National Roads to Socialism

The Concept of 'Nation' on the Danish and Swedish Left 1956-66

1. Introduction

The nation and the political left have had a precarious relationship in the 20 th century. Socialists

have often been torn between an internationalist heritage, their individual national political cultures

and loyalties and – when in power – their obligations as members of national governments. In the

interwar period, socialist and social democratic parties adapted to the national political scenes by

entering governments in individual countries and leaving a working-class-based ideology to

embrace ‘the people’ instead. The communist parties on the other hand was ideologically and

strategically bound to the Soviet Union through the Comintern – an institution coordinating the

activities of communist parties in the name of ‘international solidarity’, de facto a means of the

Soviet Union to control foreign communist parties. The dilemma of the extreme left through the

1920s and 1930s was to gain confidence on the national scene, while obeying orders from Moscow

at the same time.

In 1943 the Comintern was dissolved as a gesture to the Allies by the Soviet Union. One could

obviously not have an institution committed to the overthrow of the political and economic systems

of ones allies. Considering the situation of most communist parties during the war and the huge

prestige of the Soviet Union after the allied victory, this did not mean that Moscow loosened its grip

on international communism. Indeed, in 1947 the Comintern was revived in an officially less

centralized from, the Communist Information Bureau, Cominform. The communist parties thus still

could not rid themselves of the image of being ‘Soviet spies’. After a European-wide success in the

post-war elections, the communist take-over in Czechoslovakia in 1948 enforced this image, and

communist went back to their pre-war existence on the margin of political life in Western Europe.1

This precarious relationship between the extreme political left and the nation is the point of

departure of my project: the incoherence between being a party on a national scene and at the same

time having a both ideological and historical internationalist heritage. With decolonisation, the split

between the Soviet Union and China and the rise of the new left, the picture gets even more

complicated. My working hypothesis is that the relationship between internationalism and national

1 This is somewhat simplified, communism remained comparatively strong in for example France and Italy – the picture

fits Northern Europe, though.

1

agendas of the left stays precarious and incoherent during the whole of the 20 th century. I want to

find out how and why the concept of nation changes, how it is used and what part it plays in the

political culture on the left, in order to give a picture of the left wing that shows the relationship

between coherencies and incoherencies, anachronism and dynamic, ideology and power.

I find this relevant for (at least) two different reasons, which I will mention briefly here and explain

in more detail below: First, the history of the left, and particularly the history of the new left, has to

a large extend been written as a history of ideas were parties or movements are linked directly to

ideologies, which in an orderly and coherent way structures both internal and external politics. My

ambition is to take a concept like the nation, which from the beginning has a precarious ideological

position on the left, and focus on the incoherencies of its use. I hope to be able to present an

alternative to the history of the left and of left-wing intellectuals, where the agents do not interpret

the world and act according to coherent and reducible systems or ideological structures. I want to

look at the changes of the use and content of the concept to discover how political and ideological

power was distributed on the left, and how ideology and language was dependent on changes in the

distribution of power.

Secondly and more specific to the Scandinavian case, I want to find out why the national agenda in

the last half of the 20th century was taken over by the left wing, effectively – and often with from a

right-out nationalist position - being against any kind of binding integration into the international

community. Latest shown by the successful campaigns against membership of the Euro in both

Denmark and Sweden.

This paper will try to give an outline of where I stand at the moment. For my June-paper I intend to

write about the period 1956-66, a time of split and reform in the Danish and Swedish communist

parties. It is divided into three parts: the first one (section 2-3) is a theoretical discussion about the

concepts 'left' and 'nation', the second one (section 4-5) is a more general introduction to the

international and national history of the left in the period, and the third and largest one is a concrete

example of the use of the concept of nation. It deals only with the nation seen in the global context.

In the June paper I should like to work my way down from the global, to the European, to the

Nordic and finally to the domestic level.

2. What do I mean by 'Left'?

There exists a quite extensive literature on the topic of the division between left and right in politics.

Some authors want to keep the division, as they see it as an essential, bipolar structure of politics,

2

others see it as a historically constructed and constantly changing concept. Tempting as it might be

to enter this theoretical discussion, I choose to see it from the point of view of the pragmatic

historian, looking for a concept that opens up for new questions and new knowledge. Still some

kind of definition is needed.

One possibility is to look at the ideological definitions of ‘left’: what is at the core of leftist

ideology? One of the most well written attempts to answer this is Norberto Bobbios book Left and

Right. The Significance of a Political Distinction.2 After an interesting discussion of left and right as

a spatial metaphor with many positions between the two poles, Bobbio arrives to the rather

essentialist conclusion that ‘left’ can be reduced to a leading principle of equality, the leftist

position will always be the more egalitarian one.3 A similar attempt to reduce the concept of ‘left’ to

an ideological core has been made by Steven Lukes in the article “Qu’est-ce que la gauche?”4 Less

convincingly and considerably more vaguely than Bobbio, he ends up with a definition of ‘left’ as a

principle of ‘rectification’ (correcting wrongs), a never-ending fight against exploitation and

oppression.5 Both authors are politically on the left wing themselves, which to a large degree

influence their conclusions. Unfortunately – and partly for this reason - none of them would be very

useful as a tool to separate left from right. Most obviously, Lukes’ definition is not much good, who

would not try to correct wrongs and fight oppression? And who is to decide, what for example

oppression is? Does Margaret Thatcher’s fight against the oppression of the individual against the

welfare state make her a champion of the left? Definitions such as this one clearly comes from a

rhetoric figure on the left, which defines itself in ethical terms, where ‘left’ is good and ‘right’ is

evil.6 Norberto Bobbio is far more convincing, egalitarianism is a large element in left wing

ideology. But on the other hand, you can’t help posing your self the question: can the whole

political culture, red banners with hammer and sickle and singing the ‘Internationale’ be reduced to

an idea of egalitarianism? The argument of the book itself is for example often built up

dialectically, a clear inheritance from Bobbios Marxist origins. But what is the link between

egalitarianism and dialectics? And if you think further, how does it fit with the elitist elements in

2 Originally Destra e Sinistra: Ragioni e significati di una distinzione politica (Rome 1994)3 Bobbio, Norberto (1996), Left and Right. The Significance of a Political Distinction, Cambridge, p. 72-864 Lukes, Steven (1996), “Qu’est-ce que la gauche?” in Lazar, Marc, La Gauche en Europe depuis 1945, Paris, p. 369-885 The passage deserves to be quoted extensively in all its pathos: “Le projet de rectification peut être exprimé de

multiples manières, sur le registre des droits ou du conflit de classes, comme une affaire d’extension de la citoyenneté,

de justice, de démocratie, ou comme une lutte incessante contre l’Exploitation et l’oppression”, Ibid., p. 3816 Sirinelli, Jean-François (1993), "La morale entre droite et gauche", Pouvoirs 65/1993

3

Lenin’s idea about the party leading the masses? The answer must be that reducing ‘left’ to some

core idea is not going to get you very far.

Another way to look at left and right as a political division, is to go back to its historical roots in the

French revolution, where ‘left’ was associated with change and ‘right’ with conservatism in the

original meaning of the word. The Canadian Jean A. Laponce in his book Left and Right. The

Topography of Political Perceptions argues that this practical division reflecting the agenda of the

French revolution has developed into a myth "of a cosmic conflict between two abstract forces - one

called left, the other called right".7 The original purpose of the division has vanished, so that the two

concepts have freed themselves from any reference to particular ideological points of view.

