamberlain, M.P., His

Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: who, after having communicated to each other their respective full

powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:Article 1.Subject to the provisions of the present convention the United States

consents to the administration of Palestine by His Britannic Majesty, pur-suant to the mandate recited above.


Article 2.The United States and its nationals shall have and enjoy all the rights

and benefits secured under the terms of the mandate to members of theLeague of Nations and their nationals, notwithstanding the fact that theUnited States is not a member of the League of Nations.

Article 3.Vested American property rights in the mandated territory shall be

respected and in no way impaired.Article 4.A duplicate of the annual report to be made by the Mandatory under

article 24 of the mandate shall be furnished to the United States.Article 5.Subject to the provisions of any local laws for the maintenance of

public order and public morals, the nationals of the United States will bepermitted freely to establish and maintain educational, philanthropic andreligious institutions in the mandated territory, to receive voluntary appli-cants and to teach in the English language.

Article 6.The extradition treaties and conventions which are, or may be, in

force between the United States and Great Britain, and the provisions ofany treaties which are, or may be, in force between the two countrieswhich relate to extradition or consular rights shall apply to the mandatedterritory.

13

Document 5: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 106 (S-1)

This resolution, adopted on May 15, 1947, created a Special Committee to investi-gate and propose solutions for the “question of Palestine.” The committee was madeup of eleven nations from around the world, and given three-and-a-half months tocome up with solutions to the problem. The group traveled to the region, questionedboth sides in the conflict, and reported its findings to the General Assembly.

Resolutions Adopted on the Reports of the First Committee106 (S-1) Special Committee on Palestine

Whereas the General Assembly of the United Nations has beencalled into special session for the purpose of constituting and instructing aspecial committee to prepare for special consideration at the next regularsession of the Assembly a report on the question of Palestine,

The General Assembly Resolves that:1. A Special Committee be created for the above-mentioned purpose

consisting of the representatives of Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia,Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay andYugoslavia;

2. The Special Committee shall have the widest powers to ascertainand record facts, and to investigate all questions and issues relevant to theproblem of Palestine;

3. The Special Committee shall determine its own procedure;4. The Special Committee shall conduct investigations in Palestine

and wherever it may deem useful, receive and examine written or oral tes-timony, whichever it may consider appropriate in each case, from themandatory Power, from representatives of the population of Palestine,from Governments and from such organizations and individuals as it maydeem necessary;

5. The Special Committee shall give most careful consideration tothe religious interests in Palestine of Islam, Judaism and Christianity;

6. The Special Committee shall prepare a report to the GeneralAssembly and shall submit such proposals as it may consider appropriatefor the solution of the problem of Palestine;

7. The Special Committee’s report shall be communicated to the Sec-retary-General not later than 1 September 1947, in order that it may becirculated to the Members of the United Nations in time for considerationby the second regular session of the General Assembly;

The General Assembly8. Requests the Secretary-General to enter into suitable arrangements

with the proper authorities of any State in whose territory the SpecialCommittee may wish to sit or to travel, to provide necessary facilities, andto assign appropriate staff to the Special Committee;

9. Authorizes the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and subsis-tence expenses of a representative and an alternative representative fromeach Government represented on the Special Committee on such basisand in such form as he may determine most appropriate in the circum-stances.


Document 6: United Nations Special Committee on Palestine:Report to the United Nations General AssemblyAugust 31, 1947

The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was created bythe UN General Assembly Resolution 106 (S-1) on May 15, 1947, to explore asolution to the hostilities between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, as the British haddecided to turn over responsibility for their mandate to the United Nations. Thecommittee was comprised of representatives of eleven nations from around theworld: Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands,Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. It was empowered to “ascertain and recordfacts, and to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Pales-tine.” This report presents the committee’s findings and recommendations.

UNSCOP issued its final report following an intensive three-and-a-half-month period of study, which included sixteen public and thirty-six private meetingsand travel to and throughout Palestine, and to Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria as well. Inits final report, UNSCOP unanimously decided to end the UK mandate, and calledfor preservation of the Holy Places, constitutional democracy with rights guaran-tees, settling disputes peacefully, and preserving the economic unity of Palestine.Additionally, the majority report (seven) recommended partition of Palestine withan internationalized Jerusalem, while the minority report (three) recommendedlocal self-government of Jerusalem and Arab sections. These proposals were submit-ted for discussion by the UN General Assembly at its September–December 1947session. The UNSCOP report’s recommendations are included here.

Section A. Recommendations approved unanimously

Recommendation I. Termination of the Mandate

It is recommended thatThe Mandate for Palestine shall be terminated at the earliest practi-

cable date.CommentAmong the reasons for this unanimous conclusion are the following:

(a) All directly interested parties—the mandatory Power, Arabs andJews—are in full accord that there is urgent need for a change in the statusof Palestine. The mandatory Power has officially informed the Committee

15


“that the Mandate has proved to be unworkable in practice, and that theobligations undertaken to the two communities in Palestine have beenshown to be irreconcilable.” Both Arabs and Jews urge the termination ofthe mandate and the grant of independence to Palestine, although they arein vigorous disagreement as to the form that independence should take.

(b) The outstanding feature of the Palestine situation today is foundin the clash between Jews and the mandatory Power on the one hand, andon the other the tension prevailing between Arabs and Jews. This conflictsituation, which finds expression partly in an open breach between theorganized Jewish community and the Administration and partly in organ-ized terrorism and acts of violence, has steadily grown more intense andtakes as its toll an ever-increasing loss of life and destruction of property.

(c) In the nature of the case, the Mandate implied only a temporarytutelage for Palestine. The terms of the Mandate include provisions whichhave proved contradictory in their practical application.

(d) It may be seriously questioned whether, in any event, the Man-date would now be possible of execution. The essential feature of the man-dates system was that it gave an international status to the mandated terri-tories. This involved a positive element of international responsibility forthe mandated territories and an international accountability to the Coun-cil of the League of Nations on the part of each mandatory for the well-being and development of the peoples of those territories. The PermanentMandates Commission was created for the specific purpose of assistingthe Council of the League in this function. But the League of Nations andthe Mandates Commission have been dissolved, and there is now nomeans of discharging fully the international obligation with regard to amandated territory other than by placing the territory under the Interna-tional Trusteeship System of the United Nations.

(e) The International Trusteeship System, however, has not automat-ically taken over the functions of the mandates system with regard tomandated territories. Territories can be placed under Trusteeship only bymeans of individual Trusteeship Agreements approved by a two-thirdsmajority of the General Assembly.

(f ) The most the mandatory could now do, therefore, in the event ofthe continuation of the Mandate, would be to carry out its administration,in the spirit of the Mandate, without being able to discharge its interna-

United Nations Special Committee on Palestine: Report to the UN General Assembly 17

tional obligations in accordance with the intent of the mandates system.At the time of the termination of the Permanent Mandates Commissionin April 1946, the mandatory Power did, in fact, declare its intention tocarry on the administration of Palestine, pending a new arrangement, inaccordance with the general principles of the Mandate. The mandatoryPower has itself now referred the matter to the United Nations.

Recommendation II. Independence

It is recommended thatIndependence shall be granted in Palestine at the earliest practicable

date.Comment(a) Although sharply divided by political issues, the peoples of Pales-

tine are sufficiently advanced to govern themselves independently.(b) The Arab and Jewish peoples, after more than a quarter of a cen-

tury of tutelage under the Mandate, both seek a means of effective expres-sion for their national aspirations.

(c) It is highly unlikely that any arrangement which would fail toenvisage independence at a reasonably early date would find the slightestwelcome among either Arabs or Jews.

Recommendation III. Transitional Period

It is recommended thatThere shall be a transitional period preceding the grant of independ-

ence in Palestine which shall be as short as possible, consistent with theachievement of the preparations and conditions essential to independence.

Comment(a) A transitional period preceding independence is clearly impera-

tive. It is scarcely conceivable, in view of the complicated nature of thePalestine problem, that independence could be responsibly granted with-out a prior period of preparation.

(b) The importance of the transitional period is that it would be theperiod in which the governmental organization would have to be estab-lished, and in which the guarantees for such vital matters as the protectionof minorities, and the safeguarding of the Holy Places and religious inter-ests could be ensured.


(c) A transitional period, however, would in all likelihood only serveto aggravate the present difficult situation in Palestine unless it were relat-ed to a specific and definitive solution which would go into effect immedi-ately upon the termination of that period, and were to be of a positivelystated duration, which, in any case, should not exceed a very few years.

Recommendation IV. United Nations Responsibility during the Transitional Period

It is recommended thatDuring the transitional period the authority entrusted with the task

of administering Palestine and preparing it for independence shall beresponsible to the United Nations.

Comment(a) The responsibility for administering Palestine during the transi-

tional period and preparing it for independence will be a heavy one.Whatever the solution, enforcement measures on an extensive scale maybe necessary for some time. The Committee is keenly aware of the centralimportance of this aspect of any solution, but has not felt competent tocome to any conclusive opinion or to formulate any precise recommenda-tions on this matter.

(b) It is obvious that a solution which might be considered intrinsi-cally as the best possible and most satisfactory from every technical pointof view would be of no avail if it should appear that there would be nomeans of putting it into effect. Taking into account the fact that devising asolution which will be fully acceptable to both Jews and Arabs seems to beutterly impossible, the prospect of imposing a solution upon them wouldbe a basic condition of any recommended proposal.

(c) Certain obstacles which may well confront the authority entrustedwith the administration during the transitional period make it desirablethat a close link be established with the United Nations.

(d) The relative success of the authority entrusted with the adminis-tration of Palestine during the transitional period in creating the properatmosphere and in carrying out the necessary preparations for the assump-tion of independence will influence greatly the effectiveness of the finalsolution to be applied. It will be of the utmost importance to the dischargeof its heavy responsibilities that, while being accountable to the United


Nations for its actions in this regard, the authority concerned should beable to count upon the support of the United Nations in carrying out thedirectives of that body.

Recommendation V. Holy Places and Religious Interests

It is recommended thatIn whatever solution may be adopted for Palestine,A. The sacred character of the Holy Places shall be preserved and

access to the Holy Places for purposes of worship and pilgrimage shall beensured in accordance with existing rights, in recognition of the properinterest of millions of Christians, Jews and Moslems abroad as well as theresidents of Palestine in the care of sites and buildings associated with theorigin and history of their faiths.

B. Existing rights in Palestine of the several religious communitiesshall be neither impaired nor denied, in view of the fact that their mainte-nance is essential for religious peace in Palestine under conditions of inde-pendence.

C. An adequate system shall be devised to settle impartially disputesinvolving religious rights as an essential factor in maintaining religiouspeace, taking into account the fact that during the Mandate such disputeshave been settled by the Government itself, which acted as an arbiter andenjoyed the necessary authority and power to enforce its decisions.

D. Specific stipulations concerning Holy Places, religious buildingsor sites and the rights of religious communities shall be inserted in theconstitution or constitutions of any independent Palestinian State orStates which may be created.

Comment(a) Palestine, as the Holy Land, occupies a unique position in the

world. It is sacred to Christian, Jew and Moslem alike. The spiritual inter-ests of hundreds of millions of adherents of the three great monotheisticreligions are intimately associated with its scenes and historical events.Any solution of the Palestine question should take into considerationthese religious interests.

(b) The safeguarding of the Holy Places, buildings and sites locatedin Palestine should be a condition to the grant of independence.


Recommendation VI. Jewish Displaced Persons

It is recommended thatThe General Assembly undertake immediately the initiation and

execution of an international arrangement whereby the problem of the dis-tressed European Jews, of whom approximately 250,000 are in assemblycenters, will be dealt with as a matter of extreme urgency for the alleviationof their plight and of the Palestine problem.

Comment(a) The distressed Jews of Europe, together with the displaced per-

sons generally, are a legacy of the Second World War. They are a recog-nized international responsibility. Owing however to the insistentdemands that the distressed Jews be admitted freely and immediately intoPalestine, and to the intense urge which exists among these people them-selves to the same end, they constitute a vital and difficult factor in thesolution.

(b) It cannot be doubted that any action which would ease the plightof the distressed Jews in Europe would thereby lessen the pressure of thePalestinian immigration problem, and would consequently create a betterclimate in which to carry out a final solution of the question of Palestine.This would be an important factor in allaying the fears of Arabs in theNear East that Palestine and ultimately the existing Arab countries are tobe marked as the place of settlement for the Jews of the world.

(c) The Committee recognizes that its terms of reference would notentitle it to devote its attention to the problem of the displaced persons asa whole. It realizes also that international action of a general nature isalready under way with regard to displaced persons. In view of the specialcircumstances of the Palestine question, however, it has felt justified inproposing a measure which is designed to ameliorate promptly the condi-tion of the Jewish segments of the displaced persons as a vital prerequisiteto the settlement of the difficult conditions in Palestine.

Recommendations VII. Democratic Principles and Protection of Minorities

It is recommended thatIn view of the fact that independence is to be granted in Palestine on

the recommendation and under the auspices of the United Nations, it is a


proper and an important concern of the United Nations that the constitu-tion or other fundamental law as well as the political structure of the newState or States shall be basically democratic, i.e., representative, in charac-ter, and that this shall be a prior condition to the grant of independence.In this regard, the constitution or other fundamental law of the new Stateor States shall include specific guarantees respecting

A. Human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom ofworship and conscience, speech, press and assemblage, the rights of organ-ized labor, freedom of movement, freedom from arbitrary searches andseizures, and rights of personal property; and

B. Full protection for the rights and interests of minorities, includingthe protection of the linguistic, religious and ethnic rights of the peoplesand respect for their cultures, and full equality of all citizens with regard topolitical, civil and religious matters.

Comment(a) The wide diffusion of both Arabs and Jews throughout Palestine

makes it almost inevitable that, in any solution, there will be an ethnicminority element in the population. In view of the fact that these two peo-ples live physically and spiritually apart, nurture separate aspirations andideals, and have widely divergent cultural traditions, it is important, in theinterest of orderly society, and for the well-being of all Palestinians, thatfull safeguards be ensured for the rights of all.

(b) Bearing in mind the unique position of Palestine as the HolyLand, it is especially important to protect the rights and interests of reli-gious minorities.

Recommendations VIII. Peaceful Relations

It is recommended thatIt shall be required, as a prior condition to independence, to incorpo-

rate in the future constitutional provisions applying to Palestine thosebasic principles of the Charter of the United Nations whereby a Stateshall;

A. Undertake to settle all international disputes in which it may beinvolved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace andsecurity, and justice, are not endangered; and


B. Accept the obligation to refrain in its international relations fromthe threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-pendence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes ofthe United Nations.

Comment(a) A fundamental objective in the solution of the Palestine problem

is to achieve a reasonable prospect for the preservation of peaceful rela-tions in the Middle East.

(b) Taking into account the charged atmosphere in which the Pales-tine solution must be effected, it is considered advisable to emphasize theinternational obligations with regard to peaceful relations which an inde-pendent Palestine would necessarily assume.

Recommendation IX. Economic Unity

In appraising the various proposals for the solution of the Palestinequestion, it shall be accepted as a cardinal principle that the preservationof the economic unity of Palestine as a whole is indispensable to the lifeand development of the country and its peoples.

Comment(a) It merits emphasis that the preservation of a suitable measure of

economic unity in Palestine, under any type of solution, is of the utmostimportance to the future standards of public services, the standards of lifeof its peoples, and the development of the country. Were the country lesslimited in area and richer in resources, it would be unnecessary to lay suchstress on the principle of economic unity. But there are sound grounds forthe assumption that any action which would reverse the present policy oftreating Palestine as an economic unit particularly with regard to suchmatters as customs, currency, transportation and communications, anddevelopment projects, including irrigation, land reclamation and soil con-servation—would not only handicap the material development of the ter-ritory as a whole but would also bring in its wake a considerable hardshipfor important segments of the population.

(b) Arab and Jewish communities alike would suffer from a completeseverance of the economic unity of the country. Each of the two commu-nities, despite the inevitable economic disruptions incident to the present


state of affairs in Palestine, makes vital contributions to the economic lifeof the country, and there is a substantial degree of economic interdepend-ence between them.

(c) Despite the degree of separateness in the economic life of the Jew-ish and Arab communities in Palestine, the fact that unity exists in essen-tial economic matters contributes to the material well-being of bothgroups. If that economic unity were not maintained in essentials, people inall parts of the country would be adversely affected.

Recommendation X. Capitulations

It is recommended thatStates whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in Palestine the priv-

ileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consularjurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage inthe Ottoman Empire, be invited by the United Nations to renounce anyright pertaining to them to the reestablishment of such privileges andimmunities in an independent Palestine.

Comment(a) Article 9(1) of the Mandate for Palestine makes provision for a

judicial system which “shall assure to foreigners, as well as to natives, acomplete guarantee of their rights.” It is especially significant, in thisregard, that article 8 of the Mandate did not abrogate consular jurisdictionand protection formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the OttomanEmpire, but merely left them in abeyance during the Mandate.

(b) On the termination of the Mandate, therefore, States havingenjoyed such rights prior to the Mandate will be in a position to claim there-establishment of capitulations in Palestine, and may demand, in partic-ular, as a condition for waiving such right, the maintenance of a satisfacto-ry judicial system.

(c) The Committee takes the view that, since independence will beachieved in Palestine under the auspices of the United Nations, and sub-ject to guarantees stipulated by the United Nations as a condition prior toindependence, there should be no need for any State to re-assert its claimwith respect to capitulations.

Recommendation XI. Appeal against Acts of Violence

It is recommended thatThe General Assembly shall call on the peoples of Palestine to extend

their fullest cooperation to the United Nations in its effort to devise andput into effect an equitable and workable means of settling the difficultsituation prevailing there, and to this end, in the interest of peace, goodorder, and lawfulness, to exert every effort to bring to an early end the actsof violence which have for too long beset that country.

Comment(a) The United Nations, being seized with the problem of Palestine,

should exert every proper effort to secure there a climate as congenial aspossible to the application of a solution of the problem, both as regards thetransitional and post-transitional periods.

(b) The recurrent acts of violence, until very recently confined almostexclusively to underground Jewish organizations, are not only detrimentalto the well-being of the country, but will also so augment the tension inPalestine as to render increasingly difficult the execution of the solution tobe agreed upon by the United Nations.


Document 7: Speech by Guatemalan Delegate Dr. Jorge Garcia Granados to the UN General Assembly

Guatemalan delegate Dr. Jorge Garcia Granados, who had been part of theUNSCOP delegation, addressed the General Assembly in support of partition. Hedescribes how the hopefulness of the UNSCOP members that they would find aworkable solution ran up against the realities of the Middle East, including what hedescribes as “words of hatred for the Jews,” “scowls and threatening gestures withwhich the Arabs greeted every Jew,” and “a rancour which makes an effort at concil-iation ... seem useless.” Noting that “in the present ... the Jews could expect nothingfrom an Arab government but persecution, slavery, and death,” Granados regrets the“intransigent attitude” of the Arab leaders who have become an “obstacle” to forgingties between the Jewish and Arab peoples, and expresses the hope that as time pass-es, “new ideas and new generations will wipe out the old grudges between these twopeoples,” promoting an era of peace.

PV. 126 28 November 1947

Mr. Garcia Granados (Guatemala) The fact that Guatemala is in favour of the resolution on which we

are to vote today is well known to you, as it has been stated in the UnitedNations Special Committee on Palestine, known as UNSCOP, in the AdHoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, and in the Sub-Committeewhich considered and revised the majority plan.

Our representatives went to Palestine filled with the hope that a solu-tion might be found which would be satisfactory to both parties. I am surethat all the members of UNSCOP were animated by the same spirit. OurChairman and the Committee as a whole sought many times to bringabout a settlement between the Arabs and the Jews. Our efforts were frus-trated by the intransigent attitude of the Arab Higher Committee, whichwould not give a hearing even to Judge Sandstrom, and which ordered allits affiliated organizations to refuse to collaborate with the Committeeand to threaten and intimidate all Arabs who seemed to favour concilia-tion.

Nothing daunted, UNSCOP made every possible approach to theArabs, visiting their towns and villages and taking no notice of the hostilereception. Our representatives never failed to hold out the hand of friend-ship; but in vain, for no Arab would grasp it.

25


We learned something on our trips. In town and country we heardwords of hatred for the Jews and noticed the scowls and threatening ges-tures with which the Arabs greeted every Jew. Arab monuments, schoolsand even factories were closed to the Jewish newspapermen accompanyingus, even when they were of European or American nationality, and repre-sented internationally famous newspapers and news agencies. In Palestine,a Jew may not visit the tomb of Abraham, the common ancestor of bothArabs and Jews, nor the tombs of Isaac and Jacob, forefathers of the Jewishrace. No Jew dare risk entering the mosque which was once the great tem-ple of Solomon, the most celebrated Holy Place of the Hebrew religion,because if he did so, he would be killed.

Years of propaganda have filled the simple hearts of the Arabs with arancour which makes efforts at conciliation and the establishment offriendly relations seem useless today.

These are the facts which we ascertained for ourselves. On these real-ities, we must base our judgment.

At the hearings in Jerusalem, the Palestine Government franklydeclared through its representatives that it considered the Mandateimpracticable.