The historical point of departure leads to the conclusion that the concept ‘left’ is a construction

continuously being reconstructed.8 It seems that instead of looking for a clear and stable definition

of ‘the left’, one should take a look the people that define and redefine what it means to be on the

left. Before reaching his essentialist conclusion, Bobbio writes extensively about left and right as

spatial metaphors indicating proximity and distance. It is a key to find possible allies in the political

game, a space in which to place your self in relation to others – friends, allies or enemies.9

A definition stressing space and relativity leads to another theory, namely that of Pierre Bourdieu

and his concept of 'social space' or field, as an:

"ensemble des positions distinctes et coexistantes, extérieures les unes aux autres, définies les

unes par rapport aux autres, par leur extériorité mutuelle et par des relations de proximité …"10

This way of looking as the left as a space structured by related positions seems to me the most open

and comprehensive point of departure. Instead of struggling with more or less abstract ethical or

philosophical measures it suggests a much more pragmatic approach: to look at the network of

people recognising themselves and others to be ‘on the left’. They take different positions, some

more powerful than others, but always defined by relation to other positions in the same space. It

also allows you to use the theoretical apparatus of Bourdieu to pose questions about the distribution

of power and resources (capital) in the field, and how this capital is used in the struggle for more

power and resources.

This choice of a dynamic, constructivist approach over a stable and essential one also allows you to

criticize much of the writing on the history of the left wing. Since the left in Europe for the last 50

7 Laponce, Jean A. (1981), Left and Right. The Topography of Political Perceptions, Toronto, p. 2088 Gauchet, Marcel (1984) "La Droite et la Gauche", in Nora, Pierre, Les lieux de mémoire, III, 1, Paris9 Bobbio (1996), Left and Right, p. #10 Bourdieu, Pierre (1994), Raisons pratiques. Sur la théorie de l'action, Paris, p. 20

4

years has been dominated by intellectuals and vice versa, much of its history has been a history of

ideas: Maoism vs. Trotskyism vs. Leninism etc. Many authors have built their analysis on an

ideological core, from which everything else could be derived. One influential theory has been Ron

Eyerman and Andrew Jamisons so called ‘cognitive approach’ to social movements. It divides

social movements into a ‘cosmological’, ‘technological’ and ‘organisational’ dimensions. Where

practises and organisation of a social movement derives from certain basic ideological

assumptions.11 The result of this way of looking at the left – Eyerman and Jamison have dealt

especially the new left – is that you take the ideological statements of parties and movements at

their face value. They end up with a picture of free idealistic agents trying to save the world from

the evil technocrats.12 Since the connection between ideology and practise is assumed from the

beginning no room is left open for criticism, everything seems stable and coherent.

My ambition is to show the opposite: the left was just as opportunistic, incoherent and full of

intrigues as any other part of political life. The agents were not – as they liked to picture themselves

- free-floating rebels outside the ‘system’, but were restricted by particular patterns of thinking, by

the distribution of resources and the ongoing struggle for domination in the field. 13

3. The concept of nation

The main focus in the thesis lies on the concept of nation. Here I face another problem of definition.

On one hand, a firm definition would lead to a tautology: I would already have defined what I am

looking for, and therefore only be finding material fitting my definition. On the other hand, I need

some kind of definition that helps me pick out the relevant sources. Apart from that, 'nation' is an

almost impossible to define objectively.14

One solution that avoids the problem of definition is the method of conceptual history, as Reinhart

Koselleck puts it himself with a quotation from Nietzsche: “definierbar ist nur das, was keine

Geschichte hat”,15 that is to say, it is not about defining what you are looking for, but rather to see

how the definition of that which you look at changes. In practical terms this means looking for the 11 Eyerman, Ron & Andrew Jamison (1991), Social Movements. A Cognitive Approach, Cambridge12 See especially Eyerman, Ron & Andrew Jamison (1998) Music and Social Movements, Cambridge and (1994), Seeds

of the Sixties. Eyerman and Jamison both were active on the American left in the 1960s, which give these books an air

of happy memories of their youth – even so, they are among the most influential in the field.13 This will be a considerably longer discussion in the June-paper. 14 See Hobsbawm, Eric (1992) Nations and Nationalism. Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge, p. 5-9.15 Koselleck, Reinhart (1972), “Einleitung“ in Brunner, Otto e.a. (ed.), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Stuttgart, p. XXIII

5

word itself, and then see how the ones who use it define it. Another historian of concepts, Rolf

Reichart, has proposed the idea of constructing a ‘conceptual field’ around the concept you are

analysing. This is quite simply a framework in which to place different words in relation to the

concept: which words are used to define what the concept is and what it is not, describe what its

properties, and how these properties have manifested themselves historically.16 For example:

“Denmark is a democratic country which is peaceful by nature, but ready to fight when threatened

by its arch-enemy, the German militarism. As the resistance movement has shown during the war”.

This constructed quotation could have been taken from a Danish left-wing article, it shows what and

how Denmark is, what it is not, and it gives a historical example to prove that this picture is true.

I also find it useful to use theoretical tools that fit together. You can mirror the political field of

Bourdieu with Reicharts conceptual field, so that positions in one field resemble positions in the

other. For instance the position of the ‘other’ in the conceptual field - Germany in the example

above - with a position in the political field – communists – the communists are loyal patriots,

because they fight German superiority in NATO and in the EEC, as they fought Germany during

the war. By tying the two positions together, the communists can gain a cultural capital, which

again can be conversed into other forms of capital.

Last, the attraction of the field-metaphor also lies in its ‘flat’ character. I intend two use it as an

alternative to the word ‘discourse’, which as a spatial metaphor has two levels: one at the surface,

where you find the concrete phenomenon and one underlying structure, which generates the surface

according to some rules or guiding principles. This is related to the remarks above about

essentialism and use of coherent, ideological core principles. My aim is to describe the dynamic

incoherence on the left, not to find a hidden meaning ‘beneath the surface’.17

Of course, the conceptual field is not a perfect tool; it offers no clear-cut answer to, what belongs to

it and what not. I still have problems deciding which discussions relates to the nation as such,

especially when it comes to domestic politics, which all has some relation to the nation-state. For

the time being, I have more or less arbitrarily limited myself to discussions about foreign politics

(attitudes towards the ‘other’), culture, the people (especially in the relation to the concept of class),

and to a lesser extend the welfare state, because the nation seems to play an interesting role here. I

am still in doubt about the country as a physical object and about local politics.

16 Reichart, Rolf (1985), Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich, vol. 1-2, p. 8517 I need to work some more on the relationship between coherence and incoherence; I realize that this is not perfectly

clear or completely convincible.

6

4. From Soviet hegemony to pluralism

The 1950s have often been seen as the beginning of the end of communism. The dispute between

the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia revealed the first "crack in the base of the Stalinist 'monolith' ", 18

which was followed by an increasing loss of control culminating in the revolutions of 1989-90.

Even though the 2nd world war and its aftermath had spread communism to Eastern and Central

Europe and to China, Kremlin did no longer have the power to control all new regimes, nor could it

keep tight control over western communists, as it did it the 1930s. As described above, this process

had begun already with the dissolution of Comintern in 1943. Only at that point in time, very few

communist parties could react on the change, as they were mostly either busy fighting the Germans

in the national resistance movements or in German concentration camps. The founding of

Cominform in 1947 did only bring back some of Moscow's former power over its western allies, it

was mainly directed at the new communist regimes in the Eastern Bloc, with the PCI and the PCF

as its only western members.19 During the 1950s and 1960s it would become clear that control

Eastern Europe depended on accessibility of Soviet tanks. The Soviet Union could crush rebellions

in East Germany and Hungary, but not prevent Yugoslavia, and later China and Albania, to free

itself from the Soviet grip.