The apparently irreconcilable conflict between Arabs and Jews, onthe one hand, and between the Jews and the mandatory Power on theother, proved to the Committee that this was indeed the case.

The Mandate, then, had to be terminated. Both peoples felt thedesire for independence. But this meant that UNSCOP must also submitto the United Nations a plan for the future organization of the country.

The unitary State suggested by the Arab Higher Committee, withthe support of the neighbouring States, is impracticable. In the presentdisturbed state of Palestine, the Jews could expect nothing from an ArabGovernment but persecution, slavery and death. And the nations of theworld cannot deliberately condemn to extermination a hard-working,honest community, which has established a culture of its own in the landof its fathers, and which is inspired by a deep and indomitable nationalspirit.

The United Nations is faced, in Palestine, with a thirty-year-oldproblem, and, since we cannot put the clock back, there is no remedy butpartition. We put forward this proposal with full realization of its difficul-

Speech by Dr. Jorge Garcia Granados to the UN General Assembly 27

ties, but with the conviction that its determined purpose makes it the onlyremedy for a conflict which otherwise threatens to become perpetual.

Furthermore, the creation of a Jewish State is a reparation owed byhumanity to an innocent and defenceless people which has sufferedhumiliation, and martyrdom for two thousand years.

The Palestine Arabs must know that we who vote in favour of thisresolution have no desire to harm their interests, and that the intransigentattitude of their leaders is the only obstacle to the attainment of liberty byboth peoples and to the forging of ties of brotherhood between them.

We hope that as the years go by and friendly human relations areestablished, new ideas and new generations will wipe out the old grudgesbetween these two great peoples, and that they will become closely unitedin peace and prosperity.

28

Document 8: Speech by Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko to the United Nations General Assembly

Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko gave this speech in support of partition as theUnited Nations was preparing to vote on UNSCOP’s recommendations. In it,Gromyko, who later served for twenty-eight years as the Soviet Union’s foreign min-ister, discusses alternative solutions proposed to the problem of Palestine and con-cludes that “all the alternative solutions of the Palestinian problem were found to beunworkable and impracticable,” including the option of “creating a single independ-ent Arab-Jewish state with equal rights for Arabs and Jews.” Explaining that thesolution advocated by the Soviet Union was based on “understanding and sympathy”for the anti-colonial national aspirations of the Arabs and support of national self-determination of peoples, in which he also includes the Jews, Gromyko notes withregret that the study by UNSCOP and others has shown that “Jews and Arabs donot wish, or are unable, to live together.” He complains about the British inabilityand unwillingness to cooperate with the United Nations to solve the problem, andrebuts the argument by some states, “mainly ... the Arab states,” that the issue isbeyond the competence of the United Nations organization, stating its advocates“were unable to adduce any convincing arguments apart from various general andunfounded statements.”

Mr. Gromyko (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): The Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics, as everyone knows, has had no direct materialor other interests in Palestine; it is interested in the question of Palestinebecause it is a Member of the United Nations and because it is a greatPower that bears, just as do other great Powers, a special responsibility forthe maintenance of international peace. These facts determine the standtaken by the Government of the USSR on the question of Palestine. Theviews of the delegation of the USSR have already been expressed fullyenough at the special session of the General Assembly, in May 1947, aswell as in the course of the debates during the present session. I shall not,therefore, repeat what has already been stated earlier by the USSR delega-tion when the question of the future of Palestine was being considered.But I believe that a few additional remarks will not be useless, in view ofthe fact that the General Assembly at this or a following meeting will have

Speech by Andrei Gromyko to the UN General Assembly 29

to take a momentous decision that will decide the future of Palestine. It isnatural, therefore, for every delegation to regard it as a duty not only totake up a definite position by voting for a particular proposal but also togive reasons for the stand it takes.

When the question of the future of Palestine was under discussion atthe special session of the General Assembly, the Government of the USSRpointed to the two most acceptable solutions of this question. The first wasthe creation of a single democratic Arab-Jewish State in which Arabs andJews would enjoy equal rights. In case that solution were to prove unwork-able because of Arab and Jewish insistence that, in view of the deteriora-tion in Arab-Jewish relations, they would be unable to live together, theGovernment of the USSR through its delegation at the Assembly, pointedto the second solution, which was to partition Palestine into two free,independent and democratic States—an Arab and a Jewish one.

The special session of the General Assembly, as you know, set up aSpecial Committee on Palestine which carefully studied the question ofPalestine in order to find the most acceptable solution. After the work ofthis Committee had been completed, we were gratified to find that its rec-ommendation, or to be more exact, the recommendation of the majority ofthe Committee, coincided with one of the two solutions advanced by theUSSR delegation at the special session. I have in mind the solution of par-titioning Palestine into two independent democratic States—an Arab anda Jewish one.

The USSR delegation, therefore, could not but support this alterna-tive which was recommended by the Special Committee. We now knowthat not only did the Special Committee which studied the problem of thefuture of Palestine accept the alternative of partition, but that this propos-al gained the support of an overwhelming majority of the other delega-tions represented in the General Assembly. The overwhelming majorityof Member States of the United Nations reached the same conclusion ashad been reached by the USSR Government after a comprehensive studyof the question how the problem of the future of Palestine should beresolved.

We may ask why it is that the overwhelming majority of the delega-tions represented in the General Assembly adopted this solution and not


another. The only explanation that can be given is that all the alternativesolutions of the Palestinian problem were found to be unworkable andimpractical. In stating this, I have in mind the project of creating a singleindependent Arab-Jewish State with equal rights for Arabs and Jews. Theexperience gained from the study of the Palestinian question, includingthe experience of the Special Committee, has shown that Jews and Arabsin Palestine do not wish or are unable to live together. The logical conclu-sion followed that, if these two peoples that inhabit Palestine, both ofwhich have deeply rooted historical ties with the land, cannot live togeth-er within the boundaries of a single State, there is no alternative but tocreate, in place of one country, two States—an Arab and a Jewish one. Itis, in the view of our delegation, the only workable solution.

The opponents of the partition of Palestine into two separate, inde-pendent, democratic States usually point to the fact that this decisionwould, as they allege, be directed against the Arabs, against the Arab pop-ulation in Palestine and against the Arab States in general. This point ofview is, for reasons that will be readily understood, particularly empha-sized by the delegations of the Arab countries. But the USSR delegationcannot concur in this view. Neither the proposal to partition Palestine intotwo separate, independent States nor the decision of the Ad Hoc Com-mittee that was created at that session and which approved the proposalwhich is now under discussion, is directed against the Arabs. This decisionis not directed against either of the two national groups that inhabit Pales-tine. On the contrary, the USSR delegation holds that this decision corre-sponds to the fundamental national interests of both peoples, that is to say,to the interests of the Arabs as well as of the Jews.

The representatives of the Arab States claim that the partition ofPalestine would be an historic injustice. But this view of the case is unac-ceptable, if only because, after all, the Jewish people has been closelylinked with Palestine for a considerable period in history. Apart from that,we must not overlook—and the USSR delegation drew attention to thiscircumstance originally at the special session of the General Assembly—we must not overlook the position in which the Jewish people foundthemselves as a result of the recent world war. I shall not repeat what theUSSR delegation said on this point at the special scission of the GeneralAssembly. However, it may not be amiss to remind my listeners again

that, as a result of the war which was unleashed by Hitlerite Germany, theJews, as a people, have suffered more than any other people. You knowthat there was not a single country in Western Europe which succeeded inadequately protecting the interests of the Jewish people against the arbi-trary acts and violence of the Hitlerites.

In connexion with the proposal to partition Palestine, the representa-tives of some Arab States referred to the USSR and attempted to castaspersions on the foreign policy of its Government. In particular, the rep-resentative of Lebanon twice exercised his ingenuity on the subject. I havealready pointed out that the proposal to divide Palestine into two separateindependent States, and the position which the USSR has taken in thismatter, are not directed against the Arabs, and that, in our profound con-viction, such a solution of this question is in keeping with the basicnational interests not only of the Jews but also of the Arabs.

The Government and the peoples of the USSR have entertained andstill entertain a feeling of sympathy for the national aspirations of thenations of the Arab East. The USSR’s attitude towards the efforts of thesepeoples to rid themselves of the last fetters of colonial dependence is oneof understanding and sympathy. Therefore, we do not identify with thevital national interests of the Arabs the clumsy statements made by someof the representatives of Arab States about the foreign policy of the USSRin connexion with the question of the future of Palestine. We draw a dis-tinction between such statements, which were obviously made under thestress of fleeting emotions, and the basic and permanent interests of theArab people. The USSR delegation is convinced that Arabs and the ArabStates will still, on more than one occasion, be looking towards Moscowand expecting the USSR to help them in the struggle for their lawfulinterests, in their efforts to cast off the last vestiges of foreign dependence.

The delegation of the USSR maintains that the decision to partitionPalestine is in keeping with the high principles and aims of the UnitedNations. It is in keeping with the principle of the national self-determina-tion of peoples. The policy of the USSR in the sphere of Nationality prob-lems, which has been pursued ever since its creation, is a policy of friend-ship and self-determination of peoples. That is why all the nationalitiesthat inhabit the USSR represent a single united family that has surviveddesperate trials during the war years in its fight against the most powerful



and most dangerous enemy that a peace-loving people has ever met. The solution of the Palestine problem based on a partition of Pales-

tine into two separate states will be of profound historical significance,because this decision will meet the legitimate demands of the Jewish peo-ple, hundreds of thousands of whom, as you know, are still without acountry, without homes, having found temporary shelter only in specialcamps in some western European countries. I shall not speak of the condi-tions in which these people are living; these conditions are well known.Quite a lot has been said on this subject by representatives who share theUSSR delegation’s point of view in this matter, and which support theplan for partitioning Palestine into two States.

The Assembly is making a determined effort to find the most equi-table, most practical, most workable and at the same time the most radicalsolution to the Palestine problem. In doing so, the Assembly bases itselfon certain irrefutable facts which led to the Palestinian question beingraised in the United Nations. What are these facts? Fact number one isthat the mandate system has been found wanting. I shall say more: themandate system has failed. That the mandate system has failed we knoweven from the statements of the United Kingdom representatives. Thesestatements were made at the special session as well as at the present ses-sion of the Assembly. It was just because the system of governing Palestineby mandate had failed, had proved inadequate, that the United KingdomGovernment turned to the United Nations for help. The United Kingdomasked the Assembly to take the appropriate decision and thus to undertakeitself the settlement of the problem of the future of Palestine.

Fact number two: the United Kingdom Government, having turnedto the United Nations, stated that it could not be responsible for imple-menting all the measures which will have to be put into effect in Palestinein connexion with a possible decision of the General Assembly. In sodoing, the United Kingdom Government has recognized that the GeneralAssembly can, by virtue of the rights and powers conferred upon it by theCharter, assume responsibility for settling the question of the future ofPalestine.

The USSR delegation considers it advisable, nevertheless, to draw theAssembly’s attention to the fact that up to now the Assembly has not beengetting from the United Kingdom the kind of support which we have the


right to expect. On the one hand, the United Kingdom Government hasapplied to the Assembly for help in settling the question of the future ofPalestine; on the other hand, the United Kingdom Government duringthe discussion of the question at the special session as well as during thecurrent session of the Assembly, has entered so many reservations thatwilly-nilly one asks oneself whether the United Kingdom is really anxiousto have the Palestinian problem settled through the United Nations.

At the special session of the General Assembly, the United Kingdomrepresentative, on the one hand, declared that the United Kingdom is pre-pared to implement the United Nations decisions, provided that theresponsibility for the action that would possibly have to be taken did notrest with the United Kingdom alone.

By this declaration, the United Kingdom delegation made itunequivocally clear to the other States that it was prepared to cooperatewith the United Nations in the solution of this problem.

On the other hand, however, at that same special session, the UnitedKingdom representative stated that his Government was prepared to giveeffect to the relevant decisions of the General Assembly only if the Arabsand Jews agreed on some kind of a solution of the problem. It will be clearto everyone that these two statements contradict each other. If the firststatement shows the readiness of the United Kingdom to cooperate withthe United Nations in this matter, the second statement shows that theUnited Kingdom Government may disregard the Assembly’s decision.

Similar reservations have been made by the United Kingdom repre-sentative during the present session. We have heard, today, Sir AlexanderCadogan’s statement on this matter. He repeated in a slightly modifiedform the idea that the United Kingdom was prepared to implement theAssembly’s decision provided the Jews and the Arabs came to an agree-ment. But we all know that the Arabs and the Jews have failed to reach anagreement. The discussion of this problem at the present session showsthat an agreement between them is impossible. There seems to be noprospect of any such agreement being reached between Arabs and Jews.

This is the opinion not only of the USSR delegation but of all thosedelegations that have come to the conclusion that a definitive decision onthis question must be reached during the present session.

All these reservations by the United Kingdom delegation show that


the United Kingdom has no real desire, even now, to cooperate fully withthe United Nations in solving this problem. While the vast majority of thedelegations represented at the General Assembly were in favour of reach-ing forthwith a definite decision on the question of the future of Palestine,in favour of partitioning Palestine into two States, the United KingdomGovernment declares that it will comply with the Assembly decision onlywhen the Jews and the Arabs agree between themselves. I repeat that toput forward such a stipulation is almost tantamount to burying this deci-sion even before the General Assembly has taken it. Is that how the Unit-ed Kingdom should behave in this matter, especially now, when, afterlengthy discussion, it has become clear to everyone, including the UnitedKingdom, that the overwhelming majority of countries are in favour ofpartitioning Palestine?

In the course of the first session in which the question of the future ofPalestine first arose, it was still possible, at least to understand the reserva-tions made by the United Kingdom delegation. But now, after the views ofthe overwhelming majority of the United Nations Members have becomeclear, the lodging of such reservations is tantamount to stating in advancethat the United Kingdom does not consider itself bound by any solutionthe General Assembly may adopt.

The USSR delegation cannot share this view. We have a right toexpect the cooperation of the United Kingdom in this matter. We have aright to expect that, should the Assembly adopt a certain recommenda-tion, the United Kingdom will take that recommendation into account,especially since the present regime in Palestine is hated equally by bothArab and Jew. You all know what the attitude towards that regime is, espe-cially on the part of the Jews.

I think I should also mention yet another aspect. From the very outset of these discussions, a number of delegations,

mainly the delegations of Arab States, have tried to convince us that thisquestion was ostensibly not within the competence of the United Nations.In so claiming they were unable, as might have been expected, to adduceany convincing arguments apart from various general and unfoundedstatements and declarations.

The General Assembly, as well as the United Nations as a whole, notonly has a right to consider this matter, but in view of the situation that


has arisen in Palestine, it is bound to take the requisite decision. In theview of the USSR delegation, the plan for the solution of the Palestinianproblem which has been drawn up by the Ad Hoc Committee, andaccording to which the practical implementation of the measures neces-sary to give it effect rests with the Security Council, is in full accord withthe interest of maintaining and strengthening international peace andwith the interest of increasing cooperation between States. It is preciselyfor this reason that the USSR delegation supports the recommendation topartition Palestine.

The USSR delegation, unlike some other delegations, has from theoutset taken a clear-cut, definite and unequivocal stand in this matter. It isconsistently maintaining this stand. It has no intention of maneuveringand manipulating votes as unfortunately is done at the Assembly, especial-ly in connexion with the consideration of the Palestinian question.

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Document 9: Speech by Egyptian Delegate Mahmoud Bey Fawzito UN General Assembly

In this speech, Egypt’s representative expresses a number of procedural argumentsaimed at swaying the European members of the United Nations: that the UnitedKingdom would not implement any decision of the General Assembly unless theJews and Arabs agreed to it; that the General Assembly itself had no competence to“impose a solution” about Palestine; and that, while the partition plan may have suc-ceeded in the Ad Hoc Committee’s vote, too few UN members—less than a major-ity of UN members—had thus far voted in favor of partition. Regretting that “powerpolitics” was “insidious” at the General Assembly session, Fawzi then sets forth awarning that Egypt will not recognize any resolution adopted by the GeneralAssembly as a whole. He declares the General Assembly lacks competence on theissue, suggests the whole matter be sent to the world court for an advisory opinion,reminds that any GA decision is merely “a recommendation” to states, and that, ifthe partition plan succeeds, Egypt “will not adopt and we will not implement theproposed recommendation.”

The President: I now call upon the representative of Egypt. Mahmoud Bey Fawzi (Egypt): If I comprehend the draft resolution

offered by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question to theGeneral Assembly for adoption, if I correctly gauge its purport and itspurpose, it would call upon the General Assembly to recommend to theUnited Kingdom and to all other Members of the United Nations theadoption and the implementation of the plan of partition. The GeneralAssembly has been notified that the United Kingdom would not imple-ment any policy which is not acceptable to both Arabs and Jews. We justheard this repeated a few moments ago by the representative of the Unit-ed Kingdom.

He added that the United Kingdom is not prepared to undertake thetask of imposing a policy in Palestine by force of arms and that, in consid-ering any proposal to the effect that it should participate with others in theenforcement of a settlement, it must take into due consideration both theinherent justice of the settlement and the extent to which force would berequired to give effect to it.

Speech by Mahmoud Bey Fawzi to UN General Assembly 37

I think it must be clear by now that the General Assembly is notcompetent to impose any solution in this matter. More than that, if I havenot misunderstood the situation, a majority of the States here representedhave either denied or doubted the power of the General Assembly to makeeven a recommendation on partition. When a vote was taken yesterdayafternoon by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, thefavourable report on the partition plan could muster the support of onlytwenty-five out of fifty-seven Members of the United Nations. That wasless than a majority of the Members of the United Nations.

Is the voice of the United Nations in this most important matter, inthis most vital matter, to be merely the voice of a minority? If so, let usfrankly say to the whole world that, despite all the pressure exerted infavour of partition, a majority of the United Nations could not stomachthis violation of the principles of the Charter. It is to the credit of thismajority and of the United Nations as a whole that they could not stom-ach this violation of the principles of the Charter.

A Danish amendment (document A/AC.14/ 43/Rev. 1) was adoptedat the thirty-fourth meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the PalestinianQuestion only because of the mere twenty-five who later gave theirapproval to the partition plan. Some of those twenty-five, including theDanish delegation, were doubtful as to the legal power of the GeneralAssembly in relation to partition. However, all that the Danish amend-ment could accomplish, in fact, as was stated by the representative of Pak-istan yesterday, was nothing more than to add a zero to a zero.

I can understand the influences which made even this result possible.Power politics was not merely dominant in the conclusions of the Com-mittee; it was also insidious. Yet, it is dissipated by the fact that the greatmanipulators are contemporaneous in their unity, but are in reality dividedin their purposes.

We have been told about the situation in which one of the great Pow-ers finds itself, about the predicament in which it thinks, or perhaps feels,that it is entangled. We have been told concerning that great Power, thatbeing confronted with the imminence of a general national election, itscandidates seek the vote of a single component state, and that votedepends on the Jewish electorate of a single city. Thus is its policy dictated

with regard to a Palestine which is more than five thousand miles away.That is what we have been told. We do not wish to believe it; we wish tohope it is not true.

If the General Assembly’s resolution is passed, I must reiterate thatwe shall take it for what it is: a mere recommendation addressed to theEgyptian Government. I must, in terms of no equivocation, reiterate ourposition as it has been stated throughout the deliberations of the Ad HocCommittee on the Palestinian Question. This position is:

1. We are of the opinion that the General Assembly is not competentto make the proposed recommendation to Egypt or to any other State;

2. In view of the difference of opinion on this question of compe-tence, we requested, more than forty days ago, that the General Assemblyshould ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. Westill would like to enlightened by such an opinion from the Court;

3. Failing an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice,Egypt will be guided only by its own views as to the powers conferred onthe General Assembly by the Charter;

4. As at present advised, we will not adopt and we will not implementthe proposed recommendation by the General Assembly if it obtains thenecessary vote and is adopted;

5. As a sovereign, equal Member of the United Nations, Egyptreserves its full rights under the Charter.


Document 10: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on thePalestinian Question to the United Nations General Assembly

25 November 1947

At its September 1947 second session, the UN General Assembly referred threematters—the UNSCOP final report, a proposal of the United Kingdom, and aSaudi-Iraqi proposal for recognition of a single-state solution—to a newly createdAd Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question. Composed of all UN members,the Ad Hoc Committee deliberated for two months, examining some seventeenproposed resolutions submitted to it. It included both the Jewish Agency and ArabHigher Committee in its deliberations, and set up three bodies to examine the vari-ous proposals: a conciliation commission that tried to bring the parties together andtwo subcommittees. Subcommittee 1 was asked to draw up a detailed plan based onthe majority proposals of UNSCOP; Subcommittee 2 was asked for a detailed planbased on the Saudi-Iraqi proposal for a unitary state.

The conciliation commission reported their work had not been fruitful. Sub-committee 1 modified the UNSCOP partition plan slightly as to the dates of inde-pendence, the boundaries of each state, including those of an internationalizedJerusalem, and the implementation body to be in charge of the transition (a newfive-member Palestine Commission), and other matters. Subcommittee 2 concen-trated on three matters: (a) legal questions such as the competence of the UN toaddress the issue and the recommendation to refer the matter to the world court, asproposed by Egypt, Iraq, and Syria; (b) the issue of Jewish refugees and its relation-ship to the Palestinian question, recommending that the countries of origin takeback the refugees; and (c) the constitution and future government of a unitary Pales-tinian state. The excerpted report below describes the results of the Ad Hoc Com-mittee’s deliberations and its decisions voted upon on November 24 and 25, 1947.The Ad Hoc Committee rejected each of the three recommendations of Subcom-mittee 2, and then voted to adopt the recommendation of Subcommittee 1, on par-tition, by 25-13 with 17 abstentions. The report was then sent to the GeneralAssembly, which considered it between November 26-29.

Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question

Rapporteur: Mr. Thor Thors (Iceland)1. The General Assembly, at its ninetieth meeting held on 23 Sep-

tember 1947, established an Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Ques-tion, to which it referred the following items:

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(a) Question of Palestine: item proposed by the United Kingdom(document A/286)

(b) Report of the Special Committee on Palestine (A/364)(c) Termination of the Mandate over Palestine and the recognition of

its independence as one State: item proposed by Saudi Arabia and by Iraq(A/317 and A/328).

2. The Ad Hoc Committee, at its first meeting held on 25 September… also decided to invite the Arab Higher Committee and the JewishAgency for Palestine to be represented at its deliberations in order to sup-ply such information or render such assistance as the Committee mightrequire. The invitation was accepted. Representatives of the Arab HigherCommittee and of the Jewish Agency attended the meetings of the AdHoc Committee.

3. At its second meeting, held on 26 September, the Committeeheard a preliminary statement by the representative of the United King-dom. He recalled that the United Kingdom representative at the specialsession of the General Assembly had indicated that his Governmentwould be in the highest degree reluctant to oppose the Assembly’s wishesin regard to the future of Palestine. He added that the British Governmentwas not, however, prepared to impose by force of arms a settlement whichwas not acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews of Palestine and that, inthe absence of a settlement, it must plan for an early withdrawal of Britishforces and of the British administration from Palestine.

At the same meeting, the Chairman of the Special Committee onPalestine introduced the report of the Special Committee.

4. At its third meeting, the Ad Hoc Committee heard the representa-tive of the Arab Higher Committee, who rejected the recommendations ofthe Special Committee on Palestine and advocated the establishment ondemocratic lines, in the whole of Palestine, of an Arab State which wouldprotect the legitimate rights and interests of all minorities. At the fourthmeeting the representative of the Jewish Agency indicated its readiness toaccept, subject to further discussion of the constitutional and territorialprovisions, the majority plan of the Special Committee on Palestine.

5. A general discussion of the three items of the agenda followedthose preliminary statements.… The representative of the United King-dom, in the course of the fifteenth meeting, stated that his previous

Report of Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question to the UN General Assembly 41

announcement of the decision to withdraw the British forces and admin-istration from Palestine was designed to induce both parties to face theconsequences of failure to agree, to emphasize the urgency of the matterand to leave the United Nations unhampered in its recommendations as tothe future government of Palestine. In no case, however, would the BritishGovernment accept responsibility for the enforcement of recommenda-tions either alone or in the major role.

6. After the general discussion the representatives of the JewishAgency and of the Arab Higher Committee were again given an opportu-nity at the seventeenth and eighteenth meetings to state their views. Theymade declarations which confirmed their earlier statements.

7. At its nineteenth meeting the Committee discussed its future pro-cedure. Seventeen draft resolutions had been submitted, some referring tothe problem as a whole, others to certain of its aspects. The Chairmanproposed that no vote on matters of principle should be taken at thatstage, but that the Committee should establish: (1) a conciliation groupwhich would try to bring the parties together, as suggested by the delega-tion of El Salvador (A/AC.14/3); (2) a Sub-Committee entrusted withdrawing up a detailed plan based on the majority proposals of the SpecialCommittee on Palestine, as provided by the draft resolution of the UnitedStates of America (A/AC.14/17), amended by the Canadian delegation(A/AC.14/23); and (3) a Sub-Committee to draw up a detailed plan inaccordance with the proposal of Saudi Arabia and Iraq for the recognitionof Palestine as an independent unitary State and the proposal to the sameeffect submitted by the delegation of Syria (A/AC.14/22). The Chair-man’s plan received wide support. Several delegations favoured, however,that the Committee first take decisions on matters of substance and thenentrust to a sub-committee the working out of details. A proposal to thateffect, moved by the representative of the Soviet Union, was not adopted(fourteen votes in favour; twenty-six against) and the Committeeapproved the procedure suggested by the Chairman.

8. At its twentieth meeting the Committee considered the question ofthe composition of the conciliation group and of the two Sub-Committeeswhich it had decided to create.… The Chairman was authorized to namethe members of that Sub-Committee as well as those of Sub-Committee2, which was to work out the details of the plan for one State in Palestine.


The Sub-Committees were asked to submit their reports not later than 29October, subject to an extension of that time limit if necessary.…

By virtue of the authority vested in him by the Committee, theChairman appointed, on 22 October, the following members to serve onthe Sub-Committees:

(a) Sub-Committee 1: Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Poland,South Africa, United States of America, Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics, Uruguay, Venezuela

(b) Sub-Committee 2: Afghanistan, Colombia, Egypt, Iraq,Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen….

12. Representatives of the United Kingdom attended the meetings ofthe two Sub-Committees in order to furnish information and assistance.A representative of the Jewish Agency sat in Sub-Committee 1 and a rep-resentative of the Arab Higher Committee in Sub-Committee 2, to givesuch information and assistance as might be required. The Arab HigherCommittee did not accept an invitation to sit with the members of Sub-Committee 1 when the latter discussed the question of boundaries. TheArab Higher Committee was prepared to assist and furnish informationonly with regard to the question of the termination of the Mandate andthe creation of a unitary State.…

14. The reports of Sub-Committee 1 (A/AC.14/34) and Sub-Com-mittee 2 (A/AC.14/32) were submitted to the Ad Hoc Committee on 19November (twenty-third meeting). At the same meeting, the Ad HocCommittee was informed by the Chairman, speaking on behalf of theconciliation group, that their efforts had not been fruitful. Both partiesseemed to be confident as to the success of their case before the Assemblyand there appeared to be little hope of conciliation, at least at the presenttime.

15. The report of Sub-Committee 1 recommended the adoption of adraft resolution embodying a plan of partition with economic union. Theplan followed, in its general lines, the proposals of the majority of the Spe-cial Committee on Palestine (two independent States, a City of Jerusalemunder an international regime, and economic union of these three units).A new solution was proposed for the problem of implementation, in viewof the statements of policy made by the representatives of the MandatoryPower on that problem. A Commission of five members appointed by the


General Assembly would be sent to Palestine and would perform, underthe guidance of the Security Council, the functions assigned to it by theGeneral Assembly for the preparation of the independence of the Araband Jewish States and of the establishment of the Economic Union andJoint Economic Board provided for by the plan. As regards the City ofJerusalem, its statute would be elaborated by the Trusteeship Council.

16. The report of Sub-Committee 2 recommended the adoption ofthree draft resolutions. According to the first, the General Assembly,before recommending a solution of the Palestine problem, would requestthe International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on certain legalquestions connected with or arising from that problem, including ques-tions concerning the competence of the United Nations to recommend orenforce any solution contrary to the wishes of the majority of the people ofPalestine. The second draft resolution recommended an international set-tlement of the problem of Jewish refugees and displaced persons, and stat-ed principles and proposed machinery for the co-operation of MemberStates in such a settlement. The third resolution provided for the creationof a provisional government of the people of Palestine to which theauthority of the Mandatory Power would be transferred, as a preparatorystep to the setting up of an elected Constituent Assembly. The Constitu-tion framed by the latter would inter alia contain guarantees as regards theHoly Places, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Such guaranteeswere enumerated in the draft resolution.

17. The discussion of the two reports began at the twenty-fourthmeeting. At the twenty-fifth meeting the representative of the UnitedKingdom recalled the general principles contained in the statement madeto the Committee on behalf of his Government at the second meeting (seeparagraph 3 above). …

19. The two Sub-Committees reviewed their respective plans ofimplementation. Representatives of the United Kingdom attended themeetings to answer questions and furnish information. While Sub-Com-mittee 2 decided not to alter its plan, Sub-Committee 1 revised certain ofits proposals in the light of the British statements.…

22. The discussion of the two reports was pursued during four meet-ings (twenty-seventh to thirty-first). During the twenty-eighth meeting,the representative of the Jewish Agency renewed the offer he had made in


Sub-Committee 1 to transfer to the Arab State a part of the Beershebaarea and a portion of the Negeb along the Egyptian frontier, if such anoffer could satisfy certain delegations which were in favour of partition,but had suggested an extension of territory for the Arab State in the Southof Palestine. Following the statement of the Jewish Agency, the delegationof the United States proposed a revision of the boundaries of the twoStates in conformity with the suggestion of the Jewish Agency(A/AC.14/38).

23. After the close of the discussion on the two reports, the represen-tatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and of the Arab Higher Com-mittee made final statements (thirty-first meeting).

24. At the beginning of the thirty-second meeting, the Chairman putto the vote the first draft resolution proposed by Sub-Committee 2, pro-viding for the reference to the International Court of Justice for an adviso-ry opinion of eight legal questions connected with or arising from thePalestine problem. At the request of the representative of France, twovotes were taken, one on the first seven questions, the other on the eighthquestion which read as follows:

Whether the United Nations, or any of its Member States, is competentto enforce, or recommend the enforcement of, any proposal concerningthe constitution and future government of Palestine, in particular, anyplan of partition which is contrary to the wishes, or adopted without theconsent, of the inhabitants of Palestine.

The proposal to refer to the International Court of Justice the firstseven questions was rejected by a vote of eighteen in favour, twenty-fiveagainst, with eleven abstentions. The proposal to refer to the Court theeighth question was rejected by a vote of twenty in favour, twenty-oneagainst, with thirteen abstentions.

25. The recommendations contained in the second draft resolutionproposed by Sub-Committee 2 relating to an international solution of theproblem of Jewish refugees and displaced persons were then put to thevote, paragraph by paragraph.

By seventeen votes in favour, fourteen against and twenty-threeabstentions, the Committee adopted the first recommendation.

By eighteen votes in favour, sixteen against, with twenty-one absten-tions, the Committee adopted the second recommendation.


The Committee rejected by fifteen votes in favour, eighteen against,with twenty-two abstentions, the third recommendation providing for thesetting up of a Special Committee which would recommend to the Mem-bers of the United Nations the acceptance of a scheme of quotas of Jewishrefugees and displaced persons to be resettled in their respective territories.

After the Committee had, by a show of hands, adopted or rejectedvarious paragraphs of the preamble of the resolution, the final text com-prising the first two recommendations and the adopted paragraphs of thepreamble, was voted upon as a whole. That text was as follows:

The General Assembly, having regard to the unanimous recommenda-tion of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine that theGeneral Assembly undertake immediately the initiation and executionof an international arrangement whereby the problem of the distressedEuropean Jews will be dealt with as a matter of extreme urgency for thealleviation of their plight and of the Palestine problem;

Bearing in mind that genuine refugees and displaced persons constitutea problem which is international in scope and character;

Being of the opinion that where repatriation proves impossible, solutionshould be sought by way of resettlement in the territories of the Mem-bers of the United Nations which are willing and in a position to absorbthese refugees and displaced persons;

Having adopted resolution 62 (I) on 15 December 1946 calling for thecreation of an international refugee organization with a view to the solu-tion of the refugee problem through the combined efforts of the UnitedNations; and

Taking note of the assumption on 1 July 1947 by the Preparatory Com-mission of the International Refugee Organization of operationalresponsibility for displaced persons and refugees:

Recommends:That the countries of origin should be requested to take back the Jewishrefugees and displaced persons belonging to them, and to render themall possible assistance to resettle in life.

That those Jewish refugees and displaced persons who cannot be repatri-ated should be absorbed in the territories of Members of the UnitedNations in proportion to their area, economic resources, per capitaincome, population and other relevant factors.


The vote on the above text was sixteen in favour, sixteen against, withtwenty-six abstentions.

26. The third resolution of Sub-Committee 2 providing for the con-stitution and future government of Palestine, as a unitary, democratic, andindependent State, with safeguards for minorities, was rejected by a voteof twelve in favour, twenty-nine against, with fourteen abstentions.

27. The Committee then considered the amendments which hadbeen submitted respecting the plan recommended by Sub-Committee 1.…

Paragraph 3 in the same section B of Part I was also modified as aresult of the adoption of a Netherlands amendment (A/AC.14/36) givingwider scope to the Boundary Commission.…

Paragraph 8 of Chapter 2 of section C was altered by the adoption ofan amendment put forward separately by the delegations of the Nether-lands (A/AC.14/36) and Pakistan (A/AC.14/40) providing for the dele-tion from the paragraph of provisions regarding expropriation of land forother than public purposes. The vote was twelve in favour and nine againstthe amendment.

The delegation of the Netherlands submitted an amendment(A/AC.14/36) to add a new paragraph 9 to Chapter 2 of section C. Theamendment was withdrawn on the understanding that it might be resub-mitted to the plenary meeting of the General Assembly in a revised form.The delegation of Canada submitted an amendment (A/AC.14/45) toparagraph 1 of Chapter 3 of section C respecting citizenship, which wasadopted.

The delegation of the United States of America submitted anamendment (A/AC.14/42) to add a new paragraph to paragraph 9 of sec-tion D. The amendment was adopted.…

The delegation of Pakistan submitted an amendment (A/AC.14/40)to delete the whole of Part II dealing with boundaries and to provide for aBoundary Commission, appointed by the Security Council, to recom-mend boundaries in accordance with the principle that not more than tenpercent of the land, exclusive of state or waste lands, in the Arab or JewishState should be owned by Jews or Arabs respectively. The amendment wasrejected by a vote of eight in favour and twenty-two against.

The Committee adopted the amendment submitted by the delega-tion of the United States of America (A/AC.14/38) to Part II, providing


that the town of Beersheba and the area to the northeast thereof and aportion of the Negeb along the Egyptian frontier should be excluded fromthe area of the proposed Jewish State and incorporated in the proposedArab State.

The delegation of Sweden submitted an amendment (A/AC.14/35)to delete from paragraph 2, section C of Part III, in connection with theadministrative staff of the Governor of the City of Jerusalem, the phrase“and chosen whenever possible from the residents of the City on a non-discriminatory basis.” The amendment was rejected by a vote of ten infavour and fifteen against. The paragraph was adopted with the phrase inquestion amended to read as follows: “and chosen whenever practicablefrom the residents of the City and of the rest of Palestine on a non-dis-criminatory basis.”…

29. The amended draft resolution embodying the Plan of Partitionwith Economic Union was adopted by a vote of twenty-five in favour,thirteen against, with seventeen abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet SocialistRepublic, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Domini-can Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Iceland, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama,Peru, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union ofSouth Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States of Amer-ica, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Against: Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pak-istan, Saudi Arabia, Siam, Syria, Turkey and Yemen.

Abstentions: Argentina, Belgium, China, Colombia, El Salvador,Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexi-co, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.

Absent: Paraguay and Philippines.30. Before the vote, the representatives of New Zealand, Syria, and

Iraq had made statements explaining their votes. After the roll-call, therepresentative of Egypt also made a statement in connection with his vote.

31. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question thereforerecommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draftresolution on the future government of Palestine embodying a Plan ofPartition with Economic Union:


A/516 Future Government of PalestineThe General Assembly,Having Met in special session at the request of the Mandatory Power

to constitute and instruct a Special Committee to prepare for the consid-eration of the question of the future government of Palestine at the secondregular session;

Having Constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investi-gate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and toprepare proposals for the solution of the problem; and

Having Received and Examined the report of the Special Committee(document A/364) including a number of unanimous recommendationsand a plan of partition with economic union approved by the majority ofthe Special Committee;

Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likelyto impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations;

Takes Note of the declaration by the Mandatory Power that it plans tocomplete its evacuation of Palestine by 1 August 1948;

Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the Mandatory Power forPalestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoptionand implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, ofthe Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below;

Requests that(a) The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for

in the Plan for its implementation;(b) The Security Council consider if circumstances during the transi-

tional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestineconstitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, andin order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Councilshould supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by takingmeasures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the Unit-ed Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise inPalestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution;

(c) The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach ofthe peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter,any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution;


(d) The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilitiesenvisaged for it in this Plan;

Calls Upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may benecessary on their part to put this Plan into effect;

Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking anyaction which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommen-dations; and

Authorizes the Secretary-General to reimburse travel … expenses ofthe members of the Commission … and to provide to the Commissionthe necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions….

See General Assembly Resolution 181 for the remainder of the resolution.


Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, right, greets UN delegates just afterthe final meeting of the General Assembly that approvedthe partition plan by a vote of 33 to 13.

Chatting informally after the partition vote are (l. to r.) Guillermo Sevilla-Sacasa, the Nicaraguan UN delegate,Warren R. Austin, the American UN ambassador,UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, and UN General AssemblyPresident Oswaldo Aranho of Brazil.

Photos courtesy of United Nations Photo

Prince Faisal ibn Saud, foreign minister of Saudi Arabia,

arrives at the UN General Assembly’s second Special Session on Palestine.

Photo Spread 51

Jewish youngsters in Palestine greet UN observers.

The vote is taken to approve the resolution to partition Palestine into two statesat the second UN General Assembly session on Palestine, on November 29, 1947.

Mr. Aubrey S. Eban, permanent representative of Israel to the United Nations,addresses the Trusteeship Council during preliminary discussion of internationalization of Jerusalem.

1. See Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Supplement No. 11, Volumes I-IV.

52

Document 11: UN General Assembly Resolution 181(II)

On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolu-tion to accept the UNSCOP recommendations and partition Palestine into twostates, one Arab and one Jewish, and to declare Jerusalem an international territory.The Assembly approved the partition plan by a vote of 33-13 with 10 abstentions,reaching a two-thirds vote in favor of the plan. The Arab governments and ArabLeague rejected the proposal, and declared that the UN was “murdered” and that thecharter was “dead.” The following text is excerpted to exclude technical details.

Resolution No. 181 (II) of 29 November 1947

Recommending a Partition Plan for PalestineA

The General Assembly,Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power

to constitute and instruct a Special Committee to prepare for the consid-eration of the question of the future Government of Palestine at the sec-ond regular session;

Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investi-gate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and toprepare proposals for the solution of the problem, and

Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee(document A/364)1 including a number of unanimous recommendationsand a plan of partition with economic union approved by the majority ofthe Special Committee,

Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likelyto impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations;

Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans tocomplete its evacuation of Palestine by 1 August 1948;

Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power forPalestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoptionand implementation, with regard to the future Government of Palestine,of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below;

2. At its one hundred and twenty-eighth plenary meeting on 29 November 1947 the General Assembly,in accordance with the terms of the above resolution elected the following members of the United NationsCommission on Palestine: Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama, and Philippines.

UN General Assembly Resolution 181(II) 53

Requests that:(a) The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for

in the plan for its implementation;(b) The Security Council consider, if circumstances during the transi-

tional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestineconstitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, andin order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Councilshould supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by takingmeasures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the UnitedNations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Pales-tine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution;

(c) The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach ofthe peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Char-ter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolu-tion;

(d) The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilitiesenvisaged for it in this plan;

Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may benecessary on their part to put this plan into effect

Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking anyaction which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommen-dations, and

Authorizes the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and subsistenceexpenses of the members of the Commission referred to in Part I, SectionB, Paragraph 1 below, on such basis and in such form as he may determinemost appropriate in the circumstances, and to provide the Commissionwith the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned tothe Commission by the General Assembly.2

BThe General Assembly,Authorizes the Secretary-General to draw from the Working Capital

Fund a sum not to exceed $2,000,000 for the purposes set forth in the lastparagraph of the resolution on the future government of Palestine.*


Plan of Partition with Economic UnionPart I. Future Constitution and Government of Palestine

A. Termination of Mandate, Partition and Independence

The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but inany case not later than 1 August 1948.

The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be progressivelywithdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon as pos-sible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.

The mandatory Power shall advise the Commission, as far in advanceas possible, of its intention to terminate the Mandate and to evacuate eacharea.

The mandatory Power shall use its best endeavours to ensure that anarea situated in the territory of the Jewish State, including a seaport andhinterland adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration,shall be evacuated at the earliest possible date and in any event not laterthan 1 February 1948.

3. Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special InternationalRegime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in Part III of this Plan, shallcome into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of thearmed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any casenot later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jew-ish State, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described in Parts II and IIIbelow.

4. The period between the adoption by the General Assembly of itsrecommendation on the question of Palestine and the establishment of theindependence of the Arab and Jewish States shall be a transitional period.

B. Steps Preparatory to Independence

1. A Commission shall be set up consisting of one representative ofeach of five Member States. The Members represented on the Commis-sion shall be elected by the General Assembly on as broad a basis, geo-graphically and otherwise, as possible.

2. The administration of Palestine shall, as the mandatory Powerwithdraws its armed forces, be progressively turned over to the Commis-sion, which shall act in conformity with the recommendations of the Gen-


eral Assembly, under the guidance of the Security Council. The mandato-ry Power shall to the fullest possible extent co-ordinate its plans for with-drawal with the plans of the Commission to take over and administerareas which have been evacuated.