By the mid-50s the CPSU still was the undisputed head of international communism. At its 20 th

congress in February 1956 delegates from all over the world travelled to Moscow to make the

traditional congratulations to the victories of socialism and to hear the latest guidelines from the

'most experienced and successful communist party in the world'. The new Soviet leader emerging

from the power struggles after Stalin's death, Nikita Khrushchev, would send them home

bewildered and confused. Officially, he launched two new strategies that would have deep impact

on western communism: National roads to socialism and peaceful coexistence. The national roads

to socialism meant that other communist parties should not necessarily take the Soviet Union as the

only example, how to build a socialist society. They should be aware of the specific national

conditions under which they were working and form their own strategy according to this. Violent

revolution needed for instance not be the only way to change a capitalist system. Peaceful

coexistence meant that the Soviet Union would not try to win the cold war by force. The communist

side would necessarily win in the long run because of its better and more efficient system. For the 18 Stern, Geoffrey (1990), The Rise and Fall of International Communism, Aldershot, p. 156 19 See the list of abbreviations at the end of the paper. Left wing language is full of three or four-letter combinations, I

thought using these would bring a nice 'communist flavour' to the dissertation.

7

western communists, peaceful coexistence meant a that the a communist take-over in the West now

was at best considered in the very long run and given a very low priority by the Kremlin.20 Focus

shifted southwards to the newly independent states in Asia and Africa and Western Europe left to

attend its own petty businesses

The all-overshadowing event on the congress was the famous Secret Speech "On the cult of

personality", where Khrushchev denounced Stalin by describing the terror of the 1930s as acts of

crime, he criticised Stalin's leadership during the war in strong terms and also condemned the new

repression of the 1940s and 50s.21 Even though the speech was held secretly at the congress, the

manuscript leaked out, and its content was soon known all over the world. It left its communist

readers in a chock. Only the oldest generation could remember the communist world before Stalin.

Since the 1920s he had been hailed as an infallible genius, the incarnation of the socialist progress

and the man behind the great victory over fascism. Now the leader in the fatherland of socialism

portrayed him as a paranoid criminal, whose leadership had been a catastrophe for the country.

Though this questioned the basis of communist identity, very few dared to take the logical step and

break with the Soviet Union. Unaccustomed as they were of independent strategies, most parties

slavishly repeated the critique on the cult of personality and dogmatism, as they had repeated the

condemnation of Trotskyism or Titoism before. Some places, though, the new tones from Moscow

lead to a more thorough debate about the future of communism.

In Western Europe a few parties – most notably the PCI – did welcome the term ‘national roads’,

and the Italian leader Palmiro Togliatti launched the concept of ‘pluralism’ as a new strategy for

communism. He did not basically question the solidarity within the movement, but he took

destalinisation a step further by suggesting that Stalinism might not be the fault of the individual

Stalin, but a consequence of the Soviet system as such. Though this was going further than most

Western communists were prepared to by the time, the Italian development was followed carefully,

and just the view in itself would have been unheard of just a few years before.

Shortly after the 20th party congress, in the late fall of 1956, the new ideas of independency were

put to the test - and failed. The Stalinist regime in Hungary was toppled by a popular revolt, soon to

be put back in power after a Soviet invasion. This raised an outcry in most of the world, which was

not softened by the Stalin-style trials and execution of the reformist leader Imre Nagy on grounds of

20 Bracke, Maud (2000), The 1968 Invasion of Czechoslovakia: The End of Proletarian Internationalism, June Paper

EUI, p. 2621 "The Secret Speech - On the Cult of Personality", Modern History Sourcebook,

www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1956khrushchev-secret1.html

8

'Titoism'. If the secret speech had raised doubts about their loyalty Stalin among many communists,

now was the time to reconsider their loyalty towards the Soviet Union. At the same time this meant

the definitive end of the good will towards communism in the West.

While the Soviet Union could keep its allies in Eastern Europe in line, it could no longer control

communism on a global scale. The most significant blow in thus respect was the split between

China and the Soviet Union. The new Soviet policies of destalinisation and peaceful coexistence did

not please the Chinese leadership, which was still deeply marked by the long war they had fought to

gain power. Their language and attitudes towards the West remained as militant as always. Instead

of peaceful competition, Mao wanted to confront in crush capitalism by force. In concrete terms,

this meant Chinese support to the liberation movement in the 3rd world. A socialist Asia and Africa

would deprive Europe and America's capitalists of raw materials and so to speak cut the body from

the head of the snake. Around 1960 the disagreements grew to hostility between the two countries,

dividing the communist world in those loyal to Beijing and those loyal to Moscow. Many socialists

around the world, who were sceptical about giving up violent revolution, saw Maoism both as the

guardian of Marxism/Leninism and the spirit of revolution, and as a new, fresh and exotic

alternative to old, dusty Soviet communism.

It is indeed tempting to see the developments in the 1950s as the ‘beginning of the end’ of

international communism.22 Never the less, it is a narrative which requires the knowledge of the

events of 1989, the fall of the Berlin wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Seen from the

1950s and 1960s, communism was a strong force and the decline of the absolute ideological power

of the CPSU was overshadowed by military and technological power of the Soviet state. The rise of

several ideological communist centres around the world was by many seen not as a decline, but as a

strengthening renewal of communism. To them, pluralism meant that they had gained the freedom

to fight for socialism and remaining independent of the ideological whims of the CPSU.

5. Divorce or open marriage. The left in Denmark and Sweden

The eventful year of 1956 had different ideological and organisational consequences in Denmark

and Sweden.

Though the war had been fairly mild on Danish communism, it still had left its mark on the party.

Many communist came out of the resistance with a great gratitude towards the Soviet Union for 22 Furet, François (1995), Le passé d'une illusion. Essai sur l’idée communiste au XXe siècle, Paris, pp. 504-546

9

defeating Nazism. Even the leader, Aksel Larsen, who before the war had been sceptic towards

Stalin, now personally felt indebted to the Soviet leader that had freed him from the Sachsenhausen

concentration camp.23 The impact of the secret speech and Hungary thus hit the DKP hard. Aksel

Larsen was one of the only ones in the party that could remember a time before Stalin. He had been

at the Comintern party-school in Moscow in the 1920s, where he was attracted to Stalin's

ideological adversaries and had even been very close to being deported to the Gulag. The secret

speech and the invasion in Hungary made his old scepticism resurface and brought him into conflict

with most of the DKP leadership, who were all brought up with dogmatic Stalinism and blind faith

in the Soviet Union. After a year of ideological fight and intrigue, the party split into two, and Aksel

Larsen formed the Socialist Peoples Party (SF), leaving the hard-core Marxist-leninists behind in a

crippled DKP. The new party obliterated DKP at the 1960 elections and gained 11 seats in

parliament.24 At the same time, the so-called ‘new left’ gained a foothold in Denmark among

independent intellectuals. ‘New left’ is a very loose concept usually defined as an independent

ideological and political position between Soviet communism and reformist social democracy. It

took different forms in different countries, but is usually characterised by a ‘back to the roots’-

Marxism with focus on Marx’ early writings and more attention to the ‘Marxisms’ of Gramsci and

the Frankfurt School than on Lenin; traits that to a large degree made it an intellectual movement

than a political one. Though many new left-intellectuals took pride in their independent position, SF

became a forum and a sort of organisational structure for them as “The party that the homeless

socialists need”.25 From the beginning of the 1960s DKP was not only out of parliament, it was also

an outsider on the left itself. Instead there existed a close network of socialist with more or less

affiliation with SF. Because of its largely intellectual character and because intellectual to a very

large extend meant Copenhagen, it remained also a close geographical one. In a way, the clean

Danish divorce resulted in a much more homogenous field than the Swedish one.