In the discharge of this administrative responsibility the Commissionshall have authority to issue necessary regulations and take other measuresas required. The mandatory Power shall not take any action to prevent,obstruct or delay the implementation by the Commission of the measuresrecommended by the General Assembly.

3. On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed to carryout measures for the establishment of the frontiers of the Arab and JewishStates and the City of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines ofthe recommendations of the General Assembly on the partition of Pales-tine. Nevertheless, the boundaries as described in Part II of this Plan areto be modified in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be dividedby state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary.

4. The Commission, after consultation with the democratic partiesand other public organizations of the Arab and Jewish States, shall selectand establish in each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council ofGovernment. The activities of both the Arab and Jewish ProvisionalCouncils of Government shall be carried out under the general directionof the Commission.

If by 1 April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government cannot beselected for either of the States, or, if selected, cannot carry out its func-tions, the Commission shall communicate that fact to the Security Coun-cil for such action with respect to that State as the Security Council maydeem proper, and to the Secretary-General for communication to theMembers of the United Nations.

5. Subject to the provisions of these recommendations, during thetransitional period the Provisional Councils of Government, acting underthe Commission, shall have full authority in the areas under their controlincluding authority over matters of immigration and land regulation.

6. The Provisional Council of Government of each State, actingunder the Commission, shall progressively receive from the Commissionfull responsibility for the administration of that State in the periodbetween the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of theState’s independence.


7. The Commission shall instruct the Provisional Councils of Gov-ernment of both the Arab and Jewish States, after their formation, to pro-ceed to the establishment of administrative organs of government, centraland local.

8. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, withinthe shortest time possible, recruit an armed militia from the residents ofthat State, sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to preventfrontier clashes.

This armed militia in each State shall, for operational purposes, beunder the command of Jewish or Arab officers resident in that State, butgeneral political and military control, including the choice of the militia’sHigh Command, shall be exercised by the Commission.

9. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, notlater than two months after the withdrawal of the armed forces of themandatory Power, hold elections to the Constituent Assembly which shallbe conducted on democratic lines.

The election regulations in each State shall be drawn up by the Provi-sional Council of Government and approved by the Commission. Quali-fied voters for each State for this election shall be persons over eighteenyears of age who are (a) Palestinian citizens residing in that State; and (b)Arabs and Jews residing in the State, although not Palestinian citizens,who, before voting, have signed a notice of intention to become citizens ofsuch State.

Arabs and Jews residing in the City of Jerusalem who have signed anotice of intention to become citizens, the Arabs of the Arab State andthe Jews of the Jewish State, shall be entitled to vote in the Arab and Jew-ish States respectively.

Women may vote and be elected to the Constituent Assemblies.During the transitional period no Jew shall be permitted to establish

residence in the area of the proposed Arab State, and no Arab shall be per-mitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Jewish State,except by special leave of the Commission.

10. The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democraticconstitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeedthe Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission.The Constitutions of the States shall embody Chapters 1 and 2 of the


Declaration provided for in section C below and include, inter alia, provi-sions for:

(a) Establishing in each State a legislative body elected by universal suf-frage and by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation,and an executive body responsible to the legislature;

(b) Settling all international disputes in which the State may be involvedby peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and securi-ty, and justice, are not endangered;

(c) Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its internationalrelations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrityor political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsis-tent with the purpose of the United Nations;

(d) Guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights incivil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment ofhuman rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion,language, speech and publication, education, assembly and association;

(e) Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents and citizensof the other State in Palestine and the City of Jerusalem, subject to con-siderations of national security, provided that each State shall controlresidence within its borders.

11. The Commission shall appoint a preparatory economic commis-sion of three members to make whatever arrangements are possible foreconomic co-operation, with a view to establishing, as soon as practicable,the Economic Union and the Joint Economic Board, as provided in sec-tion D below.

12. During the period between the adoption of the recommendationson the question of Palestine by the General Assembly and the terminationof the Mandate, the mandatory Power in Palestine shall maintain fullresponsibility for administration in areas from which it has not withdrawnits armed forces. The Commission shall assist the mandatory Power in thecarrying out of these functions. Similarly the mandatory Power shall co-operate with the Commission in the execution of its functions.

13. With a view to ensuring that there shall be continuity in the func-tioning of administrative services and that, on the withdrawal of thearmed forces of the mandatory Power, the whole administration shall be inthe charge of the Provisional Councils and the Joint Economic Board,respectively, acting under the Commission, there shall be a progressive

transfer, from the mandatory Power to the Commission, of responsibilityfor all the functions of government, including that of maintaining law andorder in the areas from which the forces of the mandatory Power havebeen withdrawn.

14. The Commission shall be guided in its activities by the recom-mendations of the General Assembly and by such instructions as theSecurity Council may consider necessary to issue.

The measures taken by the Commission, within the recommenda-tions of the General Assembly, shall become immediately effective unlessthe Commission has previously received contrary instructions from theSecurity Council.

The Commission shall render periodic monthly progress reports, ormore frequently if desirable, to the Security Council.

15. The Commission shall make its final report to the next regularsession of the General Assembly and to the Security Council simultane-ously.


Document 12: Verbatim Provisional Records, United Nations General AssemblyNovember 29, 1947

In these speeches explaining their votes before the UN General Assembly, severalArab states express their opinions of UN Resolution 181(II). Amir Arslan of Syriacalls the Charter “dead,” while the Saudi Arabian delegate says that his governmentdoes not feel not bound by the decision. The speakers deny the validity of the reso-lution, claim it does not apply to them, and say that it destroys the United Nations.

H. R. H. Amir Faisal al Saud (Saudi Arabia): We came to the Gen-eral Assembly filled with hope that both the large and small nations woulddirect their efforts towards the elevation of moral standards. We came herefilled with hope that all nations would unanimously respect and upholdhuman rights and justice, and that this Organization would be an instru-ment for establishing international peace and security. At the same time,we had hoped that it would afford a sound basis for mutual understandingamong all peoples. But alas! Today’s resolution has dissipated our hopes.

We have pledged ourselves before God and history to fulfill theCharter in good faith, thereby respecting human rights and repellingaggression. However, today’s resolution has destroyed the Charter and allthe covenants preceding it.

We have felt, like many others, the pressure exerted on various repre-sentatives of this Organization by some of the big Powers in order that thevote should be in favour of partition. For these reasons, the Governmentof Saudi Arabia registers, on this historic occasion, the fact that it does notconsider itself bound by the resolution adopted today by the GeneralAssembly.

Furthermore, it reserves to itself the full right to act freely in whatev-er way it deems fit, in accordance with the principles of right and justice.My Government holds responsible those parties that hampered all meansof cooperation and understanding.

Mr. Ayub (Pakistan): Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, head of thePakistan delegation, was obliged to leave New York this morning, but hedesired me to read to the General Assembly a statement which he wouldhave liked to make if he had been present at this meeting and had witnessedthe vote that took place a few minutes ago. The statement reads as follows:

59


A fateful decision has been taken. The die has been cast. In the words ofthe greatest American, “We have striven to do the right as God gives usto see the right.” We did succeed in persuading a sufficient number ofour fellow representatives to see the right as we saw it, but they were notpermitted to stand by the right as they saw it. Our hearts are sad but ourconscience is easy. We would not have it the other way round.

Empires rise and fall. History tells us of the empires of the Babylo-nians, the Egyptians, the Greeks and the Romans, the Arabs, the Per-sians and the Spaniards. Today, most of the talk is about the Americansand the Russians. The holy Koran says: We shall see the periods of riseand fall as between nations, and that cycle draws attention to the univer-sal law. What endures on earth is that which is beneficent for God’screatures.

No man can today predict whether the proposal which these twocountries have sponsored and supported will prove beneficent or thecontrary in its actual working.

We much fear that the beneficence, if any, to which partition maylead will be small in comparison to the mischief which it might inaugu-rate. It totally lacks legal validity. We entertain no sense of grievanceagainst those of our friends and fellow representatives who have beencompelled, under heavy pressure, to change sides and to cast their votesin support of a proposal the justice and fairness of which do not com-mend themselves to them. Our feeling for them is one of sympathy thatthey should have been placed in a position of such embarrassmentbetween their judgment and conscience, on the one side, and the pres-sure to which they and their Governments were being subjected, on theother.

Pakistan desires to wash its hands of all responsibility for the deci-sion that has just now been taken. It will, therefore, take no part in theelection of the United Nations Commission which will be set up toimplement that decision.

Mr. Jamali (Iraq): In San Francisco we had high hopes for the world.Today, those hopes are shattered. We always thought that, after all,humanity was a bulwark of peace and a bulwark of justice. Today, thatfaith is destroyed. We did our best during the last few weeks to expoundthe spirit and the letter of the Charter and apply it to Palestine. The factthat we failed to win your support is not the result of a lack of good will onthe part of the members of this Assembly. It was not due to a lack of

Verbatim Provisional Records, UN General Assembly 61

understanding and appreciation on the part of most of you. On the con-trary, we understand very well that it was great pressure and great influ-ence that worked itself through UNSCOP, through the Ad Hoc Commit-tee and through the General Assembly to direct the matter in a coursewhich led to this conclusion.

We believe that the decision which we have now taken is a very seri-ous one. It is one that undermines peace, justice and democracy. In thename of my Government, I wish to state that it feels that this decision isanti-democratic, illegal, impractical and contrary to the Charter. It contra-dicts the spirit and letter of the Charter. Therefore, in the name of myGovernment, I wish to put on record that Iraq does not recognize thevalidity of this decision, will reserve freedom of action towards its imple-mentation, and holds those who were influential in passing it against thefree conscience of mankind responsible for the consequences.

Amir Arslan (Syria): Even before the Assembly took this decision, Ithink that most of the delegations had suspected a dictatorial attitude. It isuseless to speak about it at length, but as it is customary to allow thosecondemned to death to speak freely to their executioners, we shall addressourselves to ours.

Gentlemen, the Charter is dead. But it did not die a natural death; itwas murdered, and you all know who is guilty.

My country will never recognize such a decision. It will never agree tobe responsible for it. Let the consequences be on the heads of others, noton ours.

H. R. H. Prince Seif El Islam Abdullah (Yemen): The Yemen dele-gation has stated previously that the partition plan is contrary to justiceand to the Charter of the United Nations. Therefore, the Government ofYemen does not consider itself bound by such a decision for it is contraryto the letter and spirit of the Charter. The Government of Yemen willreserve its freedom of action towards the implementation of this decision.

62

Document 13: First Special Report of the UN Palestine Commission to the Security Council: Document A/AC.21/916 February 1948

The UN Palestine Commission was created to oversee implementation of Resolu-tion 181. Its first special report was delivered in February 1948. In the judgment ofthe commission, “Powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, aredefying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberateeffort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein.” Included in this specialreport are excerpts of a communication to the commission by the Arab HigherCommittee. The committee states that it will never accept partition or the idea of aJewish state and will “never submit or yield to any power going to Palestine toenforce partition.”(See paragraph II, 6.)

First Special Report to the Security Council: The Problem of Security in Palestine

The United Nations Palestine Commission herewith presents to theSecurity Council a special report on the problem of security in Palestine,with particular reference to the maintenance of law and order and to theimplementation of the resolution of the General Assembly on the FutureGovernment of Palestine.

I. Main Considerations

1. In its First Monthly Progress Report to the Security Council (Sec-tion 13), the Commission had informed the Security Council that it wasdevoting most serious attention to the various aspects of the security prob-lem.…

2. It is because of the extreme gravity of the situation in Palestinenow, and the anticipated worsening of the conditions there, that this spe-cial report is presented to the Security Council at this time. The commis-sion realizes that both the future well-being of the people of Palestine andthe authority and effectiveness of the United Nations are deeply involved.

3. The Commission has appraised the security situation in Palestineon the basis of a considerable volume of information, official and unoffi-cial, available to it from a diversity of sources. These sources have includedofficial reports and appraisals from the Mandatory Power; reports and

First Special Report of the UN Palestine Commission to the Security Council 63

comments from the Jewish Agency for Palestine; statements by the ArabHigher Committee; and dispatches from the press of the world. On thestrength of this information the Commission has concentrated its atten-tion on the following main considerations:

A. The security situation in Palestine continues to be aggravated notonly in the areas of the proposed Jewish and Arab States, but also in theCity of Jerusalem, even in the presence of British troops.

B. The Commission will be unable to establish security and maintainlaw and order, without which it cannot implement the resolution of theGeneral Assembly, unless military forces in adequate strength are madeavailable to the Commission when the responsibility for the administra-tion of Palestine is transferred to it.

C. Powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, aredefying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in adeliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein.

4. The question of providing an international force to assist the Com-mission in the maintenance of law and order in Palestine during the tran-sitional period repeatedly arose in the discussions of the Ad Hoc Commit-tee of the General Assembly and its Subcommittee 1 which elaborated thePlan of Partition with Economic Union. It was generally considered thatthe matter fell within the competence of the Security Council, whichwould subsequently take such action in the matter as circumstances mightdictate.

5. Although the security aspects of the problem are referred to theSecurity Council by this report, the Commission intends to continue withsuch of the vast amount of preparatory work essential to the implementa-tion of the recommendations as can be undertaken without the assistanceof the Security Council sought herein.

II. The Security Situation in Palestine Today

1. In its First Monthly Progress Report to the Security Council theCommission pointed out in Section 13 that:

a. The information given to the Commission by the representatives ofthe Mandatory Power and of the Jewish Agency for Palestine coincidedin substance as regards the general insecurity in Palestine and the steadydecline in the security position there;


b. The information available to the Commission at the time led to theconclusion that the situation in Palestine as regards security is morelikely to worsen than to improve;

c. The Commission envisaged the possibility of a collapse of security onthe termination of the Mandate “unless adequate means are made avail-able to the Commission for the exercise of its authority.”

2. Information available to the Commission since the submission ofits First Monthly Report to the Security Council confirms the above con-clusions as regards security, emphasizes the increasing gravity of the situa-tion, and reveals more clearly the existence of a determination to opposeby force the Assembly’s plan of partition.

3. The representative of the Mandatory Power informed the Com-mission at its sixteenth meeting on January 1948, that as regards Arabsand Jews in Palestine “elements on each side were engaged in attaching orin taking reprisals indistinguishable from attacks,” and that as a result,were it not “for the efforts of the security forces over the past month, thetwo communities would by now have been fully engaged in internecineslaughter.” He further stated that “the Government of Palestine fear[s]that strife in Palestine will be greatly intensified when the Mandate is ter-minated,” and that, therefore, “the commission will be faced with theproblem of how to avert certain bloodshed on a very much wider scalethan prevails at present.”

4. Statements made to the Commission by the representative of theJewish Agency for Palestine and in memoranda submitted by that Agencyhave corroborated the appraisals of the security situation in Palestinemade by the Mandatory Power.…

6. The Secretary-General has been informed by the Arab HigherCommittee that [it] is determined to persist in its rejection of the parti-tion plan and in its refusal to recognize the resolution of the Assembly and“anything deriving therefrom.” The subsequent communication of 6 Feb-ruary to the Secretary-General from the representative of the Arab High-er Committee set forth the following conclusions of the Arab HigherCommittee Delegation:

a. The Arabs of Palestine will never recognize the validity of the extort-ed partition recommendations or the authority of the United Nations tomake them.


b. The Arabs of Palestine consider that any attempt by the Jews or anypower or group of powers to establish a Jewish State in Arab territory isan act of aggression which will be resisted in self-defense by force.

c. It is very unwise and fruitless to ask any commission to proceed toPalestine because not a single Arab will co-operate with the said com-mission.

d. The United Nations or its commission should not be misled tobelieve that its efforts in the partition plan will meet with any success. Itwill be far better for the eclipsed prestige of this organization not tostart on this adventure.

e. The United Nations prestige will be better served by abandoning, notenforcing such an injustice.

f. The determination of every Arab in Palestine is to oppose in everyway the partition of that country.

g. The Arabs of Palestine made a solemn declaration before the UnitedNations, before God and history, that they will never submit or yield toany power going to Palestine to enforce partition.

The only way to establish partition is first to wipe themout—man, woman and child.

7. The Commission has no reason to doubt the determination andforce of the organized resistance to the plan of partition by strong Arabelements inside and outside of Palestine. In an official report, dated 4 Feb-ruary 1948, the Mandatory Power states that:

1. The High Commissioner for Palestine reported on 27 January thatthe security position had become more serious during the precedingweek with the entry into Palestine of large parties of trained guerrillasfrom adjacent territory. A band of some 300 men had established itselfin the Safad area of Galilee, and it was probably this band or part of itwhich carried out an intensive attack during that week on Yechiam set-tlement, using mortars and heavy automatics as well as rifles.

2. On the same date, the High Commissioner further reported that asecond large bank of some 700 Syrians had entered Palestine via Trans-Jordan during the night of 20-21 January. This band had its own mech-anized transport, its members were well equipped and provisioned, andwore battle dress. The party appears to have entered Trans-Jordan fromSyria and then crossed into Palestine at a point at which the entry ofSyrians was not expected. The Syrian and Lebanese frontiers are


manned on the Palestine side by both troops and police, although thenature of the border country makes it extremely difficult to secure theentire frontier against illegal entry, especially at night. On arrival inPalestine, this band appears to have dispersed, and it is thus nowimpracticable to deal with it by military action. So far as is known, itsnumbers have not engaged in illegal activity beyond the possession ofarms.

3. Arab morale is considered to have risen steadily as a result of thesereinforcements, of the spectacular success of the Hebron Arabs in liqui-dating a Haganah column near Surif, and of the capture and successfuldismantling by the Arab National Guard of a Jewish van filled withexplosives which was to have been detonated in an Arab locality. Eventhe relatively serious loss of life and damage to property caused by Jew-ish reprisals, have, in the High Commissioner’s view, failed to check therevival of confidence in the fellaheen and urban proletariat. Panic con-tinues to increase, however, throughout the Arab middle classes, andthere is a steady exodus of those who can afford to leave the country.

4. Subsequent reports dated 2 February indicate that a further party oftroops belonging to the “Arab Liberation Army” arrived in Palestine viathe Jisr Djamiyeh Bridge during the night of 29-30 January. The party,numbering some 950 men transported in 19 vehicles, consisted largelyof non-Palestinian Arabs, all in uniform and well armed. It is now dis-persed in small groups throughout villages of the Nablus, Jenin, andTulkarm sub-districts. The security forces have taken action to preventfurther incursions across the Jisr Djamiyeh and the Sheikh HusseiniBridges.

8. A subsequent communication from the Mandatory Power underdate of 9 February 1948, also reports that:

A report has been received from Jerusalem to the effect that it is nowdefinitely established that a second party of some seven hundred guer-rillas (believed to be under the command of Fawzi Bay al Kankji)entered Palestine via Djamiyeh Bridge on 29th/30th January. It isunderstood that this band dispersed rapidly among the villages ofSamaria and that there is now in that district a force of not less than1400. Although this force has dispersed, it remains cohesive and isincreasingly exercising considerable administrative control over thewhole area. As an instance of this, the force has of its own accord and incollaboration with Arab National Committee, already dealt with localbandits and other petty crimes. The presence of this force, whichexhibits a surprising degree of discipline, has been warmly welcomed by


the inhabitants of Samaria. It appears anxious to avoid becominginvolved with the British Security forces. The secrecy which clouds theentry of the second contingent is due to a deliberate and successfullyimposed policy of silence.

Individual attacks by Arabs on British troops and police have increased.These are due partly to a desire to obtain arms even at the price of mur-der, and partly to nervousness, particularly in rural areas, caused by thefrequent use by the Jews of British uniforms in order to facilitate offen-sive action.

9. The main facts controlling the security situation in Palestine todayare the following:

a. Organized efforts by strong Arab elements inside and outside Pales-tine to prevent the implementation of the Assembly’s plan of partitionand to thwart its objectives by threats and acts of violence, includingarmed incursions into Palestinian territory.

b. Certain elements of the Jewish community in Palestine continue tocommit irresponsible acts of violence which worsen the security situa-tion, although that Community is generally in support of the recom-mendations of the Assembly.

c. The added complication created by the fact that the MandatoryPower, which remains responsible for law and order in Palestine untilthe termination of the Mandate, is engaged in the liquidation of itsadministration and preparing for the evacuation of its troops.…

IV. The Problem of Security with Special Reference to the Militia

1. The Commission is determined to make every possible effort toseek the co-operation of the Arabs of Palestine. The attitude of the ArabHigher Committee, however, creates a situation the consequences ofwhich must be faced. Under the present circumstances, confronted withthe opposition of powerful Arab interests, the Commission would not beable to select and establish in the proposed Arab State a ProvisionalCouncil of Government which would act “under the general direction ofthe Commission,” and would at the same time enjoy sufficient authorityand popular support to function effectively. It will be equally impossible,under present circumstances, to establish in the Arab State an armed mili-tia over which the Commission is to exercise “general political and mili-tary control.” In any event, unless the Commission will be able to proceed


to Palestine well in advance of the termination of the Mandate, the possi-bility for exchanging every effort to consult with Arabs will be lost.