The Swedish communist party (SKP) had been in an exceptional position at the time of Comintern's

dissolution since the country was one of the few democracies not occupied by Nazi Germany.

Already in 1944 it adopted a new program called 'New Course 1943', which began a debate about

23 Jakobsen, Kurt (1993), Aksel Larsen. En politisk biografi, Copenhagen24 The Danish parliament is characterised by many small parties, 11 seats out of 179 might not seem a lot, but it actually

is a force to be considered.25 Kate Fleron in Frit Danmark - but where#

10

'the national road' for Swedish communism.26 Even after the founding of Cominform, SKP kept a

moderately ideologically independent course through the 1950s, with a positive view on

parliamentary democracy and stressing the different conditions in Sweden and in the Soviet Union.

The party managed to keep a balance between leaving the brotherhood of international communism

and being a mindless puppet of the Soviet Union. As the historian of ideas Jörgen Hermansson puts

it:

“The Soviet Union was the great, leading example, which for the part of Sweden should not

be followed”27

Also, the Danish example horrified the SKP, even though the same conflicts between so-called

'traditionalists' and 'modernists' existed, no one was prepared to begin a fight that could split the

Swedish party. In order to keep the balance, there was put a lid on the debate about the relationship

to the Soviet Union. Under the lid, though, differences became ever more pronounced. When SKP

lost terrain in the 1962 elections, almost going back to the level of the terrible post-Hungary result,

the fractions that wanted to break with Moscow began to put forward their views in public. Tension

reached its peak in late 1963, shortly before the 19 th party congress. In the SKP daily newspaper Ny

Dag the ‘modernists’ openly attacked the ‘traditionalist’ leadership for being personally responsible

for the bad election. Why did they stick to politics that obviously did not attract the Swedish

electorate? Why did SKP have to support all decisions of the Soviet Union? Why can’t we criticize

the Berlin wall or the invasion in Hungary? The general argument was that the Swedish worker

would not trust a party that was bound to the policies of a foreign country, and certainly not to one

that denied its citizens the basic rights, to which the Swedes had become accustomed. In the

Swedish welfare state communist could not build their hopes for the future on social revolution of

the starving masses:

“Swedes today have both bread and peace and often a little more than just that. The

Swedish worker right now believes he can afford to wait and see, when he suspects

that certain human rights and freedoms would be neglected in a socialist Sweden”28

No doubt, the modernist wing had had its eyes on the success of SF in Denmark. If an independent

socialist party could have such elections result in Denmark, why not in Sweden? The traditionalist

wing was clearly on the defensive, its response to the demands for a new policy amounted to little

26 Hermansson, Jörgen (1984), Kommunism på Svenska? SKP/VPK:s idéutveckling efterKomintern, Stockholm, p. 5227 Ibid. p. 20528 Rubinstein, Harald “Lik i Garderoben”, Ny Dag 15/10 1963, p. 2+5. The title means ‘skeletons in the closet’ it

became a standard metaphor about SKP’s relationship with the eastern bloc.

11

more than empty and worn-out phrases about creating a united workers front and the like; policies

which had been followed since the 1930s with no avail. During the debate in the fall of 1963 the

traditionalist leader of the party, Hilding Hagberg, resigned. Time had come for new, young people

to take over the leadership, and the Central Committee appointed the Carl-Henric Hermansson as

the new leader. Hermansson seemed a moderate modernist. He had not stuck his head out by taking

part in the debate before the congress and he had held several key positions in the party top. On the

other hand, he had been advocating an independent course ever since the ‘New Course’ of 1944.

Also [this is my impression - usually Hagberg is considered a hard-core traditionalist - I don’t have

quite enough empirical support yet], Hilding Hagberg was not deaf to the modernist demands and

Hermansson was a very suitable compromise candidate, who could be elected at the congress and

from that point lead the party in a different direction.

Hermansson was ‘elected’ at the congress in 1964. Though it was far from a landslide victory to the

modernists at the congress itself, it meant a significant change of leadership.29 During the next

years, modernist placed their own people on key positions in the party and turned towards a more

domestic, less Soviet-dependent line. After this time, SKP became more like a ‘third party’30 than

like other European communist parties; it began to make connections with SF in Denmark, its

pendant in Norway and it kept an eye on similar developments in the rest of Europe.

While the modernists and traditionalists fought for power, a new wing emerged from the leadership

of the Gothenburg party section. This wing would neither follow the Soviet Union and

Khrushchev’s new policies nor would they accept the reformist line of the modernists. Instead they

took China and chairman Mao as their model for a socialist vision. The ‘left opposition’ as it was to

be called, stressed violent confrontation with capitalism, liberation of the 3rd world and Lenin as the

true revolutionary teacher, as opposed to the ‘revisionism’ of the new left. This ideological

standpoint would be quite influential by the middle of the 1960s, as will be described later.

The ‘new leftists’ were spread from the modernist wing of the SKP over the syndicalist youth

organisation and its periodical Zenit to the left wing of the social democratic party. Although strong,

29 Modernist candidates only received marginally more votes at the congress, but the system of ‘democratic centralism’

more or less secured victory to candidates appointed by the existing leadership. ARAB, Archive of SKP/VPK, Volume

1a:13 30 I got the term ‘third party’ from Bartolini, Stefano (2000), The Mobilization of the European Left, Cambridge, p. 114-

117, who to my opinion underestimates the phenomenon. It is not a subject that has been looked into thoroughly in a

European context though similar developments exist both in France, Norway, Holland and Italy. I might want to use

some time to discuss the Danish and Swedish cases in this perspective.

12

they never attained the same hegemony as they did in Denmark, as they were confronted both by

Maoism and Soviet communism.

The striking thing about the Swedish left is its character of an ‘open marriage’, where the agents

belong to several different scenes at one time. There existed many forums that where formally

independent, but dominated by some fraction or another. The same person could be a member of

SKP, editor of the new left periodical Tidsignal and write articles in the syndicalist Zenit. Basically,

though, all threads lead back to SKP, which is rather a sign of its members’ long leach than of a

centralized, communist-lead Swedish left. Again, geography plays a role. Whereas intellectual

Denmark equalled Copenhagen, Sweden had several centres. Old universities existed both in

southern Swedish Lund and in Uppsala, relatively near Stockholm, the capital itself with

administration and political parties served as a third centre. SKP had a fairly big working class

support in the mining districts of the far north; a traditionalist stronghold, and Gothenburg on the

west coast was also a big city with a large working-class population thanks to the Volvo car-

factories, and its Maoist section could not be completely ignored.

Source material

A few notes on the source material before I turn to the concrete use of the concept of nation: The

main sources are periodicals and weekly newspapers. It was custom for communist parties to have a

daily newspaper and a theoretical journal published 5 to 7 times a year. I will not have the time to

look through daily newspapers, it is simply too much material and the gain is too little. Since it was

the same people who edited and the same policies that were presented in the theoretical journals,

reading both would be unnecessary. The only place I have done it, is the SKP daily Ny Dag in fall

1962 and fall 1963, because of the debates after the 1962 election and before the 19 th party

congress. Journals often were forums of individual groups on the left, which makes it easy to

identify the development of their views. It often means that the group or organisation has the same

name as its journal, which might be a bit confusing for the reader. I have tried to solve this by

putting names of journals in italics and writing names of groups or organisations with normal

typography; Clarté is thus the journal of Clarté.