2. According to the statements made by the Jewish Agency for Pales-tine, it would be technically possible to establish the militia of the JewishState before the termination of the Mandate. The refusal of the Mandato-ry Power to allow the formation of such militia until the termination ofthe Mandate, however, will entail delay in the implementation of theAssembly’s plan, and renders much more difficult the problem of the secu-rity of the Jewish State when the Mandate is relinquished. The militia ofthe Jewish State, if and when it is adequately armed and equipped, can,however, be responsible only for the security of that State, and it would becontrary to the Assembly’s plan if a militia were to be used on the otherside of the border for preventive or retaliatory action, however necessarysuch action might appear to be.

3. If power in the territory of the Arab State should be seized byforces hostile to the plan of the General Assembly and beyond the controlof the Commission, then the provisions of the resolution affecting theEconomic Union as well as the Arab State will be unfulfilled, and theestablishment of the Jewish State and of the international regime for theCity of Jerusalem will be gravely jeopardized.

4. The plan of the General Assembly provided for the establishmentof two States and the City of Jerusalem, in each of which the Commis-sion, until the end of the transitional period, is to exercise definite powersof direction and control. If the exercise of authority by the Commissioncannot extend to all these entities, an entirely new situation arises towhich the Commission has the duty to draw the attention of the SecurityCouncil.

V. The City of Jerusalem

1. The City of Jerusalem, which has been conceived as a de-milita-rized enclave in the proposed Arab State, even if established, would beincapable of defending itself against attacks if British security forces werenot replaced by another non-Palestinian force.

2. It is hardly necessary to point out the consequences of an intensi-fied struggle between communities in this Holy City of three world faiths.The repercussions would be immediate throughout Palestine and wouldquickly extend far beyond its borders. It is scarcely an exaggeration to state


that the whole of mankind is interested in the maintenance of internalpeace in Jerusalem.

3. The United Nations would be dealt a severe blow if its effort tomaintain the sacred character of the City and to preserve it as a possiblecenter of peace and harmony should end in a sanguinary struggle betweenreligious communities. To invite even a regularly constituted and con-trolled militia of either State to defend or secure the City would not onlybe contrary to the plan of the General Assembly but would inflame pas-sions and might provoke religious war.

VI. Provisions of the Plan Which Cannot Be Fulfilled Without the Assistance of an Armed Force

1. Apart from the impossibility of maintaining security and orderwithout the assistance of non-Palestinian military forces, there are provi-sions in the recommendations of the General Assembly which, underexisting circumstances, cannot be fulfilled in the absence of such forces.

2. The first duty assigned to the Commission “on its arrival in Pales-tine” is to “proceed to carry out measures for the establishment of the fron-tiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem.” The bound-ary commission, composed of neutral members, which the United Nationscommission intends to constitute, will not be in a position to start its workunder the protection of British security forces, since the Mandatory Powerholds to the position that such work, being part of the implementation ofthe Assembly’s plan, may be undertaken only after the termination of theMandate. In view of the Arab opposition to the plan of partition, an entire-ly untenable situation would be created if the boundary commission wouldhave to rely on the security forces of the other party for its protection. Thiseventuality obviously would not be considered by the Commission.

3. The same considerations apply to the work of the United NationsCommission itself, to that of the members of the Preparatory EconomicCommission (paragraph B.11 of the plan), and of the staff which willassist the Commission in discharging its duties. Their freedom of action,their very liberty of movement cannot depend exclusively on the protec-tion they may receive from only one side. This would be contrary to thedignity and efficiency of a Commission of the United Nations endowedwith powers of direction and control over the very authorities from whichit would have to ask protection.…

Document 14: United Nations Palestine Commission Report to the General AssemblyApril 10, 1948

The final report of the UN Palestine Commission concludes that the Jews cooperat-ed with the commission and the Arab states and the Arab Higher Committeeopposed Resolution 181(II). The report states that the opposition of the BritishMandatory power and noncooperation from the Arabs meant that the commissioncould not implement the UN resolution. The document outlines various problemsthat remained to be addressed in Palestine, such as security, economy, the status ofJerusalem, and food supplies.

VI. Conclusions

A. Review of the Facts Which Have Prevented the Implementationof the Assembly’s Resolution

1. The Commission, on 9 January 1948, took up its task of imple-menting the General Assembly’s resolution of 29 November 1947, whichhad been supported by thirty-three Members of the United Nations.

The Commission appreciates the able assistance rendered to it by theSecretary-General and his staff, who have extended full co-operation tothe Commission in carrying out the Assembly’s decision.

2. The Jewish Agency for Palestine co-operated with the Commis-sion in its task of implementing the Assembly’s resolution. The Govern-ments of the Arab States and the Arab Higher Committee not only with-held their co-operation from the Commission, but actively opposed theAssembly’s resolution. As the Commission reported to the SecurityCouncil in its first Special Report (S/676) on 16 February 1948, “PowerfulArab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, are defying the resolu-tion of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort toalter by force the settlement envisaged therein.” Armed Arab bands fromneighbouring Arab States have infiltrated into the territory of Palestineand together with local Arab forces are defeating the purposes of the reso-lution by acts of violence. The Jews, on the other hand, are determined toensure the establishment of the Jewish State, as envisaged by the resolu-tion. The resulting conditions of insecurity in Palestine have made itimpossible for the Commission to implement the Assembly’s resolutionwithout the assistance of adequate armed forces.

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UN Palestine Commission Report to the General Assembly 71

3. The policy of the mandatory Power, and particularly its refusal totake any measure which might be construed as involving it in the imple-mentation of the Assembly’s resolution, has had the following conse-quences:

(a) The provisions of the Assembly’s resolution for a progressive transferof administration from the mandatory Power to the Commission havenot been complied with. The mandatory Power has insisted on retainingundivided control of Palestine until the date of termination of the Man-date and on relinquishing the whole complex of governmental responsi-bilities on that day, except for the areas still occupied by British troops.In the view of the mandatory Power the progressive transfer of authori-ty refers only to those areas.

(b) The Commission could not proceed to Palestine until two weeksprior to the termination of the Mandate. The insistence of the manda-tory Power on this point, even though the Commission has been pre-pared to restrict its activities in Palestine prior to 15 May 1948, topreparatory work and would not attempt to exercise any authority there,made it impossible for the Commission to take the necessary preparato-ry measures to ensure continuity in administration after the date of ter-mination of the Mandate.

(c) The Commission could not take any measures to establish the fron-tiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem, since themandatory Power informed the Commission that it could not facilitatethe delimitation of frontiers on the ground.

(d) The refusal of the mandatory Power to permit any ProvisionalCouncil of Government, whether Arab or Jewish, if selected, to carryout any functions prior to the termination of the Mandate, made it nec-essary for the Commission, in accordance with part I.B.4 of the resolu-tion of the General Assembly, to communicate that fact to the SecurityCouncil and to the Secretary-General.

(e) The refusal of the mandatory Power to permit the taking of prepara-tory steps toward the establishment of the armed militia, envisaged bythe resolution for the purpose of maintaining internal order and pre-venting frontier clashes, has made it impossible to implement theAssembly’s resolution in that respect.

4. In its first two reports to the Security Council, the Commissionforesaw the prospect of a security vacuum in Palestine immediately fol-lowing the termination of the Mandate. The Commission also stated thatit was confronted with a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement

envisaged in the resolution of the General Assembly. The Commissionaccordingly had decided “to refer to the Security Council the problem ofproviding that armed assistance which alone would enable the Commis-sion to discharge its responsibilities on the termination of the Mandate.”On 15 March 1948, in its second Monthly Progress Report to the Securi-ty Council (S/695), the Commission reported the impossibility of imple-menting, within the prescribed time-limit, the provision of the Plan of theGeneral Assembly concerning the Provisional Councils of Government,and the impossibility of taking preparatory steps for the formation ofarmed militias. It pointed out that the policy of the mandatory Powertogether with the steady deterioration of conditions in Palestine left littlehope for the achievement of continuity in administrative services and foran orderly transfer of authority to the Commission. The Commission alsostated that “unless security is restored in Palestine, implementation of theresolution of the General Assembly will not be possible.” The Commis-sion has received no guidance or instructions from the Security Council,and no armed assistance has been made available to it.

5. The Commission, therefore, has the duty to report to the GeneralAssembly that the armed hostility of both Palestinian and non-PalestinianArab elements, the lack of co-operation from the mandatory Power, thedisintegrating security situation in Palestine, and the fact that the SecurityCouncil did not furnish the Commission with the necessary armed assis-tance, are the factors which have made it impossible for the Commissionto implement the Assembly’s resolution.

B. Review of the Problems Which Require an Urgent Solution1. Irrespective of the ultimate decision of the General Assembly on

the future government of Palestine, there are a number of urgent matterswhich should be dealt with in order to preserve the greatest possible meas-ure of order and essential services in Palestine. Among the matters requir-ing immediate attention are the following:

(a) Security

(i) Consultations in connexion with the terms of theproposed directive to the General Officer Commandingregarding the functions and responsibilities of Britishtroops remaining in Palestine after 15 May;


(ii) Details of the arrangements for transfer of the arms,stores, equipment, depots, etc. of the Palestine PoliceForce;

(iii) The security of Jerusalem and the Holy Places, andthe recruitment of a non-Palestinian police force forJerusalem;

(iv) The safeguarding of the physical property andpreservation of the assets of the Government of Pales-tine.

(b) Administrative

(i) Arrangements to ensure continuity in essential trans-portation and communications services such as airports,railways, posts, telegraph, telephone and radio;

(ii) Arrangements to ensure continuity in the health andprison administration, and in the judiciary;

(iii) Preservation and transfer of the files of the depart-ments of Government;

(iv) Access to Haifa and its harbour after 15 May 1948.

(c) Economic and financial

(i) Arrangements for the importation and distributionof food supplies;

(ii) Representation of Palestine before the InternationalEmergency Food Council;

(iii) Releases after 15 May 1948 from the sterling bal-ances blocked by the United Kingdom Government’sTreasury Order of 22 February 1948;

(iv) The future of the Palestine Currency Board;

(v) Maintenance of import and exchange controls;

(vi) The continuity of essential fiscal arrangements,including customs and budgetary matters;

(vii) Disposition of the assets and liabilities of Palestine;

(viii) Payments for services which will be provided toBritish Forces after 15 May in such matters as railway,road and harbour facilities.



2. With respect to the food situation in Palestine, the Commissionhas been advised by the mandatory Power that, unless immediate provi-sion is made for the further import of food supplies, on 15 May Palestine’sstock of cereals will not exceed two weeks’ supply. The mandatory Powerhas stated that the Government of Palestine cannot advance money forthe procurement of further supplies as it has no monies available for thispurpose, that the United Kingdom Government is not prepared toadvance the money, and that it has no confidence that the Commissionwould be able to implement within a reasonable time a guarantee to reim-burse it out of the future revenues of Palestine. The United KingdomGovernment is prepared to undertake procurement of food supplies forthe period 15 May to 30 June on an agency basis only, provided they arefurnished with funds to the amount of one to one-and-a-half millionpounds sterling. In view of the urgency of this matter, the Commission ispresenting a special report on the subject to the Security Council with arequest for its guidance, in accordance with part I.B.2 of the Plan.

3. With respect to the City of Jerusalem, the Commission empha-sizes the sacred character of this Holy City of Christianity, Islam andJudaism. The danger to the City and its Holy Places of violence and battlebetween hostile communities, and the possible widespread repercussionsresulting therefrom, is obvious. The Commission calls to the attention ofthe Assembly the extreme urgency of the matter referred to in paragraphVI. D.3 (e) of this report, and reports that the question of securing theservices of the Jerusalem Police Force following the termination of theMandate is still the subject of discussions with the mandatory Power andwith the Secretary-General. The Commission feels bound to point out,however, that a successful solution of this question will not provide for thesecurity of Jerusalem in the case of civil war in Palestine. It will be of assis-tance to the internal protection of life and property in the City.

4. With respect to the Palestine Police Force, the mandatory Powerhas advised the Commission that the force will be dissolved on 15 Mayand that its arms, stores, equipment and depots will be left to be taken overby such persons as the Commission may designate. A considerable num-ber of police or other personnel will be required to take over and safeguardthe large stocks of armaments that are the property of the Palestine PoliceForce. Otherwise there is grave danger that these stocks may be aban-doned or may fall into the hands of irresponsible elements in Palestine.


5. With respect to matters of administration, the mandatory Powerhas advised the Commission that the contracts of all employees of theGovernment of Palestine will be terminated on 15 May and that theCommission would be free to re-engage any employees who might wish tocontinue in government service in Palestine. Immediate steps clearlyshould be taken to preserve as much as possible of the personnel andmachinery of administration and to safeguard the files and physical prop-erty of the various departments of Government. In the case of transporta-tion, communications, health, fiscal matters and other essential services, itwill be necessary to re-employ or recruit a large staff, in order to prevent acomplete break-down in administration in Palestine after 15 May.

6. The Commission has been prevented from concluding arrange-ments, even in respect of such vital matters as food supplies, the creationof a non-Palestinian police force for Jerusalem, the organization of anemergency police force to take over the stores and armaments of the Pales-tine Police Force, and the recruitment of personnel to carry on the func-tions of administration in Palestine, by the fact that it has no funds avail-able for such purposes. Even though such expenditures would be reim-bursable out of future revenues of Palestine, the Commission wouldrequire a substantial working capital fund out of which immediate neces-sary expenditures could be met.

7. The steadily deteriorating situation in Palestine leads to theinescapable conclusion that, in the absence of forces adequate to restoreand maintain law and order in Palestine following the termination of theMandate, there will be administrative chaos, starvation, widespread strife,violence and bloodshed in Palestine, including Jerusalem. These calami-tous results for the people of Palestine will be intensified unless specificarrangements are made regarding the urgent matters outlined above wellin advance of 15 May 1948.

(Signed) Karel Lisicky (Czechoslovakia) ChairmanRaul Diez de-Medina (Bolivia) Vice-ChairmanPer Federspiel (Denmark)Eduardo Morgan (Panama)Vicente J. Francisco (Philippines)

* Reprinted with the permission of Scribner, an imprint of Simon & Schuster Adult Publishing Group, fromIn the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations by Trygve Lie. Copyright © 1954 by Trygve Lie;copyright renewed in 1982 by Guri Lie Zeckendorf, Sissel Lie Bratz and Mette Lie Holst. All rightsreserved.

Document 15: Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations*

In his memoirs, Trygve Lie, the first secretary-general of the United Nations, gives afirsthand account of the proceedings at the UN. He reviews the history ofUNSCOP and Resolution 181(II) as well as Jewish and Arab reactions to the Parti-tion Plan. When the Arab invasion of Israel began in May 1948, Lie describes it as“armed defiance of the United Nations.” His memoirs offer insight from someonewho influenced events on the ground.

The Palestine Challenge

Chapter X

The plight of Jews and Arabs.—Partition decided but sabotaged.—Issue of theauthority and power of the United Nations.—Shifting United States posi-tion.—Offer to resign.—“War” on the United Nations.

The partition of Palestine and the consequent creation of the state ofIsrael became one of the most dramatic chapters of early United Nationshistory. As Secretary-General, I put the full weight of my office consis-tently behind the Organization’s decision from the time it was first taken.A corresponding consistency did not always prevail in every other quarter.

The problem was complex. Christianity, Islam, and the Jewish faith,all are inheritors of the ancient Hebrew civilization and tradition. Reli-gious differences and rivalries were therefore bound to influence the dis-cussions from the very outset. Then there was the human-rights issue,with its background on the one side of age-old persecution of the Jews,climaxed by Hitler’s attempt to extirpate all members of the Jewish faithor “race” from European soil, and on the other side the problem of justiceto the Arabs living in the ancient Jewish homeland. Extreme nationalism,always strongest in the youngest states, added fuel to the fire. Cuttingacross all this was the conflict between the old feudalism of the East andtwentieth century social concepts. Finally, there were strategic considera-tions, there might be oil, and no great power appeared to be entirely disin-terested.

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Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations 77

It was not easy to remain objective on every one of these issues, but Ifeel that I managed. The religious rivalry did not disturb me much. I rec-ognized the right of all creeds to enjoy equal access to Palestine’s HolyPlaces. The persecution of the Jews concerned me more. Already as achild, I had been deeply impressed by the moving poems of HenrikWergeland, Norway’s great national poet of the early nineteenth century:“The Jew” and “The Jewess,” written during his indefatigable fight for thefree entry of Jews into Norway. I had read about the Czarist pogromsagainst the Russian Jews in 1906. Even fresher in memory was the fate ofthe seven hundred Norwegian Jews whom the Nazis deported in thecourse of World War II, of whom only twelve survived to return to theirhomes in 1945. This history of suffering naturally affected my conscience.About the Arab fellahin, I knew only that they were frequently oppressedby absentee landlords and would no doubt benefit from the great Zionistdevelopment projects already launched in the land: an orderly solutionwould provide for the fullest protection of their rights. The hostile atti-tudes announced at an early stage by the neighboring Arab states forecastdifficulties. Still I felt that, in view of the United Nations will to help thempreserve their newly won independence—as demonstrated already duringthe Security Council’s London session—and their obvious need for out-side help to solve their own internal problems, they would abide by theOrganization’s decisions. As to the attitudes of the great powers, I felt thathere was a field where they should still be able to act in unison—the rapiddeterioration in their mutual relationship notwithstanding. If they wishedto do something positive through the United Nations, here was the placeto do it. None of them would be interested in a breach of the peace in thisarea, with the consequent danger of becoming entangled themselves. Irealized that Britain might be in a special position, because of her involve-ment as the Mandatory power; but the United Kingdom itself had placedthe Palestine problem on the United Nations’ doorstep.

Besides, the existence of a Zionist community in Palestine had been arecognized international responsibility ever since the League of Nationsconfirmed the grant of a League of Nations mandate over the area toGreat Britain in 1922. One of the declared purposes of this decision wasthe establishment of a Jewish national home, with the necessary safe-guards for the civil and religious rights of all the country’s inhabitants,irrespective of origin or religion.

Now, in 1947, a permanent Jewish homeland seemed at least a partialsolution to the problem of hundreds of thousands of refugees languishingin European camps and driven by natural instinct to seek haven outside acontinent stained with Jewish blood.

The British, pressed by Arab opposition and Zionist insistence,harassed by acts of terrorism from both sides, finally threw up their hands.All efforts at reconciliation had ended in failure. “We have tried for yearsto solve the problem of Palestine,” Sir Alexander Cadogan put it. “Havingfailed so far, we now bring the Palestinian question to the United Nations,in the hope that it can succeed where we have not.”

It was in March, 1947, that the British government first told me thatit would request the inclusion of the Palestine problem on the agenda ofthe autumn meeting of the General Assembly. Informally it raised thequestion of calling a special, advance session of the assembly, to arrange forthe preparatory work which would be necessary for proper considerationin the fall. I was sensitive to the urgency of the matter, and, in fact, hadalready asked Ralph J. Bunche as director of the Department of Trustee-ship and Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories to considerpossible solutions and keep me informed; but I did not approve of a specialsession to set up a preparatory committee, and told the British I thought itimpracticable and certainly costly. After considering the appointment of astudy committee from the Secretariat, I finally proposed to the Britishthat eight Member governments including the Big Five be requested toconstitute themselves as a preparatory committee on the Palestine matter:if the five permanent Members of the Security Council were agreeable, Iwould inquire by cable from all Member states whether they had anyobjection to forming such a body. If fewer than one-third objected, Iwould act to constitute the committee. But the Big Five were not enthusi-astic.

On April 2, 1947, His Majesty’s government requested the Secre-tary-General of the United Nations to place the question of Palestine onthe agenda of the General Assembly at its next regular session. The gov-ernment would submit to the Assembly an account of their administrationon the League of Nations mandate and ask the Assembly to make recom-mendations, under Article 10 of the charter, concerning the future gov-ernment of Palestine. London further requested the Secretary-General tosummon, as soon as possible, a special session of the General Assembly


“for the purpose of consulting and instructing a special committee to pre-pare for the consideration, at the regular session of the Assembly, of thequestion.”...

Time enough would be lost by this procedure, and I was resolved notto add to it. Cables to the Member states asking for their approval of aspecial session were dispatched at once. The machinery for servicing agreat international meeting was promptly put into action, and on themorning of April 28 the representatives of fifty-five Members gathered atFlushing Meadow. After some sparring, the Assembly appointed theUnited Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) andadjourned. The terms of reference of the investigatory charge were broad,and the composition of the committee was equally so: Australia, Canada,Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden,Uruguay, and Yugoslavia.

Placing some of the ablest members of the Secretariat at UNSCOP’sdisposal—fifty-seven in all—I appointed Assistant Secretary-GeneralVictor Hoo as my personal representative to the committee, and designat-ed Dr. Alfonso Garcia Robles, a Mexican director in the Department ofSecurity Council Affairs, as principal secretary. I was determined that thecommittee’s secretariat should be above reproach—not only technicallybut politically.

For my own part, I kept absolutely clear of UNSCOP, holding mythoughts about the fairest solution to both Arabs and Jews to myself.When the committee made its report as the designated United Nationsorgan, I would give full support to the solution it saw fit to recommend.