I have used other kinds of sources only in a few places. If I have seen a sudden change in the editing

board of a journal, or if its views changes rapidly, I have looked for sources that could explain why.

This is the case with Maoist take-over of Clarté and the modernist-traditionalist conflict in SKP.

Both places, I have looked at material from congresses and records from meetings to see which

13

strategies were used to gain power. The DKP-SF split has been described rather thoroughly, so I

have felt no need to look into the archives here.31

6. Small nations in a big world - finding your place in a new world order

The post-war world was often perceived along two axes, where you could place yourself as a

nation. The first one was the widening division of the world in a communist; Soviet dominated East

and a capitalist, USA-dominated West. The second one was between the rich, 'old' nations of the

North and the poor, newly independent countries of the South.

Where should the Danish and Swedish left place themselves, and where on the two axes did their

countries belong according to their view of the world?

East is East and West is West …

On the East-West axis, Denmark and Sweden had chosen different positions. After the communist

coup in Prague 1948, the Danish government reluctantly abandoned its 150-year old politic of

neutrality and joined NATO, while Sweden remained firmly neutral. The choice between capitalism

and socialism was more complicated, since strong social democratic parties with an anti-capitalist

and anti-liberalist heritage led both countries.

For the DKP, integration into the western bloc meant integration into the worldwide system of

international monopoly capitalism.32 Political decision-making was secretly controlled by big

companies in the USA and West Germany and was made to suit their interests. The secret agenda

was to buy Danish companies and integrate them into the existing monopolies; Denmark would

seize to be an economically independent country. This theme was especially stressed in connection

with the EEC, which was seen as the economic weapon of German militarism where NATO was the

military one.

Apart from that, trading only with the West would be disastrous in the end. According to the DKP

during the whole period, capitalism was on verge of a major crisis, signs were showing that the

card-house could fall any day. Denmark could prevent being dragged down by this coming

downfall of the West by turning its attention to the crisis-free Eastern economies. The continuous

growth in the Eastern bloc would secure ever more profitable and stable trading-partners for 31 The intrigues leading to the split are described in Jakobsen, (1993), Aksel Larsen and in Kragh, Jens (1976), Opbrud

på venstrefløjen, Copenhagen, the latter also has printed many of the relevant sources in the appendixes of the book and

in Kragh, Jens ed. (1977), Folkesocialisme. Udvalgte taler af Aksel Larsen, Mogens Fog, Kai Molkte, Gert Petersen m.

fl., Copenhagen32 Should there be a longer explanation of 'monopoly capitalism'?

14

Denmark. These were Denmark's natural partners and allies, taking USA's side in the cold war,

meant an 'artificial freezing' of the trade with the neighbours south and east of the Baltic Sea.33

Even worse, capitalism would inevitably lead to war. With falling rates of profit34 monopolies

needed a war to boost demand. This was why there was a cold war at all, US monopolies needed an

aggressive politic to keep up demand, they would eventually need a full-scale war to compensate

the ever-falling rates of profit. Membership of NATO would drag Denmark into this inferno, while

neutrality would the country safe from invasion. The crisis-free economy did not need wars to

increase profit, since stable growth was secured by rational planning. The threat towards Denmark

did not come from the East, it came from the West.

Denmark is seen as misplaced on the East-West axis. It is not an aggressive country; it is not the

home of big monopolies. Traitorous politicians have mislead the people, and brought it into the bad

company of an alliance where it does not belong:

"The communists show that Denmark supports the case of peace and of its own sovereignty

by securing its position as a neutral state … This is why the task just now is to unite those,

who are determined to fight the battle for the working class and the people, in the communist

party, whose strength is decisive for whether the popular movements will attain their goals or

not"35

Note how the right position for Denmark is the neutral one, not in the Soviet camp. This is on one

hand necessary, because the DKP did not want to be seen as a branch of the CPSU, on the other

hand this might be exactly because the DKP de facto was a branch of the CPSU. The foreign policy

of the Soviet Union did not (as mentioned above) aim at socialist revolutions in Western Europe, its

strategy towards the Nordic countries was to make them a neutral, demilitarised and nuclear-free

zone. As in many other cases, rather than developing their own ideas, the communist parties echoed

this strategy. The position of Denmark on the East-West axis reflects Soviet wishful thinking as

much as it reflects what Danish communists thought of their country themselves. 36

Here geography plays a significant role. This is before the introduction of intercontinental missiles

and before the 3rd world war became synonymous with the end of the world. The clash between the

super-powers was rather envisaged as a repetition of the 2nd world war with more powerful 33 Tiden 2/1958, p. 5034 It is not the question, whether rates are really falling or not, according to Marxism/Leninism they are always falling,

so it is taken for granted.35 Tiden, 3/1956, s. 13736 DKP-Soviet relations are described in detail in Jensen, Bent (1999), Bjørnen og haren. Sovjetunionen og Danmark

1945-65, Odense

15

weapons. Strategies for this war did not yet include launching missiles at Los Angeles from Siberia,

instead forces had to be moved to positions within range of the enemy. The Soviet Union had to

move its Baltic fleet through the Danish belts, while NATO's strategy was to retreat from Germany

to Jutland, move East, land on the coast of the GDR and Poland, cutting of the Warsaw pact armies

west of the river Elbe. Denmark was not insignificant in these plans. After Sputnik and the

introduction of nuclear-armed submarines and intercontinental missiles in the beginning of the

1960s the Soviet interest in Nordic neutrality cooled down, and so did the rhetoric of the DKP.

From a top-priority in the 1950s, NATO membership went down to number 10 out of 13

"suggestions for a new policy" in the 1964 elections.37

When SF broke away from DKP in 1958, it was far from having an ideological basis even

comparable with the latter party. It consisted to a large degree of old, schooled communists who

wanted to bring Marxism 'up to date',38 but who were not absolutely clear what this meant. A lot of

'DKP-thinking' therefore remained in the party. Its opinions on foreign policy and Denmark's

natural place in the world did at first not differ a lot from DKP's. Though it portrayed itself as being

free from Moscow, this did not have immediate consequences in concrete standpoint on the foreign

policy of its leading members. In Bent Jensen's book about Danish-Soviet relations during the cold

war, he is stating that SF unconsciously continued to protect Soviet interests in the parliament.39

This may have been true to a certain extend, but during the 1960s, the foreign policy profile of SF

became ever more independent from of its roots. The tricky thing is that DKP and SF tried to be

associated with the same position in the semantic field, classifying Denmark as a country that

should keep out of the cold war and take a neutral standpoint. They were both against any economic

and military integration into the western bloc positive towards the UN. But the little differences

were still quite clear and in favour of SF: The DKP-version of neutrality tended to be a negative

one, they were basically against anything western, but not very convincing when it came to

explaining the alternative: on one hand, the eastern bloc was described as the great model of a good

society, but on the other, DKP could not openly say that it wanted Denmark to shift sides

completely, becoming all dependent on the Soviet Union. In this respect, SF entered the scene at the

right time. With decolonisation proceeding rapidly around 1960, the non-aligned countries grew in

37 Tiden 5/1964, s. 17038 A lot of the debate leading to the split in DKP was about whether 'bringing up to date' ("ajourføring") was the same as

a revision - revisionism being an irreconcilable with Marxism/Leninism.39 Jensen, Bent (1999), Bjørnen og Haren, p. 589-90

16

number, and - at least in the eyes of SF - the global order seemed to move from a two to a three

partite world. Denmark's natural position would be together with the new neutral countries, away

from the bad company of the nuclear powers. The alternative was both a clear and an attractive one;

SF (also for other reasons) gained the upper hand in the field, both among left wing intellectuals and

among the broad electorate.