The committee failed to reach agreement in all respects. Agreeingthat the British Mandate for Palestine should be terminated at the earliestpractical date, and that independence should be granted in Palestine aftera transitional period under United Nations auspices, it made further unan-imous recommendations with respect to the Holy Places and religiousinterests, Jewish displaced persons, minority rights, peaceful settlement ofdisputes, and other matters. At this point, the committee split. The major-ity (seven) recommended the partition of Palestine into an Arab state anda Jewish state, which would be bound together in an economic union. Thecity of Jerusalem, as the Holy City for three faiths, would be a UnitedNations trusteeship. The minority (three—incidentally, all with influentialMoslem populations) recommended a single federal state, in which the



Arabs would be the majority. Australia abstained from voting for eitherrecommendation.

The majority found that the claims of both the Arabs and the Jews inPalestine were at once valid and irreconcilable: that to neither group couldbe granted all it wished. Conceiving of the conflict in Palestine as onebetween two intense nationalisms, they saw partition as the only means ofgranting each nationality expression. I shall not set out the plan in itsimpressive justification and detail.

What had emerged was a clear victory for the principle of partition. Theinternational community, through its chosen representatives, had decidedthat two states should be created. As Secretary-General, I took the cueand, when approached by delegations for advice, frankly recommendedthat they follow the majority plan. Behind-the-scenes discussions soonbecame hectic, and some Arab spokesmen attacked me openly; but I couldnot yield. The responsibility for solving the Palestine problem had beentransferred to the United Nations, and the Organization had to act in con-formity with its best judgment.

After an epic struggle the Second Session of the General Assemblyadopted the plan of partition on November 29, 1947, by a vote of 33 to 13,with 10 abstaining. The majority included the United States and the Sovi-et Union, Western Europe and Eastern Europe, most of Latin America,and the Commonwealth. Of the minority Members, all except two hadsubstantial Moslem populations. The vote was preceded by a final series ofvain efforts to bring the Arabs and Jews of Palestine together: spokesmenfor the Jews indicated that they would accept partition, even though theysaid the plan would give them but one-eighth of the territory originallypromised them in the Balfour Declaration; spokesmen for the Arabs madeit clear that they would reject partition, and offered no hope for any com-promise. When the vote was taken, the representatives of Syria, Lebanon,Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt rose and filed out of the Assemblyhall. Another walkout! The United Kingdom—the Mandatory power—abstained from voting for or against the resolution.

Great Britain had placed the matter before the Assembly with thedeclared conviction that agreement between the Arabs and Jews was unat-tainable. This did not deter the British representative, Arthur CreechJones, from informing the Assembly that Britain would give effect only toa plan accepted by the Arabs and the Jews: Britain would “accept” the par-


tition plan but could not implement it, as this might require the use ofarmed forces. All British reservations had been respected in the November29 resolution, and so this attitude caused considerable surprise. Of course,the partition plan failed to provide sufficiently for implementation; butmost countries expected Britain as the original sponsor of United Nationsaction to do its utmost toward carrying the action through. Had it doneso, need for an international force to restore peace in Palestine would nothave become nearly as acute as it soon did.

It fell to “five lonely pilgrims”—the representatives of Bolivia,Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama, and the Philippines who togetherformed the new Palestine Commission provided for in the resolution—toplan the transfer of administrative responsibility from the Mandatoryregime to the proposed Arab and Jewish government organs. The com-mission was to take over the administration from the Mandatory powerand establish in each new state a Provisional Council of Government thatwould progressively receive full responsibility for the administration of itsstate. The commission was to supervise in each state the erection of theadministrative organs of central and local government and the creation ofan armed militia, maintaining general military and political control overthis, which would include choice of its high command. Finally, the com-mission was to effect an economic union between the two states. I choseRalph Bunche as principal secretary of the commission, and when it cametogether at Lake Success on January 9, 1948, that choice was almost thesingle bright element in the picture with which we were confronted.

From the first week of December, 1947, disorder in Palestine hadbegun to mount. The Arabs repeatedly had asserted that they would resistpartition by force. They seemed to be determined to drive that point homeby assaults upon the Jewish community in Palestine—assaults whichbrought considerable retaliation from the Jews. In response, I quietly set inmotion Secretariat studies of the possibilities of creating an internationalpolice force and undertook exploratory conversations with various Mem-ber governments. Publicly, I gave the Palestine Commission a calculatedwelcome. “You are entitled,” I asserted at its first meeting, “to be confidentthat in the event it should prove necessary, the Security Council willassume its full measure of responsibility in implementation of the Assem-bly’s resolution. You have a right to assume, as I assume, that in such a sit-uation the Security Council will not fail to exercise to the fullest, and


without exception, every necessary power entrusted to it by the Charter inorder to assist you in fulfilling your mission.” These were bold words, andadmittedly hopeful ones. I prodded the Security Council so openly notbecause I was confident that it would act, but because I feared that itmight not. There was no question now of veto. The Soviet Union and theUnited States stood together in support of the Assembly’s partition reso-lution, and, as time passed, the former proved to be the more steadfast ofthe two. Other forces—Arab intransigence, British passiveness, Americaninconsistency—acted together to undermine the considered recommenda-tion of the majority of Member nations.

The Palestine Commission energetically took up its task. It asked meto invite representatives of Great Britain, the Arab Higher Committee,and the Jewish Agency to sit with it. Sir Alexander Cadogan and MosheShertok* were promptly appointed, but the Arab Higher Committeecabled me on January 19, 1948, as follows:

Arab Higher Committee is determined [to] persist in rejecting partitionand in refusal [to] recognize UNO resolution [in] this respect and any-thing deriving therefrom, for these reasons it is unable [to] accept invi-tation.

The Arab response did not come as a surprise. The Commission andI could only endeavor to carry out the partition plan as fully as Arab oppo-sition would allow, and we accordingly entered into the most intense con-sultations with Sir Alexander and with Mr. Shertok.

The British approach proved to be not in accord, in my opinion, witheither the letter or the spirit of the partition plan: the United Kingdomcould not progressively turn over authority to the Palestine Commission,as the Assembly resolution provided, but only abruptly and completely onMay 15. Neither did it “regard favourably any proposal by the Commis-sion to proceed to Palestine earlier than two weeks before the date of thetermination of the Mandate.” London would not permit the formation ofthe militia which the Assembly’s resolution called for, nor would it facili-tate frontier delimitation. The Assembly had further recommended thatthe United Kingdom endeavor to evacuate by February 1 a seaport andhinterland in the area of the Jewish state adequate to provide facilities forimmigration. “It is not possible,” Sir Alexander reported, “for my Govern-ment to comply.”

* Later, as Moshe Sharett, first Israeli Foreign Minister, and now [in 1954] Prime Minister.


The consultations with Mr. Shertok were more fruitful. The JewishAgency in Jerusalem fully cooperated with the Palestine Commission, andhe and I—for different reasons working toward the same end, namelycompliance with the General Assembly resolution—had many useful con-sultations in the course of the meetings or in my home.

Needless to say, I should have been delighted to have an equally inti-mate collaboration with the Arab Higher Committee in implementing theresolution by which I was unreservedly bound as Secretary-General.Instead, the Arabs employed open threats. On February 6 the HigherCommittee representative wrote to me: “The Arabs of Palestine … willnever submit or yield to any Power going to Palestine to enforce partition.The only way to establish partition is first to wipe them out—man,woman and child.”

It was not for the purpose of wiping out anyone, but rather for pre-venting an unrestrained civil and international war, that the PalestineCommission and the Secretary-General began to concentrate on the for-mation and dispatch of an international force to the Holy Land. In a spe-cial report of February 16 to the Security Council, on “the problem ofsecurity in Palestine,” the commission noted that Arab interests bothinside and outside Palestine were engaged in a deliberate effort to alter byviolence the settlement which the Assembly had recommended. Armedforces from surrounding Arab states had already begun infiltration ofPalestine. The report set forth the vast difficulties caused by the Arab andBritish attitudes, and cogently maintained that the armed assistance of theSecurity Council alone would permit success: “In the view of the Com-mission, a basic issue of international order is involved. A dangerous andtragic precedent will have been established if force, or the threat of the useof force, is to prove an effective deterrent to the will of the UnitedNations.” Unless an adequate non-Palestine force was provided for keep-ing order after May 15, the commission warned, “the period immediatelyfollowing the termination of the Mandate will be a period of uncontrolled,widespread strife and bloodshed in Palestine, including the City ofJerusalem. This would be a catastrophic conclusion to an era of interna-tional concern for that territory.”

The stand of the Palestine Commission was unquestionably sound. Itwas responsive to the fact then dominating the scene: that the Arab stateswere making open preparations to invade Palestine and overthrow a Unit-

ed Nations decision. Any invasion would be aggression, in flagrant viola-tion of the Charter. Its unlawfulness would be compounded by its designto upset the specific will of the United Nations. This was my reaction tothe report, and I asked Ralph Bunche to draft a statement to the SecurityCouncil which I would hold in readiness. As he and I worked it out withother advisers, it would have stressed that, despite the disagreementbetween East and West on providing the United Nations with armedforces, a sufficient degree of agreement had been reached for the establish-ment of a United Nations land force—an emergency international forcecomposed of those minimum units which the Big Five were committed toplacing at the Security Council’s disposal. Such a force would be morethan adequate to cope with the Palestine challenge. Secondly, the draftstatement took the view that the Organization could not permit violenceto be used against its decisions and organs; that if the moral force of theOrganization were not enough, physical force would have to supplementit. Drafting such a proposal was one step; the other, and the hazardousone, was presenting it to the Security Council. I postponed the secondstep until it was possible to sense better the trend of the Council’s discus-sion and action: it would be futile to speak only for the record, even if Iwere quite prepared to act granted a substantial possibility that the Coun-cil would follow.

My caution proved to be well justified. The Security Council met onFebruary 24. Karel Lisický of Czechoslovakia, as chairman, made animpressive presentation of the Palestine Commission’s report. Theresponse of the Council rested above all in the hands of the United Statesand Britain—here, as so often, affirmative action by the Organizationrequired the support, if not the leadership, of those two great powerswhich were its originators.

Britain’s response, through Arthur Creech Jones, “loyally accepted”the Assembly’s partition recommendation—except that, “faced with spe-cific threats by the Arabs,” His Majesty’s government could not promisethe particular kind of cooperation now requested.

I hoped for more from the United States. Washington had outspo-kenly supported the partition decision at the General Assembly. At Amer-ican suggestion the Assembly had adopted a resolution which spoke instrong terms of the Security Council’s role in implementing partition. Butnow the United States spoke with a different voice. The Security Council,


Warren Austin maintained, could take action to maintain internationalpeace, but lacked the power to enforce partition or any other type of polit-ical settlement. He contented himself with proposing that the SecurityCouncil establish a committee of its five permanent members to look into“the question of possible threats to international peace arising in connec-tion with the Palestine situation.”

Ambassador Austin’s doctrine that the United Nations did not havethe power to enforce any type of political settlement is sound as a generalproposition. Indeed, much later, I used it myself in the case of Korea toanswer persons who asserted that United Nations forces should go beyondrepelling armed aggression and unify Korea by force. But the constitution-al position was very different in the two cases. The United Nations doesnot have the power to impose a political settlement, whether it be unifica-tion or partition, except in special circumstances. Such circumstances existwhen all the parties in control of a territory hand it over to the UnitedNations to determine its fate. In the case of Korea, all the parties did notdo that. In the case of Palestine, on the other hand, the United Kingdomwas the sole Mandatory power, and it had handed over the whole territoryto the United Nations for disposition. Clearly, I felt that the Organizationin these circumstances had full constitutional power not only to maintainorder inside the territory but, even more, to resist any attempt from out-side to overthrow its decision. The same circumstances would prevail forthe Territory of Trieste if the Security Council had been able to agree on agovernor and take over responsibility, as the Peace Treaty with Italy pro-vided. All the signatories to that treaty had agreed to this, so that thejuridical position was, in my opinion, fundamentally the same.

Be that as it may, with Ambassador Austin’s statement and the subse-quent arms embargo, Washington took the heart out of any support whichthe Security Council might have mobilized to enforce peace and maintainthe decision on partition. This attitude, I feared, would prejudice funda-mentally the powers of the Organization, in addition to damaging its pres-tige. I was opposed in principle, as well as on practical grounds, to theposition taken. Now the Palestine Commission requested a paper from theLegal Department on the rights of the Security Council relative to thePalestine question. I was in Norway when the paper was prepared, but ofcourse it took a position consonant with my desire to uphold the Organi-zation’s authority generally—as I had previously gone on record as doing


in earlier cases. It recalled my Trieste opinion, early in 1947, and contend-ed that the Council had already at that time “recognized the principle thatit has sufficient power, under the terms of Article 24 of the Charter, toassume new responsibilities on condition that they relate directly or evenindirectly to the maintenance of international peace and security, and thatin discharging these duties, the Security Council acts in accordance withthe purposes and principles of the United Nations.” When I returnedfrom Norway I had the Palestine opinion circulated to the Members ofthe Security Council. The Council met in a private session on March 9with the eternal question of appointing a Governor of Trieste on the agen-da, and Dr. José Arce of Argentina, who espoused the Arab viewpoint,took the occasion to attack the opinion in extreme terms. Its substance, hemaintained, was the “bastard” product of “unbalanced minds,” and, inprinciple, the Secretariat had no business producing such a document. Ireplied to Dr. Arcé’s criticism by affirming that, as long as I was head ofthe Secretariat, it would have the right to give any opinion requested byorgans of the United Nations. I added that I might have a further opinionon legal aspects of the Palestine question which I would present directly tothe Security Council. The Members of the Council supported me, andtook no action on Dr. Arcé’s attack.

The Palestine Commission carried on as best it could, and I gave it allpossible support. On February 22 I dispatched an advance party of theCommission’s secretariat to Jerusalem to establish contact with theMandatory Administration and to consult on the spot regarding the prob-lems of the take-over. The advance party arrived in Jerusalem early inMarch and left on the very eve of the expiration of the Mandate in May.In view of the attitude of the United Kingdom, this effort produced noresult. Although the members of the party lived in Jerusalem as guests ofthe Mandatory government, the conditions in that city gave me seriousconcern for their personal safety, and I took all possible measures to ensurethat they were safely evacuated. In the meantime the Security Council,after an interminable debate, requested its permanent Members on March5 to consult together regarding the instructions it might usefully give tothe Palestine Commission, “with a view of implementing the resolution ofthe General Assembly.” This resolution was a much watered version of theone Mr. Austin had put forth in February, which had been weak enough.

The United States, the U.S.S.R., France, and China thereupon


entered into consultations. The meetings took place as a rule in the officesof the delegations, and sometimes in my Manhattan office. I was presentthroughout. The United Kingdom declined to take part, but Sir AlexanderCadogan did appear a few times to answer questions. From the start, theconsultations were a frustrating affair. Only the Soviet Union seemed tobe seriously intent upon implementing partition; the United States clearlywas not. Rumors were flying that the United States was seeking to moder-ate the Arab stand even at the price of abandoning partition; and, in suchan atmosphere, firm action by the Council or its permanent Members wasout of the question. As it turned out, the United States would in effectrepudiate partition on the very day, March 19, when the committee of per-manent Members reported on its recommendations for “implementing”partition. With new instructions Mr. Austin took the floor to call for“action by all means available … to bring about the immediate cessation ofviolence” in Palestine. It was on this occasion that some sarcastic corre-spondents coined the imaginary Austin quotation: “We must do noth-ing—but at once!” To fortify his arguments for nonaction, he reverted toan old suggestion: The United States government now believed that atemporary United Nations trusteeship for Palestine should be established“to maintain the peace.… It would be without prejudice to the characterof the eventual political settlement.… Pending the convening of a specialsession of the General Assembly, we believe that the Security Councilshould instruct the Palestine Commission to suspend its efforts to imple-ment the proposed partition plan.”

I had met with Mr. Austin and representatives of the four other per-manent Members of the Security Council just before the Council session.He had told us then of Washington’s trusteeship proposal. I pointed outthat the possibility of trusteeship had been raised in UNSCOP by Aus-tralia, and had been withdrawn in the realization that the idea would befought by both sides rather than one. It would, I maintained, require moremilitary force to carry out than partition—and the objection to partitionwas that military force was needed to effect it. As Secretary-General, Istated, I had to ask whether the great powers, in adopting the Americanproposal, would accept responsibilities for implementing it. Mr. Austinreplied that the United States was “ready, of course, to back up a UnitedNations decision.” I could not help wondering if he meant backing as“staunch” as that which Washington had lent to the partition decision.


The American turnabout on partition has never been explained. Per-haps Washington, in voting for partition, expected milder opposition fromthe Arabs and more substantial cooperation from the British; perhaps, ashas been charged, some quarters feared the effect of Washington’s supportof partition upon the oil concessions American interests held in Arab ter-ritories; or perhaps there was a belief that, forcing partition through wouldarouse a bitter resentment that would turn the Arab states toward Moscowand thus promote Soviet interests in the Middle East.

In any case, the American reversal was a blow to the United Nationsand showed a profoundly disheartening disregard for its effectiveness andstanding. I could not help asking myself what the future of the UnitedNations would be, if this was the measure of support it could expect fromthe United States.

I brooded the night in this fashion, amid radio reports of UnitedNations depression, Arab jubilation, Zionist despair, and British self-righteousness. After lunch the next day—a Saturday afternoon, I recall—Itelephoned to Mr. Austin and asked to see him. He invited me to hisapartment in the Waldorf-Astoria Towers, where I bared my thoughts—my sense of shock and of almost personal grievance. Washington wellknew where I had stood in the struggle over implementing partition. Itsreversal was a rebuff to the United Nations and to me, because of mydirect and deep commitment. I said to Mr. Austin: “You too are commit-ted. This is an attack on the sincerity of your devotion to the UnitedNations cause, as well as mine. So I want to propose to you that you and I,that both of us, as a measure of protest against your instructions, and as ameans of arousing popular opinion to the realization of the danger inwhich the whole structure of the United Nations has been placed—I wantto propose that we resign.”

“Trygve,” Mr. Austin came back, his emotion rising, “I didn’t knowyou were so sensitive.”

In his warmhearted, upright Yankee way, he gave me his full sympa-thy. I think he respected my reaction, but—whether because he was lessattached to partition, or was more skeptical of the impact which our resig-nations would have, or just thought it was not the right thing to do—hedid not share it. He would not resign, and he advised me not to do soeither. I should not, he remonstrated, take Washington’s reversal in a per-sonal sense.


Parting cordially from Mr. Austin, with whom I have always had themost friendly relations, I went to see Mr. Gromyko. He could receive mewithout reservation—his government’s Palestine policy had been com-mendable. I announced the feeling that I should resign in protest at theAmerican shift of position, and I have never found Ambassador Gromykomore friendly. His melancholy features lit up with sympathy. But heseemed half alarmed at my idea. “Speaking for myself,” he said, “I hopeyou will not resign, and I advise you against it. What good will it do? Howwill it change American policy? In any case, I would be grateful if youwould take no action before I have time to consult my government.”

Tuesday, Mr. Gromyko took me aside. He had cabled Moscow, hereported, and Moscow’s reply was: “No, definitely not.” In view of theadvice from both Washington and Moscow, I did not resign.

The second special session of the General Assembly opened at Flush-ing Meadow on April 16, 1948. In the weeks preceding, I had been carefulnot to give public prejudgment of what the Assembly would do—ofwhether it should, or would, adopt the United States plan for trusteeship.When asked, I could not, of course, conceal such obvious facts as thattrusteeship had been proposed almost a year earlier and judged unworkable.

The Assembly debated for a month, not without confusion. TheAmerican proposals for trusteeship won slight support, despite Washing-ton’s announcement that it was now prepared to allot a fair share of thetroops needed to push it through; in view of the de facto partition of Pales-tine which already was dissolving British authority; this amounted to pro-posing that the United Nations take enforcement action against partition.Other Members made no offer of troops. Skepticism about the practicalityof trusteeship was everywhere, and a considerable body of states main-tained that the United Nations should still undertake to implement parti-tion, rather than go on talking while time ran out. Sir Carl A. Berendsen,the salty New Zealander, in one of his many penetrating United Nationsaddresses, compellingly voiced this view. He so well expressed the thoughtsand feelings closest to my heart that—the first time I ever did such a thingfor a speech—I sent him an admiring bouquet of roses! Sir Carl calledupon the Assembly not to abandon partition in a capitulation to threatsand violence. Partition was the right solution in November, and it was theright solution in April, but, in not making adequate plans for enforcement,the Assembly had done “the right thing in the wrong way.” New Zealand,



for its part, would continue to support enforcing partition. “What theworld needs today,” he concluded, “is not resolutions, it is resolution.”

The Assembly, at any rate, did no more than adopt three resolutions.One affirmed its support of the Security Council’s efforts to bring about atruce in Palestine, and empowered a United Nations Mediator to use hisgood offices, in cooperation with the Truce Commission which the Coun-cil had appointed, to promote a peaceful adjustment of the situation inPalestine, arrange for the operation of services necessary to the well-beingof the Palestinian population, and assure the protection of the HolyPlaces. It relieved the Palestine Commission from further exercise of itsresponsibilities and, in a separate resolution, thanked it for its efforts. Butthe Assembly did not rescind or amend its resolution of November 29,1947. The partition decision remained and remains valid.

As the Assembly debated on its closing day, May 14, word came thatJewish authorities had, with the expiration of the Mandate, proclaimedthe existence of the State of Israel. While going beyond the November 29resolution, this was essentially in accord with the partition decision. Butthe report was bound to increase the tension, already high. What wouldhappen next?