The attraction of neutralism lay for a part in the new view on the cold war that developed with the

different campaigns against nuclear disarmament.40 The main aim of these movements was to

provide an alternative to the government information about nuclear war. In the 1950s the effects

nuclear warfare were often played down,41 practical advice were given how to survive the attack

(seek cover under a table, protect skin from heat-wave etc.). As mentioned above, the third world

war has not yet gotten its apocalyptic image. It was rather described as a challenge, which one could

survive by taking the right precautions. The campaigns for nuclear disarmament turned this picture.

They informed about lasting radiation after the blast, showed pictures from the completely

destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, of the burned bodies and the mutilated survivors. Nuclear war

was now seen; rightly one might add, as an event of biblical proportions - a human-made

Armageddon. SF played a large role in the Danish campaign and vice versa. In many cases people

from the campaign were also party members and SF printed the campaigns material extensively in

its weekly newspaper. It has to be stressed, though, that the campaign was not a branch of the party,

the two influenced each other equally strong. Joining the club of non-aligned nation also meant

taking stepping out of the madness of the East-West nuclear race. This line of argumentation had a

good electoral support both for social democrats, communists and the social-liberal radical party. It

might well have been one of the reasons for SF's ever increasing electoral gains in the first half of

the 1960s.

Both DKP and SF basically perceived Denmark as a good country in bad company. It was an

innocent land with peaceful and democratic traditions and should be above participating in the cold

war. There is on the whole very little self-criticism in the Danish sources, and almost none when it

comes to place Denmark in a global context. Nuclear war, colonialism and monopoly capitalism are

40 Unfortunately, these movements have not been analysed in the European perspective where they belong. They were

very similar and to a wide degree connected groups; Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Great Britain, Kampf dem

Atomtod in West Germany, Kampagnen mod Atomvåben in Denmark and Kampanjen Mot Atomvapen in Sweden to

mention a few.41 The film Atomic Café documents this sometimes tragicomic propaganda.

17

all phenomenon that come from outside. Denmark must be protected from those evils by retreating

to a neutral outsider-position.

Sweden's position on the East-West axis was much less debated. Neutrality had brought Sweden

unharmed through the war, and few thought seriously about binding the country officially to the

Western bloc. There could be little doubt, though, that Sweden was a country of the West. It had for

example accepted Marshall aid and had a 'silent partnership' with the USA, which unilaterally

secured the country's defence against a Soviet aggression.42 Sweden could thus both feel secure and

still wash its hands in relation to the actions of NATO member-states like France in Algeria or -

more important - USA in Vietnam. Swedes saw their country as a 'moral super-power', untainted by

the atrocities of the cold war.43 More or less the position SF wanted for Denmark.

For this reason, the East-West axis was less likely to create divisions in the Swedish political

landscape. SKP tried on occasions to mobilize against NATO by stating that the social democrats

were secretly planning to make Sweden join the organisation. The mobilizing effect was at best

negligible.

North and South

In 1956, the East-West axis was the main, if not the only, global division. On one side stood the

Soviet Union, China and Eastern Europe, on the other the USA and Western Europe with its

colonial empires. 10 years later these empires were no more. Between 1956 and 1964 Great Britain

graduately dissolved its African empire, France granted independence to most of West Africa in

1960 (except Algeria which had to wait until 1962) at the same time as Belgium left Congo. India

and Indonesia had become independent after the war and the French had been defeated in Indochina

in 1954. The South (and as a consequence the North) became an independent factor on the global

level. An independence that was stressed even more by China's break from Moscow and the test of

its first nuclear bomb in 1964.

The lack of a large East-West debate in Sweden was more than compensated by the focus on the

North-South axis. Around 1960, attention switched from Algeria and to a lesser degree Indochina to

Africa the south of the Sahara. Prominent writers went to Kenya or South Africa to gather material

about race discrimination and fight for independence.44 The point of departure was a moral one, the

travellers wanted the Swedish public to know and condemn the crimes committed against the black

42 Malmborg, Michael af (1994), Den standaktiga nationalstaten, Lund, p. 50-5143 The expression 'moral superpower' comes from Salomon, Kim (1996), Rebeller i takt med tiden, Stockholm, p. 295

18

population. Gradually during the 1960s, the moral standpoint was replaced by a political, Marxist

one. This is a general European trend, which is not easily explainable. In the Swedish case, the

radicalisation seems to be connected with Maoism and China's independent course. One of the

official disputes between Khrushchev and Mao was - as described above - whether communism

could 'win' in peaceful competition with the capitalist world, or whether capitalism should be

brought down by violent means. While the Soviet Union consolidated its empire, China focused on

the 3rd world as the "storm centres of the world revolution".45 The left in general was caught by a

euphoria of decolonisation. Africa and Asia were the continents of the future, where a new and

better world was born out of the decadent and brutal European colonialism. China became a

favourite destination for those who wanted a glimpse of the brave new world. It had a large number

of the elements that gave the 3rd world its promising, exiting and exotic impression: emerging from

a heroic civil war harvesting the fruits of socialism, an ancient civilisation freed from European

oppression and most of all, it was home of the masses. Just as the proletariat masses in classical

Marxism were kept down by the capitalist minority, the countless millions of the 3rd world had been

oppressed by the North. But just as capitalism in Marx' theory was digging its own grave by

extorting the masses, so would the majority of the Earths population rise against the tyranny of the

white man. On a travel to China, these endless masses materialise before the eyes of the traveller,

expressing - through the interpreter - their fighting spirit and revolutionary zeal. A surprisingly

large number of Swedes actually went to China and came back as loyal Maoists, and began to work

for a new direction in different organisations on the left.

Maoism in Sweden is a good illustration how to use Bourdieu's concepts of field and capital to

explain a certain development. The position of the Maoists in the beginning of the 1960s was not

particularly strong. They had their small fraction in SKP, centred around the Gothenburg section,

and some followers among the younger members that were active in independent left-wing youth

organisation Clarté. Their main assets were good connections to the winning modernist-wing of

SKP,46 organisational strength in Clarté (social capital in the terms of Bourdieu) and goodwill from

its ideological associations and statements towards the 3rd world (cultural capital). Just as capital in

the Marxist sense, social and cultural capital is defined by its ability to be invested, and accumulate.

44 Examples are Dagmar Edqvist, Per Wästberg and Sara Lidman. The last one is particularly interesting; I might want

to give her a separate chapter.45 Stern (1990), The Rise and Decline of International Communism, p. 18346 This is not well looked into, but I think to have found evidence of a modernist/Maoist alliance against SKP's Soviet-

oriented leadership.

19

For Marx, who only operates with financial capital, this means a "wundertätige Mittel, um aus Geld

mehr Geld zu machen",47 capital is money invested in work in order to accumulate more money.

Even though Bourdieu's concept goes beyond financial capital, the basic concept is the same:

cultural capital can be invested, accumulated and transformed into social and economic capital.48

Two agents in the field, the Maoists Gunnar Bylin and Bo Gustafsson, both invested their social and

cultural capital to gain control over Clarté. Gunnar Bylin was not a great intellectual, but rather a

hard-working activist. During a few years of hard work in the organisation, he had placed himself

on key positions in the day-to-day leadership, making well-prepared motions for congresses,

suggesting agendas for meetings and keeping contacts to the local branches in the university towns.

Gustafsson had been very influential since the 1950s; he had edited the periodical Clarté and been

official spokesman (ordförande) in the organisation from 1960-62. He had travelled in China and

published an influential book in the 3rd world in 1964.49 In 1963 he initiated a long debate about

China versus the Soviet Union in Clarté, often referred to as 'the crack-debate' (sprickan). The

debate lasted for more than a year and split the movement in the 'Chinese' and the less ideologically

organised modernist/new left majority. Gustafsson explicitly stressed that China's experiences was

useful as an example for the 3rd world50, arguments that were echoed by the wave of sympathy for

the 3rd world in general and China in particular that washed over the Swedish left. But the battle was

not an easy one, the new left tendencies were gaining power in the SKP and gave the non-'Chinese'

both a social and cultural capital to counter-invest in the organisation. If Clarté in one issue had a

story about China, the next one could have an interview with the new SKP-leader, Carl-Henric

Hermansson, about his ideas of reforming the party to match the success of the Danish SF. When

China tested its first nuclear bomb in 1964, Clarté was forced to protest, even though the Maoists

only signed after hard pressure from the leadership. The eventual victory of the 'Chinese' where not

reached by the power of arguments alone, only after Bylin at the congress in the fall of 1964 was

elected to key positions both in the central secretariat and in the working committee that formed the

day-to-day leadership, did the victory seem within reach. The elected official spokesman was a

rather weak compromise candidate (#who may have been married to a prominent 'Chinese' - they

both have the last name Matthis), which gave real power to Bylin in the second row. Early 1965, the

war in Vietnam escalated and it soon reached the top of the agenda. At the congress, the Chinese

47 Marx, Karl (1962), Das Kapital, Berlin, I, p. 169 (a magical means by which to make money grow out of money)48 Bourdieu, Pierre (1980), Le sens pratique, Paris, p. 191-20949 Gustafsson, Bo (1964) Från kolonialism till socialism, Stockholm, reprinted 1965, 1966, 1968 and 1971 50 Clarté 6/1963, p. 18-21

20

wing was strengthened considerably, but it was not a complete victory. Vietnam both radicalised the

left in general and strengthened the arguments of Maoists: Who would put forward views on

peaceful coexistence while Americans bombed Hanoi? Increased focus in the South and new

organisational power strengthened the Maoist wing. During 1965 and certainly after the congress of

1966 Maoism came to dominate Clarté and the new left-people went elsewhere. The Chinese had

invested the social capital in intrigues in the leadership and cultural capital of solidarity with 3rd

world and gained a huge profit: Clarté, a nation-wide organisation with its own periodical and a

considerable prestige because of its importance since the 1930s.51 This profit could be, and was,

invested again in the Vietnam movement and the Maoist wing of the SKP, driving radicalisation

further.52 Radicalisation was not - as it is too often described - a product of moral contemplations by

freestanding individuals,53 it was just as much a result of a dynamic power-struggle of the agents

using the resources at hand to gain ideological and social power.

What did this mean for the concept of nation? As opposed to the East-West axis, the North-South

one did not have a third position on the middle. In this perspective, Sweden mostly belonged to the

evil, imperialist North. Clarté in particular, painted a grim picture of the Swedish state. The moral

super-power becomes a proto-fascist, neo-colonial power. Corporatism, large public sector and the

regulated labour market did not mean welfare for the working class; it was rather sign of the take-

over of the state by monopoly capital typical of fascism.54 Globally Sweden was a part of the neo-

colonial system that exploited the local populations in the 3rd world, and large Swedish companies

took home huge profits from overseas investments. Their interest was to keep the southern regimes

stable and non-socialist, like the dictatorships in Brazil and Guatemala. Through them, Sweden

became a part system that oppressed and extorted the masses of the South.

When focus turned to Vietnam in 1965 and the war became the all-important theme on the left,

America became the supreme symbol of evil:

51 Although Clarté in the 1950s and 1960s is closely linked to SKP, many important social democrats had been members

in the 1930s, Skoglund, Christer (1991), Vita mössor under röda fanor. Vänsterstudenter, kulturradikalism och

bildingsideal i Sverige 1880-1940, Stockholm 52 As described in Salomon (1996), Rebeller i takt med tiden.53 I am aiming at the kind of explanation where radicalisation is ultimately the result of being appalled by the atrocities

and injustices of ‘the establishment’: “ … the New Left wing, young and sick at heart at what it reasonably took to be

an empire flexing its muscles, moved beyond rebellion against American foreign policy”, Gitlin, Todd (1987), The

Sixties. Years of Hope, Days of Rage, New York, p. 26154 Clarté, 5-6/1966, p. 12

21

“The problem is over there, in America. The common enemy of the peoples in a big part of

the world is America. When it comes down to it or on a deeper level, America is also our

enemy, first of all because its insane policies can lead to nuclear war at any time. A nuclear

war that certainly also will destroy us in remote Sweden … Apart from that we are ourselves

exposed to an ever more visible encirclement by American commercialism”55

When America enters the picture, Sweden suddenly takes the victim’s role. America becomes the

symbol of evil; its commercial and decadent culture becomes a threat to Sweden, which as a little

country shares this fate with the 3rd world countries.56 The important thing is the shift in Sweden’s

position on the North-South axis in the semantic field: Sweden by itself an imperialist agent of

northern monopoly capital, in comparison with the USA, it became the victim of the same forces.

America also symbolized the decadence of the North as opposed to the pure, revolutionary virtues

of the South, especially in contrast to the picture of China. This reflected a curios Puritanism on the

Swedish left that did hardly exist in Denmark. As opposed to the Danish left wing, where sexual

liberation was a big theme and where most meetings included a few rounds of beer, Swedes were

stressing the virtue of staying sober and showed a remarkable moralist attitude in discussions about

sex and pornography. Kim Salomon has a discussion about this phenomenon in his book about the

Vietnam movement. He makes an interesting connection between the communist practise of self-

criticism (which is strong in Maoism) and the sense of guilt typical of the puritan roots of Swedish

Christianity.57 Alcohol-consumption was heavily criticised within the movement: "We should

always stay completely sober … if you support the Vietnamese people, you support it all the

time".58 The attitude towards sexual issued showed the same tendencies: While the Danish new left

journal Politisk Revy printed hard-core pornography, its Swedish counterpart Tidsignal printed

articles about evil managers, who made their secretaries pregnant. America and American culture

was impure; it "promoted sex and violence"59, and countries where American investments were

made became infected with its impurity. This image of America exists already in the 1950s, but

with the rise of Maoism and the Vietnam war, it grows stronger and gets enhanced by its counter-

image of the puritan, 3rd world revolutionary:

"We quote these stories about soldiers, who with pure hearts sing revolutionary songs and

abstain from infectious luxury. This tells us something about China. But the laugh of the West 55 Clarté 4/1965, p. 256 I will return to anti-Americanism on the domestic level in the June paper.57 Salomon (1996), Rebeller i takt med tiden, p. 24658 Ibid. p. 24759 Clarté 1/1966, p. 8

22

tells something about us. My Christian revivalist [väckelsestroende] great-grandparents would

not have been able to understand, why the Swedish readers are expected to laugh. Puritanism

is closely related to the traditions of the country and the needs of the city".60

Again Sweden has a double position on the North-South axis; it is a country of the North, but

similar to the South. It has been infected with American culture, but has the traditions of a pure,

popular culture like that of Chinese revolutionaries.