The bombshell came from an entirely unexpected quarter. Minuteslater, as the Assembly discussed a Franco-American proposal for theestablishment of a temporary international regime for Jerusalem, the newsflashed through Flushing Meadow that the United States had recognized“the Provisional Government as the de facto authority of the new State ofIsrael.” Another reversal of policy! The press spread the story before theUnited States Delegation had been informed of President Truman’saction, and the mortification of the American representatives was under-standably acute.

During the next hours and days, events crowded upon us. The Arabstates launched their invasion of Palestine with the end of the Mandate.This was armed defiance of the United Nations, and they openly pro-claimed their aggression by telegraphing news of it to United Nationsheadquarters. The Security Council, when it met on May 15, had before ita cable from the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, which brazenlyannounced, “Egyptian armed forces have started to enter Palestine toestablish security and order.”

91

Document 16: Abba Eban:Israel: The Case for Admission to the United Nations

In a comprehensive speech to the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the UnitedNations on May 5, 1949, Abba Eban makes the case for Israel’s entrance into theUN. Eban, who would later serve as Israel’s ambassador to the UN and foreign min-ister, stresses that Israel has fulfilled the requirements of Article Four of the UNCharter. He says that a solution to the conflict can only be found in cooperationbetween Israel and its neighbors.

I. Israel’s Application

On 29 November, 1948, Israel’s application for membership in theUnited Nations was submitted to the Security Council in accordance withArticle 4, paragraph 2, of the Charter. This was the anniversary of theGeneral Assembly’s original Resolution which had “called upon theinhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on theirpart to put this plan (of partition) into effect.” On 14 May, 1948—just oneyear ago yesterday according to the Hebrew calendar—the State of Israelproclaimed its independence, responding both to its own right of self-determination as a distinctive political and cultural unit, and to the explic-it instruction of the General Assembly itself. The Resolution of November29, 1947, contained a recommendation that when either State envisagedby that Resolution had made its independence effective, “sympathetic con-sideration should be given to its application for admission to membershipin the United Nations in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter of the Unit-ed Nations.”

A year later the State of Israel had successfully withstood a violentand aggressive onslaught organized and launched against it by sevenStates, including six members of the United Nations, in an effort to over-throw the Assembly’s Resolution by force. Israel had established the foun-dations of its government. It had secured recognition by nineteen States. Ithad persistently made efforts directly and through the agencies of theUnited Nations to negotiate with the neighboring Arab States for an endof the war and the establishment of peace. Alone amongst the Statesinvolved in that war, Israel had undertaken to comply with the SecurityCouncil’s Resolution of November 16, 1948, calling upon the govern-

ments concerned to negotiate an armistice as a transition to lasting peace.Israel was already “a vibrant reality.” Rarely in history had a people sosmall in all the attributes of physical power surmounted so many ordealsand adversities in its path to independence. It had emerged out of mortaldanger into the clear prospect of survival. Having reached this degree ofstability, both in its domestic institutions and its international position,Israel came forward to seek the shelter of the Charter and to assume itsobligations.

This application has thus been on the agenda of the United Nationsfor five months. When it was first discussed in mid-December, there wasalready a considerable body of opinion in the Security Council representedby the United States, the Soviet Union, Argentina, Colombia and theUkrainian S.S.R., ready to favor an immediate recommendation. Others,however, counselled a brief delay. They pointed out that no beginning hadyet been made in the process of negotiation called for by the Council onNovember 16, 1948, and by the General Assembly on December 11,1948. Indeed, no formal Arab-Jewish contact had then been establishedanywhere at that time. Others again invoked the provisional character ofIsrael’s governmental institutions and the somewhat restricted basis of itsinternational recognition at that time. We found it difficult to admit thatany reading of Article 4 of the Charter made these considerations strictlyrelevant. Many States had been admitted to membership before the estab-lishment of elected governments. And if the conciliation effort had notbegun by last December, this was no fault of Israel which was the first topropose direct armistice and peace talks in a formal communication toArab States through the Mediator as far back as August 1, 1948. Never-theless, it must be realized that the Security Council is the body which hasbeen entrusted by the members of the United Nations with “primaryresponsibility for the maintenance of international peace and secu rity.” Itsdecisions or hesitations must carry great weight in a matter so closelybound up with the issues of international peace.

The Security Council’s Favorable Action

Accordingly, my Government took sympathetic note of the Council’shesitations and waited until the early days of March before asking forrenewed consideration of that application. Meanwhile, the imagination


and sentiment of the world had been profoundly impressed by the specta-cle of Israel’s swift consolidation. Israel had now secured recognition by anoverwhelming majority of other States, in all the five Continents, in theOld World and the New. It had conducted the only democratic electionwith full popular participation which this part of the Near East had seenfor several years. It had established a legislature based on popular suffrage.It had formed a government dedicated to the principles of parliamentarydemocracy and social reform. It had elected as the head of the State itsmost respected and venerated citizen to symbolize both Israel’s concernfor international prestige and its vision of scientific humanism. It had suc-cessfully concluded its first experience in the most crucial task of all. Foron February 24, after direct and intricate negotiations under the skilfuldirection of the Acting Mediator, the Government of Israel had conclud-ed an agreement of armistice with the leading power in the Arab world. Inan official statement the Government of Israel declared that it wished toregard this most notable agreement as the prelude to peace between Israeland Egypt.

Such were the circumstances in which the Security Council met onMarch 3 and March 4 at its 413th and 414th meetings. By nine votes toone with one abstention it adopted the following Resolution:

The Security Council, having received and considered the application ofIsrael for membership in the United Nations;

Decides that in its judgment Israel is a peace-loving State and is able andwilling to carry out the obligations contained in the Charter, andaccordingly

Recommends to the General Assembly that it admit Israel to member-ship in the United Nations.

In every other case of admission such a resolution of the SecurityCouncil has had a decisive effect when Assembly confirmation has beensought. But this particular Resolution of the Security Council has a specialauthority deriving from circumstances which did not attend the Council’sjudgment on other applications. For Israel’s claim for admission to mem-bership was hotly contested within the Council itself by one of the Stateswhich had felt themselves entitled to make war—violent and brutal war—for the extermination of Israel and the overthrow of a General AssemblyResolution by force. The majority in the Security Council was thus not

Abba Eban: Israel: The Case for Admission to the United Nations 93

achieved by any cursory or perfunctory review. A suggestion that residualproblems of the war, especially those of the status of Jerusalem and Arabrefugees, should be clarified before this admission was recommended, wasput forward with great force and clarity by the United Kingdom. TheSecurity Council implicitly rejected this suggestion by its vote. Remainingwith austere fidelity within the terms of Article 4 of the Charter, and infull consciousness of Israel’s position on both of these questions, it sent itsimpressive verdict to this session of the General Assembly. Yet the moststriking and vivid circumstance lending weight to the Security Council’sResolution is the long record of the Council’s discussions on the Palestinequestion. At its own very table the Security Council has had an unrivalledopportunity of observing the rise of Israel to independence; its successfulstruggle against overwhelming invasion; its persistent appeals for methodsof pacific settlement; its constant recourse to the basic principles of theCharter which by forbidding the use of force in international relationsshould have prevented that violent obstruction of the partition decisionwhich is the source of all subsequent troubles and of all outstanding prob-lems. From the early weeks of the war in May and June when the ArabStates officially and boastfully refused to comply with five cease-fire Reso-lutions of the Security Council, all accepted by Israel, to the happy climaxwhen the armistice Resolution of the Security Council began to bear fruit,the Security Council had kept events in and around Israel under constantand vigilant examination. No less than eighty-nine meetings of the Secu-rity Council had been devoted to the Palestine question; and at the end ofthis unprecedentedly minute investigation, the Security Council decidedthat “in its judgment Israel is a peace-loving State able and willing to fulfilits obligations under the Charter.” This verdict of the august body chargedwith the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of internationalpeace and security” now comes before this Committee against a uniquebackground of experience and scrutiny.

The Progress towards Peace

What has happened since the Security Council gave to Israel’s appli-cation such impressive and emphatic support? The significant develop-ments since that time may be briefly summarized. On March 23 Israelconcluded an armistice agreement with Lebanon by a unilateral with-drawal of its own forces and the establishment of defensive zones. On


April 3 an armistice agreement was concluded between Israel and theHashemite Kingdom of Transjordan through processes of reciprocal con-cession whereby any serious threat of renewed hostilities was removedfrom the greater part of the area which had formed the Palestinian battle-field. Under the terms of this agreement lasting and durable peace hasbeen assured to the City of Jerusalem and its inhabitants. At this momentarmistice negotiations between Israel and Syria, which were delayed byrecent upheavals in Damascus, are approaching what we hope will be theirsuccessful consummation. On the 26th of April the Government of Israeldespatched a delegation to Lausanne where the Conciliation Commissionhad invited the parties to meet for a preliminary exchange of views.

Mr. Chairman, eight months have elapsed since my Government for-mally requested the Arab States to meet with it for a settlement by negoti-ations of all outstanding military and political questions. Nearly sixmonths have gone by since the Representative of Canada in the SecurityCouncil proposed and secured the adoption of the momentous Resolutioncalling for an armistice—a Resolution supported by my Government andopposed by the Arab States. Hundreds of thousands of people in Israeland in neighboring areas are denied the prospect of security and welfare solong as the conclusion of a formal peace is delayed. The Government ofIsrael has accordingly informed the Conciliation Commission that itwishes to regard the Lausanne meetings not as a mere preliminaryexchange of views, but as an earnest attempt by both parties to achieve afinal and effective peace settlement.

On the 30th of April my colleague, Dr. [Walter] Eytan, on assuminghis responsibilities as head of the Israeli Delegation at Lausanne, publiclydeclared:

We come to Lausanne determined to do all possible towards the attain-ment of an honorable and lasting peace under the general auspices ofthe United Nations Conciliation Commission, and by direct contactwith the delegations of the Arab States which in recent months havesigned armistice agreements with Israel. We shall make every effort tosettle outstanding questions by peaceful discussion. The Government ofIsrael sincerely hopes that the conference will lead to the complete sta-bilization of relations between Israel and the neighboring Arab States,including an undertaking to respect common boundaries, and to thepermanent settlement and rehabilitation of all those who have left theirhomes in the course of the war against Israel.


At its first meeting with the Conciliation Commission the IsraeliDelegation inquired whether Arab delegations are similarly prepared toinstitute discussions of peace in compliance with the General Assembly’sResolution of December 11, 1948, which “calls upon the Governmentsand authorities concerned ... to seek agreement by negotiations conductedeither with the Conciliation Com mission or directly, with a view to thefinal settlement of all questions outstanding between them.”

We are awaiting the Arab reply. The whole issue of peace and stabili-ty in the Near East hangs upon that reply.

It is clear, Mr. Chairman, that the progress towards peace betweenIsrael and its neighbors has maintained, and, indeed, increased its momen-tum since the Security Council recorded its decision on 4 March, 1949.Everything that has happened since the 4th of March fortifies and con-firms the judgment which the Security Council then made.

What Is Relevant to Admission

Mr. Chairman, a State seeking membership in the United Nationsmay be properly expected to study the jurisprudence of the UnitedNations relating to the admission of new members. It is our understand-ing that nothing but the provisions of Article 4 are relevant in the consid-eration of an application for membership. We base this conviction on thespirit and language of the Charter itself and of that Article 4 which opensthe door of this organization wide to any State fulfilling its provisions.Moreover, this is the first application for membership to come before theGeneral Assembly since the Resolution adopted on December 8, identify-ing the General Assembly itself with an advisory opinion of the Interna-tional Court of Justice. The General Assembly is committed by that Reso-lution to the view expressed in the following paragraph adopted onDecember 8:

A member of the United Nations which is called upon in virtue of Arti-cle 4 of the Charter to pronounce itself by its vote, either in the SecurityCouncil or in the General Assembly, on the admission of a State tomembership in the United Nations, is not juridically entitled to make itsconsent to the admission dependent on conditions not expressly provid-ed by paragraph I of the said Article.


While attaching full weight to the legal considerations involved, Ishould like to place special emphasis on the political and moral implica-tions of that Resolution. In this very Committee but a few months ago apreponderance of opinion was revealed in favor of the principle of univer-sality. This view was concisely expressed by the Representative of theNetherlands who said: “All those countries which, like the Netherlands,attached great importance to the universality of the United Nationsshould constantly consider whether their objections to the admission of anew State are really cogent.” On that occasion the Representative of theUnion of South Africa said: “All States which could show adequate proofof their independence and their peaceful character should be admitted assoon as possible.” The Representative of Burma advocated the admissionof all countries which were candidates for membership, adding “we wantto have everyone as a member of this organization.” In addition to theprinciple of universality we have no doubt that the General Assemblymust wish to uphold the principles of free discussion and argument. TheGeneral Assembly is a free tribunal rejecting the principles of totalitarianconformity. A member State, and therefore a candidate for membership, isentitled to hold any views which its conscience and interests dictate on thesolution of international problems. Member States are under no obligationto agree with each other, and I doubt whether any member of the UnitedNations could properly withhold its consent to Israel’s membership on thesole grounds that Israel does not share its particular views on any of theproblems now at issue.

An Unprecedented Procedure

Mr. Chairman, in response to the requests of this Committee and atthe insistence of the distinguished Representative of El Salvador, I pro-pose first of all to make a formal and authoritative statement of my Gov-ernment’s views on the problems of Jerusalem and Arab refugees. In doingso, I am obliged to reserve Israel’s opinion with regard to the relevance ofextraneous issues to the question of admission to membership. I am awarethat the procedure followed by this Committee today establishes a newprecedent.


The distinguished Representative of Pakistan, in pleading to theGeneral Assembly for what he called a normal procedure, successfully pre-vailed upon the plenary to require committee consideration of this item.Yet the adherents of “normal procedures” cannot point to any other occa-sion on which a candidate for membership has been called upon to expresshis views on international problems in the context of a discussion onadmission to membership. The distinguished Representative of Pakistanreferred in vivid terms to his own harrowing ordeals in guiding his coun-try’s application through the intricate routines of the General Assembly.Yet on that occasion when he eventually reached the stage of committeediscussion, the Pakistan Representative was not interrogated on his inten-tions with regard to Kashmir. He was not called upon to explain his coun-try’s intentions with regard to the eleven million refugees who were ren-dered homeless through the establishment of his State. On the same occa-sion when the application of Yemen for membership in the United Nationswas considered by the First Committee, there was no discussion as towhether an officially sponsored policy of organized slavery conformed withthe Charter’s requirements on fundamental human rights. It may beassumed that the General Assembly took the liberal and logical view thatinternational problems such as these are better solved within the frame-work of the United Nations than outside it. It is precisely because Stateshave problems of an international character that they need an internationalorganization within which such problems may be examined and solved.

Accordingly, I should like to clarify my delegation’s views on the pur-poses and objectives of our discussion this morning. We are not here, Iunderstand, to find solutions to the problems of Jerusalem or the Arabrefugees. That task has been allocated to the Conciliation Commissionwith which my Government is in the closest and most formal contact atthis moment. One question and one question alone is relevant: is Israel eli-gible for membership within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter? Areits policies on Jerusalem or on the Arab refugees, or on any other problem,consistent with the free exercise of judgment and conscience by an aspir-ing member of this organization coming forward to accept the obligationsof the Charter? I shall submit that Israel holds no views and pursues nopolicies on any question which are inconsistent with the Charter or withthe Resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.


II. Jerusalem

Mr. Chairman, the responsibilities of the United Nations in the Cityof Jerusalem originated in the General Assembly Resolution of 29November, 1947. That Resolution envisaged the establishment of a specialregime designed primarily “to protect and preserve the unique spiritualand religious interests located in the City.” In establishing that regime, theUnited Nations pledged itself to undertake the most solemn and criticalresponsibility for the welfare and development, nay, for the very lives oftens of thousands of people. The United Nations pledged itself: “to ensurethat peace and order reign in Jerusalem.” It undertook “to promote thesecurity, the well-being and any constructive measures of development forthe residents.” According to the terms of the Resolution, the exercise ofthese heavy responsibilities required the establishment of a “special policeforce of adequate strength, the members of which shall be recruited out-side of Palestine.” The United Nations undertook to appoint a Governorat the head of a large military and administrative staff, charged with theduty “of preserving the Holy Places and religious buildings, and of main-taining free access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites.” TheTrusteeship Council was instructed to elaborate and approve the detailedstatute of the City. The Jewish and Arab populations of Palestine werecalled upon to take all necessary steps to put this plan into effect.

The Sole Cause of the Conflict

Looking back at this Resolution with the retrospective wisdom ofexperience, we cannot fail to be impressed by the magnitude and gravity ofthe responsibilities which the General Assembly then undertook. I neednot delay the Committee long with an enumeration of the events whichfrustrated those high purposes. The major cause, indeed the sole cause, isthe one which lies at the root of all the complex problems which comeunder the heading of the Palestine question. One single factor alone isresponsible for the slaughter and destruction, for the anguish and bereave-ment, for the squandering of life and treasure, for the disturbance of inter-national relations; for the desecration of Holy Places, for the panic offlight and the misery of exile, and all the other tragic consequences of thisfutile and unnecessary conflict. The cause is set out by a Commission ofthe United Nations in a Report to the General Assembly at this period


last year. “Powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, aredefying the Resolution of the General Assembly, and are engaged in adeliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein. ArmedArab bands from neighboring Arab States ... together with local Arabforces, are defeating the purposes of the Resolution by acts of violence.The Jews, on the other hand, are determined to ensure the establishmentof the Jewish State as envisaged by the Resolution.”

Mr. Chairman, these grave words, unprecedented in the internationalliterature of our time, were conveyed by the United Nations PalestineCommission to the General Assembly in April, 1948. A few weeks laterthis monstrous aggression took official form when the Secretary-Generalof the Arab League, acting on behalf of seven States, six of them membersof the United Nations, informed the Security Council that those Govern-ments had undertaken what he called “military intervention.” Unless wekeep in our minds a clear vision of initial responsibility for this war, nosingle aspect of the Near East situation can be evaluated in its true per-spective. Around your table sit the representatives of six States who havethe blood of martyred thousands on their hands and the misery and exileof tens of thousands upon their consciences. I shall have occasion, in thecourse of my remarks, to comment upon the fantastic paradox whereby theonly States which have ever taken up arms to overthrow a General Assem-bly resolution by force, solemnly sit in this Committee to accuse theirintended victim of a lack of concern for General Assembly resolutions. Ifany State’s eligibility for membership should be under question, it shouldbe the eligibility of those who consciously selected war as a method ofcontesting the authority of international judgment.

The distinguished Representative of Lebanon informed us thismorning that an attitude of compliance with General Assembly Resolu-tions should be a condition of membership in the United Nations. If thatwere so, he would not be here at all. I shall circulate the statements of theLebanese Prime Minister urging that the General Assembly Resolution of29 November, 1947, should be drowned in blood.

For the moment it is sufficient to recall to this Committee that theArab States took up arms not only against the establishment of Israel, butalso with equal fervor and with greater success against the establishmentof an international regime in Jerusalem. The opposition of the Arabs took


the form both of parliamentary boycott and of military violence. In theTrusteeship Council the Representative of Iraq said: “It is my duty to showthat the plan for the City of Jerusalem is illegal ... the people of Jerusalemwho are not sacred should not incur political punishment because theirCity is. Neither the Iraqi Government nor other Arab States are preparedto enter into the details or to participate in the discussion of the plan.”

Slow and Dreadful Strangulation

In the meantime, the Trusteeship Council proceeded to elaborate astatute with the full cooperation of Jewish representatives, many of whosesuggestions were embodied in the draft statute. The Jewish religion wasthe only religious denomination whose representatives came forward tocooperate in the formulation of that plan. It is significant that the Arabviolence directed against the General Assembly’s Resolution began in theCity of Jerusalem itself with the establishment of armed gangs in the OldCity and the organization of an iron ring around Jerusalem’s communica-tions with the coast. Within a few weeks of the adoption of the Assem-bly’s Resolution, at a time when the Mandatory Regime was still operat-ing, the City became a scene of anarchy and violence. With the coastalroute firmly in Arab hands and the water supply at the mercy of Arabforces, there began a slow and dreadful process of strangulation. On thecommencement of the official Arab invasion on May 15, the armed forcesof Transjordan, Iraq and Egypt joined together in a concerted attempt tothrottle the lungs and arteries of the Holy City, to rain down devastationupon its ancient shrines and modern habitations, and to wrest it from theinternational community for immediate incorporation, without anyreserve, in an Arab Moslem regime. There were many weeks when theissue hung in the balance. Bombardment, starvation, pestilence and thirststared the Jewish inhabitants of the City in the face. By the month of Junethe population was living on a handful of barley and beans. The averagediet was brought down to 800 calories a day. Many months before theexpectation of the first rain, water was being doled out from carts in meas-ure barely sufficient to sustain human life. In this situation of thirst andmalnutrition, the utmost technical resourcefulness was necessary in orderto save the City from dire epidemic. Added to all these terrors was the car-nage of war itself, which took on unendurable proportions in the latterweeks of May.