The North-South axis also plays a role in the Danish debate, but as described above, it had to share

the space with the more dominant discussions about East and West. There was a great interest in

China, and a much similar travel-literature emerged at the same time, as it did in Sweden. But very

few people actually became Maoists themselves. In many ways, the themes related to North and

South where the same in the two countries, but the interpretations were slightly different. Because

of the ever-present East-West conflict and the NATO-question, much of the criticism of the colonial

powers in the 1950s and early 1960s (France in Algeria, Belgium in Congo) repeats the 'bad

company for Denmark' theme of the NATO debate:

“Denmark is a democratic country without colonies. It just has the bad luck to be in

association with the old colonial powers of Western Europe. We have until now both in

Congo and Algeria been tied to their egoistic politic and its bad results. This attitude has now

become completely untenable because it gives a terrible responsibility for the crimes of others

and binds our country to a lost case”61

The first priority for Denmark should be to leave NATO and become neutral, so that the good

country would leave the company of evil colonial powers and international finance capital. As

opposed to the Swedish debate, Denmark never takes the role of capitalist it self. This could be

explained by the economic structure of the two countries: Denmark is and was traditionally

dominated by agriculture and small businesses. There are very few companies that fit the image of

big capitalism. And those engaged in the 3rd world were mostly shipping companies, that don't make

direct investments. It is very hard to make an interesting story about some contract between for

example South Africa and a small Danish company, which no one has ever heard of. Big companies

like Volvo or Saab make much easier targets, and their investments are much more visible. A Volvo

factory in South Africa makes a considerably better story than a new trade route from Bangkok to

Tokyo. Also, the rhetoric against domestic 'monopoly capital' had a much stronger tradition in the

60 Jan Myrdal "Puritanism och revolution", Ord och Bild 5/1966, p. 467. 61 SF 24/2 1961, p. 3

23

SKP than in any Danish party. Carl-Henric Hermansson, who apart from being leader of SKP from

1964 also had ties with Clarté and wrote articles in Tidsignal, had earlier been assigned to the task

of mapping Swedish monopolies to show how a few companies and banks controlled the

economy.62 In this way, focus was already on the big Swedish companies; it could easily be

incorporated in the North-South debate. The term 'monopoly capital' in Denmark was commonly

used in connection with foreign companies, and it was to some extend connected with the language

of the losing part in the communist split. It was far less central in the worldview of SF than in that

of DKP. Again, radicalisation and language is heavily dependent on political constellations. The

Sino-Soviet split occurred at the same time, as SF grew into a force to be reckoned with on the

Danish political scene. While the militant Chinese rhetoric about violent confrontation with

capitalism could still appeal to members of the small, marginalized SKP, it did not fit in with SF’s

ambitions about playing a significant role in the parliament. Maoism was denounced as Stalinism

and seen as old-fashioned in comparison with Khrushchev’s reforms in the Soviet Union.

An interesting element of the North-South debate in Denmark is an image of the new countries in

Africa and Asia as the carriers of the future.

“The white man must come to terms with playing role that corresponds with our numbers and

culture. We can no longer act as the master race without the risk of being swept away … I

would say that we can keep it going for the next 10-15 years without using 'the bomb', then

the coloured peoples will have grown strong enough to decide in world politics”63

This could easily be connected with the third position in the East-West perspective: The South –

usually represented by the non-aligned countries – was the new emerging world order, which was

the alternative to the perverse, northern logic of the cold war. The old cultures of Africa and South

East Asia would re-emerge after the colonial oppression and take over the world. Northern

‘civilisation’ had proved itself unworthy to rule the world; colonialism, capitalism and the 2nd world

war had shown its inhuman character. Now, the untainted cultures of the South would take over and

make a brave, new world:

"As a consequence of the white man's bitter conflict between East and West we seek to draw

the Africans over on our side, we seek to tie them to our own ideals … But we forget that

Africa will find its own way. We forget that the African tribal democracy is far older than the

European party-democracy and that the African must find his inspiration in his own past"64

62 The result was two volumes Koncentration och storföretag, which dealt with domestic monopolies, and Monopol och

storfinans about the influence of foreign monopoly capital. There will be a separate chapter on this in the June-paper.63 Dialog 7/59, p. 264 SF 10/8 1962, p. 9. the title of the article is "A new rhythm will penetrate the world"

24

SF strongly associated itself with this image. The party was itself an expression for something new,

a third position between ‘western’ social democracy and ‘eastern’ DKP. Its connections to extra-

parliamentary movements like the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament also gave it an image of a

new, fresh way of doing politics, in contrast to the old parties and their parliamentary intrigues.

Combining the position of being ‘third’ with the attraction of being ‘new’ provided SF with a

cultural capital to establish a powerful position in the field. The ‘profit’ from the capital was paid

out in votes and access to independent media like Frit Danmark and Politisk Revy, and connections

or alliances in institutions like the folk high school [the folk high school is a powerful institution, its

relationship with the left must be described in more detail some place]. Unlike the Swedish Maoists,

SF did not re-invest their capital in strong fortified positions, but rather in broad alliances – in 1966

even as parliamentary support for the social democratic government. Alliances of course requires

compromises that in time will undermine the independent, ‘Third position’, which is exactly what

happened in the second half of the 1960s, when the party split over the cooperation with the social

democrats. But in the first half of the 1960s, it was all profit and no losses.

Again, Denmark is portrayed as the good country that washes its hands when faced with crime and

injustice. Its place is not with its European neighbours, but with the new and innocent countries,

with which it has more in common.

Summary

The concept of nation seems to be heavily dependent on the political position of the nation itself as

well as the position of those who use it.

In Denmark, NATO and the conflict between East and West plays by far the dominant role, when it

comes to defining the country and placing it in a global context. SF inherits picture of NATO from

the DKP, which shows the West as the real threat towards Denmark. The alliance is bad company

for an innocent country, which natural position is the neutral one. With decolonisation and the

emergence of a non-aligned 'third', SF build out the position by identifying with the new countries.

DKP did not have this option, since it would be to take sides with the non-aligned countries against

the Soviet bloc. The third, innocent position mirrors SF's position in the field, were it establishes a

dominant position by investing the cultural capital of being new and free from both the

undemocratic Soviet Union and the aggressive, colonialist West. Neither the semantic nor the

political field are independently structured, they influence and support each other.

25

Sweden's neutral position prevents the 'bad company'-theme from dominating the semantic field.

Instead, the field remains oscillating between Sweden as victim and executioner [#check language].

In the relation Sweden - 3rd world, Sweden and its big companies exploit the South, it supports

oppressive governments and through that the oppression of the global proletariat. In the relation

USA - 3rd world, Sweden it itself oppressed by inferior, American mass culture and shares this fate

with the South.

The Swedish left was much more loosely organised than the Danish one. SKP modernists managed

to reform the party in a slow manner that gradually distanced the party from the Soviet Union. It left

no space open for a third position. To do that, it had to remain broad and allow its members to

organise themselves in smaller groups in fractions both inside and outside the party. The concept of

the nation within these groups where tied closely to the struggles for power and resources: When

Maoists won the battle over Clarté, the North-South axis was accentuated even more.

The language and ideology of both independent intellectuals, political parties and extra-

parliamentary organisations was just as much a mixed product of geographic, economic and

political structures as it was the outcome of conscious moral and intellectual reflections. The left did

not present a coherent critique of modern society or capitalism. As in other political fields, its ideas

developed continuously and incoherently with the shifts of power inside the field and the changes in

the world around it.

List of abbreviations:

CCP - Chinese Communist Party

CPSU - Communist Party of the Soviet Union

DKP - Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti (Danish Communist Party)

PCF - Parti Communiste Français

PCI- Partito Comunista Italiano

SF - Socialistisk Folkeparti (Socialist Peoples Party)

SKP - Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti (Swedish Communist Party)

26