Mr. Chairman, the people of Jerusalem to this very day look backwith a sense of deliverance and escape to the horrors which faced them inthose unforgettable weeks. As the bombardment of the New and OldCities took a heavy toll of life, the Holy Places themselves came underconverging fire. In the Old City of Jerusalem in the Jewish Quarter,corpses lay piled up unburied, since there was no access to the Jewishcemetery on the Mount of Olives, or, indeed, to any part of the City out-side the walls. Arab forces from Transjordan, immediately on the termina-tion of the Mandate, crossed into Palestine and laid waste to the Jewishvillages in the Kfar Etzion group, with the death of most of their inhabi-tants and the capture of the rest.

The Pitiful Contrast

The Security Council, in constant session, was bombarded by clam-orous appeals for the rescue of the City on whose behalf the UnitedNations had accepted the most solemn obligations. Nothing availed. TheTrusteeship Council plodded a leisurely course against fierce Arab opposi-tion in elaborating the Statute envisaged by the Assembly’s Resolution. Atthe height of Jerusalem’s distress, the General Assembly convened in spe-cial session during April and May, 1948. Thus all the principal organs ofthe United Nations were constantly at work at this very climax of theCity’s agony. Nothing in history is more incongruous than the pitiful con-trast between this torment of the Holy City and the determined resolve ofthe international community at that time to take no steps whatever for itsrelief. The debates in the Trusteeship Council had patently revealed thatin face of Arab boycott and resistance nothing but a considerable militaryforce would avail to secure the implementation of the Assembly’s Statute.Week after week, with a regularity that must have grown monotonous todistinguished representatives themselves, Jewish spokesmen appeared inthe various organs of the United Nations imploring them to assume theresponsibilities to which they were pledged—responsibilities which wereand are inseparable from any rights to exercise authority or jurisdiction inany village, town or country in the world. For those who aspire to rulemust be prepared to govern. You cannot have a fiction of sovereignty. It isnot only a question of integrity. It is a question of life. But nothing hap-pened. The majority of the Trusteeship Council swiftly reached the con-


clusion that the Statute was no longer realistic in the existing conditions ofthe United Nations and in the context of Arab-Jewish war. On the 21st ofApril the Trusteeship Council passed a Resolution referring the future ofthe Statute to the General Assembly for such further instructions as itmight see fit to give. The General Assembly saw fit to give no furtherinstructions. Early in May a Municipal Commissioner was appointed toassume on behalf of the United Nations such functions and prerogatives ashe could secure. The Commissioner was appointed, arrived in Jerusalem atthe height of the siege and warfare, and turned away.

On June 16, 1948, the Trusteeship Council opened its Third Sessionwith a provisional agenda which prudently avoided all mention of theStatute of Jerusalem. On July 28, 1948, the Representative of the SovietUnion urging consistent fidelity to the November Resolution again soughtaction by the Trusteeship Council on the Jerusalem Statute. A Belgianproposal for postponement sine die was adopted by eight votes to one, withthree abstentions. Nothing has been heard of the Statute ever since.

The Divine Right of Starvation

The Jewish population of Jerusalem, submerged in death and famine,fighting against odds for sheer survival itself, probably had little time toreflect on the attitude of those who but a few months previously hadundertaken responsibility for their “security and well-being and construc-tive measures of development.” The right to destroy and besiege Jerusalemwas officially claimed by Arab representatives as a legitimate action of war.The idea that even a truce would involve the lifting of this brutal siegeevoked the solemn indignation of Arab Representatives. At the 313thmeeting of the Security Council, Jamal Bey Husseini, of the Arab HigherCommittee, supported by the distinguished Representative of Syria,upheld the divine right of starvation. He said:

The Zionist spokesman yesterday assumed that the truce terms adoptedby the Security Council should cover freedom of access to Jerusalemtogether with transportation of goods for civilian needs of the hundredthousand besieged Jews. We assume the contrary. The abandonment ofthe state of siege is obviously a net gain for one party and a loss for theother. The assumption of the Zionist spokesman should be corrected.

The Security Council was naturally unwilling to preside over thecomplete destruction of Jerusalem by famine during a truce, and it there-


fore undertook to supply the Jews of Jerusalem with quantities of food insuch measure as would ensure that at the end of the truce period,Jerusalem’s food supply would be exactly equivalent to what it was at thebeginning of the truce. By dismal paradox the first active intervention ofthe United Nations in the administration of Jerusalem was to ensure thatthe population should not have too much to eat.

While these terrible processes were going on, it is not surprising ifthe Jews of Jerusalem deduced the harsh lesson that they could expect nosalvation, except from one quarter alone—from their brethren in the Stateof Israel, who, while grappling desperately for their own very survival,bethought themselves of their kith and kin in Jerusalem. The State ofIsrael girded all its strength to throw a life-line to the beleaguered City.The Jewish Quarters of the Old City surrendered amidst the destructionof its Holy Places on May 28. All but five of its ancient synagogues weredestroyed, and those that remained have since been laid waste by the Araboccupation forces. The historic Wailing Wall, the most hallowed sanctuaryto adherents of the Jewish faith, was barred from access by worshippersand remains so to this very day. If the New City were not similarly to suc-cumb, its supply routes had to be opened. Within the very gun-range ofbesieging Arab forces, the Jews built a detour on the coastal road. Thisnarrow strip, carved through the steep inclines of the hill country, began torelieve the stringency of the food situation. Yet for the most part, it wasnecessary to run a gauntlet of shell-fire and ambush in a desperate attemptto bring convoys to the starving City. The people of Jerusalem carryinscribed in their hearts the memory of the occasions when such convoyspassed through the perils and hazards of that road to deliver their cargo ata point when the very extremities of endurance had been reached. Uponthe trucks of the first large convoy to reach Jerusalem at the peak of itsdanger was inscribed a message from the people of Israel to the Jews ofJerusalem: “If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, may my right hand forget itscunning!” The Jews of Jerusalem were not forgotten or alone.

Jerusalem Saved for the World

Mr. Chairman, when we speak, as I shall, of the profound and organ-ic attachment between the Jews of Jerusalem and the Jews of Israel, theCommittee should think not merely of those links of language, religion,


culture and other forms of natural allegiance, but also of that link forgedby a fight for survival in those desperate days. The battle of Jerusalem waswon, in a victory snatched from the very imminence of defeat, but it wasnot a victory lightly or cheaply achieved. As you travel from the coastalplain to Jerusalem through Bab-el-Wad, you can see to this day the over-turned hulks of trucks, lorries and cars ambushed and set on fire. Theashes which litter the roadside are not those of lorries alone. The youth ofIsrael fell in their hundreds to save Jerusalem from the disaster andreproach of famine and surrender.

It cannot be seriously doubted that in saving Jerusalem from captureby the combined Arab forces, the Jews of that City and of Israel not onlypreserved Jewish rights in the very cradle of the Jewish tradition; they alsokept Christian interests alive. For it is beyond all question that had theassault upon the City succeeded, it would have become incorporatedimmediately and irrevocably in an Arab State which explicitly andavowedly asserted its own undisputed right to wield complete sovereigntyover the whole City, including its Holy Places. If today it is still possible tomake plans for giving statutory expression to the international interest, asit is, that possibility derives solely from the success of this Jewish resist-ance at that time.

For at the time that the Arab position on internationalization wasclear both in theory and in practice, Dr. Malik was expressing the “deepstirrings” of his soul by sharing in a warlike coalition, raining downshells—unholy shells—and bullets—unsacred bullets—upon both parts ofthe City of Jerusalem.

I will not harry the feelings of this Committee any further by descrip-tions of the ordeals and perils out of which Jerusalem has now emerged.Nothing is more splendid or impressive in the whole record of Israel’sachievement than the swift rehabilitation of the City and its return to nor-mal and dignified life. A year ago there was anarchy; today there is effec-tive administration, both in the Jewish and Arab parts of the City. A yearago there was bloodshed; today there is peace. A year ago there wasfamine; today there is relative plenty. A year ago there was devastation;today there are all the symptoms of recovery. A year ago the Holy Placeswere imperilled by the clash of arms; today they are at peace and all thefacilities of access and worship to all the Holy Places except the Jewish


Holy Places are being gradually restored. This restoration of peace andnormality to Jerusalem is by far the most significant factor to be borne inmind in any consideration of the question and future of the Holy Places.Unless there is peace in Jerusalem between Arabs and Jews, no juridicalstatus can assure the protection of the City or the immunity of its sacredshrines. If there is peace in Jerusalem between Arabs and Jews, then theassurance of safeguards for the Holy Places becomes a task easily respon-sive to the processes of bilateral and international agreement.…

VI. Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, in my final remarks I must say that I could havewished that this clarification of our views might have proceeded to the endwithout the introduction of any polemical note. Yet I should be giving theCommittee a false impression of public sentiment in Israel if I did notexpress the indignation aroused by the extraordinary spectacle of Israel’sapplication for membership in the United Nations being challenged bythe Arab States. I profoundly envy the easy assurance whereby these dis-tinguished representatives come forward as the advocates of compliancewith General Assembly Resolutions. For in the earliest and most tenderyears of its existence, this United Nations was assaulted at the very foun-dations of its authority by the first and, happily, the only attempt of mem-ber States to overthrow a General Assembly Resolution by force. It is notlong since these very rooms echoed with dire threats from Arab represen-tatives of their intention to offer armed resistance to the Assembly’s policyfor the establishment of a Jewish State. “Any line drawn by the UnitedNations,” declared an Arab representative, “shall be nothing but a line offire and blood.” These threats, which were destined to be translated intodestruction and slaughter, rested upon the doctrine of the optional charac-ter of Assembly Resolutions. On the 24th February, 1948, the Representa-tive of Syria declared: “In the first place, the recommendations of theGeneral Assembly are not imperative on those to whom they areaddressed. We have numerous precedents during the short past life of theGeneral Assembly: The Indo-South African dispute, the Balkan situation,the Interim Committee, the Korean question, the admission of new mem-bers.” He went on to say: “The General Assembly only gives advice, andthe parties to whom the advice is addressed accept it when it does not


impair their fundamental rights.” Again, on the 19th March, 1948, hedeclared: “Not every State which does not apply, obey or execute these rec-ommendations would be breaking its pledges to the Charter.”

The Representative of Egypt made this theory his own. At meetingafter meeting of the Security Council he consoled his audience for therepudiation of the Palestine Resolution by the happy thought that otherresolutions of the General Assembly had not been complied with. “Noone,” he said, “could say that compliance is imperative or that the countrieswhich did not comply are acting against the Charter or undermining thestructure of the United Nations. We do not choose to comply with theGeneral Assembly’s Resolution on Palestine. This is our privilege underthe Charter.”

A Cynical Maneuver

Even if the exercise of this “privilege” had been confined to this con-tribution to international jurisprudence, the Arab States would still havebeen disqualified to lecture to others on the binding force of AssemblyResolutions. But, as is well known, their defiance went further. They tookup arms, they crossed their frontiers, they launched a war for the purposeof overthrowing that Resolution by force. The next step was persistently toexercise a “privilege” not to stop fighting when ordered by the SecurityCouncil. International morality and law in our generation recognize thosewho initiate and those who choose war as solely responsible for the entiresequence of bloodshed and suffering which ensues from that choice. Heresit representatives of the only States which have deliberately used forceagainst an Assembly Resolution; the only States which have ever beendetermined by the Security Council to have caused a threat to the peaceunder Chapter VII of the Charter, posing as the disinterested judges oftheir own intended victim in his efforts to secure a modest equality in thefamily of nations. It is a cynical maneuver. It cannot be allowed to succeedwithout bequeathing a mood of disillusion to all equitable men. In thename of those who have been killed, maimed, blinded, exiled or bereavedby the exercise of that cynicism, we must express our most passionateresentment at this gross Arab insincerity.

I do not wish to enter into a discussion of the exact degree of legalcompulsion inherent in a General Assembly Resolution. Certain it is that


the right of a State to appeal against a Resolution or to seek its revisionmust fall short, very far short, of armed violence. My Government, in thecourse of its future international career, will never be found amongst thosewho, by emptying Assembly Resolutions of all compelling moral force,would sacrifice the restraints of international law upon the altar of undi-luted sovereignty. A Resolution can be revised, yes, but by argument andrenewed examination. A recommendation can be modified, yes, but byagreement. A United Nations policy may perhaps conceivably beopposed—but certainly not by the use of force against it. It was a signalvictory for the United Nations when the first forcible attempt to sabotagea solution desired by the General Assembly failed in its objective. Thus, inassuring its own establishment and survival, Israel vindicated the supremeinternational authority. We are as one who, having been attacked in a darkstreet by seven men with heavy bludgeons, finds himself dragged intocourt only to see his assailants sitting on the bench with an air of solemnvirtue, delivering homilies on the duties of a peaceful citizen. It is mosturgent and essential for the dignity and prestige of international institu-tions that such a device should not succeed.

In conclusion, I should like to make a comment on the general effectof the questions which I have discussed on the business now before theCommittee.

San Francisco and Sinai

The State which is now celebrating its first anniversary under thebenevolent applause of its friends throughout the world is bound to theUnited Nations and its Charter by many links of peculiar intimacy andstrength. Israel is new in the art of practical statecraft. We shall be fortu-nate if our contribution to the solution of international problems can gomuch beyond the limited size and resources of our State. Yet Israel is atonce the ancestor and the heir of a great universal tradition. The high doc-trines of the Charter, founded on the hopes of international brotherhood,were bequeathed to modern civilization by Israel’s Prophetic writingswhich expressed the longing of mankind for an era when “nation shall notlift up the sword against nation nor shall they know war any more.” A sin-gle continuous line of thought and aspiration unites San Francisco toSinai. In the minds of many contemporary historians Israel represents the


modernist element in Near Eastern life, striving for progress by the resultsof modern technology and science. But no less potent an influence in thelife of the new Republic is its sense of continuous association with the tra-ditions of Israel’s past. It is no accident that the coins and stamps of theState revive memories of those early periods of Israel’s independencewhich have left so profound an impression on the course of human civi-lization. It is no accident either that our national Hebrew language evokesthe memories and associations of the golden period of Israel’s literaryachievement.

But quite apart from a deep historic affinity between Israel’s idealsand the basic concepts of the Charter, we can point to a more recent expe-rience of common interest and endeavor. This is the only State in theworld which sprang into existence at the summons and behest of theinternational community. The General Assembly is now called upon bythe Security Council to acknowledge a State to whose establishment itgave the sanction and incentive of its own prior approval. The episodes ofIsrael’s life have a way of entering into historical records. And the story ofthis brave and unequal struggle for independence of a people, which lostsix million of its sons in the cause of the victorious United Nations againstNazi despotism, is enshrined in the very documents and archives of thisorganization. Israel’s battle for sheer survival has gone hand in hand withthe most successful effort of the United Nations to solve an internationalconflict by judgment, mediation and conciliation. It would be an extraor-dinary paradox, not understood by the peoples of the world, if the UnitedNations were to close its doors upon a State which it helped to quickeninto active and vigorous life. And the question whether the UnitedNations now confirms or defers this application is not a matter of proce-dure. It is a grave issue of substance. It affects the prospects of peace. Itaffects the future authority of the United Nations in the solution of out-standing problems. It affects the question whether the Arab world willreceive from this Committee the implicit counsel to regard Israel as a per-manent international fact with which it has to make peace on the basis ofthe Charter, or whether, by hesitating now, the Assembly will confirm theArab peoples in their hesitations about Israel’s existence and Israel’s rights.The General Assembly could do nothing more calculated to persuade theArab States not to break off the juridical strife by the conclusion of peace



than if it were to rise amidst an atmosphere of doubt as to Israel’s interna-tional status: The General Assembly could do nothing more prejudicial tothe prospects of conciliation than to insist on one party going there withan inferior status and prestige to that enjoyed so lavishly by the otherparty.

The time has surely come, for the United Nations, if it wishes Israelto bear the heavy burdens of Charter obligations, to confer upon Israel theprotection and status of the Charter as well. Israel and the Arab Stateshave sent delegations to Lausanne in what Israel regards as an endeavor toconclude final peace. One party is represented by six members of thisorganization who will strive their utmost to make their views prevail withthe United Nations Commission, and will then come back into theAssembly itself with a powerful capacity to influence its decisions byspeech, vote and regional influence. The other party has no standing in theorganization which is responsible for the conciliation effort and no voiceexcept on limited sufferance in the Assembly itself. This position is repug-nant to any sense of equity. It is out of balance and out of gear. That is noway for the United Nations to confront the Arab world with Israel. Atevery stage of Israel’s checkered relations with the Arab world, which arenow opening out happily into brighter fields, we have felt equality of sta-tus to be the essential conditions of partnership. Until the scars of conflictare healed and Israel becomes integrated with its immediate world, theUnited Nations may be the only forum in which Israel sits as a colleagueand partner of its neighboring States in the transaction of internationalbusiness and in the paths of social and economic cooperation. This Com-mittee should not debar us from that precious meeting place, which is alsothe only framework within which Israel’s foreign policy can congeniallyexpress itself.

The Responsibility Is Great

We cannot logically expect the Arabs to recognize Israel if the Unit-ed Nations hesitates to recognize Israel. Mr. Chairman and Delegates, youhave it in your hands, therefore, to expedite or to delay the decisivemoment when the Arab world will find itself exhorted by the world com-munity to recognize Israel as a partner in its destiny and in the progress ofAsia. The Committee should not delay that moment. The responsibility is


too grave. The founda tions of peace, improvised as they have been by skill-ful mediation, are not so strong that they can easily withstand anotherunneces sary period of juridical uncertainty and strife.

The problems of Jerusalem and of Arab refugees can only be solvedwithin the United Nations; and this requires the presence in your midst ofthose who must contribute to their solution. Does anybody imagine thateither problem can find an easier solution if the organic links betweenIsrael and the United Nations are not speedily and formally closed? Thebare provisions of Article 4 of the Charter are thus reinforced in this caseby unique considerations of history and sentiment, of practical statesman-ship, of equity and of deep concern for an immediate prospect of stabilitywhich if surrendered might not easily recur. I have tried, without obscur-ing honest difficulties and differences, to reassure the Committee on thebasic issue of Israel’s good will. We cannot now do more. The banner ofIsrael is inscribed with the struggle and the achievement of the youngestnation on earth. Its progress has been followed with signs of ardent sym-pathy amongst the peoples of the world. Whatever intellectual or spiritualforces Israel evokes anywhere in the world are at the service of the UnitedNations as a potential reinforcement of its activity and prestige. You willcertainly lose nothing, and you perhaps may gain some modest asset, if youjoin this banner to your honored company. Whatever happens, we shallcherish this banner above everything else; we shall dedicate it to the idealsof peace and national independence; of social progress, of democracy andof cultural dynamism. A great wheel of history comes full circle today asIsrael, renewed and established, offers itself, with its many imperfectionsbut perhaps with a few virtues, to your common defense of the humanspirit against the perils of international conflict and despair.

Document 17: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 273(III) of 11 May 1949, Admitting Israel to Membership in the UN

Having received the report of the Security Council on the applicationof Israel for membership in the United Nations,

Noting that, in the judgment of the Security Council, Israel is apeace-loving State and is able and willing to carry out the obligations con-tained in the Charter,

Noting that the Security Council has recommended to the GeneralAssembly that it admit Israel to membership in the United Nations,

Noting furthermore the declaration by the State of Israel that it“unreservedly accepts the obligations of the United Nations Charter andundertakes to honour them from the day when it becomes a Member ofthe United Nations,”

Recalling its resolutions of 29 November 1947 and December 1948and taking note of the declarations and explanations made by the repre-sentative of the Government of Israel before the Ad Hoc Political Com-mittee in respect of the implementation of the said resolutions,

The General Assembly,Acting in discharge of its functions under Article 4 of the Charter and

Rule 125 of its rules of procedure,1. Decides that Israel is a peace-loving State which accepts the obliga-

tions contained in the Charter and is able and willing to carry out thoseobligations;

2. Decides to admit Israel to membership in the United Nations.Adopted at the 207th plenary meeting: In favour: 37Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Byelorussian S.S.R., Canada, Chile,

China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia , Dominican Repub-lic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Liberia, Lux-emburg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pana-ma, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Ukrainian S.S.R., Union ofSouth Africa, U.S.A., U.S.S.R., Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia

Against: 12Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon,

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen Abstained: 9Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, El Salvador, Greece, Siam, Sweden,

Turkey, United Kingdom

112

JBI Council Members

E. Robert Goodkind (Chair)

Mimi AlperinMarion Bergman

Susan Morton BlausteinRoberta Cohen

Irwin CotlerLori F. DamroschEdith B. Everett

Lois FrankBertram H. GoldDavid A. Harris

Barbara Blaustein HirschhornMichael Hirschhorn

Charlotte G. HolsteinSuzanne Denbo Jaffe

Harris L. Kempner, Jr.William KoreyStephen LoweyEdward C. LuckJesse MargolinCarol Nelkin

Leo NevasLouis PerlmutterRobert S. RifkindArthur E. Roswell

Elizabeth Blaustein RoswellStephen M. Schwebel

Jerome J. ShestackDavid F. SquireHarold TannerDaniel Terris

MA

ND

ATE O

F DESTIN

Y The 1947 U

nited Nations D

ecision to Partition Palestine JBI